Spinozas Ethics: Book IV and V

Independent Study | Allen J. Gurfel

In previous papers I outlined the basics of Spinozas metaphysical system. I

explained his substance monism and showed how it derives, through the use of Reason
alone, from fundamental postulates, definitions, and axioms. We recall that for Spinoza
there is but one substance, God, or Nature. The essence of God, or Nature is expressed
through infinite attributes in infinite modes, or modificationsthe modes flow from
Gods power and necessary nature in a determined and interconnected causal order in the
infinite intellect, paralleled isomorphically across the attributes of Thought and Extension
(and others1). In my last paper, I considered adequate ideas, knowledge, and sources of
doubt and falsity. I outlined the psychology Spinoza builds up on the ground of his
metaphysics and epistemology. I ended that paper with a sly step toward a discussion of
Spinoza ethics. That first step was Spinozas identification of strength of character as the
root of active human agency. We recall that strength of character has two elements: one,
courage (or, tenacity) is the desire whereby each [person] strives, from the dictates of
reason alone, to preserve his being; two, nobility is the desire whereby each [person]
strives, from the dictates of reason alone, to aid other persons and join them to him as
friends. We are now tasked with an explication of Spinozas ethicshow does an ethics
arise from this metaphysical, epistemological worldview? We can already see some of
the obstacles and challenges ahead: If the world is determined, how can the will be free?
Isnt a free will a prerequisite for ethical action? Isnt an ethics grounded in self1

Some commentators, most prominently Jonathan Bennett, have held that Spinoza only posits
two attributes. They argue that Spinozas use of infinite means the more limited all possible,
and that all possible attributes are exhausted by Thought and Extension. This might be supported
by and support the reading I offered, in my first paper, of attributes as subjective features of our
perception.

preservation fundamentally egoistic, Hobbbesian? Is a notion of the Good rooted in

striving sufficiently morally robust? Let us begin our final foray into the remarkable
philosophy of the Ethics and discover Spinozas own answers in Books IV and V.
Book IV: OF HUMAN BONDAGE, OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMTIONS
Preface
The Preface opens with a definition and a declaration. Bondage is defined as
mans lack of power to control and check the emotions. For a man at the mercy of his
emotions is not his own master but is subject to fortune, in whose power he so lies that he
is often compelled, although he sees the better course, to pursue the worse. Spinoza
aims, in Book IV, to demonstrate why this is so and to say what is good and what is
bad in emotions.
Later in the Preface Spinoza restates his goal: we desire to form the idea of a
man which we may look to as a model of human nature. Spinoza offers his own
definition of the terms good and bad. The good is that which we certainly know to
be the means for our approaching nearer to the model of human nature that we set before
ourselves (EIVdef1). The bad is that which we certainly know prevents us from
reproducing the said model (def2). Nothing is absolutely good or bad. The goodness and
badness of a thing, emotion, or action consists in the role it plays in bringing us nearer or
farther, respectively, to the model of human nature. Needless to say, this model will see
man free from bondage, his own master.
Propositions 1 18
Here Spinoza aims to show why, although we may see the better course, we
pursue the worse.

Insofar as we are but one mode of nature situated determinedly in, and affected
by, a web of infinite modes (which are, from our perspective, external causes), we are
passive. Our own power of striving is limited and surpassed by the power of external
causes. This follows from the only axiom presented in EIV: There is in Nature no
individual thing that is not surpassed in strength and power by some other thing.
Whatsoever thing there is, there is another more powerful by which the said thing can be
destroyed. Any person that is part of Nature necessarily undergoes changes such that are
determined externally, and of which he is not the adequate cause, for to assume the
opposite leads to an absurd assertion that man, in his own nature, exists necessarily.
Hence it follows that man is necessarily always subject to passive emotions, and that he
follows the common order of Nature, and obeys it, an accommodates himself to it as far
as the nature of things demands (EIVP4c). But, importantly, the power of a passive
emotion to persist in us is related not to our own power whereby we endeavor to
persist; rather, it is related to the power of external causes compared with our own
power (EIVP5p). The power of a passive emotion can thus overcome our own powers
and thereby persist, taking root in us. If we are assailed by an external force we will be
affected and determined by it unless there exists as well a countervailing, contrary force
capable of matching and subduing assailant force. Spinoza reaches this conclusion in
Pr.7: An emotion cannot be checked or destroyed except by a contrary emotion which is
stronger than the emotion which is to be checked.
We can reach the same conclusion perhaps more directly by considering
Spinozas physics, presented previously. The body is a conglomeration of sub-bodies that
stand in stable relations of motion and rest. Insofar as we consider a body, in itself, in

motion, it will continue in motion; similarly, insofar as we consider it at rest it will

remain at rest. An external force that affects the body, or some part of it, must be
sufficient to challenge the force involved in the bodys own momentum of selfpreservation. When it succeeds in this challenge, the force instates a new affection of the
body. This new state of affection will persist on its own momentum up until some other
force either neutralizes the effect of the previous or instates a new affection of the body.
In the latter case, the original effect may persist in an indirect sense. This is because the
new affection is a function of both the present force and the previous affection of the
body, which was at that previous point externally affected by the old force. Spinoza may
be insisting on a contrary (and not merely different) force for this reason: only a
contrary force can neutralize, as opposed to merely alter, the affection brought about by
the initial external force.
In Pr.8 Spinoza claims that knowledge of good and evil is just the emotion of joy
or sadness insofar as we are consciously aware of it. Spinozas argument for this claim
features three steps. First, the definitions of good and bad, offered in the Preface and
definitions, are restated in relation to power: the good is that which increases our powers
of action; the bad is that which decreases those powers. Second, these increases and
decreases are joy and sadness. Thus when we experience joy we are experiencing an
increase in power, which is identical to experiencing the good. Third, this experience is,
fundamentally, one experience, simply conceived in several different ways. The
experience of joy and sadness is identical to conscious knowledge of the good and bad. 2

The objection that an emotion, a feeling, is not an article of knowledge, i.e. an affirmable or
deniable proposition, can be answered with a reminder that Spinoza acknowledges no separate
Cartesian-esque faculty of an affirming, judging will.

It is only insofar as knowledge of the good and evil is an emotion, and not
because it is true, that it can check other emotions (Pr.14). Spinoza provides an
illustration in Pr.1, which is cited in the proof of Pr.14. Consider the experience of
fearing an impending and imminent evil. I fear, for example, the tidal wave headed for
my shore. That fear will vanish and turn to relief when I hear from a credible source that
the wave has broken dozens of miles at sea. But, importantly, this will be the case
regardless of whether the report I hear is, in fact, true or false. The relieved affection was
brought about not by the truth of the report but by the change its positive content
produced in me, an individual disposed to take credible sources at their word. It is thus
my beliefs that explain my emotions and not the facticity of those beliefs. I take this as an
obvious point. For example, so long as I believe my husband loves me and is faithful to
mean inference Ive made based on his behavior and other previous experience of my
ownI will be happy, regardless of whether or not he is in fact loving and faithful.
Desire arises from knowledge of good and evil since such knowledge discloses
(correctly) what things are attractive and what things are repulsive. The strength of this
desire is proportionate to the strength of the emotion from which it arises. But this
desire can be obliterated by other desires arising from the passive emotion by which we
are assailed. These desires are also proportionate to the intensity of the emotions from
which they arise. These latter desires may be stronger than the former, and are thereby
capable of checking them. In Propositions 16 and 17 Spinozas adduces and explicates
two distinct cases of such overpowering external determination. Desires, arising from
knowledge of good and evil, regarding the future are often trumped by externally
generated desires for things in the present. This is so because our emotions toward things

distant from us in time and space are feebler than emotions toward something present.
Our emotions are tempered by the negation of that remote object, with respect to its
existence, by its absence among those things immediately present. Similarly, as far as our
true knowledge concerns contingent things, it can the more easily be checked by desire
for present things. This is so because contingent things are by definition (EIVdef3)
considered only in their essence and not as actually existing. We have, it appears on
Spinozas picture, a predilection for the present.
Desire arising from pleasure is, other things equal, stronger than desire arising
from pain (EIVP18). Desire arising from pleasure is buoyed by the positive emotion of
pleasure, whereas desire arising from pain is diminished by the very emotion of pain and
the decrease in power it indicates.
At this point Spinoza takes it that he has achieved his first aim for Book IV; that
is, he has shown why one may see the better course and approve it but pursue the
worse course. As a result of external determination our desire may become channeled 1)
toward what we misperceive as serving our greatest good, or 2) toward what we may
know not to be best but which we want anyway because the force of this desire exceeds
the force of the desire arising from true knowledge.
Propositions 19 - 73
Due to its length, I restrict myself to a summary of only Spinozas main ideas in
this portion of EIV. Ive relied on the prefatory remarks made in the Scholium to Pr.18
and on Spinozas own recapitulation of his points in the Appendix to EIV to identify
those Spinoza sees as most crucial.

In the Scholium to Pr.18 Spinoza lays out the agenda for the remainder of EIV.
He asserts that reason itself demands that every man should love himself, should seek
his own advantage (I mean his real advantage), should aim at whatever really leads a man
toward greater perfection, and, to sum it all up, that each man, as far as in him lies,
should endeavor to preserve his own being. Virtue, he claims, is action from the laws
of ones own nature. The basis of virtue is therefore the very conatus to preserve
ones own being, and happiness consists in ones being able to preserve his own
being. Spinoza here reaches an essentially Platonic conclusion that virtue should be
sought for its own sake, that there is nothing preferable to it for the sake of which it
should be sought. Spinoza preempts the obvious objection that the seeking of selfadvantage cannot lead to virtue, but only to impiety. First, Spinoza will not admit the
actions and behaviors arising from a misguided quest for self-advantage. Second, Spinoza
essentially argues that we are social creatures who simply cannot ever bring it about that
we should need nothing outside ourselves to preserve our own being. On the contrary,
there are many things outside ourselves which are advantageous to us and ought
therefore to be sought. The most excellent of these things are those that are in complete
harmony with our own naturethat is, nothing is more advantageous to man than
man. It is most conducive, Spinoza claims, to our self-preservation that we live in a
harmonious community. Therefore, he who acts for self-preservation in accordance with
reason will seek nothing for [himself] that [he] would not desire for the rest of mankind;
and so [is] just, faithful, and honorablei.e. he is not impious or cruel, but instead
instantiates those qualities and behaviors we associate with virtue.

The Appendix highlights several critically upshots of the argument spanning from
Pr. 19 to 73.
First, it is our highest good, greatest happiness, and utmost blessedness to perfect
our intellect. This perfection amounts to nothing other than intuitive knowledge of God.
The attainment of this highest of goals is identical to ones achievement of an adequate
conception of himself and of all things that can fall within the scope of his
understanding. Adequate understanding enables us to dispel confusion and false beliefs
with regard to what truly increases our powers of acting or, what is the same, our ability
to persist in our being. Thus, since what increases the bodys powers is that which aids it
in being maximally disposed to be affected and to affect in multitudinous ways in
accordance with the potential of its form (i.e. the unique, stable relations of motion and
rest of its components), the minds ability to think and apply reason is promoted and, in
fact, constituted by an increase in adequate ideas. Those desires and actions that arise
from our own natureinsofar as it is considered, under the attribute of Thought, as a
mind composed of adequate ideaswill therefore be good, for they will increase power
and produce joy.
But one and the same action can arise from either active emotions, grounded in
knowledge, or from passive emotions. For example, I may pay taxes because I clearly
understand that the maintenance of a civil condition is in my interest. Alternatively, I may
pay taxes simply out of fear that the state will punish me if I fail to do so. This brings us
to the next upshot.
Second, it serves our highest good to establish close relationships and to bind
[our]selves together with such ties as may most effectively unite [us] into one body, and,

as an absolute rule, to act in such a way as serves to strengthen friendship. In uniting in

this way we become members of a body greater and stronger than ourselves and thereby,
in promoting its common good, we advance our own powers of self-preservation. This is
immediately apparent when we consider that the variety of external things needed for the
preservation of our bodies, let alone for its flourishing, is a variety any single man alone
is hard-pressed to produce for himself.
Third, right and power are coextensive. If we are capable of removing what
constitutes a hindrance to our power, we have the right to do so. Similarly, what we
deem good, that is, advantageous for preserving our being and enjoying a rational life, it
is permissible for us to take for our use and to use it as we please. However, since the
multitude are more often than not blind to their own self-interests, they will find
themselves in contrary opposition one to another. Spinoza paints a Hobbesian picture of
man in the state of nature. It becomes obvious that the establishment of a state is in the
interest of all. The state is a body in itself and hence has the right to do what is necessary
for its preservation, i.e. it has a right to exercise control over its citizens. Given that the
majority of its citizens do not live in accordance with reason, the state must implement a
system of rewards and punishments in order to affect citizens prudential calculuse.g.
I think it would best for me to murder my neighbor and take his wife as my mistress, but
I know I will be severely punished should I do so, so I will not. The unwise man thus
obeys the laws of the state out of fear; still, the consequence is beneficial, for the action
he considered to undertake would have failed to genuinely serve his good and even more
certainly failed to serve anyone elses goods besides.

Finally, Spinoza comes to a very Stoic conclusion. But human power is very
limited and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, and so we do not have
absolute power to adapt to our purposes things external to us. However, we shall patiently
bear whatever happens to us that is contrary to what is required by consideration of our
own advantage, if we are conscious that we have done our duty and that our power was
not extensive enough for us to have avoided the said things, and that we are a part of the
whole of Nature whose order we follow. In other words, we will do what is in our power
and resign ourselves to all else that Gods infinite power has determined to be the case. In
this resignation, moreover, will be a certain contentment since, insofar as we have true
and adequate understanding, we can not desire anything but what is necessary. Even in
our resignation, the better part of us will find itself in harmony with the order of the
whole of nature. Thus the strong-minded man hates nobody, is angry with nobody,
envies nobody, is indignant with nobody, despises nobody, and is in no way prone to
pride. He returns hatred with love, since in being guided by reason he aims for the good
of all. He remains aware that whatever he thinks of as injurious or bad, impious,
horrible, unjust and base arises from his [own] conceiving things in a disturbed,
fragmented, and confused way, i.e. inadequately. He therefore aims to remove obstacles
to true knowledge, such as anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions He
endeavors, as far as he can, to do well and to be glad (EIVP73s).
Book V: OF THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT, OR OF HUMAN FREEDOM
My review of the big ideas so far
In his incredible philosophy Spinoza claims that we, human beings, can not only
know God, but that we are, ourselves, manifestations of Gods infinite power. If we are

capable of such heights, what a tragedy it is if we fall far short. But how can
manifestations of Gods infinite power become so confused as we are? How can we
become so mired in superstitions, religions, and ideologies? Spinoza sets up his entire
metaphysical psychology in order to diagnose this condition of ignorance. He ties our
present emotional states, quite plausibly, to our present beliefs. These beliefs, however,
are typically muddled and confused. Spinoza asks, Why? He discovers the problem: we
are externally determined by other objects. This external disturbance affects us and is the
source of our belief that the outer object exists. However, the representation we create of
the object is not direct. Rather, the representation is a function of the nature of us and the
nature of the object. These sorts of impressions are made on us repeatedly by the external
world. We group and categorize and associate these impressions according to certain
psychological laws. In doing so, we compound our errors. We create and multiply
inadequate ideas. The conception of the world we deduce from our interactions with
external objects is erroneous. Of course, when we act on erroneous beliefs, we fail in our
actions because we are drawn to the wrong ends. We decrease our own power to act. We
perpetuate and reinforce our ignorance.
The remedy against [passive, distorting] emotions is Reason. Spinoza asks us to
divorce ourselves from our current muddled and imperfect understanding of everything.
He aims to show us that our most fundamental metaphysical conceptions are wrong. He
proposes a reconstruction from scratch. Starting with definitions and axioms he erects a
rational, metaphysical/ psychological schematic meant to adequately reveal the
phenomenal world. If we fail to see the undeniable, certain truth of Spinozas picture,
then he gives us the diagnosis: our clear vision has been corrupted by a certain

disfigurement of our bodies and minds caused by our history of being affected by
external objects. We have interpreted our finite experiences according to psychological
laws which produce, in the absence of reason, inadequate beliefs and irrational
worldviews. If we subdue our passions and cultivate reason, the clearer and more certain
will Spinozas metaphysical schematic become; that is, its truth will become apparent.
With such true knowledge will come happiness, joy, and clarity, and an absence of anger,
envy, and hate.
There are parallels between these ideas and Buddhist philosophy. For example,
Buddhist compassion is the consequence of knowledge. The Buddha knows that the
suffering that people endure and the suffering they inflict on others are rooted in their
misperceptions of ultimate, unitary reality. We desire happiness, but, because we do not
know better, we endlessly cling to an impermanent, illusory world, and thereby
perpetuate, through our attachments and desires, the cycle of suffering, samsara. The
Buddhas response to certain knowledge of our condition is boundless compassion. This
is implicit in Spinoza. Spinozas wise man knows that every individual who falls short
was predetermined to do so not just by his or her own muddled perceptions but also by
the determined unfolding of all things from the necessity and infinite power of God.
Spinozas wise man wants for others what he wants for himself, and what can this be but
clear and adequate understanding? That is the highest and only intrinsic good at which
the wise man aims. It may be objected that the wise man is motivated by self-interest
whereas the Buddha is not. But it makes no sense to say this of the Buddha because he is
free from the illusion of separateness. His enlightenment and the enlightenment of all
sentient beings are one and identical. Similarly, Spinozas wise man sees that his

maximally clear vision requires a community. The greatest possible community consists
of all humanity free of bondagea world of joy, free from hatred, anger, and envy. The
wise man thus has an interest in all individuals. This interest is compassion.3 For both the
Buddha and the wise man, the cessation of error is the entry to knowledge of ultimate
reality. The Buddha perceives the unity of all things upon the cessation of desire,
nirvana. Spinozas wise man too perceives something extraordinary. He comes to know
the structure of reality as necessarily existing and absolutely free of contingency. The
ideas of the perfectly wise mans mind are nothing but the ideas of Spinozas Ethics,
known clearly and distinctly. The ideas form a closed, self-grounding, self-referencing
loop. This closed, rational schematic is the parallel in Thought of the stable, selfperpetuating relations of motion and rest of bodies in Extension. This closed system is
the pure form of the wise, rational mancircular and self-perpetuating. In total isolation
it would go on forever, perfectly expressing the essence and power of the law-governed
substance in which it inheres, God. In the midst of countless, determinate external causes,
however, the loop is pried open and persists in duration, where it becomes increasingly
disarrayed, as it is affected by the world it seeks to negotiate, until it is destroyed by
external forces. No actually-existing person can perfectly embody in duration a pure
essence, for all existing persons are necessarily externally affected to some extent,
involved in chains of cause and effect. The wise man can approach adequate knowledge
through Reason, through the purgation of the sources of falsity, but he comes to face a

I should admit that this equivocation is a leap. Spinoza sees compassion as akin to pity and as
opposite to envy. It is a passive emotion insofar as it has as its object an external thing. I would
suggest, however, that an active compassion, grounded in the love of God and the knowledge that
all things are God, is possible. This boundless compassion is a compliment to boundless love, and
just as the love of God is not open to the criticisms Spinoza levels against mundane love,
boundless compassion is immune to such criticisms as well.

gap. Love of God and knowledge of the essence of all particular things requires of man a
leap of intuition. Intuitive knowledge of God therefore exceeds rational understanding in
precisely the way Spinoza explains. Intuitive knowledge of God is a certain and
immediate grasp of the ineffablehence the necessary intuitionunity of all things and
of the essence and power of God as it is manifest in all things. This intuitive leap is
nothing less than the wholesale transmogrification of the mind and its structure whereby
the external, phenomenal world is disclosed adequately in reason and in immediate
experience, and whereby Spinozas geometrical proof is immediately and in its entirety
grasped, not just as a systematic deductive structure, but as the fundamental and plainly
apparent truth of all existence.
Book V
Buddhism is both doctrine and practice. As the saying goes, an ounce of practice
is worth more than a ton of theory. It is one thing to intellectually entertain the idea of
the truth of suffering and of the path to liberation; it is another to perceive it as immediate
truth and to feel boundless compassion, even toward those who harm us. Buddhists thus
prescribe a number of practices aimed at the cultivation of the pure consciousness,
unencumbered by attachment to illusions. The Ethics is Spinozas doctrine; Book V lays
out the practice: I pass on finally to that part of the Ethics which concerns the method or
way leading to freedom (EVPref).
Preface
Here, Spinoza states his aims for EV. The first of these is quoted above. The
second aim is a deduction all that concerns the blessedness of the mind. The first aim is
taken up in Propositions 1 through 20; the second is taken up in Propositions 21 through

42. The bulk of the Preface, however, is devoted to a criticism of Descartes ad hoc
theory concerning the will and the interaction of the body and soul via that apparently
magical walnut in the brain, the pineal gland. This critique is so familiar that I omit its
summary.
Propositions 1 20
We already know that the arrangement of affections of the bodythat is, the
images of thingsis parallel to, or isomorphic with, the arrangement of affections
thoughts and ideasof the mind. I have repeated this many times and Spinoza now
states it unequivocally in EVP1. If we divorce from an emotion the thought of its external
cause and unite it instead with other thoughts, then love or hatred toward the external
cause, and also vacillations, that arise from these emotions will be destroyed (EVP2).
Recall that love and hate are nothing but pleasure and pain, respectively, conjoined with
the idea of an external object. When the external object is removed from the equation
love and hate cease.4
A passive emotion ceases to be passive as soon as we form a clear and distinct
idea of it (EVP3). Importantly, there are no affections of the body/mind of which we
cannot form a clear and distinct idea. Spinoza tells us that we all have the power to
clearly and distinctly understand ourselves and our emotions at least in part and thereby
to reduce our passivity. The big question, then, is: How do we form clear and distinct
ideas of emotions? How do we detach an emotion from the thought of an external
cause and join it to true [adequate] thoughts? An analogy to Freud is illuminating. Our

This seems to leave us with free-floating pleasure or pain, which are presumably the remainder
emotions which we can, according to Pr.2, join to other thoughts. We should expect these
other thoughts to be adequate, i.e. internally, not externally, determinedotherwise this whole
operation is nothing but a pointless replacement of hate for external-X with hate for external-Y.

free-floating desire becomes channeled toward certain cathectedor symbolically,

libidinally investedobjects. Our psychic economythe structure in which the cathected
constellation ultimately resideshas been formed by a long history of external forces
starting from birth. Thus, although all organisms aim toward pleasure and the dissipation
of anxiety, they may come to psychic impasses as a result of their external determination.
In other words, interactions with the external world determine the flows of libidinal
energy within the very psyche those interactions play a role in shaping. There is no
guarantee that those flows wont enter cul-de-sacs, pool in depressions, get tied up in
loops, collide with one another, or short-circuit. Spinozas claim is essentially that this
disastrous disorganization of channels is the result of a deformation of our essential form
by external forces and that the remedy is the application of reason. But, again, what is
the technique by which we extricate, or liberate, our energy from these external objects?
I suggest that an answer can be found in analogy to both Buddhism and
psychoanalysis. Before Buddhist mindfulness becomes a natural state of being it takes
practice. This practice consists in bringing our attention to our own bodies and minds. We
observe the emotion as neutral outsiders and watch it unfold like a wave across the deep
stillness of the ocean. By this mere act of stepping back the emotion is seen as nothing
more than a transient affection of our minds, i.e. it is seen for what it really is. The
psychoanalytic treatment also aims at this sort of seeing-it-as-it-is. Here we must recall
Spinozas definition of knowledge as knowledge of causes. The psychoanalyst assists the
patient in discovering the root causes of his own maladaptive symptom. Armed with
Spinozas metaphysical psychology, an individual can obtain a clear and distinct

conception of his emotions. Moreover, the moment he does so, the passive emotions
confused ideasbecome active emotionsadequate ideas.
Spinoza puts forth several new psychological principles in the following
Propositions.
First, our emotion toward a thing imagined in itselfthat is, a thing not
considered as necessary, possible, or contingentwill be, all else equal, the greatest
of all emotions (EVP5). The reason for this is straightforward: considered in itself the
object appears the sole cause of our emotion, whereas conceived of as necessary the
whole order of things is admitted as a cause of our emotion. In other words, considered in
itself, the object bears the whole weight of the emotion. This is true to experiencefor
example, we praise a man wholeheartedly or hate him to the utmost until we recognize
the conditions that made him who he is. A sentimental example: we hate the thief until
we learn that he must steal to feed his family.
Second, and this follows from the previous principle, when the mind perceives
all things as governed from necessity it gains power over emotions, becoming less
passive in respect of them (EVP6). For example, when I admit the value-neutral,
predetermined necessity of some harm to me, then I am not quick to be taken over by
self-righteous angere.g. I do not anger at the hungry man who steals bread.
Third, all else equal, emotions originating in reason are more powerful than those
related to objects we presently regard as absent. As we know, we have a bias toward the
present. All emotions arising from adequate ideas are present because those ideas are
gleamed from the common properties of things which we regard as always present
(EVP7d).

Fourth, the greater the number of simultaneous causes of an emotion the greater
the emotion. Again, this is true to experience: I am sad when my cat dies; I am sadder
when my cat dies, Im fired from work, and I lose my car. Fifth, relatedly, when we are a
affected by an emotion of a certain magnitude, we are less harmed by it when it has
numerous, separate causes than we are when the cause is singular or few. This is so
because the monolithic effect of a great emotion with a single causewhich keeps the
mind engrossed in the contemplation of only one or a few objectsdiminishes the
minds ability to think to a greater extent (than many causes would) since the minds
ability to think is a function of its ability to be affected in multitudinous ways.
Fifth, in the absence of assailant emotions contrary to our naturethat is, those
emotions that hinder understandingwe are capable of arranging and associating the
affections of the body according to the order of the intellect (EVP10). Free from such
negative, externally-determined affections, the intellect will set about unhindered in its
perception of adequate ideas and its deduction of further, also adequate ideas. This
blossoming of a rational structure within the network of ideas that is the mind will
progressively rearrange and reorganize all the affections of the mind. It will render
previously confused perceptions adequate. It will obliterate, if permitted to develop far
enough, erroneous beliefs, such as the belief from the common order of nature that
things are contingent. In my view, this blossoming is conatus, and the end-goal toward
which it tends is the erection of a closed, rational, metaphysical system, i.e. Spinozas
system, that will, once grasped intuitively and clearly and distinctly, adequately reveal
the world as well as the essence of God and of all particular things.

Staying with P10, Spinoza considers its upshots in the Scholium. Having rightly
arranged our affections we will not be easily affected by bad emotions. This is so due
to the greater force required to check emotions originating from adequate ideas arranged
according to the intellects order. But insofar as we do not have perfect knowledge of our
emotions, we must adopt a best course. We must conceive a right method of living, or
fixed rules of life, and to commit them to memory and continually apply them to
particular situations that are frequently encountered in life, so that our casual thinking is
thoroughly permeated by them and they are always ready to hand. Now this is a genuine
prescription, an applicable technique. Again we find a parallel to Buddhism. Long before
enlightenment, the novice memorizes The Four Truths, The Noble Eightfold Path, and
countless Sutras. He consciously returns to and applies this knowledge as he engages in
life. Similarly, Spinoza advises us to remind ourselves, until they become second nature,
of the truths he presents as we encounter life. Just as the novice Buddhist must put his
faith in the Dharma teachings, so we must take Spinozas promise of eventual freedom if
we follow his advice on faith, at least in part. Just as the novice Buddhist is attracted by
and dimly perceives the sanity and truth of Buddhas teaching but does not yet experience
those teachings as lived truths, so we are attracted to Spinozas philosophy, dimly
perceiving its rationality, but not yet experiencing it as lived truth. Practice will bridge
the gap. Return hatred with love. Remember that like all things, all men act from
necessity. Focus on the good in all things so as to be determined to act from joy. He who
diligently follows these precepts and practices them will surely within a short space of
time be able to direct his actions for the most part according to reasons behest.

In Proposition 14 Spinoza makes an incredible and crucial claim: The mind can
bring it about that all the affections of the body-i.e. images of things-be related to the idea
of God. This is so because there is no affection of which the mind cannot form a clear
and distinct conception and, therefore, since all things can only and must be conceived
through God, the mind can bring it about that they should all be related to the idea of
God (EVP14d). Hence, insofar as one clearly and distinctly understands himself and his
emotions, to that extent one feels pleasure accompanied by the idea of God, i.e. one loves
Godand the more so the more clearly and distinctly one understands (EVP15). As the
idea of God is associated with all the affections of the body, the love toward God is
bound to hold chief place in the mind (EVP16). This love toward God cannot turn to
hatred, for nobody can hate God (EVP18). It is impossible to hate God because,
insofar as we contemplate God, the idea of whom is adequate and perfect in us, we
are active. Activity, in itself, is an increase in power and, considered as an emotion, is the
emotion of joy. Hatred requires sadness and pain. Therefore, we cannot hate, but only
love, God. Our love for God cannot be tainted with emotions of jealousy or envy.
Rather, as we think more men to be joined to God by this same bond of love, our own
love toward God is the more fostered (EVP20), since, as Spinoza proved in EIV, The
good which every man who pursues virtue aims at for himself he will also desire for the
rest of mankind, and all the more as he acquires a greater knowledge of God (EIVP37).
In the Scholium to P20 Spinoza reiterates the remedies he has introduced in the
preceding 20 propositions. He also consolidates and summarizes the core claims of his
metaphysical psychology: [T]he strength of every emotion is defined by the power of an
external cause as compared with our own power. Now the power of the mind is defined

solely by knowledge, its weakness or passivity solely by the privation of knowledge; that
is, it is measured by the extent to which its ideas are said to be inadequate. Hence it
follows that that mind is most passive whose greatest part is constituted by inadequate
ideas, so that it is characterized more by passivity than by activity. On the other hand,
that mind is most active whose greatest part is constituted by adequate ideas, so that even
if the latter mind contains as many inadequate ideas as the former, it is characterized by
those ideas which are attributed to human virtue rather than by those that point to human
weakness.
He also makes another point reinforcing the analogy to Buddhism. [E]motional
distress and unhappiness, Spinoza writes, have their origin especially in excessive love
toward a thing subject to considerable instability, a thing which we can never completely
possess. Just as Buddha does, Spinoza identifies (excessive) attachment to what is
impermanent as a root cause of suffering: For nobody is disturbed or anxious about any
thing unless he loves it, nor do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, etc. arise except from love
toward things which nobody can truly possess.
Spinoza concludes that he has now completed all that concerns this present life.
It is now time to pass on to those matters that concern the duration of the mind without
respect to the body (EVP20s).
Propositions 21 42: my own developing conception
As I see it, the idea of the essence of the human body which is in God is the
closed geometrical collection of ideas that Spinoza presents: "Logical proofs are the
eyes of the mind (EVP23s). He also believes that Gods idea of the essence of the
human body is eternal. In EVP38 he writes, The essence of the mind consists in

knowledge. Therefore, the greater the number of things the mind knows by the second
and third kinds of knowledge, the greater is the part of it that survives, and consequently
the greater is that part of it that is not touched by emotions contrary to our nature.
Eternity belongs to that portion of our actual minds composed of adequate knowledge.
Spinoza has shown that the mind has no awareness except insofar as it is aware of
the affections of the body. It follows from this that the form in eternity, insofar as it is
complete and perfectthat is, a closed rational systemhas no awareness. It is for this
reason that Spinoza can claim that insofar as the mind conceives the present existence of
its body, to that extent it conceives a duration that can be determined by time, and only to
that extent does it have the power to conceive things in relation to time. In order to
conceive the present existence of its body this body must be externally affected. If the
body is affected it is obviously and necessarily in duration. It is only so long as this
affection animates the pure logical formthat is, the idea of the human mindinto
actual, definite existence and awareness that there is a conscious mind, at all, which can
conceive things in relation to time (EVP29). It is only insofar as the mind expresses
the actual existence of the body that the mind persists in duration. In the absence of a
concrete, determinate position as a mode among infinite other modes, the form, or
essence, of the mind/body is a closed loop of Reason that could know only itself and,
crucially, God. Because this closed rational structurethat is, the form or essence of an
individualperfectly reflects, or manifests, an aspect of Gods necessary essence
namely, his law-governed natureits ideas are necessarily and perfectly adequate,
congruent to those identical ideas in God.

To put it another way: God considered under the attribute of Thought is a lawgoverned web of ideas. The idea of the essence of the human body in God is in God in
the same way that the concept of a triangle is abstractly, yet clearly and distinctly, in
mathematical space, even when there are no concrete triangles or anyone particular
thinking about triangles. The triangle is thoroughly constituted by the essence of the
mathematical space (and its laws) in which it inheres. The triangle is an expression of that
essence, not in its potentially infinite entirety, but only insofar as it constitutes the
triangle. What the mathematical essencewe may even call it an attributelacks is
necessary existence. For this reason, the mathematical space is stable, stationary, formal,
abstract, and lifeless. The mathematical essence might share with Spinozas God its lawgoverned nature, but it utterly lacks his powerthat is, his necessary being, the spark of
existence.
What difference does the spark of necessary existence make? Let us imagine that
there is no concrete, determinate existence yet. All that exists is a static, abstract space,
like the mathematical space (you can imagine it perhaps as a Cartesian plane). The
essence of this space constitutes countless possible formstriangles, the idea of the
essence of the human body, and so on. Now we flip the EXISTENCE switchwhat
happens? Certain of these possible forms, if not all of them, will come into existence.
But, if a) they are all set forward in existence and duration at one and the same moment
and b) theyre dropped into existence in a form that perfectly embodies their static, stable
essence, then it seems one of two things is possible. First, existence will be static,
motionless, and dark. Second, every one of countless modes will be set to action and
motion, but they will never actually interact with one another. Each will strive perfectly

and in synchronicity with all others, never interacting, and never perishing. For example,
just as one completely, internally determined mode moves leftward another completely,
internally determined mode moves into that abdicated space. We would not expect a selfconsistent, non-contradictory, rational essence to manifest in mutually antagonistic
modes, unless there were some reason for such conflict. I would reject the first option. I
do not think Spinoza could hold that the concept of a motionless, static, yet actuallyexisting reality is coherent. It follows that motion is necessarily involved in existence.
This leaves the second option, and a number of questions.
What explains the fact that modes (bodies) push, impress upon, and distort one
another instead of ebbing and flowing in synchronicity, each expressing its striving
perfectly in a world that yields at every turn? Spinoza does not postulate a moment of
Creation, but the question is still instructive. Is the answer that it only appears to us that
existence is not, in fact, unfolding as smoothly as possible? Undoubtedly this is trueall
things are unfolding of necessity. It may also be possible to argue that the alternative is
absurd. Can we find a contradiction in postulating a reality in which all modes unfold
self-containedly? Yes. If we postulate such a reality while holding, as Spinoza does, that
there was no Creation, then we have de facto postulated the existence of a countless
number of eternal, self-contained objects. Without a beginning in time, every mode in
this hypothetical reality will have existed eternally with no cause. This is of course
absurd given all that Spinoza has proven. It would suggest that God is fundamentally
fragmented, since each body, each conglomeration of ideas, would be eternally and
completely separate from all others. Furthermore, without antagonistic interaction,
what would compel these modes into any sort of motion at all? Arguably, the only reality

in which modes unfold in our hypothesized synchronicity is the static, motionless, and
dark reality we rejected, for it is not a reality in which infinite things flow in infinite
ways. It is an absurdity. Gods power is thus expressed through apparently antagonistic
modes, in a world exactly like ours, of necessity.
Above I wrote the following: In the absence of a concrete, determinate position
as one mode among infinite other modes, the form, or essence, of the mind/body is a
closed loop of Reason that could know only itself and, crucially, God. Does the
essence of the body under the form of eternity know God? No, because insofar as it
lacks external affection, i.e. actual existence, it is merely a static possibility, latent in
Gods rational essence. Spinoza explains, it is the nature of reason to conceive things
under a form of eternity [and all possible things are conceived in Gods infinite intellect],
and since it belongs to the nature of mind, too, to conceive the essence of the body under
a form of eternity, and since there belongs to the essence of mind nothing but these two
ways of conceiving, it follows that this power to conceive things under a form of eternity
pertains to the mind only insofar as it conceives the essence of the body under a form of
eternity (EVP29d). This is all to say that, to the extent that our minds are populated with
adequate ideas, our determinate, particular minds approximate the pure form of the mind,
which is eternal. As we increase our adequate knowledge, we increase our amount of
activity, and we increase the part of our minds that is eternal. We are instantiations of a
unique, rational structure which is complex enough to gain adequate knowledge of itself
and of God. To the extent that this structure, in its determinate instantiation, is not
externally affected and thereby confused and distorted, to that extent our minds are
eternal. To that same extent we enjoy the intellectual love of God, which is identical to

the love with which God loves himself not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can
be explicated through the essence of the human mind considered under a form of
eternitythat is, considered as a perfect, adequate, closed loop.
What I have been calling closed loops are the parallels in reason, or Thought, of
conglomerate bodies in Extension whose subparts maintain stable, self-perpetuating
relations. These closed loops, I would suggest, enjoy a sort of privileged ontological
position. They are the only possible particular objects since only self-contained systems
can be considered in themselves without considering anything external. They are perfect
objects. They express Gods nature as law-governed Thought, or Reason. But they do not
express his power. They reveal and express Gods essence only when they are animated
by Gods power and determinedly instantiated as bodies and minds in duration, being
affected and affecting in multitudinous ways within infinite causal chains. When our
foggy-eyed, confused minds subdue the distortion produced by sense perception through
the use of reason, then we express Gods power most fully, at least within our own
bounds, and grasp his essence and the essences of all particular things. The ideas in our
minds become increasingly aligned with eternal ideas in God. That portion of our minds
is therefore eternal.