72
ISAF Campaign
p g Plan
73
74
Strategic Assessment
Situation is serious and the conflict is complex
Resilient and growing insurgency
Lack of confidence by population stemming from weak Government of
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) institutions, corruption, lack of
economic opportunity and insufficient physical protection.
PathwaytoCampaignPlan&Requirements
NATO
Objectives1
Defeat:Talibanledinsurgencynolonger
Defeat
Taliban led insurgency no longer
posesanexistentialthreattoGIRoA
Insurgencyreducedtoalevelwithin
GIRoAcapacity
GIRoA/ANSFcapableofprotecting
sovereigntyfrominsurgentthreat
i
f
i
h
NATO SecGen
tasking to
Conduct Assessment3
Opposing militant
forces no longer
g pose
p
a threat to stability
COMISAF
Initial
Assessment
Overall
Assessment
Of Situation
Situation is serious
Resilient Insurgency
Notes:
p
Strategic
g Political
NATO,, Comprehensive
Military Plan for Afghanistan, 20 April 2009
Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum,
Operational Plan for ISAF (OPLAN 30302
Revision 4), 9 April 2009
SACEUR, Memorandum to JFC-B, 1 July 2009
NATO
Mi i 2
Mission
Plan to Implement
NATO Strategy
Population-centric
counterinsurgency
campaign
Crisis of Confidence
among Afghans and
International Community
Resource
Requirement
Analysis
Prioritize Governance
76
MilitaryAssessmentofSituation
KineticEvents
1000
Poppy
900 Winter Harvest
Ramadan
Poppy
Harvest
Winter
Ramadan Winter
Poppy
Harvest
Ramadan
800
700
600
500
01Jan05 30Sep05
400
300
200
IDF
DF
Sep 09
Jul 09
Aug 09
Jun 09
Apr 09
May 09
Mar 09
Jan 09
Feb 09
Dec 08
Oct 08
Nov 08
Sep 08
Jul 08
IED
Aug 08
Jun 08
Apr 08
May 08
Mar 08
Jan 08
Feb 08
Dec 07
Oct 07
Nov 07
Sep 07
Jul 07
Aug 07
Jun 07
Apr 07
May 07
Mar 07
Jan 07
Feb 07
100
01 Jan 07 30Sep07
01Jan07
30 Sep 07
SAFIRE
Kineticeventsareincreasingatasharprate;up300%since2007and60%since2008.
Talibaninfluenceexpanding;contestingandcontrollingadditionalareas.
TalibanProvincialShadowGovernors:2005 11of34;2007 28of34;2009 33of34.
01Jan09 30Sep09
2006
2005
11 Total
2007
20 Total
2008
28 Total
2009
31 Total
33 Total
77
COMNTM-A
/ CSTC-A
RC(N)
209 Corps
RC(W)
207 Corps
IJC
RC(C)
Capital
Division
ANS
NMCC
RC(E)
201 Corps
203 Corps
RC(S)
205 Corps
Strength
ISAF / Coalition: ~107,000
ANA: ~100.131 Operational: 63.724
ANP: ~96.377 Operational: 89.030
Composition
RC(N): 1 CO, 5 PRTs; 2 ANA BDEs
RC(W): 2 BNs, 4 PRTs; 2 ANA BDEs
RC(S): 4 BDEs(+), 4 PRTs; 4 ANA BDEs
RC(E): 5 BDEs(-), 12 PRTs; 6 ANA BDEs
RC(C): 3 BNs; 2 ANA BNs
RCs are NATO OPCON to IJC
78
Mission Statement
ISAF, in partnership with GIRoA, conducts
population-centric counterinsurgency operations,
enables an expanded and effective ANSF and
supports improved governance and development in
order to protect the Afghan people and provide a
secure environment for sustainable stability.
79
COMISAFIntent
Purpose
AssistGIRoAindefeatingtheinsurgency
ProtecttheAfghanpopulationandseparateinsurgentinfluence
Gainpopularsupportforthegovernment
Allowsustainableprogressandpromotelegitimacy
Preventthereturnoftransnationalterroristsandeliminatepotentialsafehavens
Method
Conducttheoperationinthreestages:A)GaintheInitiative;B)AchieveStrategic
Consolidation;andC)SustainSecurity.
Gaintheinitiativeandstopinsurgentmomentuminthenext1218months
EstablishclosercooperationwiththeInternationalCommunity
AchieveimprovedintegrationandCIVMILoperationalcohesion
Endstate
InsurgencydefeatedtowithinGIRoAscapacity
Legitimategovernanceextendstolocallevels
SocioeconomicprogramsbenefitthemajorityofAfghanpeople
GIRoA,withISAFsupport,iscapableofassumingtheleadforsecurity
80
Campaign Design
Lines of Operation
SECURITY
S
Strategic C
Communicationss / CIV-MIL Operrational Cohesion
n
WAYS
W
Operational Objectives
Tier 1: Kandahar, Helmand, Khowst, Paktia, Paktika;
Tier 2: Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar River Valley,
K i
Kapisa,
W d k Logar,
Wardak,
L
Z b l Uruzgan;
Zabul,
U
Tier 3: Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Jalalabad, and
Kunduz.
Accelerate ANA growth to 134,000 by Fall 2010. BPT
raise new target ceiling of 240,000 for ANA. BPT
raise target strength of ANP to 160,000. Increase
mentors, trainers, partners, funding and GIRoA
participation.
Malign actors are marginalized, illegitimate
governance denied, narcotic profiteering reduced,
foreign fighter networks disrupted, development
project extortion reduced and majority of
population views GIRoA as legitimate.
Ministries and sub-national governance partnered with
civil surge; Afghan reconciliation policy
established; local governance mechanisms allow for
g
RoL and legitimate,
g
responsive,
p
and
reintegration;
accountable governance extended to the population.
GIRoA revenue collection and resource distribution
mechanisms enhanced; infrastructure and road
networks bolster licit economy and increase
employment; incentive structures increase
stability in local communities.
Ends
Phase 3 ends
when the
insurgency is
defeated and
no longer able
to threaten the
survival of
GIRoA,
Afghanistan is
stabilized,
legitimate
governance
extends to
local levels,
socioeconomic
programs
benefit the
majority of
Afghan
people, and
GIRoA, with
ISAF in
support, is
capable of
assuming the
lead for the
provision of
security
security.
MEANS
GIRoA and ANSF
NATO-ISAF, Troop Contributing Nations, UNAMA, Partners
Funding: International Community, Donors, UN, NATO, EU
81
81
CampaignStrategy
NATO
OTAN
ProtectthePopulation.
Prioritizeeffortinhighdensitypopulationareaswhereinsurgentgroupsoperateprimarilywith
disaffectedPashtunpopulations.Reduceciviliancasualties.
EnableAfghanNationalSecurityForces.
Accelerateandexpandindigenoussecurityforcecapacityandcapability.Partnerateveryechelon.
Neutralizemaligninfluence.
Identifyandreportcorruption;forgeresponsibleandaccountablegovernance.
Supportextensionofgovernance.
Gainactivesupportofthepopulationbyempoweringlegitimatesubnationalleaderswith
effectivepopulationsecuritymeasures.
Supportsocioeconomicdevelopment.
Gainactivesupportofthepopulationbycreatingsecurityconditionsthatprovidespacefor
communitybased
community
baseddevelopmentopportunities.Connecteconomiccorridors.
development opportunities Connect economic corridors
82
NATO
OPLAN38302Rev4OperationalDesign
Gain the Initiative
Achieve Strategic
C
Consolidation
lid ti
Sustain Security
y
Stage A
Stage B
Stage C
Security
PROTECT
the Population
3
ENABLE
the ANSF
NEUTRALIZE
Malign Influence
Sta
ability
OTAN
SUPPORT
Extension of Governance
SUPPORT
Socio-Economic Development
12
11
13
10
14
15
3 NEUTRALIZE Malign
Influence
4 SUPPORT Governance
5 SUPPORT Development
Partnered population
security measures stabilize
designated areas
Focused community
development bolsters
popular support for GIRoA
7. Effective IO campaign
implemented
8 Corruption reduced to a
8.
culturally acceptable level
9. Effective border control
established
10. Narco-INS-Criminal nexus
and confluence of Narco-GIRoA
corruption suppressed
83
83
ConceptofOperations
NATO
OTAN
SupportingEffort. Generate
politicalacceptancefor
governanceanddevelopment
commensuratewithsecurity.
ShapingEffort. Denyinsurgent
freedomofmovement;improve
bordersecurityandpreparefor
decisiveoperations.
Key Population Centers
Main Effort
Supporting Effort
Shaping Effort
Economy of Force
ComprehensiveApproach
Regiona
al Strateg
gy
Central
Asia
India
Russia
B ild Trust
Build
T t
Pakistan
D f t Al Qaeda
Defeat
Q d
Defeat Insurgency
Increase ability
to govern and
develop
capacity
i
al
tion cal
a
N liti
Po ffort
E
l
na
o
i
t
rna unity o
e
t
In mm rs t y
co rtne curit
pa d se nce
a
il
bu vern d nt
o
g
an me
op y
vel pacit
e
d ca
Security Zones
OTAN
Expanding Stability
Enhance Cooperation
China
Iran
NATO
hip
s
r
e
ad
e
al L
s
n
o
trie
ti
s
a
i
N
Min
nce
A
a
o
n
ver
GI R
o
al G
n
atio
n
ety
i
c
b
o
Su
il S
v
i
C
le
ta b
n
u
co an
Ac Afgh ers e
d
v
lea onsi
p
e
res to th les
op
pe eeds
n
2014
Afghan population
gains trust and
confidence leading
to suppo
supportt for
o
GIRoA
2009
85
StruggleforthePopulation
MostThreatenedPopulationAreas
p
(Present)
EssentialSecurityInfluence
Essential
Security Influence
(2014)
PreventGIRoAdevelopmentandinfluence
Limitpopulationabilitytochoose
Createtimeandspace
Enablepopulationopportunitytochoose
ElementsofInsurgentInfluence
El
t fI
t I fl
Shadowgovernance
Populationintimidatedand/orcoerced
InsurgentshaveFreedomofMovement
FriendlyFreedomofMovementlimited
F i dl F d
fM
t li it d
Infrastructuredevelopmentdisrupted
Economiccapacitytruncated
ElementsofSecurityInfluence
Elements
of Security Influence
Nationalthrulocalgovernanceimproved
Securityinkeypopulationcenters
Securityconnectedbetweenregions
FriendlyFreedomofMovementassured
Friendly Freedom of Movement assured
Majorinfrastructureprojectsongoing
Economiccorridorsustainable
86
86
Summary
Total: 80
Annual Growth Projections:
2009 25
2010 45 (20 more)
2011 70 (25 more)
2012 80 (10 more)
2013 80
2014 80
The districts in the area outside of the identified focus districts have varying
degrees of threat and security. It is possible that security, governance and
development activities take place. However, weight of effort and prioritzation
should orient on the focus districts.
Selection Criteria:
Density of population
Threatened Population
Nature of threat
Impact to stability
Infrastructure
Governance capacity
Economic potential
Relationship to adjacent
population centers
Relationship to national /
regional economic corridors
87
Risks
GIRoA:
Failure to provide accountable, legitimate and responsive governance.
ANSF:
Lack of capacity due to poor recruiting, retention and high attrition.
Failure to develop operationally effective COIN forces.
International Community:
Failure to effectively unify governance and development efforts.
Lack of flexibility to reconfigure and create strategic effects.
Key Takeaways
Analysis indicates:
indicates:
The insurgency presently has the initiative and the population perceives it.
it
Expansion of the insurgency is outpacing GIRoAs capacity to contain it.
Success requires that we control a significant percentage of the population and
regain the initiative.
Feasible ANSF growth alone cannot contain the insurgency before 2012/2013.
Risk increases over time if force levels are insufficient
Insufficient force levels dont accomplish the mission slower....
they don
dontt accomplish the mission at all.
Additional Coalition Forces are required between 2009-2011 to gain momentum,
buy time for ANSF generation, and overmatch the insurgency.
89
UZB
CHINA
HIG
ALQ
HQN
1100km
TLB
760km
Seaport of debarkation S
Airport of debarkation
ISAF supplies
30%
90
91
2009
HIG
HQN
ALQ
2009
TLB
92
Importance of Pakistan
Triple crisis:
Political instability
Economic crisis
Indigenous Taliban movement
93
Conclusion 1/2
NATO
OTAN
94
Conclusion 2/2
NATO
OTAN
W are also
We
l iin AFG to
t gain
i our own security
it
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
95
Discussion
96
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED
ISAF
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED
ISAF Mission
98
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED
ComprehensiveApproach
Regiona
al Strateg
gy
Central
Asia
India
Enhance Cooperation
China
Iran
Russia
B ild Trust
Build
T t
Pakistan
D f t Al Qaeda
Defeat
Q d
Defeat Insurgency
Increase ability
to govern and
develop
capacity
i
al
tion cal
a
N liti
Po ffort
E
l
na
o
i
t
rna unity o
e
t
In mm rs t y
co rtne curit
pa d se nce
a
il
bu vern d nt
o
g
an me
op y
vel pacit
e
d ca
Expanding Stability
hip
s
r
e
ad
e
al L
s
n
o
trie
ti
s
a
i
N
Min
nce
A
a
o
n
ver
GI R
o
al G
n
atio
n
ety
i
c
b
o
Su
il S
v
i
C
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED
le
ta b
n
u
co an
Ac Afgh ers e
d
v
lea onsi
p
e
res to th les
op
pe eeds
n
Afghan population
gains trust and
confidence leading
to support for
G
GIRoA
99
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED
MILITARY
COMISAF
GIRoA
DCOS STAB
UNAMA & UN
HQ ISAF Staff
St ff
International
Community:
Embassies
Embassies,
Aid Agencies
Dir Dev
Dir Gov
OPERATIONAL COMMANDS
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED
100
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED
DEVELOPMENT
SECURITY
ENDSTATE
GOALS
OBJECTIVES
GOVERNANCE
LONG TERM
MID TERM
MID
Partnership
with
responsive &
responsive&
accountable
GIRoAleaders
Improvement
inGIRoA
competence
andcapacity
GIRoA
responsive
and
accountable
to
population
Strategic
prioritization
prioritization
ofobjectives
International
International
unityofeffort
Afghan
Afghan
Ministries
planand
allocate
donor
funding
Quickimpact
community
focus
Momentum
ofinsurgency
is reversed
isreversed
Denationalize
donor
contributions
ANSF
capacityand
capability
expanded
through
through
partnership
GIRoAhas
sufficient
security
capacity
Afghan
population
p
p
supports
GIRoA
Significant
iincreasein
i
privatesector
investment
Increasein
GDP
GIRoAhas
effective
controlof
Afghan
Afghan
territory
Afghanistan
recognizedas
credible
credible
regional
partner
Sustainable
economic
growthand
development
Afghanistan
isnotasafe
haven to AQ
haventoAQ
Capacityy
Taliban
2009
2011
2013
2015
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED
2017
2019
101
Saf
afeandSStableAffghanisttan
NEAR TERM
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED
Natural Resources
Mines/Resources
Gas
Coal
Asbestos
Barite
Lithium
Salt
Lapis lazuli
ruby
Chilkonsar,
Samti Gold
Natural Gas
Emerald
Plaster
Peat
Resources
Gold
Mercury
Pewter
Zarkashan,
Gold
Copper
C
Mine
Industrial Sites
Cotton
Textile
Food
Sugar
Chemical Sites
Steel
Power station
Power station
Pi li (G
Pipeline
(Gas))
Construction material
Cement
Gold
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED
102
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED
Aquina
Ai
Khanem
Sher Khan
Heyratan
Nusay
X
ABP Zone 5
Shegnan
X
ABP Zone 4
Eshkeshem
ABP HQ
Islam Qalah
Zone 5
ABP Zone 1
Zone 4
Torkham
Gate/Torkham
BCC
Zone 1
Zone 3
Zone 2
Mile 78
Gulam Khan
X
ABP Zone 2
Zaranj
Weesh-Chaman
ABP Zone 3
Bahram Chah
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIFIED
103
103
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED
ISAF
SRSG
UNAMA
Human Rights
Norah Niland
COS
DCOS STAB
DIR GOV
DSRSG Pillar I
Political Affairs
[Vacant]
DSRSG Pillar II
Relief, Humanit.
Robert Watkins
Special Adv.
on DEV
Mark Ward
Donor/Aid Eff.
Anja De Beer
DIR DEV
Plans&
Policy
DEV Chiefs
Coord Officer
Cris Stephen
Governance
Hassan Elhaq
Rule of Law
Stephanie Mcphail
GOV Chiefs
Election Spt
Knut Kristie
UNOCHA
UNICEF
UNDP
UNHCR
WFP
UNOPS
HABITAT
UNDSS
UNODC
UNFPA
WHO
UN
FAO
Military Adv.
Brig Gen Tim Lai
Police Adv.
Khuda Chowdry
Dr. Karp
NATO/ISAF UNCLASSIED
ISAF
105
P t S
Peter
S. Argo
A
Office: IVSN 686-1130
Cell: +93 (0) 797 777 356
Email: peter.argo@hq.isaf.nato.int
106