I.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Definitions
a.
Administrative Law
b.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (see Administrative Code of
1987, Section 2)
c.
National Government (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
d.
Local Government (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
e.
Agency of the Government (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
f.
Department (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
g.
Bureau (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
h.
Office (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
i.
Instrumentality (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
j.
Regulatory agency (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
k.
Chartered institution (see Administrative Code of 1987, Section 2)
l.
Government-owned or controlled corporation (see Administrative Code of 1
987, Section 2)
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Creation, Establishment and Abolition of Administrative Agencies
2003 Bar Exams: Validity of abolition of long-standing Bureau under DILG by the
President.
Cases:
1.
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 134
2.
Viola v. Alunan, III, 277 SCRA 409 (1997)
3.
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935,
Dec. 7, 2010
4.
Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v. Commissioner Fe
Barin, G.R. No. 150974, June 29, 2007
5.
Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on Hum
an Rights, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004
3.
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration v. Civil Servic
e Commission, 221 SCRA 145
4.
Sinon v. Civil Service Commission, 215 SCRA 410
5.
Domingo v. DBP, 207 SCRA 766
6.
Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, 60 SCAD 262 or 242 SCRA 196 (1995)
III.
General Principles
Cases:
1.
Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 16 SCRA
623 (1965)
2.
Kilusang Bayan, etc. v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92 (1992)
3.
Senator Robert S. Jaworksi v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004
4.
Radio Communications of the Phils., v. National Telecommunications Commiss
ion, 215 SCRA 455 (1992)
5.
Matienzo v. Abellera, 162 SCRA 11 (1988)
6.
Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Cooperative, Inc., 382 SCRA 552 (2002)
7.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, 49 SCAD 649 or 231
SCRA 292 (1994)
a.
b.
c.
Legislative power
Doctrine of Separation of Powers
Non-delegation of legislative power
d.
Cases:
1.
US v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908)
2.
People v. Vera, 65 Phil 327 (1937)
3.
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)
4.
Rabor v. CSC, 61 SCAD 569 or 244 SCRA 614 (1995)
5.
Re: Entitlement to Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic Personnel, A
.M. No. 03-9-02-SC, Nov. 27, 2008
e.
o
o
o
Cases:
1.
2.
ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Gutierrez v. DBM, G.R. No. 153266, March 18, 2010 (and other allied cases)
3.
4.
f.
BPI Leasing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127624, Nov. 18, 2003
Board of Trustees v. Velasco, G.R. No. 170436, February 2, 2011
Requisites for Validity of Administrative Rules and Regulations
Cases:
1.
2.
3.
g.
Dagan
Smart
Conte
Penal
2002 Bar Exams: Validity of rules and regulations issued by a Department Secreta
ry providing penalties.
Cases:
1.
2.
3.
h.
Cases:
1.
2.
i.
Case:
1. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236 (1996)
2. Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corp., G.R. No. 179579, Feb. 1, 20
12
2000 Bar Exam: Requirement of notice and hearing of proposed administrative rule
s.
j.
Case:
1.
Victorias Milling Co v. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 627
2.
National Food Authority v. MASADA Security Agency, G.R. No. 163448, March
8, 2005
3.
SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 126999, Augus
t 30, 2000
k.
Prospective or retroactive operation of rules and regulation
Case:
1. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Azucena T. Reyes, G.R. No. 159694, Janua
ry 27, 2006
2. Rosario Dadulo v. Honorable Court of Appeals, Office of the Ombudsman, et al
, G.R. No. 175451, Sept. 28, 2007
l.
Case:
1.
Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Company, Inc., G
.R. No. 147096, January 15, 2002
m. Administrative rule and interpretation distinguished
c.
Jurisdiction
Cases:
1.
2.
d.
Administrative Due Process
Administrative Procedure (1987 Administrative Code, Book VII)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
e.
Due Process in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings
Generally
Case:
1.
2.
f.
Case:
1.
2.
3.
g.
Administrative procedure
Generally
Case:
1.
Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. v. NLRC. 87 SCAD 196 or 279 SC
RA 337 (1997)
Rules subject to Supreme Court modification
Case:
1.
Cases:
1.
h.
Cases:
1.
Exec. Judge Henry Basilla v. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Clerk of Court Loli
ta delos Reyes and Junior Process Server Eddie delos Reyes, MCTC, Placer-Esperan
za-Cawayan, Masbate, G.R. No. A.M. No. MTJ-02-1404, December 14, 2004
2.
National Housing Authority v. Segunda Almeida, Court of Appeals and RTC o
f San Pedro, Laguna Br. 31, G.R. No. 162784, June 22, 2007
3.
Judge Felimon Abelita III, v. P/Supt. German Doria and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez
, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009
3.
GSIS v. COA, G.R. No. 138381, November 10, 2004
4.
Gregorio Vigilar v. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011
5.
Geraldine Gaw Guy v. The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigrat
ion, G.R. No. 167824, July 2, 2010
Legislative power
in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to t
his test we now turn.
We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined in t
he present Civil Service law - found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executiv
e Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987 - and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Governmen
t Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of service of reti
rees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by
both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. This is crystal
clear from examination of many provisions of the present civil service law.
a.
b.
Kinds of rule-making power
1.
Rule-making by reason of particular delegation of authority (subordinate l
egislation)
2.
Rule-making by the constructuion and interpretation of a statute being adm
inistered (interpretative legislation)
3 kinds:
? Interpretation as incident of the execution of a law
? Interpretation handed down by the Secretary of Justice upon the request of a
government agency or official
? Intyerpretation in adversary proceedings
3.
Determination of facts under a delegated power as to which a statue shall
go into effect (contingent legislation)
c.
Delegation of legislative pwer has become more and more frequent, if not necessa
ry. This has led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has
become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reasons for the delegation of legislative power are the increasing complexit
y of the tast of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of socie
ty has ramified its activites and created peculiar and sophisticated problems th
at the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary.
d.
What can and cannot be delegated
What can be delegated
Legislature may properly delegate to administrative agency
any legislative power other than the making, altering or repealing of a law, th
e determination of legislative policies and objectives to be achieved, and the f
ormulation and promulgation of a defined and binding rule of conduct. It can de
legate the discretion as to how the law shall be enforced, to issue rules to fil
l in details, to ascertain facts on which the law will operate, to exercise poli
ce power, and to fix rates. To be valid, however, the delegation has to pass th
e competence and sufficiency of standard tests.
What cannot be delegated Doctrine of separation of pwers prohibits the delegatio
n of that which is purely legislative in nature. This consists of the power to
make the law, or to determine what the law shall be, and to alter or repeal it.
e.
Test to determine validity of delegation
1.
Completeness test
The law must be complete in all its terms and conditio
ns when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the onl
y thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
2.
Sufficient standard test - There must be adequate guidelines or limitati
ons in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate s authority and prevent t
he delegation from running riot.
Case:
1.
8
ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 200
Lessons: (1) Clarifying the 2 tests. (2) It is unlawful for congress to exercise
veto on the IRRs of an administrative agency.
SC s words:
On the 2 tests: Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative po
wer: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is co
mplete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or impl
emented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides ade
quate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the dele
gate s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, t
he standard must specify the limits of the delegate s authority, announce the legi
slative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fix
ing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions
of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize the rev
enue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR
) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanct
ions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Perform
ance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing the delegated power
to the President to fix revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter
referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of
the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year,
as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in th
e following percentages:
Excess of Collection of the Excess the Revenue Targets Percent (%) of the Exces
s Collection to Accrue to the Fund
30% or below
15%
More than 30%
15% of the first 30%
plus 20% of the
remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately followi
ng the year when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be release
d on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expecte
d of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expe
xxx
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the D
BCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the det
ermination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also u
ndergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board s authority and ide
ntifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue collect
ion falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board.
e following powers and functions:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and e
mployees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven an
d a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affectin
g the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated u
nder this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and complian
ce with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following exe
mptions shall apply:
On legislative veto: The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was
created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR
) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approv
ed the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. He
nce, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implemen
ting and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Co
ngress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of
legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program obje
ctives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to elim
inate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of leg
islative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressiona
l perception of public interest.
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers ma
y be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervis
ion.
a. Scrutiny - Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity o
f attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine ec
onomy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise
of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the ot
her branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for
2.
cases)
Gutierrez v. DBM, G.R. No. 153266, March 18, 2010 (and other allied
Lesson: If the law is clear, no need for IRR to be implemented. In this case, no
need for publication of the IRR.
SC s words: As will be noted from the first sentence above, all allowances were deem
ed integrated into the standardized salary rates except the following:
(1)
representation and transportation allowances;
(2)
clothing and laundry allowances;
(3)
subsistence allowances of marine officers and crew on board government v
essels;
(4)
subsistence allowances of hospital personnel;
(5)
hazard pay;
(6)
allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and
(7)
such other additional compensation not otherwise specified in Section 12
BPI Leasing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127624, Nov. 18, 2003
Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 w
as about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197
was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed re
solutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of th
e GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions wit
h the UP Law Center.
f.
1.
Must be
2.
Conform
3.
Must be
4.
Must be
f the law.
Cases:
1.
Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12, 2009
As correctly proferred by MJCI, its duty is not derived from the delegated autho
rity of Philracom but arises from the franchise granted to them by Congress allo
wing MJCI to do and carry out all such acts, deeds and things as may be necessary
to give effect to the foregoing. As justified by PRCI, obeying the terms of the f
ranchise and abiding by whatever rules enacted by Philracom is its duty.
As to the second requisite, petitioners raise some infirmities relating to Philr
acom s guidelines. They question the supposed belated issuance of the guidelines,
that is, only after the collection of blood samples for the Coggins Test was ord
ered. While it is conceded that the guidelines were issued a month after Philra
com s directive, this circumstance does not render the directive nor the guideline
s void. The directive s validity and effectivity are not dependent on any supplem
ental guidelines. Philracom has every right to issue directives to MJCI and PRC
I with respect to the conduct of horse racing, with or without implementing guid
elines.
On publication: Petitioners also argue that Philracom s guidelines have no force a
nd effect for lack of publication and failure to file copies with the University
of the Philippines (UP) Law Center as required by law.
As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administr
ative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice and hearing,
In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, this Court had the occasion to rul
e that prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or re
gulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no d
etermination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained.
The third requisite for the validity of an administrative issuance is that it mu
st be within the limits of the powers granted to it. The administrative body ma
y not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of t
he Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or wh
ich created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statu
te.
The assailed guidelines prescribe the procedure for monitoring and eradicating E
IA. These guidelines are in accord with Philracom s mandate under the law to regu
late the conduct of horse racing in the country.
Anent the fourth requisite, the assailed guidelines do not appear to be unreason
able or discriminatory. In fact, all horses stabled at the MJCI and PRCI s premis
es underwent the same procedure. The guidelines implemented were undoubtedly re
asonable as they bear a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be accompli
shed, i.e., the complete riddance of horses infected with EIA.
It also appears from the records that MJCI properly notified the racehorse owner
s before the test was conducted. Those who failed to comply were repeatedly warn
ed of certain consequences and sanctions.
Furthermore, extant from the records are circumstances which allow respondents t
o determine from time to time the eligibility of horses as race entries. The lea
se contract executed between petitioner and MJC contains a proviso reserving the
right of the lessor, MJCI in this case, the right to determine whether a partic
ular horse is a qualified horse. In addition, Philracom s rules and regulations o
n horse racing provide that horses must be free from any contagious disease or i
llness in order to be eligible as race entries.
All told, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Philracom in issui
ng the contested guidelines and on the part MJCI and PRCI in complying with Phil
racom s directive.
2.
Smart Communications Inc., v. NTC, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003
Lesson: Administrative issuances should adhere to the statutes that they are sup
posed to implement.
SC s words: It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an admi
nistrative order, the former must prevail. A rule or regulation must conform to
and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such
rule or regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a public administrative
body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge t
he authority given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its powe
r beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control wi
th respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as w
ell as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not
make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Con
stitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which cr
eated it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. Th
ough well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in
favor of the retiree, nevertheless, there is really nothing to interpret in eith
er RA 4968 or Res. 56, and correspondingly, the absence of any doubt as to the u
ltra-vires nature and illegality of the disputed resolution constrains us to rul
e against petitioners.
As a necessary consequence of the invalidity of Res. 56, we can hardly impute ab
use of discretion of any sort to respondent Commission for denying petitioners re
quest for reconsideration of the 3rd Indorsement of July 10, 1989. On the contr
ary, we hold that public respondent in its assailed Decision acted with circumsp
ection in denying petitioners claim. It reasoned thus: After a careful evaluation
of the facts herein obtaining, this Commission finds the instant request to be d
evoid of merit. It bears stress that the financial assistance contemplated under
SSS Resolution No. 56 is granted to SSS employees who opt to retire under R.A.
No. 660. In fact, by the aggrieved parties own admission (page 2 of the request f
or reconsideration dated January 12, 1993), it is a financial assistance granted
by the SSS management to its employees, in addition to the retirement benefits
under Republic Act No. 660. (underscoring supplied for emphasis) There is therefo
re no question, that the said financial assistance partakes of the nature of a r
etirement benefit that has the effect of modifying existing retirement laws part
icularly R.A. No. 660.
g.
Cases:
1.
Lesson: Effect when administrative agency issue orders that are beyond its autho
rity.
SC s words: The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with havi
ng ordered his fishermen to manage and operate the motor launches Malabon II and
Malabon III registered in his name and to fish, loiter and anchor within three
kilometers of the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over which jurisdiction
is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without pe
rmission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
These acts constitute a violation of the conditional clause of section 28 above
quoted, which reads as follows: "Provided, That boats not subject to license und
er Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the areas mentioned above (within
3 kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdict
ion is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, particu
larly Corregidor) only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permiss
ion may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendat
ion of the military or naval authorities concerned."
Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to lice
nse from fishing within three kilometers of the shore line of islands and reserv
ations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of
the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Com
merce upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. Inasm
uch as the only authority granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time such instructions, o
rders, rules and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be necessary and p
roper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceed
ings arising under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated
, contains no provisions similar to those contained in the above quoted conditio
nal clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional clause i
n question supplies a defect of the law, extending it. This is equivalent to leg
islating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to hi
m, it being exclusively reserved to the then Philippine Legislature by the Jones
Law, and now to the National Assembly by the Constitution of the Philippines. S
uch act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon th
e Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, but also an exercise of a legislative p
ower which he does not have, and therefore said conditional clause is null and v
oid and without effect (12 Corpus Juris, 845; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindo
ro, 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil., 1; U. S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phi
l., 327).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the con
ditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, issued by the Secre
tary of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void and without effect, as consti
tuting an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon him by section 4 of Act
No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative power which has not been and cannot be
delegated to him.
2.
Lesson: The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mod
e or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted.
SC s words: The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing ele
ctro fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point o
f the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is
not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or pro
ceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be