The Importance of What We Care About

Author(s): Harry Frankfurt

Source: Synthese, Vol. 53, No. 2, Matters of the Mind (Nov., 1982), pp. 257-272
Published by: Springer
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FRANKFURT

HARRY

THE

IMPORTANCE

OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT

1. Philosophers
their most
have for some time devoted
systematic
to
two
sets
of
each of which
attention
large
questions,
primarily
and trouble
out of concern with a pervasively
compelling
develops
some aspect
the
constitutes
of our lives. In the first set, which
derive
in one way or another
the questions
domain of epistemology,
our
to
in
what
believe.
The general
interest
from
deciding
topic of
as
set
to
is
in
the
how
this
is
the
second
insofar
those
behave,
subject
a third branch of
matter
to delineate
It is also possible
of ethics.
a cluster
to
with
of questions
concerned
which
pertain
inquiry,
and
fundamental
human
another thematic
of
existence
preoccupation
-

what

namely,

to care

about.

or of
scope either of epistemology
to
distinctive
conceptual
questions
leads. Those
which
this third preoccupation
need not
disciplines
reflect upon the nature of caring as such, nor are they obliged
to
is implied by the fact that we are creatures
to whom
consider what
I shall not attempt to provide a formal and exhaustive
things matter.
It is not properly
ethics to investigate

within

the

the various

account

of the branch of inquiry that does specifically

attend to such
I propose
in this essay merely
to broach,
in a somewhat
things.
a few of its central concepts
tentative
and fragmentary
and
way,
issues.

2. There is naturally an intimate connection

between what a person
or under certain conditions,
cares about and what he will, generally
to do. But while
think it best for himself
the third branch of inquiry
resembles
ethics in its concern with problems
therefore
of evaluation
it differs
in
and of action,
from
ethics
its
significantly
generative
concerns.
on the
and in its motivating
focusses
Ethics
concepts
It is concerned
of ordering our relations with other people.
contrast
with
the
between
right and wrong, and with the
especially
are led into the third
and limits of moral
We
grounds
obligation.
on
branch of inquiry,
the other hand, because we are interested
in
and because we therefore need to
deciding what to do with ourselves
understand what is important or, rather, what is important to us.
problem

Synthese 53 (1982) 257-272.

Copyright

1982 by D. Reidel

0039-7857/82/0532-0257 $01.60
Publishing

Co., Dordrecht,

Holland,

and Boston,

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U.S.A.

258

HARRY

FRANKFURT

It can hardly be disputed

of
that, for most of us, the requirements
are not the only things we care about. Even people who care a
care still more about other things.
great deal about morality
generally
care
more, for instance, about their own personal projects,
They may
and perhaps
about
certain
and groups,
about various
individuals
ethics

to which
in their lives but
they accord commanding
authority
not be particularly
of an ethical nature. There
is nothing
for instance,
stead
about such ideals as being
moral,
distinctively
fastly loyal to a family tradition, or selflessly
pursuing mathematical
ideals

which

need

to some type of connoisseurship.

onesself
truth, or devoting
in the development
and pursuit of
The role of moral
judgment
concerns
not only in potency but in
like these is often quite marginal,
as well.
im
It goes without
relevance
saying that there are many
are
to which
with
moral
decisions
considerations
regard
portant
be based, at least to
and which must accordingly
simply not decisive,
some
But even
kinds.
considerations
of nonmoral
extent,
upon
in
that are not of this sort are also often made, of course,
it
the light of values or preferences
other than moral ones. Moreover,
is always
them in such ways
that making
is not wholly
apparent

decisions

unjustifiable.
that one
and who believes
who takes morality
Someone
seriously,
to the others, may
is in fact morally
of his alternatives
preferable
of this fact as less than categoric
nonetheless
regard the importance
first that he does not actually know which
Suppose
ally preemptive.
is the morally best one. It might be sensible for him
of his alternatives
that under the
to look into the matter at all, on the grounds
to decline
so would
be too costly.
That
circumstances
is, he might
doing
to reserve for other uses
judge it more important to himself
plausibly
a conscientious
and
the time and the effort which
exploration
features
of his situation would
assessment
of the relevant moral
a judgment
of this kind is ever fully warranted
require. Whether
so
are necessarily
or not moral considerations
upon whether
depends
than others
that there
is no limit to the
much more
important
to spend in order to see that they get
resources which
it is reasonable
their due.
that the person does already know what he is
Or suppose,
secondly,
to do. He may nonetheless
choose
to
obliged
deliberately
- not because
he thinks it is overriden
this obligation
by a
course
there is an alternative
of action
one, but because
stronger

morally
violate

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WHAT

WE

CARE

ABOUT

259

which he considers more important to him than meeting

the demands
It seems to me that both in this case and in the
of moral
rectitude.
to others might be
first the subordination
of moral
considerations
cases
in
is
clear
In
it
both
that the question
event,
any
justified.
most
is
is
what
from the ques
important
concerning
distinguishable
tion concerning what is morally
right.
are not
to whom
There may be some people
ethical considerations
If
but
then
exclusive.
so,
paramount
only unequivocally
nothing else
in their lives. Their only purpose,
to
has as such any importance
to
to
intend
all
their
is
which
whatever
activities
do
contribute,
they
- to
from the point of view of morality
they regard as most desirable
maximize
human welfare,
perhaps, or to make society more just. This
to sustain, and it is rare. But
sort of overspecialisation
is difficult
someone
will
in
that
fact
suppose
accept no reason for acting except
is more likely than any other to lead to the
that the action in question
ideal. It is still the case that this person's
realisation
of his moral
are one thing and the fact that he cares about them
moral
judgments
so much
is another. His belief
that certain courses
of action are
in
other
from his
dictated
differs,
words,
by ethical considerations
no
to
in
that
those.
belief
other considerations
compare
importance
3. Providing

of the concepts
of caring and
analyses
fully articulated
is no easier than defining
the notions - e.g., those of
importance
- which are basic to the first two branches
of
belief and of obligation
to be so fun
the concept
of importance
appears
inquiry. Indeed,
at all. It
damental
that a satisfactory
analysis of it may not be possible
of

to suppose that things have importance only in virtue of

is reasonable
if it would make no difference
at all to
the differences
they make:
a
or
whether
it
had
whether
certain
certain
thing existed,
anything
nor
its
then
neither
the
existence
of
that
charac
characteristics,
thing
But everything
does
teristics would be of any importance whatever.
some
is
it
How
make
difference.
for
then,
anything
possible,
actually
to be genuinely
the difference
It can only be because
unimportant?
a
Thus
is itself of no importance.
it is evidently
such
thing makes
a
to include,
in the analysis
of importance,
essential
of the concept
to the effect that nothing
is important unless the difference
it
proviso
a useful account of the concept
is an important one. Whether
makes
can be developed
is unclear.
without
running into this circularity
in part
As for the notion of what a person cares about, it coincides
to which
with
the person
the notion
of something
reference
with

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260

HARRY

FRANKFURT

in what he does with his life and in his conduct.

It is
guides himself
a person's
not to be presumed,
that whenever
life displays
of course,
or less stable
a period
or
over
of time some more
attitudinal
cares about
the person
this reflects what
behavioral
disposition,
during that time. After all, patterns of interest or of response may be
of some
manifestations
only of habits or of involuntary
regularities
for them to develop
kind; and it is also possible
merely
by
even
in the lives of
chance.
therefore,
They may be discernible,
creatures who are incapable of caring about anything.
in guiding onesself
insofar as it consists
along a distinctive
Caring,
or in a particular
course
both agency
and
manner,
presupposes
It is a matter of being active in a certain way, and
self-consciousness.
a reflexive one. This is not exactly because
the activity
is essentially

other

to
the agent, in guiding his own behavior,
does something
necessarily
because
he purposefully
himself.
it is more
does
Rather,
nearly
something with himself.
A person who cares about something
in it.
invested
is, as it were,
He
identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he
to losses
to benefits
himself
vulnerable
and susceptible
makes
or
he cares
is diminished
what
about
upon whether
depending
concerns
Thus he concerns
himself with what
enhanced.
it, giving
to such things and directing his behavior
accord
attention
particular
or in part devoted
to
life is in whole
ingly. Insofar as the person's
a sequence
of events whose
rather than being merely
anything,
no effort to fashion,
to
it is devoted
themes and structures he makes
this.
A person might
because
he knew he
stop caring about something
to like it and to
it. But he might nonetheless
continue
and valuable.
to consider
it both desirable
Thus caring
is not to be confused with liking it or with wanting
about something
it;
nor is it the same as thinking that what
is cared about has value of
some kind, or that it is desirable.
It is especially
to be noted that these
and beliefs differ significantly
attitudes
from caring in their temporal
The outlook of a person who cares about something
is
characteristics.
as
that is, he necessarily
considers
himself
inherently
prospective;
to
for a creature
having a future. On the other hand, it is possible

could
want

have

not have
it, and

desires and beliefs without

to exist.
that he may continue
can occur
Desires
and beliefs

taking any accouunt

in a life which

at all of the fact

consists

merely

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of a

WHAT

WE

CARE

261

ABOUT

none of which
the subject
succession
of separate moments,
recog
- as an
or in memory
it occurs or in anticipation
nises - either when
element
in his own continuing
integrated with others
history. When
this recognition
is entirely absent, there is no continuing
subject. The
like that. The moments
in the
lives of some animals are presumably
are not merely
life of a person who cares about something,
however,
The person
of sequentiality.
inherently
by formal relations
binds them together,
and in the nature of the case also
in richer ways.
them as being bound together,
This both
concern with what he
entails and is entailed by his own continuing
does with himself and with what goes on in his life.
can care
that a person
of a similar kind indicate
Considerations
or less extended
about something
only over some more
period of
or to think it valuable,
to desire something,
time. It is possible
only
for a moment.
have no inherent persistence;
Desires
and beliefs
linked

necessarily
construes

or of believing
in the nature of wanting
nothing
requires that a desire
or a belief must endure. But the notion of guidance,
the
and hence
a certain
or steadiness
of
notion
of caring,
consistency
implies
some degree of persistence.
A person
and this presupposes
behavior;
who
cared about
would
be
something
just for a single moment
from someone who was being moved
by impulse.
indistinguishable
at
He would not in any proper sense be guiding or directing himself
all.

Since the making

of a decision
the fact
requires only a moment,
that a person decides
to care about something
cannot be tantamount
to his caring about it. Nor is it a guarantee
that he will care about it.
such a decision,
the person forms an intention concerning
By making
what to care about. But whether
that intention is truly fulfilled is quite
to care no more
another matter. A decision
entails caring than a
to give up smoking entails giving it up. In neither case does
decision
even to initiating
amount
the decision
the state of affairs
making
state
of affairs actually ensues.
decided upon unless that
This would hardly be worth pointing out except that an exaggerated
as well as to choices
ascribed
to decisions,
is sometimes
significance
and to other similar "acts of will". If we consider
that a person's will
is that by which
he moves
then what he cares about is far
himself,
more
to the character
of his will
or
than the decisions
germane
he makes. The
but not necessarily

choices
will,

latter may pertain to what he

to what his will truly is.

intends

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to be his

262

HARRY

FRANKFURT

in Sartre's
is sometimes
famous
under
young man
example
to
at
whether
to have resolved his dilemma,
remain
concerning
or to abandon her and join the fight
and look after his mother
a radically free choice. But
enemies,
by making
against his country's
to pursue one
is the fact that the young man chooses
how significant
even if we understand
this
rather than the other of his alternatives,
The

stood
home

on his part concerning

what sort of person
choice to entail a decision
to
to be and not merely
what
do?
It
surely gives us no
concerning
reason
will
the sort of
that
he
become
for
actually
thinking
particular
us
even
assume
nor
to
to
does
entitle
he
decides
it
that he
be,
person
will actually pursue the alternative
he chooses.
after
The point is not that he might
change his mind a moment
or
that
he
It
his
his
decision.
choice,
making
might immediately
forget
to carry out his intention. He might
is that he might
be unable
are
the
that he simply cannot
when
discover,
down,
bring
chips
he has decided.
to pursue
the course of action upon which
himself
Without
changing his mind or forgetting
anything, he might find either
to
the other course
of action
that he is moved
pursue
irresistibly
or
at
to
forbear
from the
is
least
instead
that he
similarly constrained
course he has chosen. Or he might find that he is actually
able to
to
but
he
chosen
the
has
actions
only by forcing
perform,
perform
to do so against powerful
and persistent
natural inclinations.
himself
that he does not have and that he does not
is, he might discover
the
attitudes and interests constitutive
develop
feelings,
subsequently
him to being.
has committed
of the sort of person which his decision
not merely
dilemma
does
The
of the young man's
resolution
to
It
he
he
decide
what
do.
that
that
really care
requires
require, then,
more about one of the alternatives
him
about the
than
confronting
That

of those
further
that he understand
which
other; and it requires
it is that he really cares about more. The difficulty he is in
alternatives
he cares
of the alternatives
is due either to his not knowing which
or to his caring equally about each. It is clear that in
about more,
a
case is his difficulty
to be overcome
neither
by making
reliably
decision.
The fact that someone cares about
set of cognitive,
affective
complex

by a
thing is constituted
and
and volitional
dispositions
states. It may sometimes
be possible
for a person, by making a certain
to bring it about that he cares about a
choice or decision,
effectively
than about
certain
thing or that he cares about one thing more
a certain

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WHAT

WE

CARE

ABOUT

263

But that depends

another.
do not always
which
upon conditions
that what a person cares about
prevail. It certainly cannot be assumed
is generally under his immediate voluntary
control.
4. There are, of course, wide variations
in how strongly and how
care about
to dis
It is also possible
persistently
people
things.
are not reducible
in any
criminate
different
ways of caring, which
to differences
of degree. The most notable of these
obvious manner
are perhaps
the several
dis
varieties
of love. Another
significant
is related to but not identical with the one concerning
tinction - which
or not caring can be initiated by an act of will - has to do
whether
or not a person
can help caring as he does. When
a
with whether
it may be entirely up to him both that
person cares about something,
he cares

about it and that he cares about it as much as he does. In

the person
is susceptible
to a familiar but
instances,
however,
in virtue of which his
nonetheless
somewhat obscure kind of necessity,
under his own control.
caring is not altogether
are occasions
a person
There
when
realises
that what he cares
certain

so much, but in such a way, that it is

to him not merely
for him to forbear from a certain course of action. It was
impossible
on such an occasion,
for example,
that Luther made his
presumably
famous declaration:
"Here I stand; I can do no other." An encounter
with necessity
of this sort characteristically
affects a person
less by
impelling him into a certain course of action than by somehow making
to him that every apparent
it apparent
to that course
is
alternative
unthinkable.
Such encounters
differ from situations
in which a person
or not he wants
finds that he is unable to forbear, whether
to do so,
or by some
to act by some desire
he is being
because
driven
about matters

is too powerful
for him to overcome.
which
compulsion
They also
differ from situations
in which
it is clear to the person
that he must
of forbearing because he has such a good reason
reject the possibility
for rejecting
it - for instance, because
to forbear strikes him as too
or too undesirable
a course of action to pursue.
unappealing
the other hand encounters
with
of the sort in
necessity
are in certain respects
similar to situations
like these. They
those of the latter type - viz., the person cannot forbear
so are too good - in that the
his reasons
because
for not doing
inability to forbear is not a simple matter of deficient
capacity on the
those of the former variety - viz.,
part of the agent. They resemble
or the like - in that the
is driven by irresistible
the person
passion
On

question
resemble

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264

HARRY

FRANKFURT

as having no choice but to accede

to the
himself
agent experiences
even
if
he
thinks
it
is
be
force by which he
constrained
better
might
not to do so.
to which
It is clear,
Luther
of course,
that the impossibility
nor
a
was
matter
of
causal
of
After
referred
neither
necessity.
logical
was
sense
one
in
all, he knew well enough that he
quite able to do the
to do
very thing he said he could not do; that is, he had the capacity
to muster was not the power to forbear, but
it.What
he was unable
I shall use
the term "volitional
the will.
to refer to
necessity"
was
kind
to
the
which
he
of
declared
he
constraint
subject. To the
extent
that such constraint
does render it impossible
for a
actually
as
to
act
in
other
than
he
any way
person
acts, it renders it impossible
use of his own capacities.
him from making
by preventing
Perhaps
even if his declaration
was
there is a sense in which Luther,
true,
the force which obstruc
might have been strong enough to overcome
ted his pursuit of any course of action but the one he pursued. But he
to overcome
that force.
could not bring himself
is subject to volitional
A person who
finds that he must
necessity
seem appropriate
act as he does. For this reason
to regard
it may
as providing
involve volitional
situations which
instances of
necessity
But the person
in a situation of this kind generally
does not
passivity.
as entailing
construe
the fact that he is subject to volitional
necessity
are generally
at all. People
that he is passive
quite far from consider
renders them helpless
to their
ing that volitional
necessity
bystanders
own behavior.
Indeed they may even tend to regard it as actually
and their strength of will.
both their autonomy
enhancing
If a person who
is constrained
is for that
by volitional
necessity
reason unable to pursue a certain course of action, the explanation
is
not

is in any straightforward
to overcome
the
way too weak
can
sort
account
constraint. That
of explanation
for the experience
of
an addict, who dissociates
himself
from the addiction
constraining
him but who is unsuccessful
in his attempt to oppose his own energies
to the impetus of his habit. A person who is constrained
by volitional
is in a situation which
differs significantly
from
however,
necessity,
that he

that one. Unlike

to the constraining
the addict, he does not accede
he lacks sufficient
to defeat
force because
it. He
strength of will
to it because
he is unwilling
to oppose
accedes
it and because,
is itself something
his unwillingness
he is un
which
furthermore,
willing

to alter.

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WHAT

WE

CARE

ABOUT

265

course
Not
the particular
of
only does he care about following
to follow. He also cares about caring
action which he is constrained
it. Therefore
himself
he guides
from being
about
away
critically
affected by anything - in the outside world or within himself - which
that course or
might divert him or dissuade him either from following
it. He cannot bring
from caring as much as he does about following
to overcome
himself
the
other words, he does not
addict is that
unwilling
do, but which he cannot
to that of his own will.

to which he is subject because,

in
constraint
of the
really want to do so. The predicament
to
there is something which he really wants
do because of a force other than and superior
In the case of the person
constrained
by

there is also something which he cannot do but

volitional
necessity,
he does not really want to do it.
only because
the force of volitional
The reason a person does not experience
as alien or as external
to himself,
then, is that it coincides
necessity
- desires which
are not
with - and is, indeed, partly constituted
by
his own but with which
he actively
identifies
himself.
merely
extent
the necessity
is to a certain
It is
Moreover,
self-imposed.
someone
to avoid being guided
in
requires himself
generated when
what he does by any forces other than those by which he most deeply
In order to prevent himself
wants
to be guided.
from caring about
or dis
as much
as he cares about them, he suppresses
anything
or desires
he regards as
himself
motives
from whatever
sociates
with the stability and effectiveness
of his commitment.
It
inconsistent
is in this way that volitional
may have a liberating effect:
necessity
someone
when
is tending to be distracted
from caring about what he
cares about most,
the force of volitional
may constrain him
necessity
to do.
he really wants
the pertinence
and the validity of these considerations,
to be
for a person
however,
they do not explain how it is possible
a
is
which
constrained
upon him only by
by
necessity
imposed
to act in certain
himself. To be sure, people do often force themselves
- for
are
to
act otherwise.
ways
instance, when they
strongly tempted
cases
in
of those kinds is
But the strenuous
exertion
of will power
it whenever
he likes. On
The agent can discontinue
fully voluntary.
to do what
Whatever

is self-imposed
there must
the other hand, even if volitional
necessity
in which
it is imposed or maintained
be some respect
involuntarily.
that it be self-imposed
for the fact
The condition
helps to account
that it is liberating rather than coercive - i.e., the fact that it supports

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266

HARRY

FRANKFURT

to or independent
rather than being opposed
be the case, however,
that the person who
in a certain way
that he avoid guiding himself
requires of himself
this
the
of
merely
by per
self-imposition
requirement
accomplishes
act. It must be an essential
feature of volitional
forming a voluntary
it
that it is imposed upon a person
Otherwise
involuntarily.
necessity
the person's
his will.

of

autonomy
It cannot

cannot
to account
for the fact that the person
impossible
at will - i.e., the fact that it is
himself
from it merely
a kind of necessity.
genuinely
seem difficult
can
to understand
It may
how volitional
necessity
same
at
the
time
in
be
both
and
self-imposed
possibly
imposed
or
an
to
it
is
avoid
the
how
that
conclusion
agent
voluntarily,
possible

will

be
extricate

must be simultaneously
is constrained
who
by volitional
necessity
both active and passive with respect to the same force. Resolution
of
lies in recognising
these difficulties
that: (a) the fact that a person
cares about something
is a fact about his will, (b) a person's will need
not be under his own voluntary
and (c) his will may be no
control,
it is not by his own voluntary
less truly his own when
doing that he
cares

as

he

does.

in virtue of
may be both self-imposed
necessity
own
same time,
at
will
the
the
and,
by
person's
being
imposed
not
is
it
that
in
the
fact
virtue
of
by his own
involuntarily
imposed
act
it
is.
in
his
is
what
such
that
will
cases,
voluntary
Similarly,
it is
A person
is active when
does not entail passivity.
involuntariness
even
own
not
will
what
he
when
his
his
will
that
he
is
does
does,
by
It appears,
control.
the scope of his voluntary
itself within
then, that
or
a person cares about certain things regardless
of whether
unless
to the liberation
not he chooses
to do so, he will not be susceptible
can provide.
which volitional
necessity
that a person may be in some sense liberated
5. The suggestion
Thus

volitional

to his immediate
to a power which
is not subject
acceding
most
themes of
the
and
is
ancient
control
among
persistent
voluntary
some
our moral
It must
reflect
and religious
tradition.
surely
quite
of our lives. This
structural
feature
feature
fundamental
remains,
we are unable to
As a consequence,
however,
relatively
unexplored.
through

accounts
of certain facts
thorough and perspicuous
give satisfactorily
are central
in
to our culture and to our view of ourselves:
which
we
most
two
human
the
which
that
prize
capacities
highly
particular,
are
are those for rationality
and for love, and that these capacities

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WHAT

WE

CARE

267

ABOUT

in enabling us to adapt to our

prized not only for their usefulness
natural and social environments
but also because
they are supposed
or states of
to make available
to us especially
valuable
experiences
fulfillment and of freedom. The idea that being rational and loving are
freedom
of achieving
than it does,
ways
ought to puzzle us more
a
to
that
to
both
submit
is be
person
require
given
something which
control and which may be indifferent to his desires.
yond his voluntary
to being moved
When we accede
by logic or by love, the feeling
with which we do so is not ordinarily one of dispirited
impotence. On
in both cases - whether
the contrary, we characteristically
experience
reason or following
our hearts - a sense of liberation
we are following
What accounts
and of enhancement.
for this experience?
It appears to
a person
to a
have
in the fact that when
is responding
its source
as
or
as
to
of something
rational
his relationship
beloved,
perception
is not merely
concentrated
it tends towards selflessness. His attention
it is somehow
fixed or seized by the object. The
upon the object;
him. He is guided by its characteristics
rather than
object captivates
he feels that he is overcome
primarily by his own. Quite commonly,
that his own direction
of his thoughts and volitions
has been super
seded. How are we to understand
the paradox
that a person may be
enhanced
and liberated
and
seized, made
through being
captive,
to be most fully realised,
is it that we find ourselves
overcome? Why
reason or
and consider
that we are at our best, when
through
we have lost or escaped
from ourselves.1
through love
and love equally entail selflessness.
They differ in that
Rationality
the former
is also essentially
The
substance
of this
impersonal.
difference
between
rationality and love is not that what a person loves
whereas
characteristics,
depends
largely upon his own particular
those characteristics
to
what he considers
play no role in determining
a person makes
be required or permitted
by reason. The judgments
are manifestly
no less dependent
than are any
rationality
concerning
occurrences
other
in his life upon contingent
features of his nature
and of his circumstances.
renders these judgments
What
impersonal
is that the claims they make are not limited to the person who makes
them; rather, it is implicit that anyone who disagrees with the claims
must be mistaken.
on the
A declaration
of love is a personal matter,
other hand, because
the person who makes
it does not thereby
commit
does

has

himself
somehow

to supposing
that anyone
gone wrong.

who

fails

to love what

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he

268

HARRY

FRANKFURT

are also impersonal,

and in this respect their
moral
judgments
Even
differs fundamentally
from that of volitional
necessity.
with actions which are
volitional
arises in connection
necessity
by duty, it does not derive from the person's
required or forbidden
as such but from the way in which he cares about
moral convictions
is tempted to abandon her child finds
certain things. If a mother who
Now

force
when

she knows
that she simply cannot do that, it is probably not because
she cares about) her duty. It is more
(or even because
likely because
of how she cares about the child, and about herself as its mother,
than
on her part that abandoning
the child
because
of any recognition
does not require her
would be morally wrong. Consistency
therefore
to suppose
she cannot bring herself
to perform
that the action which
must be found to be similarly
by every mother whose
impossible
are similar to hers.2
circumstances
to
In the same way, a person who finds that he cannot bring himself
an ideal to which
he has been dedicated,
his
despite
compromise
of remaining
is not
loyal to it, probably
moral
considerations
by objective
immediately
in question
is of a distinctively
moral
variety.
in conduc
ideal is to be meticulously
honest
that someone's
Suppose
is morally
affairs. Everyone
obliged, of course, to be
ting his business
that anyone
has a duty to pursue
but it does not follow
honest;
as an ideal of his life - i.e., to accord
to pursuing
it the
honesty
to an ideal
and concern
which
attention
commitment
preemptive
anxiety concerning
most
being moved
even
if the ideal

the costs

for him
that it is volitionally
entails. A person's
impossible
discovery
an
one of his ideals
to neglect
is not to be equated,
then, with
on his part of an ethical requirement.
acknowledgment
to those we love and with respect
to our
with respect
Especially
which have less to do
ideals, we are liable to be bound by necessities
to the principles
of morality
than with integrity or
with our adherence
us
kind. These
necessities
constrain
of a more personal
consistency
the things which we care about most and with which,
from betraying
we are most closely
identified. In a sense which a strictly
accordingly,
cannot make clear, what they keep us from violating
ethical analysis
are not our duties or our obligations
but ourselves.
a matter
6. The formation
of a person's will is most fundamentally
to care about certain things, and of his coming to care
of his coming
these proces
than about others. Although
about some of them more
ses may not be wholly
is
it
under his voluntary
nonetheless
control,

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WHAT

WE

CARE

ABOUT

269

often possible
for him to affect them. For that reason, as well as
in knowing what to think of
interested
because
people are generally
a person may care about what he cares about. This leads
themselves,
and justification.
to questions
evaluation
concerning
The fact that what a person cares about is a personal matter does
to distinguish
not entail that anything
goes. It may still be possible
between
things that are worth caring about to one degree or another
and things that are not. Accordingly,
it may be useful to inquire into
- that
what makes
is, what conditions
something worth caring about
as an ideal
must be satisfied if something
is to be suitable or worthy
or as an object of love - and into how a person
is to decide,
from
to care about.
things worth
caring about, which
care
or care
different
about
may
things,
justifiably
people
mean
same
not
this
does
their
the
that
about
surely
differently
things,
to significant criticism
loves and their ideals are entirely unsusceptible
of discrimination
of any sort or that no general analytical
principles
can be found.3
among

the various

Although

are quite
often do not care about certain
things which
to
to
them.
fail
after
may
all, that
They
simply
recognise,
important
But if there is something
that a
those things have that importance.
to him.
that it is important
person does care about, then it follows
an infallible
involves
This is not because
caring somehow
judgment
it is because
of
its
the
Rather,
object.
importance
caring
concerning
that thing important to the person who cares
about something makes
People

about it.
It is necessarily
the case, of course, that a person who cares about
a certain thing is not cold-bloodedly
to it. In other words,
indifferent
to the thing must make a difference
to a person who
what happens
cares about it, and the difference
it makes must itself be important to
him. This naturally does not mean that he cares about it just because
it affects him in important ways. On the contrary,
it may well be that
to being affected by it or on account
is susceptible
of it only in
virtue of the fact that he cares about it.
to people what they
that it is necessarily
This suggests
important
care about. The fact that a person cares about a certain thing or about

he

some person, or the fact that he

to him. It
important difference
to
affected
susceptible
being
by
he considers
important. Thus

does not care about them, makes an

means
that he is, or that he is not,
various circumstances
in ways which
to care about
the question
of what

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270

HARRY

FRANKFURT

as including
to care about any
the question
of whether
(construed
one
must
is
be
which
necessarily
important to him.
thing)
a
It does not quite follow
from this that it is necessarily
worth
care
to
not
while
the
The
about
be
question.
question may
person's
to him for that. What
does follow, however,
is
sufficiently
important
must
then
it
that if anything
is worth
be
worth
caring about,
caring
about what to care about. It could hardly be the case both that there
so important to a person that it is worthwhile
is something
for him to
care about
for him to care about
it, but that it is not worthwhile
or not he cares about that thing.
whether
In any event,
there are two distinct
in
ways
(albeit compatible)
a
to
be
its
which
person. First,
something may
important
importance
to him may be due to considerations
which are altogether
independent
or not he cares about the thing in question.
the
of whether
Second,
he does care about
important to him just because
sorts of ground on which a
there are two distinct
to care about a certain thing might
it worthwhile
his view. He might
claim that the thing is in
to
him
is
and
that
worth caring about for this
it
dependently
important
reason. Or he might maintain,
that the thing is
without
supposing
at
to
him
is
that
he
all,
antecedently
justified in caring about
important
to
it
is
itself
is important
it because
about
something which
caring
thing may become
it. Correspondingly,
person who thinks
to justify
attempt

him.

up to
People naturally want the things they care about to coincide,
or antecedently
a point, with those that are independently
important
to them. Thus a person often begins to care about something when he
ceases to care
to affect him in important ways,
its capacity
recognises
that it does not have that capacity,
and
about it when he discovers
himself
criticises
for caring too much or too little about things whose
he has misjudged.
When
the importance
to himself
of a
importance
certain thing to a person is due to the very fact that he cares about it,
a useful measure
cannot provide
of the
that fact plainly
however,
extent to which his caring about the thing is justified.
In such cases, the critical question
cannot be whether
the object
is
to
to the person
warrant
his caring about it. It
sufficiently
important
must
the person
in making
is justified
the thing
instead be whether
to him by caring about
to justify
it. Now
the only way
important
of caring as
of the activity
doing this is in terms of the importance
such.

It is manifest

that the varieties

of being

concerned

or dedicated,

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WHAT

WE

CARE

ABOUT

271

to us quite apart from any antecedent

loving, are important
us
for affecting
which what we care about may have. This
capacities
is not particularly
because
caring about something makes us suscep
to
tible
and disappointments.
certain
additional
It is
gratifications
it serves to connect us actively
to our lives in ways
primarily because
are creative
which
and which
of ourselves
expose us to distinctive
and of

for necessity
and for freedom.
possibilities
It would be a serious mistake
to believe
that the importance
of an
someone
to
not
is
it is independent
of his
object
fully genuine unless
the fact that many of the people we
caring about the object. Consider
care about most would not affect us in important ways
if we did not
care about them. This can hardly mean
are
not genuinely
that they
to us. In certain
to be sure, it may appear
that
cases,
important
to a person despite
does lack real importance
the fact that
something
he cares about it. But if the importance
of the object in such cases is
not fully genuine,
that is not because
it derives from the fact that the
person cares about the object.
for example,
that what a person cares about is avoiding
Suppose,
an
stepping on the cracks in the sidewalk. No doubt he is committing
error of some kind in caring about this. But his error is not that he
cares about something which
is not really important
to him. Rather,
his error consists

in caring about, and thereby imbuing with genuine

is not worth caring about. The reason it
importance,
something which
seems clear:
is not worth
it is not important
to the
caring about
to make
the cracks
in the sidewalk
to
person
avoiding
important
himself. But we need to understand
better than we do just why this is
so - i.e., what conditions must be satisfied if it is to be important to us
to make
have
something
important to us which would not otherwise
such importance.
Even when
the justification
rests upon
for caring about something
the importance
of the caring itself, rather than being derivative
from
the antecedent
importance of its object, the choice of the object is not
to one theological
irrelevant or arbitrary. According
divine
doctrine,
is in fact bestowed
without
regard to the character or antecedent
It is God's nature to love, on this view, and He
of its objects.
loves everything
therefore
of any considerations
extrinsic
regardless
to Himself.
His love is entirely arbitrary and unmotivated
absolutely
love

value

sovereign,
objects.4

in no way
conditioned
of
by the worthiness
an
it
for
is
only
Perhaps
possible
omnipotent
being
and

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its
to

272

FRANKFURT

HARRY

- to love
is antecedently
important
altogether
freely
nothing
or restrictions
of any kind. In any case, a
and without
conditions
an essential
love is by no means
for wholly
unconditioned
capacity
of our finite nature.
constituent
it more suitable, then, for a person to make one object
What makes
It seems that it must be the
rather than another
important to himself?
fact that it is possible
for him to care about the one and not about the
is more
other, or to care about the one in a way which
important to

whom

the way
it is possible
for him to care about the
in which
a
accord
When
other.
person makes
important to himself,
something
an
at
least
in a
divine
instance of
agape
ingly, the situation resembles
care
not
the
its
The
does
about
because
certain respect.
person
object
so.
the
he
the
other
worthi
do
worthiness
On
commands
that
hand,
an object
ness of the activity
that he choose
of caring commands
him

than

which

he will

be able

Yale

University

to care about.

NOTES
1
We

are

also

susceptible

encounter

to being
overcome
and by grandeur;
and we
by beauty
not identical,
when we lose ourselves
in
experiences
These
also tend to be liberating.
On the
experiences
to the selflessness
of
great fear or pain provide
analogues

similar, though perhaps

or in work.
the thrill of a moment

other
reason

of
experiences
and of love in which

hand,

enjoyable
difference.
2
Although

the loss of self

It seems

liberating.

than

unlikely
those of love

that
and

is not ordinarily
because

is merely
but
rationality,
this

it is unclear

construed
these
what

as fulfilling
or as
are less

experiences
does account

for the

not require
does
her to suppose
consistency
this, she and others might
on other grounds.
it anyhow
if it is not morally
Even
for mothers
to
suppose
obligatory
care deeply
a mother
about
their children,
who
does not do so might
still be open
to
- not that her
a duty but, for instance,
criticism
attitude
violates
that it is "unnatural"
or "shameful"
and that she lacks important
human qualities.
3
One version
with regard to these matters
of scepticism
is the view that there is really
worth
the merits
not to
of this view,
it is important
nothing
caring about. Whatever
- nor to
confuse
it with
that it entails - the more
radical claim that nothing
is
suppose
to us. A person who
cares about
of any importance
incurs certain
something
thereby
with
the effort which
himself
and with
the vul
connected
costs,
investing
requires
to disappointment
and to other
In virtue of these
losses which
it imposes.
nerability
it is possible
to be important
to a person without
for something
costs,
being
important
to care about
for it to be worth
his while
it. The view
is worth
that nothing
enough
caring

about

caring about
4
Cf. Anders

therefore

entails

only

that

nothing

is of

sufficient

importance

it reasonable.
Nygren,

Agape

and Eros

(New

York,

1969), pp. 75-81,

91-95.

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to make