Topoi (2007) 26:191–199
DOI 10.1007/s11245-007-9020-1
Divine simplicity
Mohammad Saeedimehr
Published online: 20 June 2007
Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007
Abstract According to a doctrine widely held by most
medieval philosophers and theologians, whether in the
Muslim or Christian world, there are no metaphysical
distinctions in God whatsoever. As a result of the com-
pendious theorizing that has been done on this issue, the
doctrine, usually called the doctrine of divine simplicity,
has been bestowed a prominent status in both Islamic and
Christian philosophical theology. In Islamic philosophy
some well-known philosophers, such as Ibn Sina
(980–1037) and Mulla Sadra (1571–1640), developed this
doctrine through a metaphysical approach. In this paper,
considering the historical order, I shall first concentrate on
Ibn Sina’s view. Then I shall turn to the theory of divine
simplicity of Thomas Aquinas (1225?–1274), as the most
developed and comprehensive version of the medieval
theories in Christian world. Finally, I will return to Islamic
philosophy and explore the more complicated and mature
account of the doctrine as it was introduced by Mulla Sadra
according to his own philosophical principles.
Keywords Aquinas
Divine attributes
Divine simplicity

Ibn Sina
Mulla Sadra
1 Ibn Sina
I begin my discussion of divine simplicity with a short out-
line of Ibn Sina’s views on the subject, since Ibn Sina is the
most outstanding figure in Islamic Peripatetic philosophy.
This paper has been written in English by the author and submitted for
publication in Topoi.
M. Saeedimehr (&)
Tarbiat Modares University, P.O. Box 1415–111, Tehran, Iran
e-mail: saeedimehr@yahoo.com
First of all, it is noteworthy that in Muslim philosophers’
works, including those of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, the
issues relevant to the doctrine of divine simplicity are not
gathered in a single section (as we find it, for example, in
Summa Theologiae). This is partly because Muslim phi-
losophers usually deal with philosophical issues on God in
two different sections of their philosophy: first, in the
section which is dedicated to general issues and principles
of metaphysics; and second, in the section that contains
philosophical theology. Another reason may be that in Is-
lamic philosophy, especially in its post-medieval era, we
find the thesis that God does not have any essential attri-
bute distinct from his essence presented within the dis-
cussion of divine attributes, while other kinds of simplicity
are normally included in a series of discussions on the
divine essence (dhat)1 appearing immediately after the
demonstrations of God’s existence.
Ibn Sina discusses the principle of divine simplicity and
its branches in several of his books, including his most
detailed philosophical work the Shifa’ (the Healing). In the
eighth article of the Metaphysics of the Shifa’, Ibn Sina
argues for God’s existence and unity. Here we should
remember that for him the metaphysical distinction be-
tween necessary and contingent being is a very substantial
and fecund one and must be taken as a corner-stone of his
entire philosophical theology. According to this distinction,
Ibn Sina (like many other Muslim philosophers) introduces
God as the ‘‘Necessary Existent’’ or ‘‘Necessary of Exis-
tence’’ (wajib al-wujud). So, we may say that to him the
primary characteristic of God is his being necessary. (This
1
The dhat is what possesses attributes and will be called essence. It
should not be confused with the Aristotelian ti e´sti, the quiddity or
whatness.
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192 M. Saeedimehr

is while in Aquinas’ view, as is put in his Summa Theo- Thus, the will of the necessary being (i.e., God) and
logiae, this primary characteristic is pure actuality.) His knowledge are not distinct, neither in virtue of
Ibn Sina demonstrates the existence and unity of God as their essence nor in virtue of their concept.5
the unique necessary existence in the universe. Then he
To explain this claim, Ibn Sina takes a purely ontological
moves on and claims that there is no distinction between
perspective and asserts that God’s primary attribute is His
God’s existence and His quiddity and in God these two are
(necessary) existence and all His other attributes refer to
the same. Here Ibn Sina proposes two rather detailed and
His existence along with a relation or a negation or both of
complex arguments for justifying this claim.
them. For example, when we attribute ‘‘being a substance’’
From the identity of existence and quiddity in God, then,
to God, we do not mean anything but His necessary exis-
he concludes that God has no genus. A short argument for
tence, while its being in a subject is negated. On the other
this, as Ibn Sina proposes, is to say: If God were a species,
hand, when it is said that God is powerful, it means that He
which has a genus, his given genus would be either a
is a necessary existence which is considered with a rela-
necessary being or a contingent one. In the former case, the
tion, namely, that the existence of other things are effects
given genus would not need any differentia (which obvi-
from Him. In the same way, some divine attributes could
ously sounds unreasonable) and in the latter case, since a
be paraphrased as denoting His existence considered with
genus is dependent on the differentia for its existence, God,
both a relation and a negation. When someone speaks of
while a necessary being, would be dependent on something
divine will, he could not mean anything but that God’s
else for His existence (which again is absurd). Since God
existence, while not being a corporeal entity, is the origin
has no genus, He has no differentia either.2
of the whole universe’s order which is known by Him.6
Ibn Sina goes on to deduce further conclusions: it is not
Here we should notice that these additional relations or
possible for God to have a logical definition, since a logical
negations, as Ibn Sina thinks of them, never result in any
definition is composed of a genus and a differentia. Since it
external composition or multitude in God.
is impossible for God to be caused, we can never demon-
Let’s call this second thesis, i.e., the thesis of the con-
strate His existence through His cause.3
ceptual sameness of the several (essential) attributes ap-
In another chapter, Ibn Sina considers the mode of
plied to God, the conceptual identity thesis. Does this thesis
divine knowledge and explains how God’s knowledge of
result in the baffling conclusion that the terms used for
multiple things does not entail any multiplicity in the
attributes like ‘‘knowledge’’, ‘‘power’’, ‘‘life’’ and ‘‘will’’
divine essence and, therefore, is consistent with His
are synonymous? Ibn Sina answers this question in the
essential simplicity. Then, he proceeds to show that God’s
following passage:
knowledge is identical to His life and these two are not
separate from His will and power. To this point, Ibn Sina’s It became clear that the concepts of life, knowledge,
claim is nothing but the ontological unity of all (essential) power, generosity and will, when predicated to the
divine attributes: divine knowledge, divine power, divine Necessary Being are the same, and these are neither
life and His other attributes do not exist separately as properties nor portions of His entity. However, the
distinct things, but all exist as a single being; they are concepts of life, knowledge and will, as universal
identical with each other. Ibn Sina (contrary to his suc- terms, are not the same. But universals are imagined
cessors like Mulla Sadra) does not explicitly say that these and beings are not universals; each of them possesses
attributes are also identical to the very essence of God. that which is appropriate for it. And we are just
However, we may say that his whole discussion of the talking about God and the knowledge and the power
subject implies this identity, especially since he insists on in the sense that can be attributed properly to God.7
the fact that divine attributes do not imply any multiplicity
As we see, Ibn Sina obviously distinguishes between two
in His essence.4 Let us call the thesis of the ontological
applications of attribute terms like knowledge and power:
identity between God and His attributes the ontological
only when they are applied to God do they have the same
identity thesis. Then we may claim that Ibn Sina implicitly
meaning and, in other words, become synonymous. On the
endorses this thesis.
other hand, when we use them without predicating them of
Ibn Sina, however, does not stop here, but goes on to
any special subject, they have different meanings.
assert that there is not even any conceptual difference be-
Here it is not quite clear what Ibn Sina exactly meant by
tween these properties in application to God. He writes:
concept (mafhum) or whether it is an individual subjective

2 5
Ibn Sina (1404), Metaphysics, pp. 344–348. Ibn Sina (1404), Metaphysics, article 8, chap. 7, p. 367.
3 6
Ibn Sina (1404), Metaphysics, article 8, chap. 4, p. 348. Ibn Sina (1404), Metaphysics, article 8, chap. 7, pp. 367–368.
4 7
Ibn Sina (1404), Metaphysics, article 8, chap. 8, pp. 362–368. Ibn Sina (1984), 21.

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Divine simplicity
phenomenon (i.e., what a certain subject conceives) or a
completely or partially objective one. It seems, however,
that the former option is more consistent with the philos-
ophy of Ibn Sina considered as a whole.
We may conclude from this short sketch of Ibn Sina’s
viewpoint of divine simplicity that he would accept the
following (necessary) propositions:
1. There is no composition of existence and quiddity in
God.
2. God cannot be subject of composition of genus and
differentia (and thus cannot be defined through a log-
ical definition).
3. There is no ontological distinction between God and
His essential attributes, and He is identical to His
attributes (the ontological identity thesis).
4. The attribute terms (like knowledge and power), when
applied to God, signify the same meaning (the con-
ceptual identity thesis).
As to the last proposition, one may raise the following
objection. As we saw, Ibn Sina himself interprets the
meanings of each of the divine attributes as denoting His
necessary existence along with a special kind of relation or
negation. So, one may wonder whether the meaning of
each of these attributes could not differ as the result of
different considered relations or negation. To put it in a
clearer way, it seems that according to Ibn Sina’s analysis
of God’s attributes, the aforementioned relations and
negations come to be components of the meaning of those
attribute terms (when applied to God) and therefore they
must have different meanings, since it is evident that each
compound must change due to the change of at least one of
its components. Ibn Sina himself describes the meanings of
the attributes in a manner which reveals that they are, in
some sense, at least, compound:
The truth is that the primary attribute of the Necessary
Existent is that He is existent and what is meant by
[His] other attributes is either this existence with a kind
of relation or this existence with a kind of negation.8
The other problem with Ibn Sina’s account is that he gives
two distinct meanings of the attribute terms applied to God
and man. So, the meaning of ‘‘will’’ in ‘‘divine will’’ is not
the same as in ‘‘human will.’’ This claim requires the
attribute terms being equivocal when they are applied to
God and His creatures and, as seems clear enough, a theory
that requires this sort of equivocality would have to be
considered a kind of ‘‘negative theology,’’ a view that Ibn
Sina hardly could accept.
8
Ibn Sina (1404), Metaphysics, article 8, chap. 7, p. 367.
193
As we shall see, neither Aquinas nor Mulla Sadra en-
dorsed Ibn Sina’s claim of conceptual identity between
divine attributes.
2 Aquinas
Divine simplicity, to be sure, has a prominent status in
Aquinas’ framework of theological thought. In his Summa
Contra Gentiles Aquinas discusses God’s simplicity after
proposing arguments for a number of other divine attri-
butes such as eternity, immutability and being the sole
actuality. In Summa Theologiae, however, he comes to
recognize the theoretical status of the doctrine to the extent
that he introduces it just after providing his well-known
arguments for the existence of God and before discussing
other divine attributes.
One reason for this change of structure could be that, at
the time of composing his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas
was able to acknowledge the fundamental and vital role the
doctrine played in both understanding and demonstrating
God’s other attributes.9
In Summa Theologiae, Aquinas deals with the doctrine
of divine simplicity in order to answer the question of the
manner in which God exists. He considers the problem in
eight articles. In the first, he argues for the thesis that God
is not a body. In Aquinas’ opinion, as we may understand
from a short explanatory clause in the seventh article, the
claim that God is not a body is equivalent to the claim that
there is no composition of quantitative parts in God.10 The
next five articles are presented to refute several kinds of
composition in God: the composition of matter and form,
quiddity and subject, essence and existence, genus and
difference (differentia) and finally, subject and accidents.
In the seventh article, Aquinas goes on to argue for God’s
absolute simplicity, a claim which, assuming that he has
already refuted all conceivable kinds of divine composi-
tion, can count as a strict outcome of the previous articles.
The last article is somehow different, because here
Aquinas focuses his attention on a dissimilar, though rel-
evant, issue: God enters into no composition with other
things. The need for this last article is obvious, since it
seems, at least at first glance, quite probable that God,
9
There are other disparities between Aquinas’ approaches to the
subject in these two books. For example, in Aquinas (1975) he first
argues for God’s lacking any kind of composition in general but in
Aquinas (1948) he changes his strategy and accommodates the gen-
eral refutation of God’s being a composition somewhere after refuting
particular kinds of divine composition. Moreover, in Aquinas (1975),
contrary to Aquinas (1948), he does not argue against divine com-
position of matter and form in an independent chapter.
10
Aquinas writes: ‘‘...For there is neither composition of quantitative
parts in God, since He is not a body...’’ Aquinas (1948), Q3, A7.
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194 M. Saeedimehr

while being absolutely simple, makes a composition to- Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He
gether with another thing. Thus, Aquinas undertakes the were in a species. From this it is also plain that He
task of refuting this probability in the last article. has no genus or difference, nor can there be any
Therefore, according to Summa Theologiae, we can definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a
conclude that divine simplicity, in a Thomistic perspective, demonstration of Him; for a definition is from genus
can be analyzed into six main theses: and difference; and the means of a demonstration is a
definition.14
1. God is not composed of quantitative parts.
2. God is not composed of matter and form. In the above passage Aquinas proceeds in a rather Aris-
3. God is not distinct from His quiddity. totelian framework to reach some principles about God.
4. God is not composed of quiddity and existence. According to Aristotle, any properly logical definition must
5. God is not composed of genus and difference (differ- be the result of combining the genus and differentia of the
entia). definiendum and, therefore, whatever has no genus or
6. God is not composed of subject and accidents. differentia cannot be defined in a logical manner. And as
we remember, this is the same conclusion that Ibn Sina had
It is worth noting that these six theses are not equally
inferred before.
acceptable to contemporary Christian philosophers, who
The outcome of our discussion of Aquinas’ theory of
tend to analyze Aquinas’ view into a fewer number of
divine simplicity may be accordingly summarized: Aqui-
principles. Nicholas Wolterstorff, for instance, concentrates
nas deeply believes that God is absolutely simple and that
on three theses that seem to correspond to the third, fourth,
this is one of His necessary attributes. What then are the
and sixth ones in the above list.11 Eleonore Stump, on the
grounds of this claim?
other hand, summarizes Aquinas’ most important theses
Following contemporary terminology of religious epis-
concerning divine simplicity in three claims, which
temology we may say that Aquinas maintains a version of
approximate the first, third and sixth items in the above
‘‘strong rationalism,’’ in the sense that, except in case of
list.12 As we see, neither of them pays attention to the
some mysterious doctrines (like that of the Trinity), which
second and fifth theses. It doesn’t seem difficult to guess the
are not available to ‘‘unaided reason,’’ we should try to
reason; these latter claims are strictly based on an Aristo-
make demonstrative arguments for our religious beliefs as
telian metaphysics, since they make no sense unless we
far as it is possible. In Aquinas’ view, God’s existence and
already have accepted both the distinction between matter
attributes can be the subject of such argumentation and this
and form and the distinction between genus and differentia
is the task he himself undertakes in the Summa Theologiae.
as metaphysical ones. Most contemporary metaphysicians
In other words, we can see Aquinas as one of those theo-
seem to be skeptical about such conceptions.
logians who try to use both natural and revealed theology,
There is another important difference between these two
each one in its proper arena. Thus, it seems quite reason-
analyses: Stump’s paraphrase appears more accurate in that
able for Aquinas to make an effort to provide conclusive
she provides a modal interpretation: not only is God (in
arguments for demonstrating several simplicity theses.
actuality) simple, but also He must be so and it is not
The arguments Aquinas gives, to be sure, are substan-
possible for Him to be a composite entity whatsoever.
tially based, both in form and content, on Aristotelian logic
Aquinas appears to be sensitive to the differences in
and metaphysics. Hence, any objection to Aristotelian
modality. For example, at the end of his answer to the
metaphysics and logic, as far as they are applied to this
question of God’s being a body, he writes: ‘‘I answer that it
subject, might potentially threaten Aquinas’ argumentation.
is impossible that matter should be in God.’’13 So we may
Of course, we should try to understand Aquinas, and many
conclude that even though he didn’t insist on this modality
other medieval philosophers in both the Christian and
in his discussion of some sorts of simplicity, Aquinas be-
Muslim worlds, within a roughly Aristotelian framework.
lieved that God is, not only contingently but also neces-
Some of Aquinas’ arguments, however, may seem
sarily, simple.
controversial even within the Aristotelian system. To give
It is worth noting that in the midst of the fifth article,
an example, we may consider his argument in Summa
after presenting three arguments for God’s not being
Contra Gentiles for establishing that in God there is no
composed of genus and differentia, Aquinas refers to some
composition:
philosophical implications of this kind of simplicity:
In every compound there must be actuality and
potentiality. For a plurality of things cannot become
11
Wolterstorff (1992), p. 134. one thing, unless there be actuality and potentiality.
12
Stump (2003), pp. 96–97.
13 14
Aquinas (1948), Q3, A2. Aquinas (1948), P1, Q3, A5.

123
Divine simplicity
For things that are not one absolutely, are not actually
united except by being in a manner tied up together or
driven together: in which case the parts thus got to-
gether are in potentiality in respect of union; for they
combine actually, after having been potentially
combinable. But in God there is no potentiality:
therefore there is not in Him any composition.15
The logical form of the main part of the above argument is
clearly a modus tollens: If God is combined from certain
things, then there must be a potentiality in Him. But there
is no potentiality in God. Therefore, God is not combined
of any other things (and thus has no parts whatsoever). The
rest of the argument is in the service of showing the truth of
the conditional premise.
One initial objection may be that the implication of
potentiality is only obvious in the case of an external
combination with external parts. But it would be quite
debatable whether this would be the case about an exter-
nally simple thing that is only analyzable in a purely
rationally manner, so that this analysis does not entail the
external or concrete existence of parts. One may rightly
wonder whether this line of argumentation could reject the
composition of genus and differentia or even the composi-
tion of essence and existence in God as a pure actual entity.
To gain a clearer picture of Aquinas’ account of divine
simplicity we should examine his opinion about both the
ontological and conceptual identity theses. Muslim phi-
losophers usually present the issue of the identity between
God and His attributes in chapters distinct from the chap-
ters dedicated to the issues of other kinds of divine sim-
plicity. Aquinas, however, does not write in this order.
Indeed, he presents the ontological identity thesis in a very
short sentence in the third article (in which he establishes
the identity between God and His essence): ‘‘Since God
then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His
own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus
predicated of Him.’’16
The core of his argument is that only things com-
pounded of matter and form have quiddities or natures
distinct from themselves. So, whatever is not composed of
matter and form is identical with its quiddity or nature. On
the other hand, as Aquinas shows in the second article, God
is not composed of matter and form. Thus, God is identical
with His quiddity or nature. Moreover, it is maintained in
the sixth article that God has no accidents. Therefore,
15
Aquinas (1975), I, chap. 18. A similar argument is presented in
Aquinas (1948), Q3, A7. Aquinas writes: ‘‘Fourthly, because in every
composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not
apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all
the parts potential to the whole.’’
16
Aquinas (1948), P1, Q3, A3.
195
Aquinas can reasonably conclude that God is identical with
His attributes.
According to the cited passage, we may say that Aqui-
nas supports the ontological identity thesis. As to the
conceptual identity thesis, however, he takes the opposite
standpoint and in his Summa Contra Gentiles he argues
against it as follows:
Though the names predicated of God signify the same
thing, still they are not synonymous, because they do
not signify the same point of view. For just as divers
realities are by divers forms assimilated to the one
simple reality, which is God, so our understanding by
divers concepts is in some sort assimilated to Him,
inasmuch as, by several different points of view, ta-
ken from the perfections of creatures, it is brought to
the knowledge of Him. And therefore our under-
standing is not at fault in forming many concepts of
one thing because that simple divine being is such
that things can be assimilated to it in many divers
forms. According to these divers conceptions the
understanding invents divers names and assigns them
to God-names, which, though they denote one and the
same thing, yet clearly are not synonymous, since
they are not assigned from the same point of view.
The same meaning does not attach to the name in all
these cases, seeing that the name signifies the concept
of the understanding before it signifies the thing
understood.17
As we see, Aquinas does not argue against the possibility
of divine names being synonymous (as is the case with
Mulla Sadra). Instead, he explains how it is possible for
several terms to have different meanings while denoting
the same thing. In the case of divine names (which may be
called ‘‘attribute terms’’), Aquinas’ account is that we find
several perfections in God’s creatures and then we come to
predicate them of God (through a kind of ‘‘analogy,’’ as
Aquinas explains elsewhere). Since each of these names
are assigned to God, but not ‘‘from the same point of
view,’’ they convey different concepts or meanings and,
thus, cannot be synonymous, even if they all refer to the
same simple divine being.
Using Frege’s distinction, we could say that according to
Aquinas, the divine names have the same reference but
differ with regard to sense.
3 Mulla Sadra
In Islamic philosophy, Mulla Sadra is well known as the
founder of the philosophical school of thought called
17
Aquinas (1975), I, chap. 35.
123
196
Transcendent Wisdom (al-hikmat al-muta‘aliyyah), which
brought together Peripatetic philosophy, Illuminationist
theory and Sufism along with Shi’ite theology. There is no
doubt that existence took the most important role in this
philosophy in which a number of substantial metaphysical
principles are defended, including the fundamentality of
existence, the unity of existence, and the gradation of
existence. These fertile principles enabled him to reap
solutions to many philosophical problems that had re-
mained outstanding for the prior schools of Islamic phi-
losophy. His perspective on existence also leads Mulla
Sadra to further develop some of the earlier theories about
divine simplicity.
Similar to Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra refers to God as ‘‘the
Necessary of Existence’’ and argues for His existence. He
proposes an innovative argument for the existence of God
called ‘‘the proof of the sincere’’ (burhan al-siddiqin).18 In
this argument, Sadra claims, contemplation of the pure
verity of existence allows one to find that existence, in
respect of its essential reality, is necessary and self-suffi-
cient, which means that it is the same as God, and prop-
erties such as contingency, limitation and being an effect
are not properties of existence as such, but they are applied
to reality only because of imperfections and limitations that
lie outside of the nature and verity of existence.19
Then he discusses several aspects of the principle of
God’s simplicity. First, he argues for the identity of God’s
existence and quiddity.20 The conclusion of these argu-
ments is that God lacks any quiddity except His existence.
Then he refutes four other kinds of composition in God,
namely:
(a) the composition of external form and external matter;
(b) the composition of mental form and mental matter;
(c) the composition of the components in a definition,
i.e., the genus and differentia;
(d) the composition of quantitative parts.21
Here we discover a difference between Aquinas and
Sadra concerning the distinction between external form and
matter and mental form and matter, since Aquinas does not
refer to this distinction at all. What Sadra means by mental
18
It is worth noting that Ibn Sina had used this title for his own newly
proposed argument for the existence of God. But Mulla Sadra later
argued that Ibn Sina’s argument, since it is based on the concept of
the existence, cannot be a perfect version of ‘‘the proof of the sin-
cere’’. His claim was that only his own argument, since based just on
the verity of existence (haqiqat al-wujud), deserved this title. See: Ibn
Sina (1403/1982), vol. 3; Mulla Sadra (1981), vol. 6, pp. 14–16.
19
Mulla Sadra (1981), vol. 6, p. 14.
20
Mulla Sadra discusses these arguments in two different volumes of
his Asfar. See: Mulla Sadra (1981), vol. 1, pp. 96–108 and vol. 6, pp.
48–57.
21
Mulla Sadra (1981), vol.6, sec. 1, chap. 9, pp. 100–105.
123
M. Saeedimehr
form and matter is simply their concepts in the mind. On
the other hand, according to a common view in Islamic
philosophy, the concept of the genus and the differentia of
a certain species are respectively derived from the external
matter and form common to the individuals of that species.
However, while genus and differentia may be predicated of
the species, as in, ‘‘Man is animal,’’ and ‘‘Man is ra-
tional,’’ the mental matter and mental form of man cannot
be predicated of the species, because they are the mental
components of the concept of the species and no part or
component is properly predicated of its whole.
In order to demonstrate that God does not enter into any
of these four kinds of composition, Sadra provides several
arguments, some of which are derived from his particular
view of existence. For example, his argument against
God’s composition from quantitative parts is founded on
the claim that this kind of composition (which is usually
seen in corporeal beings) is always accompanied by
ontological weakness and limitation while God’s being is
utterly intense and absolutely infinite.22
As he refutes any composition in God, Mulla Sadra also
rejects another possible conception of God: God cannot be
a simple entity, which could accompany a differentia. In
other words, God cannot be a simple genus (which is not
itself composed of a higher genus and a differentia).
One of the innovative theses of Mulla Sadra in this field
is that there is a special mode of composition, which had
not been considered, at least not in any clear and precise
way, by his predecessors. It is usually called ‘‘the com-
position of existence and non-existence.’’ This sort of
composition may seem baffling, because, at first glance, it
contains an explicit contradiction between existence and
non-existence. So, one may claim that lacking this sort of
composition cannot be a specific characteristic of God, for
it is impossible for anything, and not only God, to be
composed of existence and non-existence. In Sadra’s view,
however, lacking this sort of composition is one of God’s
unique characteristics.
For Sadra, all beings, except God, have some perfections
and lack others. In other words, considering the principle of
the gradation of existence, each finite being possesses all
the perfections of the beings of the rank below and lacks
the additional perfections of the higher beings. So, we can
correctly say that such a being is composed of existence
(namely the existence of some perfections) and non-exis-
tence, (that is, the non-existence of other perfections).
When we reach God, as the unique infinite and wholly
perfect being, this is no longer the case. God is the first and
highest being in the hierarchy of existence and, therefore,
possesses all possible perfections. Consequently, it is false
22
Mulla Sadra (1981), vol. 6, sec. 1, chap. 9, p. 106.
Divine simplicity
to say that He is composed of the existence of some per-
fections and the non-existence of some others.
Perhaps one may suppose that a composition always has
to consist of at least two existent entities; but a philosopher
is able to analyze a being in a purely rational manner into
two (real and concrete) aspects: one of them is affirmative
and the other negative. This latter represents a kind of rel-
ative nothingness, i.e., the lack of some certain perfection.
Sadra then goes on to establish a very important philo-
sophical principle: ‘‘The Truth (i.e., God, Haqq) in its
absolute simplicity is all things’’ (basit al-haqiqah kull al-
ashya’). By this statement he does not mean anything more
than that the absolutely simple Being necessarily possesses
(and, in a sense, is identical with) all perfections of all
beings so that this apparent plurality of perfections is, to
put it in a simple way, gathered in a purely simple entity.
He seems to be proud of being able to demonstrate this
principle philosophically when he writes elsewhere in his
Asfar: ‘‘And this [principle] is a noble subject of which no
one else in the world that I found is aware’’.23
It worth noting that there is no justification for inter-
preting this principle as implying any kind of pantheism. In
Sadra’s view, all finite beings (i.e., everything other than
God) are composites of some perfections and some
imperfections or shortcomings, and these imperfections are
limitations and instances of nothingness. Sadra’s principle
only claims that God is all things in respect to their exis-
tential perfections, not with respect to their limitations.
This is why sometimes an additional phrase is added to this
principle: ‘‘The Truth in its absolute simplicity is all things
but not any of them’’ (wa laysa bi-shay’an minha). In order
to avoid any explicit contradiction we should understand
this conjunction as saying: God is identical with each thing
in respect of its existential perfections and He is distinct
from each thing insofar as it is an existent compounded of
both existence and quiddity, or of perfections and imper-
fections.24
Mulla Sadra argues for this principle in a complicated
way. His main aim is to show that possessing some per-
fection and lacking others leads to a real and concrete
composition. Thus, anything that lacks some perfection
must be, in a relevant aspect, composite and not simple.
23
Mulla Sadra (1981), vol. 4, 40. Mulla Sadra appeals to this prin-
ciple to propose conclusive solutions for a number of very compli-
cated problems including the problem of God’s knowledge of other
beings.
24
Analyzing it as a predicative conjunction, some advocates of this
principle considered that the predication here is not what the logicians
call common predication (haml-e shayeh) but it is of another kind
which can be translated as ‘‘the predication of the rarity to the ver-
ity’’, if ‘‘rarity’’ is understood as that which is rarefied or subtle (the
Arabic expression is: haml al-raqiqah ‘ala al-haqiqah). For further
explanation see: Tabataba’i (1378/2000), sec. 12, chap. 4.
197
Therefore, we can conclude that the absolutely simple
Truth cannot lack any conceivable perfection.25
The second part of Sadra’s theory of divine simplicity
concerns the unity of God and His attributes. First, he
makes some classifications concerning divine attributes.
From one aspect, we may divide God’s attributes into
affirmative and negative. Knowledge and power are
examples of affirmative attributes and ‘‘being a body’’ and
‘‘having a shape’’ are examples of the negative ones. The
difference between these two is that the latter, contrary to
the former, should be denied of God. The first kind, in turn,
divides into two secondary kinds: non-relative, like
knowledge and life, and relative, such as ‘‘being the cre-
ator’’ or ‘‘being the first cause.’’ The relative attributes are
nothing but relations between God and others.
Sadra next proposes a preliminary unifying principle:
All negative attributes can be reduced to a single negation,
the negation of contingency. This negation, however, is
nothing but a negation of an imperfection, which is
equivalent to the affirmation of a kind of perfection. Since
the double negation is equal to an affirmation, it eventually
appears that all God’s negative attributes refer to his
absolute perfection and in fact are nothing more than His
affirmative attributes. When we say, for example, ‘‘God is
not a body,’’ we do not mean that God lacks a certain kind
of perfection. What we really mean is denying the non-
existence of a perfection, which results in affirming that
perfection. Therefore, to state that God is not a body is
equivalent to saying that He possesses the perfection of
being immaterial.
In a similar manner, contemplating the non-relative
attributes shows that they substantially refer to a single
primal property; the ‘‘necessity of existence’’ (wujub al-
wujud), which is, in a metaphysical sense, exactly the same
as the absolute perfection and intensity of real existence.
Moreover, all divine relative attributes refer to a single
relation, which is God’s sovereignty (qayyumiyyat) or, in
other words, His being the sustainer. This relation or action
is a unique, eternal and simple one that lies beyond God’s
essence itself, although it stems from His essential per-
fection and is a sign of it. Because the given multitude is an
external one, it is plain that it would not compromise God’s
essential simplicity, even if it were composed and multi-
plied in itself.26
In Mulla Sadra’s opinion, this kind of philosophical
consideration provides a proper ground for belief in the
ontological identity between God and His attributes. How
is Sadra, then, to argue for this theory? He first cites an
argument proposed by other philosophers and criticizes it
25
See: Mulla Sadra (1981), vol. 6, pp. 111–115 and Mulla Sadra
(1992), pp. 61–62.
26
See: Mulla Sadra (1981), vol. 6, sec. 2, chap. 1, pp. 118–120.
123
198
in detail.27 Then he offers his own arguments, one of which
can be summarized as follows.
If the divine attributes, such as knowledge and power,
were ontologically distinct from Him and existed as sepa-
rate beings, then God would be an entity, which is, in itself,
void of perfections like knowledge and power and, in order
to possess them, needs to appeal to others (even though
these ‘‘others’’ are nothing but His own attributes!). On the
other hand, it is quite evident that a given entity, which has
its perfections in itself, is greater and more perfect than one
which is in itself void of perfections and can have them just
through other beings. God is, however, the most perfect
conceivable being. Thus, it is not possible for Him to have
His attributes distinct from His very essence.
If the divine essence lacks these perfections in itself,
then the sum (or the composition) of that entity and these
external perfections will be more perfect than that essence
by itself. On the other hand, each composite is a contingent
being which could not be but an effect of a certain cause.
God is the first cause and, thus, the cause of every con-
tingent being including the composition in question. Con-
sequently, we would be led to the conclusion that God, as
the cause, would be less perfect than His effect; which is
undoubtedly absurd.28
What is, then, Sadra’s opinion about the conceptual
identity thesis? As we mentioned before, Ibn Sina, through
a fairly precise analysis, reaches the conclusion that God’s
essential attributes such as knowledge and power are alike,
even in respect to their concepts. Sadra, on the other hand,
strictly rejects this thesis. His argument is short and clear:
This thesis obviously implies that when words like
‘‘knowledge’’, ‘‘power’’, ‘‘life’’ etc. are applied to
God, they are synonymous and therefore, applying all
of them to God would convey the same meaning as
just one of them. Of course, this result is implausible
and contradicts our intuitions.29
But is the conceptual identity thesis as odd and unreason-
able as Sadra asserts? Could we really accept that a great
philosopher like Ibn Sina endorses such an unintuitive
thesis? This issue becomes more complex as we consider
the fact that Sadra has elsewhere asserted that, in addition
to ontological identity, God’s attributes are identical in the
way our reason grasps them. In this view, there is no
plurality in the manner in which our reason discovers the
several concepts of God’s attributes and we can never find
any ultimate rational distinctions between them.
The main Sadraean principles, the fundamentality, unity
and gradation of existence, can shed light on the issue.
27
Mulla Sadra (1981), vol. 6, pp. 126–132.
28
Mulla Sadra (1981), vol. 6, pp. 134–135.
29
Mulla Sadra (1981), vol. 6, p. 145.
123
M. Saeedimehr
Mulla Sadra asserts in the ending part of his discussion of
the conceptual identity thesis that someone who ignores the
fundamentality and unity of existence naturally thinks that
the plurality of quiddities and concepts brings about a
corresponding plurality in the external world. Thus, such a
person is inclined to consider each attribute of God, given
that it has a distinct concept and quiddity, as having a
separate external being. In this view, thus, if we are to
avoid the ontological plurality of divine attributes, we have
to consider them as having the same concepts and quid-
dities. In other words, we may say that, according to Sadra,
ignoring the aforementioned principles implies the mutual
implication of the ontological and conceptual identity
theses. But someone who believes in the fundamentality of
existence (over quiddity) can easily conceive how a single
external being could be signified by different concepts.
Concepts, however, have no being of their own, but are
distinguished by quiddity. Concepts can thus be concep-
tually distinct without being ontologically distinct. Like-
wise, the divine attributes are conceptually distinct, while
having no distinction in their existence.
Here Sadra refers to a very important point: according to
the principle of the gradation of existence, reality is noth-
ing but a hierarchy of beings ordered in respect of the
degree of their perfections and, indeed, the more perfect a
being, the more its simplicity, and the more concepts of
perfection are applicable to it.30 Here we find a significant
difference between the Peripatetic philosophy and Sadra’s
transcendent wisdom since, according to the former, the
more compound a being, the more the concepts derived
from and attributed to it. So, it becomes clear why Ibn Sina
tries to defend a version of the conceptual identity thesis;
he belongs to the Peripatetic tradition according to which
God, as the absolute simple entity, could not be signified by
multiple concepts. Sadra, however, thinks in the opposite
direction: God as the absolute perfect and totally simple
being must be the subject of all attributes that signify any
kind of perfection. Otherwise, we must be able to deny at
least one kind of perfection about Him and this, in turn,
would imply a violation of the principle that the Truth in its
absolute simplicity is all things.
4 Conclusion
Insofar as we may consider them representative figures in
Islamic and Christian philosophical thought, our review of
Ibn Sina, Aquinas and Mulla Sadra shows that the doctrine of
divine simplicity has enjoyed both an outstanding and pro-
gressive history. All three of these philosophers believe in
the absolute simplicity of God and think that He could never
30
Mulla Sadra (1981), vol. 6, p. 148.
Divine simplicity
be subject to any sort of composition, because being com-
posite contradicts a number of His certain and undeniable
attributes. As we saw, however, Aquinas provides a more
detailed account of the doctrine than Ibn Sina, and Mulla
Sadra develops the issue further by bringing new kinds of
composition under consideration and presenting innovative
principles, such as the principle of simplicity of verity.
On the other hand, all of these philosophers endorse a
sort of natural theology and believe that human reason is
capable of discovering at least some truths about divine
existence and attributes. Consequently, they try to justify
each of their relevant claims by presenting rational argu-
ments. Moreover, these thinkers roughly work in the par-
adigm of Aristotelian metaphysics; they all appeal to
metaphysical concepts and principles originally derived
from Aristotle’s philosophy. Mulla Sadra, however, with
the help of his own ontological tenets, seems to succeed in
moving beyond the Aristotelian framework. To put this
point in a clearer way, we may divide the doctrine of divine
Simplicity into two main parts.
(I) First there is the rejection of different sorts of compo-
sition in God, whether ontological, like the composition
of matter and form, or conceptual, like the composition
of genus and differentia. As to this part of the doctrine,
the list of the possible diverse sorts of composition is
approximately the same for these three philosophers.
One of the differences is that Aquinas distinguishes
between God’s being distinct from his quiddity and His
being a composition of quiddity and existence as two
possible kinds of composition. But Ibn Sina and Sadra
do not refer to the former separately. This could be
because, in their opinion, the only way a thing could be
separate from its quiddity is being composed of
existence and quiddity. Therefore, refuting the latter
possibility is the same as refuting the former one.
Moreover, Sadra adds a new kind of simplicity to the
list, i.e., being composed of existence and non-exis-
tence. In fact, this notion of simplicity insists firmly on
the absolute perfection of God to the extent that it is
impossible for Him to lack any possible perfection.
(II) There is a rejection of the distinction between God
and His (essential) attributes such as knowledge and
power. This part, at first glance, can be seen as
including two main theses: the ontological identity
thesis and the conceptual identity thesis. As we saw,
all three of our philosophers support the former thesis
and take it as a substantial component of their theory
of divine simplicity. As to the latter, however, this is
not the case; Ibn Sina apparently defends the con-
ceptual identity thesis, which states that, in addition to
an ontological identity, God’s essential attributes are
also identical in respect to their conception, while
199
both Aquinas and Sadra explicitly deny it, although on
different grounds. Aquinas argues that we apply
attributes, such as knowledge, to God not univocally
or equivocally but analogically, and through analog-
ical predication the creaturely different concepts of
those attributes will remain different while predicated
of Him. Consequently, the names of God cannot have
the same meaning, ‘‘because they do not signify the
same point of view.’’ But Sadra’s perspective is dif-
ferent. In his view, when the human being confronts
the absolute simplicity of divine Being, the faculty of
intellection is able to draw off diverse notions and
predicate them as attributes of God.
Mulla Sadra’s account of divine simplicity breaks out of
the Aristotelian mold in which the theories of Ibn Sina and
Aquinas take shape because that mold is ultimately inca-
pable of accommodating the monistic conception of deity
that dominates Islamic mysticism, and to which Mulla Sa-
dra gave philosophical expression. The attributes of God are
all what medieval Christian philosophers would call tran-
scendentals, because they describe pure being independent
of any category. The attributes that do not describe per-
fections, such as those that define the categories and every
genus and species, are all seen as negative, as describing
limitations on pure being. In the philosophy of Mulla Sadra,
God is not understood merely as an existing being with the
unique feature of existing necessarily, nor is He understood
merely as a being with perfect attributes infinitely greater
than the creaturely attributes with which we are familiar;
rather, God is understood as pure being stripped of any
limitations, and thus, without any compounding of exis-
tence and non-existence, and unique in this simplicity.
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