Schema

I Gradi dellessere distinti dal Nisseno:

- Interpretazione di Moreschini: Lontologia di Gregorio riproduce, quindi, il
dualismo platonico.1
- Interpretazione di Maspero: Nel ragionmento di Gregorio luso ripetuto del
mostra la forma di pensiero relazionale che distingue in modo progressive diversi
piani ontologici, differenziando il livello sostanziale del rispetto
allaccidente e quello dellincreato rispetto al creato, cio dellincorrutibile
rispetto al corruptibile, in base al . In questo modo, si pu
individuare unulteriore distinzione che si ha nellimmanenza divina, e che
riguarda la relazione di origine, indicando con il . La relazione permette
sia di distinguiere i diversi livelli, sia di unire allinterno dellunico livello2.
- Interpretazione di Zupi: Tre, dunque, sono i gradi dell'essere distinti dal Nisseno:
ii sensibile, l'intellegibile creato, l'intellegibile increato3.
Originality of the Distinction
It was again D.L. Bals himself who for the rst time exited this radical dichotomy,
recognizing the originality of Gregory: Gregorys teaching on the unity of nature in the
many individuals is neither simply Aristotelian Logic nor Platonic Ontology.57
Gregory thought of a true and real unity of nature, but did not conceive of the unique
essence as a separate existent from individuals. His conception is thus an authentic
Christian transformation of the Neoplatonic logic and ontology4.
Distinction: Nature / Relation
The immanent dynamic is expressed in terms of relation (). For this very reason,
the Persons are distinct through the attentive use of prepositions, made possible by the
linguistic precision of Greek. In the same manner, personal property is expressed in
adverbial form, in so far as the Person itself is identified with the mode of being [].
Therefore, stating that something is without generation, how it is is expounded, but, with
such words, what it is is not also explained (Abl, GNO III/ 1,56, 11-22). Gregory clearly
affirms that there are two distinct levels: that of nature, and that of relation, the 5.
Relation in Aristotle

1. GREGORY DI NISSA, Opere dogmatiche, Milano 2014, 15.

2
MASPERO, G., Essere e relazione. Lontologia trinitaria di Gregorio di Nissa, Roma 2013, 54
3
ZUPI, M., Incanto e Incantesimo del Dire, Roma 2007, 543.
4
MASPERO, G., Trinity and man: Gregory of Nyssas Ad Ablabium, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae v.
86, Leiden; Boston 2007, 15
5
MATEO SECO, L.F. MASPERO, G., ed., The Brill dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa, Supplements to Vigiliae
Christianae v. 99, Leiden; Boston 2010, 756

1. Definition: We call relatives [] all such things as are said to be just what they
are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else6.
a. Morales also draws attention to the fact that for Aristotle the predica- tion
of any relational attribute always presupposes an underlying nature: Aristotle thus repudiates the idea that relations be postulated as principles of
Being (Metaph. 1088a20ff)7.
2. All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate8.
a. Christian writers picked up the property of reciprocation. They even used
some of Aristotles examples, such as master-slave and father-son.31
Aristotle, how- ever, adds a necessary qualification, namely, that all
relatives . . . are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate,
provided they are properly given (Cat. 7a2223)9.
3. Relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature []; and in most cases this is true10.
a. To prove that God the Father and God the Son are both divine and
coeternal, Christian writers also used this property of simultaneity by
nature11.
Relation in Stoicism
Here Gregory speaks of relation in Stoic terms ():
Those then who enquire precisely into the meaning of the term almighty find
that it declares nothing else concerning the divine power than that that activity (or
energy) which controls created things and is indicated by the word almighty
stands in a certain relation to something []. For as he would not be called a
physician, save on account of the sick . . . so neither would he be styled almighty,
did not all creation stand in need of one to regulate it and keep it in being.70
Nevertheless, Gregory does not seem to favor the Stoic category of relation. The
phrase [] occurs only two more times in all of his works, at CE 2.116 (NPNF 2.5:262)
and CE 2.392 (NPNF 2.5:289). In both places, the Stoic category of relation is used to
express the relation of a body to other objects and the relation between created things,
respectively. Gregory does not attach any special significance to this phrase12.
Relation in Eunomio

Cat. 6a3640. Quoted in: TURCESCU, L., Gregory of Nyssa and the concept of divine persons, American
Academy of Religion academy series, Oxford; New York 2005, 30.
7

Ibid., 35.

Cat. 6b2835. Quoted in: TURCESCU, L., Gregory of Nyssa and the concept of divine persons, American
Academy of Religion academy series, Oxford; New York 2005, 31.
9

Ibid, 30.
Cat. 7b1521. Quoted in ibid.
11
Ibid.
10

12

Ibid., 87.

Relation in Gregory

However, he envisions a third category of names, which are used both

independently and with their relatedness, such as God and good and others like
them.71 One transforms such names from absolute into relative by attaching
possessive adjectives to them, such as my God or your good. In the example
of absolute names that can be turned into relative names by merely attaching to
them possessive adjectives, Gregory shows that he is either unaware of, or does
not care about, Aristotles argument that no substances can be called relatives
(expressed clearly at Cat. 8b1520) []13.

13

Ibid., 87-88.