Chapter 10
ARBITRATION
INCORPORATION OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
Under English law, pursuant to section 6(2) of the 1996 Act, reference may be made in a contract to a written form of arbitration
clause or to a document containing an arbitration clause and this will have the result of incorporating the arbitration clause into the
contract.
However, if this approach is adopted, the parties should check not only the clarity of the reference to the arbitration clause or
document which contains it, but also the sufficiency of the arbitration clause contained in that document. The courts of many
countries, including England, are suspicious of an incorporation-by-reference mechanism and are more likely to decline to give effect
to an arbitration clause incorporated by reference than to an express provision in the contract.
In the reinsurance context there have been a number of authorities on the question of what requirements need to be satisfied in
order for an arbitration clause in an underlying insurance policy to be effectively incorporated into a reinsurance contract. Many have
decided that the general words of incorporation which were used were insufficient to incorporate an arbitration clause into the
reinsurance or retrocession contract.
In Pine Top Insurance Co. v. Unione Italiana Anglo Saxon Reinsurance Co. [1987] 1 Lloyds Rep. 476 third party insurers
underwrote holiday insurance which was reinsured with excess of loss reinsurers. The reinsurance contract provided that all terms and
conditions of the reinsurance were to be as per the original cover. The original cover contained a limited arbitration clause. Excess of
loss reinsurers subsequently retroceded their risk to Pine Top, on similar terms to those in the excess of loss reinsurance contract.
When disputes arose between Pine Top and Unione Italiana over the scope of the cover, Pine Top sought a declaration that the
arbitration clause in the original insurance was not incorporated into the retrocession agreement which was in the form of a
retrocession slip. The Court agreed with Pine Tops contention and held that there was no express reference to arbitration in the slip
and on its true construction, the arbitration clause was not incorporated into it.
This issue also arose in Excess Insurance Ltd v. Mander [1997] 2 Lloyds Rep. 119 where the court held that general words of
incorporation which made no reference to the arbitration clause could not amount to any intention to incorporate the arbitration
clause. This decision was also followed in Trygg Hansa Insurance Co. Ltd v. Equitas Ltd [1998] 2 Lloyds Rep. 439,1 where the court
held that in the absence of special circumstances, general words of incorporation were not effective to incorporate an arbitration
clause under s. 6(2) of the 1996 Act.
This has recently been confirmed in Cigna Life Insurance Co. of Europe SA NV v. Intercaser SA de Seguros y Reaseguros [2002] 1
All E.R. (Comm) 235 in which the court again held that general words of incorporation were insufficient to incorporate an arbitration
clause as such clauses were personal to the parties to the agreement and collateral to their main obligations. The courts decision
again emphasises the severable nature of the arbitration clause.
These cases reinforce the point that if parties wish a reinsurance dispute to be determined by arbitration, they should make sure that
there is an arbitration clause in the slip as well as in the policy or treaty wording. As the arbitration is a separate contract a court will
not automatically assume that the parties intended to be bound by it. Furthermore, following the decision in Unum Life Insurance Co.
of America v. Israel Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd [2002] Lloyds Rep. I.R. 374 even where the wording, including an arbitration
clause, was agreed by the lead underwriter, it may not bind the following market if it has not been provided for on the slip and
provisions such as wording underlying will not necessarily import the arbitration clause.
JURISDICTION OF ARBITRATORS
As previously stated, the scope of an arbitration clause determines the extent of the arbitral tribunals jurisdiction. Therefore, the
wider the scope of the clause the more extensive the arbitral tribunals jurisdiction to consider and rule on disputes covered by the
clause (including, as in Harbour Assurance, disputes regarding initial illegality of the underlying contract). For example, in a
reinsurance context the jurisdiction of arbitrators can be widened considerably if the parties include an honourable engagement
clause in their reinsurance contract (as discussed in the section on The Use of Arbitration in Reinsurance Disputes, above) as this
will enable arbitrators to apply market principles in deciding the issue in dispute.
The arbitral tribunal should not exceed the jurisdiction conferred on it by the arbitration clause which the parties have negotiated
and agreed. However, an issue arises if one of the parties believes that the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction and seeks to
challenge it. The arbitration clause gives the arbitral tribunal powers to resolve disputes but does not identify who should decide on
whether the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to rule on a particular matter if its jurisdiction is challenged. The general position is that
the arbitral tribunal can decide on its own jurisdiction. This concept is known as the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz (that is,
jurisdiction ruling upon jurisdictional matters) and has been enacted in England in section 30 of the 1996 Act.
Section 30(1) provides that, unless parties agree otherwise, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own substantive jurisdiction as to:
whether there is a valid arbitration agreement;
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CONDUCT OF ARBITRATION
What determines the conduct and procedure of the arbitration?
As mentioned in the section on the Scope of the Arbitration Clause, above, the procedure for the conduct of an arbitration is
generally determined by agreement between the parties, and failing that, by the arbitral tribunal. Party autonomy is one of the guiding
principles of arbitration, and is endorsed in most national laws and institutional rules. It allows the parties to adopt either an
adversarial/common law approach (as followed in the English courts) or an inquisitorial/civil law approach, or alternatively a blend of
the two, regardless of the procedure that is followed in the courts of the state where the arbitration is being held. In international
arbitration, experience indicates that the procedure adopted depends not so much on the place where the arbitration takes place but
more on the background and experience of the tribunal and the parties legal advisers (The Americanization of International
Arbitration?, Lucy Reed and Jonathan Sutcliffe (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer), Mealeys International Arbitration Report, Vol.
16, No. 4).
Arbitration can be conducted in many different ways and there are no fixed rules of procedure that will apply. Whilst party
autonomy is, of course, fundamental in determining the procedure, there are a number of considerations that determine and impact on
the conduct of the proceedings, namely any national legislation (in particular any mandatory rules) and public policy requirements of
the place of the arbitration, any institutional rules (where the parties have opted for institutional arbitration) and any international
conventions that may apply. (In England, the Arbitration Act 1996 addresses certain aspects of the conduct of the arbitration; see in
particular sections 33 to 41, which set out the tribunals powers and duties with regard to the conduct of the proceedings. This is
discussed further below.)
It is generally thought that control of the arbitral procedure shifts as the arbitration progresses. (See for example The Law and
Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, 3rd edn, 1999, at paragraph 602; also Thomas
Webster, Party Control in International Arbitration, in Arbitration International, 2003, Vol. 19, No. 2.) When the parties are
agreeing upon arbitration and negotiating the arbitration agreement, the parties have complete control over the question of how their
dispute will be resolved, and are free to choose the type of arbitration (institutional or ad hoc), the governing law and the seat. At the
point when the dispute arises, the parties still have substantial control over key matters, such as the selection of the tribunal, the
formulation of statements of case, etc. However, once a tribunal has been appointed, their role becomes much more significant, so
that whilst the parties will maintain a significant degree of control over the procedure, for example by providing input on procedural
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orders and on the Terms of Reference, the tribunal will exercise a degree of control. During the conduct of the arbitration itself, the
parties may need to seek assistance from national courts, either at the seat of the arbitration, or in the country where an interim
remedy is required (for example, the preservation of evidence) and so certain parts of the arbitration may fall within the control of the
state courts. By the time the award is issued, assuming it is not complied with voluntarily, then the tribunal will often have become
functus officio and the successful party will be dependent upon the national courts of the country where the losing partys assets are
located in order to seek enforcement of its award. This is discussed in detail in the final section of this chapter.
(i) to act fairly and impartially as between all parties giving each a reasonable opportunity of putting its case and dealing with
that of its opponent; and
(ii) to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the arbitration, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to
provide a fair and efficient means for the final resolution of the parties dispute.
Such agreements shall be made by the parties in writing or recorded in writing by the Arbitral Tribunal at the request of and with the authority of the
parties.
14.2 Unless otherwise agreed by the parties under Article 14.1, the Arbitral Tribunal shall have the widest discretion to discharge its duties
This Article categorically sets out the importance of party autonomy in determining the conduct of the proceedings, and subsequent
provisions concerning the procedure to be followed are stated to apply unless the parties agree otherwise.
The procedural order will usually make provision for the parties to disclose those documents which support their case. Document
production tends to encompass documents, or categories of documents, that can be identified with reasonable specificity and that are
relevant to the dispute. The IBA rules, for example, allow disclosure but require a party to limit its request to named documents or
categories and to state why they are relevant.
The parties generally rely on witnesses to support their case. The scope and extent of examination of witnesses is usually a matter
for the tribunal to determine in its discretion, and it is often the case that the parties will be permitted to cross-examine all witnesses
called by the opposing party, in addition to the tribunal itself being free to put questions to witnesses. The common and civil law
approach to the use of party affiliated witnesses and to the issue of preliminary contact between a party and a witness differ, but the
IBA Rules do in fact consider that a partys officers, employees and other representatives are acceptable witnesses, and that it is not
improper for a party or its lawyers to interview its own witnesses. The use of party-appointed and/or tribunal-appointed experts is also
accepted practice in international arbitration; in the case of tribunal-appointed experts the parties are generally involved in the
briefing, choice and interrogation of the expert. Some arbitrators use more innovative procedures, such as witness conferencing,
whereby all witnesses are heard simultaneously rather than one by one.
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There is usually an oral hearing for short opening and closing statements from the lawyers and examination and cross-examination
of witnesses, and these hearings tend to be shorter than one would encounter in common law jurisdictions for a comparable dispute.
The hearing is usually adversarial rather than inquisitorial in nature, although the tribunal frequently takes a more active role than the
judge in a common law court.
Appendix 4 sets out a summary of how arbitration proceedings will be conducted under the LCIA and ARIAS rules. The 1996 Act
contains provisions relating to the conduct of arbitration proceedings in England. These are discussed further below.
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as the removal of an arbitrator (s. 24) no power to intervene unless the aggrieved party has first exhausted its remedy under the
institutional rules.
Under section 24 of the 1996 Act other grounds for an application to remove an arbitrator include where he does not have the
physical or mental capacity to conduct the proceedings or where he has failed or refused properly to conduct the proceedings.
Under section 29 of the 1996 Act, arbitrators now have immunity in the performance of their functions as arbitrators unless they
have acted in bad faith. This is no doubt directed at ensuring finality by discouraging secondary litigation designed to undermine the
arbitral process.
Arbitrators do not have the power to enforce the attendance of a witness (essentially because of the absence of any substantive
sanction, such as a fine). However, a party may seek the assistance of the English courts in securing the attendance of a witness who
is unwilling to testify. Accordingly, the English court on application by a party, with the tribunals permission or with written
agreement of the other parties, will give assistance to compel the attendance of witnesses in the United Kingdom and to ensure the
production of documents. This power is reinforced by the courts powers to impose sanctions for contempt of court.
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matters not submitted to arbitration in accordance with the parties arbitration agreement.
The remedies available to the court here are to confirm or vary the award or to set aside the award in whole or in part.
Section 68 only applies to awards and not decisions or orders of the tribunal, and therefore does not permit intervention during the
course of the arbitration.
Section 68 sets out an exhaustive list of circumstances in which a party may make an application (most of which relate broadly to
failure of due process or failure by the tribunal to act properly or in accordance with the agreed procedure). The court may only
intervene if one of the stated grounds applies and even if a serious irregularity is shown, the court will only intervene if that
irregularity has caused or will cause substantial injustice (this represents a real and significant shift towards finality and
non-intervention, as compared with the previous legislation under which the court would intervene if there was a mere possibility that
the misconduct might affect the result).
The available remedies are to remit all or part of the award to the tribunal for reconsideration, to set aside all or part of the award
and to declare all or part of the award to be of no effect. Remission is the primary remedy. Similar restrictions and time limits apply
as per challenges under section 67.
Under section 69 a limited right of appeal on a point of law is available in restricted circumstances. The rationale for this is that the
parties had implicitly agreed that the tribunal should apply the law properly and if it failed to do so, it was not reaching the result
contemplated by the parties.
An appeal may only be brought with the agreement of all the other parties to the arbitration or with the leave of the court, and the
circumstances in which the court may give leave are restricted (for example that the determination of the question of law will rather
than could substantially affect the rights of the parties). The guidelines for granting leave are that:
the decision of the tribunal was obviously wrong; or
the question is one of general public importance and the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt; and
it is just and proper in all the circumstances for the court to determine the question.
The right of appeal is expressly limited to a question of law and section 82(1) of the Act defines questions of law for an application to
the English Court as a question of English law. Accordingly there can never be an appeal on a question of fact or a question of foreign
law.
Enforcement
Part III of the Act (ss. 99 to 104) deals with the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and this is discussed below.
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Procedure
Section 38 of the Arbitration Act 1950 requires the party seeking to enforce the award to produce the original award or an
authenticated copy, evidence that the award has become final, that the award is a foreign award and that the conditions set out in
section 37(1) are satisfied.
Procedure
The procedure for enforcing a Convention award under section 102 of the 1996 Act simply requires the enforcing party to produce a
duly authenticated original award or a certified copy of it and the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy of it.
As the award can be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order, the usual means of enforcing English judgments and
orders will be available, for example, charging orders on land, stop notices on securities, etc.
The only grounds on which the English courts may refuse enforcement of a Convention award are the grounds set out in the New
York Convention and re-enacted in the 1996 Act under section 103, including that the arbitration agreement was not valid under the
law governing the arbitration agreement; that the award deals with differences not contemplated by the arbitration agreement or goes
beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement; that the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the parties agreement; that the award has been set aside under another system of law or has not yet become binding on the
parties. The English courts are under a positive obligation to enforce a foreign award unless one of the grounds set in section 103 of
the 1996 Act are satisfied and the party resisting the enforcement must prove the grounds for challenge not the enforcing party (Yukos
Oil Co. v. Dardana Ltd [2002] EWCA CIV 543). Therefore, even if the defendant against whom the award is made has no assets in
the UK (as in the case of Rosseel NV v. Oriental Commercial Shipping (UK) Ltd [1991] 2 Lloyds Rep. 625) the court will still be
required to enforce the award.
Most of the national courts of other countries party to the New York Convention have interpreted narrowly the grounds on which
enforcement of Convention awards can be resisted. In many cases they have retained discretion when grounds for refusal do exist as
to whether or not to enforce the award and have usually adopted a pro-enforcement approach.
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arbitral awards as they are specifically excluded from the Conventions remit (see Articles 1 and 25 of the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions).
1 Trygg Hansa (as reinsurer) sought to stay proceedings against it, in favour of arbitration pursuant to s. 9 of the 1996 Act. The contract of primary insurance
provided for arbitration and the reinsurance agreements entered into by Trygg Hansa included the provision that the reinsurance follow the same terms as
the policy of the primary insurers. Trygg had sought to rely on s. 6(2) of the 1996 Act to incorporate the arbitration clause contained in the primary insurance
by reference.
2 The IBA Rules (first issued in 1983, and then revised and re-issued in 1999) were drafted by eminent members of the International Bar Association from both
common and civil law backgrounds and are a useful harmonisation of the procedures commonly used in international arbitration. See also the Commentary on
the New IBA Rules of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, IBA Working Party, BLI, Issue 2 (2000).
3 Other significant decisions include Locabail (UK) Ltd v. Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] Q.B. 451 and AT&T Corporation and Lucent Technologies Inc v.
Saudi Cable Co. [2000] Lloyds Rep. 127, although the latter case, whilst of interest, is based on the Arbitration Act 1950 and the 1988 version of the ICC
Rules.
4 This provides that a prospective arbitrator should disclose:
(a) any past or present business relationship, whether direct or indirect including prior appointment as an arbitrator, with any party to the dispute, or
any representative of a party, or any person known to be a potentially important witness in the arbitration. With regard to present relationships, the
duty of disclosure applies irrespective of their magnitude, but with regard to the past relationship only if they were of more than a trivial nature in
relation to the arbitrators professional or business affairs. Non-disclosure of an indirect relationship unknown to a prospective arbitrator will not be a
ground for disqualification unless it could have been ascertained by making reasonable enquiries;
(b) the nature and duration of any substantial social relationship with any person likely to be an important witness in the arbitration;
(c) the nature of any previous relationship with any fellow arbitrator (including joint prior service as an arbitrator);
(d) the extent of any prior knowledge that he may have of the dispute;
(e) the extent of any commitments which may affect his availability to perform duties as arbitrator as may reasonably be anticipated.
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