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Palileo Vs.

National Irrigation Administration

A lot situated at Barangay Manaol, Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna, was
originally registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 2140 pursuant to Decree No. 13700
in the name of Olivia Gomez Vda. De Palileo, mother of petitioners Eugenio G. Palileo, Lauro G.
Palileo and the late Aurelio G. Palileo, herein represented by his heirs. Petitioners are in
possession of the subject property, having inherited the same from their mother who died on
14 January 1980. Said parcel of land was subdivided into three (3) equal lots among the
Respondent NIA, on the other hand, has been on the property since 1956, having built thereon
a canal in 1956 and an access road in 1983. NIA access road and the canal took an area of over
10,000 square meters. Records of respondent showed that the lot occupied by the canal was
expropriated by virtue of a court order as early as 24 February 1958 and that information
regarding the construction of access roads, under a foreign-assisted program, had been
disseminated by the respondent among municipal mayors sometime in April 1978. It does not
appear, however, whether payment of just compensation had been made upon such
expropriated property of herein petitioners.
Records likewise bear out that the respective lots of petitioners were benefited by the irrigation
system of the respondent. In a letter dated 11 January 1994, respondent NIA assessed
petitioner Olivia Palileo irrigation service fee amounting to P16,221.40.
Shortly, in a letter dated 28 March 1994, petitioner Eugenio Palileo made a formal claim for
reasonable rentals on the affected portions of the land. Since their demands were refused by
the respondent, petitioners instituted the present action on 10 July 1995 for recovery of
possession with damages against the respondent alleging that respondent illegally constructed
an irrigation canal with an adjacent road, eating up a total of 10,570 square meters.
Petitioners prayed for a judgment: (a) underscoring the fact that they are the lawful registered
owners of the 10,570 square meter-portion of the lot taken by the defendant unlawfully; (b)
ordering the respondent to bestow peaceful possession of the subject property to petitioners;
and (c) ordering the respondent to pay petitioners reasonable compensation for the continued
use of the subject portion during all the time prior to this suit in the sum of not less
than P100,000.00, acceptance fee, moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation expenses
WON the petitioners may recover the possession of the property taken for public use.

No. The petitioners cannot recover the possession of the property taken for public use.
In the case of Alfonso v. Pasay City, the court ruled that the unpaid landowner cannot recover
possession of property taken for public use even while no requisite expropriation proceedings
were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation
for his property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the
In this case, it is undisputed that the access road was taken by respondent for public
use. Hence, such taking, even in the absence of an order of expropriation or memorandum of
agreement, shall not entitle the owner to the recovery of possession but only to just
compensation, following existing case law.
Mananasan vs Republic
On April 17, 1979, the Republic, in behalf of the DECS, filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila for
the expropriation of two parcels of land with improvements thereon located at Geronimo
Street, Sampaloc, Manila: one consisted of 2,905.6 square meters owned by ADC and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 104374; and the other 584.5 square meters owned by
Manansan and covered by TCT No. 132892. The property was to be used for the construction of
the Trinidad Tecson Elementary School. Plaintiff averred that the amount of just compensation
wasP884,830.00. Plaintiff amended its complaint to implead the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
in whose favor ADC had mortgaged the property as well as the occupants of the property.
Plaintiff averred that the just compensation for the property was P904,830.00.
On September 26, 1994, the court appointed the following three (3) commissioners to
determine the just compensation of the properties expropriated: (1) City Assessor Reynaldo
Jaylo; (2) City Auditor Reynaldo Ventura; and (3) Asian Appraisal Company, Inc. (AACI), thru its
representative. However, on October 28, 1994, the court replaced City Auditor Reynaldo
Ventura with the City Treasurer of Manila.
On March 11, 1995, the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Manila submitted a Joint Appraisal
Report of the expropriated properties and fixed the valuation of both land and buildings
at P15,893,111.00. The valuation was based on the 1995 BIR Zonal Value
WON the valuation of the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Manila was valid.

Eslaban, Jr. v. De Onorio, The rule is that the value of the property must be determined either
as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first.
In this case, the complaint was filed on April 17, 1979, and the trial court issued the writ of
possession on January 10, 1981. The City Treasurer, City Assessor and the AACI based their
assessment reports as of 1995 and not as of 1979 or a difference of 16 years. Indeed, the fair
market value of the property in 1979 cannot be fixed by the mere expedient of cutting in half
the assessment made by the City Treasurer and City Assessor or AACI for that matter as of
1997. Such a process is arbitrary and a grave abuse of the trial courts discretion. It bears
stressing that just compensation means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities
should be considered.
Since the commissioners failed to base their assessment of the property as of 1979 and relied
solely on data as of 1995 instead of 1979, it behooved the trial court to direct them to revise
their assessment, or to discharge them and appoint new ones, or to require the parties to
adduce competent evidence to prove the fair market value of the property as of 1979.



The National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created

to undertake the development of hydro-electric generation of power and the production of
electricity from any and all sources; and particularly the construction, operation, and maintenance
of power plants, auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines, power stations
and substations, and other works for the purpose of developing hydraulic power from any river,
lake, creek, spring and waterfalls in the Philippines and supplying such power to the inhabitants
thereof.# Under Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, the NPC is authorized to enter private property
provided that the owners thereof shall be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby.
For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No. SMJ-389,
NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente, for an
easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly
agricultural and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386. On June 19, 1997, Maria executed a Right of Way Grant# in
favor of NPC over the lot for P1,277,886.90. The NPC paid her P524,635.50 for the damaged
improvements thereon.

The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00 per
square meter) was then processed.# However, the NPC Board of Directors approved Board
Resolution No. 97-246 stating that it would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion
and P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural portion.
On July 12, 1999, Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz submitted their report,# recommending as payment
for just compensation P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per sq m for the
agricultural lot. On October 28, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment,# declaring as well-grounded, fair
and reasonable the compensation for the property as recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr.

ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation was achieved with regards to the fair market value of the
residential and agricultural property?


The trial court fixed the just compensation for the property as follows: (1) P499.00 per sq m on the
17,195 sq m agricultural portion of the subject land; and (2) P800.00 per sq m on the 6,565 sq m
residential portion of the lot. Noticeably, the trial court did not blindly accept the recommendation
of majority of the commissioners of P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per sq m
for the agricultural lot. Indeed, the trial court took into account the evidence of the parties, in
tandem with the findings and recommendation of the majority of the commissioners. Considering
that such valuation of the trial court as affirmed by the CA is reasonable as it is and supported by the
evidence on record, we find no compelling reason to disturb the same.
The constant loud buzzing and exploding sounds emanating from the towers and transmission lines,
especially on rainy days; the constant fear on the part of the landowners that the large transmission
lines looming not far above their land and the huge tower in front of their lot will affect their safety
and health; and the slim chance that no one would be interested to buy the remaining portions on
each side of the residential lot affected by the project, to the damage of the landowners, both as to
future actual use of the land and financial gains to be derived therefrom, makes the instant case fall
within the ambit of expropriation.

Leca vs Republic
"On 18 March 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a complaint for eminent domain for the taking of some
portions of the properties of Leca Realty Corp. (Leca), Leeleng Realty Inc. (Leeleng),
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), and Cityland
Inc. (Cityland). The said properties would be affected by the construction of the EDSA-Shaw
Boulevard Overpass Project in Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City, a public purpose to be
undertaken by the DPWH.

Attached to the complaint is, among other things, Resolution No. 94-1 of the City Appraisal
Committee of Mandaluyong, which was created to appraise the properties that would be
affected by the construction of the project in question. In the said resolution, the City Appraisal
Committee fixed the fair market values of defendants' properties, as follows:
'1. All lots situated along Shaw Boulevard from Edsa going westward towards Manila up
to Samat Street, that City, at THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000) per square
The property of defendant-appellant Leca is approximately 297.00 meters from the intersection
of Shaw Boulevard and EDSA
On October 7, 1997, the court a quo appointed three (3) competent and disinterested persons;
namely, Atty. Benjamin C. Angeles, Mr. Joselito E. Gunio and Mr. Melchor Savillo as
commissioners to ascertain and report the just compensation of the properties sought to be
taken. On January 9, 1998, the commissioners submitted their report dated January 8, 1998,
and recommended the fair market value of the subject properties as follows:
'1. Properties of Leca Realty Corporation and Leeleng Realty Inc.: P50,000 per sq.m.
In arriving at the said Report, the Commissioners took into consideration the following factors:
property location, identification[,] neighborhood data, community facilities and utilities, highest
and best use, valuation and reasonable indication of land values within the vicinity.
WON the Commissioners report with regards to the valuation of the properties of Leca
Realty Corp is valid.

No. The values arrived at in the Commissioners' Report were not supported by sufficient evidence.
Moreover, they were allegedly based on newspaper listings of advertisements,29 which the
commissioners deemed to be reasonable indices of the fair market value. Further, mere offers of
sale -- not consummated transactions
In expropriation proceedings in general, the market value is the just compensation to which the
owner of a condemned property is entitled. More precisely, market value is "that sum of money
which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell,
would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor. The Commissioners' Report relied
heavily on newspaper advertisements of offers of sale of properties in the vicinity. Clearly, these
offers were merely asking prices. By their very nature, they are subject to negotiations in which a

buyer may ask for a lower price; understandably, it is customary for the owner to raise the price

LBP vs Estanislao
Spouses Vicente M. Estanislao and Luz B. Hermosa (respondents) are the registered owners of
eight parcels of land situated in Hermosa, Bataan with a total land area of 10.8203
hectares. Sometime in 1996, 1997 and 1999, 10.5321 hectares (subject lots) of respondents lands
were awarded to tenant-beneficiaries5 pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer Program (OLT)
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Applying Executive Order (E.O.) 228,7 petitioner, together
with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), valued the subject lots at P97,895 or P1.075 per
square meter,8 which was arrived at by multiplying 80 cavans per hectare,9 the average gross
production as determined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production, by 2.5, the result of
which was multiplied by P35, the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay as of
October 21, 1972, to which was added the amount of P139,194.02 as interest increment per DAR
Administrative Order 13, series of 1994, or for a total amount of P237,089.02.
Upon the request of the DAR, petitioner deposited the amount of P237,089.02, in cash and in bond,
in favor of respondents. Respondents, however, rejected the DARs valuation by letter
respondents prayed that the fair market value for purposes of just compensation be pegged
atP2,106,420 or P20 per square meter since the subject lots form "one whole compact area,
contig[u]ous to each other, adjacent to Layac River, [and] traversed by the Bataan National highway
at Layac Junction, with irrigation systems put in place and planted twice annually.
In their respective Answers to the complaint, petitioner and the DAR prayed for its dismissal,
claiming that their valuation was made pursuant to P.D. No. 27 and/or E.O. 228.
WON the valuation of DAR with respect to the land owned by Estanislao pursuant to the E.O.
228(E.O. 228, issued on July 17, 1987, by then President Corazon Aquino, provided the basis for
determining the value of remaining unvalued rice and corn lands), would be equivalent to just
compensation for the properties of Estanislao.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by
PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with
RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation
should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the
equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.

In fine, the valuation of subject lots is in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 reading:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost
of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made
by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed
by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the
non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their
property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value,
assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court
correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with,
and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence

LBP vs Puyat
Gloria and Maximo Puyat (deceased) owns a parcel of riceland consisting of 46.8731 hectares.
The said land was subjected to acquisition pursuant to PD 27 but the records does not show
when the DAR acquired the same. Sometime in December 1989 DAR then, issued several
emancipation patents in favor of various farm-beneficiaries. The Puyat's however, did not
receive any compensation for the acquisition.
Sometime in September 1992 LBP received DAR's instruction to pay the just compensation to
the Puyats. The LBP made its evaluation, but the heirs of the Puyat rejected the valuation and
filed a complaint for determination of just compensation with the RTC. The following are the
valuation of the property:
LBP = P 92,752.10 @ P 2,012.50 per hectare (in compliance with the formula
under PD 27 and EO 228. LBP also contended that the valuation should be done at the
time of the taking (1976));
RTC = P 4,430,900.00 @ P 100,000.00 per hectare since 44.3090 hectares were
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries and 6% legal interest from the date of taking until
the amount is fully paid (due to delay in payment);
CA = same as RTC but modified the legal interest not from 1990 but from March
20, 1990 for precision.

Whether or not lands acquired pursuant to PD 27 be valued using the factors in Sec. 17
of RA 6657.

Whether or not the 6% legal interest proper in this case.

RA 6657 should govern, in catena of decided cases of the Supreme Court it has been held that,
when the government takes property pursuant to PD 27, but does not pay the landowner his
just compensation until after the affectivity of RA 6657, it becomes more equitable to
determine the just compensation using RA 6657.
The SC finds that there is no need to disturb the legal interest issue since there is no current
jurisprudence to substantiate such change, and the respondents (Heirs of Maximo and Gloria
Puyat) did not contest the interest awarded by the lower courts.
Thus, there is no need to remand the case to the lower court for the determination of just
compensation, during the pendency of the case, Congress enacted RA 9700 further amending
RA 6657, the amendment provides:
Sec. 7. The DAR in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program the final acquisition and
distribution of all remaining unacquired and undistributed agricultural lands from the effectivity
of this Act until June 30, 2014. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:
...that all previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners
shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to Sec. 17 of RA 665...
That the just compensation has already been computed pursuant to Sec. 17 of RA 6657 by the

Facts: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to
Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc,
for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for
such purpose.

On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April
29, 1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax
against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.

Issue: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the
Parish priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parishpriest of Victorias did not have juridical
personality as the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.

Held: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the
Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties
as Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the
property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a
property by way of gift inter vivos.
The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition
of the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose. because at the
time of the donation he was not the priest of Victorias.

MIAA v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006
Carpio, J.
The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Paraaque City under Executive Order No. 903
(MIAA Charter), as amended. As such operator, it administers the land, improvements and
equipment within the NAIA Complex. In March 1997, the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the Local Government
Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under
Section 21 of its Charter.
Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June 2001, it received
Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable
years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of
levy on the airport lands and buildings.
At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying Opinion No.
061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from real estate tax to
show proof of exemption. According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof
that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA, thus, filed a petition with the Court of
Appeals seeking to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying

against, and auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings, but this was
dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is exempt from real
estate tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of the LGC. It invokes the principle that
the government cannot tax itself as a justification for exemption, since the airport lands
and buildings, being devoted to public use and public service, are owned by the Republic of
the Philippines. On the other hand, the City of Paraaque invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC,
which expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and
controlled corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC.
It asserts that an international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in the
said law. Meanwhile, the City of Paraaque posted and published notices announcing the
public auction sale of the airport lands and buildings. In the afternoon before the
scheduled public auction, MIAA applied with the Court for the issuance of a TRO to restrain
the auction sale. The Court issued a TRO on the day of the auction sale, however, the same
was received only by the City of Paraaque three hours after the sale.
Whether or not the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate
The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax imposed by
local governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax any real property
owned by the Republic of the Philippines. This exemption should be read in relation with
Sec. 133(o) of the LGC, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of local
governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities.
These provisions recognize the basic principle that local governments cannot tax
the national government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the
power to tax.
The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law
imposing the tax. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax
national government instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally in
favor of national government instrumentalities.
MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the government.
The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties. MIAA itself is owned
solely by the Republic. At any time, the President can transfer back to the Republic title to
the airport lands and buildings without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. As
long as the airport lands and buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership remains
with the State. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing these properties
from public use, they remain properties of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable,
hence, they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt
from real estate tax.
However, portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA leases to private
entities are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the beneficial
use of such portions for a consideration to a taxable person.

Yamane vs Lepanto
In 1998, BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation (Lepanto) received a tax assessment in the amount
of P1.6 million from Luz Yamane, the City Treasurer of Makati, for business taxes. Lepanto
protested the assessment as it averred that Lepanto, as a corporation, is not organized for profit;
that it merely exists for the maintenance of the condominium. Yamane denied the protest. Lepanto
then appealed the denial to the RTC of Makati. RTC Makati affirmed the decision of Yamane.
Lepanto then filed a petition for review under Rule 42 with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC.
Yamane now filed a petition for review under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court. Yamane avers that
a.) Lepanto is liable for local taxation because its act of maintaining the condominium is an activity
for profit because the end result of such activity is the betterment of the market value of the
condominium which makes it easier to sell it; that Lepanto is earning profit from fees collected from
condominium unit owners; and that b.) Lepantos petition for review of the decision of the RTC to the
CA is erroneous because when the RTC decided on the appeal brought to it by Lepanto, the RTC
was exercising its original jurisdiction and not its appellate jurisdiction; that as such, what Lepanto
should have done is to file an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
ISSUE: Whether or not a RTC deciding an appeal from the decision of a city treasurer on tax
protests is exercising original jurisdiction. Whether or not a condominium corporation organized
solely for the maintenance of a condominium is liable for local taxation.
Yes. Although the LGC (Section 195) provides that the remedy of the taxpayer whose protest
is denied by the local treasurer is to appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction or in this case
the RTC (considering the amount of tax liability is P1.6 million), such appeal when decided by the
RTC is still in the exercise of its original jurisdiction and not its appellate jurisdiction. This is because
appellate jurisdiction is defined as the authority of a court higher in rank to re-examine the final order
or judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review. Here, the
City Treasurer is not a lower court.
The Supreme Court however clarifies that this ruling is only applicable to similar cases before the
passage of Republic Act 9282 (effective April 2004). Under RA 9282, the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), not CA, exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions, orders or
resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases whether originally decided or resolved
by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.
No. Lepanto was not organized for profit. The fees it was collecting from the condominium
unit owners redound to the owners themselves because the fees collected are being used for the
maintenance of the condo. Further, it appears that the assessment issued by Yamane did not state
the legal basis for the tax being imposed on Lepanto it merely states that Makati is authorized to
collect business taxes under the Local Government Code (LGC) but no other reference specific
reference to specific laws were cited.