Viewed in the foregoing light, the Court finds that the CoA did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion as its affirmance of Notice of
Disallowance No. 09-001-GF(06) is based on cogent legal grounds.
First off, the Court concurs with the CoAs conclusion that the
certification submitted by petitioners cannot be properly considered
as a supporting document within the purview of Item III(3) of CoA
Circular No. 2006-01 which pertinently states that a claim for
reimbursement of [EME] expenses shall be supported by
receipts and/or other documents evidencing disbursements.
Similar to the word receipts, the other documents pertained to
under the above-stated provision is qualified by the phrase
evidencing disbursements. Citing its lexicographic definition, the
CoA stated that the term disbursement means to pay out
commonly from a fund or to make payment in settlement of debt or
account payable.
That said, it then logically follows that petitioners certification, so as
to fall under the phrase other documents under Item III(3) of CoA
Circular No. 2006-01, must substantiate the paying out of an account
payable, or, in simple term, a disbursement.
However, an examination of the sample certification attached to the
petition does not, by any means, fit this description. The signatory
therein merely certifies that he/she has spent, within a particular
month, a certain amount for meetings, seminars, conferences, official
entertainment, public relations, and the like, and that the certified
amount is within the ceiling authorized under the LWUA corporate
budget. Accordingly, since petitioners reimbursement claims were
solely supported by this certification, the CoA properly disallowed
said claims for failure to comply with CoA Circular No. 2006-01.
The CoA also correctly rejected petitioners invocation of the
provisions of Section 397 of GAAM - Vol. I and CoA Circular No. 89300 since, at the outset, such rules are applicable only to NGAs, and
not to GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries which are specifically
governed by CoA Circular No. 2006-01. A perusal of CoA Circular
No. 89-300, from which Section 397 of GAAM - Vol. I was merely
reproduced, clearly indicates in Item II thereof, captioned Scope and
Coverage, that the rules thereunder applies to appropriations
been barred. Considering that this [c]ourt had jurisdiction over the
claim, frespondent] rightfully presented the certificates before this
[c]ourt. Besides, any records that [petitioner] may have on the
administrative claim would eventually be transmitted to this [c]ourt
under Section S(b), Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of the Court of (Tax)
Appeals.
As for the second ground, this [c]ourt finds [petitioner's] contention
unmeritorious. The requirements for claiming a tax refund/tax credit
certificates had been laid down in Citibank N.A. vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 107434, October JO, 1997. Nowhere in the case cited is
proof of actual remittance of the withheld taxes to the [petitioner]
required before the taxpayer may claim for a tax refund/tax credit
certificates.
G.R. No. 199595. April 2, 2014 Philippine Woman's Christian
Temperance Union, Inc. Vs. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd
Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc.
SUBJECT MATTER: VOID JUDGMENTS; Issuance of new title v.
Complaint for revocation of donation
FACTS:
PWCTUI submitted the following arguments:
a. based on the deed of donation, the expiration of PWCTUIs corporate
term is not stated as a ground for the nullification of the donation and the
operation of the reversion clause;
b. the commercial leasing of portions of the donated land did not violate the
condition in the donation because the lease contract with Jelby Acres was
pursued for the generation of funds in order for PWCTUI to carry on the
charitable purposes of the Abiertas House of Friendship;
c. TRY Foundation has no legal standing or cause of action to claim the land
because its members are not the true heirs of angco who died single and
without descendants. His only relatives are his half-siblings who are the
legitimate children of his mother, Do a amona rguelles Corpus and her
The nullity of the RTC judgment and all subsequent rulings affirming
the same, render inoperative the doctrine of immutability of judgment,
and consequently justify the propriety of giving due course to the
present petition.
the RTC judgment in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) and all proceedings
taken in relation thereto were void because the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the fundamental subject matter of T
Foundations
petition for the issuance of a title which was in reality, a complaint for
revocation of donation, an ordinary civil action outside the ambit of
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.
To eject the agricultural lessee for failure to pay the leasehold rentals
under item 6 of the above-cited provision, jurisprudence instructs that the
same must be willful and deliberate in order to warrant the agricultural
lessees dispossession of the land that he tills.
In the present case, petitioner seeks the dispossession of respondents from
the subject land on the ground of non-payment of leasehold rentals based on
item 6, Section 36 of RA 3844. While respondents indeed admit that they
failed to pay the full amount of their respective leasehold rentals as they
become due, they claim that their default was on account of the debilitating
effects of calamities like flashfloods and typhoons. This latter assertion is a
defense provided under the same provision which, if successfully
established, allows the agricultural lessee to retain possession of his
landholding. The records of this case are, however, bereft of any showing
that the aforestated claim was substantiated by any evidence tending to
prove the same.
espondents failure to pay leasehold rentals to the landowner also
appears to have been willful and deliberate. They, in fact, do not deny and
therefore admit the landowners assertion that their rental arrearages have
ACCUMulated over a considerable length of time i.e.,
the landowner in this case never rejected any rental payment duly tendered
by respondents or their predecessors-in-interest. Neither was the legality of
their agricultural leasehold contract with the landowner ever put into issue so
as to intimate that they merely withheld their remittances in good faith.
the Court is impelled to agree with the DARAB that respondents herein
willfully and deliberately chose not to pay their leasehold rentals to the
landowner when they fell due. The term willful means voluntary and
intentional, but not necessarily malicious, while the term deliberate
means that the act or omission is intentional, premeditated or fully
considered. These qualities the landowner herein had successfully
established in relation to respondents default in this case. ccordingly, their
dispossession from the subject land is warranted under the law.
t this juncture, the Court finds it apt to clarify that respondents purported
substantial compliance as erroneously considered by the CA to justify its
ruling against their dispossession is applicable only under the parameters
of item 2, Section 36 of RA 3844, which is a separate and distinct provision
from item 6 thereof. Item 2, Section 36 of RA 3844 applies to cases where
the agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms
and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, unless his failure is caused by fortuitous
event or force majeure; whereas item 6 refers to cases where the
agricultural lessee does not pay the leasehold rental when it falls due,
provided that the failure to pay is not due to crop failure to the extent of
seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event.
As the present dispute involves the non-payment of leasehold rentals, it
is item 6 and not item 2 of the same provision which should apply.
Examining the text of item 6, there is no indication that the agricultural
lessees substantial compliance with his rent obligations could be raised as a
defense against his dispossession. On the other hand, item 2 states that it is
only the agricultural lessees failure to substantially comply with the terms
and conditions of the agricultural leasehold contract or the provisions of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code which is deemed as a ground for
dispossession. Thus, it may be reasonably deduced that the agricultural
lessees substantial compliance negates the existence of the ground of
dispossession provided under item 2. While the failure to pay leasehold
rentals may be construed to fall under the general phraseology of item 2
Security
and
floating status at the time he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal on 16
June 2006. In other words, respondent was on floating status from 10
December 2005 to 16 June 2006 or more than six months.
the temporary inactivity or floating status of security guards should continue only for
six months. Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be liable for constructive
dismissal. The failure of petitioner to give respondent a work assignment beyond the
reasonable six-month period makes it liable for constructive dismissal.
G.R. No. 201072. April 2, 2014 United Philippine Lines, Inc. and
Holland America Line Vs. Generoso E. Sibug
SUBJECT MATTER: ENTITLEMENT TWICE TO PERMANENT AND
TOTAL DISABILITIES. NLRC ruled that Sibug is entitled to permanent
and total disability benefit of US$60,000 for his Volendam injury and
another US$60,000 for his Ryndam injury
RULING:
We rule that Sibug is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefit for
his Volendam injury. But he is entitled to permanent and total disability
benefit for his yndam injury and to attorneys fees.
Sibug is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefit for his
Volendam injury since he became already fit to work again as a seaman. He
even admitted in his position paper that he was declared fit to work.
He was also declared fit for sea service after his pre-employment medical
examination when he sought reemployment with petitioners. The medical
certificate declaring Sibug fit for sea service even bears his signature. And
he was able to work again in the same capacity as waste handler in Ryndam.
On this point, the Labor rbiters ruling is amply supported by substantial
evidence. On the other hand, the CA erred in ruling that Sibug is entitled to
permanent and total disability benefit for the injury he suffered at the
Volendam. The facts clearly show that he is not.
As regards his Ryndam injury, we agree with the CA that Sibug is entitled to
permanent and total disability benefit amounting to US$60,000. Petitioners,
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred on this point.
LIST OF circumstances
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
(g)The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but
the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and
(h)The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled
within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual
sea duties after the lapse of said periods.
G.R. No. 191390. April 2, 2014 People of the Philippines Vs. Joel
Dioquino Y Garbin
SUBJECT MATTER: seven counts o f simple rape o f 17- year-old minor
ABC
G.R. No. 202704. April 2, 2014 People of the Philippines Vs. Joel
Abat y Cometa
SUBJECT MATTER: RAPE
G.R. No. 192998. April 2, 2014 Bernard A. Tenazas, Jaime M.
Farncisco and Isidro G. Endraca Vs. R. Villegas Taxi Transport
and Romualdo Villegas
ISSUE: Pivotal to the resolution of the instant case is the determination of
the existence of employer-employee relationship and whether there was an
illegal dismissal.
RULING:
[I]n determining the presence or absence of an employer-employee
relationship, the Court has consistently looked for the following incidents, to
wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of
wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control
the employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished.
The last element, the so-called control test, is the most important element.
Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be
admitted. Identification cards, cash vouchers, social security registration,
appointment letters or employment contracts, payrolls, organization charts,
and personnel lists, serve as evidence of employee status.
In this case, however, Francisco failed to present any proof substantial
enough to establish his relationship with the respondents. He failed to
present documentary evidence like attendance logbook, payroll, SSS record
or any personnel file that could somehow depict his status as an employee.
Anent his claim that he was not issued with employment records, he could
have, at least, produced his social security records which state his
We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a
judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable.
[ ]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption,
the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action even though such acts are erroneous.
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty.
Gabionza, subject to the modifications she found necessary to make the
plan viable. The complainant alleged that in modifying the plan, she
exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions of a
rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the
respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the
assailed decision, the charge of gross ignorance of the law against her should
be dismissed. To [rule] otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision,
order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he
was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption or had committed
an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was
motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in
rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides
his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations
with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed and this Court cannot
conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.
On the Ground of Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period
On the respondents failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by
the ules, we find the respondents explanation to be satisfactory.
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond
the 180-day period carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate
with particularity whether the rehabilitation court could act by itself or
whether Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently was this
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the
respondents approval of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we
find no basis to hold the respondent liable for the extension she granted and
for the consequent delay.
On the Ground of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court
and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require
similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the
dignity, independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the
Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise
more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge
should possess the virtue of gravitas.
ccordingly, the respondents unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal
counsel, her expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and
negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her condescending attitude,
are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and
air of superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent
failed to observe judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably.
She also failed to maintain the decorum required by the Code and to use
temperate language befitting a magistrate. s a judge, [she] should ensure
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all
of their activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in
their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the
propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted
Friendster photos of herself wearing an off-shouldered suggestive dress
and made this available for public viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social
networks, judges must bear in mind that what they communicate
regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial
duties creates and contributes to the peoples opinion not just of the judge
but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true
when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family
and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in
the attire she wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this
picture available for public consumption, she placed herself in a situation
where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the
publics criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications,
particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondents act of posting her photos
would seem harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary
member of the public. As the visible personification of law and justice,
however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must
accordingly comport themselves.
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office
and personal matters. The very nature of their functions requires behavior
under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the
performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be
beyond reproach.
For a measly five- or ten-peso tip that a IO-year-old child would need for lunch
money, a known acquaintance of their family would destroy a child's dignity by
having illicit carnal knowledge of her. This case involves an act that is so
dastardly that it is punished by Article 266-A of the Revised PenaJ Code as
statutory rape which carries a sentence of reclusion perpetua.
able to take out a loan from Moleta, who was misled into the belief that
petitioner, as municipal treasurer, was acting on behalf of the municipality.
In this case, it was not only alleged in the Information, but was proved with
certainty during trial that the manner by which petitioner perpetrated the
crime necessarily relates to her official function as a municipal treasurer.
Petitioners official function created in her favor an impression of authority
to transact business with Moleta involving government financial concerns.
There is, therefore, a direct relation between the commission of the crime
and petitioners office the latter being the very reason or consideration that
led to the unwarranted benefit she gained from Moleta, for which the latter
suffered damages in the amount of P320,000.00. It was just fortunate that
Rusillon instructed the bank to stop payment of the checks issued by
petitioner, lest, the victim could have been the Municipality of General
Luna.
As regards the two other elements, the Court explained in Cabrera v.
Sandiganbayan that there are two (2) ways by which a public official
violates Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions,
namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government;
or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference. The accused may be charged under either mode or under both.
In this case, petitioner was charged of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
under the alternative mode of causing undue injury to Moleta committed
with evident bad faith, for which she was correctly found guilty. Evident
bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. Evident bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
manifested in petitioners actuations and representation.
The inevitable conclusion is that petitioner capitalized on her official
function to commit the crimes charged. Without her position, petitioner
would not have induced Moleta to part with her money. In the same vein,
petitioner could not have orchestrated a scheme of issuing postdated checks
meddling with the municipalitys coffers and defiling the mayors signature.
Given the above disquisition, it becomes superfluous to dwell further on the
issue raised by petitioner that Sec. 3(e) applies only to officers and
ISSUE: whether or not in this case the schools act of imposing the penalty
of suspension instead of immediate dismissal from service at the behest of
the erring employee, in exchange for the employees resignation at the end
of the school year, constitutes constructive dismissal.
RULING:
G.R. No. 206770. April 2, 2014 People of the Philippines Vs. Noel
Prajes and Alipa Mala
SUBJECT MATTER: Illegal sale of Prohibited drugs
G.R. No. 195687. April 7, 2014 Land Bank of the Philippines Vs.
David G. Naval, Jr., et al.
The Issue
Despite the convoluted claims of the parties, the basic question before
us is whether or not respondents and intervenors are entitled to the
COLA and the BEP on top of their basic salaries from 1989 up to the
present.
Thus, in resolving the issue of whether the COLA and/or the BEP should be
paid separately from the basic salary to the employees of LBP as of July 1,
1989, we should look into the very provisions of the SSL.
Since the COLA and the BEP are among those expressly excluded by the
SSL from integration, they should be considered as deemed integrated in the
standardized salaries of LBP employees under the general rule of
integration.
In any event, the Court finds the inclusion of COLA in the standardized salary rates
proper. In National Tobacco Administration v. Commission on Audit, the Court
ruled that the enumerated fringe benefits in items (1) to (6) have one thing in
commonthey belong to one category of privilege called allowances which are
usually granted to officials and employees of the government to defray or reimburse
the expenses incurred in the performance of their official functions. Consequently, if
these allowances are consolidated with the standardized salary rates, then the government
official or employee will be compelled to spend his personal funds in attending to his
duties. On the other hand, item (7) is a catch-all proviso for benefits in the nature of
allowances similar to those enumerated.
Clearly, COLA is not in the nature of an allowance intended to reimburse expenses
incurred by officials and employees of the government in the performance of their
official functions. It is not payment in consideration of the fulfillment of official
duty. s defined, cost of living refers to the level of prices relating to a range of
everyday items or the cost of purchasing those goods and services which are included
in an accepted standard level of consumption. Based on this premise, COLA is a
benefit intended to cover increases in the cost of living. Thus, it is and should be
integrated into the standardized salary rates.
For after all, a CBA, like any contract is a product of mutual consent and not
of compulsion. As such, the duty to bargain does not include the obligation
to reach an agreement.
In this light, the corporations unswerving position on the matter of annual
lump sum payment in lieu of wage increase did not, by itself, constitute bad
faith even if such position caused a stalemate in the negotiations, as correctly
ruled by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the decision dated June
8, 2005.
As there was no bad faith on the part of the company in its bargaining with
the union, deadlock was possible and did occur. The unions reliance on
item 8 of the ground rules governing the parties negotiations which required
mutual consent for a declaration of deadlock was reduced to irrelevance by
the actual facts. Contra factum non valet argumentum. There is no argument
against facts. And the fact is that the negotiations between the union and the
company were stalled by the opposing offers of yearly wage increase by the
union, on the one hand, and annual lump sum payment by the company, on
the other hand. Each party found the others offer unacceptable and neither
party was willing to yield. The company suggested seeking the assistance of
a third party to settle the issue but the union preferred the remedy of filing a
notice of strike. Each party was adamant in its position. Thus, because of the
unresolved issue on wage increase, there was actually a complete stoppage
of the ongoing negotiations between the parties and the union filed a Notice
of Strike. A mutual declaration would neither add to nor subtract from the
reality of the deadlock then existing between the parties. Thus, the absence
of the parties mutual declaration of deadlock does not mean that there was
no deadlock. At most, it would have been simply a recognition of the
prevailing status quo between the parties.
Thus, the labor dispute between the union and the company concerned the
unresolved matters between the parties in relation to their negotiations for a
new CBA. The power of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume
jurisdiction over this dispute includes and extends to all questions and
controversies arising from the said dispute, such as, but not limited to the
unions allegation of bad faith bargaining. It also includes and extends to the
various unresolved provisions of the new CBA such as compensation,
particularly the matter of annual wage increase or yearly lump sum payment
in lieu of such wage increase, whether or not there was deadlock in the
negotiations. Indeed, nowhere does the Order dated September 20, 2004 of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment mention a CBA deadlock. What the
union viewed as constituting the inclusion of a CBA deadlock in the
assumption of jurisdiction was the inclusion of the economic issues,
particularly the companys stance of yearly lump sum payment in lieu of
annual wage increase, in the directive for the parties to submit their
respective position papers.
The unions Motion for econsideration (With Urgent Prayer to Compel the
Company to Justify Offer of Wage [Increase] Moratorium) and Second
Motion for Reconsideration questioning the Order dated September 20, 2004
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment actually confirm that the labor
dispute between the parties essentially and necessarily includes the
conflicting positions of the union, which advocates annual wage increase,
and of the company, which offers yearly lump sum payment in lieu of wage
increase. In fact, that is the reason behind the unions prayer that the
company be ordered to justify its offer of wage increase moratorium.
As there is already an existing controversy on the matter of wage increase,
the Secretary of Labor and Employment need not wait for a deadlock in the
negotiations to take cognizance of the matter. That is the significance of the
power of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under Article 263(g) of
the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest.
G.R. No. 175540. April 7, 2014 Dr. Filoteo A. Alano Vs. Zenaida
Magud-Logmao Concurring Opinion J. Leonen
FACTS:
The first two issues boil down to the question of whether respondent's
sufferings were brought about by petitioner's alleged negligence in granting
authorization for the removal or retrieval of the internal organs of
respondent's son who had been declared brain dead.
Petitioner maintains that when he gave authorization for the removal of
some of the internal organs to be transplanted to other patients, he did so in
accordance with the letter of the law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 349, as
Verily, the Court cannot, in conscience, agree with the lower court. Finding
petitioner liable for damages is improper. It should be emphasized that the
internal organs ofthe deceased were removed only after he had been declared
brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the death
of her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the
Court find evidence on record to show that respondent's emotional suffering
at the sight of the pitiful state in which she found her son's lifeless body be
categorically attributed to petitioner's conduct.
G.R. No. 192582. April 7, 2014 Bluer Than Blue Joint Ventures
Company/ Mary Ann Dela Vega Vs. Glyza Esteban
FACTS:
Respondent Glyza Esteban (Esteban) was employed in January 2004 as
Sales Clerk, and assigned at Bluer Than Blue Joint Ventures Company's
(petitioner) EGG boutique in SM City Marilao, Bulacan, beginning the year
2006. Part of her primary tasks were attending to all customer needs,
ensuring efficient inventory, coordinating orders from clients, cashiering and
reporting to the accounting department.
RULING:
It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee performs that
determines whether he or she occupies a position of trust and confidence."
In this case, while respondent's position was denominated as Sales Clerk, the
nature of her work included inventory and cashiering, a function that clearly
falls within the sphere of rank-and-file positions imbued with trust and
confidence.
Among the fiduciary rank-and-file employees are cashiers, auditors,
property custodians, or those who, in the normal exercise of their
functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.
These employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged with the care
and custody of the employers money or property, and are thus classified as
occupying positions of trust and confidence.
In this case, Esteban was a sales clerk. Her duties, however, were more than
that of a sales clerk. Aside from attending to customers and tending to the
shop, Esteban also assumed cashiering duties. This, she does not deny;
instead, she insists that the competency clause provided that her tasks were
that of a sales clerk and the cashiering function was labelled to follow.
Proceeding from the above conclusion, the pivotal question that must be
answered is whether Estebans acts constitute just cause to terminate her
employment.
Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be work
related such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to
continue working for the employer and it must be based on a wilful
breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.
In this case, the Court finds that the acts committed by Esteban do not
amount to a wilful breach of trust. She admitted that she accessed the POS
system with the use of the unauthorized 123456 password. She did so,
however, out of curiosity and without any obvious intention of defrauding
the petitioner.
Moreover, the petitioner even admitted that Esteban has her own password
to the POS system. If it was her intention to manipulate the stores inventory
and funds, she could have done so long before she had knowledge of the
unauthorized password. But the facts on hand show that she did not. The
petitioner also failed to establish a substantial connection between Estebans
use of the 123456 password and any loss suffered by the petitioner.
Indeed, it may be true that, as posited by the petitioner, it is the fact that she
used the password that gives cause to the loss of trust and confidence on
Esteban. However, as ruled above, such breach must have been done
intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, and without any justifiable excuse,
and not simply something done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently. To the Courts mind, Estebans lapse is, at best, a careless act
that does not merit the imposition of the penalty of dismissal.
Sales negative variances as wage deductions
The petitioner deducted the amount of P8,304.93 from Estebans last salary.
ccording to the petitioner, this represents the stores negative variance for
the year 2005 to 2006. The petitioner justifies the deduction on the basis of
alleged trade practice and that it is allowed by the Labor Code.
Article 113 of the Labor Code provides that no employer, in his own behalf
or in behalf of any person, shall make any deduction from the wages of his
employees, except in cases where the employer is authorized by law or
regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, among
others.
In this case, the petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that Esteban was
responsible for the negative variance it had in its sales for the year 2005 to
2006 and that Esteban was given the opportunity to show cause the
deduction from her last salary should not be made. The Court cannot accept
the petitioners statement that it is the practice in the retail industry to deduct
variances from an employees salary, without more.
G.R. No. 189563. April 7, 2014 Gilat Satellite Networks Ltd., Vs.
United Coconut Planters Bank General Insurance Co., Inc.
ISSUES
From the foregoing, we reduce the issues to the following:
between the buyer and the seller be invoked by a non-party such as the
surety.
Petitioner alleges that arbitration laws mandate that no court can compel
arbitration, unless a party entitled to it applies for this relief.
This referral, however, can only be demanded by one who is a party to the
arbitration agreement. Considering that neither petitioner nor One Virtual
has asked for a referral, there is no basis for the C s order to arbitrate.
Moreover, Articles 1216 and 2047 of the Civil Code clearly provide that the
creditor may proceed against the surety without having first sued the
principal debtor. Even the Surety Agreement itself states that respondent
becomes liable upon mere failure of the Principal to make such prompt
payment. Thus, petitioner should not be ordered to make a separate claim
against One Virtual (via arbitration) before proceeding against respondent.
petitioner had delivered all the goods to One Virtual and installed them.
Despite these compliances, One Virtual still failed to pay its obligation,
triggering respondents liability to petitioner as the formers surety. In other
words, the failure of One Virtual, as the principal debtor, to fulfill its
monetary obligation to petitioner gave the latter an immediate right to pursue
respondent as the surety.
Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Purchase
Agreement, being the principal contract to which the Suretyship Agreement
is accessory, must take precedence over arbitration as the preferred mode of
settling disputes.
[the] acceptance [of a surety agreement], however, does not change in any
material way the creditors relationship with the principal debtor nor does it
make the surety an active party to the principal creditor-debtor relationship.
In other words, the acceptance does not give the surety the right to
intervene in the principal contract. The suretys role arises only upon the
debtors default, at which time, it can be directly held liable by the creditor
for payment as a solidary obligor. Hence, the surety remains a stranger to
the Purchase Agreement. We agree with petitioner that respondent cannot
invoke in its favor the arbitration clause in the Purchase Agreement, because
it is not a party to that contract. An arbitration agreement being contractual
in nature, it is binding only on the parties thereto, as well as their assigns and
heirs.
Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest.
Indeed the actual date of filing of the petition as well as compliance with the rest of the
formal and procedural requirements of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, namely
OSGs verification and certification on non-forum shopping, the Copy Furnished
portion showing service of copies of the petition on the public and private respondent[s]
by registered mail and the required Explanation why personal service of the petition on
the respondents was not resorted to were all in the hands of the OSG. [These] were
beyond the control or intervention of the private petitioners and private prosecutors. After
all, the OSG [is the] chief legal counsel of the State and the People of the Philippines in
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 197293. April 21, 2014 Alfredo C. Mendoza Vs. People
of the Philippines and Juno Cars, Inc.
G.R. No. 180654. April 21, 2014 National Power Corporation Vs.
Provincial Government of Bataan, et al.
G.R. No. 194629. April 21, 2014 People of the Philippines Vs.
Dante Dulay
G.R. No. 193856. April 21, 2014 People of the Philippines Vs.
Sukarno Janaide y Agga
G.R. No. 192669. April 21, 2014 Raul Saberon, Joan F. Saberon
and Jacqueline Saberon Vs. Oscar Ventanilla, Jr., and Carmen
Gloria D. Ventanilla Separate Opinion J. Velasco, Jr.
G.R. No. 181792. April 21, 2014 Star Special Watchmen and
Detective Angency, Inc., et al. Vs. Puerto Princesa City, Mayor
Edward Hagedorn, et al.
G.R. No. 191590. April 21, 2014 Republic of the Philippines Vs.
Transunion Corporation
G.R. No. 195227. April 21, 2014 Froilan M. Bergonio, Jr., et al.
Vs. South East Asian Arilines and Irene Cornier
G.R. No. 196753. April 21, 2014 People of the Philippines Vs.
Erwin Lalog, et al.
G.R. No. 181719. April 21, 2014 Eugene S. Arabit, et al. Vs.
Jerdine Pacific Finance, Inc.
G.R. No. 188190. April 21, 2014 Barko International, Inc., et al.
Vs. Eberly S. Alcayno
G.R. No. 188881. April 21, 2014 Republic of the philippines Vs.
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr., Dominador R. Santiago, et al.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
J. Bersamin
G.R. No. 194446. April 21, 2014 People of the Philippines Vs.
Hermenigildo Delen Y Escobilla
G.R. No. 196023. April 21, 2014 Jose Juan Tong, et al. Vs. Go
Tiat Kun, et al.
G.R. No. 187495. April 21, 2014 People of the Philippines Vs.
Edgar Jumawan
G.R. No. 195580. April 21, 2014 Narra Nickel Mining and
Development Corp., et al. Vs. Redmont Consolidated Mines
Dissenting Opinion J. Leonen
G.R. No. 184758. April 21, 2014 People of the Philippines Vs.
Sonny Sabdula y Amanda
G.R. No. 161380. April 21, 2014 Aznar Brothers Realty Company