Whitney Tilson's Response Re: General Growth Properties (GGWPQ) ~ market folly
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We can't highlight enough how much we've enjoyed the back and forth between various
hedge funds as it pertains to the equity valuation of General Growth Properties (GGWPQ).
Yesterday, we posted up hedge fund Hovde Capital's latest presentation on GGP. Today, we
present you with follow-up thoughts from T2 Partners hedge fund manager Whitney Tilson.
Here are his thoughts:
Before proceeding, we want to make clear how much we enjoy the debate
and think our markets would be much healthier if there were a similarly
detailed exchange of viewpoints for EVERY stock!
To some extent, the debate is now about different views of the future:
Hovde believes that consumer spending will be terrible for an extended
period and that bankruptcies among mall-based retailers will continue or
worsen, which will translate into severely declining NOI for GGP over
time. Pershing believes that the worst is behind us: that unemployment
has peaked, consumer spending has stabilized and may even be picking
up a bit, and that retailers are in remarkably good shape in light of what
theyve been through over the past 18 months, all of which will translate
into approximately stable NOI. Whether Hovde or Pershing is right about
GGP over time will, to some extent, depend on future macro factors,
which are obviously impossible to predict with certainty.
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Whitney Tilson's Response Re: General Growth Properties (GGWPQ) ~ market folly
That said, good analysis matters and we think Hovdes is sorely lacking,
primarily in the following areas:
1) Hovdes most serious mistake is misunderstanding (or
misrepresenting) what will likely happen to GGPs unsecured debt.
Hovde assumes that it either remains outstanding (throughout its
presentation, Hovde calculates GGPs leverage and interest payments
assuming that the debt remains outstanding, which is the main reason its
analysis differs from Pershings and ours see page 63, for example) or
that it converts to equity, which will result in significant dilution (page
72). Hovde makes explicit this assumption when it claims that Pershing
does not use consistent assumptions regarding what happens to the
unsecured debt on page 35 of its report.
Hovde doesnt appear to understand bankruptcy law and what will likely
happen to the unsecured debt. There is almost no chance that it will
remain outstanding: it will either be refinanced or, more likely, be
converted into equity (this is what Pershing assumes there is no
inconsistency). But heres the key: it will NOT BE DILUTIVE because it
will convert AT FAIR VALUE, as determined by the bankruptcy judge.
Of course, if the judge determines that fair value is $1/share, then it would
be massively dilutive, but thats not going to happen. The judge has a
great deal of discretion in determining fair value, but will certainly take
into consideration the current stock price, comps and the price of any
equity offering(s) GGP might do.
For example, as soon as GGP exits bankruptcy and its stock is relisted
(it currently trades on the pink sheets, which means most institutional
investors cant own it), it will be a must-own stock for every REIT fund
(a big catalyst Hovde misses). To meet this demand and pay down some
debt, GGP might issue equity and the negotiated price at which this
stock is sold would likely weigh heavily on the judges determination of
fair value (and would not be dilutive). Of course, if someone like Simon
were to buy GGP at, say, $20, the debt would convert at this price and
again, it wouldnt be dilutive.
2) Hovde takes seven pages (6-12) arguing for its definition of NOI, but
theres no right answer here. NOI is like free cash flow: different people
calculate it in different ways. But however one calculates it, its important
to be consistent which Hovde is not. It uses the most conservative
assumptions to minimize GGPs NOI, but then fails to do so for Simon,
making its comp analysis deeply flawed.
3) Speaking of comps, Hovde writes: to suggest GGP should trade at
the LOWER cap rate than SPG is LAUGHABLE in our view (pages 2223). Hovde can laugh all it wants, but there are very good arguments for
why Simon is, in fact, the best comp for GGP. For starter, both have
very similar mall portfolios with a national footprint (unlike Macerich,
which Hovde cites as a better comp on page 63; MAC also has debt
issues that are more significant than what GGP will likely have postbankruptcy). In addition, GGP will likely have a BETTER liability profile
post-bankruptcy, with no maturities until January 2014. Finally and most
importantly, GGP is for sale and Simon isnt, so there should be a
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Whitney Tilson's Response Re: General Growth Properties (GGWPQ) ~ market folly
5) Hovde dismisses the likelihood that GGP might be acquired (pages 5155), focusing only on Simon and not even mentioning Brookfield, which
may in fact be the more likely acquirer due to fewer anti-trust concerns
and the need for a national platform (which Simon already has). As noted
above, Hovde misses the value of GGP as a strategic asset no doubt,
theres lots of distressed inventory out there, but only one national
platform for sale like GGP.
Finally, Hovde finds it telling that Simon and Brookfield bought GGPs
unsecured debt, but not the equity, even when the equity was at a much
lower price. But its not as telling as Hovde thinks for a number of
reasons. First, its possible that Simon and/or Brookfield do in fact own
the equity if either bought less than 5% of GGP, it wouldnt have to file
(in any case, for anti-trust reasons, they couldnt acquire more than
7.5%). Also, at the time they bought GGPs debt it was very cheap and
they might have reasonably concluded that it represented a better riskreward than the equity.
6) Hovde argues that GGPs rental rates and leasing spreads are very
poor and will likely get worse (pages 15-18). They have indeed been
under pressure, but Hovde is making the classic investing mistake of
projecting the immediate past indefinitely into the future. What Hovde is
missing is that GGP over the past year, knowing that it was in a poor
negotiating position due to the macro environment and its own
bankruptcy, has been renewing leases mainly on a short-term basis.
These renewals have indeed been done at low rates, but this isnt likely to
be a permanent state of affairs. The macro environment has at least
stabilized and may be improving and GGP will soon either be acquired or
exit bankruptcy, so its negotiating position will strengthen and therefore
rental rates and leasing spreads will likely improve.
7) On pages 28 and 33, Hovde repeats the charts from its first
presentation (pages 33-34), showing that Commercial Real Estate Prices
Have Dropped 43% Since the Peak and that cap rates are moving higher
under the heading: Despite Speculation to the Contrary, Cap Rates for
All Property Types Are Moving Higher, Not Lower. Does Pershing
Square Believe These Transactions Did Not Happen? But the CRE chart
doesnt include mall real estate and the cap rate chart, while showing cap
rates for virtually every other type of commercial real estate, is MISSING
data for malls! (The cap rate for mall REITs has fallen dramatically from
earlier this year.)
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Whitney Tilson's Response Re: General Growth Properties (GGWPQ) ~ market folly
8) Hovde paints a very bearish picture of retail sales (page 61), but the
latest data contradicts this for example, an article in the NYT earlier this
week www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/business/28shop.html) noted:
Over all, retail sales from November through Dec. 24 rose 3.6 percent from
last year, according to SpendingPulse, an information service of MasterCard
Advisors that estimates sales for all forms of payment, including cash,
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9 Comments
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5 years ago
The dilution debate really is the big issue but its not clear to me that anyone
involved gets this debate right. The unsecured obviously dilute the equity
even IF they convert to equity as their claim will be recognized in whole
senior to the equity. The mat goes like this. If the cos is worth 30BB and the
senior debt is 20BB the residual 10BB first goes to to the unsecured (8BB)
and the balance goes to the equity. If the unsecured converts it means they
own 80% of the company. Which means the shares outstanding increase
by a factor of 4X and thereby the per share price gets reduced. Where T2 is
confused is they assume that this is like a new issuance at whatever the
10BB value equates to given the existing share base. On the rest of their
pts i believe t2 is correct but the aforementioned issue is so dominant that
they miss the big picture here.
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marketfolly
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5 years ago
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5 years ago
Value Guy
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5 years ago
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marketfolly
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Whitney Tilson's Response Re: General Growth Properties (GGWPQ) ~ market folly
rather than equity over the course of the last year though.
Tdawg
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5 years ago
The value of General Growth equity will come down to two key things:
1) At what price/terms does the unsecured debt get converted to equity?
2) How will NOI/cash flow develop over the next several quarters and
years?
With regards to #1, I don't believe it's very likely that the unsecured debt will
get reinstated on new terms given the level of leverage and who holds
much of the debt. Some equity holders may argue for a high valuation to get
the debt reinstated, but the preference of the company and unsecured debt
holders will probably be conversion to equity. The question then becomes,
at what price? This will likely pit equity holders against unsecured debt
holders with the courts largely determining the outcome. One strategy the
equity holders could employ is to backstop an equity offering at some floor
price to make sure that unsecured debt holders do not overly dilute them.
This would force them to put more skin in the game to protect what they
already have at stake. All in all, it's pretty simple to understand that the
terms of debt conversion will greatly affect equity holders' share of the
General Growth pie.
see more
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marketfolly
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Thanks for the comment. Definitely agree with your last paragraph
and honestly that's the scenario I most likely see playing out. There
will be dilution but the degree of such dilution is unknown and will
largely peg where the valuation lies. Should continue to be a volatile
next few months in the stock as right now you can only ballpark
ranges at which the shares should trade given there are so many
factors at play.
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