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CASE NO.

160

TOPIC: Basis of Rights to Engage in Concerted Activities - Constitution

G.R. No. 105090 September 16, 1993


BISIG NG MANGGAGAWA SA CONCRETE AGGREGATES, INC., (BIMCAI) FSM, AND ITS UNION OFFICERS &
MEMBERS, ETC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ERNILO V.
PEALOSA and CONCRETE AGGREGATES CORP., respondents.
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
April 6, 1992, Labor Union BIMCAI staged a wild-cat strike without a valid notice of strike, nor observing the cooling-off
period, and made even during the pendency of a preventive mediation proceedings.
BIMCAI set-up banners, streamers, man-made obstruction at the main plant and offices of Concrete Aggregates Corp.
(CONCRETE) effectively impeding the entrance and exit of persons who have lawful business with Concrete.
BIMCAI also threatened, intimidated, and coerced person who have lawful business with CONCRETE and the non-striking
employees who wished to return to work.
As a direct result, CONCRETE was in great and imminent danger to suffer substantial damages and injury.
CONCRETE filed with NLRC a petition for injunction to stop the strike. The petition was set for hearing. BIMCAI did not
appear, thus, NLRC heard the evidence of CONCRETE alone. Later, BIMCAI alleged that it never received the petition
because CONCRETE misrepresented its address.
NLRC ordered ocular inspection on the premises. As observed by the reporters, the passage was obstructed with
barricades and rocks, ladder, pieces of wood; that not person was noticed inside the company; that no vehicles were
entering or exiting the premises.
NLRC issued a Temporary Restraining Order valid for 20 days and directed BIMCAI to removed the barricades and the
labor arbiter to set the case for further hearing.
No copy of this order was furnished to BIMCAI, instead, it was posted on the premises of the company. BIMCAI filed its
opposition. It argued that the question of strike legality is outside the original jurisdiction of NLRC except if the labor
dispute has been certified to it for compulsory arbitration, which is not the case. It also denied the allegations of
CONCRETE.
BIMCAI also filed its own Petition for Injunction to enjoin the company "from asking the aid of the police and the military
officer in escorting scabs to enter the struck establishment."
Subsequently, CONCRETE filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Preliminary Injunction wherein it alleged that
BIMCAI are still not allowing non-striking employees and people who have lawful business with the company to enter the
premises; and that the president of the union threatened that they will cement the gates that even cockcroaches could
not pass through.
NLRC granted CONCRETEs motion for preliminary injunction and enjoined BIMCAI from preventing the non-striking
employees officials of the company and their vehicles, customers and visitors free ingress to and egress from petitioner's
plant and premises; directing them to refrain from doing any illegal act which will exacerbate the situation upon the
expiration of the temporary restraining order; and deputizing any officer from the Legal Division of this NLRC to
effectively enforce and implement this injunctive order and, if necessary, to enlist the assistance of the PNP or other
peace officers having jurisdiction over the strike areas in the enforcement and implementation of this Order.
BIMCAI filed this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus, raising the issues below.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether NLRC can issue a preliminary injunction after the lapse of a twenty day TRO considering that it did not find
any fact that the complainant CONCRETE has no adequate remedy at law, and that public officers (police) charged with

the duty to protect complainants property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection (in disregard to Art
218(e) of the Labor Code). NEGATIVE. NLRC ERRED IN GRANTING THE PRELIMINARY INJUCTION
(2) Whether NLRC and Labor Arbiter erred in not granting BIMCAIs earlier petition asking a TRO and injunction against
the escorting by police authorities of individuals who seek to replace the strikers in entering and leaving the strike area,
and that the police force will keep out of the picket line unless actual violence occur (as provided in Art 264 (d) of the
Labor Code) POSITIVE. NLRC SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE TRO IN FAVOR OF BIMCAI
HELD:
(1) Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor in protecting the rights of employees to improve the
terms and conditions of their employment. In underdeveloped countries, it has proved many a time as the only coercive
weapon that can correct abuses against labor.
In the Philippine milieu where social justice remains more as a rhetoric than a reality, labor has vigilantly fought to
safeguard the sanctity of the right to strike. On June 17, 1953, Congress gave statutory recognition to the right to strike
when it enacted RA 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Labor enjoyed the right to strike until prohibited
during martial law because of some radical labor movement. After martial law, the new government treated labor with a
favored eye. The 1987 Constitution contains Article XIII entitled Social Justice and Human Rights. For the first time, the
fundamental law of the land madate the State to ". . . guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law." This
constitutional imprimatur given to the right to strike constitutes signal victory for labor. Our Constitutions of 1935 and
1973 did not accord constitutional status to the right to strike. According to Father Joaquin Bernas, the constitutional
recognition of the right to strike does serve as a reminder that injunctions, should be reduced to the barest minimum.
In the case at bar, NLRC failed to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 218 (e), (4) and (5) of the Labor Code. Article
218 (e) of the Labor Code provides both the procedural and substantive requirements which must strictly be complied
with before a temporary or permanent injunction can issue in a labor dispute, viz.:
Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or
to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor
of such party: Provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except after hearing the testimony of witnesses,
with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and
testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of fact by the commission, to the
effect:
(1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be
continued unless restrained but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on
account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or persons,
association or organization making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or
actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;
(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainants property will follow;
(3) That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant
by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;
(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law ; and
(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainants property are unable or
unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the
Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief
Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful have been
threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant's property.

On cross-examination of the witnesses presented by CONCRETE, it became apparent that there was no threat made by
BIMCAI. Further, no less than the Assistant Manager for Operations, Ronnie Mercado, testified that after the issuance of
the ex parte temporary restraining order, the barricade blocking the gates were removed and people were allowed free
ingress and egress.
Furthermore, Atty. Elmer Jolo, the Personnel Manager joined by Mr. Mercado, disclosed that the public authorities
charged to protect the company's properties were neither unwilling or unable to furnish adequate protection. As a matter
of fact, the police regularly patrolling the area, was never requested assistance.
Verily, the factual circumstances proven by the evidence show that there was no concurrence of the five (5) prerequisites
mandated by Art. 218 (e) of the Labor Code. Thus there is no justification for the issuance of the questioned Order of
preliminary injunction. Imprudently issued temporary restraining orders can break the back of employees engaged in a
legal strike.
(2) Nor do we find baseless the allegation by petitioner that the public respondents have neglected to resolve with
reasonable dispatch its own Petition for Injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order dated April 25, 1992. The
petition invoked Article 264(d) of the Labor Code to enjoin the private respondent from using the military and police
authorities to escort scabs at the struck establishment. Sadly contrasting is the haste with which public respondent heard
and acted on a similar petition for injunction filed by the private respondent. In the case of the private respondent, its
prayer for an ex parte temporary restraining order was heard on April 13, 1992 and it was granted on the same day. Its
petition for preliminary injunction was filed on April 30, 1992, and was granted on May 5, 1992. In the case of petitioner,
its petition for injunction was filed on April 24, 1992, and to date, the records do not reveal whether the public
respondent has granted or denied the same. The disparate treatment is inexplicable considering that the subject matters
of their petition are of similar importance to the parties and to the public.
DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is granted. The Order dated May 5, 1992
of the public respondent in NLRC NCR IC No. 000249-92 is annulled and set aside. The public respondents are likewise
ordered to hear and resolve, with deliberate speed petitioner's petition for injunction filed on April 30, 1992.

161 ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA vs. NLRC et. al.


G.R. No. 91980 June 27, 1991
NARVASA, J.
FACTS:
The controversy at bar had its origin in the "wage distortions" affecting the employees of respondent San Miguel Corporation
allegedly caused by Republic Act No. 6727, otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act. Upon the effectivity of the Act, the
union known as "Ilaw at Buklod Ng Manggagawa (IBM)" said to represent 4,500 employees of San Miguel Corporation, more or less,
"working at the various plants, offices, and warehouses located at the National Capital Region" presented to the company a "demand"
for correction of the "significant distortion in . . . (the workers') wages." In that "demand," the Union explicitly invoked Section 4 (d)
of RA 6727 which reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx
(d) . . .Where the application of the increases in the wage rates under this Section results in distortions as defined under
existing laws in the wage structure within an establishment and gives rise to a dispute therein, such dispute shall first be settled
voluntarily between the parties and in the event of a deadlock, the same shall be finally resolved through compulsory arbitration by the
regional branches of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) having jurisdiction over the workplace
The Union claims that demand was ignored. In this connection, the workers involved issued a joint notice reading as follows:
SAMA-SAMANG PAHAYAG: KAMING ARAWANG MANGGAGAWA NG POLO BREWERY PAWANG KASAPI
NG ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) AY NAGKAISANG NAGPASYA NA IPATUPAD MUNA ANG EIGHT
HOURS WORK SHIFT PANSAMANTALA HABANG HINDI IPINATUTUPAD NG SMC MANAGEMENT ANG TAMANG
WAGE DISTORTION.
That decision to observe the "eight hours work shift" was implemented on October 16, 1989 by "some 800 daily-paid
workers at the Polo Plant's production line of SMC] joined by others at statistical quality control and warehouse. There ensued thereby
a change in the work schedule which had been observed by daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant for the past five (5) years, i.e. "ten
(10) hours for the first shift and ten (10) to fourteen (14) hours for the second shift, from Mondays to Fridays . . ; (and on) Saturdays, .
. eight (8) hours for both shifts" a work schedule which, SMC says, the workers had "welcomed, and encouraged" because the
automatic overtime built into the schedule "gave them a steady source of extra-income," and pursuant to which it (SMC) "planned its
production targets and budgets.
This abandonment of the long-standing schedule of work and the reversion to the eight-hour shift apparently caused
substantial losses to SMC. It is SMC's submittal that the coordinated reduction by the Union's members of the work time theretofore
willingly and consistently observed by them, causing financial losses to the employer in order to compel it to yield to the demand for
correction of "wage distortions," is an illegal and "unprotected" activity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike is illegal
RULING:
YES. Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their
legitimate objectives. The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are concerned are: strikes- the temporary
stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. On the other hand, the counterpart activity that management may licitly
undertake is the lockout- the temporary refusal to furnish work on account of a labor dispute, Article 263 provides that the "right of
legitimate labor organizations to strike and of employer to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be
recognized and respected." The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained
and the means employed therefor.It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law
or contract.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof,
thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue. The provision states
that:

xxx the employer and the union shall negotiate to correct the distort-ions. Any dispute arising from wage distortions shall
be resolved through the grievance procedure under their collective bargaining agreement and, if it remains unresolved, through
voluntary arbitration
Furthermore, Section 16, Chapter I of the implementing rules of said law declares that, "Any issue involving wage
distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout."
Moreover, the workers concerted refusal to adhere to the work schedule in force is a slowdown, an inherently illegal activity
even in the absence of a no strike clause because while the employees continue to work and remain at their positions and accept their
wages, they at the same time select part of the work they care to perform at their own volition or in their own terms.

162 (SUPRA 166) Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. NLRC, 212 SCRA 792 (1992) HICETA

163 and 165 Title: G & S TRANSPORT


CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
TITO S. INFANTE, MELOR VELASCO, JR., JJ.
BORBO, and DANILO CASTAEDA,
Respondents.
G. R. No. 160303
September 13, 2007
Topic: Strike - Definition

Quick Notes/Doctrine: No matter by what term


the complainants used in describing their
concerted action, i.e. [,] protest, sympathy or
mere expression, their joint action have
successfully paralyzed the operations of the
company, and this is considered a strike.

Facts: G & S Transport was the exclusive coupon taxi concessionaire at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) from 1 February 1989 to 31 January 1994 by virtue of a five-year
concession contract awarded by the Manila International Airport Authority. Under the terms of
the contract, the coupon taxi units assigned to service arriving plane passengers would be
dispatched from the garage located at the Duty Free Compound opposite NAIA, whereas units
assigned to service departing plane passengers would be given their assignment by the garage
dispatcher via a two-way radio system on their way back to the garage after taking arriving
passengers to their destination
On 5 May 1990, G & S Transport claimed to have received from the NAIA Airport Taxi Service
Employees Union-TUPAS (Union) a letter-memorandum demanding the dismissal from
employment of Ricardo Gonzales (Gonzales) and Ephraim Alzaga (Alzaga), both drivers of G &
S Transport on the ground that they were found guilty of committing acts of disloyalty, conduct
unbecoming of a union member and acts inimical to the interest of the Union. The Union based
its action on a petition filed by said employees calling for a local election. On 9 May 1990, the
two employees were terminated by G & S Transport.
Upon learning of the incident, several drivers of G & S stopped driving their taxi cabs
apparently in sympathy with their dismissed colleagues. G & S alleged that the work stoppage
constituted an illegal strike at the work premises. Furthermore, G & S averred that various illegal
acts, such as stopping, barring and intimidating other employees wishing to enter the work
premises, were committed by the said drivers that resulted in the paralyzation of petitioners
business operation.
G & S ordered the striking workers to return to work but some of the drivers, including
respondents, refused to do so. On 22 May 1990, G & S filed an action for illegal strike before
the Labor Arbiter against thirty-seven (37) drivers. Two days later, said drivers filed a case for
illegal dismissal against G & S.
Out of the 37 complaining drivers, only seven remained as complainants when the case
reached the Labor Arbiter, namely: Gener Mendoza (Mendoza), Eduardo Dacanay (Dacanay),
Norman Sabiniano (Sabiniano), Mario Daramayo (Daramayo), Borbo, Infante, and Castaeda.
Others executed their respective affidavits of desistance and filed the corresponding motion to
dismiss. On 31 May 1999, the Labor Arbiter declared respondents concerted action as a form
of an illegal strike, thus:
Anent the issue of illegal strike, the records show that there was a stoppage of work on May 16,
1990 at the premises of the garage of G & S Transport located at the Duty Free Shop just
fronting the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), brought about primarily by the dismissal
of Messrs. Gonzales and Alzaga, on the account of acts of [sic] [inimical] to the interest of G & S
union. As pointed out by complainant G & S Transport, its Taxi drivers undertook those
collective action without filing any notice of strike and taking a strike vote, and in violation of no

strike-no lockout clause embodied in the CBA thus making their action as illegal activity.
Actually when the stoppage of work occurred, there seemed to be no labor disputes but merely
a protest of the dismissal of respondents leaders. Under Article 212 (D) "any temporary
stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees must be a result of an industrial or labor
dispute." No industrial or labor dispute, however, was existing on May 16, 1990, since there was
no pending case in any legal forum then.
However, finding that Mendoza, Dacanay and Sabiniano had not participated in the strike, the
Labor Arbiter declared their dismissal as illegal and ordered petitioner to pay them backwages
and separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, since petitioner had already stopped its operations
on 31 January 1995. On the other hand, respondents Daramayo, Borbo, Infante and
Castaeda, though found to have participated in the illegal strike, were not meted out the
penalty of dismissal; instead, petitioner was ordered to pay them separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement but without backwages.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On 27 June 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the decisions of the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiter
G & S maintains that respondents knowingly and deliberately participated in the illegal activities
in the course of an illegal strike by the mere fact that they resolutely defied the order directing
them to report back to work and continued to stay outside the premises, barricading the gates,
heckling and intimidating employees who were returning to work.
Respondents however aver that there was no iota of evidence that would show that they have
trooped the line of the illegal strikers. Assuming arguendo that they participated in the illegal
strike, respondents argue that they should not be dismissed because there was no proof that
they committed illegal acts during the strike

Issues: (1) Whether respondents participated in the illegal strike and (2) Whether the order for
the payment of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement without backwages, is proper.
Held: (1) Yes, The strike undertaken by respondents took the form of a sit-down strike, or more
aptly termed as a sympathetic strike, where the striking employees have no demands or
grievances of their own, but they strike for the purpose of directly or indirectly aiding others,
without direct relation to the advancement of the interest of the strikers. No matter by what term
the respondents complainants used in describing their concerted action, i.e. [,] protest, sympathy
or mere expression, their joint action have successfully paralyzed the operations of G & S
Transport, and this is considered a strike
(2) Yes, Article 264 of the Labor Code, in providing for the consequences of an illegal strike,
makes a distinction between union officers and members who participated therein. Thus,
knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination of employment of a

union officer. The law, however, treats differently mere union members. Mere participation in an
illegal strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of the union members.
With respect to backwages, the principle of a "fair days wage for a fair days labor" remains as
the basic factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee
there can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work
but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from
working. While it was found that respondents expressed their intention to report back to work,
the latter exception cannot apply in this case. In Philippine Marine Officers Guild v. Compaia
Maritima, as affirmed in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel
Employees Union,the Court stressed that for this exception to apply, it is required that the strike
be legal, a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar.
Under the circumstances, respondents reinstatement without backwages suffices for the
appropriate relief. If reinstatement is no longer possible, given the lapse of considerable time
from the occurrence of the strike, the award of separation pay of one (1) month salary for each
year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is in order.

Ratio :
Dispositive Portion:
Relation/Pertinent Law : Article 212 of the Labor Code defines strike as any temporary stoppage
of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A valid
strike therefore presupposes the existence of a labor dispute.

164 Topic:

Union Concerted Activities; Strike; Definition

CA Lofranco

Parties:
Petitioners: BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER) AND RAYMOND TOMAROY, ROEL SARDONIDOS,
JOSEPH SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY
ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS (Former Fifteenth Division), NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division),
and CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION
Nature: This is a petition for review of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
Ponente: CALLEJO, SR., J. [G.R. No. 158158. January 17, 2005.]

FACTS:
Respondent Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC) is a domestic corporation engaged in knitting/textiles. It has approximately 144
rank-and-file employees. In the year 2001, the rank-and-file employees at the CKC banded together and formed the petitioner union
BMC-SUPER duly registered with the DOLE. Meanwhile, another group of rank-and-file employees banded together and formed the
Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Corporation Katipunan (NLM-Katipunan). The NLM-Katipunan was issued a
certificate of registration by the DOLE. A petition for certification election was later filed by the petitioner union with the Bureau of
Labor Relations (BLR).
Pending the resolution of the petition for certification election, the CKC issued a Memorandum informing the employees of the
change in the schedule brought about by the decrease in the orders from the customers. Another Memorandum was issued by the
CKC informing its employees at the Dyeing and Finishing Division that a temporary shutdown of the operations therein would be
effected for one week. The employees were advised to go on vacation leave, and were asked to verify any changes in the schedule
from the Human Resources Division. Unable to solve its financial problems, the CKC decided to temporarily shutdown its operations
at the Dyeing and Finishing Division effective the next day, scheduled to resume until further notice and notified the DOLE of the
said shutdown. The operations of the other divisions of the CKC remained normal. For its reduced dyeing and finishing needs, CKC
brought the textiles to Crayons, Inc., a sister company.
On June 11, 2001, while the CKC's service truck was to deliver fabrics in Bulacan, the group of petitioner Tomaroy and some
companions approached the truck and blocked its way. As a result, the driver of the service truck decided to return to the
respondent's compound. Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy, with 16 members of the petitioner union, staged a picket in front of the
respondent's compound, carrying placards. Few days later, 23 members of the petitioner union gathered in front of the
respondent's compound carrying the same placards. Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy agreed to talk to the management with the
th
following priority demands: (a) resumption of work; and (b) 13 month pay. The next day, members of the petitioner union and
their supporters gathered in front of the respondent's compound. From June 16, 2001 up to June 18, 2001, the members, as well as
supporters of the union, gathered again in front of the company's compound.
On June 25, 2001, the CKC filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before the arbitration branch of the NLRC alleging that the
picket of the members of the union in front of the company's compound constituted an illegal strike.
The Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal and the employment status of the union officers who participated therein as terminated.
The Labor Arbiter found that the continued decline in job prompted the respondent to implement a reduced working day from the
original six (6) days to three (3) days per week because of the continued decrease of job orders, which further led to its decision to
temporarily stop the operation in its Dyeing and Finishing Division for one (1) week. The affected employees were then requested to
utilize their vacation leaves and were, thereafter, admitted back to work. However, Tomaroy and members of the union staged a
strike, and the labor unrest resulted in the cancellation of job orders. The aforestated losses prompted the petitioner to close and
stop the business operations of its Dyeing and Finishing Division.
It is worthy to note that the whole company did not cease to operate and that it was only the workers in the Dyeing and Finishing
Division who were affected by the temporary lay-off. Thus, when the respondents conducted a picket in front of the company's

premises, the whole business operations of the respondent was affected. As borne out by the records, the Labor Arbiter found that
the petitioners therein failed to comply with the requirements for a valid strike, to wit:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

It was not based on a valid factual ground, either based on Collective Bargaining Deadlock and/or Unfair Labor Practice;
No notice of strike was filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the DOLE;
There was no strike-vote taken by the majority members of the union;
There was no strike-vote report submitted to the DOLE at least seven (7) days before the intended date of the strike;
The cooling-off period prescribed by law was not observed; and
The 7-day visiting period after submission of the strike vote report was not fully observed.

Thus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the strike staged by the petitioner union was illegal; hence, the union officers who knowingly
participated in an illegal strike, already lost their employment status.
Aggrieved, the petitioner union interposed an appeal before the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter.
The petitioner union filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition. Hence, the petitioners filed the
instant petition.
ISSUE: WoN the strike was illegal.
HELD: YES. Petitioner union failed to comply with the requirements for a valid strike.
Dispositive: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
73353 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
Ratio:
Strike and labor dispute, construed.
A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A
labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms, or conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. The members and the supporters
of the petitioner union, headed by petitioner Tomaroy, thru concerted action, caused a temporary stoppage of work as a result of an
industrial dispute. The subsequent Reports dated June 14, 15, 16 and 18, 2001 of the same agency further stated that members of
the petitioner union, along with other employees particularly from the knitting department, joined in the picket. It is, thus, apparent
that the concerted effort of the members of the petitioner union and its supporters caused a temporary work stoppage. The
allegation that there can be no work stoppage because the operation in the Dyeing and Finishing Division had been shutdown is of
no consequence. It bears stressing that the other divisions were fully operational. There is nothing on record showing that the union
members and the supporters who formed a picket line in front of the respondent's compound were assigned to the finishing
department. As can be clearly inferred from the spot reports, employees from the knitting department also joined in picket. The
blockade of the delivery of trucks and the attendance of employees from the other departments of the respondent meant work
stoppage. The placards that the picketers caused to be displayed arose from matters concerning terms or conditions of employment
as well as the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment. Clearly, the petitioner union, its officers, members and supporters staged a strike.
Failure to comply with requisites for a valid strike results in loss of employment status of union officers who participated therein.
In order for a strike to be valid, the following requirements laid down in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code must
be complied with:
(a) a notice of strike must be filed;
(b) a strike-vote must be taken; and
(c) the results of the strike-vote must be reported to the DOLE.

It bears stressing that these requirements are mandatory, meaning, non-compliance therewith makes the strike illegal. The evident
intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential
to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. Considering that the petitioner union failed to comply with
the aforesaid requirements, the strike staged on June 11 to 18, 2001 is illegal. Consequently, the officers of the union who
participated therein are deemed to have lost their employment status.

Title: G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION,


Petitioner,
vs.
TITO S. INFANTE, MELOR VELASCO, JR., JJ.
BORBO, and DANILO CASTAEDA,
Respondents.
G. R. No. 160303
September 13, 2007
Topic: Strike - Definition

Quick Notes/Doctrine: No matter by what term


the complainants used in describing their
concerted action, i.e. [,] protest, sympathy or
mere expression, their joint action have
successfully paralyzed the operations of the
company, and this is considered a strike.

Facts: G & S Transport was the exclusive coupon taxi concessionaire at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) from 1 February 1989 to 31 January 1994 by virtue of a five-year
concession contract awarded by the Manila International Airport Authority. Under the terms of
the contract, the coupon taxi units assigned to service arriving plane passengers would be
dispatched from the garage located at the Duty Free Compound opposite NAIA, whereas units
assigned to service departing plane passengers would be given their assignment by the garage
dispatcher via a two-way radio system on their way back to the garage after taking arriving
passengers to their destination
On 5 May 1990, G & S Transport claimed to have received from the NAIA Airport Taxi Service
Employees Union-TUPAS (Union) a letter-memorandum demanding the dismissal from
employment of Ricardo Gonzales (Gonzales) and Ephraim Alzaga (Alzaga), both drivers of G &
S Transport on the ground that they were found guilty of committing acts of disloyalty, conduct
unbecoming of a union member and acts inimical to the interest of the Union. The Union based
its action on a petition filed by said employees calling for a local election. On 9 May 1990, the
two employees were terminated by G & S Transport.
Upon learning of the incident, several drivers of G & S stopped driving their taxi cabs
apparently in sympathy with their dismissed colleagues. G & S alleged that the work stoppage
constituted an illegal strike at the work premises. Furthermore, G & S averred that various illegal
acts, such as stopping, barring and intimidating other employees wishing to enter the work
premises, were committed by the said drivers that resulted in the paralyzation of petitioners
business operation.
G & S ordered the striking workers to return to work but some of the drivers, including
respondents, refused to do so. On 22 May 1990, G & S filed an action for illegal strike before
the Labor Arbiter against thirty-seven (37) drivers. Two days later, said drivers filed a case for
illegal dismissal against G & S.
Out of the 37 complaining drivers, only seven remained as complainants when the case
reached the Labor Arbiter, namely: Gener Mendoza (Mendoza), Eduardo Dacanay (Dacanay),
Norman Sabiniano (Sabiniano), Mario Daramayo (Daramayo), Borbo, Infante, and Castaeda.
Others executed their respective affidavits of desistance and filed the corresponding motion to
dismiss. On 31 May 1999, the Labor Arbiter declared respondents concerted action as a form
of an illegal strike, thus:
Anent the issue of illegal strike, the records show that there was a stoppage of work on May 16,
1990 at the premises of the garage of G & S Transport located at the Duty Free Shop just
fronting the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), brought about primarily by the dismissal
of Messrs. Gonzales and Alzaga, on the account of acts of [sic] [inimical] to the interest of G & S
union. As pointed out by complainant G & S Transport, its Taxi drivers undertook those
collective action without filing any notice of strike and taking a strike vote, and in violation of no

strike-no lockout clause embodied in the CBA thus making their action as illegal activity.
Actually when the stoppage of work occurred, there seemed to be no labor disputes but merely
a protest of the dismissal of respondents leaders. Under Article 212 (D) "any temporary
stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees must be a result of an industrial or labor
dispute." No industrial or labor dispute, however, was existing on May 16, 1990, since there was
no pending case in any legal forum then.
However, finding that Mendoza, Dacanay and Sabiniano had not participated in the strike, the
Labor Arbiter declared their dismissal as illegal and ordered petitioner to pay them backwages
and separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, since petitioner had already stopped its operations
on 31 January 1995. On the other hand, respondents Daramayo, Borbo, Infante and
Castaeda, though found to have participated in the illegal strike, were not meted out the
penalty of dismissal; instead, petitioner was ordered to pay them separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement but without backwages.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On 27 June 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the decisions of the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiter
G & S maintains that respondents knowingly and deliberately participated in the illegal activities
in the course of an illegal strike by the mere fact that they resolutely defied the order directing
them to report back to work and continued to stay outside the premises, barricading the gates,
heckling and intimidating employees who were returning to work.
Respondents however aver that there was no iota of evidence that would show that they have
trooped the line of the illegal strikers. Assuming arguendo that they participated in the illegal
strike, respondents argue that they should not be dismissed because there was no proof that
they committed illegal acts during the strike

Issues: (1) Whether respondents participated in the illegal strike and (2) Whether the order for
the payment of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement without backwages, is proper.
Held: (1) Yes, The strike undertaken by respondents took the form of a sit-down strike, or more
aptly termed as a sympathetic strike, where the striking employees have no demands or
grievances of their own, but they strike for the purpose of directly or indirectly aiding others,
without direct relation to the advancement of the interest of the strikers. No matter by what term
the respondents complainants used in describing their concerted action, i.e. [,] protest, sympathy
or mere expression, their joint action have successfully paralyzed the operations of G & S
Transport, and this is considered a strike
(2) Yes, Article 264 of the Labor Code, in providing for the consequences of an illegal strike,
makes a distinction between union officers and members who participated therein. Thus,
knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination of employment of a

union officer. The law, however, treats differently mere union members. Mere participation in an
illegal strike is not a sufficient ground for termination of the services of the union members.
With respect to backwages, the principle of a "fair days wage for a fair days labor" remains as
the basic factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee
there can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work
but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from
working. While it was found that respondents expressed their intention to report back to work,
the latter exception cannot apply in this case. In Philippine Marine Officers Guild v. Compaia
Maritima, as affirmed in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel
Employees Union,the Court stressed that for this exception to apply, it is required that the strike
be legal, a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar.
Under the circumstances, respondents reinstatement without backwages suffices for the
appropriate relief. If reinstatement is no longer possible, given the lapse of considerable time
from the occurrence of the strike, the award of separation pay of one (1) month salary for each
year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is in order.

Ratio :
Dispositive Portion:
Relation/Pertinent Law : Article 212 of the Labor Code defines strike as any temporary stoppage
of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A valid
strike therefore presupposes the existence of a labor dispute.

166 BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, petitioner, vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), TINIG AT LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA BLTBCO-NAFLU and
its reinstated one hundred ninety (190) members (Ang dami nung pangalan; I omitted)
Topic: Nature and purpose of strike
Facts: (Long case because of number of issues)
Private respondent Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTB Co. NAFLU (TLM-BLTB-NAFLU), an affiliate of
the National Federation of Labor Unions. (NAFLU), filed a Notice of Strike against the Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company on the grounds of unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA.
The reaction of BLTBCO was to ask the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute or to
certify it to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration. The petitioner also moved
to dismiss the notice of strike.
Efforts at amicable settlement having failed, Acting Labor Secretary C. Castro certified the dispute to the
NLRC.
A copy of the certification order was served upon the NAFLU, and on the TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU. However, it
was noted in the notice of order that union secretary Jerry Soriano refused to receive it.
The officers and members of TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU went on strike and maintained picket lines blocking the
premises of BLTBCo's terminals.
The NLRC issued an en banc resolution ordering the striking employees to lift their picket and to remove
all obstructions and barricades. All striking employees on payroll as of May 23, 1988, were required to
return to work. BLTBCo was directed to accept them back to work within 5 days under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike. 2
On September 15, 1988, the BLTBCo caused the publication of the resolution and called on all striking
workers to return to work not later than September 18, 1988. It later extended the deadline to September
19, 1988.
Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo employees who went on strike, only 1,116 reported back for work. Seventeen
others were later re-admitted. Subsequently, about 614 employees, including those who were allegedly
dismissed for causes other than the strike, filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal. Their common
ground was that they were refused admission when they reported back for work.
Among those who failed to comply with the return-to-work order were the respondent individual union
members.
NLRC = ordered (among others) Dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice and union busting;
Ordering BLTBCo to fully implement the provisions of the CBA in the matter of uniform and safety shoes;
Declaring the strike illegal; Directing likewise the reinstatement of all striking employees of BLTBCo who
have not committed illegal acts.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue 1: should the union members who participated in the strike be reinstated?
BLTBCo contends that the 190 union members who participated in the illegal strike should not have been
reinstated because they defied the return-to-work order of September 6, 1988. It quotes the NLRC in its
own resolution: A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an
assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second

paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended. The Union officers and members, as a result, are
deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act.
That is only half the picture, however. As the NLRC further explained, it was "not inclined to declare a
wholesale forfeiture of employment status of all those who participated in the strike" because, first of all,
there was inadequate service of the certification order on the union as of the date the strike was declared
and there was no showing that the striking members had been apprised of such order by the NAFLU.
Secondly, and more importantly, the resolution declared as follows: Applying the principle of vicarious
liability, only the officers of the union deserved to be penalized with the loss of their employment status.
The leaders of the union are the moving force in the declaration of the strike and the Rank-in-file
employees merely followed. Xx x True it is, that management of BLTBCo caused the publication of the
Resolution of the Commission of September 5, 1988 in the Manila Bulletin, We cannot reasonably expect
the complainants, who are ordinary workers, to be regular readers of such newspaper. Moreover, the
publication of the said resolution was only made once.
We accept these factual conclusions as they do not appear to have been reached arbitrarily. The mere fact
that the majority of the strikers were able to return to work does not necessarily mean that the rest
deliberately defied the return-to-work order or that they had been sufficiently notified thereof. As the
Solicitor General correctly adds, some of them may have left Metro Manila and did not have enough time
to return during the period given by the petitioner, which was only five days.
Issue 2: Was there an abandonment of position by reason of participation in the illegal strike?
The contention of the petitioner that the private respondents abandoned their position is also not
acceptable. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said to
have abandoned his work.
A worker who joins a strike does so precisely to assert or improve the terms and conditions of his
employment. If his purpose is to abandon his work, he would not go to the trouble of joining a strike.
Issue 3: Should the employees who committed violent acts or returned to work but
subsequently resumed their strike activities be reinstated?
The petitioner also alleges that the NLRC erred in limiting the forfeiture of employment status to the 36
union officers and members although there were at least 100 employees who committed violent acts and
20 employees who reported back for work and later abandoned it to resume their strike activities.
These issues are also factual. The findings thereon of the NLRC are conclusive on us and will not be
disturbed as it clearly appears that they are not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the mere filing of charges against an employee for alleged illegal
acts during a strike does not by itself justify his dismissal. The charges must be proved at an investigation
duly called where the employee shall be given an opportunity to defend himself. This is true even if the
alleged ground constitutes a criminal offense, as we held in Almira v. B.F. Goodrich Phil., Inc.
Issue 4: Should the union officers be dismissed and all others who participated in the illegal
strike be dismissed?
The next contention of the petitioner is that Serafin Soriano, Jerry Soriano and Desiderio Comel should
also be dismissed with the other union officers and members who participated in the illegal strike. We
note, however, that these three have not been impleaded in this petition (unlike the others who have been
individually named) and so have not been given an opportunity to defend themselves against the charges
of BLTBCo. Absent such an opportunity, we are precluded from making any pronouncement regarding
their alleged role in the strike for which their dismissal is sought.

Issue 5: Did the NLRC erred in reinstating all striking employees who have not committed
illegal acts?
The petitioner's last point is that the NLRC should not have issued the blanket directive for the
"reinstatement of all striking employees of BLTBCo who have not committed illegal acts."
The key clause here is "who have not committed illegal acts." The directive was not really "blanket," as
the petitioner would call it, but indeed selective. The NLRC made this clear in the resolution dated
September 16, 1991, thus: This Commission's order directing the reinstatement of all striking employees
against whom no complaint of illegal acts having been committed during the strikes, and who were barred
from returning to work and is similarly situated with those who have been directed to be reinstated,
should, as a consequence and on the basis of the reasons discussed in the questioned resolution be
reinstated.
Elaborating on the same issue, the Solicitor General astutely observes: The assailed Resolution does not
prevent petitioner from continuing with its investigation and come up with evidence against these
workers. But they have to be admitted back to their work first. This is clearly a situation where the social
justice provisions of our laws and jurisprudence come in aid of labor. Since such investigations might be
extended, intentionally or otherwise, the workers are in danger of losing their livelihood. As compared to
the management that is in a position to wage an extended legal struggle against labor, the latter cannot
do so. This is where the State intervenes to equalize matters between labor and management.
Nature and Purpose of strike: The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the
Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of
this right, the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more energy
and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to the employer's intransigence. The
strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled
carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared
only after the most thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that is,
peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of the legal
requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-work order in industries affected with public
interest, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect.
Quotable quotes: Even war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no less observance of the
rules, for the benefit of all concerned.

167 Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 95 (1995);MATEO


168 (SUPRA 209) Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. CCBP, G.R. No. 164302-03, 24 January
2007;MAYUGA
169Escario v. NLRC, G.R. No. 160302, September 27, 2010 HICETA
170 Master Iron Labor v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 47 (1993) PALOMIQUE
145, 147, 171 Shell Oil Workers Union v. Shell Co. of the Phils. Ltd
SHELL OIL WORKERS' UNION, petitioner, vs.SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LTD., and THE
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. [G.R. No. L-28607 May 31, 1971]
TOPIC: Management Prerogative and Unfair Labor Practices;
PONENTE: FERNANDO, .J.
FACTS:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

1964: A study made by Shell Company for the purpose of improving the productivity, organization and efficiency
of its Pandacan Installation recommended the dissolution of its security guard section. If an outside agency to
perform such service were to be hired, there would be a savings of P96,000.00 annually in addition to further
economy consequent on the elimination to overtime an administration expenses. Its implementation was
scheduled for 1965.
July 1966, a joint consultation by the Union and management on the matter. There was No serious opposition to
such a move provided it be done gradually and in close consultation with the Union. There was even an offer if
cooperation as long as a scheme for retirement of the security guards affected or their redeployment would be
followed.
August 26, 1966, a collective bargaining contract was executed between the Union and the Shell
Company effective from the first of the month of that year to December 31, 1969, which includes
the category of the security guards in such collective bargaining contract.
Respondent Shell Company of the Philippines dissolved its security guard section, stationed at its Pandacan
Installation notwithstanding its being embraced in, and its continuance as such thus assured by an existing
collective bargaining contract
The respondent company thus transferred 18 security guards to its other department and consequently hired a
private security agency to undertake the work of said security guards.
As a result a strike called by petitioner Shell Oil Workers' Union, hereinafter to be designated as the Union, the
President certified it to respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) on June 27, 1967.
Efforts were made by the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor to settle the matter, but they were
unsuccessful.
August 5, 1967: CIR declared the strike illegal primarily on the ground that such dissolution was a valid exercise of
a management prerogative of Shell.
Hence this appeal.

ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner "contends that the eighteen (18) security guards affected are part of the bargaining unit and covered by the
existing collective bargaining contract, and as such, their transfers and eventual dismissals are illegal
being done in violation of the existing contract. It, therefore, prayed that said security guards be reinstated with
full back wages from the time of their dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement
Respondent, Shell contends that it was merely performing its legitimate prerogative to adopt the most efficient and
economical method of operation; that said guards were transferred to other sections with increase, except for four (4)
guards, in rates of pay and with transfer bonus; the said action was motivated by business consideration in line with past
established practice and made after notice to and discussion with the Union; that the 18 guards concerned were dismissed
for wilfully refusing to obey the transfer order; and that the strike staged by the Union on May 25, 1967 is illegal.
Primarily, Company prayed, among others, for the dismissal of the Union's petition and the said Union's strike be declared
illegal followed by the termination of the employee status of those responsible and who participated in said illegal strike."

ISSUE: Whether the existing collective bargaining contract on maintaining security guard section, among others,
constitute a bar to the decision of the management to contract out security guards. (WON the strike was legal)
HELD/RATIO: YES. The strike cannot be declared illegal, there being a violation of the collective bargaining agreement
by Shell Company. Even if it were otherwise, however, this Court cannot lend sanction of its approval to the outright
dismissal of all union officers, a move that certainly would have the effect of considerably weakening a labor organization,
and thus in effect frustrate the policy of the Industrial Peace Act to encourage unionization. To the extent, however, that
the serious acts of violence occurring in the course of the strike could be made the basis for holding responsible a leader or
a member of the Union guilty of their commission, what was decided by respondent Court should not be disturbed.
There was specific coverage concerning the security guard section in the collective bargaining
contract. It is found not only in the body thereof but in the two appendices concerning the wage schedules as well as
the premium pay and the night compensation to which the personnel in such section were entitled. It was thus an
assurance of security of tenure, at least, during the lifetime of the agreement. Nor is it a sufficient answer,
as set forth in the decision of respondent Court, that while such a section would be abolished, the guards would not be
unemployed as they would be transferred to another position with an increase in pay and with a transfer bonus. For
what is involved is the integrity of the agreement reached, the terms of which should be binding of both
parties. One of them may be released, but only with the consent of the other. The right to object belongs to the latter,
and if exercised, must be respected. Such a state of affairs should continue during the existence of the contract. Only
thus may there be compliance with and fulfillment of the covenants in a valid subsisting agreement.
Shell as far back as 1964, had already been studying the matter of dissolving the security guard
section and contracting out such service to an outside agency. Apparently, it had reached a decision to that
effect for implementation the next year. In July 1966, there was a joint consultation between it and the Union on the
matter. Nonetheless on August 26, 1966, a collective bargaining contract was entered into which, as indicated above,
did assure the continued existence of the security guard section. The Shell Company did not have to agree to
such a stipulation. Or it could have reserved the right to effect a dissolution and reassign the guards.
It did not do so. Instead, when it decided to take such a step resulting in the strike, it would rely primarily on
provisions in the collective bargaining contract couched in general terms, merely declaratory of certain management
prerogatives. Considering the circumstances of record, there can be no justification then for Shell Company's
insistence on pushing through its project of such dissolution without thereby incurring a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement.
As to the matter of management prerogatives: (remember the 3 limitations on management prerogatives)
It is the contention of Shell Company that the dissolution of the security guard section to be replaced by an outside agency
is a management prerogative. The Union argues otherwise, relying on the assurance of the continued existence of a
security guard section at least during the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement.
It is to be admitted that the stand of Shell Company as to the scope of management prerogative is not devoid of plausibility
if it were not bound by what was stipulated. The growth of industrial democracy fostered by the institution of collective
bargaining with the workers entitled to be represented by a union of their choice, has no doubt contracted the sphere of
what appertains solely to the employer. It would be going too far to assert, however, that a decision on each and every
aspect of the productive process must be reached jointly by an agreement between labor and management. Essentially, the
freedom to manage the business remains with management. It still has plenty of elbow room for making its wishes prevail.
In much the same way that labor unions may be expected to resist to the utmost what they consider to be an unwelcome
intrusion into their exclusive domain, they cannot justly object to management equally being jealous of its prerogatives.
More specifically, it cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units
are essential for its operation. To it belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its
personnel or contracted to outside agencies. it is the opinion of the Court, that while management has the final say on such
matter, the labor union is not to be completely left out. What was done by Shell Company in informing the Union as to the
step it was intending to take on the proposed dissolution of the security guard section to be replaced by an outside agency
is praise-worthy. There should be mutual consultation eventually deference is to be paid to what management decides.
Thereby, in the words of Chief Justice Warren, there is likely to be achieved "peaceful accommodation of conflicting
interest." In this particular case though, what was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining contract
certainly precluded Shell Company from carrying out what otherwise would have been within its
prerogative if to do so would be violative thereof.
As to the issue on violence:

Employees Association v. Insular life Assurance Co., Ltd., It is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix
the seal of illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment by the guilty party.
Under the circumstances, it would be going too far to consider that it thereby became illegal. This is not by
any means to condone the utilization of force by labor to attain its objectives. It is only to show awareness
that is labor conflicts, the tension that fills the air as well as the feeling of frustration and bitterness
could break out in sporadic acts of violence. If there be in this case a weighing of interests in the balance, the ban
the law imposes on unfair labor practices by management that could provoke a strike and its requirement that it be
conducted peaceably, it would be, to repeat, unjustified, considering all the facts disclosed, to stamp the strike with
illegality. It is enough that individual liability be incurred by those guilty of such acts of violence that call for loss of
employee status.
DOCTRINES:

The Shell Company, in failing to manifest fealty to what was stipulated in an existing collective
bargaining contract, was thus guilty of an unfair labor practice. Security Bank Employees Union v.
Security Bank and Trust Company unfair labor practice is committed by a labor union or its agent by its
refusal 'to bargain collectively with the employer' and this Court having decided in the Republic Savings Bank
case that collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement, being a continuous process, the
duty to bargain necessarily imposing on the parties the obligation to live up to the terms of such a collective
bargaining agreement if entered into, it is undeniable that non-compliance therewith constitutes an unfair labor
practice."
, the legality of the strike follows as a corollary to the finding of fact, made in the decision appealed from
which is supported by substantial evidence to the effect that the strike had triggered by the Company's failure
to abide by the terms and conditions of its collective bargaining agreement with the Union, by the discrimination,
resorted to by the company, with regard to hire and tenure of employment, and the dismissal of employees due to
union activities, as well as the refusal of the company to bargain collectively in good faith
It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. It suffices, if
such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a strikeAs a consequence, we
hold that the strike in question had been called to offset what petitioners were warranted in believing in good
faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management, that petitioners were not bound, therefore, to wait
for the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of strike before staging the same, that said strike was not,
accordingly, illegal and that the strikers had not thereby lost their status as employees of respondents herein."
The right to self-organization so sedulously guarded by the Industrial Peace Act explicitly includes the right "to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and to the mutual aid or protection." a
strike as form of concerted activity has the stamp of legitimacy. As a matter of law, even under the regime of
compulsary arbitration under the Court of Industrial Relations Act, a strike was by no means a forbidden
weapon.
Former Chief Justice Paras: "As a matter of fact, a strike may not be staged only when, during the pendency of an
industrial dispute, the Court of industrial Relations has issued the proper injunction against the laborers (section
19, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended). Capital need not, however, be apprehensive about the recurrence
of strikes in view of the system of compulsory arbitration by the Court of Industrial Relations."
Justice J.B.L. Reyes: A strike then, in the apt phrase, is "an institutionalized factor of democratic
growth." This is to foster industrial democracy.

DISPOSITVE:
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Industrial Relations of August 5, 1967 is reversed, the finding of
illegality of the strike declared by the Shell Oil Workers' Union on May 25, 1967 not being in accordance with law.
Accordingly, the dismissal by the Shell Company on May 27, 1967 of the eighteen security guards, 34 with the exception of
Ernesto Crisostomo, who was found guilty of committing a serious act of violence is set aside and they are declared
reinstated. The continuance of their status such is, however, dependent on whether or not a security guard section is
provided for in the collective bargaining contract entered into after the expiration of the contract that expired on
December 31, 1969. The loss of employee status of the officers of the Union, 35 decreed by respondent Court in its decision,
is likewise set aside, except as to Gregorio Bacsa and Conrado Pena, both of whom did commit serious acts of violence.
The termination of the employment status of Nestor Samson, Jose Rey, Romeo Rosales, Antonio Labrador and Sesinando
Romero, who committed acts of violence not serious in character, is also set aside, but while allowed to be reinstated, they
are not entitled to back pay. Ricardo Pagsibigan and Daniel Barraquel, along with the aforesaid Gregorio Baesa, Conrado

Pea and Ernesto Crisostomo, were legally penalized with dismissal because of the serious acts of violence committed by
them in the course of the strike. The rest of the employees laid off should be reinstated with back pay to be counted from
the date they were separated by virtue of the appealed decision, from which should be deducted whatever earnings may
have been received by such employees during such period. The case is hereby remanded to respondent Court for the
implementation of this decision. In ascertaining the back wages to which the security guards are entitled, it must likewise
be ascertained whether or not the security guard section is continued after December 31, 1969. Without costs.

172 Consolidated Labor Association of the Phils. v. Marsman and Co., 11 SCRA 589 (1964) SANTOS
173 (SUPRA of 161) Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa(IBM) v. NLRC,198 SCRA 586 (1991); GUEVARA

AUTHOR: Jimi R. Arranchado


174 Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global
G.R. No. 144315 July 17, 2006
TOPIC: Prohibited Strikes
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.
PARTIES:
Petitioner: PHILCOM EMPLOYEES UNION
Respondents: PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS and PHILCOM CORPORATION
FACTS:
1. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner Philcom Employees Union and the respondent Philcom
Corporation expired.
2. The parties started negotiations for the renewal of their CBA in July 1997.
3. While negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) National Capital Region.
4. In its position paper, the union raised the issue of the alleged unfair labor practice of the company hereunder enumerated
as follows:
(a) PABX transfer and contractualization of PABX service and position;
(b) Massive contractualization;
(c) Flexible labor and additional work/function;
(d) Disallowance of union leave intended for union seminar;
(e) Misimplementation and/or non-implementation of employees' benefits like shoe allowance, rainboots,
raincoats, OIC shift allowance, P450.00 monthly allowance, driving allowance, motorcycle award and full-time
physician;
(f) Non-payment, discrimination and/or deprivation of overtime, restday work, waiting/stand by time and staff
meetings;
(g) Economic inducement by promotion during CBA negotiation;
(h) Disinformation scheme, surveillance and interference with union affairs;
(i) Issuance of memorandum/notice to employees without giving copy to union, change in work schedule at
Traffic Records Section and ITTO policies; and
(j) Inadequate transportation allowance, water and facilities.
5. The company, on the other hand, raised in its position paper the sole issue of the illegality of the strike staged by the
union.
6. On the premise that public respondent Labor Secretary cannot rule on the issue of the strike since there was no petition
to declare the same illegal, petitioner union filed on March 4, 1998 a Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out Portions of &
Attachments in Philcom's Position Paper for being irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent to the issues assumed for
resolution.
7. In opposition to PEU's Manifestation/Motion, the company argued that it was precisely due to the strike suddenly
staged by the union on November 17, 1997 that the dispute was assumed by the Labor Secretary. Hence, the case would
necessarily include the issue of the legality of the strike.
8. SOLE: Pending resolution of the issues of illegal strike and bargaining deadlock which are yet to be heard, all the
striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and Philcom and/or
Philcom Corporation are hereby directed to unconditionally accept back to work all striking Union officers and members
under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any
acts that may aggravate the situation.

9. Denying bith the appeals of Philcom and PEU, the SOLE decided: It is our determination that the issue of the legality of
the strike is well within the jurisdiction of this Office. The same has been properly submitted and assumed jurisdiction by
the Office for resolution.
10. CA: The Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute upon Philcom's petition as a consequence of the strike
that PEU had declared and not because of the notices of strike that PEU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB). The reason of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute was the staging of the
strike. Consequently, any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to the labor dispute between PEU and Philcom,
but also part of the labor dispute itself. It was proper for the Secretary to take cognizance of the issue on the legality of the
strike.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the SOLE properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike.
2. Whether or not the strike was illegal.
HELD:
1. YES
2. YES
RATIO:
ON SOLES JURISDICTION
1. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, since the very reason of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction was
PEU's declaration of the strike, any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to, but is essentially involved in, the
labor dispute itself.
2. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides:
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable
to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If
one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission
may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision as well as with such
orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
x x x x.
3. The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of
the police power of the State, with the aim of promoting public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is
granted "great breadth of discretion" in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers
is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place.
4. In this case, the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because it falls in an industry indispensable to the
national interest. As noted by the Secretary.
[T]he Company has been a vital part of the telecommunications industry for 73 years. It is particularly noted for its
expertise and dominance in the area of international telecommunications. Thus, it performs a vital role in providing
critical services indispensable to the national interest. It is for this very reason that this Office strongly opines that any
concerted action, particularly a prolonged work stoppage is fraught with dire consequences. Surely, the on-going strike
will adversely affect not only the livelihood of workers and their dependents, but also the company's suppliers and dealers,
both in the public and private sectors who depend on the company's facilities in the day-to-day operations of their

businesses and commercial transactions. The operational viability of the company is likewise adversely affected, especially
its expansion program for which it has incurred debts in the approximate amount of P2 Billion. Any prolonged work
stoppage will also bring about substantial losses in terms of lost tax revenue for the government and would surely pose a
serious set back in the company's modernization program.
At this critical time when government is working to sustain the economic gains already achieved, it is the paramount
concern of this Office to avert any unnecessary work stoppage and, if one has already occurred, to minimize its deleterious
effect on the workers, the company, the industry and national economy as a whole.
5. It is of no moment that PEU never acquiesced to the submission for resolution of the issue on the legality of the strike.
PEU cannot prevent resolution of the legality of the strike by merely refusing to submit the issue for resolution. It is also
immaterial that this issue, as PEU asserts, was not properly submitted for resolution of the Secretary.
6. The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in
an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from such
labor dispute. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose
of the dispute.
7. Besides, it was upon Philcom's petition that the Secretary immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute on 19
November 1997.20 If petitioner's notices of strike filed on 21 October and 4 November 1997 were what prompted the
assumption of jurisdiction, the Secretary would have issued the assumption order as early as those dates.
8. Moreover, after an examination of the position paper Philcom submitted to the Secretary, we see no reason to strike out
those portions which PEU seek to expunge from the records. A careful study of all the facts alleged, issues raised, and
arguments presented in the position paper leads us to hold that the portions PEU seek to expunge are necessary in the
resolution of the present case.
9. On the documents attached to Philcom's position paper, except for Annexes MM-2 to MM-22 inclusive22 which deal
with the supposed consolidation of Philippine Global Communications, Inc. and Philcom Corporation, we find the other
annexes relevant and material in the resolution of the issues that have emerged in this case.
ON THE ILLEGALITY OF THE STRIKE
1. Philcom is engaged in a vital industry protected by Presidential Decree No. 823 (PD 823), as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 849, from strikes and lockouts. PD 823, as amended, provides:
Sec. 1. It is the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining within the framework of
compulsory and voluntary arbitration. Therefore, all forms of strikes, picketings and lockouts are hereby strictly prohibited
in vital industries, such as in public utilities, including transportation and communications, x x x.
Enumerating the industries considered as vital, Letter of Instruction No. 368 provides:
For the guidance of workers and employers, some of whom have been led into filing notices of strikes and lockouts even in
vital industries, you are hereby instructed to consider the following as vital industries and companies or firms under PD
823 as amended:
1. Public Utilities:
xxxx
B. Communications:
1) Wire or wireless telecommunications such as telephone, telegraph, telex, and cable companies or firms; (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx

It is therefore clear that the striking employees violated the no-strike policy of the State in regard to vital industries.
2. The Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Despite the issuance of the return-to-work orders dated
19 November and 28 November 1997, the striking employees failed to return to work and continued with their strike.
Regardless of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking employees should have ceased or desisted from all
acts that would undermine the authority given the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. They could not defy
the return-to-work orders by citing Philcom's alleged unfair labor practices to justify such defiance.
PEU could not have validly anchored its defiance to the return-to-work orders on the motion for reconsideration that it had
filed on the assumption of jurisdiction order. A return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory despite the
filing of a motion for reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition
questioning its validity.
The records show that on 22 November 1997, Philcom published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer a notice to striking
employees to return to work. These employees did not report back to work but continued their mass action. In fact, they
lifted their picket lines only on 22 December 1997. Philcom formally notified twice these employees to explain in writing
why they should not be dismissed for defying the return-to-work order. Philcom held administrative hearings on these
disciplinary cases. Thereafter, Philcom dismissed these employees for abandonment of work in defiance of the return-towork order.
A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the
workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer.
The following provision of the Labor Code governs the effects of defying a return-to-work order:
ART. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) x x x x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after
certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving
the same grounds for the strike or lockout x x x x
Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status:
Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike, shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of
his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
A strike undertaken despite the Secretary's issuance of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity,
and thus, illegal, under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code. The union officers who knowingly participate in the illegal
strike are deemed to have lost their employment status. The union members, including union officers, who commit
specific illegal acts or who knowingly defy a return-to-work order are also deemed to have lost their employment status.
Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while
retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management to fill up their positions.
Hence, the failure of PEU's officers and members to comply immediately with the return-to-work orders dated 19
November and 28 November 1997 cannot be condoned. Defiance of the return-to-work orders of the Secretary
constitutes a valid ground for dismissal.
3. PEU staged the strike using unlawful means and methods.
Even if the strike in the present case was not illegal per se, the strike activities that PEU had undertaken, especially the
establishment of human barricades at all entrances to and egresses from the company premises and the use of coercive
methods to prevent company officials and other personnel from leaving the company premises, were definitely illegal.
PEU is deemed to have admitted that its officers and members had committed these illegal acts, as it never disputed
Philcom's assertions of PEU's unlawful strike activities in all the pleadings that PEU submitted to the Secretary and to this

Court.
PEU's picketing officers and members prohibited other tenants at the Philcom building from entering and leaving the
premises. Leonida S. Rabe, Country Manager of Societe Internationale De Telecommunications Aeronautiques (SITA), a
tenant at the Philcom building, wrote two letters addressed to PEU President Roberto B. Benosa. She told Benosa that
PEU's act of obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the company premises "has badly disrupted normal operations
of their organization."
The right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions. Article 264(e) of the Labor Code,
on prohibited activities, provides:
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or
egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
The Labor Code is emphatic against the use of violence, coercion, and intimidation during a strike and to this end prohibits
the obstruction of free passage to and from the employer's premises for lawful purposes. A picketing labor union has no
right to prevent employees of another company from getting in and out of its rented premises, otherwise, it will be held
liable for damages for its acts against an innocent by-stander.
The sanction provided in Article 264(a) is so severe that any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.
By insisting on staging the prohibited strike and defiantly picketing Philcom's premises to prevent the resumption of
company operations, the striking employees have forfeited their right to be readmitted.
4. PEU declared the strike during the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB.
On 17 November 1997, while a conciliation meeting was being held at the NCMB in NCMB-NCR-NS 10-435-97, PEU
went on strike. It should be noted that in their meeting on 11 November 1997, both Philcom and PEU were even "advised
to maintain the status quo." Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of Section 6, Book V,
Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, which explicitly obliges the parties to bargain collectively
in good faith and prohibits them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings. The relevant provision of the Implementing
Rules provides:
Section 6. Conciliation. x x x x
During the proceedings, the parties shall not do any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of dispute. They
are obliged, as part of their duty, to bargain collectively in good faith, to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation
meetings called by the regional branch of the Board. x x x x
Article 264(a) of the Labor Code also considers it a prohibited activity to declare a strike "during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the same strike."
Lamentably, PEU defiantly proceeded with their strike during the pendency of the conciliation proceedings.
5. PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance procedure established in the CBA.
By PEU's own admission, "the Union's complaints to the management began in June 1997 even before the start of the 1997
CBA renegotiations." Their CBA expired on 30 June 1997. PEU could have just taken up their grievances in their
negotiations for the new CBA. This is what a Philcom officer had suggested to the Dasmarias staff when the latter
requested on 16 June 1997 for an increase in transportation allowance. In fact, when PEU declared the strike, Philcom and
PEU had already agreed on 37 items in their negotiations for the new CBA.
The bottom line is that PEU should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery provided for in the CBA. In
disregarding this procedure, the union leaders who knowingly participated in the strike have acted unreasonably. The law
cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their illegal acts.

A strike declared on the basis of grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance committee as stipulated in the
CBA of the parties is premature and illegal.
Having held the strike illegal and having found that PEU's officers and members have committed illegal acts during the
strike, we hold that no writ of execution should issue for the return to work of PEU officers who participated in the illegal
strike, and PEU members who committed illegal acts or who defied the return-to-work orders that the Secretary issued on
19 November 1997 and 28 November 1997. The issue of who participated in the illegal strike, committed illegal acts, or
defied the return-to-work orders is a question of fact that must be resolved in the appropriate proceedings before the
Secretary of Labor.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53989,
with the MODIFICATION that the Secretary of Labor is directed to determine who among the Philcom Employees Union
officers participated in the illegal strike, and who among the union members committed illegal acts or defied the return-towork orders of 19 November 1997 and 28 November 1997. No pronouncement as to costs.

175 Biflex Phils., Inc. Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation and Biflex (Phils.), Inc.,
G.R. No. 155679, 19 December 2006 ZAPATA

176 MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA M. GREENFIELD (MSMG-UWP), and its


president BEDA MAGDALENA VILLANUEVA et a.l vs. HON. CRESENCIO J. RAMOS, NLRC et al. (note:
LONG list of parties, more or less 3.5 pages long, and long case) | G.R. No. 113907; February 28, 2000 |
PONENTE: PURISIMA, J. | TOPIC: PART VIII - UNION CONCERTED ACTIVITIES Strike Grounds
No Strike Clause
FACTS: MSMG (local union) is an affiliate of the federation, respondent United Lumber and General
Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP). In the CBA between MSMG and the employer, M. Greenfield, Inc.
(GREENFIELD), the parties named were M. GREENFIELD, INC. (B) represented by its general manager, Mr.
Carlos T. Javelosa and MSMG/ULGWP represented by a Nego. Committee headed by its National President,
Mr. Godofredo Paceno, Sr.
Pertinent CBA provisions under Art. II Union Security states: (1) (Sec. 2) all employees covered by the CBA and presently
members of the union shall remain members of the union for the duration of the agreement, as a condition precedent to
continued employment with the company (closed-shop agreement); and that (2) (Sec. 4) those who fail to maintain membership in
the union for non-payment of dues, resignation, or violation of Unions constitution and by-laws, upon written notice and
recommendation to the company, shall be dismissed; (3) provided, however that the union shall hold the company free and
blameless from any liabilities that may arise, (4) and provided further, that employees dismissal shall be submitted as a
grievance, (5) and provided finally, that no such written recommendation shall be made upon the COMPANY nor shall
COMPANY be compelled to act upon any such recommendation within the period of sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of
the CBA, comfortably to Law. Pertinent CBA provision under Art. IX (Sec. 4): Company shall provide Php 10k/month for continuing
labor education program, which shall be remitted to the Federation

Local union election was held (Sept. 12, 1986) under the auspices of the ULGWP, wherein petitioner, Beda
Magdalena Villanueva, and the other union officers were proclaimed as winners. Minutes of the election
were duly filed with BLR on 9/29/86. Petition for Impeachment was filed (March 21, 1987) with the national
federation ULGWP by the defeated candidates. ULGWP conducted an audit (June 16, 1987) of the local
union funds. Investigation results cleared the local union officers of the charge of anomaly in the
custody, handling and disposition of the union funds.Petition for Impeachment/Expulsion (Nov. 5, 1987)
were filed at the DOLE NCR by the 14 defeated candidates against the local union officers, but the same was
dismissed (March 2, 1988) by Med-Arbiter Renato Parungo for failure to substantiate the charges and to
present evidence in support of the allegations.
MSMG held a general membership meeting at the Caruncho Complex in Pasig, but several union
members failed to attend the meeting. This prompted the Exec. Board to create a committee tasked to
investigate non-attendance of members in he assemply, pursuant to Sec. 4 and 5 of Art . 5 of their
Constitution in By-Laws (see original Filipino text for accuracy of translation ) Sec. 4 states that: failure or
refusal to join all union activities/meetings by any member or officer may be a ground for expulsion from the
union, or a fine of not more than P50 for each day of absence; Sec. 5 states that: anyone who attends and
leaves before the end of the meeting shall be treated as an absence, and would be penalized according to Art.
4. Any member or officer who is late for not more than 1 hour would be fined at the amount of Php25, deducted
from their salary, and late arrival exceeding an hour would be treated as an absence.
On June 27, 1988, MSMG UNION wrote respondent company GREENFIELD, requesting deduction of
union fines (Php 50) from the wages/salaries of those members (named in annexes on payroll of July 2-8,
1988) who were absent from the general membership meeting, pursuant to Section 4 Article II of their
CBA. ULGWP FEDERATION Sec. Gen Godofredo Paceo, Jr., in a Memorandum (7/3/88) disapproved the
resolution of the MSMG on the imposition of the fine. MSMG union officers protested such action by
ULGWP in a Reply (7/4/88). ULFWP wrote (7/11/88) GREENFIELD advising it not to make the Php50
deductions from the salaries of the union members, requesting that all future representations by MSMG
affecting a number of the members must first be cleared with ULFWP before any action by GREENFIELD.

The next day, GREENFILED replied to MSMG stating that the requested deductions cannot be made
from employees salary without going against certain laws, and advised the latter to refer the matter to the
proper govt. office for resolution to avoid putting the company in the middle of the issue.
The issue on the Php50 fine caused a bitter disagreement between MSMG and ULFWP, which lead to
MSMGs declaration of general autonomy from the ULFWP through Res. No. 10 passed by the local
executive board and ratified by the general membership(7/16/88). In retaliation, the ULFWP asked
GREENFIELD to stop the remittance of MSMGs share in the education funds, effective 8/88. MSMG objected,
and demanded the full remittance of the education fund.
GREENFIELD was thus constrained to file a Complaint for Interpleader with a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with the Med-Arbitration Branch of the DOLE. Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin disposed of the case
as follows (10/28/88): (1) ULGWP shall administer the CBA; (2) GREENFIELD shall remit the 10k/mo. Labor
education fund to ULGWP; (3) The treasurer of MSMG shall be authorized to collect the Php 50 penalty from
the 356 union members who failed to attend the general membership assembly; but (4) if the MSMG officers
could present the individual written authorizations of the 356 union members, then GREENFIELD is obliged to
deduct the amount from the salaries.
Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja (2/7/89): On appeal, modified Med-Arbiters ruling, stating that GREENFIELD
should divide the P10k monthly labor education fund between ULGWP and MSMG (at P5k each), as both can
use the same for its intended purpose.
Meanwhile, several local unions (Top Form, M. Greenfield, Grosby, Triumph International, General Milling,
and Vander Hons chapters) filed a Petition for Audit and Examination (9/2/88) of the federation and
education funds of ULGWP. Audit and examination of the same was granted by by Med-Arbiter Rasidali
Abdullah on 12/25/88.
Officials of ULGWP called a Special National Executive Board Meeting at Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. A
resolution was passed, placing MSMG under trusteeship and appointing respondent Cesar Clarete as
administrator.
Clarete wrote GREENFIELD (10/27/88) informing them of designation of Alfredo Kalingking as local
union president and deauthorizing the incumbent union officers of MSMG. This act of ULGWP was
protested by MSMG by letter to GREENFIELD (11/11/88). Petitioner MSMG union officers received identical
letters (11/13/88). from administrator Clarete, requiring them within 72 hours to explain why they should not be
removed and expelled from union membership. MSMG petitioners replied (1) questioning the validity of the Board
Resolution which placed the union under trusteeship; (2) justifying the unions action in declaring general autonomy from ULGWP for
failure of the latter to provide proper educ., organizational, and legal services to its affiliates and pendency of the audit of federation
funds; (3) advising the their union did not commit acts of disloyalty and remained an affiliate of ULGWP; (4) giving ULGWP a period of 5
days to cease and desist from commiting acts of coercion, intimidation and harassment.

However, as early as November 21, 1988, the officers were expelled from the ULGWP. Termination
letter stated that (1) the basis for such were for acts of disloyalty and/or acts inimical to the interest and
violative to the Constitution and by-laws of your federation, and (2) failure or refusal to offer explanation inspite
of time granted; and that (3) since they are no longer members, ULGWP is constrained to recommend their
termination from GREENFIELD.
The same day, ULGWP advised GREENFIELD of the expulsion of 30 union officers from employment,
based on the Union Security Clause of the CBA. Demand was reiterated twice on 2/21/89 and 3/4/89.
Thereafter ULGWP filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB to compel GREENFIELD to immediately effect
termination of the expelled MSMG officers. Pressured by the threatened strike, GREENFIELD
terminated (on 3/7/89) the 30 union officers from employment, serving them identical copies of the
termination letter stating that due to the repeated demands of ULGWP, GREENFIELD is left with no
alternative but to comply to the Union Security clause, effective immediately.

On the same day, expelled union officers assigned in the first shift were physically or bodily brought
out of the company premises by the company's security guards, and those assigned to the second shift
were not allowed to report to work, provoking some members of the local union to demonstrate and
protest for the dismissal of their officers, by leaving their work posts and walking out of the company.
ULGWP, having achieved its objected, withdrew the Notice of Strike filed at the NCMB. However, on
3/8/89, petitioners MSMG filed a Notice of Strike with NCMB-DOLE, Manila, alleging the ff. grounds: (a)
discrimination;
(b) interference in union activities; (c) mass dismissal of union officers and shop stewards; (d). threats, coercion and initimidation; (e)
union busting. On 3/9 a strike referendum was conducted and 2,086 out of 2,103 voted to declare a strike. On 3/10, the 30
dismissed union officers filed an urgent petition with Sec. of DOLE for the suspension of the effects of their termination, but this
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by then Sec. Franklin Drilon (4/11/89), stating that the dispute at GREENFIELD is a purely
intra-union matter.

On 3/13-14, 1989, a total of 78 union shop stewards were placed under preventive suspension by
GREENFIELD, prompting union members to again stage and walk-out, and resulting in an official
declaration of strike at 3:30pm of 3/14, that was attended with violence, force and intimidation on both
sides resulting to physical injuries to several employees, both striking and non-striking, and damage to
company properties. Employees who participated in the strike and allegedly figured in the violence were
placed under preventive suspension by GREENFIELD, but it also sent return-to-work notices to home
addresses of striking employees thrice on 3/27, 4/8 and 4/21/89 but GREENFIELD admitted that only 261
employees were eventually accepted back, and those who did not respond to the notice were sent
termination letters. However, respondent company admitted that only 261 employees were eventually
accepted back to work. Those who did not respond to the return-to-work notice were sent termination letters
dated 5/17/89, stating that their failure to report is construed as effective abandonment, constraining
GREENFIELD to dismiss them.
8/7/89, MSMG filed a verified complaint with the Abitration Branch, NCR of DOLE, charging private
respondents with unfair labor practice which consists of union busting, illegal dismissal, illegal suspension,
interference in union activities, discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion, violence, and oppression. After
complaint was filed, lease contracts on GREENFIELDs office in Merville, Paraaque expired and were not renewed, and upon
demand of owners, the company was compelled to vacate the office and company. They then moved their admin and account/client
servicing at AFP-RSBS Industrial Park in Taguig. Unable to find a suitable place for relocation of its factory in Metro Manila,
GREENFIELD was constrained to move to TACLOBAN, LEYTE. On 4/16/90, they informed their employees of temporary shutdown
of operations, and for enlistment of those interested in moving to TACLOBAN to enlist on or before 4/23/90.

The complaint for unfair labor practice was assigned to Labor Arbiter Manuel Asuncion but was thereafter
reassigned to Labor Arbiter Cresencio Ramos when respondents moved to inhibit him from acting on the
case.
Labor Arbiter RAMOS: DISMISSED ULP complaint, finding the termination VALID in compliance with union
security clause of the CBA. Also held that strike was illegal for the ff. reasons: (1) it was based on an
intra-union dispute which cannot properly be the subject of a strike, the right to strike being limited to cases
of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practice (2) it was made in violation of the "no strike, no lock-out"
clause in the CBA, and (3) it was attended with violence, force and intimidation upon the persons of the
company officials, other employees reporting for work and third persons having legitimate business with the
company, resulting to serious physical injuries to several employees and damage to company property. NLRC
1st division: Affirmed NLRC. MR denied. Hence, this case at the SC, attributing grave abuse on the part of
NLRC.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the strike conducted by Petitioners were illegal for noncompliance with the
requirements
(2) Whether GREENFIELD was justified in dismissing petitioner employees merely upon labor federation
ULGWPs demand for the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA;
RULING: NO; NO. (1) On the submission that the strike was illegal for being grounded on a nonstrikeable issue, that is, the intra-union conflict between the federation and the local union, it bears
reiterating that when respondent company dismissed the union officers, the issue was transformed

into a termination dispute and brought respondent company into the picture. Petitioners believed in good
faith that in dismissing them upon request by the federation, respondent company was guilty of unfair
labor practice in that it violated the petitioner's right to self-organization. The strike was staged to protest
respondent company's act of dismissing the union officers. Even if the allegations of unfair labor
practice are subsequently found out to be untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails.25
Another reason why the Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal is due to the existence of a no strike no lockout
provision in the CBA. Again, such a ruling is erroneous. **A no strike, no lock out provision can only be
invoked when the strike is economic in nature**, i.e. to force wage or other concessions from the employer
which he is not required by law to grant.26 Such a provision cannot be used to assail the legality of a strike
which is grounded on unfair labor practice, as was the honest belief of herein petitioners. Again,
whether or not there was indeed unfair labor practice does not affect the strike.
On the allegation of violence committed in the course of the strike, it must be remembered that the Labor
Arbiter and the Commission found that "the parties are agreed that there were violent incidents . . . resulting to
injuries to both sides, the union and management."27 The evidence on record show that the violence
cannot be attributed to the striking employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to
pacify the strikers. With violence committed on both sides, the management and the employees, such
violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal.
(2) Anent public respondent's finding that there was no unfair labor practice on the part of respondent company and federation officers,
the Court sustains the same. As earlier discussed, union security clauses in collective bargaining agreements, if freely and voluntarily
entered into, are valid and binding. Corollary, dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal subject only to the
requirement of due process, that is, notice and hearing prior to dismissal. Thus, the dismissal of an employee by the company pursuant
31
to a labor union's demand in accordance with a union security agreement does not constitute unfair labor practice.
However, the dismissal was invalidated in this case because of respondent company's failure to accord petitioners with due process,
that is, notice and hearing prior to their termination. Also, said dismissal was invalidated because the reason relied upon by respondent
Federation was not valid. Nonetheless, the dismissal still does not constitute unfair labor practice.
Although this Court has ruled that union security clauses embodied in the CBA may be validly enforced and that dismissals pursuant
thereto may likewise be valid, this does not erode the fundamental requirement of due process. The reason behind the enforcement of
14
union security clauses which is the sanctity and inviolability of contracts cannot override one's right to due process.
15

In the case of Cario vs. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court pronounced that while the company, under a
maintenance of membership provision of the collective bargaining agreement, is bound to dismiss any employee expelled by
the union for disloyalty upon its written request, this undertaking should not be done hastily and summarily. The company acts
in bad faith in dismissing a worker without giving him the benefit of a hearing.
The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. However, this is not without limitation. The employer is bound
to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a
labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, . . . Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious.
Due process must be observed in dismissing an employee because it affects not only his position but also his means of
livelihood. Employers should respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to labor.
In the case under scrutiny, petitioner union officers were expelled by the federation for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty
and/or inimical to the interest of ULGWP and in violation of its Constitution and By-laws. Upon demand of the federation, the
company terminated the petitioners without conducting a separate and independent investigation. Respondent company did
not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and whether or not the federation had sufficient grounds to effect the same. Relying
merely upon the federation's allegations, respondent company terminated petitioners from employment when a separate inquiry
could have revealed if the federation had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in expelling the union officers. Respondent
company's allegation that petitioners were accorded due process is belied by the termination letters received by the petitioners
which state that the dismissal shall be immediately effective.
As held in the aforecited case of Cario, "the right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable
opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the company or his own union is not wiped away by a union
security clause or a union shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a
company which disregards his rights but also from his own union the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and
arbitrary expulsion from membership and mere dismissal from his job.
While respondent company may validly dismiss the employees expelled by the union for disloyalty under the union security clause of
the collective bargaining agreement upon the recommendation by the union, this dismissal should not be done hastily and summarily

thereby eroding the employees' right to due process, self-organization and security of tenure. The enforcement of union security
16
clauses is authorized by law provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due process. Even on
the assumption that the federation had valid grounds to expel the union officers, due process requires that these union officers
be accorded a separate hearing by respondent company.
In its decision, public respondent also declared that if complainants (herein petitioners) have any recourse in law, their right of action is
against the federation and not against the company or its officers, relying on the findings of the Labor Secretary that the issue of
expulsion of petitioner union officers by the federation is a purely intra-union matter.
Again, such a contention is untenable. While it is true that the issue of expulsion of the local union officers is originally between
the local union and the federation, hence, intra-union in character, the issue was later on converted into a termination dispute
when the company dismissed the petitioners from work without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing. As a matter of fact, the
records reveal that the termination was effective on the same day that the termination notice was served on the petitioners.
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was at the instance of the federation and that it undertook to hold the company
free from any liability resulting from such a dismissal, the company may still be held liable if it was remiss in its duty to accord the
would-be dismissed employees their right to be heard on the matter.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in Case
No. NCR-00-09-04199-89 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the respondent company is hereby ordered to
immediately reinstate the petitioners to their respective positions. Should reinstatement be not feasible,
respondent company shall pay separation pay of one month salary for every year of service. Since petitioners
were terminated without the requisite written notice at least 30 days prior to their termination, following the
recent ruling in the case of Ruben Serrano vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Isetann Department
Store, the respondent company is hereby ordered to pay full backwages to petitioner-employees while the
Federation is also ordered to pay full backwages to petitioner-union officers who were dismissed upon its
instigation. Since the dismissal of petitioners was without cause, backwages shall be computed from the time
the herein petitioner employees and union officers were dismissed until their actual reinstatement. Should
reinstatement be not feasible, their backwages shall be computed from the time petitioners were terminated
until the finality of this decision. Costs against the respondent company.1wphi1.

177 Pilipino Telephone Corp. v. PILTEA


G.R. No. 160058 June 22, 2007
TOPIC: Prohibited Strikes
PONENTE: PUNO, C.J.
PARTIES:
Petitioner: PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION
Respondents: PILIPINO TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PILTEA), PELAGIO S. BRIONES II, GEORGE
L. DE LEON, LECEL M. FIDEL, AUGUSTO C. FRANCISCO, OLIVER B. ANTONIO, RONALDO B. CORONEL,
CHRISTOPHER L. HERRERA and GEM TORRES
FACTS:
1. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Union and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (the Company)
was due to expire on December 31, 1997.
2. On October 30, 1997, the Union submitted to the Company its proposals for the renegotiation of the non-representation
aspects of their CBA. As there was a standstill on several issues, the parties submitted their dispute to the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for preventive mediation. The conciliation proceedings before the NCMB
failed.
3. On July 13, 1998, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB for unfair labor practice due to the alleged acts of
"restraint and coercion of union members and interference with their right to self-organization" committed by the
Companys Revenue Assurance Department (RAD) Manager Rosales and its Call Center Department Manager, Manny
Alegado.
4. The Company filed a petition for Consolidated Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Office of the Secretary of Labor. On
August 14, 1998, then Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma issued an Order. Thusly, any strike or lockout, whether actual
or intended, was enjoined. Furthermore, the parties were likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any or all
acts that might exacerbate the situation.
5. On September 4, 1998, the Union filed a second Notice of Strike with the NCMB on the grounds of: a) union busting,
for the alleged refusal of the Company to turn over union funds; and b) the mass promotion of union members during the
CBA negotiation, allegedly aimed at excluding them from the bargaining unit during the CBA negotiation. On the same
day, the Union went on strike.
6. On September 9, 1998, Secretary Laguesma directed the striking Union officers and members to return to work within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Order and for the Company to accept all strikers under the same terms and
conditions of employment prior to the strike. The Union and its members complied.
7. On December 7, 1998, the Company filed with the NLRC a petition to declare the Union's September 4, 1998 strike
illegal.
8. Labor-Arbiter: found the strike illegal for having been conducted in defiance of Secretary Laguesma's August 14,
1998 assumption order and for non-compliance with the procedural requirements for the conduct of a strike under the
Labor Code and its implementing rules.
9. NLRC: affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto.
10. CA: modified the ruling of the NLRC.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the strike was illegal.
HELD:
1. YES

RATIO:
1. Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6715, and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code outline the following procedural requirements for a valid strike:
1)
A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional
Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;
2)
A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the strike
thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor practice. However,
in the case of union busting where the unions existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be
observed.
xxx xxx
xxx
4)
Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour
prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the
total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.
5)
The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended
strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period.
2. It is settled that these requirements are mandatory in nature and failure to comply therewith renders the strike
illegal.
3. In the case at bar, the Union staged the strike on the same day that it filed its second notice of strike. The Union
violated the seven-day strike ban. This requirement should be observed to give the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the approval of the majority of the union
members.
4. Moreover, we agree with the CA that there was no union busting which would warrant the non-observance of the
cooling-off period. To constitute union busting under Article 263 of the Labor Code, there must be: 1) a dismissal from
employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws; and 2) the existence of
the union must be threatened by such dismissal. In the case at bar, the second notice of strike filed by the Union merely
assailed the mass promotion of its officers and members during the CBA negotiations. Surely, promotion is different
from dismissal.
5. This is consistent with the Courts ruling in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez that a promotion which is
manifestly beneficial to an employee should not give rise to a gratuitous speculation that it was made to deprive the union
of the membership of the benefited employee.
6. It cannot be overemphasized that strike, as the most preeminent economic weapon of the workers to force management
to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital, exert some disquieting effects not only on the
relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace and progress of society and economic wellbeing of the State.
7. This weapon is so critical that the law imposes the supreme penalty of dismissal on union officers who irresponsibly
participate in an illegal strike and union members who commit unlawful acts during a strike. The responsibility of the
union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members as the union officers have the duty to
guide their members to respect the law.
8. The policy of the state is not to tolerate actions directed at the destabilization of the social order, where the relationship
between labor and management has been endangered by abuse of one partys bargaining prerogative, to the extent of
disregarding not only the direct order of the government to maintain the status quo, but the welfare of the entire workforce
though they may not be involved in the dispute. The grave penalty of dismissal imposed on the guilty parties is a natural
consequence, considering the interest of public welfare.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition in G.R. No. 160094 is DENIED. The petition in G.R. No. 160058 is GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 59799 dated September 20, 2002 and September 17, 2003,

respectively, are REVERSED and the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC dated February 29, 2000 and April 28, 2000,
respectively, are REINSTATED.

178 AND 183 SUKHOTHAI CUISINE AND RESTAURANT


DOCTRINE HIGHLIGHTED IN THE RATIO.
FACTS:
Sometime in March 1998, the majority of the employees of the petitioner organized themselves into a union which
affiliated with the Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC), and was designated as PLAC Local 460 Sukhothai
Restaurant Chapter (Union).
On December 3, 1998, private respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) on the ground of unfair labor practice, and particularly, acts of harassment, fault-finding, and union busting
through coercion and interference with union affairs. On December 10, 1998, in a conciliation conference, the
representatives of the petitioner agreed and guaranteed that there will be no termination of the services of private
respondents during the pendency of the case, with the reservation of the management prerogative to issue memos to
erring employees for the infraction, or violation of company policies. On the following day, or on December 11, 1998, a
Strike Vote was conducted and supervised by NCMB personnel, and the results of the vote were submitted to the NCMB
on December 21, 1998.
On January 21, 1999, the petitioner and the Union entered into a Submission Agreement, thereby agreeing to submit the
issue of unfair labor practice the subject matter of the foregoing Notice of Strike and the Strike Vote for voluntary
arbitration with a view to prevent the strike.
On March 24, 1999, during the pendency of the voluntary arbitration proceedings, the petitioner, through its president,
Ernesto Garcia, dismissed Eugene Lucente, a union member, due to an alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee in
February 1999. In view of this termination, private respondent Union filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal.
In the morning of June 24, 1999, private respondent Jose Lanorias, a union member, was relieved from his post, and his
employment as cook, terminated. Subsequently, respondent Billy Bacus, the union vice-president, conferred with Ernesto
Garcia and protested Lanorias's dismissal. Shortly thereafter, respondents staged a "wildcat strike."
On June 25, 1999, a Notice of Strike was re-filed by the private respondents and the protest, according to the
respondents, was converted into a "sit-down strike." On the next day, or on June 26, 1999, the same was transformed into
an "actual strike."
On June 29, 1999, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike with the NLRC against private respondents, seeking to
declare the strike illegal, and to declare respondents, who participated in the commission of illegal acts, to have lost their
employment status
LA: the strike was illegal. The strike vote made during Dec 1998 cannot apply to the strike in 1999.
NLRC: strike was legal. The strike vote in 1998 can apply to the strike in 1999.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the strike was illegal?
2. W/N the strike vote in 1998 can apply to the strike that occurred in 1999?
3. What is the effect of an illegal strike?
HELD:
1. YES. respondents invoke Article 263(f) in that the decision to strike is valid for the duration of the dispute based
on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike vote was taken, thus, there is no need to repeat the
process. Furthermore, according to the respondents, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Notice of
Strike and Strike Vote in December 1998 cannot be made to apply to the concerted actions in June 1999, these
requirements may nonetheless be dispensed with since the petitioner is guilty of union busting and, hence, the
Union can take action immediately.
The undisputed fact, however, is that at the time the strike was staged in June 1999, voluntary arbitration between the
parties was ongoing by virtue of the January 21, 1999 Submission Agreement. The issue to be resolved under those
proceedings pertained to the very same issues stated in the Notice of Strike of December 3, 1998: the commission of
unfair labor practices, such as acts of harassment, fault-finding, and union busting through coercion and interference with
union affairs.
Article 264 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 264. Prohibited activities.


xxxx
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after
certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
x x x x (emphasis supplied)
This Court has held that strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration are illegal, since these
10
agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends are to be achieved. The rationale of the prohibition
under Article 264 is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that
jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike.
The alleged dismissals of Lucente and respondent Lanorias, both union members, which allegedly triggered the wildcat
strike, are not sufficient grounds to justify the radical recourse on the part of the private respondents. The questions that
surround their dismissal, as private respondents so affirm, are connected to the alleged breach of the "guarantee" by the
petitioner not to dismiss its employees during the pendency of the arbitration case, the very questions which they also link
to the other incidents of unfair labor practices allegedly committed by the petitionerthese matters should have been
raised and resolved in the voluntary arbitration proceedings that were commenced precisely to address them. On the
other hand, if private respondents believed that the disciplinary measures had nothing to do with the issues under
arbitration, then they should have availed of the appropriate remedies under the Labor Code, such as the institution of
cases of illegal dismissal or, by agreement of the parties, the submission of the cases to the grievance machinery of the
CBA, if one is available, so that they may be subjected to separate voluntary arbitration proceedings, or simply seek to
terminate the pending voluntary arbitration case and complete the mandatory procedure for a lawful strike. Private
respondents should have availed themselves of any of these alternative remedies instead of resorting to a drastic and
unlawful measure, specifically, the holding a wildcat strike. And because of the fact that the Union was fully aware that
the arbitration proceedings were pending, good faith cannot be invoked as a defense.
For failing to exhaust all steps in the arbitration proceedings by virtue of the Submission Agreement, in view of
the proscription under Article 264 of the Labor Code, and the prevailing state policy as well as its underlying
rationale, this Court declares that the strike staged by the private respondents is illegal.
2. NO. With respect to respondents' averment that assuming arguendo that the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote in
December 1998 cannot be made to apply to the strike in June 1999, the requirements for a valid strike may
nonetheless be dispensed with in case of union busting, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the question at
length, especially in view of the foregoing declaration that the strike is illegal, as well as the considerations of
established doctrine: the language of the law leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off period and the
seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were intended to be mandatory, and in case of union
busting where the existence of the union is threatened, it is only the 15-day cooling-off period that may be
dispensed with.
Article 263(f) in part states: "In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Department the results of the voting
at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided." This provision
should be read with Section 3, Rule XXII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, then applicable at the time
of the dispute, the relevant provisions of which state:
However, in case of unfair labor practice involving the dismissal from employment of any union officer duly elected in
accordance with the union constitution and by-laws which may constitute union-busting where the existence of the union
is threatened, the fifteen-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately after the strike
vote is conducted and the results thereof submitted to the appropriate regional branch of the Board.(emphasis supplied)
The NCMB Primer on Strike, Picketing, and Lockout (January 31, 1992) provide the same wording. The foregoing
provision of the implementing rules should also be compared to the provisions of the Labor Code under Article 263(c):
(c) x x x However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union
constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.

The implementing rules clarify Article 263(c) in that the union may strike "immediately" provided that the strike vote is
conducted, the results thereof submitted "in every case" at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout. In sum,
in case of alleged union busting, the three remaining requirements notice, strike vote, and seven-day report
period cannot be dispensed with.
What is more, the strike had been attended by the widespread commission of prohibited acts. Well-settled is the rule that
even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared
invalid where the means employed are illegal
IN CASE SIR ASKS ABOUT WHAT THE EMPLOYEES ACTUALLY DID:
The evidence in the record clearly and extensively shows that the individual respondents engaged in illegal acts during
the strike, such as the intimidation and harassment of a considerable number of customers to turn them away and
33
discourage them from patronizing the business of the petitioner; waving their arms and shouting at the passersby,
"Huwag kayong pumasok sa Sukhothai!"[34] and "Nilagyan na namin ng lason ang pagkain d'yan!"[35]as well as
36
numerous other statements made to discredit the reputation of the establishment; preventing the entry of
37
38
customers; angry and unruly behavior calculated to cause commotion which affected neighboring establishments
39
40
within the mall; openly cursing and shouting at the president in front of customers and using loud and abusive
41
language, such as "Putang ina niyong lahat!", toward the rest of the management as well as their co-workers who
42
43
refused to go on strike; physically preventing non-strikers from entering the premises, as well as deliberately blocking
44
45
their movements inside the restaurant, at times by sharply bumping into them or through indecent physical
46
47
contact; openly threatening non-strikers with bodily harm, such as "Pag hindi sila pumayag, upakan mo!"; and shouting
at the security guard "Granada!" which caused panic among the customers and prompted security to report a possible
death threat to management and the security agency.
3. In Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc. this Court explained that the
effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264, make a distinction between workers and union
officers who participate therein: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation
in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. A union
officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal
strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike. In all cases, the striker must
be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under
the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.

179 Reliance Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 365 (1991)

DOCTRINE/S:
- In staging the strike in question, a strike that was illegal in more ways than one, the reinstated
union officers were clearly in bad faith, and to reinstate them without, indeed, loss of seniority
rights, is to reward them for an act public policy does not sanction.
- Good faith is still a valid defense against claims of illegality of a strike. However, it did not find any
semblance of good faith in the case at bar, but rather, plain arrogance, pride, and cynicism of
certain workers.
FACTS:
- Reliance Surety Insurance Co., Inc. (RSIC) on 21 November 1986, thru the manager (Mr. Celso
Eleazar) of its underwriting department, effected a change in the seating arrangement of its
personnel in said department to avoid unnecessary loss of productive working time due to
personal and non-work-related conversations, personal telephone calls and non-work-connected
visits by personnel to other departments.
- Four of those affected namely: Isagani Rubio, Rosalinda Macapagal, Glene Molina, and
Severa Cansino protested the transfer of their tables and seats, claiming that the change
was without prior notice and was done merely to harass them as union members. When the
manager insisted, a heated discussion ensued, during which Rubio and companions were
alleged to have hurled unprintable insults (sipsip, balimbing, vacuum, etc.) to the manager
and supervisors.
- Rubio, Macapagal, Molina and Cansino were asked to explain within 48 hours why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for misconduct, insubordination, and
gross disrespect. The work atmosphere in the department had allegedly become charged or
tense as Rubio continued to refuse to stay at his designated place, and Molina and
Macapagal still levelled insults to those who testified against them.
- Hence, Rubio and companions were placed under preventive suspension and ultimately dismissed
after investigation.
- On 6 March 1987, the Reliance Surety & Insurance Employees Union (RSIEU) filed in behalf of the
4 employees with the NLRC against the RSIC a complaint for illegal dismissal which it
subsequently amended to include the charge of unfair labor practice.
- RSIEU claims that RSIC was guilty of ULP because it, among others, effected transfer and changes
in the seating arrangement to pressure or intimidate union members; because it interfered in the
union members' exercise of their right to self-organization by forcing them to undertake overtime
work even on a non-working Saturday and in times when there were scheduled union meetings to
prevent them from attending the same: and because, thru its manager and assistant managers, it
caused the resignation and withdrawal of union members from the union.
- It also appears that on 12 March 1987, or while the complaint for illegal dismissal and ULP was
hibernating in the NCR Arbitration Branch, RSIEU filed with the DOLE a notice of strike predicated
on unfair labor practices (dismissal of union officers/members, discrimination and coercion on
employees) allegedly committed by the company.
- A day after, RSIC received a copy of the notice of strike and a telegram from the DOLE setting the
notice of strike for initial conciliation conference the next day, at 2:00 p.m. But even before the
initial conference could take place, the union in the morning of March 17 struck and picketed the
company premises by forming human barricades, which effectively obstructed the free ingress to
and egress from its premises, more particularly at the lobby of the 8th floor of the building where
it has its office, thereby preventing its officials and employees from doing their usual duties.
- Because of this new development, RSIC filed with the NLRC (Arbitration Branch), a petition to
declare the strike illegal on the grounds that the 30 or 15 day cooling-off period was blatantly
defied; that the legal requirement to furnish the department with the results of the strike vote at

least 7 days before the strike was ignored; just as the 24-hour period within which BLR or the
Regional Office should be furnished with a written notice of the meeting to declare a strike was
also not complied with.
Charged, together with the union and its members, as individual respondents in the petition to
declare the strike illegal were the following officers: Rolando Tugade, president; Joseph Aying,
vice-president; Isagani Rubio, treasurer; Ms. Glene Molina and Ms. Rosalinda Macapagal,
secretaries; Froilan Garcia and Ms. Luz Monroy, Sgts. at arms: Orlando Calma, auditor; and Manolo
Que, pro, who, RSIC claims, should be divested of their employment status for having knowingly
participated in the illegal strike and in the commission of illegal acts.
The Labor Arbiter found the strike to be illegal, a finding the National Labor Relations
Commission, on appeal, affirmed. However, the Commission held: while we are convinced that
the strike is illegal, we are equally convinced that it should not be visited with the consequence so
harsh as the supreme penalty of dismissal, where merely reinstating them (strikers) without
backwages would suffice in view of the union's belief, in proceeding with strike, that the company
was committing unfair labor practice in terminating the services of some of its officers and members,
in line with the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Ferrer vs. CIR xxx In other words xxx we find it
more in keeping with justice and equity if the striking union officers are reinstated, instead of being
dismissed, to their former positions without loss of seniority rights but without backwages to serve
as penalty for their indiscretion in launching an illegal strike.
Petitioner RSiC argues that in so disposing, the Commission is guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: W/N strikers who have been found to have staged an illegal strike may be reinstated to work? NO
RULING:
There is no dispute that the strike in question was ILLEGAL, for failure of the striking personnel to
observe legal strike requirements, to wit: (1) as to the fifteen-day notice; (2) as to the two-thirds required
vote to strike done by secret ballot; (3) as to submission of the strike vote to the Department of Labor at
least seven days prior to the strike.
As found likewise by the Commission, in the course of the strike held on April 1, 1987, certain strikers
harassed non-striking employees, called company officers names, and committed acts of violence (as a
result of which, criminal charges were brought with the fiscal's office.)
There is no question, finally, that the strike itself was prompted by no actual, existing unfair labor
practice committed by petitioner RSIC. In effecting a change in the seating arrangement in the
office of the underwriting department, RSIC merely exercised a reasonable prerogative
employees could not validly question, much less assail as an act of unfair labor practice. The Court
is indeed at a loss how rearranging furniture, as it were, can justify a four-month-long strike. As to
RSIEUs charges of harassment, the Commission found none, and as a general rule, the Court is
bound by its findings of fact.
In staging the strike in question, a strike that was illegal in more ways than one, the reinstated
union officers were clearly in bad faith, and to reinstate them without, indeed, loss of seniority
rights, is to reward them for an act public policy does not sanction.
The Court reiterates that good faith is still a valid defense against claims of illegality of a strike.
However, it did not find any semblance of good faith in the case at bar, but rather, plain arrogance,
pride, and cynicism of certain workers.
As a general rule, the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because the
Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. The

Court must take care, however, that in the contest between labor and capital, the results achieved are fair
and in conformity with the rules. We will not accomplish that objective here by approving the act of the
National Labor Relations Commission which we hold to constitute a grave abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

180 Master Iron Labor Union v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 47 (1993); DE LEON
181 National Union of Workers Hotels, Restaurant and Allied Industries v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 192 (1998) DIAZ DE
RIVERA
182 G.R. No. 158075

June 30, 2006

PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. (MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL), Petitioner,
vs.
MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION, Respondent.
Union filed a petition for cert. election before DOLE-NCR
The DOLE-NCR denied the unions petition as it failed to comply with legal requirements, specifically Section
2, Rule V, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code
On June 2, 1997, Francis Mendoza (Mendoza), one of the Hotels outlet cashiers, was discovered to have
failed to remit to the Hotel the amount of P71,692.50 at the end of his May 31, 1997 duty.6 On being directed
to explain such failure, Mendoza claimed that after accomplishing his daily cash remittance report, the union
president Jose Leonardo B. Kimpo (Kimpo) also an outlet cashier, who signed the same and dropped his
remittances.7
Mendoza was subsequently suspended for one week, it being "the responsibility of the cashier to personally
drop-off his remittances in the presence of a witness
Union,through its president Kimpo, notified petitioner of its intent to bargain
the Hotel, through its Human Resource Development Manager Mary Anne Mangalindan, advised the union
that since it was not certified by the DOLE as the exclusive bargaining agent, it could not be recognized as
such.12
he union went on to file a Notice of Strike16 on September 29, 1997 with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) due to unfair labor practice (ULP)
Kimpo filed before the Arbitration Branch a complaint for ULP against petitioner.19
n the conference held on November 20, 1997, the union demanded the holding of a consent election to which
the Hotel interposed no objection
he union suddenly went on strike. The following day, the National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant
and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) joined the strike and openly extended its support to the union.22 At about
this time, Hotel supervisors Vicente T. Agustin (Agustin) and Rowena Junio (Rowena) failed to report for work
and were, along with another supervisor, Mary Grace U. de Leon (Mary Grace), seen participating in and
supporting the strike.23
An NLRC representative who conducted an ocular inspection of the Hotel premises confirmed in his Report
that the strikers obstructed the free ingress to and egress from the Hotel.
he NLRC thus issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
then DOLE Acting Secretary Jose Espaol, Jr., by Order of April 30, 1998, modified the April 15, 1998 Order of
Secretary Trajano by directing the Hotel to just reinstate the strikers to its payroll, and ordering that all cases
between the parties arising out of the labor disputes which were pending before different Labor Arbiters be
consolidated with the case earlier certified to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
NLRC:strike was illegal,union officers and members who were reinseinstated to the Hotels payroll were
deemed to have lost their employment status

CA:ordered reinstatement with back wages of members but not the union officials
Issue:
Was there unfair labor practice because the employer refused to bargain?
Held:NO
ART. 255. EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATION AND WORKERS PARTICIPATION IN POLICY
AND DECISION-MAKING
The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining
As the immediately quoted provision declares, only the labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.
The union (hereafter referred to as respondent) is admittedly not the exclusive representative of the majority of
the employees of petitioner, hence, it could not demand from petitioner the right to bargain collectively in their
behalf.
Respondent insists, however, that it could validly bargain in behalf of "its members," relying on Article 242 of
the Labor Code.39 Respondents reliance on said article, a general provision on the rights of legitimate labor
organizations, is misplaced, for not every legitimate labor organization possesses the rights mentioned
therein.40 Article 242 (a) must be read in relation to above-quoted Article 255.
On respondents contention that it was bargaining in behalf only of its members, the appellate court, affirming
the NLRCs observation that the same would only "fragment the employees" of petitioner,
f the same shall be allowed, employees who are non-union members will be economically impaired and will not
be able to negotiate their terms and conditions of work, thus defeating the very essence and reason of
collective bargain
t bears noting that the goal of the DOLE is geered towards "a single employer wide unit which is more to the
broader and greater benefit of the employees working force.
is also evident from the records of the instant petition, specifically from the Notice of Strike, that their principal
ground for the strike was the "refusal of the Hotel Management to bargain collectively with the Union for the
benefit of the latters members." In the instant case, it is not disputed that the petitioner UNION is not a certified
bargaining unit to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with private respondent Hotel . . . 45
(Underscoring supplied)
An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be
proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer who may be dismissed by mere
knowingly participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an illegal act during a strike.51
This Court must thus hearken to its policy that "when employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest
against unfair labor practices," no backwages during the strike is awarded.
Reinstatement without backwages of striking members of respondent who did not commit illegal acts would
thus suffice under the circumstances of the case. If reinstatement is no longer possible, given the lapse of
considerable time from the occurrence of the strike, the award of separation pay of one (1) month salary for
each year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is in order.66

183 Sukhotai supra at 178

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION, et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS, et


al. 502 SCRA 219 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
An ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have lost his employment status by mere
participation in an illegal strike.
Facts:
The Arellano University Employees and Workers Union (the Union), the exclusive bargaining
representative of about 380 rank-and-file employees of Arellano University, Inc. (the University), filed
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike charging the University
with Unfair Labor Practice (ULP). After several controversies and petitions, a strike was staged. Upon
the lifting of the strike, the University filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC issued a Resolution holding that the University was
not guilty of ULP. Consequently, the strike was declared illegal. All the employees who participated in
the illegal strike were thereafter declared to have lost their employment status.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employee is deemed to have lost his employment by mere participation in an
illegal strike
HELD: Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, an ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have
lost his employment status by mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he
knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. While the University
adduced photographs showing strikers picketing outside the university premises, it failed to identify

applicable in dismissal cases. With respect to the union officers, as already discussed, their mere
participation in the illegal strike warrants their dismissal.

CASE 185

TOPIC: ILLEGAL STRIKES: EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY

G.R. Nos. 158190-91

June 21, 2006

NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and BAGONG
NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS SA NISSAN MOTOR PHILIPPINES, INC. (BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU), Respondents.
x--------------------------------------x
G.R. Nos. 158276 and 158283

June 21, 2006

BAGONG NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS SA NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES, INC. (BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU),


Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL DIVISION OF FIVE), SECRETARY OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT
and NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
GARCIA, J.:
DOCTRINE: An ordinary striking worker or union member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for mere participation in an

illegal strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike. And lest it be forgotten, the law invests
the Secretary of Labor and Employment the prerogative of tempering the consequence of the defiance to the assumption
order. The Secretary may thus merely suspend rather than dismiss the employee involved.
FACTS:
Dec. 4, 2000, the Union BANAL filed 1st notice of strike on the ground of alleged unfair labor practice, stemmed from
the suspension of about 140 company employees, following the Nov. 15, 2000 disruptive protest action arising from the
employees demand for payment of the 2nd half of their 13th month pay.
Jul. 24, 2001, the Union filed the 2nd strike notice on the ground of deadlock in collective bargaining involving a mix of
economic and non-economic issues.
Aug. 27 2001, the Union filed a 3rd Notice of Strike on the ground of illegal lockout, illegal suspension and union
busting.
Sep. 18, 2001, the Union filed a 4th Notice of Strike on grounds of alleged illegal dismissal of eighteen (18) union
officials, illegal lockout on account of the forced leave, coercion/intimidation, union busting and non-payment of salaries
for the period August 15-30, 2001.
Sep. 28, 2001, DOLE acting secretary ordered consolidation of the four notices of strike and reiterated the injunction
order issued previously.
Oct. 5, 2001, the Company filed a Motion to Deputize PNP Laguna to Secure, Maintain and Preserve Free Ingress and
Egress of NISSAN, alleging that despite the injunctions against any slowdown and strike, the Union went on actual strike
on Oct. 1, 2001, picketed and blocked the company offices, and plant premises, unlawfully blocked and obstructed all
entrances and exits points. The Union filed and opposition. Nevertheless, Secretary issued an order deputizing PNP.
According to Union in its supplemental position paper:
a. that the Union is composed of 360 highly skilled workers who are always forced on leave. The work is only 4
or 5 days, with an average daily salary of P400, which is below the poverty line.
b. that the gross sale the previous year amounted to P3.2 billion while its direct labor cost is only P68.18 million.
c. that 140 union officers and members were placed under suspension from 3-6 days without observing
procedural due process amounting to an abuse in its prerogative in imposing discipline.
d. that as regards the second notice of strike, the low production resulting in the Company charging the Union
with engaging in work slow down, was actually due to the non-arrival of the CDK parts.
e. that the charge against the employees of violation of the assumption of jurisdiction order is just a union
busting ploy.

The Company filed its reply:


a. that the suspension of 140 employees is a valid exercise of management prerogative to instill discipline among
its employees who refused to go back to their work station but instead demanded payment of half of their 13 th
month pay.
b. that the Company is incapable of meeting the economic demands of the Union because of the losses in
incurred in the past 4 years amounting to P1.49 billions. Notwithstanding the reduction in the Unions total
package, it would still be 309.5% increase over the previous CBA. Copies of audited Financial Statements were
submitted as evidence.
c. that the slowdown carried out by the Union after the filing of the 2nd strike notice, was in violation of the
cooling off period prescribed by law, therefore illegal. Slowdown of production violates the CBA.
d. that on the matter of the dismissal of 19 Union officers and 25 members after the issuance of the Assumption
of Jurisdiction Order, the subject employees defied the Order by continuing to carry on the slowdown. This
blatant defiance of the DOLE orders left it with no choice but to declare the concerned employees to have
forfeited or lost their jobs. The dismissal was preceded with due process.
Dec. 5, 2001, DOLE secretary issued an order (1) affirming the suspension of 140 employees; (2) sustaining the
dismissal of union officers; (3) reinstating the dismissed union employees without back pay; (4) ordered the parties to
conclude their CBA. Agreement shall have prospective effect.
Both parties appealed to CA. CA affirmed the DOLE secretarys decision.
In this instant case, the following are the contentions of the parties;
NISSAN: CA faults in ordering the reinstatement of 140 union members who waged a work slowdown notwithstanding
the return to work order of DOLE when it assumed jurisdiction. The dismissal of 140 union members should be upheld
considering that the work slowdown constitute an illegal strike as viewed by DOLE Secretary.
UNION: CA erred in sustaining the finding that there was a concerted work slowdown when in fact no overt act has
been shown to prove it, let alone the participation of each of its members thereon. Nissan was guilty of unfair labor
practice when it dismissed the union members without due process of law.
ISSUE: Whether the workers who participated in the work slowdown be dismissed as it constitute an illegal strike.
HELD: The Union members should be suspended only without backwages. The Union officers should be dismissed.
RATIO:
The Court found that the hands of both parties are unclean.
NISSAN neglected DOLEs repeated admonition against any act that might exacerbate the labor dispute by suspending a
very substantial number of Union officers/members with threat of eventual dismissal and perceived illegal lockout and
union busting. But this is not to say that the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice, or union busting, to be precise.
The Union, on the other hand, was found guilty of engaging in work slowdown. A perusal of the Production Plan and
Results tells that during the time of the CBA deadlock, the production fell by 50%. The Unions claim that the low
production was due to lack of parts was belied by evidence at hand. The Unions claim that the production setback was
due to forced leaves and suspension of workers was untrue. On the contrary, it was the work slowdown and absenteeism
that triggered the declaration of forced leave.
The Unions excuses do not sway this Court. To be sure, the Union engaged in work slowdown which under the
circumstances in which they were undertaken constitutes illegal strike. The Company is therefore right in dismissing the
subject Union officers in accordance with Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, for participating in illegal strike in defiance of
the assumption of jurisdiction order by the Labor Secretary.
Article 263(g) in relation to Article 264 of the Labor Code governs the effects of a strike or similar prohibited acts in
assumption cases, thus:
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. xxx

(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it. Such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike or lockout as specified. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and re-admit
all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. xxx.
Article 264. Prohibited Activities.
(a) xxx No strike or lockout shall be declared after the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary or during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. Any union officer who knowingly
participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.
While the employer is authorized to declare a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
employment, his/its option is not as wide with respect to union members or workers for the law itself draws a line and
makes a distinction between union officers and members/ordinary workers. An ordinary striking worker or union member
cannot, as a rule, be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal
acts during the strike. And lest it be forgotten, the law invests the Secretary of Labor and Employment the prerogative of
tempering the consequence of the defiance to the assumption order. The Secretary may thus merely suspend rather than
dismiss the employee involved.
With the view we take of this case, the public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment - and necessarily the CA acted within the bounds of the law and certainly rendered a judicious solution to the dispute when she spared the
striking workers or union members from the penalty of dismissal. This disposition takes stock of the following
circumstances justifying a less drastic penalty for ordinary striking workers: a) the employees who engaged in slowdown
actually reported for work and continued to occupy their respective posts, or, in fine, did not abandon their jobs; b) they
were only following orders of their leaders; and c) no evidence has been presented to prove their participation in the
commission of illegal activities during the strike.
We held in previous cases that any worker who participates in a strike or otherwise engages in any prohibited act in
defiance of the assumption order may be meted the penalty of loss of employment status. But as correctly pointed out by
the public respondent Secretary, however, the law itself authorizes the graduation of penalties, Article 264 of the Labor
Code making, as it were, a distinction between union officers and its members or any other workers, the main differing
line contextually being that the latter do not necessarily lose their job by mere participation in an illegal strike absent
proof that they committed illegal acts.
The Court cannot give credence to the Unions contention that Nissan Motor imposed disciplinary sanctions against its
officers and members without due process of law. As it were, the records tend to show that the Company, before
proceeding against those concerned, asked the erring Union officers/members and workers to explain what amounts to
their defiant attitude and duly warned them of their imminent fate as a consequence of their intransigence, before
declaring and then confirming their loss of employment status.
In view of the legality of the disciplinary measures taken against the union officers and members of the union, the Court
need not delve on the issue of entitlement to full backwages. Backwages is, as a rule, forthcoming only in cases where
the dismissal or suspension, as the case may be, is declared unlawful.

186 YOLITO FADRIQUELAN, et al. vs. Monterey Foods Corporation


G.R. No. 178409 | 8 June 2011
Doctrine:
A strike conducted after the Secretary of Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute is illegal and any union officer who
knowingly participates in the strike may be declared as having lost his employment. The present case involved a slowdown strike.
Unlike other forms of strike, the employees involved in a slowdown do not walk out of their jobs to hurt the company. They need only
to stop work or reduce the rate of their work while generally remaining in their assigned post. The Supreme Court upheld the finding
that the union officers committed illegal acts that warranted their dismissal from work when they refused to work or abandoned their
work to join union assemblies after the Labor Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
Facts:
The collective bargaining agreement between Buklod ng Manggagawa sa Monterey-Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (the union) and
Monterey Foods Corporation (the company) expired on 30 April 2002.
On 28 March 2003, the negotiation for a new CBA reached a deadlock with the union filing for a notice of strike with the NCMB.
The company filed with the DOLE a petition for assumption of jurisdiction. As a result, the DOLE secretary assumed jurisdiction on
12 May 2003 and enjoined the union from holding any strike.
The union filed a second notice of strike on the grounds of alleged unfair labor practices by the company resulting in the charging of
intentional acts of slowdown by the company against the union officers. Six days later, on 16 June, the company sent new notices to
the officers informing them of their termination.
The union file d a third notice of strike which was subsumed by the DOLE under the first and the second notices.
The company filed a petition for certification of the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration but was denied the motion.
On 20 November 2003, the DOLE upheld the companys termination of the 17 union officers. The union appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals.
On 29 May 2006, the CA upheld the termination of the 10 union officers but declared illegal the rest.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that slowdowns actually transpired at the companys farms.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that union officers committed illegal acts that warranted their dismissal from work.
Held:
1. No. The CA was correct seeing that the union held its assemblies to supposedly inform their members of the developments of the
CBA at the same time and the same day (26 May 2003, 7:00am at the Cavite and Batangas farms) along with separate company farms
causing a significant delay of work.
In a slowdown strike employees do not walk out of their jobs to hurt the company. They need only to stop work or reduce the rate of
their work while generally remaining in their assigned post.
The law is explicit: no strike shall be declared after the Secretary of Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute. A strike
conducted after such assumption is illegal and any union officer who knowingly participates in the same may be declared as having
lost his employment.
2. A distinction lies between ordinary workers liability and union officers. The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for merely
participating in the strike as there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during its conduct. A union officer, however, can be
terminated upon mere proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal strike.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 82526, DECLARES Monterey Foods
Corporations dismissal of Alberto Castillo, Nemesio Agtay, Carlito Abacan, and Yolito Fadriquelan illegal, andORDERS payment of
their separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service up to the date of their termination. The Court
also ORDERS the company to pay 10% attorneys fees as well as interest of 6% per annum on the due amounts from the time of their
termination and 12% per annum from the time this decision becomes final and executory until such monetary awards are paid.

187 Union of the Filipro Employees-Drug v. Nestle, G.R. No. 158930-31, August 22, 2006; HICETA (TOPIC: Effect
of Assumption/Certification order)
188 Title: MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION and its members, Petitioners,


vs.
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154591
March 5, 2007
Topic : Effect of Assumption/Certification
Order; Violation of Order

Quick Notes/Doctrine: Regardless therefore of


their motives, or the validity of their claims, the
striking workers must cease and/or desist from
any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this
authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an
assumption and/or certification order is issued.
They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work
orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part
of the company, to justify their action

Facts: On 11 November 1999, the MHEA filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) in its National Capital Region office against Manila Hotel on the
grounds of unfair labor practices.2 Upon the petition of Manila Hotel, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (SOLE) certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant
to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code on 24 November 1999. Specifically, the Order enjoined any
strike or lockout and the parties were ordered to cease and desist from committing any acts that
may exacerbate the situation
The case was set for mandatory conference on 8 February 2000 before Presiding
Commissioner Rogelio I. Rayala. During the conference, the parties were advised of the
certification order, which prohibited them from taking any action that would exacerbate the
situation
On 10 February 2000, the MHEA conducted a strike despite the clear terms of the Order issued
by the SOLE on 24 November 1999, and despite the repeated reminders thereof. On the same
day, Commissioner Rayala called for a mandatory conference.7 Thereafter, several conferences
were conducted by the NLRC, wherein both parties were warned against aggravating the
already volatile situation
After the strike was conducted, both parties filed various motions and pleadings before the
NLRC. Manila Hotel filed a complaint with Prayer for Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order on 11 February 2000, alleging that MHEA conducted an illegal strike, blocked all ingress
and egress of the hotel premises, harassed and intimidated company officers, non-striking
employees, customers and suppliers. In addition, it sought a declaration that the strike was
illegal and that, consequently, the striking employees lost their employment.
The NLRC issued an Order dated 11 February 2000 directing the striking workers to return to
work immediately and the hotel to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of
employment. The NLRC further instructed the parties to submit proof of compliance with the
instant order immediately after the lapse of twenty-four hours.
In response to the NLRCs return-to-work order, dated 11 February 2000, the MHEA filed an
Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Set Aside Order on 14 February 2000. It alleged that the
Motion for Reconsideration, dated 29 November 1999, questioning the validity of the Order of
the SOLE, dated 24 November 1999, which certified the case to the NLCR, was still pending
with the SOLE. The said motion had prevented the said Order of the SOLE from becoming final
and executory. Thus, it alleged that the NLRC had not acquired jurisdiction over the labor
dispute pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed before the SOLE. On 17
February 2000, the NLRC denied MHEAs Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Set Aside Order.
The NLRC also issued another Order on 17 February 2000, ordering MHEA to refrain from

putting up a blockade or barricade or any mode of preventing the free ingress to and egress
from the hotel. Parenthetically, it also ordered Manila Hotel to respect the right of the striking
workers to peacefully picket in a designated area outside the hotel. Manila Hotel moved for the
Reconsideration of the said Order on the ground that the picket, which they were ordered to
respect, was an unlawful activity.
In the Decision promulgated on 5 April 2000, the NLRC ruled that the 10 February 2000 strike
held by MHEA was illegal for its defiance of the return-to-work order. However, it determined
that only the union officers were deemed to have lost their employment. It ruled that there was
no evidence showing who among the striking employees were actually notified of the return-towork order, and therefore, such employees have not forfeited their employment. But in view of
the antagonism on both sides, the NLRC awarded a severance pay equivalent to one-month
salary to the returning union members for every year of service, instead of ordering Manila Hotel
to reinstate them.
On appeal, In a Decision dated 31 October 2001, the Court of Appeals ruled . The assailed
Decision is MODIFIED in that both the incumbent officers and members of the Union involved in
the illegal strike are declared to have lost their employment status. The award of severance
compensation to the striking members of the union is consequently DELETED.

Issues: WON there was an illegal strike staged by MHEA

Held: Yes, the Court has consistently ruled in a long line of cases spanning several decades
that once the SOLE assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute, such jurisdiction should not be
interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout. Defiance of the
assumption order or a return-to work order by a striking employee, whether a union officer or a
member, is an illegal act and, therefore, a valid ground for loss of employment status.
The assumption of jurisdiction by the SOLE over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a police
power measure. In this case, the SOLE sufficiently justified the assumption order
ART. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCKOUTS
g) When, in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of the assumption or certification,
all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with
this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES

(a) x x x x
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration
or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
, The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other
construction. The certification attests to the urgency of the matter, affecting as it does an
industry indispensable to the national interest. The order is issued in the exercise of the courts
compulsory power of arbitration, and therefore must be obeyed until set aside. To say that its
[return-to-work order] effectivity must await affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not
only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return
to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be
affirmed insofar as the time element it concerned.

Ratio :
Dispositive Portion: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court
AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 31 October 2001, declaring
the strike conducted by the MHEA on 10 February 1999 as illegal and, thus, resulting in the loss of
employment status of the union officers and members who participated in the said strike.
Relation/Pertinent Law :

189 Topic:

Union Concerted Activities; Illegal Strikes; Effect of Assumption/Certification order

CA Lofranco

Parties:
Petitioner: STEEL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent: SCP EMPLOYEES UNION-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS [SCPEU-NAFLU]
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision rendered by the Court
of Appeals denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, as well as the
Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Ponente: AZCUNA, J. [G.R. Nos. 169829-30 April 16, 2008.]

FACTS:
A consent election was conducted, with "FUEL-GAS" and "NO UNION" as choices but was declared a failure because less than a
majority of the rank-and-file employees cast their votes. FUEL-GAS filed an Election Protest claiming that the certification election
was characterized by and replete with irregularities. NAFLU, the mother federation of respondent, filed a petition for Certification
Election for and on behalf of its affiliate, seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of petitioner.
Med-Arbiter
The Med-Arbiter denied the election protest of FUEL-GAS and granted the petition for certification election filed by NAFLU and
further ordered the conduct of the election with "NAFLU" and "NO UNION" as choices. Both STEEL CORPORATION and FUEL-GAS
appealed to the Secretary of Labor, which appeals were later consolidated.
Secretary of Labor
DOLE Undersecretary rendered a consolidated decision ordering the conduct of a certification election with "FUEL-GAS," respondent
and "NO UNION" as choices. Unsatisfied, STEEL CORPORATION and FUEL-GAS appealed to the CA by way of certiorari.
Meanwhile, the certification election, as ordered by the Med-Arbiter, proceeded. FUEL-GAS participated without prejudice
to the decision of the CA in its pending petition. In said election, respondent Union SCPEU-NAFLU emerged as winner;
hence, the second election protest filed by FUEL-GAS.
CA
The CA annulled and set aside decision and resolution of the Undersecretary and directed the holding of a certification election with
"FUEL-GAS" and "NO UNION" as choices, to the exclusion of respondent Union SCPEU-NAFLU.
*The Med-Arbiter dismissed FUEL-GAS' election protest but deferred the request of respondent Union to be declared
winner in the certification election until final resolution of the pending petitions with the CA. Not satisfied with the
deferment of their certification as winner, respondent Union appealed to the Labor Secretary.
*The Undersecretary rendered a Decision certifying respondent Union as the exclusive bargaining agent of STEEL
CORPORATION's employees. STEEL CORPORATION and FUEL-GAS timely filed motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision. As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA
proposals. STEEL CORPORATION, however, held in abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion for
reconsideration.
*Finding no justification in petitioner's refusal to bargain with it, respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB
raising the issue of unfair labor practice (ULP) allegedly committed by STEEL CORPORATION for the latter's refusal to
bargain with it. FUEL-GAS moved for the conduct of a certification election pursuant to the CA decision. The Undersecretary
affirmed its decision.

NLRC
The labor dispute was certified to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
*Another Notice of Strike was filed by respondent for non-recognition as a certified union; refusal to bargain; discrimination
against union officers and members; harassment and intimidation; and illegal dismissal, which was later consolidated with
the certified case.
*Acting on the petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiter recommended the holding of another certification
election but with respondent Union and FUEL-GAS as contenders. The decision was appealed to the Labor Secretary. The
Labor Secretary in turn dismissed the motion to conduct certification election.
The NLRC issued a Resolution declaring STEEL CORPORATION as having no obligation to recognize respondent Union as the certified
bargaining agent; dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice; declaring as illegal the strike held by the union; and declaring the
loss of employment of the officers of the union.
*Respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds, petitioner's refusal to bargain and union busting. The notice
was later dismissed and respondent was enjoined from holding a strike. Respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the
grounds of refusal to bargain and union busting. Respondent thereafter went on strike. The Labor Secretary certified the
dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees to return to work.
The NLRC rendered a Decision ordering STEEL CORPORATION to bargain collectively with respondent as the duly certified bargaining
agent. In addition, it ordered the reinstatement of the employees who were dismissed in connection with the strike, without loss of
seniority rights and diminution of salary.
Petitioner STEEL CORPORATION contented among others:
1.

2.

That the strike held by respondent Union is illegal arguing that respondent has no right to demand that it bargain with the
latter. Its refusal to recognize respondent Union as the bargaining representative of its employees is based on the directive
of the CA to conduct another certification election. Petitioner maintains that respondent never denied that its purpose for
holding the strike was to force it to recognize the latter over the other union. Since the strike is a union-recognition strike, it
is illegal.
That the strike was manifestly illegal for it was in gross violation of the Labor Code, particularly Art. 264, which expressly
prohibits the declaration of a strike over an issue that is pending arbitration between the parties. Since the labor dispute in
the first certified case was still pending compulsory arbitration at the time of the strike, and since the said strike was based
substantially on the same grounds, i.e., the alleged refusal by petitioner to recognize the union, the strike is illegal by
express provision of the law.

ISSUE: WoN the strike participated in by the officers of the respondent union was legal.
HELD: YES. Petitioner union failed to comply with the requirements for a valid strike.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2005 in the
consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314 and its Resolution dated September 22, 2005 are MODIFIED in that the strike in
question is found ILLEGAL and the order to reinstate the union officers who participated in the illegal strike is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
Ratio:
The strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union was illegal.
The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human struggle for a decent existence. It is considered as the most effective weapon in
protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. But to be valid, a strike must be
pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy
the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise.

In the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal for the following reasons:
(1) it is a union-recognition strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws;
(2) it was undertaken after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration; and
(3) it was in violation of the Secretary's return-to-work order.
Respondent's notices of strike were founded on petitioner's continued refusal to bargain with it. It thus staged the strike to compel
petitioner to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent, making it a union-recognition strike. As its legal designation implies, this
kind of strike is calculated to compel the employer to recognize one's union and not other contending groups, as the employees'
bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite the striking union's doubtful majority status to
merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit.
The certification election that was conducted where respondent emerged as winner, not having been recognized as valid, it has
no authority to represent the rank and file employees of petitioner. Thus, it could not ask petitioner to bargain with it. As the issue
of its identity had been the subject of a separate case which had been settled by the court with finality, petitioner cannot, therefore,
be faulted in refusing to bargain. Neither could this Court sustain respondent's imputation of unfair labor practice and union busting
against petitioner. With more reason, this Court cannot sustain the validity of the strike staged on such basis.
Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondent's purpose or objective in staging a strike, still, the strike would be
declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the Secretary's return-to-work order and after the dispute had been
certified for compulsory arbitration.
Although ostensibly there were several notices of strike successively filed by respondent, these notices were founded on
substantially the same grounds petitioner's continued refusal to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative.
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides:
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption
or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor
and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this provision
as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. . . .

Effect of assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and certification of the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration .
The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police
power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted "great breadth of
discretion" to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike
or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place.
The moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest,
such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for
the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing a return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary
of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the
assumption order.
A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the workers
may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer.
Says the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. xxx No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.

Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job
together with his co-workers so that the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and
promoting its interest. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy
solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. Regardless of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the
striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that undermine or tend to undermine this authority of the Secretary
of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing
unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their action.
Respondent, in the instant case, after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration, filed notices of strike and staged the strike obviously contrary to the provisions of labor laws. Worse, it filed not one but
several notices of strike which resulted in two certified cases which were earlier consolidated. These disputes could have been
averted had respondent respected the CA's decision. That way, the collective bargaining agent would have been determined and
petitioner could have been compelled to bargain.
Respondent, through its officers, instead opted to use the weapon of strike to force petitioner to recognize it as the bargaining
agent. The strike, having been staged after the dispute had been certified for arbitration and contrary to the return-to-work order,
became a prohibited activity, and was thus illegal.
Strikes exert disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace and
progress of society, not to mention the economic well-being of the State. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the
union and members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. Hence, the decision to wield the
weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few,
and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not however be antithetical to the public welfare. In every
strike staged by a union, the general peace and progress of society and public welfare are involved.

190 FEU-NRMF v. FEU-NRMFEA-AFW, G.R. No. 168362, October 16, 2006; MATEO
191 Manila Cordage Company v. CIR, 37 SCRA 288 (1971; MAYUGA

UNIVERSITY of IMMACULATE, CONCEPCION, INC., petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE
UIC TEACHING and NON-TEACHING PERSONNEL AND EMPLOYEES UNION, LELIAN CONCON, MARY ANN DE
RAMOS, JOVITA MAMBURAM, ANGELINA ABADILLA, MELANIE DE LA ROSA, ZENAIDA CANOY, ALMA
VILLACARLOS, JOSIE BOSTON, PAULINA PALMA GIL, GEMMA GALOPE, LEAH CRUZA, DELFA
DIAPUEZ, respondent.
TOPIC: rationale of compulsory arbitration
1. This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between petitioner University of Immaculate
Concepcion, Inc. (UNIVERSITY) and respondent The UIC Teaching and Non-Teaching Personnel and
Employees Union (UNION).
1. Among the bargaining proposals, only one item was left unresolved and this was the inclusion or exclusion of the
following positions in the scope of the bargaining unit: a. Secretaries; b. Registrars; c. Accounting Personnel; d.
Guidance Counselors.
2. This matter was submitted for voluntary arbitration. The panel of voluntary arbitrators rendered a decision which
excludes the said position.
3. Union filed motion for reconsideration. Pending the resolution of its motion it filed a notice of strike and proceed
with the strike.
4. The then Secretary of Labor, Ma. Nieves R. Confessor, (SOLE) issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the
labor dispute. It also issued a return-to-work order to all workers who participated in the strike. They were also
directed to cease and desist from committing any or all acts that might exacerbate the situation.
5. The motion for reconsideration of Union was denied. Thereafter, the UNIVERSITY gave the abovementioned
individual respondents two choices: to resign from the UNION and remain employed as confidential employees or
resign from their confidential positions and remain members of the UNION.
6. However, the individual respondents remained steadfast in their claim that they could still retain their confidential
positions while being members or officers of the Union. Hence, the UNIVERSITY sent notices of termination to
the individual respondents
7. The UNION filed another notice of strike, this time citing as a reason the UNIVERSITYs termination of the
individual respondents. The UNION alleged that the UNIVERSITYs act of terminating the individual respondents
is in violation of the Order of the Secretary of Labor.
8. The SOLE issued another Order reiterating the directives contained in the first issued order. The Secretary also
stated therein that the effects of the termination from employment of these individual respondents be suspended
pending the determination of the legality thereof. Hence, the UNIVERSITY was directed to reinstate the individual
respondents under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute.
st
9. UNIVERSITY 1 motion for reconsiderations contention = SOLEs Order directing the reinstatement of the
individual respondents would render nugatory the decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude them
from the collective bargaining unit.
10. MR Denied = SOLE declared that the decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude the individual
respondents from the collective bargaining unit did not authorize the UNIVERSITY to terminate their employment.
nd
11. 2 motion for reconsideration = denied.
rd
12. 3 motion for reconsideration = denied with modifications: Anent the Unions Motion, we find that superseding
circumstances would not warrant the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated employees. Hence,
they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally
resolved.
13. CA = Affirmed.
14. Hence, this appeal.
15. The UNIVERSITY contends that the Secretary cannot take cognizance of an issue involving employees who are
not part of the bargaining unit. It insists that since the individual respondents had already been excluded from the
bargaining unit by a final and executory order by the panel of voluntary arbitrators, then they cannot be covered
by the Secretarys assumption order.
ISSUE: whether or not SOLE has the authority to reinstate terminated employees not part of the bargaining unit
involved in a labor dispute over which the SOLE assumed jurisdiction.

13

This Court finds no merit in the UNIVERSITYs contention. In Metrolab Industries, Inc. v. Roldan-Confessor , this Court
declared that it recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives and it often declines to interfere with the legitimate
business decisions of the employer. This is in keeping with the general principle embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of the
14
15
Constitution, which is further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code. However, as expressed in PAL v. National Labor
16
Relations Commission, this privilege is not absolute, but subject to exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the
Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes involving industries indispensable to the national interest
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. (provision omitted; ang haba eh)
When the Secretary of Labor ordered the UNIVERSITY to suspend the effect of the termination of the individual
respondents, the Secretary did not exceed her jurisdiction, nor did the Secretary gravely abuse the same. It must be
pointed out that one of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a
labor dispute to the further detriment of the national interest. In her Order dated March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor
rightly held: (rationale of compulsory arbitration)
It is well to remind both parties herein that the main reason or rationale for the exercise of the Secretary of Labor
and Employments power under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, is the maintenance and upholding
of the status quo while the dispute is being adjudicated. Hence, the directive to the parties to refrain from
performing acts that will exacerbate the situation is intended to ensure that the dispute does not get out of hand,
thereby negating the direct intervention of this office.
Indeed, it is clear that the act of the UNIVERSITY of dismissing the individual respondents from their employment became
the impetus for the UNION to declare a second notice of strike. It is not a question anymore of whether or not the
terminated employees, the individual respondents herein, are part of the bargaining unit. Any act committed during the
pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise to further contentious issues or increase the tensions between the parties
should be considered an act of exacerbation and should not be allowed.
[Another topic; baka lang matanong] With respect to the Secretarys Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead of actual
reinstatement for the individual respondents herein, an amendment to the previous Orders issued by her office, the same
is usually not allowed. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to
work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout. The phrase "under the same terms and conditions" makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This is
consistent with the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to the national
interest.
As an exception to the rule, payroll reinstatement must rest on special circumstances that render actual reinstatement
19
impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law.
The "superseding circumstances" mentioned by the Acting Secretary of Labor (see facts no doubt refer to the final
decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential nature of the positions of the twelve private respondents, thereb y
rendering their actual and physical reinstatement impracticable and more likely to exacerbate the situation. The payroll
reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement ordered in these cases, therefore, appears justified as an exception to the
rule until the validity of their termination is finally resolved.

191 Manila Cordage Company v. CIR, 37 SCRA 288 (1971; MAYUGA


192 UNIVERSITY of IMMACULATE, CONCEPCION, INC., petitioner, vs. The HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR,
THE UIC TEACHING and NON-TEACHING PERSONNEL AND EMPLOYEES UNION, LELIAN CONCON, MARY ANN
DE RAMOS, JOVITA MAMBURAM, ANGELINA ABADILLA, MELANIE DE LA ROSA, ZENAIDA CANOY, ALMA
VILLACARLOS, JOSIE BOSTON, PAULINA PALMA GIL, GEMMA GALOPE, LEAH CRUZA, DELFA
DIAPUEZ, respondent.
TOPIC: rationale of compulsory arbitration
2. This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between petitioner University of Immaculate
Concepcion, Inc. (UNIVERSITY) and respondent The UIC Teaching and Non-Teaching Personnel and
Employees Union (UNION).
16. Among the bargaining proposals, only one item was left unresolved and this was the inclusion or exclusion of the
following positions in the scope of the bargaining unit: a. Secretaries; b. Registrars; c. Accounting Personnel; d.
Guidance Counselors.
17. This matter was submitted for voluntary arbitration. The panel of voluntary arbitrators rendered a decision which
excludes the said position.
18. Union filed motion for reconsideration. Pending the resolution of its motion it filed a notice of strike and proceed
with the strike.
19. The then Secretary of Labor, Ma. Nieves R. Confessor, (SOLE) issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the
labor dispute. It also issued a return-to-work order to all workers who participated in the strike. They were also
directed to cease and desist from committing any or all acts that might exacerbate the situation.
20. The motion for reconsideration of Union was denied. Thereafter, the UNIVERSITY gave the abovementioned
individual respondents two choices: to resign from the UNION and remain employed as confidential employees or
resign from their confidential positions and remain members of the UNION.
21. However, the individual respondents remained steadfast in their claim that they could still retain their confidential
positions while being members or officers of the Union. Hence, the UNIVERSITY sent notices of termination to
the individual respondents
22. The UNION filed another notice of strike, this time citing as a reason the UNIVERSITYs termination of the
individual respondents. The UNION alleged that the UNIVERSITYs act of terminating the individual respondents
is in violation of the Order of the Secretary of Labor.
23. The SOLE issued another Order reiterating the directives contained in the first issued order. The Secretary also
stated therein that the effects of the termination from employment of these individual respondents be suspended
pending the determination of the legality thereof. Hence, the UNIVERSITY was directed to reinstate the individual
respondents under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute.
st
24. UNIVERSITY 1 motion for reconsiderations contention = SOLEs Order directing the reinstatement of the
individual respondents would render nugatory the decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude them
from the collective bargaining unit.
25. MR Denied = SOLE declared that the decision of the panel of voluntary arbitrators to exclude the individual
respondents from the collective bargaining unit did not authorize the UNIVERSITY to terminate their employment.
nd
26. 2 motion for reconsideration = denied.
rd
27. 3 motion for reconsideration = denied with modifications: Anent the Unions Motion, we find that superseding
circumstances would not warrant the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated employees. Hence,
they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally
resolved.
28. CA = Affirmed.
29. Hence, this appeal.
30. The UNIVERSITY contends that the Secretary cannot take cognizance of an issue involving employees who are
not part of the bargaining unit. It insists that since the individual respondents had already been excluded from the
bargaining unit by a final and executory order by the panel of voluntary arbitrators, then they cannot be covered
by the Secretarys assumption order.
ISSUE: whether or not SOLE has the authority to reinstate terminated employees not part of the bargaining unit
involved in a labor dispute over which the SOLE assumed jurisdiction.
13

This Court finds no merit in the UNIVERSITYs contention. In Metrolab Industries, Inc. v. Roldan-Confessor , this Court
declared that it recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives and it often declines to interfere with the legitimate
business decisions of the employer. This is in keeping with the general principle embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of the
14
15
Constitution, which is further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code. However, as expressed in PAL v. National Labor

16

Relations Commission, this privilege is not absolute, but subject to exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the
Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes involving industries indispensable to the national interest
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. (provision omitted; ang haba eh)
When the Secretary of Labor ordered the UNIVERSITY to suspend the effect of the termination of the individual
respondents, the Secretary did not exceed her jurisdiction, nor did the Secretary gravely abuse the same. It must be
pointed out that one of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a
labor dispute to the further detriment of the national interest. In her Order dated March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor
rightly held: (rationale of compulsory arbitration)
It is well to remind both parties herein that the main reason or rationale for the exercise of the Secretary of Labor
and Employments power under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, is the maintenance and upholding
of the status quo while the dispute is being adjudicated. Hence, the directive to the parties to refrain from
performing acts that will exacerbate the situation is intended to ensure that the dispute does not get out of hand,
thereby negating the direct intervention of this office.
Indeed, it is clear that the act of the UNIVERSITY of dismissing the individual respondents from their employment became
the impetus for the UNION to declare a second notice of strike. It is not a question anymore of whether or not the
terminated employees, the individual respondents herein, are part of the bargaining unit. Any act committed during the
pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise to further contentious issues or increase the tensions between the parties
should be considered an act of exacerbation and should not be allowed.
[Another topic; baka lang matanong] With respect to the Secretarys Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead of actual
reinstatement for the individual respondents herein, an amendment to the previous Orders issued by her office, the same
is usually not allowed. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to
work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout. The phrase "under the same terms and conditions" makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This is
consistent with the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to the national
interest.
As an exception to the rule, payroll reinstatement must rest on special circumstances that render actual reinstatement
19
impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purposes of the law.
The "superseding circumstances" mentioned by the Acting Secretary of Labor (see facts no doubt refer to the final
decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential nature of the positions of the twelve private respondents, thereb y
rendering their actual and physical reinstatement impracticable and more likely to exacerbate the situation. The payroll
reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement ordered in these cases, therefore, appears justified as an exception to the
rule until the validity of their termination is finally resolved.

193 GTE Directories Corp. v. GTE Directories Corp. Employees Union, 197 SCRA 452 (1991); PALOMIQUE
194 Phimco Industries Inc. v. Brillantes, 304 SCRA 747 (1999); SANTOS
195 Trans-Asia Shipping Lines Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 433 SCRA 610 (2004); UY
196 (SUPRA 205) Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Phils., 192 SCRA 396 (1990); ZAPATA (note: other case = 2006,
same parties)

197 PHILTREAD WORKERS UNION (PTWU) et al. vs. SECRETARY NIEVES R. CONFESOR,
NLRC, GEN. RECAREDO SARMIENTO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, PHILTREAD TIRE &
RUBBER CORPORATION, GERARD BRIMO, HARRY McMILLAN | G.R. No. 117169 March 12, 1997|
PONENTE:
TORRES,
JR., J.
|
TOPIC: PART VIII - UNION CONCERTED ACTIVITIES Strikes in industries indispensable to the
national interest SOLEs assumption/certification order is constitutional;
FACTS: Philtread Tire Workers Union (PTWU) filed a Notice of Strike (5/27/94) at NCMB-NCR on grounds
of unfair labor practice, specifically: (1) union busting; (2) violation of the CBA. On the other hand, private
respondent Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (PHILTREAD) filed: (1) a notice of lockout, three days later
(5/30)
and
(2) a petition to declare illegal the work slowdowns staged by PTWU. Both cases were then consolidated,
but there was a failure to settle.
PHILTREAD then declared a company-wide lockout on 6/15/94, which continued until 8/22/94, and about 80
union members of PTWU were dismissed. This lead to the filing of a Notice of Strike in self-defense in NCMB.
NLRC: Declared the slowdowns illegal (8/15/94), granting the petition of PHILTREAD, and thereby considered
PTWU members appearing in Annex A as deemed to have lost their employment status. However, as a
measure of compassion to the workingman, NLRC resolved not to award damages to PHILTREAD, as well as
attorneys fees, because these were not substantiated by PHILTREAD.
On August 31, 1994, PHILTREAD requested the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the labor
dispute.
SECRETARY CONFESSOR: Issued the assailed order (9/8/94) which (1) certified the entire labor dispute at
PHILTREAD to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration; (2) enjoins strictly the holding of any strike or lockout,
whether actual or intended (3) gave directive for a return-to-work within 24 hours all striking workers, except
those dismissed based on the 8/15/94 decision, and those retrenched and have received separation pay; (4)
included the issue on retrenched employees who refused separation pay benefits in the certified case; and (5)
further directs parties to cease and desist from committing any and all acts which might exacerbate the
situation. Motion for consideration was filed by PTWU, but this was denied on 8/26/94 for lack of merit,
hence this SC petition.
PTWU Contends that: (1) Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code violates the workers' right to strike which is
provided for by Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution and Atricle 3 of the ILO Convention No. 87. (2) that
the assailed order was issued with grave abuse of authority, because (3) the instant labor dispute does not
adversely affect the national interest, because the tire industry has long ceased to be a government protected
industry and the strike in Philtread will not adversely affect the supply of tires in the market and the supply of
imported tires is more than sufficient to meet the market requirements.
ISSUE: 1) Whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
orders;
2) Whether or not Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code is unconstitutional;
RULING: NO; NO. The petition is devoid of merit. On the issue of the constitutionality of Article 263 (g) of
the Labor Code, the same had already been resolved in Union of Filipino Employees vs. Nestle
Philippines, Inc., 7 stating that: (1) no law has ever been passed by Congress expressly repealing Articles
263 and 264 of the Labor Code. Neither may the 1987 Constitution be considered to have impliedly repealed
the said Articles considering that there is no showing that said articles are inconsistent with the said
Constitution. (2) The continued validity and operation of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code has been
recognized by no less than the Congress of the Philippines when the latter enacted into law R.A. 6715,
otherwise known as Herrera law, Section 27 of which amended paragraphs (g) and (l) of Article 263 of the
Labor Code; (3) Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have been enacted pursuant to the police power of

the State, defined as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote
the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society.
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not violate the workers' constitutional right to strike. The
section provides in part, viz.: When in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration. . . .
The foregoing article clearly does not interfere with the workers' right to strike but merely regulates it,
when in the exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the
Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not
exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected
and not one of them is given undue preference.
The Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are
indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the determination of the Secretary of Labor that such
industry is indispensable to the national interest, it will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said
industry. The assumption of jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. This is done for the
promotion of the common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the
national economy. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, his certification for
compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede the workers' right to strike but to obtain a speedy
settlement of the dispute.
This is well-articulated in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor, in this wise: Plainly,
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors)
and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would
not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to
the absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may have
diametrically opposed rulings. As we have said, "(i)t is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that
would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it. 8
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the certification for compulsory arbitration. It had been determined by the Labor
Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-04156-94 that the work slowdowns conducted by the petitioner
amounted to illegal strikes. It was shown that every time the respondent company failed to accede to
the petitioner's demands, production always declined. This resulted to the significant drops in the
figures of tires made, cured, and warehoused.
However, when the demand of the petitioner union for the restoration of overtime work was allowed,
production improved. The work slowdowns, which were in effect, strikes on installment basis, were
apparently a pattern of manipulating production depending on whether the petitioner union's demands
were met. These strikes, however, had greatly affected the respondent company that on November 11,
1994, it had indefinitely ceased operations because of tremendous financial losses.
We do not agree with the petitioners that the respondent company is not indispensable to national interest
considering that the tire industry has already been liberalized. Philtread supplies 22% of the tire products in
the country. Moreover, it employs about 700 people. As observed by the Secretary of Labor, viz.: The
Company is one of the tire manufacturers in the country employing more or less 700 workers. Any
work disruption thereat, as a result of a labor dispute will certainly prejudice the employment and
livelihood of its workers and their dependents. Furthermore, the labor dispute may lead to the possible
closure of the Company and loss of employment to hundreds of its workers. This will definitely
aggravate the already worsening unemployment situation in the country and discourage foreign and
domestic investors from further investing in the country. There is no doubt, therefore, that the labor dispute
in the Country is imbued with national interest.
At this point in time when all government efforts are
geared towards economic recovery and development by encouraging both foreign and domestic investments

to generate employment, we cannot afford to derail the same as a result of a labor dispute considering that
there are alternative dispute resolution machineries available to address labor problems of this nature. 9
The intervention of the Secretary of Labor was therefore necessary to settle the labor dispute which had
lingered and which had affected both respondent company and petitioner union. Had it not been so, the
deadlock will remain and the situation will remain uncertain. Thus, it cannot be deemed that the
Secretary of Labor had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order as she had a
well-founded basis in issuing the assailed order. It is significant at this point to point out that grave abuse of
discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. Thus, an act may be considered as
committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility. ACCORDINGLY, the assailed order of the Secretary of Labor
dated September 8, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

198 Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.-Unlicensed Crews


Employees Union v. CA,
G.R. No. 145428 July 7, 2004
TOPIC: Effect of Assumption/Certification Order
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J.
PARTIES:
Petitioners: TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC. - UNLICENSED CREWS EMPLOYEES UNION ASSOCIATED
LABOR UNIONS (TASLI-ALU) and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES INC.- DECK AND ENGINE (LICENSED
CREW)-OFFICERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONALS, SUPERVISORS, OFFICE AND TECHNICAL
EMPLOYEES UNION (APSOTEU); AND MELCHOR VILLANUEVA, GERARDO SUAN, NESTOR SANCHEZ,
LUCAS APAS, JR., BONIFACIO YSAO, NICASIO CALAPRE, GILBERT SUMALPONG, ARNULFO VICTORIO,
ALBERTO SILVA, NEIL ARNEJO, DANILO JAYA, SOCRATES ALCOS, ARNOLD ARCIPE, JOSEL
ARRANGUEZ, OSCAR ARRANGUEZ, FRANCISCO CUIZON, RAMON ORTEGA, FRANCISCO MANTILLA and
MATEO MARAVILLAS,
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in coastwise shipping services for the
transportation of passengers and cargoes. It operates thirteen (13) vessels servicing seventeen (17) points in the Visayas
and Mindanao, including Cagayan de Oro, Ozamis, Zamboanga, Tagbilaran, Leyte, Masbate, Iloilo and Bacolod, with the
Port of Cebu as its base. The respondent employs 700 employees, more or less.
2. Petitioner TASLI-ALU is a labor union of the respondents rank-and-file employees, while petitioner TASLIAPSOTEU is a labor union of its supervisory employees. The individual petitioners are members of these two unions and
the respondents employees.
3. On July 6 and 7, 1999, the two unions filed separate notices of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board, Regional Branch VII (NCMB-RB VII) against the respondent on the ground of unfair labor practice. Secretary of
Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma intervened and issued the Order dated July 20, 1999 certifying the labor dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration of the Labor Code and enjoining any strike or lock-out. Further, the parties were
directed to cease and desist from committing any act that would exacerbate the situation.
4. Despite the aforesaid order, the petitioners went on strike on July 23, 1999, paralyzing the respondents operations. The
Secretary of Labor was thus constrained to issue the Order dated July 23, 1999 directing all striking workers to return to
work within twelve (12) hours from receipt of this Order and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike.
5. The bone of contention between the petitioners, on the one hand, and the respondent, on the other, hinged on the proper
interpretation of the phrase for the company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing before
the strike. The terminated workers asserted that said phrase must be construed to mean that they be reinstated to their
former assignments.
6. The respondent posited that it refers only to their salary grades, rank and seniority, but cannot encompass the usurpation
of managements prerogative to determine where its employees are to be assigned nor to determine their job assignments.
Consequently, the strike continued as the parties insisted on their respective hard-line stance. To aggravate the situation,
the Coalition of Shipowners and Arrastre Operators, of which the respondent is a member, supported the latter by not
operating their vessels beginning July 26, 1999.
7. Recognizing that protracted work disruptions were inimical not only to the parties involved but to the national interest
as well, the Secretary of Labor issued the Order dated July 27, 1999 directing the striking workers to return to work
immediately and the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prevailing prior to
the strike.
8. On July 28 and 29, 1999, then NLRC Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala met with the parties. The petitioners manifested that
the 21 employees be issued their respective embarkation orders to the vessels they were assigned as crew members as a
precondition to their reporting for work. Chairman Rayala directed them to comply with the Secretary of Labors return-

to-work order.
9. The respondent consequently reinstated the twenty-one (21) employees. Despite their reinstatement, however, the
respondent continued to refuse to issue the said employees embarkation orders to their former ship assignments. The
employees, thus, refused to report back for work.
10. The respondent forthwith filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Secretary of Labor in issuing the reinstatement order of the dismissed employees. The said
order allegedly constituted an unlawful deprivation of property and denial of due process for it prevented the respondent
from taking disciplinary action and seeking redress for the huge property losses that it suffered as a result of the
petitioners illegal mass action.
11. On August 26, 1999, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Secretary of Labor from implementing
the reinstatement order contained in his Order of July 27, 1999.
12. On August 30, 1999, bolstered by the temporary restraining order issued by the CA, the respondent issued a
memorandum terminating the employment of the subject twenty-one (21) employees, including the individual petitioners.
13. On September 27, 1999, the NLRC, Fourth Division, issued an Order directing the parties to comply faithfully with
the July 20, 1999 Order of the Secretary of Labor.
14. CA: ruled in favor of the respondent, holding that the petitioners demand that they be issued embarkation orders
could not be properly considered as under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike because the same
constituted undue interference with the respondents management prerogative. The CA held that the continuous refusal of
the striking workers to comply with the return-to-work order and the violence that erupted during the strike justified the
respondents position not to reinstate the dismissed employees. The appellate court, likewise, noted that the striking
workers might resort to sabotaging the operations of the respondent, and thereby endanger the lives of its passengers. It
thus ruled that the respondents refusal to reinstate the twenty-one (21) employees who participated in the illegal strike was
a legitimate precautionary measure properly exercised.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals, acted contrary to law when it enjoined the Secretary of Labor in implementing
its return-to- work orders in connection with labor dispute at Trans-Asia, Inc.
HELD:
1. YES
RATIO:
1. The Orders dated July 20, 1999, July 23, 1999 and July 27, 1999 of the Secretary of Labor, certifying the labor dispute
involving the herein parties to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and enjoining the petitioners to return to work and the
respondent to admit them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike, were issued pursuant to Article
263 (g) of the Labor Code.
2. The powers granted to the Secretary of Labor under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an
exercise of the police power of the State, with the aim of promoting public good.
3. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted great breadth of discretion in order to find a solution to a
labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or the lifting
thereof if one has already taken place. Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute, or as in this case the certification of
the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, always co-exists with an order for workers to return to work
immediately and for employers to readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout.
4. The CA, adopting the respondents theory, ruled that the phrase under the same terms and conditions prevailing before
the strike could not encompass the usurpation of managements prerogative to determine where its employees are to be

assigned nor to determine their job assignments. The appellate court committed reversible error in so ruling.
5. Case law recognizes the employers right to transfer or assign employees from one area of operation to another. This
right, however, is not absolute but subject to limitations imposed by law. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code constitutes one
such limitation provided by law.
6. In Metrolab Industries, Inc. v. Roldan-Confesor, the Court noted that when a labor dispute has in fact occurred and a
general injunction has been issued restraining the commission of disruptive acts, management prerogatives must always be
exercised consistently with the statutory objective.
7. The respondent cannot rightfully exercise its managements prerogative to determine where its employees are to be
assigned or to determine their job assignments in view of the explicit directive contained in the Orders dated July 23, 1999
and July 27, 1999 of the Secretary of Labor to accept the striking workers back under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to the strike.
8. The order simply means that the employees should be returned to their ship assignments as before they staged their
strike. To reiterate, Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code constitutes an exception to the management prerogative of hiring,
firing, transfer, demotion and promotion of employees. And to the extent that Article 263 (g) calls for the admission of all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike, the respondent is restricted from exercising its
generally unbounded right to transfer or reassign its employees. The respondent is mandated, under the said order, to issue
embarkation orders to the employees to enable them to report to their ship assignments in compliance with the Order of the
Secretary of Labor.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 10, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
54393 and its Resolution dated September 13, 2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment dated July 27, 1999, is AFFIRMED.

199 MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE SECRETARY
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and THE MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL, respondents.
FACTS:
This petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals arose out of a dispute between the Philippine Diamond Hotel and
Resort, Inc. (Hotel), owner of the Manila Diamond Hotel, and the Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union (Union). The facts
are as follows:
On November 11, 1996, the Union filed a petition for a certification election so that it may be declared the exclusive bargaining
representative of the Hotels employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. The petition was dismissed by the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on January 15, 1997. After a few months, however, on August 25, 1997, the Union sent a
letter to the Hotel informing it of its desire to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement. In a letter dated September 11,
1997, the Hotels Human Resources Department Manager, Mary Anne Mangalindan, wrote to the Union stating that the Hotel
cannot recognize it as the employees bargaining agent since its petition for certification election had been earlier dismissed by
the DOLE. On that same day, the Hotel received a letter from the Union stating that they were not giving the Hotel a notice to
bargain, but that they were merely asking for the Hotel to engage in collective bargaining negotiations with the Union for its
members only and not for all the rank and file employees of the Hotel.
On September 18, 1997, the Union announced that it was taking a strike vote. A Notice of Strike was thereafter filed on
September 29, 1997, with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for the Hotels alleged refusal x x x to bargain
and for alleged acts of unfair labor practice. The NCMB summoned both parties and held a series of dialogues, the first of which
was on October 6, 1997.
On November 29, 1997, however, the Union staged a strike against the Hotel. Numerous confrontations between the two parties
followed, creating an obvious strain between them. The Hotel claims that the strike was illegal and it had to dismiss some
employees for their participation in the allegedly illegal concerted activity. The Union, on the other hand, accused the Hotel of
illegally dismissing the workers. What is pertinent to this case, however, is the Order issued by the then Secretary of Labor and
Employment Cresenciano B. Trajano assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. A Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction was
filed by the Union on April 2, 1998.
SOLE issued an order certifying that the labor dispute be submitted to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and that upon receipt
of the order, workers were directed to go back to work within 24 hours. Union members tried to return to work but the Hotel
refused to accept the returning workers and instead filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Secretarys Order.
Acting Secretary Espanol directed the strikers be reinstated only in the payroll. Union members moved for reconsideration,
denied. Filed a petition for certiorari to SC, transferred to CA. CA dismissed petition, affirmed SOLE order for payroll
reinstatement.
ISSUE: W/N the modification of the order made by the Acting Secretary was proper? NO.
HELD:
The decision made by the Sole was based on jurisprudence (UST vs NLRC) wherein the teachers(union members) were
ordered to be reinstated, however, in that case, since it was in the middle of the semester, the school could not actually reinstate
them to their former jobs, so reinstatement in the payroll became a viable option, which they did. However, such dilemma is not
present in this case because there is no showing that the facts called for payroll reinstatement as an alternative remedy. A
strained relationship between the striking employees and management is no reason for payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual
reinstatement. Petitioner correctly points out that labor disputes naturally involve strained relations between labor and
management, and that in most strikes, the relations between the strikers and the non-strikers will similarly be tense. Bitter labor
disputes always leave an aftermath of strong emotions and unpleasant situations. Nevertheless, the government must still
perform its function and apply the law, especially if, as in this case, national interest is involved.
As a general rule, the State encourages an environment wherein employers and employees themselves must deal with their
problems in a manner that mutually suits them best. This is the basic policy embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of the
Constitution, which was further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code. Hence, a voluntary, instead of compulsory, mode of
dispute settlement is the general rule.
However, Article 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, which allows the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute involving an industry indispensable to the national interest, provides an exception:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable
to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify
the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already
taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and
the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike or lockout. x x x
This provision is viewed as an exercise of the police power of the State. A prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the
national economy and, therefore, the situation is imbued with public necessity and involves the right of the State and the public
to self-protection
Under Article 263(g), all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. This Court must point out that the law uses the precise phrase of
under the same terms and conditions, revealing that it contemplates only actual reinstatement. This is in keeping with the
rationale that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be inimical to the national economy. It is clear that
Article 263(g) was not written to protect labor from the excesses of management, nor was it written to ease management from
expenses, which it normally incurs during a work stoppage or slowdown. It was an error on the part of the Court of Appeals to
view the assumption order of the Secretary as a measure to protect the striking workers from any retaliatory action from the

Hotel. This Court reiterates that this law was written as a means to be used by the State to protect itself from an emergency or
crisis. It is not for labor, nor is it for management.
It is, therefore, evident from the foregoing that the Secretarys subsequent order for mere payroll reinstatement constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Indeed, this Court has always recognized the great breadth of
discretion by the Secretary once he assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute. However, payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual
reinstatement is a departure from the rule in these cases and there must be showing of special circumstances rendering actual
reinstatement impracticable, as in the UST case aforementioned, or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purpose of the law
in providing for assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in a labor dispute that affects the national
interest. None appears to have been established in this case. Even in the exercise of his discretion under Article 236(g), the
Secretary must always keep in mind the purpose of the law. Time and again, this Court has held that when an official by-passes
the law on the asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective, the same will not be maintained if the intendment or purpose of
the law would be defeated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 19, 1999 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated April 30, 1998 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment modifying the
earlier Order dated April 15, 1998, is likewise SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

200 Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global Communications and Philcom Corporation, 495 SCRA 214 (2006)
DOCTRINE:
The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of
the police power of the State, with the aim of promoting public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is
granted "great breadth of discretion" in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers
is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place.
A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived.
While the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer.
A strike undertaken despite the Secretary's issuance of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited
activity, and thus, illegal, under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code. The union officers who knowingly participate in the
illegal strike are deemed to have lost their employment status. The union members, including union officers, who
commit specific illegal acts or who knowingly defy a return-to-work order are also deemed to have lost their
employment status. Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the
company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management to fill up their
positions.
FACTS:
- Upon the expiration of the CBA between petitioner Philcom Employees Union (PEU/Union) and private respondent
Philippine Global Communications, Inc. (Philcom) on June 30, 1997, the parties started negotiations for the renewal of
their CBA in July 1997.
- While negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed with NCMB, a Notice of Strike due to perceived unfair labor practice
allegedly committed by Philcom.
- Philcom suspended negotiations on the CBA which moved the union to file another Notice of Strike on the ground of
bargaining deadlock.
- On November 11, 1997, at a conciliation conference held at the NCMB-NCR office, the parties agreed to consolidate the
two (2) Notices of Strike filed by the union and to maintain the status quo during the pendency of the proceedings.
- On November 17, 1997, however, while the union and the company officers and representatives were meeting, the
remaining union officers and members staged a strike at the company premises, barricading the entrances
and egresses thereof and setting up a stationary picket at the main entrance of the building. The following
day, the company immediately filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume
jurisdiction over the labor dispute in accordance with Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.
- Subsequently, Acting Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the
dispute, enjoining any strike or lockout, whether threatened or actual, directing the parties to cease and
desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation, directing the striking workers to return to
work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Secretary's Order and for management to resume
normal operations, as well as accept the workers back under the same terms and conditions prior to the
strike. The parties were likewise required to submit their respective position papers and evidence within ten
(10) days from receipt of said order. On November 28, 1997, a second order was issued reiterating the
previous directive to all striking employees to return to work immediately.
- On November 27, 1997, PEU filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing, among others, the authority of then Acting
Secretary Trajano to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Said motion was denied.
- As directed, the parties submitted their respective position papers. In its position paper, the union raised the issue of
the alleged unfair labor practice of the company hereunder enumerated as follows: (a) PABX transfer and
contractualization of PABX service and position; (b) Massive contractualization; (c) Flexible labor and additional work/function;
(d) Disallowance of union leave intended for union seminar; (e) Misimplementation and/or non-implementation of employees'
benefits like shoe allowance, rainboots, raincoats, OIC shift allowance, P450.00 monthly allowance, driving allowance, motorcycle
award and full-time physician; (f) Non-payment, discrimination and/or deprivation of overtime, restday work, waiting/stand by
time and staff meetings; (g) Economic inducement by promotion during CBA negotiation; (h) Disinformation scheme, surveillance
and interference with union affairs; (i) Issuance of memorandum/notice to employees without giving copy to union, change in
work schedule at Traffic Records Section and ITTO policies; and (j) Inadequate transportation allowance, water and facilities.

On the other hand, Philcom raised in its position paper the sole issue of the illegality of the strike staged by the union.
PEU filed a Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out Portions of & Attachments in Philcom's Position Paper for being
irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent to the issues assumed for resolution on the premise that the Labor Secretary
cannot rule on the issue of the strike since there was no petition to declare the same illegal.
In opposition to PEU's Manifestation/Motion, Philcom argued that it was precisely due to the strike suddenly staged
by the union on November 17, 1997 that the dispute was assumed by the Labor Secretary. Hence, the case would
necessarily include the issue of the legality of the strike.
On 2 October 1998, the SOLE issued an order stating the following:

o
o
o

o
o

The complaints charged by the Union as unfair labor practices are not within the legal connotation of Article 248 of the
Labor Code (grounds for ULP). On the contrary, these complaints are actually mere grievances which should have been
processed through the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration outlined under the CBA.
With respect to the charges of contractualization and economic inducement, this Office is convinced that the acts of said
company qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Likewise, the promotion of certain employees, who are incidentally members of the Union, to managerial positions is a
prerogative of management. A promotion which is manifestly beneficial to an employee should not give rise to a
gratuitous speculation that such a promotion was made simply to deprive the union of the membership of the promoted
employee.
Considering the precipitous nature of the sanctions sought by the Company, i.e., declaration of illegality of the strike and
the corresponding termination of the errant Union officers, this Office deems it wise to defer the summary resolution of
the same until both parties have been afforded due process. The non-compliance of the strikers with the return-to-work
orders, while it may warrant dismissal, is not by itself conclusive to hold the strikers liable. Moreover, the Union's
position on the alleged commission of illegal acts by the strikers during the strike is still to be heard. Only after a fullblown hearing may the respective liabilities of Union officers and members be determined.
The Union's Manifestation/Motion to Implead Philcom Corporation is hereby granted.
The Union's
Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out Portions of and Attachments in Philcom's Position Paper is hereby denied for lack of
merit. The Union's charges of unfair labor practice against the Company are hereby dismissed.
Pending resolution of the issues of illegal strike and bargaining deadlock which are yet to be heard, all the striking
workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and Philcom and/or
Philcom Corporation are hereby directed to unconditionally accept back to work all striking Union officers and members
under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any
acts that may aggravate the situation.

Philcom filed a MR. Philcom prayed for reconsideration of the Order impleading it as party-litigant in the present case
and directing it to accept back to work unconditionally all the officers and members of the union who participated in
the strike. Philcom also filed a Motion to Certify Labor Dispute to the NLRC for Compulsory Arbitration. PEU filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration. PEU asked the Secretary to "partially reconsider" the 2 October 1998 Order
insofar as it dismissed the unfair labor practices charges against Philcom and included the illegal strike issue in the
labor dispute.
The Secretary denied both motions for reconsideration of Philcom and PEU in its assailed Order of 27 November
1998. PEU filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Supreme Court referred the case back to
the CA.
On 31 July 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment viz:
o

Contrary to PEU's view, the Secretary could take cognizance of an issue, even only incidental to the labor dispute,
provided the issue must be involved in the labor dispute itself or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. The Secretary
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute upon Philcom's petition as a consequence of the strike that PEU had declared
and NOT because of the notices of strike that PEU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). CA
stated that the reason of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute was the staging of the
strike. Consequently, any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to the labor dispute between PEU
and Philcom, but also part of the labor dispute itself.
For an employee to claim an unfair labor practice by the employer, the employee must show that the act charged as unfair
labor practice falls under Article 248 of the Labor Code. The acts enumerated in Article 248 relate to the workers' right to
self-organization. Accordingly, if the act complained of has nothing to do with the acts enumerated in Article 248, there is
no unfair labor practice. Philcom's acts, which PEU complained of as unfair labor practices, were not in any way related to
the workers' right to self-organization under Article 248 of the Labor Code. PEU's complaint constitutes an enumeration
of mere grievances which should have been threshed out through the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration
outlined in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Even if by Philcom's acts, Philcom had violated the provisions of the CBA, still those acts do not constitute unfair labor
practices under Article 248 of the Labor Code. PEU failed to show that those violations were gross or that there was
flagrant or malicious refusal on the part of Philcom to comply with the economic provisions of the CBA. As of 21 March
1989, as held in PAL vs. NLRC, violations of CBAs will no longer be deemed unfair labor practices, except those gross in
character. Violations of CBAs, except those gross in character, are mere grievances resolvable through the appropriate
grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration as provided in the CBAs.

ISSUE:
(1) W/N the Secretary of Labor may validly assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving industries indispensable to the
national interest? YES
(2) W/N the strike and the strike activities that PEU had undertaken were legal? NO
RULING:
(1) The Secretary properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike. As the Court of Appeals correctly
pointed out, since the very reason of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction was PEU's declaration of the strike,
any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to, but is essentially involved in, the labor dispute itself. The
powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the
police power of the State, with the aim of promoting public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is

granted "great breadth of discretion" in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers
is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place.
In this case, the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because it falls in an industry indispensable to the national
interest. As noted by the Secretary: The Company has been a vital part of the telecommunications industry for 73 years. It is
particularly noted for its expertise and dominance in the area of international telecommunications. Thus, it performs a vital role
in providing critical services indispensable to the national interest. It is for this very reason that this Office strongly opines that
any concerted action, particularly a prolonged work stoppage is fraught with dire consequences. Surely, the on-going strike will
adversely affect not only the livelihood of workers and their dependents, but also the company's suppliers and dealers, both in the
public and private sectors who depend on the company's facilities in the day-to-day operations of their businesses and commercial
transactions. The operational viability of the company is likewise adversely affected, especially its expansion program for which it
has incurred debts in the approximate amount of P2 Billion. Any prolonged work stoppage will also bring about substantial losses
in terms of lost tax revenue for the government and would surely pose a serious set back in the company's modernization
program. At this critical time when government is working to sustain the economic gains already achieved, it is the paramount
concern of this Office to avert any unnecessary work stoppage and, if one has already occurred, to minimize its deleterious effect
on the workers, the company, the industry and national economy as a whole.
It is of no moment that PEU never acquiesced to the submission for resolution of the issue on the legality of the strike. PEU
cannot prevent resolution of the legality of the strike by merely refusing to submit the issue for resolution. It is also immaterial
that this issue, as PEU asserts, was not properly submitted for resolution of the Secretary.
The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies
arising from such labor dispute. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and
efficiently dispose of the dispute.
Besides, it was upon Philcom's petition that the Secretary immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute on 19
November 1997. If petitioner's notices of strike filed on 21 October and 4 November 1997 were what prompted the
assumption of jurisdiction, the Secretary would have issued the assumption order as early as those dates.
RE: ISSUE OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE allegedly committed by Philcom as stated in the Unions complaint, the Court
affirmed the CAs EXHAUSTIVE ruling for all the allegations of unfair labor practice which are just TOO LONG to
include in this digest. You may want to check on the full text for that. Ill only discuss the issue pertinent to the outline
BUT to make the story short, the Supreme Court held that the acts complained of by the Union do not constitute
unfair labor practice and were only done pursuant to a valid exercise of management prerogative by Philcom. The
Court has always respected a company's exercise of its prerogative to devise means to improve its operations.
Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including
hiring, work assignments, supervision and transfer of employees, working methods, time, place and manner of work.
This is so because the law on unfair labor practices is not intended to deprive employers of their fundamental right to
prescribe and enforce such rules as they honestly believe to be necessary to the proper, productive and profitable
operation of their business. And even assuming arguendo that Philcom had violated some provisions in the CBA, there
was no showing that the same was a flagrant or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions. The law
mandates that such violations should not be treated as unfair labor practices.
(2) The strike and the strike activities that PEU had undertaken were patently illegal for the following reasons:
2.1. Philcom is engaged in a vital industry protected by PD No. 823, as amended by PD No. 849, from strikes and lockouts. PD
823, as amended, provides: Sec. 1. It is the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining
within the framework of compulsory and voluntary arbitration. Therefore, all forms of strikes, picketings and lockouts are
hereby strictly prohibited in vital industries, such as in public utilities, including transportation and communications, x x x.
Enumerating the industries considered as vital, Letter of Instruction No. 368 provides:

For the guidance of workers and employers, some of whom have been led into filing notices of strikes and lockouts even in vital
industries, you are hereby instructed to consider the following as vital industries and companies or firms under PD 823 as
amended:
1. Public Utilities:
xxxx
B. Communications: 1) Wire or wireless telecommunications such as telephone, telegraph, telex, and cable companies or firms.

It is therefore clear that the striking employees violated the no-strike policy of the State in regard to vital industries.

2.2. The Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Despite the issuance of the return-to-work orders
dated 19 November and 28 November 1997, the striking employees failed to return to work and continued with their
strike.
Regardless of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking employees should have ceased or desisted from all acts
that would undermine the authority given the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. They could not defy the
return-to-work orders by citing Philcom's alleged unfair labor practices to justify such defiance.
PEU could not have validly anchored its defiance to the return-to-work orders on the motion for reconsideration that it had
filed on the assumption of jurisdiction order. A return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory despite the
filing of a motion for reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition
questioning its validity.
The records show that Philcom published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer a notice to striking employees to return to
work. These employees did not report back to work but continued their mass action. In fact, they lifted their picket lines only
on 22 December 1997. Philcom formally notified twice these employees to explain in writing why they should not be
dismissed for defying the return-to-work order. Philcom held administrative hearings on these disciplinary cases. Thereafter,
Philcom dismissed these employees for abandonment of work in defiance of the return-to-work order.
A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived.
While the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer.
A strike undertaken despite the Secretary's issuance of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited
activity, and thus, illegal, under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code. The union officers who knowingly participate in the
illegal strike are deemed to have lost their employment status. The union members, including union officers, who
commit specific illegal acts or who knowingly defy a return-to-work order are also deemed to have lost their
employment status. Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the
company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management to fill up
their positions.
Hence, the failure of PEU's officers and members to comply immediately with the return-to-work orders cannot be
condoned. Defiance of the return-to-work orders of the Secretary constitutes a valid ground for dismissal.
2.3. PEU staged the strike using unlawful means and methods.
Even if the strike in the present case was not illegal per se, the strike activities that PEU had undertaken, especially the
establishment of human barricades at all entrances to and egresses from the company premises and the use of coercive
methods to prevent company officials and other personnel from leaving the company premises, were definitely illegal. PEU is
deemed to have admitted that its officers and members had committed these illegal acts, as it never disputed Philcom's
assertions of PEU's unlawful strike activities in all the pleadings that PEU submitted to the Secretary and to this Court.
PEU's picketing officers and members prohibited other tenants at the Philcom building from entering and leaving the
premises. The right to strike, while constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions. Article 264(e) of the Labor
Code, on prohibited activities, provides: No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public
thoroughfares.
The Labor Code is emphatic against the use of violence, coercion, and intimidation during a strike and to this end
prohibits the obstruction of free passage to and from the employer's premises for lawful purposes. A picketing labor
union has no right to prevent employees of another company from getting in and out of its rented premises,
otherwise, it will be held liable for damages for its acts against an innocent by-stander. The sanction provided in
Article 264(a) is so severe that any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal
acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.
By insisting on staging the prohibited strike and defiantly picketing Philcom's premises to prevent the resumption of company
operations, the striking employees have forfeited their right to be readmitted.
2.4. PEU declared the strike during the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB.
It should be noted that in their meeting on 11 November 1997, both Philcom and PEU were even "advised to maintain the
status quo." Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of Section 6, Book V, Rule XXII of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, which explicitly obliges the parties to bargain collectively in good faith and prohibits
them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings.

Article 264(a) of the Labor Code also considers it a prohibited activity to declare a strike "during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the same strike." Lamentably, PEU defiantly proceeded with their strike during the pendency
of the conciliation proceedings.
2.5. PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance procedure established in the CBA.
By PEU's own admission, "the Union's complaints to the management began in June 1997 even before the start of the 1997
CBA renegotiations." Their CBA expired on 30 June 1997. PEU could have just taken up their grievances in their negotiations
for the new CBA. This is what a Philcom officer had suggested to the Dasmarias staff when the latter requested on 16 June
1997 for an increase in transportation allowance. In fact, when PEU declared the strike, Philcom and PEU had already agreed
on 37 items in their negotiations for the new CBA.
The bottom line is that PEU should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery provided for in the CBA. In
disregarding this procedure, the union leaders who knowingly participated in the strike have acted unreasonably. The law
cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their illegal acts. A strike declared on the basis of
grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance committee as stipulated in the CBA of the parties is premature and
illegal.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
53989, with the MODIFICATION that the Secretary of Labor is directed to determine who among the Philcom Employees
Union officers participated in the illegal strike, and who among the union members committed illegal acts or defied the returnto-work orders of 19 November 1997 and 28 November 1997. No pronouncement as to costs.

201 (SEE 188,Manila Hotel Employees Association and its members v. Manila Hotel Corp., G.R. No. 154591, March 5,
2007;)LEE
202Grand Boulevard Hotel v. Genuine Labor Organization, 406 SCRA 688 (2003); DE LEON
203Toyota Motor Phils Corp. Workers Assn. v. NLRC, 537 SCRA 171 (2007); DIAZ DE RIVERA
204 Sarmiento v. Tuico, 162 SCRA 676 (1988); EMPLEO
205 (SEE 196, Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Phils., 192 SCRA 396 (1990)) ZAPATA
206 (SEE 161, 173 Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa(IBM) v. NLRC,198 SCRA 586 (1991);) GUEVARRA
207 (SEE 186, Yolito Fadriquelan, et al. vs. Monterey Foods Corporation/Monterey Foods Corporation v. Bukluran ng
mga Manggagawa sa Monterey-ILAW, et al., G.R. No. 178409/G.R. No. 178434, June 8, 2011 )GUEVARRA
208 Insular Inc v CA supra at 131 (eto yung mahaba)
209 (SEE 168, Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. CCBP, G.R. No. 164302-03, 24 January 2007; ) MAYUGA

CASE NO. 210

G.R. No. L-29630

July 2, 1981

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES'


ASSOCIATION, ROMEO G. ROY, DALUYONG GABRIEL, BAYANI A. BAUTISTA, DOMINGO VILLANUEVA,
ALEJANDRO RICARDO, JESUS MANAHAN, MANUEL JACINTO, ERNESTO BATAC, LEONIDO CASPE PATRICIA
GRANADOS and PANTALEON BERNARDO, defendants-appellees.
TOPIC: Picketing: Picketing and Libel Laws
FACTS:
On April 3, 1967, defendant Philnabank Employees' Association (PEMA), a labor organization composed of the rank and
file employees of the Philippine National Bank, declared a strike.
During the said strike, which lasted up to the following day, members of the PEMA paraded and displayed placards in
front of the PNB building at Escolta, Manila, one of which contained the following words:
" PCIB BAD ACCOUNTS TRANSFERRED TO PNB-NIDC? "
PCIB stands for plaintiff Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank; PNB refers to Philippine National Bank; and NIDC
stands for National Investment Development Corporation, a subsidiary of the PNB.
Because of the placards, an action for libel was filed by PCIB against PEMA. PCIB considered the above to be defamatory
and libelous per se for it amounts to an "act tending to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a juridical person."
To prove its claim for the recovery of actual and exemplary damages, PCIB contended that the writing on the placard is a
baseless and malicious accusation that PCIB was a party to a fraud, in that it was able to recover on uncollected accounts
by fraudulent, questionable and immoral transfer thereof to the PNB or NIDC. Malice was likewise attributed to PEMA and
its officers.
The allegation was denied by PEMA on the ground that such is their fair, legal labor strategy denouncing the
incompetence, arbitrary and despotic act of the Management of Philippine National Bank to heed their legitimate
demands; and that they were only moved by good intention and justifiable motives and did not intend to injure any party
not connected with the strike (such as PCIB); and that their legal strategy is to bolster their imputation of incompetence
and arbitrariness of the Philippine National Bank Management.
In its decision, the Trial Court Judge stated that he could not discern any libelous imputation in the alleged offending
words, thus, he sustained the defense and dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Given the facts that the writing on the placards was made as part of labor strike activity and legal strategy,
whether PEMA can be held guilty of libel.
HELD: NO. The ruling of the Judge finds additional support in the sympathetic approach followed by courts to
inaccuracies and imprecision in language in the use of placards as part of peaceful picketing in labor controversies.
RATIO:
1. As found by the Court, PCIB is the largest 100% Filipino commercial bank in the Philippines; that at the time of
the filing of the complaint (May 6, 1967), it had 27 branches all over the country. On August of 1967, it had
increased its branches to 29, and even to 33 branches on September 1967.
PCIBs networth likewise increased from P46,000,000.00 in March, 1967 to P53,000,000.00 in August, 1967. And
although PCIB presented a witness who testified that there was a decrease in deposits of PCIB after the display
of the placards, there was no records presented to sustain the claim, which is even inconsistent with the
admission of the same witness that the Bank's networth increased since that time and has continued to increase
up to the time he testified.
PCIB has several big companies among its clients and that it has a reputation for honesty, reliability and
trustworthiness, and has enjoyed domestic and international prominence.

The found facts above indicate that PCIB did not suffer any alleged injury. Yes, PCIB was right to guard its
reputation it has earned after many years of laudable and creditable performance in the field of banking. But it is
precisely because of its well-deserved reputation that the libelous act they claimed that could be hurt its prestige,
if viewed with calmness and objectivity, would really appear as lacking in libelous imputation.
2. There was a labor controversy resulting in a strike. PEMA made use of its constitutional right to picket. This Court
has been committed to the view that peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech guarantee of the
Constitution.
There is no mention of the other placards but it is not unlikely that to bolster its claim, mention was likewise
made and in bold letters at that of such alleged failing of its management.
The offending imputation in the form of question (writing of the placard) was due to a former official of PCIB who
was thereafter named as President of the Philippine National Bank.
According to realistic observation of Justice Frankfurter in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, labor disputes give rise to strong emotional response. It is a fact of industrial life, both in the Philippines
as in the United States, that in the continuing confrontation between labor and management, it is far from likely
that the language employed would be both courteous and polite.
In pricing reliance on the constitutional right of freedom of expression, this Court once again makes manifest its
adherence to the principle first announced by Justice Malcolm as ponente in the leading case of United States v.
Bustos. In no uncertain terms, it made clear that the judiciary, in deciding suits for libel, must ascertain whether
or not the alleged offending words may be embraced by the guarantees of free speech and free press.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No costs.

211 (Nagkahiusang Manggagawa sa Cuizon Hotel v. Libron, 124 SCRA 448 (1983))GUEVARRA
212 LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS
UNION, Affiliated with the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS, HERMOGENES
ATRAZO, AQUILINO DISTOR, BENJAMIN GUTIERREZ, JOSE RAMOS, TIBURCIO MARDO,
ERNESTO ALMARIO and DOMINGO LEANO, defendants-appellants.
Topic: Picketing; Regulations and Restrictions, Innocent Third Party Rule and Liabilities
Facts:
The case commenced when Liwayway Publications, Inc. brought an action in the CFI-Manila against
Permanent Concrete Workers Union, et al. for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and for
damages it incurred when its employees were prevented from getting their daily supply of newsprint from
its bodega.
Plaintiff alleged that it is a second sublessee of a part of the premises of the Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. from Don Ramon Roces, a first lessee from the aforesaid company. The premises of the
plaintiff is separated from the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. by a concrete and barbed
wire fence with its own entrance and road leading to the national road. This entrance is separate and
distinct from the entrance road of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. 1
Plaintiff further alleged that it has a bodega for its newsprint in the sublet property which it uses for its
printing and publishing business. The daily supply of newsprint needed to feed its printing plant is taken
from this bodega.
On September 10, 1964, the employees of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. who are
representatives and members of the defendant union declared a strike against their company.
On October 3, 1964 for unknown reasons and without legal justification, Permanent Concrete Workers
Union and its members picketed, stopped and prohibited plaintiff's truck from entering the compound to
load newsprint from its bodega. The union members intimidated and threatened with bodily harm the
employees who were in the truck. Union members stopped and prohibited the general manager, personnel
manager, bodega-in-charge and other employees of the plaintiff from getting newsprint in their bodega. 2
Plaintiff made repeated demands to the defendants not to intimidate and threaten its employees with
bodily harm and not to blockade, picket or prohibit plaintiff's truck from getting newsprint in their bodega.
Defendants refused and continued to refuse to give in to the demands of the plaintiff.
As a consequence thereof, plaintiff rented another bodega during the time members of the defendant
union prevented its employees from entering its bodega in the compound of Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. and thus incurred expenses both in terms of bodega rentals and in transporting newsprint
from the pier to the temporary bodega.
On December 14, 1964, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the said actions
of the defendant.
Defendant union moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: 1.) issue is one of labor
dispute, this jurisdiction is with CIR; and 2. That plaintiff is not the real party in interest in whose name
the present action may be prosecuted. The real party in interest in this case is the Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. against whom the defendants' strike and picket activities were directed and confined, and
they point to cases between the real parties in interest pending before the Court of Industrial Relations.
Plaintiff Liwayway Publications, Inc. opposed the motion, alleging that: 1. There is no employer-employee
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; 2. There is no labor dispute between them; 3.
Plaintiff's compound is separate and distinct from the compound of the company where the defendant's
are employed.
Union counter-argued that absence of employer-employee relationship does not make the issue not a
labor dispute as held in several cases (Remember our earlier cases?). It also argued that the cause of

action of the company herein should be against Don Ramon Roces, the first lessee by reason of Art. 1654
which obliges the lessor to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for
the entire duration of the contract.
On October 22, 1964, the lower court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and motion to
dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that there was no labor dispute between the
plaintiff and defendant of which the Court of Industrial Relations may take cognizance. The injunction later
became permanent.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the union has a ground to strike and picket in the bodega subleased by the
company herein
Held: They have no ground.
In such a factual situation (paraphrased: union picketed at the bodega being leased by the company
herein; company not in anyway related to the union except that it is a sublessee of the bodega of the
unions employer; the picketing disrupted their operations; business of company herein not related to the
cause of strike of the union against their employer), the query to be resolved is whether the appellee is a
third party or an "innocent bystander" whose right has been invaded and, therefore, entitled to protection
by the regular courts.
At this juncture it is well to cite and stress the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the right to
picket. Thus, in the case of Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs. Judge Gaudencio Cloribel et
al., L-25878, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 465, 472, the Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
said:
The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phrase of the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed
even in the absence of employer-employee relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an
exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are not without power to confine or localize the
sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those
with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or
having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus, the right may be regulated at the
instance of third parties or "innocent. bystanders" if it appears that the inevitable result of its
exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or
interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights.
The same case state clearly and succinctly the rationalization for the court's regulation of the right to
picket in the following wise and manner:
Wellington and Galang are mere 'innocent bystanders'. They are entitled to seek protection of their
rights from the courts and the courts may, accordingly, legally extend the same. Moreover, PAFLU's
right to peacefully picket METBANK is not curtailed by the injunctions issued by respondent judge.
The picket is merely regulated to protect the rights of third parties. And the reason for this is not
far-fetched. If the law fails to afford said protection, men will endeavor to safeguard their rights by
their own might, take the law in their own hands, and commit acts which lead to breaches of the
law. 'This should not be allowed to happen.
We cannot agree that the above rules cited by the appellants are controlling in the instant case (they cited
2 cases) for as We said in Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et at. vs. Tan, 99 Phil. 854, that
"with regard to activities that may be enjoined, in order to ascertain what court has jurisdiction to issue
the injunction, it is necessary to determine the nature of the controversy, " (emphasis supplied) We find
and hold that there is no connection between the appellee Liwayway publications, Inc. and the striking
Union, nor with the company against whom the strikers staged the strike, and neither are the acts of the
driver of the appellee, its general manager, personnel manager, the man in-charge of the bodega and

other employees of the appellee in reaching the bodega to obtain newsprint therefrom to feed and supply
its publishing business interwoven with the labor dispute between the striking Union and the Permanent
Concrete Products company. If there is a connection between appellee publishing company and the
Permanent Concrete Products company; it is that both are situated in the same premises, which can
hardly be considered as interwoven with the labor dispute pending in the Court of Industrial Relations
between the strikers and their employer.
Not labor-related issue but worth mentioning: The contention of appellants that the court erred in
denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, is likewise
without merit.
Article 1654 of the New Civil Code cited by the appellants in support of their motion to dismiss, which
obliges the lessor, among others, to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
lease for the entire duration of the contract, and therefore, the appellee publishing company should have
brought its complaint against the first sub-lessee, Don Ramon Roces, and not against the appellant Union
is not in point. The acts complained of against the striking union members are properly called mere acts of
trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) such that following the doctrine laid down in Goldstein vs. Roces,
34 Phil. 562, the lessor shall not be obliged to answer for the mere fact of a trespass (perturbacion de
mero hecho) made by a third person in the use of the estate leased but the lessee shag have a direct
action against the trespasser.
213 (SUPRA of 126 but different topic not covered in previous digest, Caltex Filipino Managers and
Supervisors Association v. CIR, G.R. Nos. L-30632-33, April 11, 1972 TOPIC = Labor Injunction; Injunction
Prohibited) PALOMIQUE