DOUBLES NEG V.

NORTHWESTERN OS

1NC

1NC IRAN DA
No Iran Sanctions now, but continued PC investment key
Everett, 12/29/14 (Burgess, GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation,
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html, JMP)
Congressional Republicans

are setting up early challenges to President Barack Obama in January,

preparing to move forward quickly on new Iran sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a

bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline.

The Republican-controlled Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the
first few weeks of next year, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by
Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite
opposition from the White House.
Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone,
which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama.
Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And taking a confrontational stance toward

Iran as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations appears to be top of mind for the new
Senate Republican majority.
Its an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate, said McConnell
spokesman Don Stewart on Monday.

The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Irans energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was
never taken up by the Senate.
The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over
nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Irans nuclear activities in return for unwinding
some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer
out a permanent deal that would curtail Irans nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Irans economy and isolated
the country globally.
A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress
to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOPs plans next year.
You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be
reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal, Graham said at a weekend press
conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez

legislation in 2014, though President Barack Obamas administration convinced other onthe-fence members to hold off public support after warning that voting on that
legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to
clear the Senate in the new Congress, Democratic aides on Monday declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions
in the new year.
Indeed, the largest challenge for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline is building

veto-proof levels of support in Congress that would require dozens of Democrats in the House
and Senate to oppose the White House. White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new
penalties during negotiations would be counterproductive.

Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task,
given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and
lack of unanimous support in the GOP. But Kirk said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he
expects really bipartisan votes and predicted having a shot of even getting to a veto-proof
majority in the Senate.
Fully legalizing is political suicide
Nagourney, 14 (4/5/2014, Adam, Despite Support in Party, Democratic Governors Resist
Legalizing Marijuana, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/us/politics/despite-support-inparty-democratic-governors-resist-legalizing-marijuana.html?_r=0, JMP)
Even with Democrats and younger voters leading the wave of the pro-legalization shift, these
governors are standing back, supporting much more limited medical-marijuana proposals or
invoking the kind of law-and-order and public-health arguments more commonly heard from

Republicans. While 17 more states most of them leaning Democratic have seen bills introduced this
year to follow Colorado and Washington in approving recreational marijuana, no sitting
governor or member of the Senate has offered a full-out endorsement of legalization. Only

Gov. Peter Shumlin, a Democrat in Vermont, which is struggling with a heroin problem, said he was open to the idea.
Quite frankly, I dont think we are ready, or want to go down that road, Dannel P. Malloy, the Democratic governor of Connecticut,
which has legalized medical marijuana and decriminalized possession of small amounts of marijuana, said in an interview. Perhaps
the best way to handle this is to watch those experiments that are underway. I dont think its necessary, and I dont think its
appropriate.
The hesitance expressed by these governors reflects not only governing concerns but also, several analysts said, a

historically rooted political wariness of being portrayed as soft on crime by Republicans. In

particular, Mr. Brown, who is 75, lived through the culture wars of the 1960s, when Democrats suffered from being seen as
permissive on issues like this.
Either they dont care about it as passionately or they feel embarrassed or vulnerable. They fear the judgment, said
Ethan Nadelmann,

the founder of the Drug Policy Alliance, an organization that favors decriminalization of
fear of being soft on drugs, soft on marijuana, soft on crime is woven into the DNA
of American politicians, especially Democrats.
He described that sentiment as, Do not let yourself be outflanked by Republicans when it
comes to being tough on crime and tough on drugs. You will lose.
marijuana. The

PC key - solves war

Beauchamp, 11/6/14 --B.A.s in Philosophy and Political Science from Brown University and
an M.Sc in International Relations from the London School of Economics, former editor of TP
Ideas and a reporter for ThinkProgress.org. He previously contributed to Andrew Sullivans The
Dish at Newsweek/Daily Beast, and has also written for Foreign Policy and Tablet magazines,
now writes for Vox (Zack, How the new GOP majority could destroy Obama's nuclear deal with
Iran, http://www.vox.com/2014/11/6/7164283/iran-nuclear-deal-congress, JMP)
There is one foreign policy issue on which the GOP's takeover of the Senate could have huge ramifications, and beyond just the US:
Republicans are likely to try to torpedo President Obama's ongoing efforts to reach a nuclear deal

with Iran. And they just might pull it off.

November 24 is the latest deadline for a final agreement between the United States and Iran over the latter's nuclear program.
That'll likely be extended, but it's a reminder that the negotiations could soon come to a head. Throughout his presidency,

Obama has prioritized these negotiations; he likely doesn't want to leave office without having made a deal.
But if Congress doesn't like the deal, or just wants to see Obama lose, it has the power to torpedo
it by imposing new sanctions on Iran. Previously, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid used procedural powers to stop
this from happening and save the nuclear talks. But Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell may not be so kind, and he may
have the votes to destroy an Iran deal. If he tries, we could see one of the most important
legislative fights of Obama's presidency.

Why Congress can bully Obama on Iran sanctions

At their most basic level, the international negotiations over Iran's nuclear program (they include several other nations, but the US is
the biggest player) are a tit-for-tat deal. If Iran agrees to place a series of verifiable limits on its nuclear development, then the
United States and the world will relax their painful economic and diplomatic sanctions on Tehran.
"The regime of economic sanctions against Iran is arguably the most complex the United States and the international community
have ever imposed on a rogue state," the Congressional Research Service's Dianne Rennack writes. To underscore the point,
Rennack's four-page report is accompanied by a list of every US sanction on Iran that goes on for 23 full pages.
The US's sanctions are a joint Congressional-executive production. Congress puts strict limits on Iran's ability to export oil and do
business with American companies, but it gives the president the power to waive sanctions if he thinks it's in the American national
interest. "In the collection of laws that are the statutory basis for the U.S. economic sanctions regime on Iran," Rennack writes, "the
President retains, in varying degrees, the authority to tighten and relax restrictions."

The key point here is that Congress gave Obama that power which means they can take it
back. "You could see a bill in place that makes it harder for the administration to suspend
sanctions," Ken Sofer, the Associate Director for National Security and International Policy at
the Center for American Progress (where I worked for a little under two years, though not with Sofer directly), says.
"You could also see a bill that says the president can't agree to a deal unless it includes the following things or [a bill] forcing a
congressional vote on any deal."

Imposing new sanctions on Iran wouldn't just stifle Obama's ability to remove existing
sanctions, it would undermine Obama's authority to negotiate with Iran at all, sending the

message to Tehran that Obama is not worth dealing with because he can't control his own
foreign policy.
So if Obama wants to make a deal with Iran, he needs Congress to play ball. But it's not

clear that Mitch McConnell's Senate wants to.

Congress could easily use its authority to kill an Iran deal
To understand why the new Senate is such a big deal for congressional action on sanctions, we have to jump back a year.
In November 2013, the Obama administration struck an interim deal with Iran called the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). As part of the
JPOA, the US agreed to limited, temporary sanctions relief in exchange for Iran limiting nuclear program components like uranium
production.
Congressional Republicans, by and large, hate the JPOA deal. Arguing that the deal didn't place sufficiently serious limits on Iran's
nuclear growth, the House passed new sanctions on Iran in December. (There is also a line of argument, though often less explicit,
that the Iranian government cannot be trusted with any deal at all, and that US policy should focus on coercing Iran into submission
or unseating the Iranian government entirely.) Senate Republicans, joined by more hawkish Democrats, had the votes to pass a
similar bill. But in February, Senate Majority leader Harry Reid killed new Iran sanctions, using the Majority Leader's power to
block consideration of the sanctions legislation to prevent a vote.
McConnell blasted Reid's move. "There is no excuse for muzzling the Congress on an issue of this importance to our own national
security," he said. So now that McConnell holds the majority leader's gavel, it will remove that procedural roadblock that stood
between Obama and new Iran sanctions.
To be clear, it's far from guaranteed that Obama will be able to reach a deal with Iran at all; negotiations could fall apart long before
they reach the point of congressional involvement. But if he does reach a deal, and Congress doesn't like the terms, then they'll be
able to kill it by passing new sanctions legislation, or preventing Obama from temporarily waiving the ones on the books.
And make no mistake imposing new sanctions or limiting Obama's authority to waive the

current ones would kill any deal. If Iran can't expect Obama to follow through on his promises to
relax sanctions, it has zero incentive to limit its nuclear program. "If Congress adopts sanctions," Iranian
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif told Time last December, "the entire deal is dead."
Moreover, it could fracture the international movement

to sanction Iran. The United

States is far from Iran's biggest trading partner, so it depends on international cooperation in
order to ensure the sanctions bite. If it looks like the US won't abide by the terms of a deal, the
broad-based international sanctions regime could collapse. Europe, particularly, might decide

that going along with the sanctions is no longer worthwhile.

"Our ability to coerce Iran is largely based on whether or not the international community thinks that we are the ones that are being
constructive and [Iranians] are the ones that being obstructive," Sofer says. "If they don't believe that, then the international
sanctions regime falls apart."
This could be one of the biggest fights of Obama's last term

It's true that Obama could veto any Congressional efforts to blow up an Iran deal with sanctions.
But a two-thirds vote could override any veto and, according to Sofer, an override is entirely within
the realm of possibility.
"There are plenty of Democrats that will probably side with Republicans if they try to push a harder line on Iran," Sofer says. For a
variety of reasons, including deep skepticism of Iran's intentions and strong Democratic support for Israel, whose government
opposes the negotiations, Congressional Democrats are not as open to making a deal with Iran as
Obama is. Many will likely defect to the GOP side out of principle.
The real fight, Sofer says, will be among the Democrats those who are willing to take the
administration's side in theory, but don't necessarily think a deal with Iran is legislative priority
number one, and maybe don't want to open themselves up to the political risk. These Democrats
"can make it harder: you can filibuster, if you're Obama you can veto you can make it impossible for a
full bill to be passed out of Congress on Iran," Sofer says. But it'd be a really tough battle, one that would
consume a lot of energy and lobbying effort that Democrats might prefer to spend
pushing on other issues.
"I'm not really sure they're going to be willing to take on a fight about an Iran sanctions bill," Sofer concludes. "I'm not really sure
that the Democrats who support [a deal] are really fully behind it enough that they'll be willing to give up leverage on, you know,
unemployment insurance or immigration status these bigger issues for most Democrats."
So if the new Republican Senate prioritizes destroying an Iran deal, Obama will have to fight

very hard to keep it without necessarily being able to count on his own party for support.
And the stakes are enormous: if Iran's nuclear program isn't stopped peacefully, then
the most likely outcomes are either Iran going nuclear, or war with Iran.
The administration believes a deal with Iran is their only way to avoid this horrible choice.
That's why it's been one of the administration's top priorities since day one. It's also why this could
become one of the biggest legislative fights of Obama's last two years.

The impact is nuke wars

Philip Stevens 13, associate editor and chief political commentator for the Financial Times,
Nov 14 2013, The four big truths that are shaping the Iran talks,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af170df6-4d1c-11e3-bf32-00144feabdc0.html
The who-said-what game about last weekends talks in Geneva has become a distraction. The six-power negotiations with Tehran to curb
Irans nuclear programme may yet succeed or fail. But wrangling between the US and France on the terms of an acceptable deal should
not allow the trees to obscure the forest. The organising facts shaping the negotiations have not changed. The first of these is that Tehrans acquisition of a
bomb would be more than dangerous for the Middle East and for wider international security. It would most likely set off
a nuclear arms race that would see Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt signing up to the
nuclear club. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty would be shattered. A future regional conflict
could draw Israel into launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike. This is not a region obviously
susceptible to cold war disciplines of deterrence. The second ineluctable reality is that Iran
has mastered the nuclear cycle. How far it is from building a bomb remains a subject of debate. Different intelligence agencies give different answers.
These depend in part on what the spooks actually know and in part on what their political masters want others to hear. The progress of an Iranian warhead programme is one of
the known unknowns that have often wreaked havoc in this part of the world. Israel points to an imminent threat. European agencies are more relaxed, suggesting Tehran is
still two years or so away from a weapon. Western diplomats broadly agree that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not taken a definitive decision to step over the line. What Iran has
been seeking is what diplomats call a breakout capability the capacity to dash to a bomb before the international community could effectively mobilise against it. The third
fact and this one is hard for many to swallow is that neither a negotiated settlement nor the air strikes long favoured by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israels prime minister, can
offer the rest of the world a watertight insurance policy. It should be possible to construct a deal that acts as a plausible restraint and extends the timeframe for any breakout

bombing Irans
nuclear sites could certainly delay the programme, perhaps for a couple of years. But, assuming that even the hawkish Mr Netanyahu is not
proposing permanent war against Iran, air strikes would not end it. You cannot bomb knowledge and
technical expertise. To try would be to empower those in Tehran who say the regime will be safe
only when, like North Korea, it has a weapon. So when Barack Obama says the US will never allow Iran to get the bomb he is indulging in, albeit
understandable, wishful thinking. The best the international community can hope for is that, in return for
a relaxation of sanctions, Iran will make a judgment that it is better off sticking with a threshold
capability. To put this another way, if Tehran does step back from the nuclear brink it will be because of its
own calculation of the balance of advantage. The fourth element in this dynamic is that Iran now has a
leadership that, faced with the severe and growing pain inflicted by sanctions, is prepared to talk. There is
but no amount of restrictions or intrusive monitoring can offer a certain guarantee against Tehrans future intentions. By the same token,

nothing to say that Hassan Rouhani, the president, is any less hard-headed than previous Iranian leaders, but he does seem ready to weigh the options.

1NC RICO DA
Raich precedent key to enable widespread use of RICO prosecutions
Miller 11
[Kristina A. Miller, J.D. 2009, Widener University School of Law, AFTER GONZALES V.
RAICH: CAN RICO BE USED TO PROSECUTE INTRASTATE NONECONOMIC STREET
GANG VIOLENCE? 2/6/11, Widener Law Review, widenerlawreview.org/files/2011/02/06MILLER_final.pdf]

Courts are currently divided on how to apply RICOs statutory affecting commerce requirement in the context of as-applied challenges by defendants
involved in street gangs engaged in noneconomic, criminal activity. After Lopez was decided, many lower courts were wary or unsure of how to apply
the precedent. After the Court reaffirmed its decision in Morrison, several lower courts began to take the change in Commerce Clause jurisprudence
seriously. After

Morrison, but prior to Raich, the Sixth Circuit used the rationale of Lopez and
Morrison to sustain an as-applied challenge of RICO by litigants engaged in noneconomic
intrastate criminal activity. Relying on Raich, and expressly rejecting the Sixth Circuits
approach, the First Circuit held that RICO, as applied to an enterprise engaged exclusively in
noneconomic criminal activity, did not violate the Commerce Clause because Congresss power
to criminalize conduct pursuant to the Commerce Clause turns on the economic nature of
the class of conduct defined in the statute, rather than the economic facts of a single case.
RICO critical to deter and crack down on patent trolling
Silver 9
[Blair, J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2008; B.S., Tufts University, 2005,
CONTROLLING PATENT TROLLING WITH CIVIL RICO, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 70 (2009)]
Aggressive patent enforcement suits by patent holding companies have become commonplace in
the modern patent system. Such holding companies acquire their questionable patents by abusing the patent office. These
patent trolls engage in excessive litigation, assaulting industry after industry and extorting
huge sums of money. The current systems counterbalances to fraudulent conduct and trolling
are not adequate disincentives to curb this behavior. Patent trolling has become such a huge issue that Congress and the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have proposed a series of substantial amendments to the patent system to alleviate trolling. However, using
current law in new, creative ways may inhibit some troll behavior: when the behavior becomes
extreme enough, systemic enough, and prolonged enough, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
also known as RICO, may help stymie costly trolling. The RICO Act was originally designed to prevent organized crime.
However, the Acts broad reach due to its close relationship with fraud, mail fraud in particular,
have led to a broad application of its provisions. Successful civil RICO plaintiffs receive huge
awards: treble damages, reasonable attorneys fees, and investigation costs. The threat of
such large damages will deter ambitious trolls from attempting fraud or extreme
influence on the Patent Office and from engaging in overly litigious behavior. So far,
however, the courts have met civil RICO challenges with little enthusiasm. Usually, civil RICO patent cases are dismissed for formalistic reasons. The
Federal Circuit has also limited the conduct that qualifies for civil RICO to post-grant activity. However, a few key cases have refused to dismiss civil
RICO challenges in the patent context; in particular, the Lemelson case lays a foundation for how RICO can be used to curb extreme trolling behavior.
Therefore, because of modern systemic abuses of the patent system and the flexibility of RICO, civil

RICO should be applied more

often in patent litigation cases to curb extensive fraud on the PTO and abuse of the courts. This
paper explains how Civil RICO can reign in extreme trolling behavior. Part I will discuss why there is a
need to extend RICO into patent law by laying out the modern problem of patent trolling and
discussing the public benefits of applying RICO. Part II will explore the history of RICO, why RICO is attractive to claimants,
and the elements of a civil RICO claim. Part III will discuss how RICO and patent law overlap and what limitations have been imposed by the courts in
applying RICO. Part IV will discuss specifically where RICO can and should be applied in modern patent law and how civil RICO may
disproportionately affect brand name pharmaceutical companies. Finally, Part V will conclude by summarizing the paper and by offering some
normative thoughts on civil RICO and patent law.

Patent trolls devastate US innovation capacity -- aggregation of best studies

Bessen 14

[James, Harvard Business Review, The Evidence Is In: Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation, July,
https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-evidence-is-in-patent-trolls-do-hurt-innovation/]
But there is evidence of significant harm. The White House and the Congressional Research Service both cited
many research studies suggesting that patent litigation harms innovation. And three new
empirical studies provide strong confirmation that patent litigation is reducing venture capital
investment in startups and is reducing R&D spending, especially in small firms.Haber and Levine admit
that patent litigation is surging. There were six times as many patent lawsuits last year than in the
1980s. The number of firms sued by patent trolls grew nine-fold over the last decade; now a
majority of patent lawsuits are filed by trolls. Haber and Levine argue that this is not a problem: it might instead reflect a
healthy, dynamic economy. They cite papers finding that patent trolls tend to file suits in innovative industries and that during the nineteenth century,
new technologies such as the telegraph were sometimes followed by lawsuits. But this does not mean that the explosion in patent litigation is somehow
normal. Its true that plaintiffs, including patent trolls, tend to file lawsuits in dynamic, innovative industries. But thats just because they follow the
money. Patent trolls tend to sue cash rich companies, and innovative new technologies generate cash. The

economic burden of
todays patent lawsuits is, in fact, historically unprecedented. Research shows that patent trolls
cost defendant firms $29 billion per year in direct out-of-pocket costs; in aggregate, patent
litigation destroys over $60 billion in firm wealth each year. While mean damages in a patent lawsuit ran around $50,000
(in todays dollars) at the time the telegraph, mean damages today run about $21 million. Even taking into account
the much larger size of the economy today, the economic impact of patent litigation today is an
order of magnitude larger than it was in the age of the telegraph. Moreover, these costs fall
disproportionately on innovative firms: the more R&D a firm performs, the more likely it is to be
sued for patent infringement, all else equal. And, although this fact alone does not prove that this litigation reduces firms innovation,
other evidence suggests that this is exactly what happens. A researcher at MIT found, for example, that medical imaging
businesses sued by a patent troll reduced revenues and innovations relative to comparable
companies that were not sued. But the biggest impact is on small startup firms contrary to Haber and
Levine, most patent trolls target firms selling less than $100 million a year. One survey of software
startups found that 41% reported significant operational impacts from patent troll lawsuits,
causing them to exit business lines or change strategy. Another survey of venture capitalists found
that 74% had companies that experienced significant impacts from patent demands. Three
recent econometric studies confirm these negative effects. Catherine Tucker of MIT analyzed venture capital investing
relative to patent lawsuits in different industries and different regions of the country. Controlling for the influence of other factors, she estimates that
lawsuits from frequent litigators (largely patent

trolls) were responsible for a decline of $22 billion in venture

investing over a five-year period. That represents a 14% decline.Roger Smeets of Rutgers looked at
R&D spending by small firms, comparing firms that were hit by extensive lawsuits to a carefully
chosen comparable sample. The comparison sample allowed him to isolate the effect of patent lawsuits from other factors that might
also influence R&D spending. Prior to the lawsuit, firms devoted 20% of their operating expenditures to
R&D; during the years after the lawsuit, after controlling for other factors, they reduced that
spending by 3% to 5% of operating expenditures, representing about a 19% reduction in relative
R&D spending. And researchers from Harvard and the University of Texas recently examined R&D
spending of publicly listed firms that had been sued by patent trolls. They compared firms where the suit was
dismissed, representing a clear win for the defendant, to those where the suit was settled or went to final adjudication (typically much more costly). As

when lawsuits were

not dismissed, firms reduced their R&D spending by $211 million and reduced their patenting
significantly in subsequent years. The reduction in R&D spending represents a 48% decline.
in the previous paper, this comparison helped them isolate the effect of lawsuits from other factors. They found that

Importantly, these studies are initial releases of works in progress; the researchers will refine their estimates of harm over the coming months. Perhaps
some of the estimates may shrink a bit. Nevertheless, across

a significant number of studies using different

methodologies and performed by different researchers, a consistent picture is emerging about
the effects of patent litigation: it costs innovators money; many innovators and venture
capitalists report that it significantly impacts their businesses; innovators respond by
investing less in R&D and venture capitalists respond by investing less in startups.

Haber and Levine might not like the results of this research. But the weight of the evidence from these many studies cannot be ignored; patent trolls do,
indeed, cause harm. Its time for Congress to do something about it.

Extinction
Barker, 2k electrical engineer, and manager of corporate communications for the Electric Power Research Institute and

former industrial economist and staff author at SRI International and as a commercial research analyst at USX Corporation (Brent,
Technology and the Quest for Sustainability. EPRI Journal, Summer, infotrac)

accelerating productivity is
an imperative
to provide the
wealth for environmental sustainability
and to provide an economic
ladder for developing nations
opportunity for technology lies in its potential to help
stabilize global population
The key is economics. Global
communications
have brought an image of the comfortable life of the developed
world into the homes of the poorest people, firing their own aspirations for a better quality of
life, through economic development
If we
can make the
prosperity
--more accessible and affordable
the cultural drivers for
producing large families will be tempered,
quickly
From a social standpoint,

not an option but rather

for the future. It is necessary in order

, to support an aging population in the industrialized world,

. The second area of

at 10-12 billion sometime in the twenty-first century, possibly as early as 2075.

, from television to movies to the Internet,

either

in their own country or through emigration to other countries.

--infrastructure, health care, education, and law

in the developed world

basic tools of

, recent history suggests that

relatively

and without coercion. But the task is enormous. The physical prerequisites for prosperity in the global economy are

electricity and communications. Today, there are more than 2 billion people living without electricity, or commercial energy in any form, in the very countries where some 5 billion people will be added in the next 50 years. If for no other reason than our enlightened
self-interest, we should strive for universal access to electricity, communications, and educational opportunity. We have little choice, because the fate of the developed world is inextricably bound up in the economic and demographic fate of the developing world. A

opportunity for technology is in decoupling population growth from land use and
decoupling economic growth from natural resource consumption through recycling, end-use
efficiency, and industrial ecology.
third, related

, more broadly,

Decoupling population from land use is well under way. According to Grubler, from 1700 to 1850 nearly 2 hectares of land (5 acres) were needed to support every child born

in North America, while in the more crowded and cultivated regions of Europe and Asia only 0.5 hectare (1.2 acres) and 0.2 hectare (0.5 acre) were needed, respectively. During the past century, the amount of land needed per additional child has been dropping in all

Europe and North America

crossed the "zero threshold"
meaning that no additional land is needed to support additional children and that land
requirements will continue to decrease
the pattern of returning land to nature will
continue to spread throughout the world, eventually stemming and then reversing the current
onslaught on the rain forests. Time is critical if vast tracts are to be saved
and success
will depend on how rapidly economic opportunities expand for those now trapped in
subsistence and frontier farming
areas of the world, with

experiencing the fastest decreases. Both

in the past few decades,

in the future. One can postulate that

great

from being laid bare,

largely

. In concept, the potential for returning land to nature is enormous. Futurist and scholar Jesse Ausubel of the Rockefeller University calculates that if farmers could lift average

grain yields around the world just to the level of today's average U.S. corn grower, one-half of current global cropland--an area the size of the Amazon basin--could be spared. If agriculture is a leading indicator, then the continuous drive to produce more from less

with shrinking agricultural land requirements, water distribution and use

around the world can be greatly altered
will prevail in other parts of the economy Certainly

, since nearly two-thirds of water now goes for irrigation. Overall, the technologies of the future will, in the words of Ausubel, be "cleaner, leaner, lighter, and

drier"--that is, more efficient and less wasteful of materials and water. They will be much more tightly integrated through microprocessor-based control and will therefore use human and natural resources much more efficiently and productively. Energy intensity,
land intensity, and water intensity (and, to a lesser extent, materials intensity) for both manufacturing and agriculture are already heading downward. Only in agriculture are they falling fast enough to offset the surge in population, but, optimistically, advances in
science and technology should accelerate the downward trends in other sectors, helping to decouple economic development from environmental impact in the coming century. One positive sign is the fact that recycling rates in North America are now approaching
65% for steel, lead, and copper and 30% for aluminum and paper. A second sign is that economic output is shifting away from resource-intensive products toward knowledge-based, immaterial goods and services. As a result, although the U.S. gross domestic product
(GDP) increased 200-fold (in real dollars) in the twentieth century, the physical weight of our annual output remains the same as it was in 1900. If anything, this trend will be accelerating. As Kevin Kelly, the editor of Wired magazine, noted, "The creations most in
demand from the United States [as exports] have lost 50% of their physical weight per dollar of value in only six years.... Within a generation, two at most, the number of people working in honest-to-goodness manufacturing jobs will be no more than the number of
farmers on the land--less than a few percent. Far more than we realize, the network economy is pulling us all in."

from population and economic growth

Even pollution shows clear signs of being decoupled

. Economist Paul Portney notes that, with the exception of greenhouse gases, "in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]

countries, the favorable experience [with pollution control] has been a triumph of technology That is, the ratio of pollution per unit of GDP has fallen fast enough in the developed world to offset the increase in both GDP per capita and the growing number of 'capitas'
themselves." The fourth opportunity for science and technology stems from their enormous potential to unlock resources not now available, to reduce human limitations, to create new options for policymakers and businesspeople alike, and to give us new levels of
insight into future challenges. Technically resources have little value if we cannot unlock them for practical use. With technology, we are able to bring dormant resources to life. For example, it was only with the development of an electrolytic process late in the
nineteenth century that aluminum--the most abundant metal on earth--became commercially available and useful. Chemistry unlocked hydrocarbons. And engineering allowed us to extract and put to diverse use untapped petroleum and gas fields. Over the course
of history, technology has made the inaccessible accessible, and resource depletion has been more of a catalyst for change th an a longstanding problem. Technology provides us with last-ditch methods (what economists would call substitutions) that allow us to
circumvent or leapfrog over crises of our own making. Agricultural technology solved the food crisis of the first half of the nineteenth century. The English "steam crisis" of the 1860s, triggered by the rapid rise of coal-burning steam engines and locomotives, was
averted by mechanized mining and the discovery and use of petroleum. The U.S. "timber crisis" that Teddy Roosevelt publicly worried about was circumvented by the use of chemicals that enabled a billion or so railroad ties to last for decades instead of years. The
great "manure crisis" of the same era was solved by the automobile, which in a few decades replaced some 25 million horses and freed up 40 million hectares (100 million acres) of farmland, not to mention improving the sanitation and smell of inner cities. Oil
discoveries in Texas and then in the Middle East pushed the pending oil crisis of the 1920s into the future. And the energy crisis of the 1970s stimulated the development of new sensing and drilling technology, sparked the advance of non--fossil fuel alternatives, and
deepened the penetration of electricity with its fuel flexibility into the global economy Thanks to underground imaging technology, today's known gas resources are an order of magnitude greater than the resources known 20 years ago, and new reserves continue to
be discovered. Technology has also greatly extended human limits. It has given each of us a productive capability greater than that of 150 workers in 1800, for example, and has conveniently put the power of hundreds of horses in our garages. In recent decades, it has

But global sustainability is not

inevitable
there is the potential for all of this to backfire before
the job can be done.
people sometimes turn in fear
on technologies,
that openly foster an ever-faster pace of change
extended our voice and our reach, allowing us to easily send our words, ideas, images, and money around the world at the speed of light.
. In spite of the tremendous promise that technology holds for a sustainable future,
There are disturbing indications that

and anger

industries, and institutions

. The current opposition to nuclear power genetically altered food, the globalization of the economy and the spread of American culture

should give us pause. Technology has always presented a two-edged sword, serving as both cause and effect, solving one problem while creating another that was unintended and often unfor eseen. We solved the manure crisis, but automotive smog, congestion, and
urban sprawl took its place. We cleaned and transformed the cities with all-electric buildings rising thousands of feet into the sky. But while urban pollution was thereby dramatically reduced, a portion of the pollution was shifted to someone else's sky. Breaking
limits "Limits to growth" was a popular theme in the 1970s, and a best-selling book of that name predicted dire consequences for the human race by the end of the century. In fact, we have done much better than those predictions, largely because of a factor the book
missed--the potential of new technology to break limits. Repeatedly, human societies have approached seemingly insurmountable barriers only to find the means and tools to break through. This ability has now become a source of optimism, an article of faith, in

Today's perceived limits

are global in nature
and larger in scale and
complexity than ever before. Nearly 2 billion people in the world are without adequate
sanitation, and nearly as many are without access to clean drinking water. AIDS is spreading
rapidly
Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are
climbing steadily. Petroleum reserves
may last only another 50
years
the biodiversity of the planet could become threatened in this
coming century as it was at the end of the last ice age, when more than 70% of the species
disappeared
All these perceived limits require innovation of
a scope and intensity surpassing humankind's current commitment. The list of realworld problems that could thwart global sustainability
includes war, disease, famine,
political and religious turmoil, despotism, entrenched poverty, illiteracy, resource depletion,
many parts of the world.

, however, look and feel different. They

, multicultural,

in the regions of the world least able to fight it.

and are

more than 30% greater than preindustrial levels

, expected to be tapped by over a billion automobiles worldwide by 2015,

. And without careful preservation efforts,

-100

as

of large mammals

and other vertebrates in North America

(along with 29% in Europe and 86% in Australia).

is long and sobering. It

and environmental degradation

. Technology can help resolve some of these issues--poverty and disease, resource depletion, and environmental impact, for example--but it offers little recourse for

the passions and politics that divide the world. The likelihood is that we will not catch up and overtake the moving target of global sustainability in the coming century, but given the prospects for technology, which have never been brighter, we may come surprisingly

We should put our technology to work, striving to lift more than 5 billion people out of
poverty while preventing irreversible damage to the biosphere and irreversible loss of the
earth's natural resources.
close.

1NC CP
The United States should
--limit the United States Congress constitutional commerce clause authority to
prohibit marihuana; affirm the constitutionality of the marijuana prohibition
based upon the Treaty Power; propose an amendment to the international drug
conventions to allow legalization of marijuana; in the event of rejection, the United
States should maintain federal marijuana prohibition but not require state
government enforcement of federal priorities
--initiate criminal prosecution against United States government officials
responsible for torture
Wait and see approach to legalization while the US pursues treaty amendments is
best for i-law
Counts, 14 - J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2014 (Nathan, INITIATIVE 502 AND
CONFLICTING STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 49 Gonz. L. Rev. 187,
http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/law-review/files/2014/04/1-Counts-Pgs-187-212.pdf)
In dealing with the conflicting state and federal law, enforcement

decisions will affect the United States role as an

actor in international law and the direction of international cooperation in combatting illegal
drug trade. First, if the United States breaches its treaty obligations under the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, it would undermine the
international rule of law. A strong international rule of law is desirable to establish and
maintain order and enhance reliable expectations in international affairs.142 As there are no
enforcement mechanisms for international legal obligations equivalent to that which exists with domestic law, the weight of
obligations relies to some extent on comity among the states involved.143 As long as states agree to limit their
sovereignty and comply with international law, states will be more likely to respect one anothers reasonable expectations and fulfill
their obligations.144
Both conventions have provisions that read, If there should arise between two or more Parties a dispute relating to the
interpretation or application of this Convention, the Parties shall consult together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by . . .
peaceful means of their own choice, and should this fail, they agree to jurisdiction before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).145 Despite this possibility of justiciability of breach, it is highly unlikely that any state party would bring a case before the ICJ
over domestic non-enforcement of the treaty obligations, as diplomatic channels are more predictable and possible noncompliance
with ICJ judgments weakens the international rule of law.146
If the United States fails to enforce the CSA and allows the Washington legalization system to

succeed, it may signal to other states that the United States is willing to allow its domestic law
overcome its international law obligations and may not be reliable in international
transnational enforcement efforts in the future. It also signals to other states that they may allow
their domestic law to inhibit effective enforcement of international treaty obligations,
which may undermine the United States goals in the future.
Aside from rule of law concerns, breach of treaty obligations may undermine the international cooperation required to combat
international drug trafficking. The United States has historically been a strong proponent of drug prohibition and prioritization of
enforcement efforts against trafficking, so legalization and non-enforcement of a Schedule I drug within our borders would send a
conflicting message.147 The former Administrator of the DEA, John C. Lawn, commented, A violation of these treaties by the
United States would destroy our credibility with drug source and drug transit countries that are now working with the United States
in the global war on drugs.148 Some parties have already softened their domestic enforcement policies and similar action by the
United States would make this course more acceptable.149 If other governments follow suit and legalize drugs in some capacity, this
may decrease the focus on enforcement against drugs generally, which may negatively impact coordinated efforts against illicit drug
trafficking. Thus, if the United States allows legalization of marijuana in its borders, it should be ready

to support the change in policy that this represents and address it at the international level. The United
States would need to restate the importance of cooperation against international drug trafficking, even though some amount of
domestic social experimentation may be permissible.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Domestically

The possible federal response depends on whether the government wishes to continue to pursue the policy underlying the CSA or
defers to the states in managing local marijuana regulation. If the policy goals of the CSA are to be continued, the government should
take steps to disrupt the Washington legalization scheme and deter use, which may take three forms.
First, the government could encourage re-criminalization by conditioning state funding on penal statutes for marijuana use, similar
to that used for enforcing a drinking age of twenty-one throughout the United States.150 Congress has immense fiscal resources
relative to the states, and the Court has imposed few meaningful restrictions on how Congress may employ those resources to extract
conditions from the states.151 This option could make up for the difficulties in enforcing the CSA by causing state actors to resume
enforcement. State law enforcement of marijuana crimes may continue but at a much lower level, because it is likely that
Washington would still have a policy of deprioritizing marijuana-related crimes. This strategy also undermines federalism and state
experimentalism to some extent and should be used sparingly.152
Second, the government could enforce the CSA against distributors of recreational marijuana in Washington. If even one marijuana
retailer were charged under the CSA, it is likely that the entire marijuana legalization of system of Washington would cease to
function. As the businesses are licensed by Liquor Control Board, they will be easily investigated by federal agents and subject to
possible felony prosecution, so marijuana distribution will likely return to black markets. This may make the situation worse if
Washington does not enforce against illicit sellers even when the activity is still illegal under state law, as a result of marijuana crime
de-prioritization. Federal enforcement would be insufficient and illegal markets may actually grow in Washington. Arrests of
licensed business owners could lead to a sense of injustice as explained above as the retailers would view themselves as law-abiding
citizens, not the drug traffickers that the CSA was designed to combat.
Third, federal enforcement could pursue civil injunctions or raids focused on forfeiture of marijuana, which the DEA currently uses
against medical marijuana suppliers.153 This strategy would have similar effects as the second option, but without the perception of
injustice, as these actions only assert the illegality of the activity and force the business to close without employing the full penal
power of the law. Note though that U.S. Attorneys may still pursue felony charges under the CSA, the directive to use civil remedies
will only be departmental guidelines.
With any of these three approaches, the federal government should take an aggressive stance against marijuana. Advertising in
public media by marijuana-related businesses will go a long way toward shaping attitudes and giving recreational marijuana
legitimacy. Injunctions should be brought to remove any instances of advertising. This should be paired with anti-marijuana
advertising. Conditional funding could be used to ensure that Washington spends some of the marijuana excise tax on antimarijuana advertising campaigns. In addition, proceeds from fines against marijuana producers and distributors, as well as from
forfeitures, could be used to fund a federal anti-marijuana advertising effort targeted to Washington. The advertising will
demonstrate the governments continued assertion that marijuanas negative health conse-quences are too severe for it to be suitable
for any use, and combat the change in social beliefs that coincide with the state legalization of marijuana.
If the policies behind the CSA are to be reconsidered in light of changing public opinion on marijuana, there are
several options for supporting Washington in implementing Initiative 502. The first would be a

wait-and-see approach
of non-enforcement. This would be best paired with an official statement interpreting the CSA as
being inapplicable to actors that follow relevant state law for a certain time period, so that the
actor may raise a defense of entrapment by estoppel. Otherwise U.S. Attorneys may still bring criminal charges against violators of
the CSA who comply with state law and the actor would have no cognizable defense. At the end of the time period of

non-enforcement, the federal government could examine the success of Washingtons

legalization regime and determine appropriate next steps, possibly reverting to
enforcement or going toward rescheduling.

Finally, Congress could remove marijuana from CSA scheduling and allow states to decide how to penalize or regulate marijuana
production, distribution, and consumption. It could remain a felony to transport marijuana into or out of the United States, which is
a level of enforcement that is likely commensurate with federal law enforcement capacities. This also ensures that the United States
maintains its commitment to international cooperation in the prevention of drug trafficking and also ensures that state social
experimentalism does not negatively impact the international community.
B. Internationally
On the international level, it is important that the United States respect international obligations to

maintain the integrity of the rule of law and support coordination in combatting international drug
trafficking. First, the federal government could pursue one of the approaches above in ensuring
enforcement of the CSA in Washington. This would demonstrate the United States ongoing dedication
to the goals of both conventions despite conflicting state laws, reinforcing for other countries that they should
pursue this policy even as public opinion shifts in some areas.

Second, the United States could submit an amendment for the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances that would allow for
possible recreational use of marijuana within the territory of state parties, but still require
criminal enforcement against international trafficking. Each convention has a provision for
amendments, which would allow the United States to alter the treaty obligations of all parties such
that non-enforcement against Washington recreational marijuana, and similar actions by other parties, is
no longer a breach.154 As other countries have begun to liberalize their drug laws, there may be support for such an
amendment.155 This must be paired with vigorous enforcement against international traffickers though, so the policy does not
negatively affect supply or transit countries.
VI. CONCLUSION

Initiative 502 gives the federal government the opportunity to reevaluate the policies of the CSA and either renew efforts against
recreational marijuana or allow state governments to control domestic regulation of marijuana. It is important, however, that

in selecting an approach, the impact of the inconsistency between state and federal law be
minimized to avoid a culture of rule-breaking, and that the United States work to bring itself
into compliance with international law, either through enforcement or by
amending existing treaties.

Solves the entirety of advantage 2 and creates uniqueness for treatieswe overrule
the Commerce Clause holding of Raich but retain authority to prohibit based on
Treaty Power
Kleiman, 13 - Mark Kleiman is a professor of public policy at the University of California Los
Angeles (Poisoning, Chemical Warfare, and the Controlled Substance Act Washington
Monthly, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-milessquare/2013/11/poisoning_chemical_warfare_and047759.php#)
The question is whether a perfectly ordinary criminal case can be federalized via the treaty
power. Clearly, a general federal statute against homicide, or poisoning in particular, wouldnt be within any of the enumerated
powers of the Congress. But the President undoubtedly has the power to sign a treaty, and if ratified by
two-thirds of the Senate, a treaty has the force of law. The chemical weapons treaty, like some others, requires

each state party to enact appropriate domestic criminal legislation, and in this case the law passed by Congress more or less tracks
the language of the treaty. (And yes, in case youre wondering, the use of pepper spray and tear gas by police is specifically exempted.
Doesnt it make you feel good to know that cops can lawfully do to our own people things it would be a war crime to do to enemies?)
The objection raised by Clement is that the President and two-thirds of the Senate should not, by signing a treaty with Rinky-Dink
and Tabasco, to be able to make any arbitrarily selected element of domestic policy a federal matter, thus gutting the doctrine of
enumerated powers. Thats a reasonable enough concern on its surface, though I wouldnt be surprised if concern that, e.g.,
womens-rights legislation might be validated in that way underlay Clements willingness to take up the poisoners defense.
The whole thing sounds like a law-school hypothetical, without much practical interest. Maybe the Justices will duck by ruling that
you cant prosecute someone for chemical warfare unless she does something more well,warlike than trying to poison a
personal enemy.
But if the Justices were to decide to limit this use of the treaty power, that decision might have an effect that (so far as I can tell from
the reports) didnt come up in the briefs or the oral argument.
It is not obvious on its face how the Controlled Substances Act could be constitutional except as applied to drugs carried across state
lines; it certainly would have surprised Mr. Madison to learn that he and his colleagues had authorized the Congress to criminalize
growing a plant in your own windowbox and smoking its leaves. That would have seemed to them an exercise of the police power,
and thus the province of the states.

When the courts upheld the CSA, they did so partly on Commerce Clause grounds and
partly on Treaty Power grounds, similar to what happened in the medical-marijuana case Gonzales
v. Raich.
Tracking Wickard v. Filburn, the Commerce Clause argument is is that, since production within a state might displace imports, it
thereby becomes entangled with interstate commerce. But this is - if he Justices will pardon my French - complete, economically
illiterate bullsh*t. In Wickard, the goal of the law was to support crop prices in order to maintain farmers incomes. So it was
reasonable to say that someone who grew his own wheat to bake his own bread was removing his little bit of the demand from the
market, thus (almost infinitesimally) reducing wheat prices nationally, defeating the purpose of the law.
But it is not the purpose - though it is the effect - of the Controlled Substances Act to provide incomes for drug traffickers. If a

cannabis user in California grows her own, the effect on interstate commerce is to reduce the
volume of illegal traffic, which can hardly be held to frustrate the purpose of the Controlled
Substances Act in controlling interstate and international drug trafficking. (Yes, you could argue that its hard to prove the origin of
a specific batch of drugs, but that at most might support a law allowing intrastate origin as an affirmative defense.)
So if the Treaty Power argument is no good - and its hard to see how it would be good for drugs if it fails for
chemical weapons - then

the CSA, as applied to intrastate activity, stands on very shaky legs.

TREATIES
Obamas wait and see approach lays groundwork for treaty reform, but
legalizing now wrecks the system
Bennett and Walsh, 10/14 - *Wells C. Bennett is a Fellow in National Security Law at the
Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare AND **John Walsh is a Senior Associate
at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect
human rights, public health and public safety. His work has contributed to the recent opening of
the hemispheric debate on drug policy (Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize
International Drug Treaties October,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15-marijuanalegalization-modernize-drug-treaties-bennett-walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf)
United States enforcement discretion under the drug treaties might be drawn precisely, we
cannot be an across-the-board, categorical affair, when the issue is federal tolerance of
regulated, comprehensive marijuana markets established by state law. And thats just it: if more states
take a legalize-and-regulate approach, a federal-level decision not to prosecute similarly situated persons
could start to look like blanket non-enforcement of implementing legislationsomething that, in
our view, the drug treaties do not contemplate.
Wherever the limits of the

know that such discretion by definition

The prospect of future marijuana regulation raises a second, more fundamental reason to rethink things: the nations experiment with legalizing and
regulating marijuana might actually go well. Suppose Colorado and Washington both operate their regulated marijuana markets smartly, without
offending federal enforcement prerogatives, andmost importantly without compromising public health and safety. We dont think this is a fanciful
or improbable scenario. Our Brookings colleague John Hudak was the first to examine Colorados implementation effort up close. And he tentatively
concluded that so far, the states initial rollout has been imperfect but quite effective.39 If this path continues or even bends towards improvement,
then other states may soon elect to follow Washington and Colorados lead. And that, in turn, stands to exacerbate an already visible tension between
obligations imposed by the drug treaties, and the federal governments enforcement posture towards legalizing states.
To put the point another way, if

Colorado and Washington augur a real trend, then the costs to the United
States of treaty breach could be swiftly ratcheted upwards. The INCB could raise the volume
and severity of its criticisms; we wouldnt be surprised to hear protests from more prohibitionist
countries about the United States treaty compliance, or to see other nations start pushing the limits of other
no less important treaties to which the United States is party. When some or all of this happens, the United States
wont get very far in emphasizing the CSAs theoretical application nationwide, subject to enforcement priorities enunciated in the Cole Memo; or in
appealing to larger objectives woven throughout the drug treaties, and their conferral of policy flexibility. What if twenty or thirty states successfully
establish, and police, regulated markets for marijuana production and sale?
Having that scenario in mind, we lastly emphasize the United States unique relationship both to the drug treaties and to the wider international
community. The

United States was aif not thekey protagonist in developing the 1961, 1971, and 1988
Conventions, as well as the 1972 protocol amending the 1961 Convention; the United States has for decades been widely
and correctly viewed as the treaties chief champion and defender.40 That fact feeds back onto this one: The
United States also occupies a singular place in international relations. It can summon powers no other
nation can summon, but it also confronts risks no other nation confronts.41 For that oft-cited reason, the
United States has a profound interest in ensuring that counterparties perform their treaty
obligations. Reciprocity is always a big deal for any nation that trades promises with other
onesbut it is perhaps uniquely so for ours.
These factors mean that caution is in order regarding international law and the viability of the Cole Memo in the longer run. If the United States can
flexibly interpret the drug treaties with regard to marijuana, then Mexico is entitled to no lessthough it might view the limits of its flexibility
differently, or apply it to another controlled substance within the treaties purview. Or imagine that a foreign nations controversial policy butts up
against seemingly contrary language, in a treaty covering an extremely important global issue other than drug control. Likely the United States will
have a tougher time objecting when, rather than conceding the problem or changing course, that nations foreign ministry invokes the need to
tolera[te] different national approaches; or recasts the relevant treaty as a living document subject to periodic, unilateral reinterpretation.
This is not to suggest that compliance challenges or complexity should always trigger a call to reshape the United States treaty commitments. Practice
and prudence both support a more nuanced, case-specific approach than that. Sometimes the United States has sought to make significant adjustments
to multilateral frameworks or even quit them; other times, the United States has weighed costs and benefits, and pressed on within the treaty despite
consequential breachesin situations much more obvious (and less open to reasonable contention) than that regarding marijuana.
But in those instances, the United States compliance failures often have come despite some hard striving by the federal government. The State
Department, to name one well known example, tries mightily to make state law enforcement officers aware of the United States obligations under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relationsnotwithstanding some repeated and well-known violations of that treaty by the likes of Texas, Virginia, and
Arizona.42 In this case, though, no external factorsfederalism, say, or a contrary ruling from the U.S. Supreme Courthave frustrated a strong push
by the executive branch to vindicate the drug treaties; the decision not to assert federal supremacy was in fact taken unilaterally by the Obama
administration. Given the circumstances, we believe it was the correct decision. The

Cole Memo nevertheless establishes at least

some friction with a treaty obligation, by holding back on CSA enforcement, so as to

accommodate state-level regulation of marijuana. Again, the reasons why are entirely understandable: given the incipient
nature of the changes to which the Cole Memo was reacting, the United States essentially opted to take a wait-and-see
approach as to how problematic the treaty questions might become.
So far as we are aware, this strategy is without precedent in U.S. treaty practice. The United States
should approach it carefully and deliberatively, given the countrys outsized interest in reciprocal
performance of treaty obligations. That depends in part on being able to credibly call out other
nations for treaty failingssomething which in turn depends on strictly performing our
own obligations, or at least making a good show of trying hard to do so before coming up short.
Again, we think the United States can sustain the status quo in the short term. But todays
model likely wont hold up year in and year out, for the reasons we describe above. The government therefore ought
to start thinking about some of the fundamental treaty reforms that its public statements seemingly have
downplayed. Better to have weighed such options early on, should existing policys downsides start to overtake its upsidesas we predict they could.

Sequencing keylegalizing before gradual amendment cracks the global treaty

regime
Bennett and Walsh, 10/14 - *Wells C. Bennett is a Fellow in National Security Law at the
Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare AND **John Walsh is a Senior Associate
at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect
human rights, public health and public safety. His work has contributed to the recent opening of
the hemispheric debate on drug policy (Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize
International Drug Treaties October,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15-marijuanalegalization-modernize-drug-treaties-bennett-walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf)
VI. A Stress Test We Can Pass
In making the case for the United States to proactively open the door to future change in the drug treaties, we have emphasized, so
far, the negative value of avoiding conflict and instability. We would be remiss not to end on an equally important positive note. The
political changes and incentives in play in the marijuana-policy debate open a real opportunity to

demonstrate and improve the adaptability of the international legal systema system on which the
United States relies more and more.
No treaty can survive the collapse of a political consensus supporting it. And no

treaty system can endure if it cannot

cope with changing political conditions. Sustainability in international law depends not only on
commitment but also on resilience and adaptability.
At this writing, one or two more U.S. states may be about to adopt a version of marijuana legalization. If
states continue to legalize, and if the federal government continues to allow their reforms to
proceed, the short run for treaty reform may come quite soon. This is why we refer to the
challenge of marijuana legalization as a stress test for the adaptability of international
law. Should legalization prove politically popular or socially successful, it will spread to more states and nations; should it
spread, then one way or another both domestic and international politics will find ways to
accommodate iteither by adapting formal legal commitments or by cutting new, informal
channels around those commitments. The latter would weaken international law; the
former would strengthen it.

Marijuana-related reform to the drug treaties offers, in several respects, good odds of achieving constructive adaptation. Reform
need not entail any wholesale reconsideration of international drug policy, nor need any brand new treaty be negotiated. Modest
incrementalism can do the job. In the United States, moreover, a growing political constituency, embracing members of both
political parties, favors reform, so the issue is less partisan than many. Persuading the Senate to make more room for U.S.
experimentation by revising an existing treaty is a lighter lift than persuading it to undertake entirely new treaty obligations. And, if

the United States plays its cards right (with, as we have suggested, suitably narrow and hedged legal
changes), we believe a consensus abroad for modest change could become within reach. In any case,
broaching the subject relatively early onby ruling treaty change in, now, as a possibility, instead
of ruling it out as a non-startermay itself open the door to a new international conversation about
modernizing and adapting drug treaties. In other words, marijuana offers as good a chance as we are
likely to see of setting a precedent for creative, consensual, and gradual adaptation of a wellestablished international treaty structure.

The international legal system, however suspicious of it many Americans may be, has always mattered and has never
mattered more than now. For example, the campaign against ISIS and the Ukraine crisis
underscore all too dramatically the continuing importance of multilateral security commitments.
If anything, international laws remit is growing as environmental, social, economic, and security
problems transcend national borders. From global warming to sanctions on Iran and
Russia to the campaign against terrorism and military intervention in a host of theaters,
the United States and its allies increasingly rely on international agreements and commitments to
legitimize and amplify joint action against common threats.
Of course, marijuana and the international narcotics treaties are only one small piece of that
puzzle. But they are a highly visible piece, and they offer a real opportunity to demonstrate
adaptation through international legal channels, rather than around them. Laying
groundwork for manageably incremental changesby beginning conversations with treaty
partners and other constituencies about where flexibility might liewould reaffirm American
commitment to constructive adaptation, and to building consensus. Conversely,
pushing the outer boundaries of the drug treaties flexibility could weaken the international
order and damage American interests.
To put the point another way: Marijuana policy reform is a stress test that the United States and the international order should, and
realistically can, pass.

Their Jelsma evidence is only about a Court-based legal justification for

decriminalization for personal use
Jelsma, 14 - coordinated TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme, David R. Bewley-Taylor,
University of Wales Swansea and Tom Blickman, Cannabis reforms: the scope and limits of
treaty latitude, March, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, Transnational Institute
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_ch3.pdf)
Decriminalization of possession for personal use
Use of drugs was consciously omitted from the articles that list the drug-related acts for which
penal measures are required. There is no doubt, therefore, that the UN conventions do not
oblige any penalty (criminal or administrative) to be imposed for consumption per se. The
Commentary to the 1988 Convention in relation to its article 3 is quite clear on the issue: It will
be noted that, as with the 1961 and 1971 Conventions, paragraph 2 does not require drug
consumption as such to be established as a punishable offence.8
The conventions are more restrictive with regard to possession, purchase or cultivation for
personal consumption. Article 33 of the 1961 Single Convention states parties shall not permit
the possession of drugs except under legal authority (and then only for medical and scientific
purposes) and article 36, paragraph 1, obliges parties to make possession a punishable offence.
Crucially, regarding the obligation to criminalize possession, a distinction is made between
possession for personal use and that for trafficking. According to Boister, the thrust of the
Conventions penal provisions is the prohibition of illicit drug trafficking, allowing little
interpretative doubt that parties are obliged to criminalize possession in that context. But it
does not appear that article 36(1), obliges parties to criminalize possession of drugs for
personal use.9 The Conventions focus on the suppression of trafficking can be seen as an
affirmation that countries are not obliged in terms of article 36 to criminalize simple possession
under the 1961 Convention. This view is also bolstered by the drafting history of article 36, in
fact, originally entitled Measures against illicit traffickers.10 Based closely upon the earlier
instrument, the subject is treated similarly in the 1971 Convention.
NU EVIDENCE BEGINS HERE
Circumstances became more complex with the introduction of the 1988 Convention. Article 3
repeats in slightly broader language the provisions of article 36 of the Single Convention and
article 22 of the 1971 Convention. Paragraph 2 of article 3 adds:

Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system, each party shall
adopt such measures as may be seen necessary to establish as a criminal offence under its
domestic law, when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotic
drugs or psychotropic substances for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the
1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention.
Even though the language is more restrictive and might be regarded as reducing the flexibility of
the earlier treaties, a persuasive legal case can be made that article 3, paragraph 2 still leaves
significant scope for deviation from the punitive approach. Subject to its constitutional
principles and basic concepts of its legal system, represents a clear escape clause. It implies
that any latitude existing under this Convention does not result exclusively from the
Convention but also from the constitutional and other legal principles of each country.
Therefore, Parties would not violate the Convention if their domestic courts held
criminalization of personal use to be unconstitutional, 11 and consequently are not obliged to
establish possession for personal use to be a criminal offence. A strong case can also be made
that a party need not make cultivation for personal use a criminal offense either.12 Further, the
article allows for alternatives to conviction or punishment for offences related to personal use
and other offences of a minor nature, albeit restricting and strongly discouraging national
discretionary powers related to illicit trafficking offences of a more serious nature.13
As a result, a country might rule that, in line with its own national circumstances, it is not within
the interest of society to prosecute for possession or cultivation for personal use; that the right to
privacy overrules state intervention regarding what people consume or possess in their private
homes; or that self-destructive behaviour, be it consumption of potentially harmful substances
or other behaviour including suicide, shall not be subject to punishment. These justifications
have been argued and accepted respectively in the Netherlands, Alaska and Germany with
regard to possession of cannabis for personal use. More recently, in Argentina the Supreme
Court ruled that the section of the 1989 drug law criminalizing drug possession was
unconstitutional.14 The existence of an escape clause of this nature, based on constitutional
principles as well as basic concepts of national legal systems, is relatively rare in international
law.15 It has been utilized by a range of authorities to create more policy flexibility while
remaining within the confines of the treaty framework.16 Thus, despite widespread acceptance
of the 1988 Convention, significant room for manoeuvre in relation to cannabis
decriminalization has been retained since its enactment in 1990.
Court rulings will gut US compliance with the Single Convention because it
prioritizes the Commerce Clause over the Treaty Power
DuPont et al, 4 - Robert L. DuPont, M.D., was the first Director of the National Institute on
Drug Abuse (NIDA) and the second Director of the White House Special Action Office for Drug
Abuse Prevention (BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE, JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET
AL., Petitioners, -v- ANGEL McCLARY RAICH, ET AL., Respondents,
www.ibhinc.org/pdfs/ARAmicusBrief.pdf)
This case is not what it appears. The Court of Appeals ruling belowand the parties in their written argumentshave focused only
on the effect that the activities in this case do (or do not) have on illegal interstate drug trafficking. But this case implicates issues
that extend far beyond that narrow question issues of enormous national significance. This case presents the Supreme

Court with the opportunity to recognize and reinforce the United States obligation to comply with
international treaties, specifically, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. It also enables this Court to underscore

the appropriateness of the federal governments reliance on the Food and Drug Administration as the sole agency authorized to
approve medical products as safe and effective for use within the United States.
The activities in this case, if allowed to proliferate across the country, would essentially eviscerate our comprehensive
federal regulatory system governing the testing and use of medical products--a system that has been carefully crafted over the last
century to protect patient health and safety. Such a proliferation would also force the United States for the first time to fall

out of compliance with the unmistakable and very specific mandates of the Single Convention. If
the Court of Appeals ruling is allowed to stand, it will have widespread negative consequences

for the enforcement of the comprehensive provisions of the Controlled Substances Act, and therefore for the

implementation of the United States obligations under the Single Convention. For these reasons, amici have submitted this brief
urging this Court to address these far-reaching questions.
ARGUMENT
I. The Treaty Power Provides a Separate and Independent Source of Congressional Power in This

Case.

While Congress must certainly regulate in accordance with its enumerated powers, the

Commerce Clause does not

provide the sole source of congressional authority in this case. The United States may enter into treaties

governing matters of international concern and impact. Such treaties, in conjunction with the federal Constitution and federal
legislation, comprise the supreme law of the land. U.S. Const. Art. II, sec. 2. cl. 2 (power of the President to enter into treaties); U.S.
Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Congress has the power to enact all laws necessary and proper for carrying into ExecutionallPowers granted
by this Constitution. U.S. Const. Art. I, sec.8, cl.18. Accordingly, Congress has the power to enact laws

implementing the United States obligations under treaties to which the U.S. is a signatory. The
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. sec. 801 et seq. (1970), (CSA) is such a law, and its regulation of the class of activity in this
case is necessary to fulfill those obligations.

Federal laws, like the CSA, which implement U.S. treaty obligations, are unquestionably a valid
exercise of congressional power, even in the face of conflicting state laws.2 In Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), this Court upheld the power of Congress to enact legislation, pursuant to a treaty, despite contrary
state law. The Court stressed that such legislation--in that case the Migratory Bird Treaty Act--stands on a separate basis of
congressional power, and rejected the argument that Congress must have independent constitutional
authority separate from a treaty as a basis for enacting legislation. Id. at 432-33. The CSAs comprehensive
regulatory structure, too, is supported by the Treaty Power, as well by Congress authority under the Commerce
Clause.

Treaties are fine now but unilateral legalization wrecks them

Bewley-Taylor, 12 - Department of Political and Cultural Studies, College of Arts and
Humanities, Swansea University, UK (David, International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured,
p. 315-316)
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way, they
could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the regulation of the
cannabis market and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. Disregarding all or selected
components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The
possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten
the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of simply opting out. Drawing
on provisions within the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, some international lawyers argue that all treaties can
naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing or when an error
of fact or situation at the time of conclusion has later been identified by a party.89 Both are lines of reasoning pursued in 1971 by
Leinwand in relation to removing cannabis from the Single Convention.
Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in circumstances in the nature, extent and understanding of the world drug problem since
the 1960s, the fundamental change of circumstances approach could be applied to the drug conventions or parts thereof. It has been
noted how this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has largely fallen into misuse, probably due to the general availability of the option to
denounce. That said, the case for both this and error at time of founding may be useful rationales for reform-minded states to note
when pursuing the denunciation option. Once again the selective application of such principles alone would call into

question the validity of many and varied treaties. This remains an area of concern for many,
particularly European, states that in general maintain a high regard for international law.
This stands in stark contrast to the selective approach towards international law displayed by the
administration of George W. Bush, particularly during its first term. Such disdain for multilateralism generated an
atmosphere within which reformist states may have been able to defend a simple disregard for parts of
the drug control treaties. As the most capable and energetic supporter of the GDPR, the USA was still best
placed to enhance the benevolent appeal of the control system and where necessary dispense costs for

defection beyond those of the reputational variety. Nonetheless, such a position would have been difficult to sustain when defecting
states could justify action on the grounds that they were merely emulating the habits of a hegemony. The likelihood of any significant
state simply disregarding the international legal framework for the control of drugs has always been slim. Yet the election of Barack

Obama and a resultant re-engagement with the UN made this possibility even slimmer. In an
effort to rebuild bridges with the organization, the Obama administration has in many ways attempted to
reverse the policies of its predecessor.90

Zero ISIS threat

Benjamin 14 Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security
and Intelligence, The Intelligence Project
Daniel, Hawks Exaggerate Islamic State Threat to the United States
[http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/08/17-hawks-exaggerate-islamic-statethreat-benjamin] //
Stoking the panic has been a very excitable press. On CNN last week, I was asked if Islamic State fighters
represented an existential threat to the United States. Set aside that absurdity; no terrorist group threatens our
existence. (America has faced one existential threat in modern times the Soviet nuclear arsenal and that is it.) But is the
Islamic State a huge and menacing terrorist threat? Certainly not to the United States today. The danger to Iraq

and its neighbors is real. The Islamic State has shown itself to be a formidable insurgency. Its focus is on ripping apart Iraq and
Syria, sowing sectarian conflict, and creating in its midst a new jihadist state or caliphate. (That very word seems to incite
fearmongers: Every day that goes by, ISIS builds up its caliphate, and it becomes a direct threat to the United States, said New
York Representative Peter King, conjuring an image of a new Golden Horde with nuclear-tipped scimitars.) If the insurgency grows,
and the threat to Jordan or Lebanon increases, we may have to act. But, for now, its important to understand that even if

marauding operatives in Land Cruisers may be humiliating Iraqs hollowed-out military, that
doesnt mean they have genuine terrorist skills. Consider the details: The Islamic State has never
carried out a significant attack outside of its neighborhood. In 2005, when its operatives were still part of Al

Qaeda in Iraq, operatives carried out hotel bombings in Jordan and tried and failed to attack an American warship in the Red Sea.
More recently, four people were killed in an apparent lone-wolf attack at the Jewish museum in Brussels by a young man trained in
Syria. In other words, weve seen no demonstrated ability to carry out the kind of complex

international strike that kills dozens or hundreds, let alone engulfs a US city in flames.

Impossible to solve
Pearce, 13 environmental consultant for New Scientist magazine with over 20 years of
experience reporting on the environment, winner of 2002 CGIAR agricultural research science
journalism award [9/25, Fred, The New Scientist, www.newscientist.com/article/dn24261world-wont-cool-without-geoengineering-warns-report.html#.VENB0VevdqO]
Global warming is irreversible without massive geoengineering of the atmosphere's chemistry. This stark warning
comes from the draft summary of the latest climate assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change. Delegates from national governments are discussing the draft this week, prior to its release on Friday morning. According to
one of its lead authors, and the latest draft seen by New Scientist, the report will say: "CO2-induced warming is projected to
remain approximately constant for many centuries following a complete cessation of emission. A
large fraction of climate change is thus irreversible on a human timescale, except if net
anthropogenic CO2 emissions were strongly negative over a sustained period." In other words, even if all the world ran on
carbon-free energy and deforestation ceased, the only way of lowering temperatures
would be to devise a scheme for sucking hundreds of billions of tonnes of carbon dioxide out of the
atmosphere. Much of this week's report, the fifth assessment of the IPCC working group on the physical science of climate change, will reaffirm
the findings of the previous four assessments, published regularly since 1990. It will point out that to limit global warming to 2 C
will require cumulative CO2 emissions from all human sources since the start of the industrial
revolution to be kept below about a trillion tonnes of carbon. So far, we have emitted about half this. Current
emissions are around 10.5 billion tonnes of carbon annually, and rising. Since the last assessment, published in 2007Speaker, the IPCC has almost
doubled its estimate of the maximum sea-level rise likely in the coming century to about 1 metre. They also conclude

that it is now
"virtually certain" that sea levels will continue to rise for many centuries, even if warming
ceases, due to the delayed effects of thermal expansion of warming oceans and
melting ice sheets.
No extinction
Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry
and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, Climate Change and Economic
Growth, online:
http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists

and others that give the

impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern
2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC
2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow
exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 2030 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be
catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate
hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut
dramatically today, economic growth and wellbeing may be at risk (Stern 2006).
These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves
attention, societys

immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic

consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next
few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a
century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will
be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most
of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these potential
impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and
dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart longrange climate risks. What is needed are longrun
balanced responses.

No Ukraine war
Clark, 14 [Christopher, General Editor at Urban Times, Former Deputy Editor of The Cape
Town Globalist, Urban Timeshttp://urbantimes.co/2014/03/5-reasons-why-the-ukrainiancrisis-is-unlikely-to-lead-to-world-war-iii/]
The Ukrainian Crisis Won't Lead To World War III The US Has Not Even Threatened To
Use Its Military
the possibility of the US deploying its army in Ukraine has not
been threatened as an option
political and economic
isolation of Russia will be favoured
5 Reasons Why

1.

It is telling that over the past couple of days

. Despite Secretary of State John Kerrys assertion that all options are on the table, it appears that an attempted

the

method of punishing Putins indiscretions in Crimea. In a statement to the press, a senior US official indicated that military options were not currently being

considered: Right now, I think we are focused on political, diplomatic and economic options. Frankly our goal is to uphold the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, not to have a military escalation I dont think were focused right now o n the notion of

Western Governments Would have Little Success In

Selling Military Intervention
Cameron and Obama will have learnt from their failure to
win support for military strikes on Syria
a potential military
intervention in Ukraine would receive scant
political support
some U.S. military intervention. I dont think that necessarily would be a way to de-escalate the situation. 2.
Both David

Barack

. Despite Bashar al-Assad crossing Obamas red line by using chemical weapons against his own people, the UK parliament voted against possible military

strikes. The US Congress narrowly avoided voting on what would have been an extremely divisive issue after a deal was brokered with the Russians to pursue a diplomatic solution It is likely that
equally

public and

in both countries. 3. Putin Would Not Have Invaded Had He

Thought Military Retaliation Was Likely Vladamir Putin has proven time and time again to be a master strategist when it comes to international affairs. Last years foreign policy victories over the US on Snowden and Syria proved this to be the case. If the immediate
deployment of NATO troops to protect the Ukraine was likely, the invasion of Crimea would have been a reckless and potentially suicidal act on Moscows part, regardless of its significant interests in the Ukraine. The Wests inability to act against Assad in Syria will
have fed into Russian confidence in acting in such a heavy handed manner in the Ukraine. Moreover, US and European impotence during the 2008 invasion of Georgia will have provided further assurances of Moscows impunity in carrying out regional relations as
it sees fit. Once more, Forbes magazines most powerful man has defied the West. Putin has acted strongly and decisively, placing the ball firmly in the court of Obama and his allies. 4. David Vs. Goliath Without the assurance of western military intervention backing
them up, Ukraines fledgling government will be very reluctant to act alone against the Russian forces currently occupying the Crimean Peninsula. Despite the government calling up all army reservists and Ukrainians volunteering for military service in their droves,
the size and fire-power of the Ukrainian army is dwarfed by that of its powerful neighbour. Ukrainian forces dispatched to Crimea in the past few days have already begun to surrender and in some cases switch allegiance to the pro-Russian local authorities. 5.

The
military doctrine
will remain a significant deterrent in the Ukrainian case. Despite
bitter
military rivalry and arms race
the US and Soviet Union never engaged in direct
confrontation
as each was aware of the
consequences of nuclear war With both
the US and Russia holding considerable military nuclear capabilities, the possibility of direct
military confrontation is very low
utually

ssured

estruction The threat of nuclear war will make direct conflict between the US and Russia extremely unlikely

Cold War

which has so far ensured no two nuclear powers have

engaged in a full scale military conflict

enduring a

which lasted for over 4 decades,

with each other

side

potentially catastrophic

FEDERALISM
Its resilient
Tim Conlan October 2006; professor of government and politics in the Department of Public and International Affairs at

George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia; George Mason University From Cooperative to Opportunistic Federalism: Reflections
on the Half-Century Anniversary of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Public Administration Review September |
October 2006
Fortunately, positive developments are beginning to emerge in the paradigms of public management, institutional support for
intergovernmental analysis, horizontal federalism, and specifi c tools of policy design. Moreover, political balance in

the federal system is still nourished by the underlying strength of state and local
governments. An increasingly hollow federal workforce has become more rather than less reliant
on its intergovernmental partners. Such dependency and the power it conveys over the implementation of federal policy goals is an important source of strength for the agents of federal policy
making. The trust and aff ection that citizens retain for their state and local governments which
typically outweighs that held for the national government nourishes a deep foundation of political
power and legitimacy at these levels of government ( Kincaid and Cole 2005 ). And the capacity for
policy innovation at the state and local levels, exemplifi ed by intergovern- mental ventures such
as the streamlined sales tax proj- ect and by domestic state innovations, all point to the
continuing resilience of the American federal system.
Multiple alt causes undermine federalism
--Gun control
Kincaid 13Robert B. and Helen S. Meyner Professor of Government and Public Service and
director of the Meyner Center for the Study of State and Local Government, Lafayette College
(Robert, State-Federal Relations: Back to the Future?, The Book of the States 2013, Council of State Governments, dml)

Similarly, debate over federal gun control propos- als following the December 2012 school
shootings in Newtown, Conn., led some state and local officials to urge nullification of new
federal gun laws.Neither I, nor my deputies, will participate in the enforcement of laws that
violate our precious constitutional rights, Sheriff Terry Box of Collin County, Texas, said.7 The
Utah Sheriffs Association announced in early 2013 that its members are prepared to trade
(their) lives to prevent federal officials from enforcing new gun laws. Lawmakers in many states
have introduced anti-federal government bills, including measures to authorize state
nullification of federal laws, exempt guns made in-state from federal regulation, require federal
officials to obtain a county sheriffs approval to serve a war- rant or make an arrest, and ban
enforcement of Agenda 21, a United Nations agreement promot- ing sustainable development.
Alabama adopted the first state ban on Agenda 21 in 2012.8
--Obamacare
Gluck 14Professor of Law at Yale Law School

(Abbe, Don't Buy the Cooperative-Federalism-Makes-Halbig-Logical Argument, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/07/dont-buycooperative-federalism-makes.html, dml)

It may be true that the ACAs politics have created a landscape no one ever predictedone in
which federalism-focused states, whose congressional representatives were demanding the
states rights to establish exchanges instead of the federal governmenthave decided that
politics is more important than federalism and opted out. But whats happened in hindsight
doesnt change what happened when the statute was enacted and how the statute is actually
designed. What happened when the statute was designed was that no one thought the states
needed a carrot to do this and the statute was never designed as a

Federalism worse for disaster response

Beauchamp 12 (Zack, Editor of TP Ideas and a reporter for ThinkProgress.org. He previously
contributed to Andrew Sullivans The Dish at Newsweek/Daily Beast, and has also written for
Foreign Policy and Tablet magazines. Zack holds B.A.s in Philosophy and Political Science from
Brown University and an M.Sc in International Relations from the London School of
Economics., 10-20-12, "Why The Federal Government Should Handle Disaster Relief" Think
Progress) thinkprogress.org/politics/2012/10/30/1112851/why-the-federal-governmentshould-handle-disaster-relief/
Almost on cue after Hurricane Sandy, conservatives and libertarians have begun arguing that
the federal government should get out of the business of providing disaster relief. The
function could be delegated to states and the private sector, they claim, echoing an argument
advanced by Mitt Romney last year. But theyre wrong. The private sector and states cannot
muster the resources that the federal government can. To deal with massive disasters like
Sandy, we need the feds. Conservatives touting the market often refer to one paper, by
Professor Stephen Horwitz, arguing that Wal-Mart responded more efficiently to Hurricane
Katrina than the federal government. While its widely agreed that Wal-Mart played an
important role in the aftermath of the 2005 storm, it amounted to only $17 million in direct
donations and roughly $25 million when you include in-kind work. By contrast, the federal
government spends $10 billion every year on routine disaster preparedness, a figure that
spikes in the case of severe disasters like Katrina. Its simply inconceivable that corporations
would be capable of filling that gap on their own. But isnt most of that federal money wasted?
Not really, say the experts. Michigan State Professor Saundra Schneider wrote in her survey
of recent American disaster relief efforts that for the vast majority of natural disasters,
public institutions respond very well . When asked if the private sector could fill-in for the
government, she scoffed. The government is the only entity that has the power and
resources to deal with this disaster of this scope, Schneider said. [There's] a pretty
strong consensus in the literature , especially the social science literature, that thats needed.
Indeed, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) itself has had a rather sterling
track record in responding effectively to crises like Sandy but while the agency suffered
under both Presidents Bush, it prospered during the Clinton administration . During the

Bush administrations, FEMA was considered a backwater agency, led by unqualified nominees
and given relatively little attention. The results were catastrophically bad responses to 1992s
Hurricane Andrew and 2005s Hurricane Katrina. After Andrew, President Clintons renewed
attention on FEMA revitalized the agency, resulting in a substantially more effective agency. As
The New Republics Jonathan Cohn notes, FEMAs response to last years tornadoes was
generally considered exceptional. And New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, a prominent
Romney surrogate and vice presidential contender, has praised the organizations swift response
to Sandy, saying The federal governments response has been greatThe President has been
outstanding in this and so have the folks at FEMA. Currently, federal, state, and local
governments all play critical roles in managing disaster relief. The system works in the
following way: local governments respond first, turn to the state government if the disaster
exceeds their resources, who in turn may ask FEMA to step-in. This system works pretty
well as Richard Sylves, a disaster expert at the University of Delaware, notes, most disasters
are handled by local and occasionally state governments. This means that most disaster relief
is already delegated locally. The principal federal role, Sylves writes, is to supplement, not
supplant, the efforts of others[federal aid is designed to] stimulate and guide emergency
planning efforts, furnish substantial response efforts after (and sometimes before) a
governor secures help from the President, and fund many disaster mitigation efforts. In
other words, the feds provide money, material and coordination states cant give on their

own . Natural disasters often spill across state lines , requiring coordination and
cooperation between states with different economic abilities and constraints . Moreover,
the sheer expense of disaster relief stretches the limited resources of poor states and states
with restrictive balanced budget amendments. Effective response to major disasters
requires federal assistance.

No pandemic threat
Ridley 12 [8/17, Matt Ridley, columnist for The Wall Street Journal and author of The Rational
Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves, Apocalypse Not: Heres Why You Shouldnt Worry About
End Times, http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/08/ff_apocalypsenot/all/]
The emergence of AIDS

led to a theory that other viruses would spring from tropical rain forests to
wreak revenge on humankind for its ecological sins. That, at least, was the implication of Laurie Garretts 1994 book, The

Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance. The most prominent candidate was Ebola, the hemorrhagic
fever that starred in Richard Prestons The Hot Zone, published the same year. Writer Stephen King called the book one of the most
horrifying things Ive ever read. Right on cue, Ebola appeared again in the Congo in 1995, but it soon disappeared. Far from being a
harbinger, HIV was the only new tropical virus to go pandemic in 50 years. In the 1980s British
cattle began dying from mad

cow disease, caused by an infectious agent in feed that was derived from the remains of other

cows. When people, too, began to catch this disease, predictions of the scale of the epidemic quickly turned terrifying: Up
to 136,000 would die, according to one study. A pathologist warned that the British have to prepare for perhaps thousands, tens of
thousands, hundreds of thousands, of cases of vCJD [new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the human manifestation of mad cow]
coming down the line. Yet the total number of deaths so far in the UK has been 176, with just five occurring in
2011 and none so far in

2012. In 2003 it was SARS, a virus from civet cats, that ineffectively but inconveniently led to
predictions of global Armageddon. SARS subsided within a year, after
killing just 774 people. In 2005 it was bird flu, described at the time by a United Nations official as being like a combination
quarantines in Beijing and Toronto amid

of global warming and HIV/AIDS 10 times faster than its running at the moment. The World Health Organizations official forecast
was 2 million to 7.4 million dead. In fact, by late 2007, when the disease petered out, the death toll was roughly 200. In
2009 it was Mexican swine

flu. WHO director general Margaret Chan said: It really is all of humanity that is under threat during
to be a normal flu episode. The truth is, a new global pandemic is
growing less likely, not more. Mass migration to cities means the opportunity for viruses to
jump from wildlife to the human species has not risen and has possibly even declined, despite media
hype to the contrary. Water- and insect-borne infectionsgenerally the most lethalare declining as
living standards slowly improve. Its true that casual-contact infections such as colds are thrivingbut only by
being mild enough that their victims can soldier on with work and social engagements, thereby
allowing the virus to spread. Even if a lethal virus does go global, the ability of medical science to
sequence its genome and devise a vaccine or cure is getting better all the time.
a pandemic. The outbreak proved

Federalization of crime inevitable plan doesnt solve

--weak mens rea requirements
--literally too many laws to count
Walsh 11 [June 9, 2011, Doing Violence to the Law: The Over-Federalization of Crime, Brian
W. Walsh, senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/06/doing-violence-to-the-law-the-overfederalization-of-crime]
But over the past few decades in particular, Congress

has routinely enacted criminal laws that lack mens rea

requirements or that include mens rea requirements that are so watered down as to provide little or no
protection to the innocent. As a result, honest men and women increas-ingly find themselves facing
criminal convictions and prison time. This happens even when their "crimes" are inadvertent violations that occur in
the course of otherwise lawful, and even beneficial, conduct. Despite increasing attention to this problem in recent years, the
trend is for fewer and weaker mens rea require-ments. In a recent study, Professor John Baker found that

seventeen of the ninety-one federal criminal offenses enacted between 2000 and 2007 lacked any mens rea requirement whatsoever.
The Heritage Foun-dation and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers will soon publish the results of their joint
research into the mens rea provisions in bills introduced in the 109th Congress. Preliminary findings reveal that the majority of
those offenses lack a mens rea require-ment sufficient to protect from federal conviction anyone who engaged in the specified
conduct but did so without criminal intent. Many lawyers seem to accept uncritically the idea that any act made

criminal by a legislature is, by that fact alone, an actus reus. But to accept that definition is to obliterate the meaning
of actus reus, for the term would be a mere synonym for "act that has been made criminal." The prob-lem
may be best illustrated using some of the "criminal" laws made and enforced by totalitarian regimes. For exam-ple, in some
communist countries it was deemed a "criminal" act for relatives of politically or religiously perse-cuted persons to discuss their
relative's persecution, even in private and even with other family members. In some regimes, any type of unauthorized
communication with a foreigner was deemed a "crime." Regardless of any elabo-rate (or convoluted) logic and rhetoric that may be
used to justify criminalizing such conduct, it is evident that there is no actus reus in these so-called crimes. Similarly, but to a lesser
extreme, when Congress makes it a federal crime to violate any foreign nation's laws or regulations

governing fish and wildlifeas it has done in the Lacey Actmany violations will be "crimes" that include
no actus reus. Some of those foreign regula-tions may do nothing more than protect the foreign nation's local business
interests. For example, the fishing regulations of a small Central American nation might require fishermen to package their catch in
cardboard, perhaps only in order to stimulate business for a domestic cardboard manufacturer. If a fisherman then packs his catch
taken in that nation's waters in plastic rather than cardboard and imports into the United Statesin viola-tion of the express terms
of no federal or state law of the United Statesis there a real actus reus? Answering yes leads to the absurd conclusion that
Congress could, with a single sentence in a single legislative act, make it a crime to violate any and every law

of every nation on earthand that every such offense thereby includes a meaningful actus reus.
Such may be positive law, but they are not "crimes" in the truest sense of the word; they are merely legislatively created
offenses that are unworthy of any free nation's criminal law. The size of the federal criminal law compounds
these problems and undermines other protections. The Princi-ple of Legality, for example, holds that
"conduct is not criminal unless forbidden by law [that] gives advance warning that such conduct is criminal." The sheer num-ber and
disorganization of federal criminal statutes ensures that no one could ever know all of the conduct that has been criminalized.

Those who have tried merely to count all federal offensesincluding both Professor Baker and the Justice
Department itselfhave been able to provide only good estimates. The task proves impossi-ble because offenses
are scattered throughout the tens of thousands of pages of the United States Code (not to men-tion
the nearly 150,000 pages of the Code of Federal Regulations). If criminal-law experts and the Justice Department
itself cannot even count them, average Amer-icans have no chance of knowing what they must do to avoid violating
federal criminal law.

No lone wolf terror

Becker, 12/14/14 [The Foreign Policy Essay: Wolves Who Are Lonely By Michael Becker
Sunday, December 14, 2014 at 10:00 AM, Michael Becker is a Ph.D. student in political science
at Northeastern University. His research focuses on international security, conflict, and
terrorism. He can be reached at
becker.m@husky.neu.edu.http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/12/the-foreign-policy-essaywolves-who-are-lonely/]
the fear surrounding lone wolves is unwarranted and based on ignorance of how they
operate.
-actor terrorists tend to conform to certain distinct patterns that can be useful
in preventing attacks
lone wolves are not nearly as threatening as either
their name or the hype around them suggest.
But much of

My research shows that lone

future

. Perhaps more important, my findings indicate that

Becker photoThe concern about lone-wolf terrorism pervades much of the U.S. national security establishment. President Obama, former

Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, and current DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, among others, have cited lone wolves as one of the gravest potential threats to U.S. security. They point to the rise of social media and terrorist propaganda, like the

It is true that lone-wolf terrorism against

the United States has become more common in the past several years
sophisticated videos produced by the Islamic State, and express concern that socially isolated individuals can become radicalized with troubling ease.

. And several lone-actor attacksincluding the 2011 shooting of

Representative Gabrielle Giffords, which left six dead, and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, which killed 13have had deadly and tragic consequences. Concurrently, there has been little success in terms of identifying a lone wolf profile. They can be young or old;

I recently
undertook an analysis of 84 lone-wolf attacks that occurred in the United States between 1940
and 2012 in an effort to identify patterns
First,
similar to our recent experience with the Ebola outbreak, the fear of the thing is usually worse
than the thing itself. Few lone-wolf attacks in the United States actually kill anyone, and many
others only succeed in killing one person the lone wolf himself
Many lone wolves are
black or white; radical Islamists, right-wing extremists, anti-Semites, militant environmentalists, or of another ideological persuasion altogether. Given the diversity of their backgrounds, how can such a protean enemy be countered?

in the targets that lone wolves chose. I came away with several findings that have important national security implications.

(they are almost invariably men).

incompetent loners with no experience discharging a bomb or firearm; oftentimes they

exhibit behavior that, in retrospect, is more bizarre and sad than frightening Take Dwight
Watson, a.k.a. the Tractor Man. In 2003, Watson drove his tractor to Washington, D.C., and
threatened to blow up explosives
After two days, he surrendered unceremoniously and
it was revealed that he never had any weapons Part of the reason for the low casualty rate in
lone-wolf attacks is that unlike groups such al-Qaeda that have significant resources at their
disposal and, even more important, a sophisticated division of labor lone wolves have to do all
the work of terrorism themselves finding a target, planning an attack, gathering supplies, doing
reconnaissance, actually carrying out the attack, and possibly executing an escape plan This
disadvantage is reflected in the weapons most lone wolves choose: firearms. Globally
most terrorist attacks are bombings
a lone gunman
likely to produce fewer
fatalities
Another significant characteristic of lone wolves is their limited ability
to select meaningful targets The expertise needed to conduct a successful attack on a
hardened targetnot an easy taskis reflected in the targets most lone wolves choose and how
they conduct themselves Lone wolves tend to choose unhardened, undefended targets
suspect that this tendency is due to two factors: the
more personal motives thatalongside their political ideologiesinform lone wolves violent
tendencies; and the desire to carry out a successful attack
The targets lone
wolves choose tend to be congruent with the ideologies that they say motivate them: so antiabortion lone wolves
What should all these
patterns mean to counterterrorism officials? They indicate most notably that lone wolves are not
as fearsome as they are often made out to be. Lone wolves are only rarely deadly. What is more,
when they do manage to kill people, their incompetence and reliance on firearms usually limit
the number of deaths
concern about lone wolves is probably overblown,
Even if the threat were more severe,
there are too many potential targets and too many potential lone wolves to expect law
enforcement to monitor, detect, and interdict them all.
.

near the National Mall.

at all.

, at the organizational level,

, but lone wolves mainly choose guns. In part, this is because guns can more easily be attained than bombs in the United States, but lone wolves preference for firearms

obtains globally as well, suggesting it is driven by their lack of facility with explosives. And

while still potentially able to cause multiple casualtiesis

than a well-made and well-placed bomb.

like college campuses,

churches, and local government buildings. Only rarely do they opt for significant or symbolic targets like the National Mall. I

, a task made easier by choosing a softer target.

go after clinics or doctors who perform abortions, while right-wing extremists target government buildings and officials. What is even more striking is that these small-ball targets tend to be found in or near

places well known to perpetratorsthe square in their hometown, the synagogue they pass on their way to work, etc. Their daily routines, in other words, are usually the scene of the crime.

. As a result, policymakers

and the allocation

of resources for counterterrorism purposes should take account of this. In some sense, this requires us to learn to live with the existence of lone-wolf terrorism.

Public health checks

Youngerman 8 (2008, Barry Youngerman, Facts on File, Global Issues: Pandemics and Global
Health, p 103-4)
Yes: given

the propensity of the flu virus to mutate, and given the constant growth in international
travel, trade, and migration, sooner or later a deadly and contagious influenza virus may well
emerge one year and begin to spread from one person to the next and from one region to
another. But: the world community is becoming better equipped from year to year to meet
such a threat. Better surveillance, international communication, diagnosis, genetic analysis,
vaccine production, antiviral development, and antibiotics will probably prevent anything like the
terrible toll of 1918. The longer such a threat can be postponed, the better prepared we are likely to be. With regard to the threat of
avian flu, in the 10 years since the pathogenic H5N1 virus emerged to infect its first human victims it has failed to
develop permanent mutations that would allow it to spread more easily to people. However, this is not
entirely a matter of good luck. Several mutations have emerged that are quite worrisome to scientists, but as far as we know, every single person
infected with the mutated virus has been isolated and either recovered or died without passing the mutation on. We

must be grateful for

the swift response of World Health Organization (WHO) teams who encouraged governments to impose
quarantines and arrange for the treatment of everyone involved with antivirals. This quick
response has denied the mutated viruses the opportunity to mix with human flu viruses to create
a super-pathogenic strain, which probably happened sometime before 1918. 152 The world community must
continue to be vigilant, however, and proactively help those countries that lack the resources to deal with the issue on their own.

2NC

SOLVES COMMERCE CLAUSE

The Treaty Power is a separate basis for regulation but prevents federal overreach
on federalism
Austin, 7 - Senior Attorneys at the Environmental Law Institute (Jay, Anchoring the Clean
Water Act: Congresss Constitutional Sources of Power To Protect the Nations Waters
https://www.acslaw.org/files/Clean%20Water%20Act%20Issue%20Brief.pdf)
In the event that any so-called isolated wetland or similar body of water were to be deemed by
a court to lie beyond the reach of federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, Congresss
treaty power would provide an independent basis for regulation.58 Article II, Section 2 of
the Constitution establishes that the President of the United States shall have power, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur. This provision, taken together with the Necessary and Proper Clause power
(discussed above) to implement federal authority, form what is known as the treaty power of
Congress. And Article VI of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause, provides that treaties, like
the Constitution and federal laws, are the supreme law of the land.
The foreign affairs power of the United States governmentincluding the power to make
treatiesis not an enumerated power under the Constitution. Rather, it is inherent in the
Nations sovereignty.59 This power is vested exclusively in the federal government, and need not
be exercised so as to conform to state laws or policies.60 Nor are there limitations on either the
purpose or subject matter of international agreements.61
Despite its breadth, the treaty power of course is not without limits. A treaty may not contravene
an express constitutional prohibition, and legislation passed to implement a treaty must bear a
rational relationship to a permissible constitutional end.62 Every treaty must be a bona fide
international agreementand not simply a mock marriage between nations contrived solely to
address the subject matter of the agreement.63 And the fact that a supermajority (two-thirds) of
the Senate is required to approve a treaty reflects not only a legislative check on the executive
branch, but also a structural federalism opportunity for the states to have their say
and, indeed, for even a minority of states to block passage of a treaty altogether.

PATRICK
Says chart a new course, we do that now, actually goes neg because says we need
approaches sensitive to national contexts like countries that dont want immediate
full legalization in violation of the original treaty
Stewart M. Patrick, 14, Senior Fellow and Director, Program on International Institutions
and Global Governance @ CFR, The Global Debate Over Illegal Drugs Heats Up, April 1, 2014,
http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2014/04/01/the-global-debate-over-illegal-drugs-heats-up/
Having been frozen for four decades, a long-deferred debate over the war on drugs is finally heating up. Ever since the Nixon
administration, the dominant paradigm informing U.S. and global policy towards narcotics has been
prohibition. That failed approach is now being challenged by a slew of influential reports, path-breaking
national policies in the Western Hemisphere, and state-level experiments within the United
States. Just how turbulent the debate has become was clear at yesterdays roundtable on the future of international drug policy, hosted by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. The United States will need to chart a new policy course if it hopes to retain
credibility and influence as global attitudes toward drugs continue to evolve. The U.S. law enforcement approach

has focused on attacking sources of supply, interdicting shipments of drugs and incarcerating dealers. It has also targeted demand, imprisoning and fining addicts and casual
users. And yet these repressive efforts have made little dent in the global drug trade. By artificially inflating profits, prohibition has only incentivized criminal activity. Traffickers
have successfully shifted production sites and transit routes in response to crackdowns. Criminality, corruption and violence have destabilized vulnerable governments. Prison

debate over
how to handle the global drug trade is gaining momentum. The first cracks in the prohibitionist edifice appeared in 2011, with
the publication of the Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy. The commissionco-chaired by former Mexican president Ernesto
populations have swollen with addicts and casual users. And yet drugs are cheaper and more available than ever before. Fortunately, a long-deferred

Zedillo, former Brazilian president Fernando Enrique Cardoso, and former U.S. secretary of state George Shultz, and including other global luminaries like Kofi Annan, Paul

pulled no punches

Volcker, and Javier Solana

. The reports opening paragraph said it all: The global war on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for
individuals and societies around the world. Fifty years after the initiation of the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and 40 years after President Nixon launched the US
governments war on drugs, fundamental reforms in national and global drug control policies are urgently needed. It was time, the commission concluded, to break the taboo

The
commission endorsed a public health approach to reducing drug use and dependence, an end to incarceration of low-level drug offenders, and a shift from
prohibition to regulation and harm reduction, with ample room for national experimentationincluding decriminalization and even legalization. The
Western Hemisphere has been most receptive to this appeal. The secretary-general of the Organization of American States,
Jose Miguel Insulza, last year released a bracing Report on the Drug Problem in the Americas, documenting the damage of the war on drugs and
endorsing differentiated approaches tailored to national contexts and concerns.
on debate and reform. The report categorically rejected the repressive measures that had clearly failed to effectively curtail supply or consumption.

In Central America, ravaged by drug-related violence, Guatemalan President Otto Perz Molina has insisted that prohibition has failed and that the only solution is regulation.
In Colombia, which has received billions of dollars in U.S. counterdrug assistance since 2000, president Juan Manuel Santos has announced, Its time to think again about the
war on drugs. Further south, Uruguay has become the first country in the Americas to legalize the marijuana trade. Meanwhile, in the United States, Colorado and Washington
have legalized recreational use of cannabis, and eighteen other states and the District of Columbia have decriminalized its use. And at the federal level, both President Obama

The United
States, long the watchdog of the global prohibition regime, is facing a new diplomatic landscape
as a result of all this turbulence. Speaking at CSIS, Ambassador William Brownfield, assistant secretary of the State Department Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), called it the most significant national and global debate on drug policy in history. It is one where the
United States increasingly finds itself on the defensive, alternately whipsawed by
attacks on its prohibitionist national stance and criticisms of the conduct of its individual
states. Last October, Brownfield found himself before the International Narcotics Control Board, where he was asked to explain why the United States could claim to be in
compliance with the obligations of the three main international drug conventions, given legal and fast-developing cannabis markets in Washington and Colorado. The
diplomatic challenge for the United States is to adjust its prohibitionist stance to new
hemispheric and global realities. And it does not have much time. In 2016 the United Nations General
Assembly will convene a Special Session (UNGASS) on Drug Policythe first such event in eighteen years. To move the
global debate on drug policy in a constructive direction, the United States has just two years to
go from enforcer to reformer.
and Attorney General Eric Holder have noted the futility and injustice of continuing to imprison millions of Americans for low-level drug offenses.

The CP is far more likely to spill over globally than the plan
Harm Reduction Coalition, 11 (HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW AFFECTS US DRUG
POLICY harmreduction.org/wp.../HowInternationalLawAffectsUSDrugPolicy.pdf)
Why US drug reform must go hand-in-hand with global reform:
There are many supporters of drug reform within the US, but surprisingly little awareness of the
limitations on domestic reform given the international reality. Calls for domestic reform in

isolation from the international community can only go so far both because of the USs role in
the international drug control system and the Administrations stated intention to adhere to the
system. US advocates would benefit from taking advantage of the growing community of
member states and international organizations calling for international reform. US reform will
be more effective using a combination of efforts in the US as well as collaboration with reformminded member states in the international community.
Options under the current state/federal/international system (short-term):
Decriminalization may be the best option for now, since it is arguably allowable under
the treaties, many member countries are already enacting formal decriminalization laws, the US
Administration has announced a shift towards treatment/prevention, and there is precedent for
decriminalization and/or allowance of harm reduction measures at the state level.
Depenalization/non-enforcement is a viable option that is allowable under the treaties;
however, it leaves significant control in the hands of local law enforcement.
Legalization is not currently a viable option in light of the treaties and the stated
intention of the Obama Administration, as it would require either 1) modification or amendment
to the treaties (neither of which is currently likely) or 2) disregard of, or withdrawal from, the
treaties by the US Federal Government.

2NC SAY YES

Amendment only requires a simple majority vote at UNGASS
Bewley-Taylor 14 - Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea
University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory (David,The Rise and
Decline of Cannabis Prohibition: the History of cannabis in the UN drug control system and
options for reform,
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf
Substantially modifying the scheduling of cannabis (and coca leaf) via a WHO review might be a feasible scenario. Regarding

amendments, an alternative option explained in the Commentary on the Single Convention is

particularly interesting in light of the upcoming UNGASS in 2016: [T]he General Assembly may
itself take the initiative in amending the Convention, either by itself adopting the revisions, or by calling a
Plenipotentiary Conference for this purpose.43 The General Assembly could thus adopt treaty amendments
by simple majority vote, always provided that no amendment, however adopted, would be
binding upon a Party not accepting it.44 The Secretary- General or the General Assembly could first appoint an expert
group or high-level panel to advise on various options for treaty reform, including the more ambitious idea for a new Single
Convention. Cannabis, most likely, would no longer be part of the control system under such a new Single Convention. Another
international control model for cannabis could perhaps be designed, as several have suggested, modelled on the WHO Tobacco
Convention.45

Their say no arguments assume harder drugs not cannabis enough support
exists for legalization within the 2016 UNGASS conference
Chawla, 10/17/14 - Former Deputy Executive Director and Director of Research and Policy UN
Office on Drugs and Crime (INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE U.S. TREND TOWARDS
LEGAL MARIJUANA Brookings Event Transcript
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2014/10/17-international-impactsmarijuana/20141017_legal_marijuana_transcript.pdf
Now, in the situation which we have at the moment, and I now turn to the present with this, this
whole debate seems to have done a full circle with Colorado and Washington, because now, with
what is happening in these two states, the ground on which the federal government has
advocated drug control internationally has now turned very shaky. And if several states within
this country move along the path of Washington and Colorado, then there is a danger that in the
future, the emperor may have no clothes.
And the danger is one in which an international commitment will need to be adapted to face a
completely different situation, because the policy of the United States internationally has always
sought to occupy the model high ground. With drugs, the model high ground is the international
conventions. If the support for the conventions is wavering within the country, then we need to
deal with that reality, and the government of this country will have to deal with that reality in
terms of how it pursues its policies internationally, since occupying the moral high ground,
supporting the drug conventions has always meant that all the very significant power of the
United States comes down against anybody transgresses the international system and against
the conventions.
So, the power of the United States has frequently been exercised in soft terms, in hard terms, in
different ways against any state that transgressed or pushed the limits of the conventions,
whether it was against countries like the Netherlands, which defected from the conventions, but
in terms of a soft defection, whether it was against countries like Bolivia, which tried first to
amend the single convention, and then eventually denounced and re-acceded with a reservation,
or whether it was against countries like Uruguay, but now the approach to Uruguay is
completely different because of Colorado and Washington.

So, we have to move now into a situation in which the international leadership provided by the
United States in the United Nations, among other areas, will have to somehow be adapted to
these new realities. That adapting will be one which we will see very clearly in the UNGASS in
2016, a special session of the General Assembly, which is meant to look at this whole drug
control system, and for us to try and anticipate what we can expect from this and what can
reasonably be done before it, because we need to have a situation in which something concrete
and constructive can be achieved.
Its quite clear that in this, the considerable influence of the United States government can be
used to pursue the idea of getting a constructive debate forward. What can we do in this
constructive debate? First and foremost, I think its clear, and now the concluding remarks
about the future, at the UNGASS, its quite clear that if we have another self congratulatory
exercise saying everything is all well and fine in the world in drug control, and we eliminate the
drug problem and make our world drug free by a certain pre-determined date, well, thats not
likely to happen.
Or, it may happen, but I hope it won't. I think there is enough happening in the world to prevent
that kind of outcome. We can't expect another very optimistic outcome which is at 2016; the
nations of the world will agree to revise the drug treaties. Thats a very slow, cumbersome
process, and thats very unlikely to happen, as well. But I think it is realistic to hope for the fact
that we will have some genuine debate.
We need not come up with a binding declaration on all countries, but we can have some genuine
debate about how the world has changed since these conventions were adopted. We can,
through the UNGASS, allow for a certain amount of space and flexibility for countries to
experiment with their own drug policies. This includes the United States with Colorado and
Washington and what may happen as far as marijuana is concerned, and we may eventually
get to the first step to remove what was quite clearly the most -- the weakest and the most
vulnerable point of this whole control system, which was something that has been obvious for 30
years, but nobody has ever been able to do anything about it, because of the dead weight of
multi-lateral consensus, and that was to include cannabis in the same control regime as heroin
and cocaine and methamphetamine. That oddity of the system needs to be removed, and the
UNGASS can take the first step towards it.
Russia will go along with public health approaches their say no cards take out
the aff because it means the principled violation they do is seen as too radical
this can only go neg
Collins, 10/28/14 - John Collins is the International Drug Policy Project Coordinator at LSE
IDEAS at the London School of Economics (John, Surprising source offers signs the global war
on drugs may be ending Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2014/10/28/surprising-source-offers-signs-the-global-war-on-drugs-may-be-ending/
Now that the United States has openly rejected the role of key bilateral enforcer the United
Nations will likely cease to be a forum where states are pressured to pursue the war on drugs
orthodoxy. Instead, it can become a forum that facilitates cooperation and discussion on a new
range of policy approaches.
The main obstacle to this change will likely remain Russia and a coalition of conservative states
that are reticent to move away from a militarized and repressive police response. Nonetheless,
Russia, despite a strong grip on the UN drug control apparatus, will struggle to enforce its vision
due to the post-Ukraine diplomatic freeze and a general recognition that Russias domestic drug
policies have fuelled incarceration, human rights abuses and a HIV epidemic.

CP SOLVES U
The CP creates uniqueness it boosts US credibility in all international forums
Bennett, 10/16/14 - Brookings fellow in governance studies (Wells, Interview conducted by
Jonathan Rauch, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2014/10/16-marijuanaenforcement-modernize-international-drug-treaties-rauch)
Why should we care about avoiding a collision between international
commitments and domestic policies? Countries technically violate treaties all the
time, dont they?
The United States has a unique role in the world. It can summon powers that no other nation
can summon, but it confronts risks that no other nation confronts. If you accept that premise,
then the United States has a unique interest in securing reciprocal compliance from its treaty
partners. It gets harder and harder to call out our partners for excessive flexibility within the
drug treaty structuresor for that matter within other multilateral commitmentsafter we have
claimed a lot of flexibility for ourselves.

You argue that the United States, starting now, should proactively rule in drug-treaty changes as a possibility,
instead of ruling them out. What do you mean by that?
So far, in public anyway, the United States has described the drug treaties as living documents that can be updated through
interpretation. Now, whats missing from that is a suggestion that the drug treaties might be changed structurally through provisions
established within the treaties themselves. There are real advantages that go with, say, a treaty amendment process.
Your paper emphasizes that revising the marijuana treaties could actually strengthen international law. How so?
There are two ways to go about ensuring that international law accommodates domestic policy change. One is to engage in a
unilateral interpretive exercise. The other is, where possible, to use channels that have been set up in international law itself. There
are times when the former route is appropriate, but it carries certain risks, and one of those risks is undercutting an international
legal regime on which the United States increasingly depends. The other approach, though it involves costs and challenges of its
own, has the benefit of operating within international law itself. Going that route pays tribute to international law.
But why now? Why not wait?
Because youre always setting a precedent. There are costs to not doing it now. Moreover, the United States has been justly described
as the biggest advocate for and defender of the drug treaties. In the past, when it perceived deficiencies in the drug control regimes,
it pushed for changes using procedural avenues created by the drug control system itself. So theres a precedent set by the United
States acting within this regime and using the rules that it sets forth.
What kinds of changes should we be starting to think about?
Nothing aggressive or radical, certainly. But ideally you would want to codify at the international level the kind of domestic flexibility
that the Justice Department is claiming. For example, you might consider a treaty amendment making clear that a national
government could allow federal subunits to liberalize their marijuana policies in a rigorous and regulated way, but still allowing or
even requiring the national government to intervene if liberalization at that level goes awry.
Flexibility just for marijuana? Not other illegal drugs?
Right. In fact, thats an advantage to making these changes using mechanisms within the treaties: when you negotiate for them in
that way, you can provide greater clarity about what youre allowing and not allowing. The United States is understandably anxious
about setting bad precedents with respect to much more dangerous substances, things that would cause the whole drug control
framework to unravel. The amendment procedure accounts for that in a better fashion than does a unilateral approach.
Is it realistic to talk about adjusting the treaties? Would our partners consider it? Would the Senate approve it?
Yes, I think it is realistic. Reaching a consensus at the international level would be difficult. Obtaining Senate approval would also be
difficult. But difficult does not mean impossible. As an issue, marijuana summons unique support from both sides of the aisle
domestically. On the international level, the United States has successfully changed the treaties when it has pushed to do so. So the
difficulty of the project shouldnt take it off the table.

If we and our partners made treaty reform work for marijuana, would that ramify
beyond drug policy?
At a minimum, success in treaty reform could reaffirm the United States commitment to
acting within international legal structures, and in that regard give us credibility in all kinds
of international forums. Any time youre trying to persuade parties to a treaty to go your
way, it helps to be able to point to other treaty areas and say you acted as scrupulously as
possible.

2NC TREATIES LINK

The US already bases its current stance towards UNGASS on constitutional
discretion the squo solves their turn through existing state legalization and
decriminalization escape clauses and this proves the CP fully resolves their
advantage and theres only a chance of a link
Jelsma, 14 - Martin Jelsma is a political scientist. He coordinates the Drugs and Democracy
program at the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam (Martin, Reforming the Global DrugControl System: The Stakes for Washington NACLA Report, Summer 2014NACLA Report,
Summer 2014
https://nacla.org/article/reforming-global-drug-control-system-stakes-washington
Washington proposes to allow more flexibility with regard to constitutional discretion on
how to allocate scarce resources for treaty implementation. This interpretation, until now
rejected by the INCB, forms the basis for the U.S. argument that its federal decision not to
intervene in states regulation of cannabis is in compliance with the UN conventions. In
exchange for international acceptance of this narrative, Washington appears willing to let
Uruguay and others regulate cannabis unhindered as well. This nascent U.S. leniency, however,
does not extend to areas such as Bolivias coca policy or harm reduction measures such as drug
consumption rooms.
No easy treaty reform options exist, and renegotiating a new single convention is not a very
attractive prospect given diverging opinions and broken global consensus. But avoiding the
debate only perpetuates an outdated and inconsistent treaty framework, leading to more legal
hypocrisy that hides the reality of treaty breaches, which in turn undermine respect for
international law. The current flexibility in the treatiesthanks to built-in escape clauseshas
been useful in generating more respect for human rights and for arguing the legality of certain
harm reduction and decriminalization policies. But thats not good enough.
The normative UN framework for drug control should represent a moral high ground and
provide proper guidelines for countries to do what is right, instead of allowing them via legally
contested interpretations to abstain from doing what is wrong. The conventions escape clauses
do not turn the treaties into something whose integrity is worth defending.
The current framework is rooted in zero tolerance; it obliges countries to ban ancient cultural,
religious, and indigenous practices, forces them to criminalize cultivation and possession
including for personal use, and imposes severe criminal sanctions on anyone involved in the
illicit market. In 2008, at the ten-year review of the United Nations General Assembly Special
Session (UNGASS) on drugs the UN recognized a spirit of reform in the air to adapt [the
conventions] to a reality on the ground that is considerably different from the time they were
drafted. Today that is truer than ever. The 2016 UNGASS represents a unique opportunity to
perhaps not yet resolve, but at least to openly discuss genuine options for bringing the global
drug policy framework up to date and making it more flexible.
The constitutional principles loophole would destroy the treaty
David R. Bewley-Taylor 2, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea
University Wales, and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, July 2002,
Habits of a Hegemon: The United States and the future of the global drug prohibition regime,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:BshFLtlnFjMJ:www.drugtext.org/Int
ernational-national-drug-policy/habits-of-a-hegemon.html+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
Should parties prefer not to follow the denunciation route, they could exploit what Peter Webster has called an
"important loophole" in the treaties.(11) As Webster notes, the 1997, UNDCP World Drug Report states:

"...[none of the] three international drug Conventions insist on the establishment of drug consumption per se as a punishable
offence. Only the 1988 Convention clearly requires parties to establish as criminal offences under law the

possession, purchase or cultivation o f controlled drugs for the purpose of non-medical, personal consumption, unless

to do so
would be contrary to the constitutional principles and basic concepts of their legal systems.(12)
(emphasis added)

Thus, if the highest courts in signatory nations ruled that such prohibitive clauses with regard to
a single drug (cannabis for example) or a selection of outlawed substances was unconstitutional, then the parties
involved would no longer have to work within the limitations of the Convention with respect to those
drugs. Such action would be perfectly legitimate according to the provisions of the treaties themselves. Debate
already exists with regard to the value of challenging drug prohibition on the grounds of human rights violations. (14) As with all of

the options discussed here, this course of action would undoubtedly attract massive criticism and more from
the UN and the US. Yet, as with the denunciation option, a group of nations would more likely be able to withstand pressure.

Defection via this route would again severely weaken the treaty system and possibly act as a trigger for
regime change.

Courts still trigger massive international political backlash even if the plan is
technically correct
Bewley-Taylor, 3 - Department of American Studies, University of Wales Swansea (David,
Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and possibilities International
Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171-179, Science Direct)
Thus, if the highest courts in signatory nations ruled that prohibition of a single drug (cannabis
for example) or a selection of outlawed substances, was unconstitutional then the Parties
involved would no longer be bound by the limitations of the Conventions with respect to those
drugs. Such action would be perfectly legitimate according to the provisions of the treaties
themselves. Debate already exists with regard to the value of challenging drug prohibition on the
grounds of human rights violations (Riley, 1998; Van Ree, 1999). As with all of the options
discussed here, this course of action would undoubtedly attract massive criticism and more
from the UN and the US. Yet, as with the denunciation option, a group of nations would more
likely be able to withstand pressure. Defection via this route would again severely weaken the
treaty system and possibly act as a trigger for regime change.
Brownfield doctrine is mobilizing support for international reform now
Collins, 12/1/14 - John Collins is a PhD Candidate in the Department of International History
at the London School of Economics, and Coordinator of the LSE IDEAS International Drug
Policy Project (The State Departments move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a
rational approach to a difficult question. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-snew-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficultquestion/
The US State Department recently restated a major shift in US drug diplomacy. At its core is the idea of

allowing greater variation in international policies and the opportunity to develop new national innovations. Ambassador William
Brownfield, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, recently summed up
the idea:
Things have changed since 1961. We must have enough flexibility to allow us to incorporate those changes into our policies to
tolerate different national drug policies, to accept the fact that some countries will have very strict drug approaches; other countries
will legalize entire categories of drugs.
This new Brownfield Doctrine has provoked significant international policy discussion and debate.
What is the Brownfield Doctrine?

The Brownfield Doctrine is a framework for thinking about how to readjust international drug
policy in the short term. Its based on shifting enforcement priorities and allowing policy
innovation via flexible interpretation of certain antiquated provisions of the international drug

conventions. Its derived from US constitutional principles around purposive interpretations of legal texts rather than maintaining
strict legalistic or originalist interpretations. Ambassador Brownfield described this, similar to the US constitution, as viewing the
treaties as living breathing documents which should be interpreted via their preambulatory principles of protecting the health and
welfare of mankind instead of pedantic readings of outdated clauses. It is based on four points:
Defend the integrity of the core of the conventions.
Allow flexible interpretation of treaties.
Allow different national/regional strategies.

Tackle organised crime.

The international response
The response has been tentative and mixed. Member

states of drug conventions are pushing ahead with it in

many respects. For example the recent Organization of American States Special General Assembly
on Drugs invoked principles derived from the doctrine. It has become particularly controversial
within some circles because its a unilateral framework put forward by the former chief
proselytizer and bully on international drug policy the United States.
Regardless of who authored it, the four-point approach is on balance a sensible path forward for the
immediate future and allows breathing room for innovation and changes in policy, which could
become stalled in messy discussions around treaty reform. If a Latin American or a European country had
authored the framework it would likely have received a warmer response; it just so happens to be from the US.

Brownfield doctrine strikes the perfect sequence of reform aff criticisms are
wrong the squo isnt an actual breach
Collins, 12/1/14 - John Collins is a PhD Candidate in the Department of International History
at the London School of Economics, and Coordinator of the LSE IDEAS International Drug
Policy Project (The State Departments move to a more flexible diplomatic policy on drugs is a
rational approach to a difficult question. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/12/01/the-u-snew-more-flexible-diplomatic-doctrine-on-drugs-is-a-rational-approach-to-a-difficultquestion/
The downsides to the State Departments policy
I have already discussed the human rights aspects. Some

argue that the Doctrine doesnt go far enough and

allows for repressive approaches to be continued and that its a tool to hide US violation of
treaties around cannabis, while the US continues to enforce the parts of the war on drugs it
wants. Further they question why the US should get to set out the terms for global drug policy reform or debates.
I think these arguments miss the point. Firstly the Brownfield Doctrine is what states make of
it. If they use it to develop innovations around policy, which improve the global approach to
drugs and make the repressive model empirically unjustifiable, then I think it can be extremely positive, especially
if it can be used to forward discussions on treaty reforms. If, on the other hand, it is used to ignore
broader issues about drug policy reform, then I think it will be a negative. It will be up to civil society and
reform-minded states to hold other member states feet to the fire on this, but ultimately I think the opportunities
drastically outweigh the dangers.
Secondly, its very hard to argue that the US is flat-out breaching the treaties. The Federal
Government is the executor of the treaties and national legislation is unchanged. The Federal
Government also has no ability to force states to criminalise marijuana. They could use federal resources
to enforce federal laws, but that would result in a drastic reshaping of state-federal relations. The real implications of the
Brownfield Doctrine therefore fall on less powerful states. Uruguay has a far tougher time explaining its
decision to legalise cannabis in the context of the drug treaties, but the Brownfield Doctrine essentially says that
the US and other states will allow them breathing room while the debates around treaty
reform play out. To me that seems like a rational approach to a difficult question.
Thirdly, there is nothing in the treaties which mandates the current war on drugs approach. There are certain legislative actions
which adherence to the treaties require, but the level of resourcing is entirely up to states as is their implementation. The war on
drugs was a national and bilateral creation, facilitated by multilateral forums, such as the UN. To end the war on drugs requires a
rollback on various diplomatic, regional, national and local fronts. In the immediate term very few of these relate to the drug
treaties. Further, evidence of efficacy around alternative policies is the best inoculation against states continuing the repressive
model. In the future, increasing pluralism in international drug policies will likely render the treaties

unsustainable, and that is when treaty rewriting will likely become inevitable.
Fourthly, no member state is yet advocating rewriting the documents. Multilateral cooperation on
any issue is hard to create. When it is created, the goal of member states becomes to sustain it,
even in the face of variance in implementation and interpretation. The Brownfield Doctrine is
just the application of this fact to the field of drug policy. The most rational reform strategy
seems to me one which pushes the doctrine as far as practicable and uses it to hold the US to a
standard of non-intervention outside its borders. When sufficient national level reforms have

taken place, then issues around treaty reforms will become more apparent and practical, but
there needs to be a sequential action process here.
Their turns conflate treaty EXIT with treaty BREACH the plan doesnt formally
withdraw from the treaty so its not an exit and cant access the turn
Helfer, 5 - Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, Vanderbilt
University Law School (Laurence, EXITING TREATIES Virginia Law Review Vol. 91:1579)
Material sanctions can be an important inducement to comply with treaty commitments. Even
where sanctions are weak or difficult to impose, however, a states concern with reputation acts
as an independent inducement for a state to adhere to its international obligations. At the
highest level of generality, the link between reputation and compliance is simply stated: If a
state fails to comply with its treaty commitments, other states will be reluctant to enter into
future agreements with that state or will demand additional assurances or concessions before
doing so.100
What are the reputational consequences of treaty exit and how do they compare to those of
treaty breach? The most basic distinction is that a withdrawing state is actually adhering to
the treatys rules by publicizing its decision to exit prospectively.101 Given the generally
weak mechanisms available to monitor and enforce compliance with treaty obligations, breach is
often a plausible alternative to exit. The choice to denounce, therefore, together with any
explanation the state offers to justify its decision, may signal an intent to play by the rules of
future treaties as well. As a result, the harm to the withdrawing states reputation as a law
abiding nation may be minimal.
Its impossible to fashion effective international drug policy from outside the
Single Convention framework---alternatives to the regime will go nowhere
Collins, 11 - John Collins is a PhD candidate in the Department of International History at the
London School of Economics. He researches the history of post-war drug control and its foreign
policy implications. (De-emphasising the Single Convention - The Lessons of Drug Control
History 10/11, http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/11/10/2011/de-emphasising-singleconvention-lessons-drug-control-history)
These observations have practical as well as analytic significance. By misreading the Single
Convention as sui generis, and a direct product of US drug control imperialism, reform
advocates risk overlooking many of the historical forces that helped create - and continue to
underpin - the system. For example, some regime critics are drawn to a repealist narrative - one
that suggests that the path to change is through a retraction of the Single Convention. The
problem with such a conception is that it is likely to lead down the path of most
resistance. The Single Convention was the product of an extremely complex interplay of
forces: geopolitical, economic, cultural, diplomatic and personal. It would be impossible now
to reach a consensus at the international level on the future shape of the control system outside
of the Single Convention. The realisation of this fact helps explain the almost paranoid defensive
crouch that has long characterised the regime and its bureaucrats.
The transnational bureaucracies and layers of civil society that underpin the system are over a
century old. The regime has survived two world wars and the geopolitical tides of the
twentieth century. In the pantheon of international cooperation it certainly qualifies as one of
the great survivors. The odds that it will simply pack-up shop or cede control of the issue to a
new epistemic community are very poor. Understanding the broader historical forces, rather
than focusing intently on their manifestation through treaty documents like the Single
Convention, is therefore important for critics. Meaningful change will be most likely to occur
when the regime internalises an understanding of its own failures and its bureaucrats begin to
see their own futures as dependent on moving away from the failed norms and policies of the

past. Such a change will not happen in a revolutionary manner. Instead it will be evolutionary
and incremental. To expect anything more is to underestimate the forces of bureaucratic inertia
as well as the byzantine structures of international politics.

[1NR] AT: STATE LEGALIZATION N/U

State legalization is less symbolic it was the driving force behind the move to cut
off federal funding for DC legalization
Noble, 11/18/14 - Andrea Noble is a crime and public safety reporter for The Washington
Times (D.C. marijuana legalization could put U.S. in violation of anti-drug treaties
Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/18/marijuanalegalization-in-dc-could-put-us-in-viola/?page=all
Allowing marijuana legalization in the District leaves the United States vulnerable to charges it
is violating international treaties aimed at stemming the drug trade, the nonpartisan research arm of
Congress concluded in an analysis that could strengthen the resolve of lawmakers on Capitol Hill to overturn the measure.
Though four states have voted to legalize the drug, a report issued this week by the Congressional Research Service
suggests that implementation of the Districts Initiative 71 could be considered the most direct
affront to international agreements because Congress has oversight of local D.C. laws and the ability to

overturn them.
The analysis addresses questions by the United Nations-backed International Narcotics Control Board on whether the citys marijuana law would
undermine the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which pledged international cooperation to limit the spread of illegal substances.
This line of reasoning suggests that if Initiative 71 is permitted to take effect, this inaction by the federal government may strengthen the Boards
argument that the United States has not fulfilled its commitments under the Single Convention, the report stated.
Last week, Reuters quoted Yury Fedotov, executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, as saying legalization in some states was
inconsistent with international treaties.
I dont see how [the new laws] can be compatible with existing conventions, the news agency quoted Mr. Fedotov as saying.
More than two-thirds of voters endorsed marijuana legalization in the District at the ballot box this month. But unlike measures passed in Oregon and
Alaska and those in effect in Colorado and Washington, Congress has final authority over laws in the city.
Members could block implementation through a rider attached to a larger bill, or the House and Senate could pass a rare joint disapproval resolution
that would also require the signature of President Obama.
Conflicting reports about congressional interest in blocking implementation have emerged in the weeks since the initiative passed, suggesting that the
referendums fate is uncertain.
Rep. Andy Harris, a Maryland Republican who has led the effort to block implementation of looser pot laws in the District, said Tuesday that the legal
opinion puts more pressure on Congress to act.
I would hope it would, but this issue has gone way outside the realm of rationality, Mr. Harris said. Im a little puzzled at how we can avoid enforcing
the law on marijuana and still be in compliance with those treaties.
He said the Congress would act to overturn the marijuana law early next year either through riders or a disapproval resolution.
Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky, the ranking Republican on the Senate committee with oversight of the District, has said Congress should respect the will of
the voters.
The author of the Congressional Research Service analysis, Todd Garvey, pointed out that the United States is a party to three international drug
control conventions that require U.S. authorities to limit the movement and use of marijuana to scientific and medical purposes. The analysis notes that
the Controlled Substances Act was enacted to enable compliance with those requirements.
Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but the Justice Department has outlined a policy by which it would use prosecutorial discretion not to go
after users in states where it has been legalized for recreational use. Officials have cited the low priority of such cases, framing the issue as one of law
enforcement resources.
William R. Brownfield, assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, echoed the argument before
international reporters in October. Asked about U.S. treaty obligations, he said the Controlled Substances Act was still in effect.
We are all required to abide by the conventions that we ourselves have ratified, he said. But the conventions are not rigid. The conventions were
written more than 50 years ago. We are allowed to interpret them so long as our interpretation is still consistent with our universal desire to reduce the
misuse and abuse of harmful products throughout the world.

The Congressional Research Service report puts off the question of whether the U.S. has strayed
from its international obligations by adopting a policy of nonenforcement in Oregon, Alaska,
Washington and Colorado. It notes that the Constitution leaves Congress with little authority over the laws passed in those states.
The federal relationship with the District, however, is a completely different story, it states,

recounting how Congress has plenary authority over D.C. laws.

While the federal government is limited in its ability to prevent states from removing criminal penalties for marijuana under state law, there would
appear to be an available legislative action that the federal government may take to prevent the District from legalizing marijuana: it may enact a joint
resolution of disapproval rejecting Initiative 71 and preventing the measure from taking effect, the analysis states.
The initiative passed by D.C. voters would make it legal to possess up to 2 ounces of marijuana and for D.C. residents to grow up to six marijuana plants
in their homes. The ballot measure does not set up a scheme by which marijuana could be bought and sold, but city lawmakers already have begun
drafting regulations and a taxation mechanism.
Keith Humphreys, a professor at Stanford University who studies drug policy, agrees that the treaty

concerns make the District a

special case when it comes to marijuana legalization.
This is not as clear-cut as Oregon or Alaska, which are not party to international treaties, Mr.
Humphreys said. If Congress doesnt act, this would be pushing it further than what has happened so far.
For

the states, it may be pushing the spirit of the treaties, but the letter of the treaties are
fine. This would be going against the treaties more directly, Mr. Humphreys said.

State legalization is OK
Garvey, 11/20/14 analyst for the Congressional Research Service (Todd, Congressional
Research Service weighs marijuana legalization in the District Washington Times,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/20/text-congressional-research-serviceweighs-marijua/
Notwithstanding the Boards position, our

federal structure may sometimes give rise to difficulties in fully

implementing U.S. treaty commitments, as the federal governments ability to ensure state
action that is consistent with our international commitments is subject to constitutional
constraints. As discussed here, the federal government is limited in its ability to stop states like Colorado,

Washington, Alaska, and Oregon from removing their own criminal penalties for marijuana (although the federal government
arguably has a greater degree of authority to prevent the states from enacting regulatory systems providing for the affirmative
licensing of marijuana growers and retailers). A number of courts have held that the Tenth Amendment protects a states power to
decide what [under its own laws] is criminal and what is not. Accordingly, the federal government can neither direct states to enact
specific legislation, prevent states from amending or repealing their own laws, nor require state police to enforce federal law against
private parties. In limited ways, the Single Convention appears to reflect this principle by stating that the

obligation to adopt measures making the cultivation, distribution, or possession of marijuana a punishable offense
shall be subject to [each Partys] constitutional limitations.

1NR

OVERVIEW
Outweighs on magnitude
Avery, 13 --Associate Professor, University of Copenhagen (11/6/2013, John Scales Avery, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate
Into Global Nuclear War, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm)

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure
groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global

nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember
that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict.
There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the
Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable
government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government
might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the
conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East.
Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price
of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy. In the
dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would
be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that
besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive
contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a
global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate
ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere.
To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the
peoples of the world, US citizens included.

AT: UNIQUENESS
At best their ev creates a brink GOP may have a feasible shot at veto-proof
majority but it isnt guaranteed and demonstrates why Obama must continue
investing PC to prevent sanctions. Thats Everett and Beauchamp. Every aff card is
aspirational and reflects quotes from neocon sponsors, not moderate holdouts
which only the link implicates.
Riechmann, 12/29/14 (Deb, Associated Press, Obama doesn't rule out US embassy in Iran,
Factiva, JMP)
WASHINGTON (AP) While President Barack Obama hasn't ruled out the possibility of reopening a U.S. Embassy in Iran,
Republicans say the Senate will vote within weeks on a bill to impose more sanctions on Tehran

over its nuclear program.

Obama was asked in an NPR interview broadcast on Monday whether he could envision opening an embassy there during his final
two years in office.
"I never say never," Obama said, adding that U.S. ties with Tehran must be restored in steps.

Washington and its partners are hoping to clinch a deal with Iran by July that would set longterm limits on Iran's enrichment of uranium and other activity that could produce material for use in nuclear

weapons. Iran says its program is solely for energy production and medical research purposes. It has agreed to some restrictions in
exchange for billions of dollars in relief from U.S. economic sanctions.
On a visit to Israel on Saturday, Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., said the new Republican-controlled Senate will vote on an Iran
sanctions bill in January.
He said the bipartisan sanction legislation says: "If Iran walks away from the table, sanctions will be re-imposed. If Iran cheats
regarding any deal that we enter to the Iranians, sanctions will be re-imposed."
Graham also is sponsoring legislation that would require any deal with Iran to be approved by Congress before sanctions could be
lifted.
Standing alongside Graham, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called Iran a "dangerous regime" that should be prevented
from having nuclear weapons.
"I believe that what is required are more sanctions, and stronger sanctions," Netanyahu said.
The Obama administration has been telling members of Congress that it has won significant

concessions from Iran for recently extending nuclear talks, including promises by the Islamic republic to allow
snap inspections of its facilities and to neutralize much of its remaining uranium stockpile. Administration officials have
been presenting the Iranian concessions to lawmakers in the hopes of convincing them to
support the extension and hold off on new economic sanctions that could derail the
diplomatic effort.
Obama has threatened to veto any new sanctions legislation while American diplomats continue their push for
an accord that would set multiyear limits on Iran's nuclear progress in exchange for an easing of the international sanctions that
have crippled the Iranian economy. Senate hawks are still trying to build a veto-proof majority of 67 votes
with Republicans set to assume the majority next month.
Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., told Fox News Sunday that Senate Republicans might have enough backing from
Democrats to pass veto-proof legislation that would impose more sanctions on Iran.
"The good thing about those votes, they will be really bipartisan votes," he said. "I have 17 Democrats with me. . We have a

shot at even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate."

Obamas continued lobbying is working

Klapper, 12/4/14 (Bradley, New Iran sanctions supporters seek veto-proof bloc,
http://www.salon.com/2014/12/04/new_iran_sanctions_supporters_seek_veto_proof_bloc/,
JMP)
WASHINGTON (AP) Congressional

hawks are struggling to build a veto-proof majority for new Iran

sanctions despite wide discontent among lawmakers over the lack of progress from more than a year of
nuclear talks with Iran, recently extended for seven more months.
One week after world powers and Iran failed to meet their own deadline for a deal, many in Congress are decrying the stalemate and
what they perceive as widespread concessions by the United States and its partners for few steps by Iran to dismantle its nuclear
program. Rhetoric aside, however, there has been no serious push yet in the Senate that would match a package of new sanctions
approved by the House a year and a half ago. And even though Senate Republicans will be in the majority next month, there is no
clarity on what is going to happen.

Thats because President Barack Obama has threatened to veto any new sanctions legislation while American
diplomats push for an accord that would see Iran accept stricter limits on its uranium enrichment activity for a gradual easing of the
international sanctions that have crippled the Iranian economy. Sanctions proponents thus need 67 votes out of

100 in the Senate, and administration officials have been lobbying furiously to keep
them below that threshold.

Incoming Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., hasnt spoken on the subject since criticizing his Democratic rival, Sen. Harry
Reid of Nevada, for standing in the way of sanctions legislation in early November. That was before the midterm elections in which
Democrats received a drubbing. McConnell hasnt spelled out specific plans for when he can set the agenda.
Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., a leading anti-Iran voice in the Capitol, said last month he was still working on building a veto-proof majority
in the Senate, though he was more confident about sufficient support in the House.
New Jersey Sen. Bob Menendez, the outgoing Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, said this week he is working with Kirk to redraft a bill they authored in 2013 which
was stymied by administration pressure. Its unclear how many Democrats will support
Menendez, whose relations with the White House and State Department have become increasingly acrimonious over Iran.
A minority of Republicans may balk, too. Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky, a possible presidential candidate, expressed
optimism Wednesday about the negotiations and with the constraints on Irans nuclear program that U.S. and international
negotiators have delivered. A year ago, Sen. Jeff Flake of Arizona joined Paul in declining to sign on to the

Menendez-Kirk sanctions package.

Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., the incoming Foreign Relations Committee chairman, is vowing to increase pressure on Iran but has
focused his energy on assuring Congress has a say in a final deal and lawmakers lay down acceptable parameters for any agreement.
In any scenario, Republicans will need significant Democratic support to pass new sanctions on Iran,
which says its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only.

Administration officials believe they have a short window to negotiate unimpeded by

Congress. But they know theyre on a short leash, with many Democrats under pressure from
groups like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a pro-Israel lobby, to join the sanctions push.
The top U.S. nuclear negotiator, Wendy Sherman, and the Treasury Departments sanctions chief, David Cohen, are likely to hear a
series of grievances when they brief leading senators behind closed doors Thursday. A number of Democratic senators

were invited to the White House on Wednesday to hear the administrations case for patience.

AT: ANNOUNCED LATER

It could be announced now
McElroy, 10 (Lisa, SCOTUS Blog, 1/27, The last two days in plain English: Overturning
precedent, per curiam opinions, and pluralities http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/the-lasttwo-days-in-plain-english/#more-15646)
Take Mondays short-as-can-be decision in Briscoe v. Virginia. Now, I and others on this
blog have discussed the case from any number of angles (see here, for example). But for those of
you watching and reading out there, Mondays decision may have slipped right by you that is
how unexpected it was to some of us, in the timing at least. Why? Well, because the case was
only argued two weeks ago, as discussed here. Usually, it takes the Court a while to reach
agreement about the proper outcome of a case, then draft an opinion. As I discussed last week
when explaining why we waited for quite some time for the Citizens United decision, these
decisions are extremely important and far-reaching. But in Briscoe, the Court decided the
case quickly and definitively in what Richard Freidman, one of the attorneys in the case, has
called a G . . . . VR.
Violates - should - voter for jurisdiction
Summers 94 (Justice Oklahoma Supreme Court, Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of
Durant, 1994 OK 123, 11-8,
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)
4 The

legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order

connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15
it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the
critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would
do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four
corners of the entire record.16
[CONTINUES TO FOOTNOTE]
13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not
always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall 9, Judgments 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note
15. Certain

contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating
preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in

proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v.
California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a
section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment);
State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958)

("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an

praesenti means literally "at the
present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is
presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in
the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).
instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In

AT: NO DEAL
We dont need to win everything gets resolved in the short term, just that new
sanctions derailbut progress thusfar disproves the premise of their claims
Tabatabai, 12/18/14 --associate at Harvard Kennedy Schools Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs (Ariane, What it will take for Iran nuclear talks to succeed,
http://thebulletin.org/what-it-will-take-iran-nuclear-talks-succeed7859, JMP)
It would be easy to interpret the deadline extension as bad news. In fact, though, the way in
which it has been handled by both sides suggests that there is yet hope. The next months will
be challenging, but there is a strong chance a deal will still get done.
What went wrong? In the weeks leading up to November 24th, various factions and stakeholders increased their pressure on the negotiators to abandon
making a deal. In the United States, some raised questions regarding Iran's compliance with the terms of the interim agreement. In Tehran, some
critics urged Foreign Minister Javad Zarif's team not to give up the nation's nuclear achievements. Meanwhile, Israel and Saudi Arabia continued to
voice their concerns, advocating for "no deal" rather than a "bad one." As the deal came apart, many began to speculate, some wondering if the failure
could be linked to the Saudi foreign minister having appeared in Vienna on November 23rd to meet with US Secretary of State John Kerry. Neither side
confirmed or denied this theory, which remains just that.

Subtle successes. Regardless of what went wrong, the way the missed deadline was handled
provides evidence that the talks may yet succeed. It is important to note the positive
developments in Vienna. One concern was that the parties would start a blame game, pointing fingers at each other, but it
didnt happen. On the contrary, the parties highlighted the progress made and concluded on a
civil note. Kerry praised his Iranian counterpart and thanked him. Zarif, for his part, issued a fairly positive joint statement with Catherine

Ashton, the European Unions high representative for foreign affairs and security policy. This shows that both sides are still committed to the process
and want a deal. The

lack of belligerent rhetorical exchange between Iran and the United States in particular is now taken for
is evidence of some level of trust among the negotiators.
The way the talks concluded is also evidence of greater coordination and unity among the P5+1
(the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany). Even French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, viewed as the
"Uncle Scrooge" of the talks, generally pessimistic and distrustful of the Iranian side, who a year ago almost derailed the negotiations
leading to the interim deal, has been fairly positive about the process (link in French). This shows that the United States has
done a better job communicating with the various teams than it had been doing a year ago. It also shows an understanding that the
stakes are too high to let the opportunity slip between the parties' hands.
A number of promising events in Iran are also worth highlighting. Following the extension,
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the highest authority in the country, reiterated (link in Persian) his
support for the negotiations and shut down the critics, who had been increasingly vocal in the
weeks leading to the November deadline. "For the same reason we were not opposed to the essence of the negotiations, we are
granted, but it's no small matter. It

also not opposed to their extension. Of course, we accept any just and rational agreement," he said. Likewise he defended the negotiating team, noting
its "diligence, seriousness, strength, and rationality." The delegation, he said to critics, "has stood up in the face of pressuring discourse." To drive the
point home, Khamenei's adviser, Aliakbar Velayati, echoed the position (link in Persian), asserting that the Supreme Leader has supported the process
itself as well as its extension, and that therefore, given that he has the final say on all matters, there should no longer be any statement contrary to this
position." Velayati also highlighted that the Iranian delegation has not crossed any of the leader's red lines, of which the key ones were the
requirement that the nuclear program, including research and development, continue; that the enrichment facility in Fordow be maintained; and that
Iran eventually acquire the ability to produce 190,000 separative work units (SWU). As such, contrary

to the conventional wisdom

in Washington, the generally conservative Khamenei has in fact acted as a moderating agent in
this process. It is up to the government of President Hassan Rouhani to seize the momentum and use it as a vehicle to quiet down critics and
continue the process, and ultimately sell a deal back home.

Would-be dealbreakers. Despite these reasons to be optimistic, the talks could still fail. The length of the extension
came as a surprise to many observers. Seven months is an awfully long time, providing room for hardliners on both sides to maneuver and potentially
derail the talks. This is why Zarif pushed to set a clear deadline.
In Washington, the new Congress will take over in January, which may be problematic given that many members are already pushing for more
sanctions and hawkish lobbies are preparing to advocate for more pressure. Kerry alluded to this in his answer to a
question raised by the press following his November 24th statement, when he asked Congress to allow the US delegation to preserve "the equilibrium
for a few months to be able to proceed without sending messages that might be misinterpreted and cause miscalculation." Yet some members of
Congress continue to press their concerns over the extension. Some believe that it is to Tehran's advantage, giving it what it wants without any
concessions.

It is not actually true that Iran has made no concessions to get to this pointit had already
undertaken to suspend some of its key activities under the joint plan, and has agreed to even
more as of November 24th. Nevertheless, members of Congress in favor of increasing sanctions sought to legitimize their position by
inviting a panel of arms control and Middle East experts who are generally skeptical of Iran for a
hearing. But among the invitees, neither the head of the Institute for Science and International

Security, David Albright, nor the president of United Against Nuclear Iran, Gary Samore, endorsed
more sanctions, noting that they would produce the opposite effect from what Congress is
seeking, which is to strengthen the United States' hand in the negotiations. They are right. More
sanctions would undermine the legitimacy of the process in Iran, potentially increasing the
pressure on the negotiating team to the point that it would have to withdraw from the talks
altogether. Irans international reputation would also gain from more sanctions, which would show it to be a victim of Washington's lack of

good faith.
Moreover, the argument that the JPOA was good for Iran and bad for the United States is not founded on facts. The limited sanctions relief that Tehran
is receiving has done little to lift the domestic economy, which to the extent that it is doing somewhat better than it was two years ago (before Rouhanis
election), has more to do with better management. In exchange for this limited sanctions relief and ability to gain access to its frozen assets, Tehran has
effectively suspended many key sensitive activities and allowed more monitoring and verification. It has accepted caps on enrichment and enriched
uranium stockpiles, as well as caps on advances at several key facilities (including the Fordow and Natanz fuel enrichment facilities and the Arak heavy
water reactor).
Standing up to domestic pressure. For both parties, striking a deal by November 24 would have been optimal. Observers, including myself, warned that
an extension could be detrimental to the process, given vocal criticism in Tehran and Washington. But the

extension is not a bad

outcome. It serves all parties' purposes, while ensuring that the diplomatic channel
remains open for a peaceful resolution, rather than yet another conflict in the
Middle East, which could be catastrophic for the already volatile region. Extending the talks keeps Iran's nuclear
activities capped, while allowing for more comprehensive monitoring. It also allows Tehran to continue to gain
some sanctions relief. And, important, it allows the two parties to continue to engage with each other and
overcome more than 35 years of mistrust.
In the next seven months, the key challenge will be to manage domestic audiences on both sides. While
Rouhani and his delegation are strengthened by Khamenei's support, the Obama administration is going
to be challenged by the new Congress. This could prove detrimental to the talks. The hearing organized by
Sen. Bob Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat, on December 3, showed the eagerness of some members of Congress to continue to exercise pressure on
Tehran.
It is important for critics of the talks to note the steps taken by Iran, and what they mean. Tehran

has agreed to cap its centrifuge

research and development activities, which is a significant step. It has agreed to limit what it
does with several advanced centrifuges, including the IR-6, the IR-5, and the IR-2M, and agreed not to install the IR-8 at the
Natanz pilot plant. These are important confidence-building measures, which remove the
possibility that misunderstandings and miscalculations will derail the talks. They
also show that Iran is ready to take measures that could be controversial at home. And they give
evidence of the flexibility of Khamenei's red lines, which had been viewed in Washington as rigid
and potentially detrimental to the negotiations.
So far, both the Supreme Leader and the Iranian people have supported the talks. Likewise, in the United States, the administration has
been able to manage pressure from hardliners. But time is limited. Another extension of the JPOA seems highly
unlikely and problematic for both parties beyond June 2015. In Washington, Congress wont want any further extension to talks that it sees as good for
Iran and bad for the United States. In Iran, Rouhani still enjoys some level of support, but another extension of the talks that keeps Tehrans nuclear
program suspended without tangible progress on sanctions wouldnt help him. The next seven months are therefore decisive. More

would close a window of opportunity and delegitimize the process altogether.

sanctions

AT: COURTS NO LINK

This is just a glorified Courts dont link claim, but they do
Mr. Mirengoff 10 is an attorney in Washington, D.C. A.B., Dartmouth College J.D., Stanford
Law School, June 23 The Federalist Society Online Debate Series, http://www.fedsoc.org/debates/dbtid.41/default.asp
The other thing I found interesting was the degree to which Democrats used the hearings to attack the "Roberts Court." I don't
recall either party going this much on the offensive in this respect during the last three sets of hearings. What explains this
development? My view is that liberal Democratic politicians (and members of their base) think they lost the

argument during the last three confirmation battles. John Roberts and Samuel Alito "played"
well, and Sonia Sotomayor sounded like a conservative. The resulting frustration probably
induced the Democrats to be more aggressive in general and, in particular, to try to discredit Roberts and Alito
by claiming they are not the jurists they appeared to be when they made such a good impression on the public. I'm pretty sure
the strategy didn't work. First, as I said, these hearings seem not to have attracted much attention. Second, Senate Democrats
are unpopular right now, so their attacks on members of a more popular institution are not likely to resonate. Third, those

who watched until the bitter end saw Ed Whelan, Robert Alt and others persuasively counter
the alleged examples of "judicial activism" by the Roberts Court relied upon by the Democrats
-- e.g., the Ledbetter case, which the Democrats continue grossly to mischaracterize. There's a chance that
the Democrats' latest partisan innovation will come back to haunt them. Justice
Sotomayor and soon-to-be Justice Kagan are on record having articulated a traditional, fairly
minimalist view of the role of judges. If a liberal majority were to emerge -- or even if
the liberals prevail in a few high profile cases -- the charge of "deceptive testimony" could
be turned against them. And if Barack Obama is still president at that time, he likely will receive some of
the blame.
The worlds favorite card
Harrison 5Professor of LawUniversity of Miami, FL [Lindsay, Does the Court Act as
"Political Cover" for the Other Branches?, http://legaldebate.blogspot.com/]
While the Supreme Court may have historically been able to act as political cover for the
President and/or Congress, that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore. The Court is seen today as a
politicized body, and especially now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court, with a Chief Justice hand picked by the
President and approved by the Congress, it is highly unlikely that Court action will not, at least to some extent, be
blamed on and/or credited to the President and Congress. The Court can still get away with a lot
more than the elected branches since people don't understand the technicalities of legal doctrine like they understand
the actions of the elected branches; this is, in part, because the media does such a poor job of covering legal news. Nevertheless,
it is preposterous to argue that the Court is entirely insulated from politics, and equally
preposterous to argue that Bush and the Congress would not receive at least a large portion of the
blame for a Court ruling that, for whatever reason, received the attention of the public.

AT: KEYSTONE
3. They misunderstand the docket
Pianin, 12/29/14 --veteran journalist who has covered the federal government, congressional
budget and tax issues, and national politics (Eric, How the GOP Could Jettison the Iran Talks,
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2014/12/29/How-GOP-Could-Jettison-Iran-Talks, JMP)
Republicans signaled over the weekend they intend to waste little time in the New Year before they
challenge President Obama on a range of sensitive national security and defense issues.
Likely to be first up: a measure to beef up economic sanctions against Iran if that country violates an
interim nuclear agreement with the U.S. or scuttles the ongoing talks on the future of Irans nuclear weapons capability.
Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) said on Saturday in Israel that the Senate would vote on a bipartisan

measure next month that could greatly complicate the delicate talks by introducing the threat of additional

sanctions, The Hill reported.

The administration wants a deal with Iran that would dismantle large parts of its nuclear infrastructure and delay for years its
nuclear weapons capability in exchange for further relief from tough economic sanctions that have severely hampered Irans
economy.
Standing side-by-side with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Graham said, You will see a very vigorous Congress when it
comes to Iran. You will see a Congress making sure sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see
Congress wanting to have a say about any final deal.
The joint appearance of Graham, a prominent congressional defense hawk, along with Netanyahu was highly symbolic of the GOPs
skepticism over Obamas foreign policy and defense tactics and its determination to take a harder line. Graham is closely allied with
Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), a top Obama critic who becomes chair of the Armed Services Committee next month.
Netanyahu has also been highly critical of Obamas policy toward Iran. Little more than a year ago, he threatened unilateral military
action unless Tehran abandoned its perceived drive to develop nuclear weapons that could be used against Israel.

With the Republicans taking control of both the Senate and House beginning next month, the
debate over the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and defense will be front and center on
Capitol Hill. GOP leaders are certain to challenge Obama on a wide range of topics on everything from his handling of the
war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq to his efforts to combat Russian President Vladimir Putins military aggression in Ukraine, to
spending on defense and new weapons systems.

4. Wont spend capital on it

Obama wont have to spend capital on Keystone --Dems in House will sustain Obamas veto
Halstead, 12-26
(Richard, 12-26-14, Marin News, Huffman says House Democrats will play key role in new
GOP-controlled Congress, http://www.marinij.com/marinnews/ci_27212362/huffman-sayshouse-democrats-will-play-key-role, amp)
"They're going to need Democratic votes even more to get even the basic stuff done," he said.
And Huffman said if Republicans try to override President Obama's veto on issues such as the
Keystone XL pipeline project, Democrats in the House will muster the votes needed to
sustain the president's veto. He said Republicans might get enough Democratic votes in the
Senate to override a veto, "but I think we have enough votes in the House to block it."

AT: NO PROLIF SPILLOVER

Yes regional prolif
Wimbush and Ford, 10 (S. Enders Wimbush, Senior Vice President for International
Programs and Policy at Hudson Institute, and Christopher A. Ford, senior fellow and director of
the Center for Technology and Global Security at Hudson Institute, 1-14-10, Hudson Institute,
Perspectives Upon a Nuclear Iran)
Possession of nuclear arms may well encourage the clerical regimes worst instincts for
regional provocation by seeming to remove the threat of possible outside intervention, and
could catalyze further nuclear weapons proliferation among Irans frightened
neighbors. We may debate if Irans ultimate ambitions should be understood as fundamentally Persian or fundamentally

revolutionary that is, whether Tehran is likely to wish only for some kind of regional hegemony or rather for a more sweeping
vanguard role in regional or global Islamic revolution. Clearly a lot will depend on who ends up in charge of Irans new capabilities.
That said, there seems to be little difference in nuclear policy between the radicalized clique that runs the current government and
the somewhat more democratically minded moderates now being persecuted for having done too well at the polls last summer.
(Although it has been reported that some of the pro-democracy demonstrators currently being abused or simply murdered in the
streets by security forces have begun chanting Death to Russia and Death to China in apparent reference to those countries use
of UN Security Council veto threats to protect the Iranian regime from accountability for its nuclear lawlessness.) Conventional

wisdom insists that Irans neighbors will recoil from a nuclear Iran and that some of them will
likely build their own nuclear arsenals. This is indeed a possibility; the list of potential
candidates would certainly include Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and conceivably
even Iraq, perhaps through the acquisition of peaceful nuclear programs that can later be turned to other purposes. Yet it is

not a given that Irans neighbors will form anti-Iranian coalitions or otherwise overtly seek to balance its growing power. Some may
choose to bandwagon with Iran that is, to collaborate in ways that link Irans nuclear accomplishments to their own objectives.
The presence or absence of a continued U.S. role in the Middle East will be a critical factor in how such regional dynamics develop.
An America that remains active and engaged will have a powerful ability to influence the degree to which Irans nuclear
empowerment is destabilizing. An America that withdraws from engagement whether out of moralistic disdain for power politics,
fear of Iranian nuclear weapons, financial insolvency in this era of trillion-dollar federal budget deficits, or simply from strategic
fatigue will cede the field to others. Fundamentally, Iran would likely aspire to fill a post-American power vacuum
itself, claiming the de facto regional hegemony that its proud but insecure sense of historical self seems to demand. Other
outsiders, however, might end up playing important roles. Putin-era Russia, which is not unlike
Iran a corrupt, grievance-nursing autocracy with revanchist dreams that imperil its neighbors security, clearly

seeks to
reacquire its strategic leverage in the Middle East, a historic focus of Russias foreign policy. Yet
despite its ambitions, Russia is unlikely to possess sufficient capability to exercise great influence though one should not
entirely discount the Kremlins appetite for the kind of Middle Eastern
troublemaking that would drive up oil prices with the aim of keeping the regime in Moscow
afloat on a sea of petrodollars. China was more likely than Russia eventually to fill the role of
outside player. This might take the form of a Sino-Persian condominium, in which Beijing steps in as a

quasi-guarantor of Iranian hegemony in return for assured and preferential energy access, and global status as the new primus inter
pares of the Great Powers. Alternatively, a Middle East destabilized as a result of Irans nuclear

empowerment might draw in China, possibly even against its will, in order to forestall threats
to the oil supplies upon which Beijing depends. If an exogenous power is needed to stabilize the region, and the

United States has withdrawn, China might fill the vacuum. As Beijing continues to build a blue water navy increasingly capable of
long-distance power projection while the U.S. Navy continues its precipitous decline down from some 600 ships in the Reagan
administration to well under 300 today, and projected to fewer than 200 in the next decade this is by no means inconceivable as a
mid-term scenario. India has a potential to be a powerful force in the region, either as the increasingly important strategic partner of
an America determined to remain engaged in the Middle East, or as a potential balancer of some future Sino-Persian alliance, or
both. Yet India today remains psychologically, politically, institutionally, and militarily unprepared for such a role. And if it doesnt
step into this role of its own accord, and develop the requisite military capabilities and political will that such a role requires, the
promising Indo-U.S. strategic partnership is unlikely to take off; indeed, it may wither. Even if Iranian hegemony contains the seeds
of its own demise, as seems increasingly apparent, a fragile or wounded Iran could be especially dangerous. Tehrans rise to
preeminence would exacerbate simmering tensions between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, a dynamic that would be worsened by
national rivalries and insecurities, and by ethnic tensions between Persians and Arabs. Iranian hegemony would, therefore, face
powerful centrifugal forces that could erode it over time, increasing the likelihood of eventual balancing (instead of bandwagoning)
regional reactions even in the absence of a strong outside player. Nevertheless, the decay of Irans position and indeed perhaps the
clerical regimes own internal decay, if todays demonstrators are cowed into submission as the regime clearly intends would take
time, and might entail much instability. Such tensions could propel Iran into increasingly aggressive behavior to suppress regional
resistance, distract from internal contradictions, and to build political legitimacy for its hegemony. It might also choose to claim a

regional, or pan-Islamic, leadership role as the barrier against infidel encroachment. This dynamic could, of course, prove most
problematic for Israel, but it would likely affect any outside power seeking to play a role in Middle Eastern affairs. If Iran is to

have access to nuclear weapons as it tries to build and maintain regional hegemony and then as it
subsequently declines and perhaps disintegrates the perilous stakes for everyone else will rise
exponentially. The implications of Irans nuclear ambitions, converging with the growing sense of superpower decline-ism

currently in vogue in Washington and welcomed by many on the political left, are profound and unsettling. Among defense and
security planners in Asia and the Middle East, the debate on whether the United States will withdraw from their regions increasingly
leads them to entertain downside scenarios about the shape of the security landscape and the dynamics of the strategic competition
once Americas influence declines. If we give them reasons to expect such developments, we should not be surprised if those
considering these scenarios end up acting on them in ways that harm American interests. These worrisome scenarios are
not inevitable, but they are becoming more likely. The Obama administration can make them less probable by providing
some upside scenarios of its own, aimed at those doubting Americas commitment and resolve beginning by taking a firm line
against Iran acquiring the ability to produce nuclear weapons. For it is Irans nuclear future, far more than

outcomes in Iraq or Afghanistan, that will affect the shape and dynamics of both the Middle East
and Asia, while defining Americas role to everyone else.