OF DEKALB COUNTY
GEORGIA
ANTHONY S. TRICOLI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROB WATTS; RON CARRUTH; JIM
RASMUS; MARK GERSPACHER;
SHELETHA CHAMPION; HENRY
HUCKABY; JOHN FUCHKO; STEVE
WRIGLEY; BEN TARBUTTON; THE BOARD
OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
SYSTEM OF GEORGIA; SAM OLENS, THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GEORGIA; and
ROBIN JENKINS
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Comes now Plaintiff Dr. Anthony Tricoli and files this reply to
Defendants Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support (Defendants Brief) of
the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Georgia RICO action, and shows the Court
as follows:
Introduction
The Georgia RICO statute was specifically enacted, in part, to prevent
government agencies from being controlled and conducted as a criminal
The RICO Act specifically authorizes this civil action against the State.
The Georgia RICO Act specifically includes governmental entities in
the definition of RICO enterprises. OCGA 16-14-3(6). Thus an action can be
brought against any person who exercises control over a governmental
entity for purposes of a plan of criminal activity, just as the Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants usurped the machinery of state government and abused their
positions of power and public trust in order to perpetrate a concerted scheme
that consisted of multiple violations of the U.S. and Georgia Criminal
Codes, all directed at harming the Plaintiff by destroying his career and
livelihood, not only by publicly disgracing him but by taking away his
salary, position, and pension. OCGA 16-14-4(a-c).
In addition, many of the offenses named as predicate acts by the
Georgia legislature are necessarily crimes that could only be by committed
by state government officers. Who can make a knowingly false material
County Sheriff for perjury and false statements to a state agency); Caldwell
v. State, 321 SE2d 704, 705-07, 253 Ga. 400 (1984) (civil RICO action
upheld against State Labor Commissioner and 15 members of his staff for
running state government office through a pattern of criminal activity);
Colon v. Fulton County (Ga. 2013) (statutory language authorizing a suit
against governmental entities and officers must be given effect, with no
other specific language stating a waiver of sovereign immunity required).
There has never been the slightest inkling or suggestion since the
statute was enacted that government employees benefitted from any special
shield that protected them from accountability for their criminal actions
under Georgia RICO. If the Defendants in the instant action, like Sheriff
Dorsey and Commissioner Caldwell before them, can be indicted for a
pattern of crimes that are RICO predicate acts, they can also be subject to a
civil suit under RICO for the same conduct, as State Labor Commissioner
Caldwell was. OCGA 16-14-6(c). If convicted in the criminal prosecution,
in fact, they are estopped from disputing the civil claims against them.
OCGA 16-14-6(e)11; Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates Ltd., 734 SE2d 883,
889 (Ga. App. 2012) (civil plaintiff allowed to amend tort action to add civil
RICO claims after criminal RICO conviction of defendant). Thus a private
11
conviction in any criminal proceeding under this chapter shall estop the defendant in any subsequent
civil action or proceeding as to all matters proved in the criminal proceeding.
plaintiff aggrieved by the acts for which Dorsey and Caldwell were
convicted under the RICO statute could not only bring a civil action against
them, but such a plaintiff would automatically win the civil action--based on
the criminal convictions. OCGA 16-14-6(e). The Attorney General has
pointed to nothing in the RICO statute, or any other statute, that would alter
this result of civil liability for criminal actions clearly mandated by the
Georgia Legislaturewhether to shield the Attorney General himself or any
other state officer named as a Defendant in this action who participated in
the criminal scheme alleged in detail. In fact, the Attorney General does not
address the actual language of the RICO statute anywhere in Defendants
Brief, an admission that Defendants have no response to the RICO statutes
specific authorization of this civil suit against the governmental entities in
the instant action.
In addition to the unequivocal language of the statute itself, the
Georgia Supreme Court has already directly addressed Attorney General
Sam Olens argument that government agencies and officials are immune to
civil claims brought under the RICO Act for their criminal conductand
squarely rejected it. Here is how the Georgia Supreme Court refuted State
Labor Commissioner Caldwells argument, identical to the Attorney
10
Generals in the instant action, that the Georgia General Assembly did not
intend for RICO to apply to state officials:
Defendant concedes that RICO would be applicable to a
governmental entity if organized criminals gained control of it from
without by bribery or like means. By urging that RICO was not
intended to apply to an elective office holder seeking reelection, the
defendant is urging, in effect, that RICO was not intended to apply
where control of a governmental entity is gained or maintained
from within. However, substituting the words "governmental entity"
for "enterprise" in OCGA 16-14-4(a), supra, it is a crime for any
person, through a pattern of racketeering activity [i.e., by committing
2 or more similar or interrelated predicate offenses], to acquire or
maintain control of any governmental entity. The language of the act
is clear. Acquiring or maintaining control of a governmental entity
by means of a pattern of racketeering activity constitutes a crime
whether such control be obtained from without or within. [citations
omitted]. By its express terms, the RICO act includes as a crime a
reelection campaign by the holder of public office in which 2 or more
similar or interrelated predicate offenses specified in the act are
committed. The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint. Caldwell v. State, 321 SE2d at 707
(emphasis added).12
Also in light of the RICO action against Sheriff Dorsey, it is well
settled that RICO Act applies to governmental entities and officials, in a
civil suit on the same basis as a criminal prosecution, and that state officers
were never intended to fall into any privileged category of immune
12
The Court should take notice that this directly on-point authority, in which the Georgia
Supreme Court explicitly rejects the Attorney Generals argument that state officials
enjoy sovereign immunity from RICO actions, is mentioned nowhere in the Attorney
Generals brief in support of his motion to dismiss, though the Caldwell case has been
previously brought to the Attorney Generals attention in two pending RICO actions
based on similar conduct by the Board of Regents and Attorney General, Benedek v.
Adams 13EV016714D, and Benedek v. Olens, 2014-CV-246185.
11
characters--and with good reason, considering the Gotham City mayhem that
could easily ensue if state officials, including those charged with
investigating and prosecuting criminal conduct, could feel free to conduct
criminal enterprises at Capitol Place, SW, withholding and falsifying
evidence at whim, under an assured safe harbor of immunity.
Defendants Briefwhile ignoring the substance of the RICO statute
entirelymerely begs the question why the Attorney General is straining so
hard to defend against claims spawned by the continuing pattern of criminal
RICO predicate acts within his own office and the University System of
Georgia instead of prosecuting the perpetrators under the same law.
12
13
statute reaches within the halls of state government, as the RICO statute does
when it specifically addresses governmental entities that are co-opted for a
criminal scheme. Id.; OCGA 16-14-3(6).
As the Supreme Court stated in Colon, Indeed, in order for the statute
to have any meaning at all here, it can only be interpreted as creating a
waiver of sovereign immunity.("Because the General Assembly is
presumed to intend something by passage of [an] act, we must construe its
provisions so as not to render it meaningless"). Colon, p. 7; Accord, Dover
v. State, 385 SE2d 417, 420-21, 192 Ga.App. 429 (GA. App. 1989)
(applying the language of the statute must be given effect rationale to the
Georgia RICO Act); Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates Ltd, 734 SE2d 883, 890
(Ga. App. 2012) (language of RICO statute equating civil RICO actions with
criminal prosecutions require that the literal meaning of the wordsmust
be followed).
By arguing that the RICO statute does not authorize a civil suit against
a governmental entity conducted as a RICO enterprise, contrary to the plain
language of he RICO Act, the Attorney General does indeed attempt to
render it meaningless. Colon, p. 7.
All that is required to state a waiver is an authorization for the civil
action, as at OCGA 16-14-6(c). And all that is needed to state the extent of
14
15
authorizes, and provides an even more detailed list of remedies ranging from
treble compensatory and punitive damages to injunctive relief and forfeiture.
OCGA 16-14-6(a-e).
Moreover, the very cases cited by the Attorney Generalas well as
other on-point cases the Attorney General does not mentionexpressly
reject the Attorney Generals argument that the GTCA provides the
exclusive waiver for sovereign immunity. Defendants Brief, p. 2-3 (THE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF A STATE ENTITY IS WAIVED ONLY
AS SET FORTH IN THE GEORGIA TORT CLAIMS ACT); contra,
Colon, 294 Ga at 93; Tuttle v. Bd. of Regents (Ga. App. 2014) (the right of
action provided in the Georgia Whistleblower Act is a waiver of Georgia's
sovereign immunity that is separate and independent of the waiver in the
Georgia Tort Claims Act); Pattee v. Georgia Ports Authority, 477
F.Supp.2d 1253, 1269 (S.D. Ga., 2006). Pattee, another case misrepresented
by the Attorney General15 to claim it stands for the diametrically opposite
proposition, explicitly states:
Defendants claim that because the Georgia Tort Claims Act
constitutes the exclusive waiver of Georgia's sovereign immunity, the
State is immune from suit under the GWA. The Court rejects these
arguments. "The right of action provided in the [GWA] is a waiver of
15
Defendants
Brief
misrepresents
the
holding
of
Pattee
at,
p.
19
16
17
18
While the Attorney General cannot seem to tell the difference between
torts and crimes, for purposes of alleging a RICO predicate act, the courts
have had no such trouble making the distinction. The Georgia Court of
Appeals observed the obvious when it stated, for example, The elements of
the civil cause of action for fraud are different from the elements of the
felony offense of Theft by Deception. Avery v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 448
S.E.2d 737, 738 214 Ga.App. 602 (Ga. App., 1994) (tort breach of duty and
criminal violations not equivalent).
Nonetheless, in addressing claims pled with great specificity under the
RICO statute, the Attorney General, throughout Defendants Brief, indulges
the fiction that these are tort claims governed by the GTCA. The Attorney
General then proceeds, for pages and pages, to purport to knock that straw
man down with tort case after irrelevant tort case. Tootle v Cartee, 634 SE2d
90, 92, 280 Ga. App. 428, 429 (Ga. App. 2006) at n.13 (notwithstanding tort
immunity, officer could be liable for the same conduct on a different legal
theory with different elements); accord, Hardin v. Phillips, 547 SE2d 565,
569, 249 Ga. App. 541, 545 (Ga. App. 2001) (claim barred only for alternate
tort theory with identical elements to tort listed in GTCA exceptions); Board
of Public Safety v. Jordan, 556 S.E.2d 837, 252 Ga. App. 577 (Ga. App.,
2001) (alleging tort claim only for emotional stress by plaintiff who admitted
19
18
This
was
a
case
in
which
there
was
a
pattern
of
criminal
collusion
by
state
inspectors,
which
would
have
been
the
proper
subject
of
a
RICO
action,
but
that
was
never
pled
by
the
plaintiff
or
considered
by
the
court.
19
Here
is
the
complete
list
of
tort
cases
cited
in
Defendants
Brief,
all
of
which
have
no
bearing
on
the
RICO
statute:
Lewis v. Department of Human Resources, 255 Ga.
App. 805, 567 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. App., 2002) (negligence for placing patient in scalding
water); Mattox v. Bailey, 472 S.E.2d 130, 131 221 Ga.App. 546 (Ga. App., 1996) (battery
claim dismissed under assault exception in GTCA, but court held that notwithstanding
that exception a claim could lie under a non-tort theory); Christensen v. State, 464 S.E.2d
14, 219 Ga.App. 10 (Ga. App., 1995) (claim that negligent supervision allowed a rape by
a third party); Georgia Military College v. Santamorena, 514 S.E.2d 82, 237 Ga.App. 58
(Ga. App., 1999); (negligence claim against school for rape by fellow student); Rhoden v.
Department of Public Safety, 473 S.E.2d 537, 221 Ga.App. 844, 845-46 (Ga. App., 1996)
(negligence claim against off-duty police officers for failing to interfere with improper
arrest); Department of Transp. v. Bishop, 453 S.E.2d 478, 216 Ga.App. 57 (Ga. App.,
1994) (negligence in construction of wall barred by GTCA licensing exception);
Southerland v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections, 666 S.E.2d 383, 293 Ga.App. 56 (Ga. App.,
2008) (negligence claim against prison when inmate killed by cellmate); Ardizonne v.
DHR, 575 S.E.2d 738, 258 Ga. App. 858 (Ga. App., 2002) (negligence claim against
hospital for releasing mental patient); Murray v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., 644 S.E.2d
290, 284 Ga. App. 263 (Ga. App., 2007) (negligence claim for licensing stop signal); In
re Carter, 653 S.E.2d 860, 288 Ga.App. 276 (Ga. App., 2007) (negligence claim when
mother received no notice of childs condition despite repeated attempts to reach her).
20
448 S.E.2d 737,739, 214 Ga.App. 602 (Ga. App., 1994) (distinguishing
elements of torts and criminal RICO predicate acts).
Meanwhile, the Attorney General, while quoting liberally from the
GTCA--irrelevant to any RICO analysis--never once addresses or analyzes
the language of the RICO statute itself or cites a single Georgia RICO case
to support his self-serving claim of sovereign immunity. Instead, he strings
together every red herring negligence case he can find, hoping they will
shine in the eyes and blind the Court to the real, relatively simple issue in
this case: Are government officials immune when they hijack government
agencies for purposes prohibited by the Georgia Criminal Code, in a pattern
of criminal activity defined by the Georgia RICO Act? The GTCA does not
speak to this issue, at all. The Georgia RICO statute emphatically answers:
No, state employees who abuse their position of public trust for prohibited,
criminal purposes are not immune. The Georgia Supreme Court has
seconded that motion in Dorsey and Caldwell.
21
22
Again and again, the Attorney General asks this Court to believe that
Defendants Tort Minnow can swallow a Felony Whale.
Even without considering the whereabouts of the missing $9 million,
the Attorney Generals claim that the knowing misrepresentation of the
budget numbers in state budget hearings, GPC executive committee
meetings, and official reports to the Presidents Cabinet are absolved by the
GTCA exception for accounting errors directly contradicts OCGA 16-1020. It is undisputed that there were two very different sets of books at GPC.
That did not occur by negligence or mistake. Those were knowing
misrepresentations, and therefore criminal offenses under OCGA 16-1020, a RICO pattern of predicate acts under OCGA 16-14-9(A), and
therefore a criminal offense giving rise to Tricolis private right of action
under OCGA 16-14-6(c). By arguing that the criminal prohibition of
OCGA 16-10-20 is cancelled out by the negligence exception of the
GTCA, the Attorney general is, as the Georgia Supreme Court observed in
Colon, attempting to render [the Legislatures enumeration of OCGA 1610-20 as a predicate act under OCGA 16-14-9(A)] meaningless.20
20
One
of
the
main
knowing
misrepresentations
alleged
in
this
action,
the
Special
Report
of
the
USG,
fulfills
several
functions
in
establishing
the
validity
of
Plaintiffs
Complaint.
The
Special
Report
is
a
double
violation
of
OCGA
16-10-20,
in
that
it
is
a
knowingly
false
report
by
a
state
agency,
and
a
knowingly
false
report
to
a
state
agencyfor
example,
in
misrepresenting
that
Plaintiff
Tricoli
was
part
of
the
budget
team
that
misrepresented,
which
the
author,
Defendant
John
Fuchko,
knew
to
be
23
24
25
to have its noisy tort Schnauzer swallow and devour the Doberman of
criminal extortion.23
26
liable to Plaintiff for his annual contract salary and benefits since the date of
the breach.
27
Conclusion
The RICO Act prohibits any person, association or entity, however
affiliated, whether in government or outside of government, from
committing a pattern of criminal acts for the common purpose of injuring
another person the way Tricoli was directly, intentionally, and
premeditatedly harmed by Defendants criminal fraud. OCGA 16-14-4(ac). The RICO Act further authorizes a person harmed by such criminal
28
activity to institute a civil suit against the members of any RICO enterprise-including one operating within a state government agency. OCGA 16-146(c), OCGA 16-14-3(6), Caldwell.
There is no sound policy reason for immunizing the criminal conduct
of state employees, as the Attorney General seeks to do (instead of
prosecuting it). Every effort should be made, rather, to ensure that the
administration of the University System and the Attorney Generals office
are not co-opted by public employees immunized from the criminal laws of
this state such that they feel free to run a state agency as a criminal RICO
enterprise. In particular, Attorney General Sam Olens should be forced to
declare that such criminal activity in state office will not be tolerated and to
oppose it instead of defending it.
He can start by dropping the self-serving insistence, on his own behalf
and that of his co-defendant conspirators in this pattern of criminal activity,
the rather supercilious insistence that they are immune for criminal offenses
designated by the RICO statute that they commit when they are supposed to
be doing the publics business. If the Attorney General is not going to
investigate and prosecute such criminal abuse of the power of the State, then
he can at least recognize that the RICO Act has provided a civil remedy to
29
30
EXHIBIT
1
31
32
33
34
Chatman v. Findley, 274 Ga. 54, 55 (548 SE2d 5) (2001) ("Because the
General Assembly is presumed to intend something by passage of [an]
act, we must construe its provisions so as not to render it meaningless")
(citation omitted).
We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' decision insofar as it relates
to the express waiver of sovereign immunity created by OCGA 45-1-4.
Page 8
Case No. S12G1905
2. We disagree with the Court of Appeals, however, with respect to its
interpretation of OCGA 45-1-4 regarding causes of action for alleged
retaliation. In this regard, in order to determine whether the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of OCGA 45-1-4 as a whole, and subsections (b)
and (d) of the statute in particular, is correct, we must turn to the basic
rules of statutory construction. Specifically,
we apply the fundamental rules of statutory construction that require us to
construe [the] statute according to its terms, to give words their plain and
ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language
mere surplusage. At the same time, we must seek to effectuate the intent
of the legislature.
(Citations omitted.) Slakman v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191 (587
SE2d 24) (2003). Furthermore, "[w]here the language of a statute is plain
and unambiguous, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but
forbidden." Six Flags over Ga. II, L.P. v. Kull, 276 Ga. 210, 211 (576 SE2d
880) (2003). In this regard, "under our system of separation of powers this
Court does not have the authority to rewrite statutes." State v. Fielden, 280
Ga. 444, 448 (629 SE2d 252) (2006).
Page 9
OCGA 45-1-4 (d) (2) and (3) speak only in terms of prohibiting an
employer from "retaliat[ing] against a public employee for disclosing a
violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a
supervisor or a government agency" or "for objecting to, or refusing to
participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the public employer that the
public employee has reasonable cause to believe is in violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation." These subsections say
nothing of being limited by subsection (b) of the statute.
In turn, subsection (b) of the statute does not mention subsection (d)
in any way. OCGA 45-1-4 (b) states:
35
36
37
-------Notes:
1.
(2) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee for disclosing a violation
of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or a government
agency, unless the disclosure was made with knowledge that the disclosure was false or
with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.
(3) No public employer shall retaliate against a public employee for objecting to, or
refusing to participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the public employer that the
public employee has reasonable cause to believe is in violation of or noncompliance with
a law, rule, or regulation.
2. The briefs in these two cases are identical, as the separate case numbers exist
only insofar as they relate to each of the individual plaintiffs involved below (i.e., Case
No. S12G1911 relates to Warren and Case No. S12G1912 relates to Colon). The two
case numbers will therefore be handled together for purposes of this Opinion.
3. Because the issue relating to the County's waiver of sovereign immunity would
be dispositive in this case if decided in the County's favor, we will address Case Nos.
S12G1911 and S12G1912 first.
4.
38
complains; or
(C) Who has been designated by a public employer to receive complaints regarding a
violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation.
5. In this regard, the Legislature made sure to define public employees and
employers under subsections (a) (3) and (4) in such a manner as to include
"governmental entit[ies] that receive[] any funds from the State of Georgia or any state
agency," but specifically declined to use this same definitional language in subsection (a)
(5) with respect to the types of disclosures by a public employee that could give rise to a
retaliation claim if an adverse employment action was taken against the employee for
having "disclos[ed] a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either
a supervisor or government agency." If the Legislature intended for the disclosures
giving rise to a potential retaliation claim to be limited to those relating to programs or
operations funded by the state, it could have expressly stated so.
6.
(e) (1) A public employee who has been the object of retaliation in violation of this Code
section may institute a civil action in superior court for relief as set forth in paragraph (2)
of this subsection within one year after discovering the retaliation or within three years
after the retaliation, whichever is earlier.
(2) In any action brought pursuant to this subsection, the court may order any or all of
the following relief:
(A) An injunction restraining continued violation of this Code section;
(B) Reinstatement of the employee to the same position held before the retaliation or to
an equivalent position;
(C) Reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights;
(D) Compensation for lost wages, benefits, and other remuneration; and
(E) Any other compensatory damages allowable at law.
(f) A court may award reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and expenses to a
prevailing public employee.
7. OCGA 45-1-4 (c) provides:
(c) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, such public employer shall not after
receipt of a complaint or information from a public employee disclose the identity of the
public employee without the written consent of such public employee, unless the public
employer determines such disclosure is necessary and unavoidable during the course of
the investigation. In such event, the public employee shall be notified in writing at least
seven days prior to such disclosure.
8. Indeed, the straightforward construction of the statute outlined above makes
perfect sense, as a public employee might not even know whether state money is
involved at the time that he or she discovers and reports a violation of the rules to his or
her supervisor. Under OCGA 45-1-4, regardless of whether a public employee has
knowledge of the extent to which state funds may or may not be involved in a reported
violation of rules or regulations, the public employee would still be protected from
retaliation after making the disclosure. This makes sense, as OCGA 45-1-4 would then
operate such that a public employee would always be protected from retaliation when
disclosing improper conduct, rather than offering protection for some public employees
who disclose improper conduct (i.e. those reporting rule violations relating to state
funded operations) and leaving others who disclose improper conduct without such
protection (i.e. those reporting rule violations that do not relate to state funded
operations).
39
EXHIBIT
2
GA. Code 45-1-4 Whistleblowers (Georgia Code (2013 Edition))
40
41
set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection within one year after
discovering the retaliation or within three years after the retaliation,
whichever is earlier.
(2) In any action brought pursuant to this subsection, the court may
order any or all of the following relief:
(A) An injunction restraining continued violation of this Code section;
(B) Reinstatement of the employee to the same position held before
the retaliation or to an equivalent position;
(C) Reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights;
(D) Compensation for lost wages, benefits, and other remuneration;
and
(E) Any other compensatory damages allowable at law.
(f) A court may award reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and
expenses to a prevailing public employee.
HISTORY: Code 1981, 45-1-4, enacted by Ga. L. 1993, p. 563, 1; Ga.
L. 2005, p. 899, 1/HB 665; Ga. L. 2007, p. 298, 1/HB 16; Ga. L. 2009,
p. 745, 2/SB 97; Ga. L. 2012, p. 446, 2-66/HB 642.
42
EXHIBIT 3
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF DEKALB COUNTY
GEORGIA
ANTHONY S. TRICOLI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROB WATTS; RON CARRUTH; JIM
RASMUS; MARK GERSPACHER;
SHELETHA CHAMPION; HENRY
HUCKABY; JOHN FUCHKO; STEVE
WRIGLEY; BEN TARBUTTON; THE BOARD
OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
SYSTEM OF GEORGIA; SAM OLENS, THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GEORGIA; and
ROBIN JENKINS
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
43
STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS
Georgia Bar No. 378099
44
re:
Anthony
Tricoli
Ante
Litem
Notice
To
whom
it
may
concern:
This
firm
represents
Anthony
Tricoli,
former
president
of
Georgia
Perimeter
College
(GPC)
in
the
University
of
Georgia
System
(USG).
We
are
writing
to
give
notice
of
tort
claims
against
the
Board
of
Regents
for
the
USG
for
actions
occurring
in
Atlanta
and
Decatur,
Georgia
that
occurred
or
were
discovered
on
or
about
April
25,
2012.
The
injury
to
Dr.
Tricoli
occurred
because
of
acts
or
omissions
by
the
Board
of
Regents
and
officers
of
the
University
System
and
Georgia
Perimeter
College
for
which
the
Board
of
Regents
is
liable.
Specifically,
GPC
Executive
Vice
President
for
Financial
and
Administrative
Affairs
Ron
Carruth
failed
to
inform
Dr.
Tricoli
pursuant
to
system
policy
of
factors
affecting
the
budget
of
Georgia
Perimeter
College.
When
an
alleged
$16
million
shortfall
was
alleged
on
April
25,
2012,
other
state
officers
including
personnel
of
the
State
Audit
Department,
GPC,
USG,
and
the
Board
of
Regents
claimed
to
know
about
problems
with
the
GPC
budget
over
a
period
of
three
years
without
informing
Tricoli.
These
alleged
budget
shortfalls
were
used
as
a
pretext
for
forcing
Tricoli
out
of
his
job
as
GPC
president,
even
though
a
subsequent
state
audit
cleared
Tricoli
of
any
knowledge
of
the
budget
problems
because
he
was
misinformed
by
the
responsible
budget
officials
and
the
USG
budget
oversight
procedures
were
found
to
be
deficient
and
in
need
of
reform.
Persons
with
knowledge
of
the
alleged
budget
shortfalls
who
did
not
inform
Tricoli
include
without
limitation
USG
Chancellor
Henry
Huckaby,
Executive
Vice
Chancellor
of
Administration
Steve
Wrigley,
Associate
Vice
Chancellor
of
Fiscal
Affairs
Ben
Riden,
Vice
Chancellor
of
Fiscal
Affairs
John
Brown,
GPC
Executive
Vice
President
for
Financial
and
Administrative
Affairs
Ron
Carruth,
GPC
Budget
Director
Mark
Gerspacher,
GPC
Associate
Vice
President
of
Fiscal
Affairs
Sheletha
Champion,
former
Chief
Operating
Officer
and
interim
GPC
President
Rob
Watts,
Assistant
Director
for
Financial
Services
Michael
Cole,
Assistant
Vice
Chancellor
for
Fiscal
Affairs
Usha
Ramachandran,
45
46
47
president
and
the
salary
and
benefits
of
the
comparable
system
office
position
he
was
promised.
In
addition,
Tricoli
was
by
denied
his
appeal
rights,
depriving
him
of
due
process
under
Regents
policy
and
due
process
of
law
under
the
Fifth
and
Fourteenth
Amendments
to
the
U.S.
Constitution.
These
salary
and
benefits
total
approximately
$300,000
per
year
for
the
remainder
of
his
anticipated
career
until
retirement.
Without
the
fraud
that
caused
his
wrongful
removal
from
office,
Tricoli
would
have
continued
his
existing
contract
until
its
completion.
Without
the
fraud
that
caused
his
removal
from
office,
Tricoli
would
have
had
his
existing
contract
renewed,
as
the
time
for
giving
any
notice
of
reasons
for
non-renewal
had
already
lapsed
at
the
time
of
his
forced
resignation.
Without
the
fraud
that
caused
his
wrongful
removal
from
office,
Tricoli
expected
to
work
at
GPC
or
USG
for
an
additional
14
years.
Due
to
the
fraud
and
dissemination
of
false
information
it
has
been
impossible
for
Tricoli
to
obtain
other
employment
commensurate
with
his
ability,
training,
experience,
and
accomplishments.
In
addition,
Tricoli
has
incurred
continuing
legal
expenses
because
of
this
tortious
conduct.
Tricoli
is
claiming
$4.2
million
in
damages
plus
legal
fees.
Thank
you
for
your
immediate
attention
to
this
matter
and
we
look
forward
to
your
earliest
response.
Stephen Humphreys
Attorney for Anthony Tricoli
48
49
50
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Undersigned counsel hereby certifies that all Defendants in this action have
been served via counsel who purports to represent them in this action, this
4th day of August, 2014, as follows:
Samuel S. Olens
Dennis R. Dunn
Kathleen M. Pacious
Annette M. Cowart
Loretta L. Pinkston
Christopher A. McGraw
C. McLaurin Sitton
Office of the Attorney General
40 Capitol Square, SW
Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300
52