CASES FOR LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY et.al. vs. CONCERNEDRESIDENTS OF MANILA

BAY (Ministerial Function)
December 18, 2008
FACTS: The government agencies namely, MWSS, LWUA, DENR, PPA, MMDA, DA, DBM,DPWH, DOH,
DECS, and PNP did not take notice of the present danger to public health and the depletion and
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay. According to the Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay, the
condition of Manila Bay did not matched to the intended SB level standard of water quality in such a
way that swimming, ski diving and etc. are unallowable. Thus ,the RTC ordered the government agencies
to participate in cleaning the Bay. Authorities from DENR and MWSS testified in favor of the petitioners
that the bay is in safe-level bathing and that they are doing their function in reducing water pollution.
However the RTC decided in favor of the respondents and ordered the government agencies in violation
of PD 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code to rehabilitate the bay.The petitioners argued to the CA
that PD 1152s provisions only pertain to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover
cleaning in general. However, CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not cleaning Manila Bay is the ministerial act of the petitioners that canbe
induced by mandamus.
(2) Whether or not Section 17 and 20 of Presidential Decree 1152only pertain to the specific cleaning of
pollution (and not general cleaning).
RATIO DECIDENDI: (1) The cleaning and rehabilitation of Manila Bay can be compelled
by Mandamus. Petitioners claimed that it is not their ministerial duty to clean up the bay because for
them it is a discretionary duty which cannot be compelled by mandamus. According to the Supreme
Court, the obligations to perform the duties (as defined by law) of the petitioners and on how they carry
out such duties are two distinct concepts. The former pertains to the discretionary duties of the
petitioners while the latter is their ministerial duty. As for this case, it is the discretion of the petitioners
to choose not to perform or to perform their duties as defined by law. And when they have chosen to
perform their duties, the way they carry out those duties are called ministerial acts. It is very clear in
their charters that aside from performing their main function as an agency, they are also mandated to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection,
and preservation of the Manila Bay.
(2) In the second issue, the Supreme Court held that Sections 17 and 20 of P.D. 1152 include cleaning in
general. Section 17 provides that in case the water quality has deteriorated, the government agencies
concerned shall act on it to bring back the standard quality of water. On the other hand, Section 20 also
mandates the government agencies concerned to take action in cleaning-up in case the
polluters failed to do their part. In the succeeding section 62(g) and (h) of the same Code, provide that
oil spilling is the cause of pollution that should be done in clean-up operations. This provision actually,
expanded the coverage of Sec. 20 because it included oil-spilling as one of the causes of pollutions that
need to be cleaned-up by the government agencies concerned. Moreover, Sec. 17 emphasizes that
government agencies should clean that water for the sake of meeting and maintaining the right quality

standard. This presupposes that the government agencies concerned have the duties of cleaning the
water not only in times when the water is polluted.
Moreover, even without such provisions, it is the inescapable duty of everyone to protect the water and
prevent pollution, because of the tenable need of present and future generations as provided in Art. 2
Sec. 16 of the 1987 Constitution, that the State shall protect and advance the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Ferdinand Topacio v Assoc Justice of the Sandiganbayan ( Qou Warranto)
Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks, in the main,
to prevent Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of a
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
It will be recalled that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,[1] the Court, by Decision of July 3, 2007,
enjoined Ong from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully
completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that
he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship.[2]
Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified Letter-Request/Complaint[4] of September 5, 2007, implored
respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste aquo warranto proceeding against
Ong in the latters capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The OSG, by letter
of September 25, 2007, informed petitioner that it cannot favorably act on *his+ request for the filing of
a quo warranto petition until the [RTC] case shall have been terminated with finality.[7] Petitioner
assails this position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside from Ongs
continuous discharge of judicial functions.
Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita did not annul or declare null his
appointment as Justice of the Supreme Court, but merely enjoined him from accepting his appointment,
and that there is no definitive pronouncement therein that he is not a natural-born Filipino. He informs
that he, nonetheless, voluntarily relinquished the appointment to the Supreme Court out of judicial
statesmanship.[9]
The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it
cannot be assailed collaterally,[28] even through mandamus[29] or a motion to annul or set aside
order.[30] In Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,[31] the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into
the validity of the appointment of a public officer.
[T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as judges or other judicial officers,
cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the
functions of the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto, the title to the office and the right to
act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of a judicial office, the person
dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to
cease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by which
to determine the title to an office.[32]

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested
public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment.[33] It is brought against the person who is
alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office,[34] and may be
commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person
claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another
The Ofc of Ombudsman v Ramon Galicia (Jurisdiction)
GENERALLY, the Ombudsman must yield to the Division School Superintendent in the investigation of
administrative charges against public school teachers.

Respondent Ramon C. Galicia was a former public school teacher at M.B. Asistio, Sr. High School
(MBASHS) in Caloocan City. Based on the academic records that he submitted forming part of his 201
file, Galicia graduated from the Far Eastern University with a degree in civil engineering but failed to
pass the board examinations. He also represented himself to have earned eighteen (18) units in
education in school year (SY) 1985-1986, evidenced by a copy of a Transcript of Records (TOR) from the
Caloocan City Polytechnic College (CCPC). Likewise, he passed the Teachers Professional Board
Examination (TPBE) given on November 22, 1987.
Subsequently, on December 2001, Reynaldo V. Yamsuan, then Principal of the MBASHS, reviewed
the 201 files of his teaching staff. He took note that the TOR submitted by Galicia was not an original
copy, but only stamped with verified correct from the original signed by Administrative Officer Rogelio
Mallari. Pursuant to a Division Memorandum, Yamsuan required Galicia and other teachers with similar
records, to secure authenticated copies of the TOR that they submitted. All of the teachers who were
given the said instruction complied, with the exception of Galicia.

After the parties submitted their reply, rejoinder, and respective memoranda, the Ombudsman gave
judgment with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered finding Galicia RAMON C. GALICIA,
Guilty of Dishonesty for which the penalty of Dismissal From the Service, Forfeiture of Leave Credits and
Retirement Benefits and Temporary Disqualification for Re-employment in the Government Service for a
period of One (1) Year from the Finality of this Decision, is hereby imposed, pursuant to Section 52 (A1) OF THE Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases (CSC Resolution No. 991936).[7]
While stating that Galicia presented the original of the questioned documents during the preliminary
conference,[8] the Ombudsman nevertheless found that the absence of a certification from the College
Registrar destroyed the TORs credibility. Said the Ombudsman:
Galicia further challenged the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman by invoking Section 20 of R.A. No. 6770 or
the Ombudsman Act[12] which enumerates the instances when the Ombudsman may not conduct an
administrative investigation. Under the said provision, the Ombudsman may not conduct investigation
if the following requisites concur:
1.

Complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;

2.
The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman;
3.
The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;
4.
Complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or
5.
The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained
[13]
of.
On January 20, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman,[17] disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED and the Decision
dated October 18, 2002 as well as the Order dated July 28, 2003 of public respondent are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ordered REINSTATED to his former position and is hereby
awarded backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal until he is reinstated and also all other
monetary benefits that may have accrued to him during the period of his unjustified dismissal.[18
We are mindful of Our decision in Lumancas v. Intas,[41] where two government employees submitted
TORs and Special Orders as proof of their educational attainment. Upon verification with the CHED, it
was found that there were no records with the Department of Education that respondents were
enrolled with the named school during the period. Consequently, the decision of the Ombudsman
finding them guilty of falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct was upheld.
We find, however, that Lumancas is not applicable to this case. In Lumancas, it was the CHED which
issued the negative certification, a public document of a government institution which enjoys the
presumption of regularity.[42] Here, what was presented to the Ombudsman was a certification not from
the CHED but from a college, and that does not enjoy the same evidentiary value.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the
complaint.[43] Absent substantial evidence to prove the falsity of the TOR presented by Galicia duly
signed by the College Registrar at that time, We are constrained to uphold his innocence of the
charges of falsification.
Galicias original TOR, although belatedly submitted, is positive evidence that, indeed, he took up 18
units of education at the CCPC. The present College Registrars certification of the absence of Galicias
records in her office, is negative evidence to the contrary. Following the general rule that positive
evidence is more credible than negative evidence, We find more reason to uphold the findings of the CA
LIWAYWAY CHATO V FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP ( Statutory liability under the Civil Code).[44]
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem
tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to
effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More (all
manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55%
ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated
its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal
protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action
against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the
scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the
latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground
that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:

Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative
Code

HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may
suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.
An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not
liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the
Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a
public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle ofimmunity for
official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith,
malice, orgross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same
Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional
rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts
were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for
acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1)
acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right
of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which
prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).

Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has
been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives
some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been
stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the
tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered
immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the
alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of
good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise
an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant
acted without evil intent.
OCA V EMMA ARAFILES (Habitual Tardiness)
The Leave Division of the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a Report of Tardiness on
December 6, 2007 stating that Ms. Emma Annie D. Arafiles, Court Legal Researcher, Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Branch 48, Pasay City, incurred tardiness in September and October 2007. She was tardy
11 times in September and 16 times in October. The Report was docketed as A.M. No. 08-107-MeTC
(Habitual Tardiness of Emma Annie D. Arafiles, MeTC, Branch 48, Pasay City.)
Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepa (through a 1st Indorsement dated January 14, 2008) required Ms.
Arafiles to comment on the report within ten (10) days from receipt.
Ms. Arafiles complied with a letter-comment dated January 30, 2008. She admitted the tardiness and
gave various explanations, specifically: that she had no maid; that she had to attend to the needs of her
school children ages eight (8) and two (2) years; and that she was hypertensive. She asked for "human
consideration" and apologized for her tardiness, promising that she would no longer be tardy in the
future.
Court Administrator Elepa evaluated Ms. Arafiles' explanation and found no justification for her habitual
tardiness. The Court Administrator recommended (1) that the Report be redocketed as a regular
administrative matter, and (2) that Ms. Arafiles be given a reprimand with a warning that a repetition of
the same offense would warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
The law requires all government officials and employees to render not less than eight (8) hours of work
per day for five (5) days a week, or a total of forty (40) hours of work per week, exclusive of time for
lunch. As a rule, these hours are from eight (8) o'clock in the morning to five (5) o'clock in the
afternoon.1
Under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 14, S. 1991,2 an officer or employee of the civil service is
considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times a
month for at least two (2) months in a semester or for at least two (2) consecutive months during the
year.
We have previously ruled that non-office obligations, household chores, traffic problems, and health,
domestic and financial concerns are not
sufficient reasons to excuse or justify habitual tardiness.3 These are the types of reasons Ms. Arafiles
gave; hence, we cannot free her from liability for her infractions.
Time and again, we have reminded officials and employees of the Judiciary that by reason of the nature
and functions of their office, they must be role models in the faithful observance of the constitutional
principle that public office is a public trust.
A way of doing this is through the strict observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient use of
every working moment, if only to give back the true worth of what the Government, and ultimately, the

people, pay in maintaining the Judiciary.4 In short, in the public service, punctuality is a virtue,
absenteeism and tardiness are impermissible.5 chanrobles virtual law library
We agree with Court Administrator Elepao that "(B)y being habitually tardy, she [respondent] has
fallen short of the stringent standard conduct demanded from everyone connected with the
administration of justice" and thus merits the prescribed penalty. Under Section 52(c)(4), Rule VI of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, habitual tardiness is penalized as follows: first offense,
reprimand; second offense, suspension for 1-30 days; and third offense, dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ms. Emma Annie D. Arafiles, Court Legal Researcher, MeTC, Branch
48, Pasay City, GUILTY of habitual tardiness. Pursuant to Section 52(c)(4), Rule VI of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, this first offense merits the penalty of REPRIMAND with the WARNING
that a more severe penalty shall be imposed for the repetition of the same or a similar offense in the
future.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN GALERO V THE HONORABLE CA (Simple Neglect of duty)
For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57397 dated April 26, 2001
affirming the Resolution[2] of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in OMB-VIS-ADM-97-0565 finding
petitioner Ruben S. Galero guilty of Dishonesty, Falsifying Official Documents and Causing Undue Injury
to the Government and imposing the penalty of dismissal from service, forfeiture of all benefits and
perpetual disqualification to hold public office. Likewise assailed is the CAs Resolution[3] dated
December 21, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.
On May 31, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) issued a Resolution[12] against petitioner, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, this Office finds Ruben Galero guilty of Dishonesty,
for Falsifying Official Documents, and for causing undue injury to the government, thus metes upon him,
the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE, FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS, and PERPETUAL
DISQUALIFICATION TO PUBLIC OFFICE in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989
of the Civil Service Commission.[13]
SO RESOLVED.
Ombudsman concluded that the petitioner, being his immediate superior who verified his DTRs, was
aware of such irregularity.[14] Hence, the extreme penalty of dismissal as to the petitioner. Mr. Elizalde,
on the other hand, was exonerated for lack of evidence to show conspiracy. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was also denied on December 10, 1999.[15
Petitioner likewise failed to obtain a favorable judgment from the CA when his petition for review was
denied.[16] The appellate court declared that petitioners verification of Mr. Geocadins DTRs was
sufficient to hold him guilty as charged. His verification, according to the court, enabled Mr. Geocadin
to receive from the government such amounts not due him. The court did not give credence to the
affidavits of some security guards that Mr. Geocadin was indeed their station commander. Neither did
the appellate court consider the affidavit of retraction executed by one of the witnesses.[17] In
conclusion, the court said that there was substantial evidence to establish petitioners guilt.

Aggrieved, petitioner comes before this Court in this petition for review raising the following
errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
OMBUDSMAN WHICH FINDING IS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATION, SURMISES OR
CONJECTURES.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILS (SIC) TO NOTICE CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS WHICH, IF
PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WILL JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.
III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AS TO THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS
DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.[18]

The powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman are set forth in Section 15(3) of Republic Act No.
6770 (R.A. 6770) otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989 which substantially restates
Section 13(3),[22] Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
xxxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault
or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, andrecommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act;Provided, That the refusal by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.[23]

The restrictive interpretation of the word recommend had long been rejected by this Court for
being inconsistent with the wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the Office of the
Ombudsman.[24] Instead, to be faithful to the constitutional objective, the word has been construed to
mean that the implementation of the Ombudsmans order of dismissal, suspension, etc., is mandatory
but shall be coursed through the proper officer.[25]
While not totally exonerating petitioner from the charges filed against him, a modification of the nature
of petitioners administrative liability as well as the penalty that was correspondingly imposed, is in
order. The only basis of petitioners liability for dishonesty, etc., was the presumed collusion between
him and Mr. Geocadin. This stemmed from the unproven fact that Mr. Geocadin was a ghost employee

and that petitioner was receiving part of his (Mr. Geocadin) salary. There was nothing in the record
which establishes petitioners collusion or conspiracy with Mr. Geocadin to defraud the
government. For the purpose of sustaining the Ombudsmans findings, it would have been necessary
that the alleged conspiracy or collusion be established by independent, competent and substantial
evidence. Since the records are bereft of this evidence, what remains is only petitioners verification of
Mr. Geocadins false DTR. With this as sole basis, petitioner can be held administratively liable only for
simple neglect of duty --- not for dishonesty, for falsification of official document, or for causing undue
injury to the government.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an
employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference.[31] Had petitioner performed the task
required of him, that is, to monitor the employees attendance, he would have discovered that indeed
Mr. Geocadin was dividing his time between PPA and Napocor. Though not required to know every
detail of his subordinates whereabouts, petitioner should have implemented measures to make sure
that the government was not defrauded. As he was required to sign Mr. Geocadins DTR, petitioner
should have verified the truthfulness of the entries therein. Indeed, petitioner neglected his duty which
caused prejudice to the government in that Mr. Geocadin was paid twice for his services. These facts,
taken together, are sufficient to make petitioner liable for simple neglect of duty, but insufficient to
make him answer for charges of dishonesty and falsification of document.
As to the proper penalty imposable, simple neglect of duty is classified as a less grave offense
punishable by suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.[36] The
circumstances surrounding the instant case, considering that it appears to be petitioners first offense,
warrant the imposition of suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 26, 2001 and its Resolution
dated December 21, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 57397 are herebyMODIFIED. We find petitioner GUILTY of
Simple Neglect of Duty instead of Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents, Causing Undue Injury
to the Government, and is meted the penalty of suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1)
day, instead of dismissal from service, forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification from public
office.
MANICAM BASCASAR V CSC (Good faith defense)
Petitioner Manicam M. Bacsasar (petitioner) filed this Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the
Resolutions dated June 26, 2007[1] and October 2, 2007[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
01508.
On May 7, 2003, petitioner was charged with dishonesty by the Civil Service CommissionAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (CSC-ARMM), committed as follows:
1.
That in your Personal Data Sheet (PDS), dated February 20, 2001, you indicated that you passed
the Career Service Professional examination on November 28, 2000 with a rating of 87.54% conducted
in Quezon City;
2.
That the same eligibility was used to support the issuance of an appointment in your favor by
Mayor Hadji Ali MB. Munder of Bubong, Lanao del Sur as Municipal Assessor under Permanent status;
and

3.
That a verification from Civil Service Regional Office National Capital Region in Quezon
City yielded a response that your name is not included in the Master List of passing and failing list of
NCR-CSP dated November 28, 2000.[3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No.
062250[8] dated December 19, 2006. Petitioner received CSC Resolution 062250 on January 8,
2007. On January 23, 2007, she requested a thirty day-extension of time, or until February 22, 2007, to
file a petition for review. Petitioner, however, failed to file the intended petition within the extended
period.[9]
On June 26, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for having been tardily filed and for lack of merit. It
held that the failure of the petitioner to file the intended petition for review within the extended period
rendered the CSC decision final and executory. Accordingly, it had been divested of jurisdiction to
entertain the petition. The CA also affirmed the CSC finding that there is substantial evidence on record
to establish petitioners culpability. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the CA denied it
on October 2, 2007.
The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory. Failure
to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and beyond the
power of the Court's review. Jurisprudence mandates that when a decision becomes final and
executory, it becomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest. Such decision
or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may have been.
Petitioner was charged with dishonesty which is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a
matter of fact relevant to ones office or connected with the performance of his duty.[2
Indisputably, when petitioner applied for the position of Municipal Assessor, she submitted a Certificate
of Eligibility purportedly issued by the CSC certifying that she passed the Career Service Professional
examination on November 28, 2000 with a rating of 87.54%. She also submitted a PDS dated February
21, 2001 stating that she passed the Career Service Professional examination on November 28,
2001 with a rating of 87.54%. Upon verification, it was found that her Certificate of Eligibility was
spurious. Clearly, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish that petitioner is, indeed, guilty of
dishonesty.
We cannot accept petitioners simplistic claim that she used the fake eligibility in good faith because she
was not aware that the same was spurious.
Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law,
together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction
unconscientious. In short, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although this is something
internal, we can ascertain a persons intention not from his own protestation of good faith, which is selfserving, but from evidence of his conduct and outward acts.[23]

NAB V MAMAUAG (Who can appeal)

Section 45 of RA 6975 provides that a disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be
final and executory. Under Section 45, a disciplinary action is appealable only if it involves either a
demotion or dismissal from the service. If the disciplinary action is less than a demotion or dismissal
from the service, the disciplinary action shall be final and executory as Section 45 of RA 6975 expressly
mandates. Thus, a decision imposing suspension on a PNP member is not subject to appeal to a higher
authority.
Administrative disciplinary action connotes administrative penalty.[17] If the decision exonerates the
respondents or otherwise dismisses the charges against the respondents, there is no disciplinary action
since no penalty is imposed. The provision that a penalty less than demotion or dismissal from service
is final and executory does not apply to dismissal of charges or exoneration because they are not
disciplinary actions. This gives rise to two crucial questions.
First, can a party appeal from a decision of the disciplining authority dismissing the charges against a
PNP member? Second, if a decision dismissing the charges against a PNP member is appealable, who
can appeal the PNP or the private complainant, or both?
Before the case of CSC v. Dacoycoy,[18] case law held that dismissal of the charges or exoneration of the
respondents in administrative disciplinary proceedings is final and not subject to appeal even by the
government. Thus, in Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission,[19] et al., the Court held:
Section 37, paragraph (a), of PD 807, the Philippine Civil Service Law, provides:
(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving
the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office xxx (Italics supplied).
Interpreting the above provision, we held in Mendez v. CSC that:
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provision of law. (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Office of the
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, 153 SCRA 318).
Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision xxx (italics
supplied) (p. 104, Rollo)
The phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government employee against whom
the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of
suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In the instant case,
Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not the respondent
in the administrative case below.
Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city major, as head of the city government,
is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties like suspension from work for one
month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring employees.
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the
respondent is found guilty of the charges files against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of
said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held
respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the
complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil
Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously

prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that the phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may
take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office and
not included are cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary or when the respondent is exonerated of the
charges, there is no occasion for appeal. In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the
Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service
Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export
Processing Zone Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.

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