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"Fordism" in Crisis: A Review of Michel Aglietta's "Rgulation et crises: L'exprience des

Etats-Unis
Author(s): Mike Davis
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall, 1978), pp. 207-269
Published by: Research Foundation of SUNY for and on behalf of the Fernand Braudel Center
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Review,II, 2, Fall 1978, 207-69.

in Crisis:a review
"Fordism"
of MichelAglietta's
et crises:L'exprience
Rgulation
desEtats-Unis*

MikeDavis

1.0
For the past decade the highgroundof Americaneconomic
historyhas been dominated by a bastard progenyof neoclassical economics known to most of its practitionersas
"Cliometrics".Its stock and tradehas been the applicationof
to problemsof the past. With
macroeconomicmodel-building
dramaticdisplaysof quantitativevirtuositywhich frequently
set about debunkingsuch
dazzled theuninitiated,
cliometricians
established"myths"as the "necessityof the railroadto economic development"and "the immiseration
of workersduring
the IndustrialRevolution."In theirmostambitiousgambit,the
enfantterriblesof the "New Economic History",Fogel and
launcheda directassaultupon the "neo-abolitionist"
Engerman,
of the Slave South. In the famousfightthat
historiography
followed,the seeminglyinvinciblechartsand graphsof Messrs.
Fogel and Engermanwere themselves"put on the cross" by
(Belgium: Calmann-Lvy,1976). All page referencesare to this edition. An
EnglishLanguageeditionis beingpublishedby New LeftBooks.

208

MikeDavis

HerbertGutman'smeticulousand devastating
critique.1
of Time on the Cross clearlyreGutman's dmystification
vealed some of the flimsyand contradictory
theoreticalunderpinningsof theattemptto squeeze historythrougheconometric
models. At the same time, the controversyover Fogel and
Engerman'sworkdramatizedthe overallplightof the studyof
economic historyin this country:particularly
its neo-colonial
dependencyupon academyeconomicsand its attendantfetishism of econometricsand simplisticmodel-building.
Whatever
cliometric'spretensionsto be "scientifichistory",its achievements remain circumscribedby its own narrow ideological
biases. Indeed it is debatable whethertoday's neo-classical
approachin economic historyhas yielded a singlefecundadvanceovertheolder,Keynesianschoolof the 1930's and 1940's
(Mitchell,Gates, etc.). Many of the most promisingcontributions of cliometricsseem quite banal once theirelaborate
mathematicalparaphernaliahas been carefullydismanteledto
revealtheirrealconceptualstructure.2
The stagnationof US. economic historyin its own backwatershas had a retarding
influenceupon otherfieldsof historical investigation.
The absenceof majorsynthetic
interpretations
- especiallyof post-CivilWareconomicdevelopment- constitutes a roadblock(or, as the Frenchwould say, "an epistemoviewof modernU.S. history.
logicalobstacle") to an integrated
For instance,in contemporarylabor historiography,
wherea
lifehas gradually
relativelytotalisticapproachto working-class
supercededthe older "institutional"focus of the Commons
school, the politicaleconomy of workers'struggles(emphaticallynot the same subjectas "labor economics"!) remainsfor
the most part a terraincognita? The underdevelopment
of
Robert Fogelman and Stanley L. Engerman,Time on the Cross (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1974). Herbert G. Gutman, Slavery and the Numbers Game: A
Critique of Time on the Cross (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1975). Also see
Thomas L. Haskell, "The True and Tragical Historyof Time on the Cross," New
YorkReviewof Books, 22:15, Oct. 2, 1975, 33-39.
o
I particularlyhave in mind the recent work of JeffreyWilliamson,Late
Nineteenth-Century American Development: A General Equilibrium History
(London: CambridgeUniv. Press, 1974) which surelyawaits its demolitionat the
handsof anotherGutman.
' For
an excellent example of what the integrationof political economy and
labor historymightlook like, see Gareth StedmanJones, "Class Struggleand the
IndustrialRevolution,"New Left Review,No. 90, Mar.-Apr.1975, 35-71.

"Fordism"in Crisis

209

economichistoryresonatesin labor historyas the absenceof a

theoreticallevel linking class strugglesto their structural
in the accumulationprocess(as well as,
(partial-)determinants
conversely,the absence of a theoryof the role of the class
strugglein U.S. economic development).It is difficultto
bridgecould be builtbeimagine,moreover,how a meaningful
tween the substantiveissues of labor historyand the current
preoccupationsof cliometry.
The signalimportanceof the new book, Rgulationet crises
du capitalisme:L'expriencedes Etats-Unis
yby MichelAglietta,
is preciselyhis attemptto theoretically
unifythe concretehistoryof modernAmericancapitalismwitha rigorousanalysisof
laws of motion.In contrastto mostof theclioits fundamental
metricians,Agliettacarefullysubordinatesthe deploymentof
his econometricdata to thesystematic
expositionofunderlying
theoreticalconcepts. Writingwithinthe particularly
vigorous
discourseof contemporaryFrenchMarxism,Agliettaconfirms
the increasinginterestof European Marxistsin all aspects of
U.S. historyand social development.Like MarioTrontiin his
analysisof Americanlabor or ManuelCastellsin his studyof the
U.S. urban crisis,Agliettahas been attractedto the United
forall contemporary
Statesas the "model of reference
capitalist
nations,"the "ideal-type"best suitedforstudyingthe "general
structures
laws governingthe reproductionof the determinate
of capitalism"(p. 20). Yet at the same time,by providingthe
initialelementsof a theoreticalhistory,Agliettahas contributed
of Americandevelopment
to the elucidationof the specificity
withintheoverallevolutionof theworldcapitalisteconomy.
book, esRgulationet crisesis in manyrespectsa difficult
juncturesa familipeciallyas it presupposesat certainstrategic
aritywith Marxismin its Gallic idiom. Yet the arduousnessof
some passages is compensatedby the formalrigorand exemplaryorganizationof the argumentof the book. At therisk
and deletions, I would like to
of distortingsimplifications
attemptin this reviewto presentthe major propositionsof
Aglietta'stheoryof U.S. capitalistdevelopment.Leavingmore
technicalcommentsforthe appendices,I willalso undertakein
the last sectionof thispaper a partialand exploratorycritique
ofRgulationet crises.
2.0
forcomingto gripswithRgulation
A necessarypreliminary

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MikeDavis

et crisesis a clarification
of its theoreticalterminology.
Aglietta,
in the course of differentiating
Marxismand bourgeoiseconomics,employs severalconcepts - particularlythe ideas of
"structuralform" and "social regulation"- which are unfamiliarto English-speaking
Marxists.An explanationof these
conceptsentailsa briefexaminationof the radicallydifferent
epistemologicalpremiseswhich support General Equilibrium
Theory (the conceptual bedrock of most of the "New EconomicHistory")on one hand,and Marxismon theother.
In the openingpages of Rgulationet crises,Agliettapoints
to the double inabilityof GeneralEquilibriumTheory(G.E.T.)
economicdynamicsor to accountfor
to analyzecontemporary
the social contentof economiccategories.In hisviewG.E.T. is
a reductionismrooted in philosophicalidealism and a naive
concept of "human nature" whichseeks to explain the economic systemin termsof the behavioror psychologyof individual economic "subjects". It attemptsto elaboratea science
of rationalaction - i.e., a praxiology- based upon the automatismof exchangerelationswhich are, in turn,totallydetached fromany historicalcontext.These dual operationsof
all
postulatinga universaleconomicsubjectand of exorcisizing
historicalspecification
producethe "economy" as a differentiable continuumaccessible to the manipulationof a calculus.
G.E.T. presumesthe existence,then,of a homogeneous,linear
variablesunfold theirevotime in which empirically-chosen
lution.In theneo-classicalsynthesesof Marshall,
Jevons,Walras,
and Mengerknowledgealwaystakes the formof thedisclosure
variablephenomena.
of immutable"essences" whichdetermine
In Aglietta'sdescription,G.E.T. has "the rigorof a theological
construction,
purelyinternalto the worldof ideas, totallycut
offfromreality"(pp. 12-14).
The role of abstraction,seen thusin G.E.T. as a movement
funcfromthe empiricalto the theoretical,has a verydifferent
tion withinthe morecomplexMarxistdialecticof the "abstract
and the concrete". Like Althusser,4Agliettadenies that cognitioncan everproceeddirectlyfromthe "red"; insteadtheory
is recognizedas a reworkingor transformation
of previous
level of "concreteness".His description
conceptsat a different
of this pivotal differencein the epistemologiesof G.E.T. (or
"positivism"in a broadersense) and Marxismis worthquoting
at length.
Louis Althusser,ReadingCapital (London: New LeftBooks, 1970).

"Fordism" in Crisis

211

Abstractionis not a reflectionof thoughtupon itselfin order to

apprehend its true essence (the rational subject); rather it is exclusivelyan experimentalpath for the investigationof the concrete
(i.e., historicallydeterminaterelationsof production). Concepts are
not introducedat a fixed level of abstraction;rathertheyare transformed by the passage from the abstract to the concrete which
permitsthe absorptionof the concreteinto the heartof the theory.
The progression of thought entails not only "hypotheticodeductive" phases; it also consistsof the alternationof thesephases
with "dialectical" phases. These last are primordial:theyensurethat
theoryis somethingotherthan an explicationof conclusionsalready
embryonicin the initialpremises(i.e., whatis axiomatic). This transformationof concepts createsnew formsand negatesthe limitations
contained in their anterior expressions. If this transformationis
effectively
produced by an experimentalprocedure,the sequence of
concepts can become a representationof historical movement
(p. 13).

It should be clear, then,that G.E.T. and Marxismare not

"methodologies"appliedto thesameempirical
merelydifferent
different
theoretifield;rather,theypresupposefundamentally
cal objects which, in turn,entail differentconstructionsof
"data". G.E.T. is a calculusof the variationof scarce "means"
in the attainmentof subjective"ends" framedwithinan ahistoricaland Euclidean social space. The Marxisttheoryof the
social formation,on the otherhand, is a theoryof objective
systemsof social relationswhichare qualitativelytransformed
overtime.In contrastto G.E.T., Marxismposes theproblemsof
time - "a time which
historicalspecificationor differential
mustbe constructedby theoryand whichhas forsubstancethe
changingsof the formof social relations"- and of complex
structuresor morphologies(p. 21). Accordingto Aglietta,the
capitalistsocial formationis irreducibleto the "continuumspace" of G.E.T.'s conception of the economy; instead the
"morphology"of capitalismmust be graspedvia the interrelated concepts of structuralforms, crises, and regulation
(pp. 17-21).
Abstractly,structuralforms are "complex social relations,
which are the historicalproductsof
organizedin institutions,
the class struggle"(p. 16). They are modes of existenceof determinateand historicallyspecific relations of production
"each . . . acting upon the law of accumulationin a decisive
domain" (p. 325). In the firsthalf of Rgulationet crises,
Aglietta,beginningwithan examinationof the generallaws of
capital accumulation,focuses upon the historicaltransformationsof the wage relation(rapportsalarial) througha sequence

212

MikeDavis

of structuralforms.In the second half,and startingwith an

analysisof the laws of competitionand the formationof an
of the
averagerate of profit,he studies the transformations
relations of production between capitalists(rapportsintercapitaliste).This ordercorrespondsto the mode of exposition
whichMarxadopted in Capital: firstpresenting
the analysisof
the global relationsof social capital and labor beforeintroresultducing- at a moreconcretelevel - the determinations
followAlso
from
interrelations
of
individual
the
capitals.5
ing
ing Marx, Aglietta emphasizes that "capital is not ... an
immanententity[as bourgeoiseconomicshas alwaysassumed]
but a developmentof thewagerelationship"(p. 145).
In the capitalist mode of productiontransitionsbetween
structuralformsgenerallytake the formof crises.Crisesare
"creativeruptures"in the continuityof the reproductionof
in new forms.
social relationswhichlead to theirrestructuring
on
the
other
to
the
overall
unification
refers
hand,
Regulation,
and articulationof specificstructuralformsinto a complex
social formation.It is the principleof structuralcohesion
(synchrony)which Agliettacounterposesto the neo-classical
conceptionof "generalequilibrium".At the same timeit is a
further
concretizationof the theoryof expandedreproduction
whichMarx developedin Capital: "regulation"encompassesall
the constraintsacting upon the accumulationof capital at a
particularphase of development.Moreoverit is preciselythe
constructionof a theoryof specificmodes of "regulation"
whichpermitsa rigorousperiodizationof thehistoryof capital
accordingto itsown innerlogic(p. 12).
In the followingtable I have attemptedto summarizethe
foregoingdistinctionswhich Agliettahas drawnbetweenthe
of G.E.T. and Marxism.
epistemologies
Table 1.
GeneralEquilibriumTheory
"UniversalEconomic Subject"
Calculus of Means and Ends
(Praxiology)
Ahistoricism

Marxism
CapitalistMode of Production
ObjectiveSystemof Social
Relations
HistoricalSpecification

* See Ernest
Ben Fowkes,transi.,
KarlMarx,Capital,
Mandel,Introduction,
VolumeI (London:Pelican,1976),12-38.

213

"Fordism"in Crisis
Linear,HomogeneousTime

"DifferentialTime"

Empirical/Theoretical

Dialectic of Abstract/Concrete

"ExpressiveTotality"
(Simple Structure)
GeneralEquilibrium

"Morphology" (Complex Structure)

"Social Regulation" ("StructuralForms", "Crises")
Relationsof Production

NaturalizedQuantities
("ImmanentEntity")
Identityof Technico-Material
Processesof Productionand
and Its Social Forms

ContradictionBetweenthe
Socialization of the Labor
Processand the Valorization
of Capital

3.0

In Aglietta'sview the historyof United States industrial

capitalismcan be roughlydividedintothe following
periods:
(a) 1846-1873: A period which correspondsto the rapid
accumulationof thestructural
forthedominance
preconditions
of industrial
capitalism(pp. 55-56).
(b) 1873-1919: The formationof the basic industrialinfrastructure; working-classconsumption,however, remained
social relations
dependentto a largeextentupon pre-industrial
(pp. 59-60).
crisesand far(c) 1919-1945: Protractedperiodof structural
in both the labor process and the
reachingtransformations
sphereof working-class
consumption(pp. 72-79).
(d) 1945-1966: New model of accumulationand "regulation" based upon accelerated technological change and
plannedconsumption(ibid.).
crisis(p. 80).
(e) 1966-? A newera of structural
The logic of this periodizationis based upon Aglietta's
assertionthat therehave existed two basic systemsof "regulation" in post-CivilWarU.S. economy:an "extensiveregimeof
accumulation"and an "intensiveregimeof accumulation".The
latterof these he also refersto as "Fordism".6 In his scheme,
"Fordism"acquiredpopularityin the 1920's as a synonymfor the "rationalization" of production.See CharlesS. Maier,"Between Taylorismand Technocracy:
in the 1920's," Journal
European Ideologiesand the Vision of IndustrialProductivity
of ContemporaryHistory, V, 2, 1970, 27-62. For a prescientattemptto constructa
far-reaching
theoryof "Fordism" as a new stage of capitalistdevelopmentand to
explore its implicationsforproletarianconsciousness,see AntonioGramsci,"Ameri-

214

MikeDavis

periods(a), (c), and (e) are transitional

periods,whileperiod(b)
"extensive
to
the
of
the
corresponds
regime"(somehegemony
timesdescribedas the "frontierprinciple")and period (d) to
the fullinstallationof "Fordism".The two "regimes"represent
ensemblesof structuralforms,and beforeconverydifferent
sideringAglietta'sintricateanalysisof theirhistoricalevolution,
it is necessaryto developtwoverysweepingdistinctions.
First, the extensiveregimeof accumulationcharacterizesa
historicalperiod duringwhich(accordingto Aglietta)absolute
is the predominantmode of exploitation.
surplus-extraction
Fordismor the intensiveregime,on theotherhand,exemplifies
the predominanceof relativesurplus-value.The concepts of
absolute and relativesurplus-value
are, of course,fundamental
Marx
in
differentiated
his analysisof thecapitalist
by
categories
in
Volume
of
One
labor-process
Capital. As Diagram I ilarises throughan auglustrates,absolute surplus-extraction
mentationof surpluslabor-timebased upon either(modality
one) the prolongation of the working day or (modality
of laborencompasses
The intensification
two)itsintensification.
not only "speed-up", but also the eliminationof "slack
times" (delays, rest periods, etc.) which Marx described
as the "pores" in the workingday. Althoughthe prolongation
of the workingday and its intensification
are both modes of
that
directlyincreasingsurplus-labor
wages are equal
(assuming
to subsistence),theytend to be inverselyrelatedto the degree
that the maximumexertionof labor is incompatiblewith an
exceedinglylong workingday (pp. 39-40). In his famousdescriptionof the strugglesof Englishworkersto win a shorter
workingday, Marx showed how the riposteof the capitalists
was to intensifylabor, i.e., effectively
"condensing"a 12- or
14-hourday intoa 10-hourday.7
Relativesurplus-extraction,
on theotherhand,dependsupon
a risingproductivity
of labor whichultimatelycheapenswage
goods and, thereby,makespossiblea reductionof thenecessary
labor-timedevoted to the productionof theirequivalent.Acis the mode of excordingto Marx,relativesurplus-extraction
most
characteristic
of
the
ploitation
"specificallycapitalistform
canism and Fordism" in Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart,1971),
277-321.
7*

Marx,op. cit., 389-411. See AppendixI.

"Fordism"in Crisis

215

of the labor process," i.e., increasingmechanization.8Thus in

Aglietta'sanalysis, the extensiveregime of accumulationis
based upon a labor processwhichis onlypartiallymechanized.
Fordism,in contrast,is theproductof a profoundrestructuring
of the labor process in the U.S., beginningin the late 1890's,
which ultimatelymade the assemblyline ubiquitousin most
basicindustries(pp. 91-93).
American capitalism also
Secondly, nineteenth-century
differsfromFordismby the mode in whichproductionis combined with the social reproductionof labor-power.To understand this,it should be recalledthat industrialism
entailsthe
of
of
relations
productionthrougha twoexpansion capitalist
On one hand,there
foldprocessof globalsocial transformation.
is what Marx called the increasing"real subsumptionof labor
by capital," the integrationof labor into the conditionsof
large-scalemachineproductionforprofit.9On the otherhand,
accumulationbrings about the destructionof the "spatiotemporal universe modeled by pre-capitalistformsof production"(p. 61).
betweentown
This universeis characterized
by the closerelations
and
betweenproductive
thestillincomplete
and country,
separation
domesticactivity,the dominationof non-commodityrelationsin the

relationsare powerfully
mode of consumption:thesenon-market
establishedin the networkof the extendedfamilyand the traditionalneighborhood
(p. 61).

These two processes- the increasingsocializationof labor

relations- do not, howand the destructionof pre-capitalist
in time. Afterthe CivilWar,for
ever,proceed simultaneously
work
was
the
instance,
continuallybeingtransformed
process
of
new
processes productionwithoutany correspondingly
by
radicalremodelingof the mode of working-class
consumption.
based
In fact,as Marxpointedout, absolutesurplus-extraction
of
the
maximum
extension
the
workingday requiredthe
upon
milieux
of
(smallplots,supplementary
persistence non-capitalist
domesticproduction,etc.) to help subsidizetheverylow wages
and long hours. Later, with the growingdominanceof heavy
was destroyedor
industry,the traditionalsocial environment
coherent
structure
without
a
being replacedby new,
degraded
of capitalistconsumptionrelations.Thiswas, then,theclassical
8*
9*

Ibid., 1023-25.
Loc. cit.

216

MikeDavis

Diagram1. Modes of Surplus-Value.

Victorianperiod of industrialslums,widespreadimmiseration
amongstthe factoryproletariat,and the crisis of the urban
centerwithitsmanyfossilizedpre-industrial
enclaves(p. 6 1).10
on
the
other
Fordism,
hand,presupposestheemergenceof a
of organizedconsumptionbased
mode
distinctively
capitalist
the
"dominance
of
upon
commodity relations over nonrelations"
commodity
(p.62). In Aglietta'sterms,the "wagerelation" only assumes its complete,mature formwhen the
proletariat,throughthe mediationof new structuralforms,is
See GarethStedmanJones,OutcastLondon (Oxford: ClarendonPress,1973)
for a provocativeanalysisof how the IndustrialRevolutionfossilizedand preserved
modes of workand consumption.
largeenclavesof degradedpre-industrial

"Fordism"in Crisis

217

able to buy all of its conditionsof existencewithinthegeneral

circulationof commodities.Under Fordisma "social normof
consumption"- i.e., a regulated,averagelevel of mass consumptionhigherthanmeresubsistence- is broughtintobeing
as a crucialdeterminate
of the accumulationprocess.Later we
will see how the formationof thisnew capitalistmode of conof the relationsbesumptionalso leads to a transformation
tween differentsectors of production,and to a dramatic
accelerationin therateof relativesurplus-value
(pp. 62, 96).
3.1
In surveyingthe historyof the industrialrevolutionin the
United States, Aglietta emphasizes the "originality"of the
Americanpath of capitalistdevelopment.Like otherwriters,
he
attributesspecificityof nineteenth-century
U.S. historyto the
dominanceof the "frontierprinciple".On the otherhand,he
invests this term with a more complex meaning than the
familiarTurnerconcept of the Western"safetyvalve". In the
firstplace, the frontierfunctionsas the "heroic myth" of
Americancapitalism,the centerpieceof a bourgeoisideology
whichidentifiescapitalismwith the extensionof the frontier,
which equates free enterprisewith freedom,etc. Agliettaattaches decisiveimportanceto the fact that the "superstructures" of U.S. society, fromthe RevolutionaryWar period
onward,reflectan unadulteratedhegemonyof bourgeoisideas
and practices.Unlike Europe thereis not an inherited"dead
weight" fromthe past; there is no powerfulresidueof precapitalistrelationsand ideologicalforms.Giventheubiquityof
"general commodity reification"at the base of American
thateveryvarietyof
culture,Agliettadoes not findit surprising
individualistic
has
in
flourished
the
hothouseenvironideology
mentofU.S. capitalism.Thus narrowutilitarianism
and religious
fundamentalism
complementone anotheras different
poles of
the same hegemonic"frontier"ideology: "At one pole one
findsa positivismwhich secreteseconomic utilitarianism
and
at theother,an idealismwhichin theUnitedStates
pragmatism;
has takenan essentiallyreligiousform"(p. 55).
Unlikemuchof the continentalEurope wherethepeasantry
clung to atavisticideologies, bourgeoisconcepts thoroughly
pervadedthe culturaluniverseof thatenormousmass of petty
commodityproducers,the Americanfarmers.The second key
ramification
of Aglietta'sinterpretation
of the "frontier
princi-

218

MikeDavis

pie" is the significanceof the existencein nineteenth-century

Americaof hughreservesof freeland as a foundationforexplosiveindustrialgrowth.Unlike Europe (sans Britain),where
the agricultural
had to be
surplusnecessaryforindustrialization
extortedfroma recalcitrant,
self-subsistent
peasantryor shared
with a parasiticlanded gentry,Americanindustrialism
could
base itself upon an incomparablydynamic,market-oriented
operatedby smallcapitalistfarmers
agriculture
(pp. 54-57).
of
Accordingto Aglietta,the watershedin theestablishment
this agricultural
was
the
concatenation
of
events
which
system
roughlycoincided with the Mexican War (1846): vast land
fromIreland
annexations,discoveryof gold,mass immigration
and Germany,openingof prairieagriculture,
increasingEurofor
demand
food,
pean
imported
risingcrop prices,etc. There
were two principalmechanismsfor transfering
the resultant
the
into
of
financial
and
coffers
industrial
agricultureprofits
First
the
a
railroad
off
capital.
monopoliessiphoned
largepart
of the agrariansurplusdirectlythroughtheirrate structure,
of gianttractsof Western
indirectlythroughtheirappropriation
land. Secondly, the competitionfor the best lands created
rampantland speculation;in turn, the risingprice of land
to banks.
broughtin its wake the indebtednessof smallfarmers
The interlinked
forcesof land speculation,railroadsuperprofits,
and bank debts createdeven greaterpressureson all farmers
to
1
market
7
54-5
expand
production(pp.
J.1
The only importantstructuralobstacle to this agricultural
revolutionwas theequallyexpansionistdynamicof theprimary
product/export
economy of the Slave South. Agliettaechoes
the opinion of Marx that the Civil War was the culminating
revolutionwhichhad begun
phase of the bourgeois-anticolonial
in the 177O's.
The American Civil War was the last act of the struggleagainst
colonial domination. That is why it is legitimateto consider the
origin of the modern epoch to be the American Capitalist Revolution. The slave form of production in the South tied its own
existence and prosperity to its total integrationinto the international commerce dominated by England. It blocked the unifi-

For a profoundappreciationof the contributionof Americanagricultureto

industrialdevelopmentand its specificityvis-a-visEuropean models of agricultural
revolution,see V. I. Lenin, "New Data on the Laws Governingthe Developmentof
Capitalism in Agriculture"(1915), excerpted in Lenin on the U.S.A. (Moscow:
ForeignLanguagePubl. House, 1967).

"Fordism"in Crisis

219

cation of the Americannation on all planes and threatenedto halt

the expansionof the frontier.. . (p. 58).

During the long "boom-bust"cycle of the post-bellumindustrialrevolution(1873-97), the articulationof the modes
of productioncomprisingthe social formationwas profoundly
modified.Petty commodityproduction- i.e., Northernand
Westernagriculture- was progressively
integratedinto the
capitalistmode of productionthroughthe diffusionof agriculturalmachineryand the rise of a giganticfood processing
sectorwhichwas also the world'sfirstlargescale assemblyline
industry(originatingin the Cincinnatipackinghouses of the
1850's, perfectedin the "jungle" of the Chicagostockyardsat
the turnof the century).Comparedto both the Britishand the
the formation
variouscontinentalmodels of industrialization,
of this "agro-industrial"
complex was a unique featureof
Americancapitalistdevelopmentwhose importancehas been
too often underestimatedor overlooked by economic his2
torians.1
Under the prevailing"extensiveregime"of accumulationin
the late nineteenthcentury,industrialdevelopmentprogressed
par coups. Each waveof industrialaccumulationwas based on
a complex linkage of (a) furtherextensionsof the frontier,
(b) intensificationof exploitation of the mineral and agriculturalsectors,and (c) the induction("demand-pull")of new
fromEurope. Thus, in the 1880's, it is possibleto
immigrations
relatethe growthof theiron-steel
industryto dual demandsfor
rails and implementsresultingfromthe extensionof the railtierof states
frontier
acrossthe northernmost
road/agricultural
to the Pacific Ocean. This expansionof the Northwestgrain
belt, togetherwith increasingmechanizationon "bonanza
farms",created additionalagricultural
profitsto be siphoned
off for industrialdevelopment.At the same time,moreover,
additionalraw labor forironmills,rail gangs,and wheat farms
masses
to be tappedfromthevastsupernumerary
was beginning
12*

AlthoughAgliettadoes not actually draw thisconclusionhimself,it is certainlypossible to suggestthat traditionalmodels of the industrialrevolutionin the
U.S., perhaps because they have been overlyinfluencedby featuresof the British
prototype,have exaggeratedthe role of the textile/shoesectorat the expense of the
food processingand agriculturalimplementindustries,especially fromthe 1850's
onward. Furtherresearchis needed to clarifythe relativedemands for machinery
fromthesedifferent
sectors.
originating

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MikeDavis

of Easternand SouthernEuropean peasantry(thus the "New

Immigration").
WhereasBritishindustrialism
had requiredfromits takeoffa
world market stretchingfrom Naples to Canton, American
capitalismrelentlesslyforgedan internalmarketon a continental scale, whose absorptivecapacity by the turn of the
centurywas greaterthan all the colonial marketsof Europe
combined. Aglietta argues that the mainspringof this
industrialgrowthwas the extractionof
nineteenth-century
absolutesurplus-value
based upon theprolongationof theworkof
ing day. The lengthof theworkingday was also theleitmotif
in thenineteenth
the classstruggle
centuryas workersfoughtto
impose limits upon the duration of theirsurpluslabor. In
Britain15 yearspassed betweenthe beginningof massChartist
agitationand the firstregulationof the workingday by the
FactoryActs. Aftertheend of the CivilWar,Americanworkers
renewed theirsimilarbattle for a shorterworkingday which
had firstbegunin the 1830's. UnlikeBritain,however,it took
U.S. workersthree-quarters
of a centurybeforetheyachieveda
"normal
workingday"; and then,as we shall
legally-codified
effect
of the developmentof Taylorism,
the
"under
see, only
then of Fordism,which permittedthe developmentof more
of thesociallabor
efficaciousmethodsof raisingthe efficiency
force"(p. 109).
Agliettastressesthat in the United Statesthe formationof
was "an extremelylonghistorical
stableworkers'organizations
aftertheCivil
for
brief
interludes
immediately
process."Except
War and in 1880-85, the unions were not able to achieve a
durablenationalpresenceuntil the 1890's. This was partially
business
due to the characterof the late nineteenth-century
followed
of
accumulation
with
its
by
cycle
explosive spurts
Another
equally drasticdownturnsand mass unemployment.
factorwas the vast capital controlledby the "robberbarons"
which equipped themwith unprecedentedresourcesfor class
warfare(as well as for inter-capitalist
competition).Certainly
one of the most distinctive
featuresof Americancapitalismwas
the astonishingfrequencyand scale of privateemployerviolence exercised through armies of guards and vigilantes
(pp. 109-11).
But theuntrammeled
despotismpracticedby Frickor Rockefellerpresupposedthe complicityof the state; and forAglietta
the janus face of American"democracy"played the decisive
the ultimatetrajectoryof class strugglein
role in determining

"Fordism"in Crisis

221

the periodof extensiveaccumulation.In striking

contrastto the
mostadvancedEuropeancapitalistcountries,the U.S. political
systemblocked significantlabor reformin every field (e.g.,
social security,legal protectionfor trade union activity,regulationof workingconditions,etc.) formorethana half-century
afterthe rise of the post-bellumlabor movement.Yet at the
same time,the Americanstate was supremelysuccessfulin dethedevelopmentof working-class
away from
insurgency
flecting
the channelsof independentpolitical action. The pre-existing
broad white-malefranchise,a legacy of the Jacksonianera,
thekindof fusionof economic
playeda key role in preempting
and political demands which nurturedlaborism or social3
democracyin othercountries.1
Thus a numberof unique structuralforms- the "purest"
bourgeoisculture,the "most advanced"bourgeoisdemocracy,
and the most systematicapplicationof corporateand stateviolence againstthe labor movement- interactedtogetherwith
to givetheclassstruggle
the internaldivisionsof theproletariat,
in thenineteenth
its
in the UnitedStates specificphysiognomy
Time
centuries.
and
and earlytwentieth
again,therewerewaves
strikes
of elementaland violent
sometimescatalyzingsemilike in 1877 or 1894 withoutthe development
insurrections
of any overallproletarianclass perspective(even whenled by
As Agliettapoints out, even
socialistor anarcho-syndicalists).
the rebellionsof the "new immigrants"
withinthe
stayedfirmly
limitsof theirideological assimilationof Americancapitalist
and the primacy
norms(such as individualism,
acquisitiveness,
of thefamily).
theextremely
hardconequallyrecognized
[The new immigrants]
ditions of economic exploitationwhichmateriallynegatedthe
offered
liberalism.
Thisdouble
bypoliticalandreligious
perspectives
for understanding
the specificformsand
aspect is fundamental
theAmerican
labormovement.
Thismovecharacterizing
objectives
menthad takenrootin thecountrywherepoliticaldemocracy
was
and where
by far the most advancedin the nineteenth
century,
unionorganization
was at thesametimeforimmigrants
a meansof

terrainsof
Agliettarefrainsfrommakinga directcomparisonof the different
the class strugglein Europe and the UnitedStates.Thereare importantdiscussionsof
the link between bourgeois democracyand class "hegemony" in PerryAnderson,
"The Antinomiesof Antonio Gramsci,"New Left Review, No. 100, Nov. 1976-Jan.
1977, 5-78, and in Goran Therborn,"The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," New Left Review, No. 103, May-June 1977, 3-43. I presenta summary
comparisonof Europe and the UnitedStates in AppendixII.

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MikeDavis

claiming their cultural identityas citizens. The class strugglesunleashed in the last decade of the nineteenthcenturywere struggles
againstthe degradationof conditionsof lifeundertakenin the name
of the principlesof commoditysociety. For the mostpart theywere
not conducted under a proletarian ideology, instead they were
pursuedon an economic terrain.. . (p. 63).

3.2
failed
Althoughsuccessivewavesof working-class
insurgency
to breach the redoubtsof bourgeoispolitico-ideological
domination,theydid, nonetheless,become primemoversin forcing
of the entireregimeof accumulation.First,
the restructuration
in the period 1895-1925, the continuingattemptsof workers,
especiallycraftsmen,to preservetheirresidual"job control"
induced a capitalistresponsein the formof a profoundreshapingof the workprocess.Secondly,theriseof theCongress
of IndustrialOrganizations(C.I.O.) a generationlater and its
successfulconquestof nationalcollectivebargaining
agreements
(1938-46) helpedconsolidatethe new model of massconsumptionintegralto Fordism.
of semi-automatic
In analyzingthe establishment
assembly
productionas the prevalentlabor process of Americanmanufactureby the 1920's, Agliettaemphasizesthefollowingpoints:
(a) Capitalistproductionis always the unity of the labor
process(in a tecnnico-material
sense) and the processofvalorization (self-expansionof value) under the dominationof the
latter.14Thus the technicaldivisionof labor is alwayssubordinated to the social divisionof labor. Importantchangesin the
workprocessare expressionsof theclassstruggle(pp. 91-92).
(b) All modificationsof the labor process whichthe class
of the
strugglemay necessitateare extensionsor reinforcements
of the
i.e., "of thetransfering
globalprincipleof mechanization,
oflabor to themachine"(p. 93).
qualitativecharacteristics
(c) "Taylorism"or "scientificmanagement"arosein thelate
1890's as a strategyfor breakingthe power stillpossessedby
14

The concept of "valorization"( Verwertung)

has been the subjectof repeated
mistranslationsand misunderstandings.
In some earlier editions of Capital or in
Penguin Grundrisseit is incorrectlyrenderedas "realization". As ErnestMandel
points out in his Introductionto the new Fowkes translationof Volume One of
Capital, this pivotal concept can be more adequately defined as the "process of
constant searchingfor increasesin its own value throughthe unity of the labour
processand theprocessof the productionof increasedvalue." Op. cit., 36.

"Fordism"in Crisis

223

in the contextof the incompletemechanizationof

workgroups
of workin
production.It soughtto recomposetheorganization
such a way that each worker'srelationshipto the production
processwould be exclusivelymediatedby individualefficiency
normsratherthanby workgroup
solidarity.
[Taylorism] is a capitalist response to the class strugglein production when the work process is comprisedof severalmechanized
segments,but when the integrationof these segmentsdepends still
upon direct relationsbetween differentcategoriesof workers.. . .
The separationand specializationof functionshas the sole purpose
of combating the degree of control over workingconditions providedby the relativeautonomyof workposts (p. 94).

of the work
(d) By consolidatingthe mechanicalintegration
and
theintroof
the
electrification
the
factory
through
process
ductionof theconveyorsystem,FordismsupersededTaylorism,
and virtuallyeliminatedthe possibilityof traditionalformsof
theresulting
dequalijob controlor "soldiering".Concurrently,
ficationof large sectorsof the industrialworkforcetendedto
unify furtherand homogenize the proletariatas a mass of
machine operators ("travailleursfragmentaires,
interchangeables") (pp. 96-98).
of the labor processwas, of
This progressivetransformation
course,closely tied to the emergenceof a new sectorof consumerdurableindustries(auto, electricalappliances)at theend
of the FirstWorldWar.This new massproductionwas,in turn,
of capitalaccomplished
of thevastcentralization
the outgrowth
financialgroupssince theturnof thecentury.
by trust-building
"necessities"
Moreoverthe initialdemand forthe new-fangled
strata of the "new
was provided by the rapidly-increasing
middleclasses" who grewapace withmonopolizationand the
expansionof corporatebureaucracies.This "golden circle" of
rationalization+ consumerdurables+ the new salariatfueled
and sustainedthe greatboom from1919 until 1926. By 1926,
however,consumerdurableproductionreachedits ceilingand
aggregatedemand stagnateduntil the Bull Marketcollapse of
1929 unleasheda cataclysmicdownturn(pp. 74-75).
and artificial?
Why was the "New Prosperity"so shortlived
Agliettapointsto the "rigidand brutallimit"on thegrowthof
demandwhichwas theconsequenceof thepovertywagesof the
majorityof the blue-collarworkingclass. The new labor processeswhichseemedto open vistasof a "car in everygarage,an
electricstove in everykitchen,"were also accompaniedby a
brutal dimunitionof trade union power afterthe big strike

224

MikeDavis

defeatsof 1919-22.15 In the age of companyunionsand the

so-called"AmericanPlan" of 1920-29,therewas a verystriking
of wealthto theadvantageof theupperbourgeois
redistribution
strata. Accordingto Aglietta'sstatistics,the top 1% of the
populationincreasedits shareof the net nationalincomefrom
12 to 18%, the top 5% from24 to 33.5%. Total incomein the
formof profits,interest,and rentsoared by over45% during
the decade, whilethe real wagesof factoryworkersbarelyadvanced 2%. Overall,some 40-45% of all households,including
the majorityof factoryoperatives,laborers,farmtenants,and
small farmers,were too poor to participatein the greatconsumerballyhooof the 1920's (pp. 74-75).
of effectivedemand,partiallythebyproduct
This restriction
of the devastating
impactof Fordistproductionpracticesupon
threwup huge obstaclesto
craft
union
structures,
antiquated
the furthervalorizationof the capitalwhichhad been set into
of the 1919-26 boom. In Aglietta's
motionby the superprofits
view, the Depressionwas the inevitableconsequence of the
formsof
highlyunevendevelopmentof the principalstructural
Fordism.As we saw earlier,he definesFordismas an ensemble
in both the work process and the
of major transformations
mode of consumptionwhich conjointlyestablishedthe preof the
The revolutionizing
dominanceof relativesurplus-value.
work process,however,precededthe formationof a level of
mass consumptionadequate to realize the new capacitiesof
production.In fact,as Agliettaargues,theTaylorized/Fordized
work regime,the basis of enhancedmanagementcontrolover
the workprocess,tendedto encouragetheincreasedextraction
withof absolutesurplus-value
(via speed-upand intensification)
increasesof realwages(p. 75). 16
out significant
The structuralcrisis of the 1930's was markedlydifferent
and
fromearlierdepressions.Whileall the crisesof nineteenthearlytwentieth-century
capitalismhad also includedan "underconsumptionist"dimension,accumulationhad generallybeen
On the other hand, the shorter(8 hour) workingday won by millionsof
workers(except in steel) duringthe FirstWorldWar was preserved- thanksto the
new productionprocesses.
I referhere to the stagnantwages of the majorityof unskilledand semiskilled workers.Skilled workers'wages, in spite of the erosion of theirunions,increased more substantiallyduringthe 1920's. Also in thisperiod therewas the first
largeexpansionof the unproductiveworkforcein retailtradeand the servicesector.

"Fordism"in Crisis

225

resumedand the crisis "resolved" by a new wave of capital

formationin DepartmentOne (Marx's macrosectorof capital
goods production).This path of developmentwas possible as
conditionsof the "frontier"model
long as the basic structural
of accumulationpersisted- as long as massivesectorsof petty
productionremainedto be integratedinto the capitalistmode,
was
as long as internationaldemand for Americanagriculture
and
new
Western
territories
reas
as
rapidlyincreasing, long
sourceswerestillbeingadded to the economy.But once these
One accumupotentialitiesfora highrate of intra-Department
lationhad disappeared,thentherewas no way to detouraround
the constraintswhich the low level of working-class
consumption imposedupon therealizationof thesocialproduct(pp. 75,
84-90).
The noveltyof the Great Depressionwas preciselythe fact
that,comingafterthe completionof the basic industrialplant
there
and the "closure" of the industrial/agricultural
frontier,
was no longeranypathout of thecrisisotherthanthecomplete
oflaborof the conditionsof the reproduction
reconstruction
new
consumer
of
the
rise
but
The
brief,
spectacular,
power.17
the directionof
durable sectorsduringthe 1920's prefigured
consumption
growthwhichonly a remodelingof working-class
could reopen.
came neitherfrom
The motor forcefor thistransformation
UnlikecertainNew LefthisWall Streetnor fromWashington.
torianswho have emphasizedthe initiatoryrole of a "classconscious" corporate bourgeoisie,18Aglietta attributesthe
main impetustowardthe completionof Fordismto the mass
strugglesof the workingclass duringthe 1930's and 1940's.
at
Only afterthe riseof theC.I.O. and itshistoricbreakthrough
General Motors in 1937 did it graduallybecome possible to
overridethe resistancesof each giantcorporationto a fundaof wages and consumptionthroughthe
mentalreorganization
The eclecticpoliciesof the
installationof collectivebargaining.
New Deal (badly shakenaftertheforcedscuttlingof thecorporatist N.R.A. experiment)only began to acquire a real coherencewith the passage of the WagnerAct and the C.I.O.
* It is
importantto note that Agliettadoes not discusseitherfascismor any
otherformof war-economyas an alternativesolution.See Section 7.0 (B) fora more
detailedcritique.
18'
I am thinkingparticularlyofJamesWeinsteinand MartinSklar.

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MikeDavis

alliancewithRoosevelt.Whatensuedwas a complexand uneasy

cooperation between reformisttrade union leadership,the
and certainkey corporate
Roosevelt-Truman
administrations,
leaders which ultimatelysucceeded in containingthe great
workingclass momentumof the 1930's withinchannelswhich
conformedto the historicalneeds of capitalism.Ironically,
then,theheroiceconomicmilitancyof Americanworkersin the
1934-46 period helped create some of the indispensiblepreof
conditionsforthe restorationof the expandedreproduction
114,
163-65).19
capital(pp.
The class strugglecan then, in a political and ideological climate
which doesn't call capitalismitselfinto question,provokethe major
of the social organizationof work which are the
transformations
pre-conditionof new consumerdurableaccumulation(p. 309).

3.3

withinthenew system
This containmentof the classstruggle
of collectivebargainingand timecontractsconstituted"one of
the structuralformsmost essentialto the regulationof concapitalism"(p. 163). It providesa decisivehingefor
temporary
Fordismin threeways:
provideda foundationforlong-range
(a) Collectivebargaining
It assured
and
corporatewage planning economicprogramming.
the ecothis,moreover,to the extentthat it institutionalized
nomic class strugglewithinformscompatiblewith exclusive
overinvestment
management
perogatives
policiesand theorganization of production.Agliettarecognizes,however,that this
outcomewas by no meansthe inevitableor immanentresultof
the developmentof collectivebargaining
per se. In facthe contraststhe "very rich content" of some of the earlywartime
contracts(withtheirpioneeringinroadson management
control
over seniority,lay-offs,and promotion)to the historicconcessions involvingproductivityand mechanizationwhich the
industrialunions made in the 1950's. The ultimateconversion
of collectivebargaininginto an instrumentality
of capital ac19
This same problematicof a working-class
uprisingcircumscribedwithinthe
limitsof economisticaims and creatingthe "inadvertant"conditions for the resolution of a structuralcrisisof capitalismhas a familiarring.It correspondsmore or
less exactly to Marx's famousanalysisof the strugglefor"a normalworkingday" in
Englandbetween 1833 and 1865. See Capital,Volume I, Chapter10, Part6.

"Fordism"in Crisis

227

cumulationcan only be understoodfroman analysisof postwarclassstruggles

(p. 168).
In this context Agliettaemphasizesthat the employeroffensive after the Second World War, unlike the post-1918
"AmericanPlan", did not generallyseek to rollback unions
the content of
altogether,but rather to delimitstringently
collectivebargaining.The firststep in achievingthis was the
passage of the Taft-HartleyAct in 1947 which "effacedthe
intentionsof the WagnerAct and became the new
progressive
charterforthe regulationof social conflicts"(p. 165). By codion the
fying"unfairlabor practices"and puttingrestrictions
at
to
struck
the
of
the
unions
ability
right strike,Taft-Hartley
to protestworkingconditions.Reinforcedby the Cold War
decimationof the labor left,the new law had "an enormous
influence"in pushingthe tradeunionsalong thepath towarda
"stagnantcorporatism"(a trend which Agliettasees consolidatedby theAFL/CIO mergerof 1954-55) (pp. 166-67).
Meanwhile the post-Korean War recession of 1953-54
the resolveof the corporationsto sweepaway "at
strengthened
the
cost"
constraintson management
any
perogativewhichsurvivedin contracts.
It was the recession of 1952-1954 with its overcapacitiesof production and its financial difficultiesaggravatedby Eisenhower's
abandonmentof easy creditpolicies . . . whichrevealedto the bosses
the amplitude of the necessary transformationswhich were required ... a generalized assault to lower the direct wage costs of
production.. . . [T] his [in turn] requiredthe rapid generalizationof
the transformationsof the technical division of labor which had
been maturing since the 1930's and the Second World War namely,the generalizationof assemblyproduction,the introduction
of multi-operationalmachine tools capable of givinggreaterflexibilityto the labor process,the modificationof the configurationand
assemblage of productive operations... in order to install the new
collectivemeans of production.. . (p. 169).

The corporationsweregenerallysuccessfulin attainingmost

of these objectives.Increasinglyin the late 1950's contracts
came to reflecta labor-management
"trade-off"of wagesvis-avis workingconditions.Unionsgave way on safetyissues,control of job conditions,and futureemployment;in returnthey
receivedproductivitypayments,health plans, pension funds,
and insurancefundsagainstthe immediate(but not the longrun)financialconsequencesof unemployment
(p. 169).
(b) These "supplementations"have played a crucialrole in
the evolutionof Fordismas the dominantregimeof accumu-

228

MikeDavis

lation. First, togetherwith an otherwiseinadequate social

insurancesystem (also won in the 1930's), they provide a
minimalcoverageof the overheadcosts of the reproductionof
and old age)
labor-power(sickness,accident,unemployment,
which is indispensableto sustain the continuityof both the
credit systemand consumerdurable consumption.Secondly,
in differentiattheyexemplifythe role of collectivebargaining
the
real
"defered"
comthe
i.e.,
wage;
sociallymobilizing
ing
of
the
a
of
contractual
which
as
stream
wage
savings
ponents
and creditsyshas come to play a key role in the investment
tems. Agliettaparticularly
emphasizesthe astonishing
developmentof joint-contribution
pensionfundssince the 1950's, and
their dramatic impact on corporate investmentprocesses
(pp. 157-58).
In contrastto public retirementsystemswhose fundsare
investedin insuredpublic bonds or diversified
conservatively
theprivate-sector
portfolios,
pensionmonieswhichare funneled
throughthe big New York banks are an ideal source of uninsuredand venturablefinancecapital.These vastbilliondollar
pools of capital("comingfromlabor,but the actualpropertyof
thecapitalistclass") haveincreasingly
replacedthestockmarket
as the primaryexternalconduitof investment
capital.20Moreover the pension fundshave become veritable"iron lances"
employed by big banks in the reorganizationof corporate
financingand ownership.Agliettapointsout theirpivotalrole
in the mergermachinationsof the 1960's wherethe manipulation of trustdepartmentcapital (pensionfunds)enabledkey
financialgroupsto carryout thelargestwaveof capitalcentralizationin history(pp. 157-60,204-06).
(c) Finally,collectivebargaininghas also contributedto the
reconstructionof the working-classmode of consumption
throughthestablizationof thenominalwage.
In the era of extensiveaccumulationthe adjustmentsof
nominalwages were closely synchronizedto the formationof
grossfixedcapital.In periodsof recessionand withweakunion
organization,nominalwages tended to fall brutally.Withthe
rise of collectivebargaining,however,the nominalwage has
become quasi-autonomousof the businesscycle. In periodsof
upswingthe indexingof wagesensuresthattheywill growfast
20
The stock purchases of the middle classes on the New York marketcontributedonly a bare 2.5% of new asset growthin the 1962-65 period (pp. 204-05).

"Fordism" in Crisis

229

enough to maintaineffectivedemand, but not so fastas to

disturbthe divisionbetweenwages and profits.On the other
hand,in periodsof slowinggrowthor recession,thenew "rigidity" of the nominalwage breaksthedeclineof masspurchasing
powerand dampensthe "multiplier"effectof theinitialdownturn(pp. 173-76).21
4.0

To recapitulate,the historicachievementof the workers'

of the Depressionera was to wintheincorporation
of
struggles
newelementsintowhatMarxcalled the "historicalcomponent"
of wages.These new needs comprised,above all, a standardof
mass consumptiondefinedby the privatehouse and the automobile. Furthermore,
the formationof a new social norm of
working-classconsumptionrequired a vast socialization of
a verystrictcontrolover the reand, correlatively,
financing,
sources and expendituresof the workers.The fullcommodization of consumptionrealizedthroughthe riseof thenominal
wage and the astronomicalgrowthof consumercreditpresupposed the extensionof industrialdisciplineto the totalityof
life.22
working-class
This transformation
of working-class
consumptioncoalesced,
workprocessto
accordingto Aglietta,withthe semi-automatic
constitutethe basis of Fordism.To illustratetheoverallarticulation of the structuralformswhich comprisethe intensive
a schematicdiagram
regimeof accumulationI haveconstructed
With
the aid of thisdiaof the key interrelations
(DiagramII).
gram,I will attemptto summarizeAglietta'sanalysisof the
and dynamicsof Fordism:
structure
21'
Agliettaalso attaches fundamentalimportanceto the New Deal reformsof
the monetaryand financialsystems(the Securitiesand ExchangeAct of 1934, Banking Act of 1935, etc.) which,forreasonsof space, I have decided not to examinein a
separatesection.
22'

of the workprocess was symmetriThus, under Fordism,the fragmentation

cally complementedby the cuttingof links to organiccollectivities:families,neighborhoods, etc., - "considerably impoverishingnon-commodityrelationsbetween
people." The old social universe structuredby traditionalsolidaritiescontracted
around the familyhousehold as the social institutionmost congruentwith the dual
commodizationand privatizationof consumption.Finally,Fordismmass produced
and coordinatedconsumptionthroughadvertisingand its own functionalaesthetic
("Design"); creatinga "society of the spectacle" whereideologicalrepresentations
werecoextensiveand confusedwithsocial reality(pp. 136-39).

230

MikeDavis

(a) The higherlevel of effectivedemand maintainedby the

credit system and the new "social norm of consumption"
inducesa much fasterrateof accumulationacrossa broadfront
of DepartmentII (wage goods). This,in turn,catalyzeda progressive"densification"of the exchangesand linkagesbetween
both departments(producergoods/consumer
goods). The mass
of
drew
consumer
durables
production
heavy industrymuch
closer in tandem to the final processes of consumergood
of thedepartments
whichwas
assembly.The greaterintegration
to
of
Fordism
evoked
the
Ford's
specific
image Henry
(now
outmoded) super-factoryat River Rouge with its totallyintegrated
productionprocesses:ironore and coal enteringone
fromtheother.
end,finishedautomobilesemerging
DiagramII. SchematicRepresentationof the IntensiveRegime of
Accumulation(Fordism) as the Unityof StructuralForms.

(b) This "densification" of macrostructurallinkages accleratedthe speed at whichtechnicalinnovationin Department

I transformed
the conditionsof productionin DepartmentII.
was generalizedand diffusedmuch morequickly
Productivity
reductionsin
throughoutthe economy.This led to significant
the social value of labor-power(i.e., reductionsin the "necesinsary" componentof the workingday) and corresponding
creasesof relativesurplus-value.
Aglietta makes an interestingattemptto illustrateeconowhich
metricallythe accelerationof relativesurplus-extraction
was the motorforceof Fordism.Aftera lengthydiscussionof
the epistemologicalproblemsinvolvedin the constructionof

231

"Fordism"in Crisis

statisticalmeasuringrods and theiradequationto Marxistanalysis,he singlesout "changingunit labor cost" as the econometricindicatorbestsuitedto measuretheevolutionof therate
of surplus-value
over time.He rigorously
demonstrates
thatthis
index (definedby the ratioof the hourlyaveragereal wage to
valueadded permanhour)is a directexpressionof theevolution
of the "real social labor cost" ("cot salarialsocial rel"). This
in turn"variesinverselyto the rate of surplus-value
over the
and recordsitschangesof rhythm"(p. 71).
long-term
GraphI tracesthe developmentof productivity
(valueadded
per manhour),hourlyreal wages,and unitlabor costs overthe
period 1900-72. The year 1919 standsout as thestarting
point
of a dramaticincreasein productivity.
In factAgliettaconsiders
this year to markthe beginningof "the period of the transformationof theconditionsof theexistenceof theproletariat,"
i.e., of the passage fromthe extensiveto the intensiveregime
war "transitional"period,the real social
(p. 72). In this interrose
labor cost underwenta moderatedecline. It temporarily
under the special "disaccumulationist"conditions of the
Second WorldWar,thenbegan a rapidand regulardeclinefrom
1945-66. Accordingto Aglietta,this long secular decline of
labor costs reflectsthe maturationof Fordismand the mechanismsof relativesurplus-extraction.23
(c) This decliningproportionalvalue of social labor-poweris
rises
compatiblewithrisingreal wages as long as productivity
even faster.This was, in fact,the actual trendfromthe end of
the Second WorldWarto the IndochinaWar;withtherisingreal
wages feeding back into productionas increasingeffective
demandforDepartmentII output.As we saw earlier,however,
whichwas regulatedby
the indexingof wagesto productivity,
collectivebargaining,assuredthat the growthof wageswould
23
The trendsof real social wage costs are also corroboratedby a similarperiodizationevidentin the evolutionof net fixedcapital.These trendsare:
(i)

1900-15

(ii)

1921-29/30
1930-35
....
1935-40

rapidgrowth
massivedestruction
stagnation

1950-59
1961-66

veryrapidgrowth
mostrapidgrowth

(iii)

. slow and irregular

growthof capital stock;extensive
regimeis stilldominant

....

transition
I
|

Fordlsm
(p. 81)

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MikeDavis

GraphI. Real Social Labor Cost, Value Added per Manhour,and

Productionbetween
HourlyReal Wages:Private,Non-agricultural
1900 and 1972.

consistently
lag behindtheshareof profits.Moreover,consumer
debt as a percentageof net incomealso tendedto growfaster
thanthepace of realwages.
(d) The increasingproductivityof social capital has other
manifoldand contradictory
On the one hand,it
repercussions.
tendedto raisethe organiccompositionof capital (theratioof
the values of constantand variablecapital);whichis, of course,
an expressionin value-form
of the increasingmechanizationof
production.Such a risewouldautomaticallytendto depressthe
rate of profitand to block new accumulationif it were not
counter-balanced
simultaneously
by: (1) a risingrate of (relative) surplus-valuewhich was, as we have just seen, another
ineluctable result of the evolution of productivity;and/or
(2) by the "cheapening"of constantcapital throughthe reductionof the unitvalue of themeansof production.Paradoxically, the accelerationof eitherof theseprocesses(since they
would onlytendto
facetsof productivity)
compriseinterrelated
the
reproduce originalproblemof a risingorganiccomposition
of capital.

"Fordism"in Crisis

233

(e) This complex calculus of tendenciesand theircountertendenciesassociatedwith growingproductivity(see Diagram

withinthe accumulation
III) createdirreduciblecontradictions
which
could
be
resolved
process
only
througha partialdevalorizationof capital.In orderto counteracttherisingorganiccompositionof capital and to preserveits competitiveposition,a
capitalmustincreasethe developmentof its productiveforces,
yet,at thesame time,striveto depreciate(realize)thefullvalue
of its presentfixed capital. Devalorizationexpressesthe ultimate impossibilityof realizingboth of theseobjectivesat the
same time. Part of the value of the fixedcapitalmustbe devalorized (i.e., socially invalidated by exchange)in orderto
reestablishthe conditionsforthecontinuing
valorizationof the
remaining
capital.
DiagramIII. MacroeconomicConsequences of IncreasingProductivity
and TheirImpact on the Rate of Profit.

To the extentthattheunequal developmentof DepartmentI

is not counteractedby the capitalistpenetrationand transof labor-power,
of theconditionsof thereproduction
formation
of
of
devalorizationmust take the form periodicdestructions
the
characterized
what
value en masse. This was precisely
businesscycle duringtheperiodof extensiveaccumulation.The
of the classicalbusinesspanicwas simultaneousdestructiveness
momentin the process
ly, as Agliettaexplains,"a constitutive
The
massivecollapse of fixedcapital
of accumulation"(p. 89).
valuesin thesloughof a depression(i.e., thefactthatpreviously
validatedpropertyrelationswere no longersociallyreproducof production,a
ible) made way fora qualitativerestructuring

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MikeDavis

of ownership,a new levelofproductivity

greatercentralization
and relativesurplus-extraction,
and, thus,a renewedcycle of
accumulation.
Under Fordism,on the otherhand, devalorizationoperated
througha new modality: becoming "a permanentprocess
structurally
incorporatedinto the rhythmof capital formation" (p. 86). Industrialcapitalistsattemptedto programthe
formationof fixed capital in such a way that it would least
affectthe value of capital alreadyin operation.Everypressure
was exertedto speed-upthe turnoverof fixedcapital to avoid
its premature"moral depreciation"by new technologies.Yet
the continuoustechnologicalinnovationwhichwas thebasis of
the intensiveregime(for the reasonswe have just examined)
could only be achieved by the inclusionof the permanent
obsolescence of fixed capital directlywithinthe investment
process.Under Fordism,corporatecapital recognizedthatany
turnparticulargenerationof fixedcapital - despiteincreasing
over- could not be fullyamortized.Insteadthecorporatecash
flowincorporateda growingprovisionfora continuousreplacement of obsolete fixed capital. The depreciationprocess(i.e.,
the incrementalaccumulationof a moneycapital fundequivalent to the value of installedfixedcapital) and the investment
process(the formationof new fixedcapital)tendedto overlap.
Thus the qualitativetransformation
of the productiveforces
tendedto becomean ongoingratherthanaperiodic process.
Underthisnew regime(continuoustechnologicalinnovation
- > increasingproductivity
therates
-> ongoingdevalorization),
of growthin DepartmentsI and II tended to become more
synchronized.Synchronizedbut not identical,since Aglietta
emphasizesthat nothingwould be more "absurd" thanthe assumptionof identicalratesof accumulationin each department
(p. 242). But the unequal departmentalaccumulationwhich
was so characteristic
of the extensiveregimewas partiallyovercome under Fordism by the "densification" of interdepartmental
exchanges;which,in turn,impliedthefullerrealization of that portion of the social productwhichmust be
exchangedbetweendepartments(i.e., in Marx'snotation:

v1+ s1+c2).

To say that developmentis not unequal means to say thatthe transformationsof the conditionsof production,inherentin the antagonisms of the wage relationship,occur in such a manner that the
evolution of the macrostructureof production and the divisionof

"Fordism"in Crisis

235

global revenuewill be compatible.This compatibilityis expressedby

the social constraintof the full realizationof global exchangevalue
(P. 242).

This tendencytoward "balanced" economic growth,however,did not in any way "suppress"thebusinesscycle,as some
bourgeois economists have claimed. But it did tend to
"dampen" or "break" the plunge of downturnswhile simulthe period of the cycle,partiallydue to
taneouslycompressing
thefasterturnover
of fixedcapital.
(f) Agliettastressesthat this enormouslywastefulmode of
technicalinnovationthroughthe continuousdevalorizationof
existingtechnologieswas not necessitatedby any of thepurely
technico-materialrequirementsof the production process.
Ratherit was imposedby the exigenciesof the valorizationof
capital and the dominanceof bourgeoisproductionrelations
overthelaborprocess.
Generalized obsolescence ... is evidentlynot dictated by any technological necessity. It is the fruitof the financialstrategieswhich
devolvefromthe principlesof monopolisticcompetition(p. 261).

In the era of extensiveaccumulationthecostsof theperiodic

drasticdevalorization
of capitalwerepartiallytransferred
to the
classes
mass
and
the
fall
of
the
working
through
unemployment
nominalwage. On the otherhand, thesocial costsof thegeneralized obsolescencespecificto Fordismwereinflictedupon the
proletariatin the dual formsof increasedexploitationand a
risingcost of living.The "giant waste" of productiveforces
entailed by permanentdevalorizationwas, thus,passed onto
"society" - but especiallythe workingclasses- in theformof
the "rampantpermanentinflationwhich is the fundamental
traitof capitalistregulationsinceWorldWarTwo" (p. 89, italics
added).
The loss of substance is not paid for by the firms,but by society
through the monetary erosion and the considerable distortions
whichit secretes(p. 261).
The fundamentalpoint of Fordismseems to be thatthe ruptures
in the rhythmof accumulation are not primarilyregulatedby the
fluctuationsof the rate of unemployment,but by those of the
generallevel of prices, or more profoundly,by the formationof the
general equivalent, that is to say, by the temporalevolution of the
monetaryexpressionof the workhours (p. 178).

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MikeDavis

5.0
Fordism,therefore,
representedthe historicalresolutionof
contradictionsarisingout of the extensiveregimeof accumulation. It would be completelyerroneous,however,to imagine
that it in any way succeeds in attentuatingpermanentlyor
eliminatingthe contradictionsinherentin the accumulation
process per se and analyzed by Marx in Volume Three of
Capital RatherFordismentailedthedisplacementof thesecontradictionsonto new structuralformsas well as thechanneling
of the class struggleonto new terrains.One of the most imof Rgulationet crisesis Aglietta'sanalyportantcontributions
sis of the currenteconomiccrisisas the productof new structuralcontradictions
specificto Fordism.24
The "organic" crisisof FordismwhichAgliettatracesin its
developmentfrom1966 onward,is, firstof all, a crisisof the
laborprocess. To a certainlimitedextentit reflectstheappearance of internaltechnologicallimits to the accelerationand
coordination of production.With the increasingfractionala mechanically
coordinated
ization of workwhichcharacterizes
productionprocess it is impossibleto equally distributetime.
Irreducible "pores" or "balance delay times" reflect the
mechanicalrigiditiesof the assemblyline and the impossibility
of achievingperfectsynchronization.
These dead timesconstitutea growingobstacleto speed-upand the extractionof relativeand absolutesurplus-value
(p. 99).
Far moreimportant,
however,has been the reappearanceof
24
It is pertinentat thispoint to situateAglietta'sworkin relationshipto one of
the most importantcurrentsof neo-Marxismin the United States. The readermay
have alreadybeen struckby a certainresemblancebetween his theoreticalconstruction of the concept of Fordism and the positions of American"criticaltheorists"
(e.g., the Telos group and its supporters)who have advanced the concept of an
"integrated"workingclass. Indeed both have emphasizedthe profoundimplications
of the deepeningimbricationof the mechanizationof consumptionsince the late
1930's. Both have stressedthe reciprocitybetween Taylorism's(or Fordism's) fragmentationof workgroupsand the trendtowardthe atomizationof the workingclass
in the sphereof consumption.
Beyond these superficialsimilarities,however,thereare deep and irreconcilable
differencesbetween the theories of "capitalist regulation" and "one-dimensional
society". In the firstplace, the "criticaltheorists"have tended to constructeclectic
and impressionisticanalyses of contemporarycapitalismwithout a rigorousexaminationof macroeconomicprocesses.This lacunae has been characteristic
both in the
work of the more "classical" FrankfurtSchool tradition(at least sinceits American

"Fordism"in Crisis

237

class strugglesover workingconditions.Agliettaassignsa key

role to the "hardening"of the class strugglein the wake of
increasingexploitationand despite the "co-optation" of the
union bureaucracies.In particularhe locates the originof the
of
presentcrisisin the 1958-61 periodwhen the modifications
collectivebargaining(e.g., the aforementioned
rise of pension
plans, wage programmingthroughproductivityagreements,
unionconcessions,etc.) clearedtheway forescalatingspeed-up
and declining
job safetystandards.
The pivotal years 1958-1961 primed an acceleration of the fall of
the social labor cost stemmingfroma brutal changein the formsof
class struggleto the detrimentof workers.. . . The weakeningof the
means of action of the workingclass played a big role in the increase
of the rhythmof accumulationin the firsthalf of the 1960's . . . ,
the mostintensivewave of accumulationin the entirehistoryof U.S.
capitalism(pp. 79, 160).

One result of this intensificationof work was a further

erosion of the "psycho-physiological
equilibriumof workers"
in
as
well
a profusionof nervous
as
resulting greaterfatigue
disordersamongindustrialworkers.At thesame timetherewas
a steadybreakdownof the perceived"link betweencollective
efficiencyof the forcesof labor and the individualenergiesof
the workers"(p. 100). Under the conditionsof the new proit was becomingharderto divideworkers
ductivityagreements
via pieceworkand differential
norms.
efficiency
The outcomeby the mid-1960'swas an unprecedented
wave
of wildcatstrikesand contractrejectionscoupledwithan over-

exile) and in the new currentreflectedin Telos. Ironicallyfora theoreticaltradition

whichhas seen itselfas the guardianof dialecticalreason,criticaltheory(particularly
in the recentphase since Marcuse'sOne-DimensionalMan) has reliedheavilyupon the
researchof arch-positivist
sociology. And increasingly(despite Marcuse's own romanticsearch fornew revolutionary
agenciesand Utopias)it has purveyeda visionof
the "end of class struggle"resultingfromthe total serializationof theworkingclass
and theubiquityof totalitarianadministration.
In contrast,Agliettasuppliesthe "missinglink" whichcriticaltheoryhas so sorely
lacked: a developed theoryof the economic dynamicsof advanced capitalism.Precisely on this basis he is able to chart the developmentof explosive new contradictionsboth withinthe labor process and the mode of consumption.Unlike the
criticaltheoristswho myopicallyfocus on the "integrationist"aspects of Fordism,
Agliettaexaminesthe increasinglycentrifugalforceswhichare the directbyproducts
of the intensiveregime'stendencytoward"the generalizationof the proletariatand
thecentralizationof capital."

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MikeDavis

all deteriorationof workerdisciplineas absenteeismand sabotageclimbedto postwarrecordlevels.

Since 1966 the rejectionof contractsby workershas increased.They
have also been accompanied by wildcat strikeswhich multiplied
toward the end of the decade, particularlyin the very industries
where collective bargainingprocedures seemed to be the most
harmonious and refined(notably auto, steel, and electricalequipment). These sporadic movementshave reoccupied the terrainof
workingconditions which collective bargaininghad generallyabdicated (p. 171).

This endemicrank-and-file
protest,"by callingintoquestion
of tasks
the conditionsof workbased upon the fragmentation
revealedthe inherentlimitsof Fordand theirintensification,"
ism as a mechanism for producing relative surplus-value
boom
(p. 139). Since the culminationof the Kennedy-Johnson
in 1966, unitlabor costs ceased to falland thelongprogressive
from1946-66 was halted (see
increaseof relativesurplus-value
this
growingblockage of relative
Graph One). Simultaneously
the
expansion of exchanges
interrupted
surplus-extraction
between
aggravated
departmentsand further
("densification")
the tendencytowardunbalancedgrowthwhich Agliettaindicates began to reemergeafter1961 witha veryunevendevelopmentof certaincapitalgoodsindustries.
(In 1958-61) DepartmentI was enlargedmore rapidlythan Department II and became differentiated:the sub-departmentproducing
machinerytook off,sustainedby the social demand formedfromthe
of the productionprocess. . . . The resultwas
generaltransformation
a profoundlyunbalanced accumulation which could only be sustained by an acceleratedrate of relativesurplus-value.. . . The year

1966 heralded the blockage of this mode of accumu-

lation (pp. 79-80; italicsadded).

another
Whilethiscrisisof the labor processwas developing,
the
level
at
contradictions
to
seriesof interrelated
began emerge
of the reproductionof labor-power.As we saw earlier,withthe
modes of consumption,the reprodestructionof pre-industrial
ductionof wage labor dependsupon (a) individually-consumed
commoditiesand (b) servicesprovidedby public collectivities.
Thereis no generallaw whichexplainstheactualproportions
of
this division between individual consumption and public
services.Instead specifichistoricaldifferences
betweencountriesplay a decisiverole in structuring
thecompositionof their
standardsof living.In the UnitedStatesprivatecapitalistproduction has provideda greatershare of crucialservices(the

"Fordism"in Crisis

239

majorityof healthcare, a largeportionof education,etc.) than

in anyothercapitalistcountry.
It is in the contextof thisrelativelylow level of the socializationof consumptionthatAgliettasituatesthe growingcrisis
of the public sector. He points to a virtual"explosion of incontradirectwage costs" whichexpressedthe mushrooming
dictionbetweentheprivatizedmode of consumptionembodied
by the "auto-household"complex and the collectiveservices
whichwerenecessaryto sustainit. Concomitantwiththecrisis
of industrialdisciplinein the mid-1960'stherewas a rapidand
dramaticrise in the costs of these collectiveserviceswhich
tendedto eat away at corporateprofitsalreadyimperiledby
decliningproductivity.
The followingis a general law: within the frameworkof Fordism
collectively consumed services are degraded and their costs rise
rapidly,endingby annihilatingthe generaltendencyof an increasing
rate of surplus-value(p. 142).

Agliettaattributesthis crisisof collectiveservicesto three

causes:
principalstructural
While
Fordism
"pushed to the extremethe mechanical
(a)
of labor" throughmass prothe
socialization
of
principle
duction, the same principle is "totally inadequate to the
productionof collectiveservices"(pp. 142-43). Regardlessof
whetherthese servicesare publiclyor privatelyprovided,their
costs (e.g., healthcare, education,etc.) havesoaredvertiginoushas stagnatedor evendeclined.
ly whileproductivity
(b) There has been a developingcrisisof insurancesystems
and contracteraisavings plans. Until 1965, payment/fund
equityratiostendedto be low and stockvaluesgrewfasterthan
inflation.Since 1965, however,the situationhas been totally
reversedas the proportionof paymentshas risento keep pace
with inflation.This financial deteriorationhas been most
markedin the case of non-guaranteed
privatesectorpension
funds:
In a number of capitalistcountriesthe insufficientsocialization of
consumptionwhich is part of the crisisof Fordismhas been translated into a degradationof the financialequilibriumof the systems
of insurancereserves.This degradationhas provokeda constrainton
paymentswhich,in turn,aggravatedthe crisis.In the U.S., the htroclite mosaic of private systems(where the obligationsof management are only conditional) brought about a particularlygrave
crisis.... In the delirious belief of union leaders in permanent
growth,therehas resultednot only a despoiliationof a largepart of
the real value of pension fundsby inflationbut ofteneven a part of
thenominalvalue whichhas not been guaranteed (p. 160).

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MikeDavis

betweenthe
(c) Finally,Agliettadiscussesthe contradiction
laws of accumulationspecific to Fordism (e.g., continuous
devalorization)and the regimesof "political pricing"in pubserviceindustries(telecommunications,
licly-regulated
pipelines,
and utilities). Preciselybecause the so-called
transportation,
"public" regulatory
agenciesare actuallydominatedby thevery
industrieswhich they are supposed to oversee,the rates of
profitin these industriesacquire an administrative
guarantee.
Consequently,"everything
happensas ifthe statehas been substitutedfor the law of value;" withthe resultof growingcost
inflation(p. 270). Since therateof profitremainedunequalized
by competition,therewas lesspressurefortechnicalprogressor
the replacementof obsolete equipment(Agliettanotes thatit
took ATT overa quarterof a centuryto replaceits old electric
technologywith electroniccircuitry).Instead of continuous
devalorization
and theprogrammed
obsolescenceof technology,
therehas been an overwhelming
trendtowardtheconservation
of pastvalue- towardsovercapitalization,
which makes the price of regulationtotally contradictoryto the
generallogic of intensiveaccumulation.Contraryto the enterprises
which must engendera cashflowby procedureswhich constrainto
give the greatestweight to new investmentsand to minimize"immobilizations of capital," the public utilitieshave the interestof
capitalizingto a maximum.. . . This leads to the encouragementof
contractorsto blow up theirprices and incorporatesthe largestpos. . (p. 271).
sible superprofits.

Thus Aglietta makes it clear that the crisis of collective

serviceshas been to a largeextentalso a crisisat thelevelof the
in public/
labor process.The problemof laggingproductivity
collectiveservicesbecame fused with the problemsof work
relatedcrises
in theprivatesector.The indissolubly
organization
in productionand consumptioncombinedto pull downcorporateprofits.This declinein the global rate of profitultimately
led to an overaccumulation
of capital relativeto the surplusvalue availableto valorizeits reproduction.In 1969, therewas
the firstcontractionof grosscapital formationin thirtyyears,
withthedeclineparticularly
markedin automobilemanufacture
and home construction(formerlythe bellwethersectorsof
Fordism).
Agliettaemphasizesthatthe crisiswhichemergedin thelate
1960's was not a conjuncturaldisorderliketheweak recessions
in 1948-49, 1953-54, or 1958-59; but a profoundstructural
crisis of the intensiveregime.What distinguishes
the present

"Fordism"in Crisis

241

crisisfromthe Depression,moreover,is the role of the new

macrostructural
formsspecific to Fordism,particularlythe
of
the
nominal wage and the new interventionist
"rigidity"
of
the
in themonetarysphere(via the Federal
state
capabilities
ReserveSystem),whichbrakethe trendtowarddepressionand
massivedeflation.The decisivemediumby whichthestateand
the privatefinancialsystemhaveactedto preventa classiccrash
has been the vast expansion of credit at all levels of the
economy.
and
The resulthas been a massiveescalationof indebtedness
confor
an increasingly
generalizedliquidityproblem everyone:
This universal
sumers,banks, corporations,and governments.
of
in
tended
to
has
transform
expansion debt, turn,
"creeping"
inflationinto "cumulative"or "runaway"inflationthroughthe
intermediaryof overdraftmoney creation by the banking
system(i.e., debt literallyexpands the money supplyunder
today's post-Keynesianfinancialrules). In the firstperiod of
this new structuralcrisis(1966-74) cumulativeinflationonly
fueled corporatecompetitionfor sharesof advancedproduct
marketsor for a redivisionof old markets.In eithercase, corporations resorted to accelerated technologicalinnovation
of new fixedcapital.Giventhe
throughthe increasedformation
soaringcost levels of new inputsbecause of inflation,corporationswere spurredto borrowon an even wider scale, thus
addiincreasingtheir own liquidityproblemsand stimulating
tional money/priceinflation.The state and privatebanking
systemshave only held thistendencytowardrunawayinflation
in check throughdeliberatelyadministereddoses of tight
Thus the distinctive
physiognomy
moneyand unemployment.
of the presentcrisishas takenshape in the formof alternating
bouts of unbalancedexpansionand bufferedrecessionmoducrisiswhichmayyetexplodethe
structural
latedby a worsening
intensive
regimealtogether.
The functioningof the structuralforms (banking system,nominal
wage, etc.) explain the profile of the contemporaryconjunctures
wherephases of rapid expansion and cumulativeinflationon the one
hand are succeeded by creepinginflationand stagnationof investment on the otherhand; these two "regimes" are bonded together
by the formationof instable structuresof indebtednessfollowedby
debt. In the recurrenceof this conjunctural
deflationof short-term
of capitalismbecame protracted. . . from
crisis
the
organic
profile,
one cycle to another,the averagelevel of unemploymentclimbedto
the highest levels since the low point of 1969 and the average
rhythmof the riseof pricesincreased.. . (p. 322).

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MikeDavis

6.0

Whatare thepossibleoutcomesto this"organic"crisisof the

intensive regime of accumulation?Is American capitalism
doomed to protracted"stagflation"or even possibly to an
eventual"breakdown"?Or is it passingthroughthe birthpangs
of a new,"post-Fordist"economicorder?
Accordingto Agliettathere are no mechanicalanswersto
these questions.In the elaborationof his theoryof capitalist
role of the class
regulationhe has insistedon the determinant
in the transitionfromtheextensiveregimeto Fordism.
struggle
Likewisehe emphasizesthatthepossibilityof a capitalist"solution" to the presentcrisiswill depend farmoreupon the trathanupon purelytechnological
jectoryof futureclass struggles
The developmentof theseclassstruggles
considerations.
will,in
turn,hinge on the impactof the crisisupon the hegemonyof
bourgeoispolitico-ideologicalinstitutions.Given these "overit is fruitless
to attemptto predicttheoverall
determinations",
outcomeof thecrisis.
define
it remainsimperative"to progressively
Nevertheless,
the issues at stake," exploringsome of the dimensionsof a
possible,if by no meansinevitable,capitalistsolution(p. 145).
Agliettaborrowsthe term"neo-Fordism"coined by Christian
Palloix,25 to denote a hypotheticalregimeof accumulation
based on the transcendanceof the internalcontradictionsof
Fordismthrougha new global systemof structural
formsand a
new overall "regulation".As we have just seen, the contradictions of Fordism comprise in the abstract(a) the direct
blockage of relativesurplus-valueat the level of the labor
process,and (b) its indirectobstructionat thelevelof thecosts
of the collectiveserviceswhich reproducelabor-power.The
generalrequirementof neo-Fordism,then,is the capacityto
remodel the relationshipsbetween the labor process and the
generalconditionsof the reproductionof labor-power.More
specifically,neo-Fordismwould have to be based upon the
combinationof extensive<fsemi-automation"
witha far more
advancedsocializationof collectiveconsumption,
"Semi-automation"would involvethe supersessionof the
ofproductionbased upon the"mechanold, "rigid"integration
25'

ChristianPalloix, L'internationalisation
du capital: Elmentscritiques(Paris:
Maspero,1975).

"Fordism"in Crisis

243

ical principle"by a farmoreextendedand flexibleorganization

controlledby "a general system of informationcapable of
analyzing and correctingthe parametersof production"
of the labor processthroughthe
(p. 107). The restructuring
introductionof new cybernetic/electronic
technologieswould
the
of
to
eliminate
much
the
way
remainingdependency
open
upon humanfaculties(e.g.,reactiontimes,alertness,
etc.) which
has constrainedthe further
of
under
development productivity
Fordismsince the mid-1960's.At the same time,it promises
dramaticincreasesin the flow of productionand furtherretimeof fixedcapital.
ductionsin theturnover
Yet thisspeculativereorganization
of productioncould only
constitutea real solution to the crisis to the extentthat it
thesubordination
re-established
of theworkerto capital.
firmly
Given the impossibilityof full automationunder capitalism
(since only livinglabor can valorizedead labor), the new productionprocessesbased on automaticcontrolmustbe capable
"of canalizingtheclassstruggle
into [new] modalitieswhichare
with
the
of the law of accumulation"
compatible
functioning
how
describes
neo-Fordismwould entail a
(p. 102). Aglietta
of
the
strategy undermining potentialpowerand solidarityof
the"collectiveworker"on threekeyfronts:
(a) Since semi-automationwould allow for a growingdecentralizationof fabricationand assembly(althoughnot of
ownership!),it would enable capitalto beginto dismantlethe
older industrial complexes which have traditionallybeen
bastionsof tradeunionpower.26
[T] hanks to the much greater flexibilityin the location of production units,it is possible to attemptto disassociatethe greatconcentrationsof workersand to create an environmentable to blunt
the convergenceof strugglestaken up at the point of production
(p. 106).

(b) It would become increasinglypossible to modifythe

stricthierarchicalorganizationof work which characterized
Fordismand to introducethe rotationof tasks. Agliettaemphasizes, however,that this so-called "job enrichment"has
nothingto do with "workers' control" or overcomingthe
alienationof labor. Ratherit is onlythe "ultimateextensionof
2fi

This newer formof decentralization,

verymarkedin formerlyconcentrated
industrieslike meat-packing,should be analyticallydistinguishedfrom more traof the textile
ditionalexamples of capital flightto lowerwage areas (e.g., the transfer
industryfromNew Englandto the SouthernPiedmontduringthe 1920's).

244

MikeDavis

the principlesof Fordismand Taylorism"correlatedwiththe

furthertransferenceof workers' skills to the ensemble of
machines(p. 107).
[Automation] develops a certainpolyvalenceof operators,not because they have become more qualified, but, on the contrary,because the division of labor has pushed dequalification to the
maximum, e.g., deprived work of all specificity.. . . Control becomes at the same time more abstract and more rigorous. The
workersno longersubmitto a personalconstraintby obedience but
to a collectiveconstraintof production(p. 107).

in Aglietta'sanalysis,is to
The real aim of "job enrichment",
conflicts"by fraction"isolate and disarmpoint-of-production
into
new
"semi-autonomous
the
workers
workgroups"
alizing
wouldparalysethe
(p. 108). Supposedlythesenew workgroups
functionsof unions by interposinga formof workerorganization which is "heterogeneousto union structuresand intemightalso
gratedinto the plant" (p. 108). Collectivebargaining
tendto become moredecentralized,if not entirelyeclipsedby
in the class
the increasingrole of the stateas an intermediary
struggle.
(c) Indeed under neo-Fordismtherewould be a generalized
"statification"of industrialrelations.Agliettaexplainsthatin
the era of Fordismstate intervention
was not requiredto be
constant;"ratherit could be sporadicand exemplary."Under
neo-Fordism,
however,theexpandedroleof thestatewould far
the
outdated frameworkof Taft-Hartley.Aglietta
outstrip
claimsthatNixon's PhasesI and II weremerelydressrehearsals
fortheinevitableimpositionof a permanentincomepolicycum
strikebans (pp. 323-29).
These profoundchanges in the organizationof the labor
wouldhaveto be
processand themodalitiesof theclassstruggle
corroboratedby far-reaching
of the
changesin theorganization
"firm".Alreadythereis clear evidencethat,whiledirectproduction is becomingless dependentupon immediatecomplementarities
derivedfromlocationalconcentration,
management
is undergoinga new centralization(relativeto the "divisional"
managementstructurecharacteristicof Fordism)based upon
the application of cybernetic/electronic
technologyto the
itself.
processof management
In the present period firmsare in the process of undergoingan
organizationalmutation just as radical, if not more so, than that
which saw (under Fordism) the change fromdepartmentalto divisional management.This mutation consists of a returnto centralization, but completely modified in principle.. . . [T] he new

"Fordism"in Crisis

245

"informationprinciple"permitsthe replacementof the constraintof

personal direction by the direct constraint of production. This
principleextendsfromthe controlof productiondepartmentsto the
controlof the ensembleof managementpractices(pp. 216-17).

Thus neo-Fordismassumesa generalcoherenceat everylevel

of the productionprocess.Nonetheless,all thesenew structural
forms - decentralizedproduction,recentralizedand semiautomaticmanagement,
national
semi-autonomous
workgroups,
are
no
more
of
the
etc.
wage guidelines,
capable guaranteeing
durablerestorationof relativesurplus-extraction
thanwere the
similarlyprofoundchanges in productionduringthe 1920's
capable of avoidingthe Depression.The resolutionof thestructuralcrisisof Fordismmusthingeupon the further
transformation of the mode of working-classconsumptionand the
simultaneouscreation of new opportunitiesfor industrialexpansion. Aglietta underlinesthat the "socialization of consumptionbecomes the decisiveterrainand goal for the class
struggle"(p. 142).
Agliettaseems to envisionthe possible rise of whatJames
O'Connorhas called the "Social-Industrial
Complex".27 In the
vagueoutlinewhichAgliettasketches,thisnew "socializationof
of
consumption" would require sweeping transformations
on
four
different
levels:
Fordism
to the production
First,the applicationof semi-automation
of collectiveservices,whichwould,accordingto Aglietta,lead
to radicalincreasesin productivity
and all-important
reductions
in indirectwage costs as faras theyconcernsocial capital.Pilot
projectsin healthcare, education,public transportation,
pollutioncontrol,etc.,havesupposedlyproventhepotentialof the
newtechnologyto achievethesegoals (p. 144).
nationalsystemof
Secondly,thecreationof a comprehensive
social welfareand insurance,the foundationstones of which
have alreadybeen laid by the "indexing"of social securityto
thecost of living.
of racialminoritiesand women
Thirdly,the full integration
into the "social norm" of consumption.Agliettaarguesthat
thereare systemsof internalclass stratification
specificto each
27
O'Connor emphasizes the importanceof the "Social-IndustrialComplex"
based on dramaticincreasesin the productivityof public servicesin the context of
the structuralobstacles to higherproductivityin either the competitiveor the
monopoly sectors of the privateeconomy. See The Fiscal Crisisof the State (New
York: St. MartinsPress,1973), 40-58.

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MikeDavis

regimeofaccumulation.UnderFordismtheprincipleof workingclass stratificationwas the segmentationof labor markets

on the basis of sex and race. Neo-Fordismwould repealthese
divisionsas a preconditionforprofoundlyreshapingurbanization.
Neo-Fordismcan become a principleof intensiveaccumulationonly
ifit introducesqualitativelynew productiveforces.These productive
forces imply an even more powerfulunificationof the proletariat.
The materialconditionsof the cycle of the reproductionof the labor
forcewill probably be registeredin a [mode of] urbanizationwhich
can no longertoleratethe maintenanceof ghettoes.. . . [It] would
[also] destroy all objective basis for discriminationagainstfemale
workers(p. 150).

labor
of unproductive
Fourthly,the "massivetransformation
into labor productive of surplus-value"(p. 146). Although
Agliettadoes not explainhow thiswould occur,it is possibleto
surmisethathe foreseesa vastexpansionof production(comparable to the 1946-66 era?) based on the "Social-Industrial
workers
Complex" whichwould make it possibleto reintegrate
in unproductivesectors(services,state,bureaucracy,etc.) back
intodirectproduction.
The coherenceof thesenew structural
formswouldrestupon
the success of the first:i.e., the initiationof a technological
revolutionin the productionof collectiveserviceswhichwould
reduce the costs of the reproductionof labor-powerwhile
simultaneously
openingup vast new marketsforthe meansof
production.Agliettaseems to believe that the automationof
public servicesmightplay an analogousrole in the riseof neoFordism that auto productionplayed in the transitionto
Fordism (stimulatingthe absorptionof DepartmentI overmaerostructural
production,"densifying"
linkages,etc.).
The problemwiththisspeculativemodel- and Agliettadoes
not avoidit - is thatneo-Fordismseemsto implythata massive
of additionallabor (Blacks,women,unproductive
incorporation
workers,etc.) into direct productionand into the "norm of
consumption"can be achieved throughan equally massive
introductionof new labor-saving
machines.The contradiction
seems obvious and irresolvable.All the potentialtransformations which Agliettaascribes to neo-Fordismpresupposethe
Massive technologicalungeneralizationof semi-automation.
employmentwould seem to be the ineluctableresultunless
demandcould be so radicallyexpandedas to compensateboth
for the relativedisplacementof labor as well as forthe signifi-

"Fordism"in Crisis

247

of the productiveworkforce.Such an event

cant enlargement
seems clearlyimpossible.The productiveworkforceremained
about the same size underFordism.Undersemi-automation
we
could not,then,reasonablyenvisionitsexpansion.
At one place in the text of Rgulationet crises Aglietta
ratherhalf-heartedly
suggeststhat an unspecifiedreductionof
the workingday might square the circle of making semiautomationcompatiblewith a vast expansion of social consumption.In his conclusion,however,he warns that a new
"regulation"of capitalismis, in fact,only possiblethroughthe
totalitarianextensionof state power (althoughthis will undoubtedlybe cloaked under "the ideologicalcover of liberalism") (p. 328). How the "State Capitalism"to whichAglietta
alludes mightmanage to resolvethese contradictionsis never
clarified,perhapsbecause it remainsmoreproperlythe subject
of "/a critiquedes armes" than "Uarmede la critique"at this
momentin history.
7.0

his debt to currentdebateswithin

Althoughacknowledging
Marxism,Agliettais, as he himselfputs it, "discrete"in his
allusionsto otherwriters.The polemicalpositionswhichenerdirectedagainstthe "high
gize Rgulationet crisesare primarily
economics"
of
neo-classical
(p. 9). Agliettaprovidesfar
priests
fewerindicationsof the relationshipbetweenhis analysisand
other currentsof Marxist theory.As a firstapproach to a
critiqueof Rgulationet crises,therefore,I would like to attemptto situatesome of his theseswithinthe coordinatesof
past and presentresearchinto the historicaldynamicsof advancedcapitalism.
of thehistory
interpretations
(A) One of the mostinfluential
of modernAmericancapitalismis based on the idea thatgrowing monopolization(or, more accurately,oligopolization)has
led to the structuralblockage of the developmentof the productiveforces.The concept of an immanenttendencytoward
"stagnation"resultingfromthe emergenceof monopolieswas
the hallmarkof a certainschool of Keynesianeconomicsduring
the 1930's and 1940's.28 It has also been a centralthesisin

1938).

See AlvinH. Hansen,Full Recoveryor Stagnation(New York: W. W. Norton,

248

MikeDavis

JosefSteindl'sneo-Marxistanalysisof thecausesof theDepression and the more recent work of Paul Baran and Paul
of
Sweezy.29 They have all emphasizedthe interrelationship
in
rate
of
secular
decline
the
accumulation,
(a) monopoly,(b)
(c) the problem of "surplus capital", and (d) its realization
throughincreasingsocial waste, war production,and imperialism.
This "Steindl-Baran-Sweezy"
school has had a deep impact
on thedevelopmentof contemporary
AmericanMarxismand its
One
ideas can be tracedin the workof innumerablewriters.30
of its moreobviousweaknesses,however,has been itsinability
to convincingly
the dynamicsof prewarversuspostdistinguish
war Americancapitalism.As GabrielJip has pointedout in a
has reflected
perceptivereview,theworkof the "stagnationists"
a common tendencytoward a theoreticalformalismthat at
times verges upon a one-dimensionaland almost ahistorical
tend to be flattened
analysis.31Key structuraltransformations
out and assimilatedto linear "trends" withina monocausal
problematicof monopolyand stagnation.In Jip'sview,thisis
especiallyevidentin Steindl'sattemptto explain the crisisof
1929 as onlytheinevitableculminationof theslow deceleration
of economicgrowthfrom1870 on. LikewiseBaranand Sweezy
are seen as havinggreatdifficulties
accountingforthecausesof
the long post-warboom fromthe standpointof the inherent
tendencytoward"stagnation"and "surpluscapital".
By comparison,Rgulationet criseshas the clearadvantages
of locatingthe problemof monopolywithinthehistoricalcontextof the evolutionof the wage relationthroughitsmanifold
and interdependentstructuralforms.As Agliettarepeatedly
emphasizes,all seculareconomictrends(like Steindl'sdeclining
rate of accumulation)must be disaggregated(removedfrom
theirEuclidean"ether")and reconceptualized
upon thebasisof
a periodizationwhichtakesintoaccountthecontinuing
process
29*
Josef Steindl,Maturityand Stagnationin AmericanCapitalism(Oxford: B.
H. Blackwell, 1952); Paul Baran & Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York:
MonthlyReviewPress,1968).
For example, see the importantbook of Gabriel Kolko, Main Currentsin
AmericanHistory(New York: Harper& Row, 1976).
3 1*
Gabriel Jip, "Le dveloppementdes monopoles et la tendance la stagnation," Critiquesde l'conomie politique, Nos. 11-12, avr.-sept.1973, esp. 96-98,
115-23.

"Fordism"in Crisis

249

whichcharacterizesthe capitalist
of qualitativetransformation
mode of production. Thus the concepts of the "frontier
regime",Fordism,and neo-Fordismprovidespecificcoordinates
eventsin thehistoryof Amerifortheorizingthe key structural
can capitalism:thesui generischaracterof the 1929 Depression,
of the businesscycle, the current
the postwartransformation
crisisin its most fundamental
aspectsas a crisisof production
to
etc.
relations,
Compared Monopoly Capital,Rgulationet
crisesregistersa notable advancetowarda morecomplexconcept of the totalityof levelsand structuralformsconstituting
advanced capitalism.This is particularlyevidentin Aglietta's
analysisof those strategiclevels of the mode of production
whichBaranand Sweezyneglected:thelaborprocess,thetransof labor-power,
of theconditionsof thereproduction
formation
the role of the class strugglein remodelingthe accumulation
functionsof the monetary
process,and the semi-autonomous
system.
For example,while the authorsof MonopolyCapital generally ignoredthe internalchangesin the workprocess,Aglietta
has emphasizedthe centralityof the developmentof contradictionsat the level of directproductionand has tracedout the
structuralformsof the class strugglespecificto the current
stage of monopoly (collectivebargaining,
pensionfunds,etc.).
from
WhereasBaranand Sweezyanalyzeconsumptionprimarily
the standpointsof new modes of corporatecompetition("the
sales effort")and the growthof wasteproduction,Agliettauncovers the fundamentalmechanismsof risingrelativesurplusvalue based on the transformation
of working-class
consumption whichtend to counteracttendenciestowardstagnation.In
fact,I don't thinkit is a distortionof theanalysisof Baranand
aroundtheproblem
Sweezy to claim thattheypivoteverything
of the realizationof surpluscapital,whileAgliettasubordinates
thisto the moreprofoundproblemof thedevelopmentof relative surplus-extraction.
As Jip notes, the "stagnationist"approachremainspartiallymiredin theKeynesianproblematicof
In contrast,Aglietta'smulti-causal
"underconsumptionism".
and "structural"approach seems more clearly a creativedeframework
of Capital.
velopmentwithintheepistemological
On
the
other
et
crises
is markedby
hand, Rgulation
(B)
surprizinglacunae. Compared to the emphasesof Baran and
Sweezy, Agliettasays verylittle(except in regardto collective
bargainingand the bankingsystem)about the decisiverole of
the postwarstate in capital accumulation,especiallythe 1.6

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MikeDavis

trilliondollars devoted to the permanentarmseconomysince

1946. Moreoverthis is clearly not the resultof any lack of
recognitionby Agliettaof the importanceof the state's new
economic functions.On the contrary,he assertsin his conclusion that "it is exclusivelythroughthe state that the cohesion of the structuralformscan be established.. . . [T] he
theconceptof
theoryof theregulationof capitalismdetermines
"state monopolycapitalism"(p. 326). RatherAgliettaseemsto
have intentionallypostponed a discussionof the state's role
because he believessuch an analysiscan only be producedat a
much later (i.e., more "concrete") stage of theoreticalelaboration. Rgulation et crises is, then, only a kind of prolegomenonto a muchmoreambitiousfuturetheorizationof "state
monopoly capitalism" (Fordism) and its possible transformationinto "statecapitalism"(neo-Fordism).
If the expression"state monopoly capitalism"has a meaning,it is as
the concept of a structuredsocial totality.It designatesa mode of
articulation of relations which are themselvescomplex. Consequently,this concept can only be produced at the end of a theoretical process whichstates thegenerallaws of theregulationof capitalism and the mannerin whichtheselaws are historicallytransformed
(p. 324; italicsadded).

Undoubtedlyin this decision to defer the analysisof the

main formsof stateeconomicregulationAgliettawas mindful
of Marx'splan forhisunfinished
Critiqueof PoliticalEconomy:
firsta theoryof the fundamentalstructuresof the capitalist
mode of production(subjectsof Volumes I-III of Capital), a
historyof economictheory(VolumeIV), thensubsequentparts
on the role of classes,theworldmarket,and thestate.It is very
doubtful,however,whetherthissame orderof epistemological
prioritiesis applicable to the theorizationof state monopoly
capital in lightof the profoundlyaugmentedrole of the state
sector of the economy. In the era of competitivecapitalism
therewas a much greatertheoreticalsanctionfor considering
the relationshipof the state to the mode of productionas primarilya relationshipof politicalpracticesto economic structures.Withincontemporary
capitalism,of course,thisrelationship becomesfarmorecomplex.Now thestatemustbe situated
vis-a-visthe mode of productionin two dimensions:(a) the
political vis-a-visthe economic as before, and (b) the state
sector (or state expenditurein general) vis-a-visthe private
sectorof the economy.The pivotalproblemof thearticulation
of the state sector(expenditure)withtheprivatesectorcannot,

"Fordism"in Crisis

251

it seems to me, be posed posteriorto the expositionof the

generallaws of the regulationof capitalism.Ratherwith the
reality"
appearanceof the stateas a profound"infrastructural
the questionof its role mustbe movedcenterstagewithinthe
analysisof thedynamicsof accumulation.
I believe thatAglietta'sfailureto incorporatean analysisof
the rise of state expenditureand production(especially the
"military-industrial
complex") in termsof its structuralrelato
tionship privateproductionhas had profoundrepercussions.
In particularI feara whole seriesof important,if not crucial
questionshave, as a result,slippedbeyondthe graspof Rgulationet crises:
(i) There is no consideration,for instance,of how stateexpenditure,especiallymilitaryoutlay,has made it possible to
valorizeexcesscapitalnorany assessmentof therelativeimportance of defensespendingvis-a-vis
consumerdurableproduction
in the postwar(Fordism)tendencytowardthe "densification"
of macrostructural
linkages.To a certainextent,Rgulationet
crisesincorporatesan approachdirectlyoppositeto the works
of the theoristsof the "PermanentArmsEconomy".32 Where
the latterfocusedto an exagerrateddegreeon the role of defenseproductionas a deus ex machinawhichdevourssurplus
capital,Aglietta(at leastjudgingby thepresentwork)has been
perhaps too beguiled with the workingsof privateaccumulation. In thissense each holds a different
part of theelephant
it
for
thewhole.
of contemporary
capitalism,mistaking
role
of
of
the
state
expenditurealso
(ii) Aglietta'sneglect
weakensthe coherenceof his analysisof thehistoricaldevelopment of the intensiveregimeof accumulationand the emergence of the structuralcrisis of Fordismin the 1960's. In
spendingand private
particularhe is silenton how government
have interactedin specifichistoricalturningpoints
investment
to create the specificrhythmsand intensitiesof the postwar
businesscycle. He providesno theoryof the relationshipbetween spurts of private fixed capital formation(1947-48,
boosts"
1953-57, and 1960-65) and the "military-inflationary
whichappear to have stimulatedthem(Korean War,1950-53;
Aerospaceexpansion 1957-60). Nor does he considerthe very
QO

MichaelKidron,Western
MarxismSince the War(London: Penguin,1968); T.
N. Vance et al.y The Permanent War Economy (Berkeley: IndependentSocialist
Press, 1970).

252

MikeDavis

analysesof these questions (as well as the broader

significant
problem of advanced capitalismin general)advancedby the
Soviet economistsassociated with the Instituteof the World
Economy33 and by the circleof Hungarianeconomistsaround
FerencMolnar.34
withRgulationet crisesis the
(iii) Anotherrelateddifficulty
absence of any examinationof the internalmechanismsof the
fiscalsystemwhichsustainthestatesectoror anyinterrogation
of the ratherthorny,but crucial,problemof therelationship
of
taxation to surplusextraction.This absence is all the more
strikingin that Agliettadevotes, as we have seen, a rather
of contractualsavings
lengthyexcursusto the transformation
into a lever of financecapital. (Is taxationless important?)
whileAgliettadoes focuson therole of thesocial
Furthermore,
insurancesystemin sustainingthe levelof effective
demand,he
doesn't develop (or borrow)the formalconceptsadequate for
theorizingthe state's overallrole in the reproductionof social
labor-power(or the inextricableconnections,as O'Connor
points out, between "warfareand welfare"). Indeed the concepts developedin the Fiscal Crisisof the State - e.g., social
social consumption;social expendicapital: social investment,
etc.
ture,
appearindispensibleforthe analysisof the differentialfunctionsof stateintervention.
Againthereis no explicit
of thisseminalwork.
consideration
(iv) Finally,Aglietta'shistoryof inflationas the expression
of the continuousdevalorizationof fixedcapitalis diminished
of
by the lack of any analysisof state debt or, moregenerally,
the problemof risingunproductive
labor (includingthegrowing
of the economy)as a cause of inflation.Evenif
"tertiarization"
it is accepted that privatedebt is, as Agliettamaintains,the
drivingforcebehind"creepinginflation",it remainsto account
for the secondary,but far frominsubstantial,
contributionof
deficits.
a
Indeed
multi-causal
budgetary
only
theoryof inflation can adequately account for the transformation
of
into
inflation
at
the
end
of
the
1960's.
"creeping"
"galloping"
It is odd thatin his analysisof the originsof the presentcrisis
Agliettajuxtaposes the revolt against speed-up and the exQQ

S. Menshikov,The Economic Cycle: Postwar Developments(Moscow: Progress,1975).

* Ferenc
Molnar,Economic Growthand Recessions in the U.S.A. (Budapest:
AkademiaiKiado, 1970).

"Fordism"in Crisis

253

plosion of welfarecostswithoutaddingtherole of theVietnam

War or examiningits catalyticeffecton the accelerationof
inflation.
(C) In addition to the lacunae of state spending,thereare
otherimportant"missinglinks" in Rgulationet criseswhich
themajor
identifying
depreciateAglietta'sclaimof theoretically
of twentieth-century
U.S. capitalism.One of
transformations
the most obviousof theseis the omissionof any discussionof
the rise of the multinationalcorporationand the increasing
centralizationof capital. Since Agliettais actually
international
the authorof an importantcontributionto the debate on this
subject35 we must assume thathe has again,as in the case of
the fieldof theostate expenditure,deliberatelycircumscribed
reticalproblemsin orderto stayat a certainlevelof abstraction
(i.e., the level of the generalformsof "capitalistregulation")
(p. 323). Once again,however,the objectionmustbe made that
of capital) is
the deleted problem (the internationalization
at
the
the
to
givenlevelof
conceptualization
necessarilyintegral
du
et centralisation
abstraction(i.e., Chapter4: "Concentration
not
therefore,
legitimatelydisplaceable to
capital") and,
"concrete"
more
another,
stage of analysis. In particular,
of
the
most
importantchangesin corporate
Aglietta'sanalysis
in the
is
and
ownership totally unsatisfactory
organization
absence of any discussionof the trendtoward "multinationality" of capital and its relationshipto internalcontradictions
of theaccumulationprocess.
The same stricturesapply almost identicallyto Aglietta's
neglectof the changingstructuralformsof Americanimperialism and theirarticulationwithinthe overallregulationofrelaOne dimensionof thisproblemwhichErnest
tivesurplus-value.
Mandel has devoted attentionto in Late Capitalism36is the
of primaryproductproductionto ensure
postwarrestructuring
a cheapeningof importedcirculating
capitalto theadvantageof
the advanced countries.From this standpointa fundamental
structuralformof Fordismwould appear to be the regimeof
Michel Aglietta,Les principauxtraitscontemporainsde l'internationalisation
du capital (Grenoble: I.N.S.E.E., 1973); see also ChristianPalloix, Les firmesmultinationaleset le processus d'internalisation(Paris: Maspro, 1973); Palloix, L'internationalisationdu capital, op. cit.; Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: NewLeftBooks, 1975).

36* Late

op. cit.,W-lb.
Capitalism,

MikeDavis

254

cheap oil guaranteedby the long dominance of American

form
capital in the Middle East (1945-73). Anotherstructural
of imperialismwhichseemsintegralto Fordismis the postwar
of theentireNorthAmeritendencytowardthe transformation
can region(Canada, Quebec,Mexico,and theCarribean)intoan
unprecedentedkind of "semi-integrated
periphery"of theU.S.
7
economyand labormarkets.3
A further"missinglink" whichis perhapsevenlessjustifiable
in terms of an epistemologypatternedafter the theoretical
designof Capital is the neglectin Chapter5 ("Taux de profit
gnral et concurrencedes capitaux") of the problemof the
It is oftenforchangingmodalitiesof realizingsurplus-profits.
gottenthatMarx assertsin VolumeThreeof Capital(i.e., at the
theoretical
levelof "ManyCapitals") thatthesearchforsurplusprofit(ratherthansimply"profit"or "surplus-value"
per se) is
the special drivingforcebehindthe accumulationof capital.If
of its
capitalismis characterized
by a permanentrevolutionizing
it
is
because
differential
is
forces,
productive
only
productivity
rewardedor punishedby differential
rates of profit.Surplusin proprofitsaccrue frommedium-or long-termdifferences
which
assure
a
redistribution
of
to the
ductivity
surplus-value
of
the
most
and
enteradvantage
productive
capital-intensive
or
sectors.
As
Ernest
in
Late
Mandel
prises
emphasizes
Capitalism, the theoreticalperiodizationof the historyof capitalism
demandsan "analysisof the successively
formsof
predominant
differences
in levels of productivity,togetherwith the main
directionsof the quest forsurplusprofitswhichcorrespondto
them."38 Accordingto Mandel,theexploitationof agricultural
regions,the exploitationof colonies, and the exploitationof
less developedbranchesof productionhave "cotechnologically
existedside by side" throughoutthe historyof capitalism,but
underthe successivedominanceof one or anotheras the "main
source of surplus-profit."In contemporarycapitalism the
dominantmodalityof surplus-profit
has tended to be the extractionof "technologicalrents";
37.

The conceptual tools for analyzingthisprofoundand far-reaching

processof
transformation
lie beyond any of the currenttheoriesof imperialism.What is involvedis nothingless than the challengeto produce a new and unprecedentedtheoreticalobject not accounted forin mtropole- peripherymodels.
go

Mandel,Late Capitalism,op. cit., 104.

"Fordism"in Crisis

255

derivedfroma monopolTechnologicalrentsare surplus-profits

- i.e., fromdiscoveries
and inventions
izationof technicalprogress
of commodities
but cannot(at ]east in
whichlowerthe cost-price
becomegeneralized
the medium-run)
a givenbranchof
throughout
becauseof thestructure
and appliedby all competitors,
production
of entry,size of minimum
of monopolycapitalitself:difficulties
controlofpatents,cartelarrangements,
andso on.^^
investment,

Mandel shows in detail how the mad scramble of the

monopoliesafterthese technologicalrentsunderliesthe interrelatedphenomenaof the accelerationof technologicalinnovation, permanentobsolescence, and the continuous devalorization of fixed capital. In Rgulationet crises,on the other
hand,Agliettadiscussessurplus-profits
onlyas theyariseout of
the evolvingpositionsof oligopolyand controlof marketentry.
He does not directlyconnectmonopoly,technologicalchange,
and devalorizationvia a consistentset of concepts.Indeed,his
entire theory of the postwar accelerationof technological
innovationis explainedeitherby itseffects(i.e., greater"densification") or by its generalconditions(i.e., the new demand
createdby the transformation
of working-class
consumption),
but not by itsunderlying
cause (thecompulsionformonopolies
to seek increasingtechnologicalsurplus-profits).
Nor does
examine
the
historical
combination
of the
Aglietta
specific
modes of regional,international,
and sectoralunevendevelopmentwhichhave characterizedthe Fordistphase of American
capitalistdevelopment:the postwar industrializationof the
intensive
South, the rise of the Sunbelt,the aforementioned
integrationof a North Americaneconomic periphery,the
massiveexportof capital to WesternEurope,the emergenceof
multi-national
theindustrialization
of thetertiary
agro-business,
sector,etc.
and acFinally,to approach the questionsof surplus-profit
also
failsto
cumulationfroma slightlydifferent
angle,Aglietta
the
between
of
the
comperelationship
pose rigorously problem
titiveand monopoly sectors of the economy.True, he does
analysisof "monopolisticcompetidevelop a veryinteresting
and
therelationship
of the "hierarchical
formation,
tion",price
of profits"to "differentiations
of the working
stratification
class" (e.g., "segmented"labor markets)(pp. 231-75). But he
does not succeed in clearlyfocusingon the principalmechaQQ

Ibid., 192. Italicsadded.

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MikeDavis

fromthe competiof surplus-value

nismsof the redistribution
tiveto themonopolysectors;norupon thespecificlawsgovernof the "competitive"sector;nor
ing the expandedreproduction
crucial
of
how
thegrowingindustrializationthe
upon
question
of
labor
intensiveand competitive
oligopolization traditionally
branchesof the economy duringthe 1960's has reduced the
and conoverall possibilitiesfor monopoly surplus-profits
tributedto thestructural
crisisof Fordism.40
7.1
My criticismsso far have all focusedon the lacunae within
Rgulationet crises.But what about theadequacyof Aglietta's
basic conceptualapparatus- above all his constructionof the
concepts of "extensive" and "intensive"regimesof accumulation - to account for the most importantstructuraltransformations
withintwentieth-century
U.S. capitalism?And can
these concepts be extended,21sAgliettaintends,to grounda
theoryof capitalist"regulation"in general?
(A) In the firstplace, I can see littlejustificationforpreservingAglietta'sequation of the "extensive" regimeof accumulationwiththe "predominanceof absolutesurplus-value"
(p. 109). CertainlyAgliettais correctto assertthatthecreation
of absolutesurplus-value
throughtheprolongationof theworking day plays "an essentialrole in the firststage of the extension of capitalist relations of production in industry"
(p. 39). But an "essentialrole" and "predominance"are not
identical;particularlywhen, as Agliettarecognizes,"absolute
and relativesurplus-value
are indissoluble"underconditonsof
growingmechanization(p. 40). None of the structuralfeatures
of pre-1919 Americancapitalismwhichare discussedin Rgulation et crises (the struggleover the prolongedworkingday,
thelinkageof nominalwagesand thebusinesscycle,thesurvival
of pre-industrial
modes of working-class
consumption,etc.)
directlyimplythe "predominance"of absolutesurplus-value.
On the contrary,Aglietta'sown evidencedemonstratesthe
of relativesurplus-extraction
based upon thecheapencentrality
ing of labor-powerduringthe whole of the 1870-1919era. For
40' To
pursue these questions analytically,Agliettawould have had to differentiate his conception of the macrostructure
beyond the fundamentalinterrelationship of DepartmentsI and II.

257

"Fordism"in Crisis

instanceone of the most strikingtrendsis the continuingdeand manuflationof consumergoods prices,both agricultural
factured,throughoutthe last thirdof the nineteenthcentury.
This reflectsthe revolutionary
increasein labor productivity
which became the hallmarkof U.S. industrial
capitalism.On
page 73, Agliettahas thefollowingchart:
of theaverageindicesfortheperiod1890-1899in difComparison
ferentcountries,
evaluatedin Englishmoneyand by relationto the
in England.
sameindicesobserved
Germany
Sweden
UnitedStates

(1)
0.59
0.69
1.08
1.00

(2)
0.66
0.76
1.57
1.00

England
(1) Indexofaveragerealhourlywage
worker
(2) Indexofvalueaddedperproductive
(3) Indexofrealsociallaborcost

(3)
0.90
0.87
0.68
1.00

AssumingthatAgliettais correctin his directcorrelationof

real social labor cost to the rate of relativesurplus-extraction
(pp. 67-71), these figuresdramaticallydemonstratethe differential levels of relativesurplus-valuein some of the leading
capitalistcountriesat the end of the nineteenthcentury.Most
specifiedof the United
they show the differentia
strikingly,
States as the capitalist economy most integrallydependent
upon theproductionof relativesurplus-value.
loses
The contrastbetweenabsoluteand relativesurplus-value
for
a
standard
differentiatas
its effectiveness,
therefore, simple
On the
ing the early and late period of U.S. industrialization.
more
I
it
would
be
both
accurate
and
also
believe
that
contrary,
more consistentwith Aglietta'sown substantiveanalyses to
the "extensive"and "intensive"regimesof accumudistinguish
formswhichcombine
ensemblesof structural
lationas different
modalitiesof absoluteand relativesurplus-extraction
different
under the predominanceof the latter.This correctionwould
betweentwoprincialso enable us to drawa sharperdistinction
of
relative
of
the
surplus-value:
development
(a) the
pal phases
of
the
of
unskilled
the
mass
characterized
poverty
by
period
and semiskilledfactorylabor (1870-1940) wherethereduction
of the value of labor-powertakesplace in thecontextof a very
limitedincreasein working-class
consumption;(b) the period

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MikeDavis

characterizedby the integrationof the majorityof the white

proletarianfamiliesinto a standardof consumerdurableconis dynasumption(Fordism),whererelativesurplus-extraction
mized by an advancingreal wage and an expandingcredit
system.
(B) The concept of an "extensive"regimeof accumulation
can also be challengedin termsof its adequacyto differentiate
thestructural
transformations
whichoccuredbetween1896 and
1919. The readerwill recallthatAgliettaproposedthe followingtemporalparameters.
1873-1919

the extensiveregime

1919-1945
1945-1966

transitionalperiod
Fordism

1966- ?

new era of structuralcrisis

GivenAglietta'sown formalcriteriaof thedifferent

levelsor
structureswhichcomprisea "regime"of accumulation(historof
ically specific formsof the labor process, stratification
classes,mode of reproductionof labor-power,mechanismsof
price formation,etc.), it would appear thathe has telescoped
two historicallydistinctregimesof accumulation(pre-1896,
post-1896) into a singleunity (the "extensive"regime).The
watershedcharacterof the 1893-96 Depressionin American
a fewof thestructural
historycan be elucidatedby considering
changesto whichit playedtheroleof a violentmidwife:
(i) "Trustification"of leading sectorsof industry,utilities,
communications,and transportation;the growingfusion of
bank and industrialcapitalin theformof financialgroupings
or
"trusts".
underthe
(ii) A recompositionof the internalstratification
and as an outgrowthof the
impact of the "New Immigration"
mechanization
and "deskilling"of thelaborprocess
accelerating
(Taylor,thenFord).
of the bourgeoisie(further
concen(iii) A new stratification
trationof ownership)and the riseof a largenew middleclass
to profoundchangesin the processand scale of
corresponding
and sales.
management
of themodelsof urbanizationand
(iv) Partialtransformations
consumption;growthof suburbs.
in the regu(v) First attemptsat direct state intervention
lation of competitionand class conflict.Openingof era of U.S.
overseasimperialism.

259

"Fordism"in Crisis

all thesetransformations
occuredin thecontext
Furthermore
of an epochal switchin technologiesfromthe age of steamto
It is a seriousflawin Rgulationet
the age of oil and electricity.
crises that Aglietta never clearly situates major structural
changesin the economyin termsof eitherthe "Second Technological Revolution"after1896 or the "ThirdTechnological
Revolution" (electronics,nuclear energy)after 1945.41 The
inclusionof macrotechnological
changewithinthe framework
of Rgulationet criseswould have demandeda reworkingof
some key theses. In particular,Agliettawould have had to
recognizethe breakin thelast decade of thenineteenth
century
between structuralformswhich regulatedthe "competitive
phase" of industrialcapitalismand the new formswhich developed the potentialitiesof the Second TechnologicalRevolutionas a base fortheriseof monopolycapitalism.Thus a new
theoretical
periodization:
1873-1896
1896-1919 (or 1929?)
1919 (or 1929)-1945
1945-1966

1966-

"competitive"industrial
capitalism
firstphase of monopoly
capitalism
transitional/crisis
period
Fordism(or "late capitalism")=
second phase of monopoly
capitalism
new era of crisis(neo-Fordism?)

on the theoreticalstatusof theconcept

(C) Similarstrictures
of the "extensive"regimewould apply,pari passu to any attempt to generalizeabout world capitalistdevelopmentfrom
to note,
the perspectiveof Rgulationet crises.It is interesting
however,thatthe revisedperiodizationwhichI have suggested
does correspond,with the exceptionof the 1919-26 periodin
the U.S., to the averaged succession of international"long
the object of
waves" or Kondratieff
cycleswhichare currently
renewedstudyamongstMarxisteconomists.

41*

Mandel,Late Capitalism,op. cit., 184-222.

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MikeDavis
"LONG WAVES" OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT42
"tonality"

1874-1893

slackening

1894-1913

expansive

1914-1939

regressive

1940/45-1966
1967-

expansive
slackening

In Late Capitalism,Mandelpresentsa theoryof the history

of capital accumulationon a world scale which explainsthe
movementsof these long waves as the complex resultantsof
manycauses. WhereasAgliettahas focusedupon theU.S. as an
ideal-type of advanced capitalism, Mandel considers the
commonfeaturesof the entiremetropolitanor imperialist
pole
of the capitalistworldeconomy(E.E.C.+U.S.+Japanversusthe
the analysis
rest). Withinthisbroadercanvashe also integrates
of the strategiclevels which Rgulationet crises omits: the
world market,arms spending,internationalization
of capital,
of
modalities
etc.
macro-technological
change,
surplus-profits,
The analysisof the innerlogic of long wave cycles which
Mandel undertakesin Late Capitalismonly underscoresthe
inadequacyof the extensive/intensive
dichotomyas a basis for
Seen
fromtheperspective
of
periodizingcapitalistdevelopment.
the evolutionof world capital, Aglietta'sjuxtapositionof the
predominanceof absolute over relativesurplus-valueand its
reversalin a subsequentstage of developmentseems an even
moresimplisticmodel: most of all becauseit failsto locate one
of the greatestturningpointsin worldcapitalistdevelopment,
the riseof imperialism.
As Hilferding,
Lenin,etc. drummedinto
the heads of theirreaders,the rise of imperialism
and the concomitanttransformation
of competitiveinto monopolycapital
is a passage to a "higherstage". The recognitionof this fact
obviously overthrowsthe assertionof an integralregimeof
accumulationbetween1873 and 1919.
7.2

What, then, of the overall achievementof Rgulationet

crises?
49
*A'

Taken fromMandel,Late Capitalism,op. cit., 130-32.

"Fordism"in Crisis

261

As I have triedto showin thisprecursory

critique,Agliettais
in
of
successful
his
only partially
goal developinga conceptual
structurecapable of analyzingthe most importanttransformationsoftwentieth-century
capitalism.Althoughsuperiorin its
rigorand epistemologyto most earlierworks (includingthe
loses its
"stagnationist"
school), Rgulationet crisesfrequently
way as a result of its "missinglinks" and untenableconstructions
(liketheconceptof the "extensive"regime).It frankly neverattains,in my opinion,the same theoreticalcoherence
or breadthof visionofferedby Late Capitalism.
As a contributionto the debate on U.S. economicdevelopment,however,Rgulationet crisesclearlystandsapart.Whateverits weaknesseson a hightheoreticalplane,it is absolutely
innovativein the attemptto found a theoreticalhistoryof
Americancapitalism.Not since Louis (Fraina) Coreywrotethe
Decline of AmericanCapitalismin 1934,43 has any Marxist
dared such an audacious synthesisof economic analysisand
history(and I includethe workof Baranand Sweezy). It particularlystandsas a clear cut and provocativechallengeto the
pretensionsof the New Economic History.Hopefully,as it
becomes translatedand widelyread by AmericanMarxists,it
willspawnits own successors.
APPENDIX I: INTENSITY OF LABOR
AND SURPLUS-VALUE
The changingintensityof labor poses certainabstruseprobof
lems forMarx'stheoryof surplus-value.
Is theintensification
the labor process,forinstance,to be consideredas a modality
of absolute or of relativesurplus-value?How rigorousa distinctioncan be maintainedbetweenthe magnitudeof abstract
labor (in both its extensiveand intensivedimensions)and its
"quality"- itsproductivity?
intensification
as a mode
Aglietta,as we haveseen,interprets
of absolute surplus-value
because it entailsa "fillingin of the
pores of the workingday" and, therefore,constitutesan extensionof surpluslabor time. To depict thismoreclearly,he
distinguishes
tn as "necessarylabor time,"tyas "timeuniformly productiveof value," and T as the "apparentduration."The
43#New York:
Covici, Friedi,1934.

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MikeDavis

two modesof absolutesurplus-extraction

are,then,(a) "the rise
of t togetherwith that of T" (lengtheningwork day) and
(b) "the diminutionof T-ty"(intensification)
(pp. 38-39).
Other writers,in contrast,like David Gordon have claimed
that intensification
must be defined as a form of relative
since
surplus-extraction it involvesa reductionof thenecessary
componentof theworkingday (tn).44
Whatwas Marx'sopinion?
First we must carefullyexamine the distinctionwhichhe
developedin Chapter12 of Capital,Volume I, wherehe introduced the concept of relativesurplus-extraction
for the first
time.Withoutyetintroducing
differences
in intensity,
he differentiatesabsolute and relativesurplus-valueaccordingto two
interrelated
setsof criteria.
Absolute
is based on theprolongation
of ty,
(a)
surplus-value
whilerelativesurplus-value
involvesa reductionof tR.
is a reductionin
(b) More specifically,relativesurplus-value
the value of labor-powerdue to the impactof increasinglabor
productivityupon the value of wage goods. The growthof
moreover,is assumedto dependupon increasing
productivity,
mechanizationreflectedin thetendencyfortheorganiccompositionof capitalto growth.
Later in his famousdiscussionof "Machineryand Large-Scale
Industry"(Chapter 15), Marx devoted an entiresectionto an
analysis of the effects of intensificationupon surplusextraction.In the wake of the compulsoryshorteningof the
workingday after1844 in Britainhe examineshow the "in" deversionof extensivemagnitudeinto intensivemagnitude
velops as a "phenomenaof decisiveimportance."He explicitly
considersthe intensification
of labor as a "change... in the
natureof relativesurplus-value."45
Yet at the same timehe makesit clear thattheinitialeffect
of the "condensation"of the old workingday of 12-14 hours
into the new workingday of 10 hours is not a revolutionary
but merelythecompressionandpreserchangein productivity,
vationof thepreviousquantitiesof abstractlabor.
44

David Gordon, "Capital v. Labor: The CurrentCrisisin the Sphere of Production,'*in Radical Perspectiveson the Economic Crisis of Monopoly Capitalism
(New York: U.R.P.E., 1975), 32-33.
45 '
Marx,Capital,op. cit., 534. Italicsadded.

"Fordism"in Crisis

263

of labournow countsforwhatitreallyis,namely
Thiscompression
an increasein the quantityof labour.. . . The denserhourof the
than
10-hour
daycontainsmorelabour,i.e.,expendedlabour-power,
themoreporoushourof the 12-hourday. Thustheproductofone
of the 10 hourshas as muchvalueas theproductof 1 1/5of the12
hours,orevenmore.

Since abstractlabor is homogenously

compressed,it logically
followsthat Marx means that both tn and tyare equally condensedwithoutany alterationof the rate of surplus-value
(i.e.,
in
the
above
of
we
have
Rather,
Marx's,
example
tv-tn/tn).
T^Tj.butt^t^!
In othersectionsMarxemphasizesthatwithintensified
labor,
as contrastedwithmoreproductivelabor,the unitvalue added
of commodities(V+S/quantityof use-valuesper production
seems,then,merely
period) does not diminish.Intensification
to comprisea changein the form of magnitudeof expanded
labor-powerratherthan a real cheapeningof variablecapital
Fromthisperspective
throughtheimpactof risingproductivity.
it would seem most consistentwithMarx'smostcompletedefinitionsof relativesurplus-extraction
to defineintensification

la Agliettaas a modalityof absolute surplus-value(albeit a

modespecificto advancingmechanizationand closelybound up
withtheriseof relativesurplusper se).
This,however,is not the end of the problem.In Chapter17
("Changes of Magnitudein the Priceof Labour-Power"),Marx
takes a second look at the consequencesof varyinglabor intensity.This timehe adds the importantprovisothatintensity
can only be countedas more abstractlabor to the extentthat
different
levelsof intensity
can
persist.In otherwords,intensity
count
as
to
the
that
the
circulation
only
"extensivity"
degree
processsociallyvalidatesand equalizesmoreintenselaborswith
more extensivelabors of less intensity(hence the paradoxical
equation: 1 hour= 1 1/5hours).Furthermore:
If theintensity
of labourwereto increasesimultaneously
andequalthenthenewand higherdegreeof
ly in everybranchof industry,
wouldbecomethe normalsocialdegreeof intensity,
and
intensity
wouldtherefore
ceaseto countas an extensive
magnitude.^

This recalibration- so to speak - of thelaw of valueon the

basis of a higheraveragelabor intensityseemsto implya mas* Loc. cit.Italicsadded.
47*

Ibid.,661-62.Italicsadded.

264

MikeDavis

sive diminutionof abstractlabor realized withinthe whole

social product.This slightly
factseemsto me to flow
disturbing
as an unavoidablecorollaryto Marx's assertionthat with the
of intensityit would no longercount "as an exgeneralization
tensivemagnitude."In DiagramIV I have attemptedto illustratethisproblemas well as synthesizing
some of Marx'sstatementsconcerning
theeffectsof increasing
of labor.
intensity
DiagramIV.

Let: Z = quantityof use values produced,held constant

n = a constantnumberof productiveworkers
tj = 15 hours= old sociallyaverageworkingday
a = its intensity
and a' = new social averageintensityof labor, a<a'
= 10 hours= new sociallyaverageworkingday
tg
further
to = the period of transitionin which the workingday
has been shortenedfor some workers(n/y)but not
forothers(n/[l-l/y] ). Moreoverin conformitywith
Marx's assumption that intensity counts as extensityuntil the establishmentof a new social norm
of intensity,we will treat a' as equal to tj during
the period of transition.

40
*o#
Scci6iW.,431.

"Fordism"in Crisis

265

Now assumingthatall expendedlabor is actuallyrealizedas

sociallynecessarylabor and holdingall otherfactorsconstant,
we can drawthe followingconclusions:
(i) The totalabstractlaborat tj equals n(tj) or 15n.
(ii) The total abstractlabor at t2 is calculatedas follows:10
a' countsas 15 n/y;15 n/y+ 15 n/(l-l/y)= 15 n;
n/yat intensity
=
n (ti ) n(t2); and unitvalueadded tj n/zequals t^^/^constitutemeasuresof
Both extensityand differential
intensity
themagnitudeof value.
of a new social norm
(iii) At tg, however,withthe formation
a' ceases to be equalizedas an extensivemagnitude;
of intensity,
thetotalabstractlaborat tg equals n(tg) = lOn.
therefore
(iv) n(tg)<n(tj); all other factorsconstant,thereis a net
disappearance of abstract labor (social value) within the
economy. Uniformintensityis no longera measureof value.
Also unitvalue added now diminishes:tgn/z<tjn/z.
In summary,I make the embarrassingly
scholasticprecision
text we must disto
the
word
of
Marx's
that according
very
to the extent
absolute
intensification
as
tinguish
surplus-value
when
it
becomes
that it remainsdifferential
generalized,
(t2);
however,it then becomes a modalityof relativesurplus-value
(tgn/z<tjn/z implies a reduction of tn). Finally under the
highlyartificialand perhapstotallyunmeaningful
(because it
excludes all the other factors- risingproductivity,
etc., which Marx inextricablyassociatestogether)circumstanceof
the simple "decanting"of the old workingday into a shorter
new workingday of greaterintensity,
therewould be a loss of
abstract
labor.
global
APPENDIX II: CLASS STRUGGLE IN EUROPE
AND THE U.S. COMPARED
I wouldliketo suggestthefollowinghypotheses:
(i) In every major European capitalist nation, including
for
Britain,the workingclassesconductedprotractedstruggles
of the
suffrage.In fact the periodof the activeself-formation
Europeanworkingclasses (their"making"in E. P. Thompson's
sense) encompassedboth elementaleconomicorganizationand
rudimentary
politicalmobilizationto obtain democraticrights.
All European workingclasses share thisearlyphase of revolutionary-democratic mass movement: Chartism in Britain
(1830-48); the Lasallean and "illegal" periodsof Germanlabor
(1860-85); Russia(1898-1917), etc.

266

MikeDavis

(ii) It made a crucial difference,of course, whetherthis

fordemocracywas conducted(a) in the framework
of a
struggle
bourgeois-democraticrevolution which was ongoing (e.g.,
Francein 1848-52); (b) againsta hegemonicbourgeoisiein the
context of a restricteddemocracy(e.g., Britain1819-65); or
revoof a bourgeois-democratic
(c) in the absence/impossibility
lution, against both the pre-capitalistand bourgeois ruling
classes at the same time (Russia 1898-1917: the dynamicof
"permanentrevolution").Nevertheless,
everyEuropean working class underwenta seminalperiod where the politicaland
economic class struggleswere deeply imbricated.This period
was decisivefor the later formationof independentworkingclasspoliticalparties.
(iii) In the (relative) absence of an integratingpoliticoideologicallevel - e.g., of "broad democracy"- the political
by thestatebecamenecessary
"regulation"of the class struggle
in orderto avoid a radicalpolarizationof society.In orderto
impose this,however,the immediate,narrowlysectionalinteroverests of the industrialbourgeoishad to be temporarily
riddenon behalfof the historicalinterestsof bourgeoissociety
as a whole.Thus in Englandand Prussia/Germany,
conservativelandlordstrata(ToriesandJunkers)playeda keyrolein passing
initialfactorylegislationand/orsocial insurance;in France (as
also in Prussiato someextent)an evenmore"substitutionalist"
regime(Bonapartism)was necessary.
(iv) Factorylaws comprisednot onlypartof a largerstrategy
of reform(partialextensionsof the suffrage
to skilledworkers,
of the mode of
etc.); they also catalyzed transformations
Thus, as Marxpointedout in Capital,and as
surplus-extraction.
we examined in Appendix I, the capitalistsrushedto "condense" theold workingday intothenew one (throughintensification), while at the same time increasingactual productivity
and relativesurplus-value.
Factorylaws and tradeunionshelped
to goad capitalismonwardinto the second (iron-railroad
age)
revolution.
phaseof theindustrial
(v) In the United States, on the other hand, the politicowas verydistinctive,
juridicialframework
(farmore so, in fact,
than Therborn has recognized in his otherwiseinteresting
article). This was due, above all, to the characterof the
revolutionin North America: the U.S.
bourgeois-democratic
bourgeoiswas, in reality,the only "classically"revolutionary
democraticbourgeoisiein worldhistory.It not only profited
fromtherevolution,
but actuallyled it untilitsconclusion.This

"Fordism"in Crisis

267

tiedup withtheanti-colonial
characwas,of course,profoundly
terof thisrevolution.Thiswas eventrueof the 1861-65 second
phase, in which nationalcapitalistdevelopmentoverrodethe
historiccompromiseof 1787 between planterand capitalist
sectionsof therulingclass.
(vi) The singularNew England industrialbourgeoisie,who
occupied the "Jacobin" (= Radical Republican) wing of the
Lincoln coalition ideologically and politically hegemonize
theabolitionists)overthe
(throughtheir"organicintellectuals",
pettyproducerswho werethemassforceof thestruggle
against
the South. Historiansusually emphasize the populist, antiof theAmericanfarmer,
their"isolationmonopolyinsurgencies
ist" outlook,etc. Actuallytheirfundamental
role (not including
the semi-proletarianized
Southerntenants)has been as themost
zealous advocates of individualprivatepropertyand national
expansion.In no othercountryhas the ideologyof the industrial bourgeoisiefound such a mass resonance. (Indeed, in
were
Europe, the actual political parties of the industrialists
oftentiny,as in Germanyand Italy.)
(vii) In the Jacksonianperiod, the artisanalworking-class
movementwas a political appendage to the cause of small
propertyownersin general.The prevalenceof pettyproduction
and white manhood suffrageimpartedto the nativeworking
class a deep sense of the exceptionalismof Americansociety.
(This is what Therborn underestimated.)Unlike European
workerswho experiencedboth the absence of political and
economic freedom,Anericanworkerscame, in the post-Civil
War period, to contrast their political liberty with their
moveeconomicexploitation.Thus the Americanworking-class
ment was primarilyconstitutedaround the single axis of
economicredress.
(viii)Given the absence of any equivalent"revolutionary
of theAmericanworkdemocratic"movementin the formation
the
and
given
incomparablehegemonyof bourgeois
ing class,
in
the
United
States, therewas not the same presdemocracy
sure to use labor reformin orderto canalize the class struggle
Ironiinto institutional
formssubject to state administration.
of
the
United
States
"advanced
the
bourgeoisdemocracy"
cally,
coexistedwiththe maintenanceof the class strugglein a "wild
constraints
state"withminimalgovernmental
upon theaccumulation of capital. The state was primarilyresponsiblefor the
expansion of the frontierand the maintenanceof the public
domainforthebenefitof largecapital(e.g.,railroads),occasion-

268

MikeDavis

ally supplyingtheauxiliaryviolencenecessaryto suppressreally

laborrevolts.
large-scale
(ix) The macroeconomicrepercussionsof factorylegislation
were probably also not necessaryin the U.S* The distinctive
characterof the labor processin Americawas probablynot the
oftnoted"scarcity" of labor and high wages,but ratherthe
singularlyhigherintensityof work which - coexistingwith
protractedand unregulatedworkinghoursuntilthe FirstWorld
War - contributedto the highestrate of surplus-value
in the
world(see Section7.1).
APPENDIX III: DEPARTMENTS I, II, AND III

In myopinion,a minimally
of themacroadequate definition
structureat the level of the analysis of Rgulationet crises
would haveto (a) distinguish
submonopolisticand competitive
departmentson the assumptionof medium term tendency
towardtwo averageratesof profit,and (b) posita thirddepartmentof productionwhose surplus-value
entersinto the formation of the rate(s) of profit,but whose end productsplay no
role in the materialreproductionof eitherconstantor variable
capital.Thus:
(L = capitalistconsumption)
Cla+Vla+Scla+Svla+SLla
(a) monopolysubdepartment:
+ Vlb + Sclb + Svlb + SLlb
Clb
competitive
(b)
subdept.:
II. C2+V2+Sc2+Sv2+SL2
C2a+V2a+Sc2a+Sv2a+SL2a
(a) monopolysubdepartment:
+ V2b + Sc2b + Sv2b+ SL2b
:
C2b
(b) competitive
subdept.
III. C3+V3+S3
I.

Cl+Vl+Scl+Svl+SLl

Given the necessary interdepartmental

circulationwhich
Marx definesas thepreconditionforthefullrealizationof total
value (i.e., the exchange:Vl+Svl+SLl = C2+Sc2), it wouldbe
necessaryfor the purposesof adequatelyconceptualizingthe
of accumulation,the existenceof two rates
globedinterrelation
of profit,and a large sphereof unproductiveconsumptionto
define:
(i) The new structuralproportionalitieswhich must exist
betweenla, Ib, Ha, and lib as constraints
upon fullrealization.
(ii) The impactof theexistenceof DepartmentIII undertwo

"Fordism"in Crisis

269

conditions:(a) when C3+V3 valorizesproductivecapital less

thanor equal to unusedproductivecapacity(Is therea "multiplier effect"on accumulationin I & II?); and (b) when it is
greaterthansurpluscapacity(Is therenet "disaccumulation"in
I & II?).
(iii) The exact natureof the sourcesof C3+V3 in relationto
DepartmentI & II accumulation(i.e., analysisof fiscaltransfers
and inflationary
of value fromothersectors).
expropriations
The elaborationof these relationships,
in my opinion,are
first
of
toward
the
kind
consistent
necessary
steps
conceptual
apparatuscapable of connectingthe threelevelsof analysisin
question: (a) the level of global surplusextiactionand reproductionof the use-valuematerialsubstructure;
(b) levelof combetween
and
the
petition
"many capitals";
increasingim(c)
of
portance unproductive
expenditures.