G.R. No.

L-30289

March 26, 1929

SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA, opponents-appellants.
Sumulong, Lavides & Hilado for petitioner-appellant.
Godofredo Reyes for opponent-appellant Gonzales.
Ramon Diokno for opponent-appellant Ona.
OSTRAND, J.:
On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of Severina, was
designated executrix. The testatrix died in November, 1926, leaving no heirs by force of law, and on December 2,
1926, Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased,
filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the
estate of the deceased. She returned an inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and made several demands
upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the delivery to her of the property inventoried and
of which he was in possession.
On September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver to Serapia de Gala all the
property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the property as ordered, Sinforoso filed a motion asking the
appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in her
stead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was
nevertheless granted, Serapia was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in her place,
principally on the ground that he had possession of the property in question and that his appointment would simplify
the proceedings.
In the meantime and after various continuances and delays, the court below in an order dated January 20, 1928,
declared the will valid and admitted it to probate. All of the parties appealed, Serapia de Gala from the order
removing her from the office of special administratrix, and Apolinario Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona from the order
probating the will.
Serapia's appeal requires but little discussion. The burden of the argument of her counsel is that a special
administrator cannot be removed except for one or more of the causes stated in section 653 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. But that section can only apply to executors and regular administrators, and the office of a special
administrator is quite different from that of regular administrator. The appointment of a special administrator lies
entirely in the sound discretion of the court; the function of such an administrator is only to collect and preserve the
property of the deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay any
debts of the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a special administrator
indicates that both his appointment and his removal are purely discretionary, and we cannot find that the court below
abused its discretion in the present case. In removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessor of the
property pending the final determination of the validity of the will, the court probably prevented useless litigation.
The appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales argue that the will in question was not executed in the form
prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645. That section reads as
follows:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor
charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by
him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the
number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the

presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
The principal points raised by the appeal are (1) that the person requested to sign the name of the testatrix signed
only the latter's name and not her own; (2) that the attestation clause does not mention the placing of the thumbmark of the testatrix in the will; and (3) that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses
was not stated in the attestation clause but only in the last paragraph of the body of the will.
The first point can best be answered by quoting the language of this court in the case of the Estate of Maria Salva,
G. R. No. 26881:1
An examination of the will in question disclosed that it contains five pages. The name of the old woman,
Maria Salva, was written on the left hand margin of the first four pages and at the end of the will. About in
the center of her name she placed her thumb-mark. About in the center of her name she placed her thumbmark. The three witnesses likewise signed on the left-hand margin and at the end of the will.
On these facts, the theory of the trial judge was that under the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it was essential to the validity of the will that the person writing the
name of the maker of the will also sign. Under the law prior to the amendment, it had been held by this court
that where a testator is unable to write and his name is signed by another at his request, in his presence and
in that of the subscribing witnesses thereto, it is unimportant, so far as the validity of the will is concerned,
whether the person who writes the name of the testator signs his own or not. (Barut vs. Cabacungan (1912),
21 Phil., 461). But his Honor, the trial judge emphasizes that the amendment introduced into the law the
following sentence: 'The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin . . ..' This
requirement, it is said, was not lived up to in this instance.
There is, however, an entirely different view which can be taken of the situation. This is that the testatrix
placed her thumb-mark on the will in the proper places. When, therefore, the law says that the will shall be
'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by the customary written signature but by the
testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. The construction put upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original
meaning of a signum or sign, rather than the derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting. A statute
requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. (28 R. C. L., pp. 116117).
The opinion quoted is exactly in point. The testatrix thumb-mark appears in the center of her name as written by
Serapia de Gala on all of the pages of the will.
The second and third points raised by Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales are sufficiently refuted by quoting the
last clause of the body of the will together with the attestation clause, both of which are written in the Tagalog
dialect. These clauses read as follows:
Sa katunayang ang kasulatang ito, na may anim na dahon, ay siyang naglalaman ng aking huling tagubilin,
at sa hindi ko kaalamang lumagda ng aking pangalan, ipinamanhik ko sa aking pamankin na si Serapia de
Gala na isulat ang aking pangalan at apellido, at sa tapat ay inilagda ko ang titik ng kanang daliri kong
hinlalaki, sa walkas at sa bawat isa sa anim (6) na dahon ng kasulatang ito, at ito's ginawa niya sa kautusan
at sa harap ko at ng tatlong saksing nagpapatutuo sa huli ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo ng Nobiembre ng
1920.
(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES
Pinatutunayan namin na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng anim (6) na dahon na pinirmahan sa harap namin
ni Serapia de Gala sa kahilingan ni Severina Gonzales sa wakas at sa mga gilid ng bawa't isa sa anim (6)
na dahon at isinaysay na ang kasulatang ito ay siyang huling habilin o testamento ni Severina Gonzales, ay
pinirmahan namin, bilang mga saksi sa wakas at sa gilid ng bawa't dahon sa harap at sa kahilingan ng
tinurang testadora, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay pumirma sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, ngayon ika
dalawang po't tatlo ng noviembre ng taong 1920 ng taong 1920.

(Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD

JUAN SUMULONG
FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD
The translation in English of the clauses quoted reads as follows:
In virtue of this will, consisting of six pages, that contains my last wish, and because of the fact that I cannot
sign my name, I request my niece Serapia de Gala to write my name, and above this I placed my right
thumb-mark at the end of this will and to each of the six pages of this document, and this was done at my
direction and in the presence of three attesting witnesses, this 23rd of November, 1920.
(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES
We certify that this document, which is composed of six (6) sheets and was signed in our presence by
Serapia de Gala at the request of Severina Gonzales at the end and on the margins of each of the six (6)
sheets and was declared to contain the last will and testament of Severina Gonzales, was signed by us as
witnesses at the end and on the margins of each sheet in the presence and at the request of said testatrix,
and each of us signed in the presence of all and each of us, this 23rd day of November of the year 1920.
(Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD
JUAN SUMULONG
FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD
As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumb-mark, but it does there
appear that the signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is sufficiently
described and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It maybe conceded that the attestation clause is
not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in
connection with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent;
it leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document.
The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the fact that the will had been signed
in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause is without merit; the fact is expressly stated
in that clause.
In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed without costs. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-15388

January 31, 1961

DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, oppositor-appellant.
Ponce Enrile, S. Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for petitioner-appellee.
Lazaro A. Marquez and J. D. Quirino for oppositor-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceedings No. 29636 authorizing the
special administrator of the testate estate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins to sell at public auction certain personal
properties left by the deceased.
It appears that said special proceedings were commenced on May 10, 1956, by a petition presented by Dora Perkin
Anderson for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins, who died in
Manila on April 28, 1956 allegedly possessed of personal and real properties with a probable value of P5,000,000.
On the same date of the filing of the aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent petition

for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court
issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator upon his posting of a bond in the
amount of P50,000. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition
to the probate of the will presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. On September 28, 1956 the special
administrator submitted an inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the
deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death.
About two years later, or on September 4, 1958, the special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking
authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left
by the deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating
both physically and in value, in order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value migh be
obtained in their disposition. When the motion was heard on September 25, 1958, the court required the
administrator to submit a specification of the properties sought to be sold, and in compliance therewith, the special
administrator, on October 21, 1958, submitted to the court, in place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the
personal properties belonging to the estate with the items sought to be sold marked with a check in red pencil, with
the statement that said items were too voluminous to enumerate.
On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposetion to the proposed sale. Reasons, for the opposition were
that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and
(2) that unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been made.
The opposition notwithstanding, the lower court, on December 2, 1958, approved the proposed sale, authorizing the
Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same. Oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the
grounds (1) that said order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the
deceased, contrary to Rule 81, section 2. Rules of Court; (2) that said order was issued without a showing that the
goods and chattels sought to be sold were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the
personalty sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor; (4) that there is evidence
on record showing unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot
would prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed; and (5) that there is also evidence showing
oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part of the personal estate.
On February 23, 1959, the lower court denied the above motion for reconsideration. Whereupon, oppositor Idonah
Slade Perkins appealed to this court.
Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold not being perishable, the special administrator
has no legal authority to sell them. This argument is untenable, because section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court,
specifically provides that the special administrator "may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders
sold", which shows that the special administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable" property only.
It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased until
a regular administrator is appointed (sec. 2, Rule 81; De Gala v. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 104; Collins v. Henry, 118 S.E.
729, 155 Ga. 886; Sqydelko v. Smith's Estate, 244 N.W. 149, 259 Mich. 519). But it is not alone the specific property
of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special
administrator of perishable property (Cao vs. Cascade Silver Mines & Mills, et al., 213 P. 109 66 Mont. 488). It is in
line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not only the property of the estate but also its
value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell "other proerty as the court ordered sold;" .
There is, however, a serious obstacle to the proposed sale, namely, the vigorous opposition presented thereto the
appellant, the surviving spouse of the deceased, on the ground that she is allegedly entitled to a large portion of the
personal properties in question, either because the were conjugal property of herself and the deceased, or because
they are her own, exclusive, personal property. Indeed the records show that up to the time the propose sale was
asked for and judicially approved, no proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the alleged
exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of the estate supposedly left by the deceased or to
liquidate the conjugal partnership property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of
the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or,
at least, an agreement be reached with a appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not
mind being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all, most of the items sought to
be sold pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical appliances, various gadget and books can

easily be protected and preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of two residential houses
(in Manila and in Baguio City left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale
at this time over the strong opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a
substantial portion of the personal estate in question.
The special administrator claims in his brief that t oppositor-appellant should have indicated the alleged "fine
furniture" which she did not want sold and that her refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious claim. But it
does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out which items in the inventory she did
not want sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and later her motion for reconsideration to the order
approving the same were overruled by the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her
opposition were not well-founded; the records do not even show that an inquiry was made as to the validity of the
grounds of her opposition.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the special administrator to sell certain
personal properties of the estate is set aside, with costs against the special administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
petition-appellee Dora Perkins Anderson.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez David, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-20735

August 14, 1965

GLICERIA C. LIWANAG, Special Administratrix of the Estate of PIO D. LIWANAG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS DE VEYRA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
MANUEL AGREGADO, respondents.
C. M. Baltazar and A. P. Narvasa for petitioner.
Manuel P. Calanog for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D. Liwanag, the settlement of which is
the subject of Special Proceeding No. 46599 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. On January 9, 1962
respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her as such special administratrix, Civil Case No. 50897 of the
same court, for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage constituted in his favor by said Pio D. Liwanag during his
lifetime. On July 18, 1962, here petitioner moved to dismiss Agregado's complaint, upon the ground that as special
administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor of the deceased. In an order dated August 1, 1962, respondent,
Hon. Jesus de Veyra, as Judge of said court, denied the motion, whereupon petitioner filed case CA-G.R. No.
31168-R of the Court of Appeals against respondent Judge and Agregado, to annul said order by writ
ofcertiorari and enjoin said Judge from entertaining said Case No. 50897. Upon petitioner's motion, the Court of
Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing respondent Judge to refrain from proceeding with the trial of
that case, until further orders. However, subsequently, or on December 3, 1962, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision denying the writ prayed for and dissolving said writ of preliminary injunction, with costs against the
petitioner. Hence this appeal taken by petitioner upon the theory that, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 81 of the (old)
Rules of Court, "a special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased," and that, accordingly,
Agregado has no cause of action against her as a special administratrix.
In as much, however, as the alleged absence of a cause of action does not affect respondent's jurisdiction to hear
Case No. 50897, it follows that the denial of petitioner's motion to the same, even if it were erroneous, is reviewable,
not by writ of certiorari, but by appeal, after the rendition of judgment on the merits. Moreover, the theory that a
mortgagee cannot bring an action for foreclosure against the special administrator of the estate of a deceased
person has already been rejected by this Court. In Liwanag vs. Hon. Luis B. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19159 (September
29, 1964), involving the same petitioner herein, the same estate of the deceased Pio D. Liwanag, a similar action for
foreclosure, although of another mortgage and an identical motion to dismiss and issue, we expressed ourselves as
follows:

The defendant Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for foreclosure, on the theory that
she may not be sued as special administratrix.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim against the
deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (1)
abandon his security and prosecute his claim and share in the general distribution of the assets of the
estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may
prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and
foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage,
he shall not...share in the distribution of the assets.
Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second remedy, having filed his action for foreclosure
against the administratrix of the property.
Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner herein can be sued as special administratrix. The Rules
of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate.
Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases
where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are not to deny the present action
on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed, the very
purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-23419 June 27, 1975
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GELACIO SEBIAL. BENJAMINA SEBIAL, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTA SEBIAL, JULIANO SEBIAL and HEIRS OF BALBINA SEBIAL, oppositors-appellants.
C. de la Victoria & L. de la Victoria for appellants.
Robustiano D. Dejaresco for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:
Gelacio Sebial died intestate in 1943 in Pinamungajan Cebu. According to the appellants, Gelacio Sebial, by his first
wife Leoncia Manikis, who allegedly died in 1919, begot three children named Roberta, Balbina and Juliano. By his
second wife, Dolores Enad, whom he allegedly married in 1927, he supposedly begot six children named
Benjamina, Valentina, Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza and Luciano.
On June 17, 1960 Benjamina Sebial filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu a verified petition for the settlement
of Gelacio Sebial's estate. She prayed that she be appointed administratrix thereof (Spec. Proc. No. 2049-R).
Roberta Sebial opposed the petition on the ground that the estate of Gelacio Sebial had already been partitioned
among his children and that, if an administration proceeding was necessary, she, Roberta Sebial, a resident of
Guimbawian, a remote mountain barrio of Pinamungajan, where the decedent's estate was supposedly located,
should be the one appointed administratrix and not Benjamina Sebial, a housemaid working at Talisay, Cebu which
is about seventy kilometers away from Pinamungajan. In a supplemental opposition the children of the first marriage
contended that the remedy of Benjamina Sebial was an action to rescind the partition.

After hearing, the lower court in its order of January 16, 1961 appointed Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. It found
that the decedent left an estate consisting of lands with an area of twenty-one hectares, valued at more than six
thousand pesos, and that the alleged partition of the decedent's estate was invalid and ineffective.
Letters of administration were issued to Benjamina Sebial on January 19, 1961. On the same date, a notice to
creditors was issued. The oppositors moved for the reconsideration of the order appointing Benjamina Sebial as
administratrix. They insisted that the decedent's estate had been partitioned on August 29, 1945, as shown in
Exhibits 5, 6, 7 and I, and that the action to rescind the partition had already prescribed. The lower court denied the
motion in its order of February 11, 1961.
The oppositors filed on March 16, 1961 a motion to terminate the administration proceeding on the grounds that the
decedent's estate was valued at less than six thousand pesos and that it had already been partitioned and,
therefore, there was no necessity for the administration proceeding.
On April 27, 1961 Benjamina Sebial filed an inventory and appraisal of the decedent's estate allegedly consisting of
seven unregistered parcels of land, covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 04477, 04478, 04490, 04491, 04492, 04493
and 04500, with a total value of nine thousand pesos, all located at Barrio Guimbawian, Pinamungajan. The
oppositors registered their opposition to the inventory on the ground that the seven parcels of land enumerated in
the inventory no longer formed part of the decedent's estate.
On May 6, 1961, the administratrix filed a motion to require Lorenzo Rematado, Demetrio Camillo and the spouses
Roberta Sebial and Lazaro Recuelo to deliver to her the parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 04478,
04490,04491 and 04493.
On June 24, 1961 the probate court issued an order suspending action on the pending incidents in view of the
possibility of an amicable settlement. It ordered the parties to prepare a complete list of the properties belonging to
the decedent, with a segregation of the properties belonging to each marriage. Orders of the same tenor were
issued by the lower court on July 8 and October 28, 1961.
On November 11, 1961 the oppositors, Roberta Sebial, Juliano Sebial and the heirs of Balbina Sebial, submitted
their own inventory of the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia Manikis, consisting of two parcels of land
acquired in 1912 and 1915. They alleged that the conjugal estate of Gelacio Sebial and Dolores Enad consisted of
only one parcel of land, containing an area of seven hectares, allegedly purchased with money coming from the
conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia Manikis. They further alleged that the said seven- hectare land was
sold by the children of the second marriage to Eduardo Cortado (Tax Declaration No. 2591).
1wph1.t

The oppositors claimed that the aforementioned two parcels of land acquired during the first marriage were
partitioned in 1945 among (1) Roberta Sebial, (2) Juliano Sebial, (3) Francisco Sebial as the representative of the
estate of Balbina Sebial and (4) Valentina Sebial as the representative of the six children of the second marriage,
some of whom were minors. They clarified that under that partition the three children of the first marriage received a
three-fourths share while the six children of second marriage received a one-fourth share (Tax Declaration No.
06500). They also alleged that Eduardo Cortado, Emilio Sialongo, Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo were the
third persons involved in the transfer of the lands pertaining to the estate of Gelacio Sebial (Tax Declarations Nos.
04493, 06571 and 04471). To the inventory submitted by the oppositors, the administratrix filed an opposition dated
November 18, 1961.
In an order dated November 11, 1961 the lower court inexplicably required the administratrix to submit another
inventory. In compliance with that order she submitted an inventory dated November 17, 1961, wherein she
reproduced her inventory dated April 17, 1961 and added two other items, namely, two houses allegedly valued at
P8,000 and the fruits of the properties amounting to P5,000 allegedly received by the children of the first marriage.
The oppositor interposed an opposition to the said inventory.
On November 24, 1961 the oppositors filed a "motion for revision of partition" which was based on their own
inventory dated November 7, 1961.
The lower court in its order of December 11, 1961 approved the second inventory dated November, 7, 1961
because there was allegedly a "prima facie evidence to show that" the seven parcels of land and two houses listed
therein belonged to the decedent's estate. In another order also dated December 11, 1961 the lower court granted

the motion of the administratrix dated May 4, 1961 for the delivery to her of certain parcels of land and it directed
that the heirs of Gelacio Sebial, who are in possession of the parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations Nos.
04493, 04491, 04490 and 04478, should deliver those properties to the administratrix and should not disturb her in
her possession and administration of the same. The lower court denied the oppositors' motion dated November 20,
1961 for "revision of partition".
On December 29, 1961 Roberta Sebial moved for the reconsideration of the two orders on the grounds (1) that the
court had no jurisdiction to approve an inventory filed beyond the three-month period fixed in section 1, Rule 84 of
the Rules of Court; (2) that the said inventory is not supported by any documentary evidence because there is no
tax declaration at all in Gelacio Sebial's name; (3) that the two houses mentioned in the inventory were nonexistent
because they were demolished by the Japanese soldiers in 1943 and the materials thereof were appropriated by the
administratrix and her brothers and sisters; (4) that the valuation of P17,000 indicated in the inventory was fake,
fictitious and fantastic since the total value of the seven parcels of land amounted only to P3,080; (5) that Gelacio
Sebial's estate should be settled summarily because of its small value as provided in section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court and (6) that an ordinary action is necessary to recover the lands in the possession of third persons.
The oppositors without awaiting the resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed a notice of appeal from the
two orders both dated December 11, 1961. The notice of appeal was filed "without prejudice to the motion for
reconsideration". Benjamina Sebial opposed the motion for reconsideration. The lower court in its order of January
18, 1962 denied oppositors' motion for reconsideration. It approved Roberta Sebial's amended record on appeal.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals in its resolution of July 31, 1964 in CA-G.R. No. 31978.-R certified the case to this Court
because in its opinion the appeal involves only the legal issues of (1) the construction to be given to section 2, Rule
74 and section 1, Rule 84 (now Rule 83) of the Rules of Court and (2) whether an ordinary civil action for recovery of
property and not an administration proceeding is the proper remedy, considering oppositors' allegation that the
estate of Gelacio Sebial was partitioned in 1945 and that some of his heirs had already sold their respective shares
(Per Angeles, Gatmaitan and Concepcion Jr., JJ.)
The Clerk of Court of the lower court in his letter of January 15, 1963, transmitting the amended record on appeal,
said "there was no presentation of evidence by either parties concerning the two orders appealed from".
This case involves the conflicting claims of some humble folks from a remote rural area in Cebu regarding some
unregistered farm lands. Because of her poverty Roberta Sebial wanted to appeal in forma pauperis. Her husband
Lazaro Recuelo and her nephew, Candelario Carrillo, in order to justify the filing of a mimeographed brief, swore
that their families subsisted on root crops because they could not afford to buy corn grit or rice.
Oppositors' contention in their motion for reconsideration (not in their brief) that the probate court had no jurisdiction
to approve the inventory dated November 17, 1961 because the administratrix filed it after three months from the
date of her appointment is not well-taken. The three-month period prescribed in section 1, Rule 83 (formerly Rule
84) of the Rules of Court is not mandatory. After the filing of a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
and the publication of the notice of hearing, the proper Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction over a decedent's
estate and retains that jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed. The fact that an inventory was filed after the threemonth period would not deprive the probate court of jurisdiction to approve it. However, an administrator's
unexplained delay in filing the inventory may be a ground for his removal (Sec. 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court).
The other contention of the oppositors that inasmuch as the value of the decedent's estate is less than five thousand
pesos and he had no debts, the estate could be settled summarily under section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court or
that an administration proceeding was not necessary (the limit of six thousand pesos was increased to ten thousand
pesos in section 2, Rule 74 effective on January 1, 1964) rests on a controversial basis. While in the verified petition
for the issuance of letters of administration, it was alleged that the gross value of the decedent's estate was "not
more than five thousand pesos", in the amended inventory the valuation was P17,000. Indeed, one of the lower
court's omissions was its failure to ascertain by preponderance of evidence the actual value of the estate, if there
was still an estate to be administered. The approval of the amended inventory was not such a determination.
Anyway, in the present posture of the proceeding, no useful purpose would be served by dismissing the petition
herein and ordering that a new petition for summary settlement be filed. Inasmuch as a regular administrator had
been appointed and a notice to creditors had been issued and no claims were filed, the probate court could still

proceed summarily and expeditiously to terminate the proceeding. With the cooperation of the lawyers of the parties,
it should strive to effect an amicable settlement of the case (See arts. 222 and 2029, Civil Code).
If the efforts to arrive at an amicable settlement prove fruitless, then the probate court should ascertain what assets
constituted the estate of Gelacio Sebial, what happened to those assets and whether the children of the second
marriage (the petitioner was a child of the second marriage and the principal oppositor was a child of first marriage)
could still have a share, howsoever small, in the decedent's estate.
The lower court's order of December 11, 1961, approving the amended inventory of November 11, 1961, is not a
conclusive determination of what assets constituted the decedent's estate and of the valuations thereof. Such a
determination is only provisional in character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action on the
issue of title or ownership (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., 448-449).
1wph1.t

The other order dated December 11, 1961 requires the delivery to the administratrix of (1) two parcels of land
covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 04491 and 04493 in the possession of the spouses Lazaro Recuelo and Roberta
Sebial, an oppositor-appellant; (2) the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 04490 in the possession of
Lorenzo Rematado and (3) the parcel of land described under Tax Declaration No. 04478 in the possession of
Demetrio Camillo (Canillo), a child of the deceased Balbina Sebial, one of the three children of the first marriage.
We hold that the said order is erroneous and should be set aside because the probate court failed to receive
evidence as to the ownership of the said parcels of land. The general rule is that questions of title to property cannot
be passed upon in a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is
optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title to property and, when so submitted, the
probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (3 Moran's Comment's on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp.
448, 473; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892).
Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo are not heirs of the decedent. They are third persons. The rule is that
matters affecting property under administration may be taken cognizance of by the probate court in the course of the
intestate proceedings provided that the interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil.
227; Ibid, 3 Moran 473).
However, third persons to whom the decedent's assets had been fraudulently conveyed may be cited to appear in
court and be examined under oath as to how they came into the possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule
87, Rules of Court) but a separate action would be necessary to recover the said assets (Chanco vs. Madrilejos, 12
Phil. 543; Guanco vs. Philippine National Bank, 54 Phil. 244).
The probate court should receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of
decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets. The issue of
prescription should also be considered (see p. 84, Record on Appeal). Generally prescription does not run in favor
of a coheir as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership (Art. 494, Civil Code). But from the
moment that a coheir claims absolute and exclusive ownership of the hereditary properties and denies the others
any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but that of ownership (Bargayo vs. Camumot,
40 Phil. 857).
1wph1.t

At the hearing of the petition for letters of administration some evidence was already introduced on the assets
constituting the estate of Gelacio Sebial. The petitioner testified and presented Exhibits A to J and X to Y-3. The
oppositor also testified and presented Exhibits 2 to 10-A. The stenographic notes for the said hearing should be
transcribed. In addition to that evidence. The probate court should require the parties to present further proofs on
the ownership of the seven parcels of land and the materials of the two houses enumerated in the amended
inventory of November 17, 1961, on the alleged partition effected in 1945 and on the allegations in oppositors'
inventory dated November 7, 1961.
After receiving evidence, the probate court should decide once and for all whether there are still any assets of the
estate that can be partitioned and, if so, to effect the requisite partition and distribution. If the estate has no more
assets and if a partition had really been made or the action to recover the lands transferred to third person had
prescribed, it should dismiss the intestate proceeding.

WHEREFORE, (a) the probate court's order of December 11, 1961, granting the administratrix's motion of May 4,
1961 for the delivery to her of certain properties is set aside; (b) its other order of December 11, 1961 approving the
amended inventory should not be considered as a final adjudication on the ownership of the properties listed in the
inventory and (c) this case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines
laid down in this decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

[Digests] UNREPORTED CASES

Vda. de Paz vs. Vda. de Madrigal 100 Phil 1085 (1956)
Facts:
This is an appeal from the order of the CFI dismissing Vda. de Paz's action to recover possession and ownership of 7
parcels of land in Camarines Sur, 1 parcel in Marinduque and 1 parcel in Manila.
Held: The appeal is granted. Amend the complaint to include the executrix of the estate as defendant.

G.R. No. L-19265

May 29, 1964

MOISES SAN DIEGO, SR., petitioner,

vs.
ADELO NOMBRE and PEDRO ESCANLAR, respondents.
A. R. Castaeda and M. S. Roxas for petitioner.
Amado B. Parreo Law Office for respondents.
PAREDES, J.:
The case at bar had its origin in Special Proceedings No. 7279 of the CFI of Negros Occidental wherein respondent
Adelo Nombre was the duly constituted judicial administrator. On May 1, 1960, Nombre, in his capacity was judicial
administrator of the intestate estate subject of the Sp. Proc. stated above, leased one of the properties of the estate
(a fishpond identified as Lot No. 1617 of the cadastral survey of Kabankaban, Negros Occidental), to Pedro
Escanlar, the other respondent. The terms of the lease was for three (3) years, with a yearly rental of P3,000.00 to
expire on May 1, 1963, the transaction having been done, admittedly, without previous authority or approval of the
Court where the proceedings was pending. On January 17, 1961, Nombre was removed as administrator by Order
of the court and one Sofronio Campillanos was appointed in his stead. The appeal on the Order of Nombre's
removal is supposedly pending with the Court of Appeals. Respondent Escanlar was cited for contempt, allegedly
for his refusal to surrender the fishpond to the newly appointed administrator. On March 20, 1961, Campillanos filed
a motion asking for authority to execute a lease contract of the same fishpond, in favor of petitioner herein, Moises
San Diego, Sr., for 5 years from 1961, at a yearly rental of P5,000.00. Escanlar was not notified of such motion.
Nombre, the deposed administrator, presented a written opposition to the motion of Campillanos on April 11, 1964,
pointing out that the fishpond had been leased by him to Escanlar for 3 years, the period of which was going to
expire on May 1, 1963. In a supplemental opposition, he also invited the attention of the Court that to grant the
motion of the new administrator would in effect nullify the contract in favor of Escanlar, a person on whom the Court
had no jurisdiction. He also intimated that the validity of the lease contract entered into by a judicial administrator,
must be recognized unless so declared void in a separate action. The opposition notwithstanding, the Court on April
8, 1961, in effect declared that the contract in favor of Escanlar was null and void, for want of judicial authority and
that unless he would offer the same as or better conditions than the prospective lessee, San Diego, there was no
good reason why the motion for authority to lease the property to San Diego should not be granted. Nombre moved
to reconsider the Order of April 8, stating that Escanlar was willing to increase the rental of P5,000.00, but only after
the termination of his original contract. The motion for reconsideration was denied on April 24, 1961, the trial judge
stating that the contract in favor of Escanlar was executed in bad faith and was fraudulent because of the

imminence of Nombre's removal as administrator, one of the causes of which was his indiscriminate pleasant, of the
property with inadequate rentals.
From this Order, a petition for Certiorari asking for the annulment of the Orders of April 8 and 24, 1961 was
presented by Nombre and Escanlar with the Court of Appeals. A Writ of preliminary injunction was likewise prayed
for to restrain the new administrator Campillanos from possessing the fishpond and from executing a new lease
contract covering it; requiring him to return the possession thereof to Escanlar, plus damages and attorney's fees in
the amount of P10,000.00 and costs. The Court of Appeals issued the injunctive writ and required respondents
therein to Answer. Campillanos insisted on the invalidity of the contract in favor of Escanlar; the lower court alleged
that it did not exactly annul or invalidate the lease in his questioned orders but suggested merely that Escanlar "may
file a separate ordinary action in the Court of general jurisdiction."
The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the petition for certiorari, among others said
The controlling issue in this case is the legality of the contract of lease entered into by the former
administrator Nombre, and Pedro Escanlar on May 1, 1960.
Respondents contend that this contract, not having been authorized or approved by the Court, is null and
void and cannot be an obstacle to the execution of another of lease by the new administrator, Campillanos.
This contention is without merit. ... . It has been held that even in the absence of such special powers, a
contract or lease for more than 6 years is not entirely invalid; it is invalid only in so far as it exceeds the sixyear limit (Enrique v. Watson Company, et al., 6 Phil. 84). 1
No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant a lease of property placed under his
custody is provided for in the present law. Under Article 1647 of the present Civil Code, it is only when the
lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot be instituted without special authority. Thus,
regardless of the period of lease, there is no need of special authority unless the contract is to be recorded
in the Registry of Property. As to whether the contract in favor of Escanlar is to be so recorded is not
material to our inquiry.
1w ph1.t

On the contrary, Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court authorizes a judicial administrator, among other
things, to administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by will. Commenting on this Section in the
light of several Supreme Court decisions (Jocson de Hilado v. Nava, 69 Phil. 1; Gamboa v. Gamboa, 68
Phil. 304; Ferraris v. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732; Rodriguez v. Borromeo, 43 Phil. 479), Moran says: "Under this
provision, the executor or administrator has the power of administering the estate of the deceased for
purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all acts of administration without special
authority of the Court. For instance, he may lease the property without securing previously any permission
from the court. And where the lease has formally been entered into, the court cannot, in the same
proceeding, annul the same, to the prejudice of the lessee, over whose person it had no jurisdiction. The
proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator or the heirs to annul the lease. ... .
On September 13, 1961, petitioner herein Moises San Diego, Sr., who was not a party in the case, intervened and
moved for a reconsideration of the above judgment. The original parties (the new administrator and respondent
judge) also filed Motions for reconsideration, but we do not find them in the record. On November 18, 1961, the
Court of Appeals denied the motions for reconsideration. With the denial of the said motions, only San Diego,
appealed therefrom, raising legal questions, which center on "Whether a judicial administrator can validly lease
property of the estate without prior judicial authority and approval", and "whether the provisions of the New Civil
Code on Agency should apply to judicial administrators."
The Rules of Court provide that
An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession of the real as well as the personal estate
of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration,
and shall administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by his will. (Sec. 3, Rule 85, old Rules).
Lease has been considered an act of administration (Jocson v. Nava; Gamboa v. Gamboa; Rodriguez v. Borromeo;
Ferraris v. Rodas, supra).

The Civil Code, on lease, provides:

If a lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property, the following persons cannot constitute the same
without proper authority, the husband with respect to the wife's paraphernal real estate, the father or
guardian as to the property of the minor or ward, and the manager without special power. (Art. 1647).
The same Code, on Agency, states:
Special powers of attorneys are necessary in the following cases:
(8) To lease any real property to another person for more than one year. (Art. 1878)
Petitioner contends, that No. 8, Art. 1878 is the limitation to the right of a judicial administrator to lease real property
without prior court authority and approval, if it exceeds one year. The lease contract in favor of Escanlar being for 3
years and without such court approval and authority is, therefore, null and void. Upon the other hand, respondents
maintain that there is no limitation of such right; and that Article 1878 does not apply in the instant case.
We believe that the Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the validity of the contract of lease in favor of
Escanlar, notwithstanding the lack of prior authority and approval. The law and prevailing jurisprudence on the
matter militates in favor of this view. While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent
(petitioner alleges that both act in representative capacity), are in some respects, identical, the provisions on agency
(Art. 1878, C.C.), should not apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is
not only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate (Chua Tan v. Del Rosario, 57
Phil. 411). A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is required to file a bond. These circumstances are
not true in case of agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The protection which the law gives the
principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be
thru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of
the appointing court. The observation of former Chief Justice Moran, as quoted in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, is indeed sound, and We are not prone to alter the same, at the moment.
We, likewise, seriously doubt petitioner's legal standing to pursue this appeal. And, if We consider the fact that after
the expiration of the original period of the lease contract executed by respondent Nombre in favor of Escanlar, a
new contract in favor of said Escanlar, was executed on May 1, 1963, by the new administrator Campillanos. who,
incidentally, did not take any active participation in the present appeal, the right of petitioner to the fishpond
becomes a moot and academic issue, which We need not pass upon.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against
petitioner Moises San Diego, Sr.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Labrador and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1

Referring to Art. 1548 of the old Civil Code.

G.R. No. L-9271

March 29, 1957

In the matter of the testate estate of the late DA. MARGARITA DAVID. CARLOS MORAN SISON, Judicial
Administrator, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
NARCISA F. TEODORO, heiress, oppositor-appellee.
Teodoro R. Dominguez for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On December 20, 1948, the Court of First Instance of Manila, which has jurisdiction over the estate of the late
Margarita David, issued an order appointing Carlos Moran Sison as judicial administrator, without compensation,
after filing a bond in the amount of P5,000. The next day, Carlos Moran Sison took his oath of office and put up the
requisite bond which was duly approved by the court. On the same day, letters of administration were issued to him.
On January 19, 1955, the judicial administrator filed an accounting of his administration which contains, among
others, the following disbursement items:
13. Paid to Visayan Surety & Insurance
Corporation on August 6, 1954, as renewal
premiums on the Administrator's bond of Judicial
Administrator Carlos Moran Sison covering the
period from December 20, 1949 to December 20,
1954, inclusive .................................
P380.70
15. Paid to Visayan Surety & Insurance
Corporation on December 21, 1954, for
premiums due on the Administrator's bond of
judicial Administrator Carlos Moran Sison for the
period from December 21, 1954 to December 21,
1955 ...............................................................

76.14

Narcisa F. Teodoro, one of the heirs, objected to the approval of the above- quoted items on the grounds that they
are not necessary expenses of administration and should not be charged against the estate. On February 25, 1955,
the court approved the report of the administrator but disallowed the items objected to on the ground that they
cannot be considered as expenses of administration. The administrator filed a motion for reconsideration and when
the same was denied, he took the present appeal.
The only issue to be determined is "whether a judicial administrator, serving without compensation, is entitled to
charge as an expense of administration the premiums paid on his bond."
The lower court did not consider the premiums paid on the bond filed by the administrator as an expense of
administration taking into account undoubtedly the ruling laid down in the case of Sulit vs. Santos, 56 Phil., 626.
That is a case which also involves the payment of certain premium on the bond put up by the judicial administrator
and when he asked the court that the same be considered as an expense of administration, it was disapproved for
the same reasons advanced by the trial court. In sustaining this finding, this Court ruled that the "expense incurred
by an executor or administrator to produce a bond is not a proper charge against the estate. Section 680 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (similar to section 7, Rule 86) does not authorize the executor or administrator to charge
against the estate the money spent for the presentation, filing, and substitution of a bond." And elaborating on this
matter, the Court made the following comment:
The aforementioned cases, in reality, seem superfluous in ascertaining the true principle. The position of an
executor or administrator is one of trust. In fact, the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure so mentions it. It is
proper for the law to safeguard the estate of deceased persons by requiring the executor or administrator to
give a suitable bond. The ability to give this bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office. The
execution and approval of the bond constitute a condition precedent to acceptance of the responsibilities of
the trust. If an individual does not desire to assume the position of executor of administrator, he may refuse
to do so. On the other hand, when the individual prefers an adequate bond and has it approved by the
probate court, he thereby admits the adequacy of the compensation which is permitted him pursuant to law.
It would be a very far-fetched construction to deduce the giving of a bond in order to qualify for the office of
executor or administrator is a necessary expense in the care, management, and settlement of the estate
within the meaning of section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for these are expenses incurred after the
executor of administrator has met the requirements of the law and has entered upon the performance of his
duties. (See In re Eby's Estate [1894], 30 Atl., 124.)
We feel that the orders of Judge Mapa in this case rested on a fine sense of official duty, sometimes lacking
in cases of this character, to protect the residue of the estate of a deceased person from unjustifiable
inroads by an executor, and that as these orders conform to the facts and the law, they are entitled to be

fortified by an explicit pronouncement from this court. We rule that the expense incurred by an execution or
administrator to procure a bond is not a proper charge against the estate, and that section 680 of the Code
of Civil Procedure does not authorize the executor or administrator to charge against the estate the money
spent for the presentation, filing, and substitution of a bond.
It is true that the Sulit case may be differentiated from the present in the sense that, in the former the administrator
accepted the trust with the emolument that the law allows, whereas in the latter the administrator accepted the same
without compensation, but this difference is of no moment, for there is nothing in the decision that may justify the
conclusion that the allowance or disallowance of premiums paid on the bond of the administrator is made dependent
on the receipt of compensation. On the contrary, a different conclusion may be inferred considering the ratio
decidendi on which the ruling is predicated. Thus, it was there stated that the position of an executor or
administrator is one of trust: that it is proper for the law to safeguard the estates of deceased persons by requiring
the administrator to give a suitable bond, and that the ability to give this bond is in the nature of a qualification for the
office. It is also intimated therein that "If an individual does not desire to assume the position of executor or
administrator, he may refuse to do so," and it is far-fetched to conclude that the giving of a bond by an administrator
is an necessary expense in the care, management and settlement of the estate within the meaning of the law,
because these expenses are incurred "after the executor or administrator has met the requirement of the law and
has entered upon the performance of his duties." Of course, a person may accept the position of executor or
administrator with all the incident appertaining thereto having in mind the compensation which the law allows for the
purpose, but he may waive this compensation in the same manner as he may refuse to serve without it. Appellant
having waived compensation, he cannot now be heard to complain of the expenses incident to his qualification.
The orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, without costs.
Paras. C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.