RTJ-07-2050
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2563-RTJ)
OLIVEROS,
Complainants,
Present:
- versus -
HONORABLE DIONISIO C.
SISON, Acting Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 74,
Antipolo City,
Respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 27, 2007
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
A few days later, the defendants filed a motion for the issuance of a TRO
and/or preliminary injunction against complainants, to prevent the latter from
occupying or entering the property. The motion was granted.[4]
Complainants then filed a motion for reconsideration. While waiting for the
ruling on their motion for reconsideration, complainants filed an ex-parte motion
for the judges voluntary inhibition,[5] as they were convinced that Judge Sison was
partial to the defendants. Complainants also allege that on October 3, 2006, while
they were securing certified copies of documents in their case, they saw Fulgencio
Oliveros, brother of defendant Susana Mallett, come out of Judge Sisons private
chambers.
On the same day, respondent Judge issued an Order[6] denying the motion
for reconsideration and the motion for voluntary inhibition.
Complainants then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
on October 18, 2006. On the same day, defendants paid the P100,000.00 injunction
bond. Judge Sison approved the bond and ordered the issuance of the writ of
injunction on October 23, 2006.[7]
Two days later, on November 15, 2006, the Oliveros spouses filed the
verified complaint under consideration. They argue that respondent Judge
manifested bias and partiality in granting defendants prayer for TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction. They also assert that they should not have been cited for
indirect contempt because defendants should have filed a separate petition for
indirect contempt and paid the docket fees thereon. The respondent Judge should
not have entertained the motion and set the same for hearing.
for Certiorari questioning the assailed order is now pending before the Court of
Appeals.[16]
Thus, the OCA recommended that (a) the instant case be REDOCKETED as
a regular administrative matter; and (b) respondent Judge be FINED in the amount
ofP10,000.00.[18]
We agree with the OCA.
Since complainants have already brought the matter of Judge Sisons Order
granting defendants prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction to the CA on a
petition forcertiorari, we cannot as yet rule on the propriety of such Order. Any
inquiry into the judges administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be
made only after other available remedies have been settled.[19]
As to the Order citing complainants for indirect contempt, while we are
disposed to accept Judge Sisons good faith in issuing the same, we have already
held in the past that good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment and does not apply where the
issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be
issued. The undue haste in disposing of this procedurally infirm motion deprived
complainants of one of mans most fundamental rights, the right to be heard.
These circumstances amply overcome the presumption of good faith that
Judge Sison enjoys in his favor.
Under the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law or procedure
constitutes a serious charge.[22] However, we find the OCAs recommendation of
a P10,000.00 fine appropriate.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we find respondent Judge
Dionisio C. Sison GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and impose on him
a FINE of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
[1]
[2]
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 15-18.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 26-29.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31-33.
Id. at 34-35.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
Id. at 1-5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Caguioa v. Lavia, 398 Phil. 845, 854 (2000).
Poso v. Mijares, 436 Phil. 295, 314 (2002).
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
[21]
Espaol v. Mupas, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1358, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 14, 44, citing Ricafort v.
Judge Gonzales, 437 SCRA 549 (2004). See also DBP v. Judge Llanes, Jr., 334 Phil. 186, 196 (1997).
[22]
Rules of Court, Rule 140, Section 8(9).
THIRD DIVISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
only in April 2005, in addition to his tasks as judge designate of Branch 63, La
Carlota City.
The Court, in its Resolution in A.M. OCA IPI No. 01-1167-P dated September
13, 2006 resolved, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the complaint against Homero L. Robles, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch
69, Silay City is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Judge Reynaldo M. Alon, is DIRECTED to show cause within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for Gross Misconduct and
Gross Negligence. Let the case against Judge Alon be given a regular administrative
docket number and raffled for assignment.[1]
In his Compliance dated October 11, 2006, respondent avers: He had been
in the service for 31 years. The delay in the disposition of the administrative case
was not done on purpose but by reason of the delay on the part of the
complaining party who requested that the same be held in abeyance until such
time as the affidavit of retraction shall have been available. He admits that he
failed to submit a partial report to the Honorable Court about the status of the
case. Upon discovery of the fact that the original record of the administrative
case was misplaced, he went out of his way and took pains to locate the same and
even reconstituted the documents just to comply with the requirement of the
Honorable Court. The RTC of Silay has two branches, Branch 40 and Branch 69,
and one Administrative Office of the Clerk of Court with only three rooms
inclusive of the court rooms and staff room. The court personnel from the two
branches and the staff of the OCC commonly occupy the room where court
records are usually filed. There is therefore the possibility that said rollo might
have been misplaced unintentionally. Having in mind his duty to swiftly dispose
cases referred to him, he immediately prepared his report and proper
documentations after the affidavit of retraction was executed. The delay in the
submission of the original records was not intentional on his part. It was a result
of some facts not attributable to him, not only by reason of the loss of the original
records, but more importantly, the delay of the parties to the case who failed to
submit their persons for investigation until such time as the affidavit of retraction
shall have been filed. He could not possibly ignore all directives of this Honorable
Court. He had religiously complied with all orders and directives of this
Honorable Court to the best of his ability and in utter respect of the Rules of
Law. Not even for a single time did he neglect his duty as a judge.
We find respondents explanation unacceptable.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct, provides that a judge shall
dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.
Time and again, this Court has emphasized that any delay in the rendition of
judgments diminishes our peoples faith in the judiciary. If, for some valid reason,
a judge cannot comply with the required deadline, he should seek an extension to
avoid administrative sanctions.[2] In this case, respondent admitted his failure to
submit a partial report on the status of the case. Moreover, he failed to ask for
any extension within which to submit his investigation, report and
recommendation. Records show that the administrative case was forwarded to
respondent on July 1, 2002 with specific instruction to submit his investigation,
report, and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the same. However,
respondent submitted his investigation, report and recommendation only on May
13, 2005 or almost three years after the same had been assigned to him and after
the OCA required him to submit a status report on April 12, 2005.
Judges are charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of
the cases and official documents in their custody are intact. They must adopt a
system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business.[8] There is no justification for missing
records, save fortuitous events.[9] The loss of records in his office indicates gross
negligence on his part.[10]
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
[1]
Rollo, p. 5.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1737, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 1,
[2]
3.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
Go v. Achas, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1564, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 189, 196.
Id.
366 Phil. 485 (1999).
344 Phil. 677 (1997).
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Id. at 683.
Jacinto v. Layosa, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1743, July 11, 2006, 494 SCRA 456, 465.
Id..
Tolentino v. Cabral, 385 Phil. 631, 648 (2000).
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.09.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Carriedo, A.M. No. P-04-1921, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 443,
446; Legaspi, Jr. v. Montero III, A.M. No. P-05-1986, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 137, 143.
P.D. No. 828, Creating the Office of the Court Administrator in the Supreme Court and Providing
Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes, November 18, 1975.
Dela Cruz v. Vallarta, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1531, March 6, 2007.
467 Phil. 391, 403 (2004).
A.M. No. 03-1515-MTJ, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 79, 86.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, Sec. 11(b).
FIRST DIVISION
ATTY. REX G. RICO,
Complainant,
Present:
-versus-
Promulgated:
June 25, 2007
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This case involves a Complaint dated January 6, 2003, filed by Atty. Rex G.
Rico charging respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon, Acting Presiding Judge, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Bacolod City with gross ignorance of the law,
incompetence and violations of the Code of the Judicial Conduct, particularly
Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02; Canon 2, Rule 2.01; and Canon 3, Rules 3.01 and
3.02.
The complainant alleged that:
1.
He was the counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 32482 entitled
Dos Amigos Branch IV, Teodoro Ko and Carmelina B. Suplido vs.
Rachel J. Akol pending before RTC, Branch 155, Pasig City. In the
decision dated April 26, 1983, the Pasig court decided in favor of the
plaintiffs. Defendant Rachel Akol appealed the case but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision. Some of the properties in the name of
Claudio Akol as spouse of Rachel Akol which were located in Bacolod
City where thereafter levied in execution by the Bacolod City Sheriff who
annotated a Notice of Embargo dated May 16, 1989 on the TCTs;
2.
On June 7, 2000, as counsel for the plaintiffs, he filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution with RTC, Branch 155, Pasig City. The
motion was granted and the Branch Sheriff of Bacolod City was directed
to implement the writ of execution on the properties of defendant Akol
in Bacolod City;
3.
4.
On the other hand, the RTC, Branch 155, Pasig City issued an Order
dated November 29, 2000 holding in abeyance the enforcement of the writ
of execution. It was only on January 2, 2001 that the said court directed
the implementation of the writ;
5.
Subsequently, Judge Rufon issued another Order dated March 21, 2001
directing the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to comply with his
October 27, 2000 Order by canceling the Notice of Embargo on the
TCTs. On April 25, 2001, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch
51, Bacolod City issued a Certification that the court Order dated March
21, 2001 had become the final and executory.
Complainant claimed that Judge Rufon exhibited gross ignorance of the law
and incompetence when he (1) violated the principle of judicial stability of taking
cognizance of the Petition for Cancellation of Notice of Embargo on Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-469321, Y-19969 and T-19968; (2) failed to
notify plaintiffs Dos Amigos Branch IV, Teodoro Ko and Carmelina Suplido on
the October 27, 2000 hearing on the petition for Cancellation of Notice of
Embargo; and (3) issued an Order dated October 27, 2000 in the nature of a
judgment without adequate legal and factual basis.
On the first issue of violation of the principle of judicial stability, the
following positions were taken by the parties:
1.
Complainant stated that the RTC, Branch 155, Pasig City issued the writ
of execution pursuant to which the Bacolod City Sheriff annotated a
Notice of Embargo on the titles of the conjugal properties of Claudio and
Rachel Akol. Accordingly, any challenge on the effectivity, enforceability
or legal effects of the writ of execution upon the rights and interests of the
parties involved should be addressed exclusively to the court which issued
it. The complainant cited Pajarito v. Seeris, et al. (87 SCRA 275,
283[1978] ) which held that, There is no question that the court which
rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process
of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every
question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution;
2.
Judge Rufon, however, claimed that his court has special and limited
jurisdiction as a cadastral court to take cognizance of the petition pursuant
to Section 112 of Act 496 (the Land Registration Act) now found in Sec.
108 of P.D. No. 1529 (the Property Registration Decree). He cited the last
paragraph of Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 which expressly provides that,
all petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other
provision of this Decree after original registration, shall be filed and
entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was
entered. Moreover, Judge Rufon claimed that he relied in good faith on
the verification and certification on non-forum shopping in taking
cognizance of the case;
3.
On the second issue of failure to notify the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
32482, the following contentions were put forward:
1.
2.
3.
Complainant would refute this by stating that since the petition for the
cancellation challenges the notice of embargo issued in Civil Case No.
32482, this would nullify the rights of the adverse party, namely Dos
Amigos IV, Teodoro Ko and Carmelina Suplido. Clearly, the Petition for
Cancellation of Notice of Embargo is an action in personam, not directed
against the whole world, but only against the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
32482, although it concerns the right to a tangible thing (res).
Complainant alleged that the records of the petition show that respondent
judge did not require reception of evidence to prove that prescription had
set in, which is a question of fact. Judge Rufons Order dated October 27,
2000 granting the petition grounded on the alleged prescription does not
state the facts and the law upon which it is based. A perusal of the Order
shows that it is not interlocutory but one in the nature of a judgment hence
it is required by the Constitution and the Rules of the Court to state the
facts and the law upon which it is based.
2.
Judge Rufon argued that considering that the time that has lapsed from
the annotation of the Notice of Embargo on May 16, 1989 until the filing
of the petition on September 11, 2000was more than ten (10) years, the
Notice of Embargo has become stale, void, and ineffective by sheer lapse
of time or by prescription. As such, cancellation of the entry of the Notice
of Embargo was in order, pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.
On July 18, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required
respondent judge to manifest in writing whether he is willing to submit this case
for resolution on the basis of the evidence at hand. In response, respondent
manifested in a letter dated July 30, 2003 that he is submitting the case for
resolution.
After considering the Report of the OCA, the Court finds that the allegations
of gross ignorance of the law are substantiated by the evidence. As shown on the
face of TCT Nos. T-469321, T-19968 and Y-19969, the titles were issued in the
name of Claudio G. Akol, Jr., married to Rachel J. Akol. Furthermore, at the back
of the titles, Entry No. 159694 states that there is a Notice of Embargo in Civil
Case No. 32482 issued by the Ex-Officio City Sheriff, entitled Dos Amigos, et al.
vs. Rachel J. Akol. The inscription is dated May 16, 1989.
Respondent judge should have caused actual service of notice to the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 32482. The petition for the cancellation of notice of
embargo is not cadastral in nature but is an action to quiet title and/or remove
cloud therefrom, under Articles 476, 478 and 481 of the Civil Code. The petition
challenged the notice of embargo issued in Civil Case No. 32482 and prayed that
the annotations on the TCTs be cancelled. This would nullify the rights of the
adverse parties, specially the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 32482. Clearly, the
petition for the cancellation of the notice of embargo is an action in personam. It is
not directed against the whole world but only against the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 32482 although it concerns their right to a specific property.
In Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.,[1] this Court clarified the
concepts of a real action, a personal action, a proceeding in rem and a
proceeding in personam, thus:
A real action is not the same as an action in rem and a personal action is
not the same as an action in personam.
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property,
the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of the damages. In a real action, the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section 2 (a) of
Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery
of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on, real property.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his
personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself,
instead of against the person (1 C.J.S. 943-4). Hence, a real action may at the
same time be an action in personam and not necessarily an action in rem.[2]
Clearly, this Order not merely interlocutory but is in the nature of a final
judgment or decision. As such, it does not comply with the requirement under the
Constitution to state the facts and the law upon which it is based.[3] It also
confirms that respondent judge did not require evidence to show that prescription
had set in.
Respondent judges lack of familiarity with the rules undermines public
confidence in the competence of the court. His failure to follow basic legal
commands embodied in the law and the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law
for which he should be subjected to disciplinary action.[4]
Although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for
every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license
to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory
prerogatives.[5]
In Villa Macasasa, et al. v. Judge Faustino H. Imbing,[6] this Court found the
respondent judge guilty of ignorance of the law and ordered him to pay a fine of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for issuing an Order which gratuitously included
the astronomical amount of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,200,000) as incidental expenses.
Similarly, in Evelyn De Austria v. Judge Orlando D. Beltran,[7] the
respondent judge was fined Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for gross ignorance of
the law in failing to comply with Sec. 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which requires submission of a certificate of cash deposit and a written
undertaking before an accused may be released on a cash bail.
Also, in German Agunday v. Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles,[8] this Court imposed
a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) on the respondent judge after finding that
he had shown gross ignorance of the law when he failed to deny outrightly a
Motion to Quash despite the fact that it is a prohibited pleading under the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.
Considering the foregoing and the fact that this is respondent judge Rufons
first infraction in his six (6) years of service in the Judiciary, the Court deems the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as a reasonable fine.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon, Acting Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Bacolod City, is hereby FOUND
GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000), with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same
will be dealt with more severely.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chairperson
Chief Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
SECOND DIVISION
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA,
Complainant,
Present:
- versus -
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
June 25, 2007
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule
19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand
letter the contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal
cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.
BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and
claim bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of millions under
established precedence of cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges
like:
1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not reported to the
government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws.
These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts
as settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[1]
Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical
standards, complainant filed an administrative complaint [2] with the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondent filed
an Answer with Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaims)[3] claiming that
Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainants legal counsel, also played an important
part in imputing the malicious, defamatory, and fabricated charges against him.
Respondent also pointed out that the complaint had no certification against forum
shopping and was motivated only to confuse the issues then pending before the
Labor Arbiter. By way of counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the
disbarment of Atty. Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the
prosecution of Atty. Jocson for Usurpation of Public Functions[4] and for violation
of the Notarial Law.[5]
A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent
failed to appear.[6] Both parties were thereafter required to submit their position
papers.
The Report and Recommendation[7] of Investigating Commissioner Milagros
V. San Juan found that complainant, failed to file his position paper and to comply
with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring a certificate against forum
shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[8] On 10 July
2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court the
notice of said Resolution and the records of the case.[9] Thereafter, on 18 August
2006, respondent filed with the IBP a Motion for Reconsideration (for
Modification of Decision)[10] reiterating his claim of damages against complainant
in the amount of four hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in
dollars, for filing the false, malicious, defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal
fabricators [sic], malevolent[,] oppressive, evasive filing [of] a groundless and
false suit.[11]
Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline)[12] alleging that he personally submitted
and filed with the IBP his position paper, after serving a copy thereof on
respondent by registered mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his right
to due process when the IBP dismissed his complaint without considering his
position paper and without ruling on the merits thereof.
Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26
May 2006 Resolution[13] of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the case
to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for proper adjudication and disposition
on the merits.
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[15] Said rule states that a violation thereof would
constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both
petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel
of the party concerned.[16]
The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took
against complainant his failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to
his complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however,
disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case to
the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.
The Courts determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of
disbarment proceedings, the reasons for the certification against forum shopping
requirement, complainants subsequent compliance with the requirement, and the
merit of complainants complaint against respondent.
The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,[17] dwelt on the sui generis character
of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, thus:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.[18] [Emphasis supplied]
complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely
proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged
communication rule under which a private communication executed in the
performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter
was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and extort from
the latter compliance with the demands of his client.
However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we
hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent,
considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his clients
interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May
2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found liable for violation of
Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE
TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
O.
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
[1]
[2]
Id. at 1-5.
[3]
Id. at 21-27.
[4]
Respondent claims that Atty. Jocson signed the administrative complaint against him without indicating
his Roll of Attorney Number.
[5]
Respondent claims
his notarial commission.
that
Atty.
Jocson
notarized
[6]
Rollo, p. 49.
[7]
Id. at 103-105.
[8]
[9]
Id. at 101-105.
[10]
Id. at 170-177.
[11]
Id. at 175.
[12]
Id. at 106-115.
[13]
Id. at 102.
the
complaint
despite
the
expiration of
[14]
Id. at 76-88.
[15]
[16]
Land Car, Inc. v. Devt Bachelor Express, Inc., 462 Phil. 796, 801 (2003), citing Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, April 1, 1994; Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA
614; Prubankers Association v. Prudential Bank & Trust Company, 302 SCRA 74.
[17]
[18]
Id. at 600-601.
[19]
Wee v. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, 11 August 2004, 436 SCRA 96, 108-109, citing Zebra Security Agency
v. NLRC, Phil. 200, 209.
[20]
[21]
Id., citing Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 605, 616.
[22]
[23]
Supra note 19, at 110, citing Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, G.R. No. 143016, 30 August 2000, 339 SCRA 306,
309 citing Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112547, 18 July 1994, 234 SCRA 192, 198.
[24]
See E.L. PINEDA, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1995 Ed.), p. 210, citing Maglasang v. People,
190 SCRA 306.
[25]
Id. at 213.
[26]
See AM. JUR. 2d, Vol. 5, citing Hess v. Sparks, 24 P. 979, 980, 44 Kan. 465, 21 Am.St.Rep. 300.
[27]
[28]
Id. at 674-675.
[29]
Rollo, p. 132.
EN BANC
NELSON P. VALDEZ,
Complainant,
Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus -
Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario,
Garcia,
Velasco, Jr., and
Nachura, JJ.
ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON
M. DABON,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
June 22, 2007
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On June 8, 2006, Process Server Fernando Sia made a report that he failed
to serve a copy of the Order upon the respondent because the housemaid at
Thus, in an Amended Order dated June 16, 2006, the Investigating Justice
cancelled the scheduled preliminary conference and directed the respondent to
submit his Answer within 15 days from notice, otherwise, the case shall be
deemed submitted for resolution. A copy of the Amended Order was sent by
courier service to respondents address in the United States.
In his report, Process Server Sia narrated that on November 30, 2006, he
went to Pampanga but was informed by the guards at Greenfields Subdivision
that Atty. Dabon is no longer residing thereat. He then went to Pandacan but the
housemaid refused to receive the notices. She also informed him that
respondent is still in the United States.
Thus, in an Order dated January 12, 2007, the Investigating Justice directed
Sia to re-serve the envelope addressed to Atty. Dabon at his two aforesaid
addresses and in case of refusal, to leave the same in the premises with a person
of sufficient age and discretion residing thereat.
That same day, Sia went to respondents Pandacan, Manila address and
noticed that the house was locked. So he left the envelope underneath the door
in the presence of a certain Pamela, who lives next door. On January 16, 2007, Sia
went to Greenfields Subdivision in San Fernando, Pampanga and left the envelope
with the guard on duty.
However, both envelopes were later returned to the Court of Appeals via
LBC. An examination of the envelopes revealed that both had been opened.
In his complaint, Nelson alleged that his wife, Sonia, admitted to him that
she engaged in an adulterous and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon since
November 2000. In March 2006, she decided to end the relationship but
respondent would not agree. He started harassing and threatening Sonia. In one
instance, respondent brought Sonia to a motel against her will. Their arrival
caused a commotion which forced Atty. Dabon to drive back to the Court of
Appeals. In another occasion, respondent forcibly boarded Sonias car and
refused to alight despite her pleas. Respondent likewise used members of his
staff to deliver messages or packages to Sonia.
In his supplemental complaint, Nelson alleged that on May 16, 2006, or one
day after the complaint was filed, respondent surreptitiously left for the Unites
States without securing a travel authority from the Supreme Court. He likewise
averred that in his Embarkation Card, Atty. Dabon indicated that he is a lawyer
without disclosing that he is also a government employee.
In his sworn letter-complaint dated May 15, 2006, complainant alleged that
respondent had an adulterous and immoral relationship with his wife, Sonia Valdez, for
a span of five years; that he only came to know of the said adulterous relationship on
April 18, 2006 from an anonymous text message; that Sonia admitted that the
relationship started sometime in November 2000 and continued until March of 2006;
that Sonia, bothered by her conscience, decided to break off with respondent who,
however, persisted communicating with her, threatening and harassing her through
phone calls and handwritten messages; that Sonia, in her effort to stop said harassment,
decided to speak with respondent one last time aboard respondents car somewhere
along Roxas Boulevard, however, respondent instead took her into a motel; and that
Sonia parried respondents advances by being hysterical, which prompted respondent to
drive her back to the office.
In another incident on March 13, 2006, respondent forcibly boarded his wifes car
at the Court of Appeals parking lot; and that it was only upon pleas of Sonias
officemates, Atty. Heiddi Barroso and Atty. Aileen Ligot, that respondent alighted from
the car. Complainant also alleged that respondent continuously made threats to reveal
their illicit relationship if Sonia would not reconcile with respondent, thus, Sonia was
forced to shun respondents calls in her office and to change their house phone number.
A)
Nelson, Jun and I were separating I will file an annulment anytime soon,
although Im in great pain, I ask for your apology and forgiveness for everything
he is leaving for US and I hope he evolves into a strong and mature person
there. D. cya masamang tao, just emotional and easily manipulated. Sana dont
blame entirely bec. he is the type that never initiate things. He is passive and
tame. He was honest with me and I hope Sonia would find the courage to tell d
truth to you. I just pray for peace and a fresh start for all of us. I just want to go
on with my life and use above all of these for my sons sake. I love jun and I
appeal to you na sana wala ka maisip sa atin lahat. Just as I have accepted
everything. Salamat sa panahon and pangunawa. God bless.
B)
1.
Atty. Heiddi Venecia Barrozo and Atty. Aileen T. Ligot, Court Attorney IV of
this Court, who executed a Joint Affidavit alleging that sometime in March 2006 at
around 5:00 in the afternoon, Sonia asked them to accompany her to the parking lot of
the Court of Appeals because respondent refused to disembark from her car; that upon
arriving at the parking lot, they saw respondent sitting in front of Sonias car; that Sonia
shouted and demanded that respondent get out of the car but the latter refused and
insisted on talking with Sonia; that the commotion started drawing attention so they
begged respondent to alight from the car, who then obliged.
Atty. Barrozo and Atty. Ligot further alleged that they received a text message
from respondent the next day requesting them to see him in his office; that respondent
told them that alam ko na malaki and kasalanan ko kay son, at alam ko na imposible na
nya akong mapatawad and begged them to convince Sonia to talk and settle things
with him; that respondent kept sending them text messages such as: musta na sya?,
nakakakain ba sya?, pumunta ba sya sa gym ngaun?, Sana mapatawad na nya
ako, mahirap para sa akin ito., Hindi ko na kaya, sana naman maconvince nyo sya
na kausapin na ako; that they told respondent that Sonia refused to talk with him;
and that on May 10, 2006 at 11:00 in the morning, Atty. Ligot received another text
message from respondent which reads: Gud am aileen. Alam ko na kahit papaano
kapakanan pa rin ni sonia nasa isip nyo, na gagamitin kayo to testify against me. Pero
kung talagang mahalaga pa rin si sons sa inyo, isipin nyo twice if wat u wil do wud help
her or makakahirap pa sa kanya
2.
Virginia D. Ramos, Court Stenographer IV in the Office of the Presiding
Justice, who executed an Affidavit alleging that sometime in the third week of April
2006, she received some telephone calls at the local line from respondent expressing his
desire to speak with Sonia but the latter refused to speak with him; that sometime in
the fourth week of April 2006, respondent went to their office located at the third floor
of the Court of Appeals main building, supposedly to inquire about some court matters
from her officemate, Mr. Raul Yumang; that respondent also proceeded to Sonias
working area who was surprised and infuriated upon seeing respondent; that Sonia
asked respondent Ano kailangan mo dito? and the latter replied May kukunin lang
ako kay Mang Raul., then Sonia said Dun ka lang sa labas, huwag kang lumapit sa
akin!; and that respondent hurriedly left their office after the confrontation.
3.
Marie Iris Magdalene Minerva, Executive Assistant II at the Office of the
Presiding Justice, who alleged in her Affidavit that she received some telephone calls
from respondent requesting to speak with Sonia who deliberately refused saying
Pakisabi na ayoko makipagusap sa kanya at pinagbabawalan na ako ni Nelson.; that
Sonia had been receiving letters sealed in brown envelopes and hand carried by some of
respondents staff; that one time when Sonia was not around, respondent himself
personally placed a sealed brown envelope on Sonias table; and that upon her
suggestion, Sonia tore the letter into pieces to prevent anybody from reading it.
4.
Complainants allegation that respondent left the country on May 16, 2006
for the United States way ahead of his approved leave from June 3, 2006 up to August
25, 2006 and without the requisite Authority to Travel from the Supreme Court is
supported by complainants evidence, namely, (1) Northwest Airlines, Inc.s Passenger
Manifest which includes the name DABON/ANTOLINAL; (2) Application for Leave; (3)
letter requesting permission to travel; (4) Embarkation Card; and (5) Certification issued
by the Bureau of Immigration.
In the present case, this Investigating Justice finds that there is substantial
evidence showing an amorous relationship between respondent and complainants
wife. Respondent failed to refute complainants allegation that Sonia admitted having a
relationship with him sometime from November 2000 until March 2006. Complainants
unrebutted evidence consisting of the affidavits of Sonias officemates lend credence to
complainants allegation that such amorous relationship existed between his wife and
respondent. Moreover, respondents abrupt and unauthorized trip to the United
States and eventual resignation from office are telltale proofs of the existence of such
illicit relationship between respondent and Sonia and of respondents desperate
attempt to avoid facing the consequences of his indiscretion.
Anent the charge of falsification, it was noted that respondent did not act
with malice when he indicated in the embarkation card that he is a lawyer
without stating that he is also a government employee.
against her will. Not only did he transgress the norms of decency expected of
every person but he failed to live up to the high moral standard expected of a
court employee.[1] The exacting standards of ethics and morality upon court
employees are required to maintain the peoples faith in the courts as dispensers
of justice, and whose image is mirrored by their actuations. Thus, it becomes the
imperative sacred duty of everyone in the court to maintain its good name and
standing as a true temple of justice.[2]
It has not also escaped our attention that respondent tried to evade and
continue to defy the processes of the court. After he was formally charged with a
complaint for gross immorality on May 15, 2006, respondent immediately left the
following day, May 16, 2006, for the United States. Although the Personnel
Division of the Court of Appeals certified that he filed an application for leave of
absence from May 8 to June 2, 2006, the application however remained unacted
upon. This proves that Atty. Dabon left for theUnited States before the approval
of his application for leave by the authorized official of the Personnel
Division. Moreover, respondents application for leave did not indicate the type
of leave he is taking, whether vacation or sick leave, or whether the leave will be
spent here or abroad. In short, respondents absence was unauthorized. As
correctly observed by the Investigating Justice:
Moreover, respondents abrupt and unauthorized trip to the United States and
eventual resignation from office are telltale proofs of the existence of such illicit
relationship between respondent and Sonia and of respondents desperate attempt to
avoid facing the consequences of his indiscretion.
In Re: Judge Cartagena,[4] the Court found respondent judge guilty of gross
misconduct when he departed abroad without the knowledge and permission of
the Court and was ordered dismissed from service with forfeiture of all benefits
and with prejudice to re-employment in any other branch, instrumentality or
In the instant case, respondent should have been meted the penalty of
dismissal from service. However, he could no longer be dismissed or suspended
from service in view of his resignation on August 12, 2006.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
[1]
FIRST DIVISION
JUDGE
DOLORES
L.
ESPAOL,* Presiding
Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Dasmarias, Cavite,
Petitioner,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus -
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswindas name was cancelled and in lieu
thereof, TCT No. T-511462 was issued in the name of Sharcons. However, when
the latters workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot, they were
prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. The
caretaker claimed that spouses Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons
verified the status of the title and found that TCT No.
T-107163 was indeed
registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.
On January 25, 2000, Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite a complaint for quieting of title, docketed as Civil
Case No. 2035-00. Impleaded as defendants were spouses Mapua, Evanswinda
Morales, and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.
In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the
documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.
From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view and so holds that the
instant case is a callous and blatant imposition of lies, falsehoods, deceptions, and
fraudulent manipulations, through the extensive use of falsified documents by the
plaintiff corporation and its former counsel, Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant
Evanswinda C. Morales and even the Geodetic Engineer who connived with this private
group on one hand, and some officials and employees of the government agencies
responsible for the processing and issuance of spurious or falsified titles, on the other.
Unless these fraudulent operations are put to a complete and drastic halt, the Courts
are at the mercy of these unscrupulous people for their own personal gain.
Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer of Sharcons Builders
Phils. Inc., respectively, and Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, counsel for Sharcons
until March 13, 2001, are declared and held in contempt for foisting falsehoods and
using falsified and spurious documents in the pursuit of their nefarious activities
pursuant to the instant case filed before this Court. Let the corresponding Warrants of
Arrest be issued against the aforesaid respondents who should serve ten (10) days of
detention at the Dasmarias Municipal Jail, Cavite.
Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc., under TCT No. T511462 allegedly issued on November 11, 1994, being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it
having been derived from another spurious title with TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued
to Evanswinda C. Morales on December 29, 1989. The Declaration of Real Property No.
4736 is likewise hereby cancelled for being spurious. Let a copy of this Order be
forwarded to the Registry of Deeds for its implementation with respect to the two (2)
titles
for
cancellation
and
to
the
Assessors
Office
of
the Municipality of Dasmarias, Cavite, to stave off the proliferation of these spurious
instruments.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65652. On July 19, 2001, the Court
of Appeals granted the petition.
On September 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Espaol erred in taking cognizance of
the Decision rendered by then Judge Tagle in Civil Case No. 623-92 since it was
not offered in evidence in Civil Case No. 2035-00 for quieting of title. Moreover,
as the direct contempt of court is criminal in nature, petitioner should have
conducted a hearing. Thus, she could have determined whether respondents are
guilty as charged.
The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when all
courts in the realm were but divisions of the Curia Regia, the supreme court of
the monarch, and to scandalize a court was an affront to the sovereign.[6] This
concept was adopted by the Americans and brought to our shores with
modifications. In this jurisdiction, it is now recognized that courts have the
inherent power to punish for contempt on the ground that respect for the
courts guarantees the very stability of the judicial institution.[7] Such stability is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, to the enforcement
of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the very
administration of justice.[8]
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings
of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(f)
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from
issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings.
We agree with petitioner that the use of falsified and forged documents is a
contumacious act. However, it constitutes indirect contempt not direct
contempt. Pursuant to the above provision, such act is an improper conduct
which degrades the administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance
of Cebu, Branch VI,[12] we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document,
more so where the falsity of the document is not apparent on its face, merely
constitutes indirect contempt, and as such is subject to such defenses as the
accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule
71, a contemner may be punished only after a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity has been given to the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel.[13] Moreover, settled is the rule that a contempt proceeding is not a civil
action, but a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises
limited jurisdiction.[14] Thus, the modes of procedure and the rules of evidence in
contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to
criminal prosecutions.[15] Perforce, petitioner judge erred in declaring summarily
that respondents are guilty of direct contempt and ordering their
incarceration. She should have conducted a hearing with notice to respondents.
SEC. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government, and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time,
and the geographical divisions.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
[1]
Retired.
Rollo, pp. 26-35. Penned by Associate Justice Candido V. Rivera (retired) and concurred in by Associate
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Fuentes, Jr.
[2]
[3]
[4]
Heirs of Trinidad De Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138660, February 5, 2004, 422
SCRA 101, 114, citing Halili v. CIR, 220 Phil. 507 (1985).
[5]
[6]
Re Caruba, 139 NJ Eq 404, 51 A2d 446, affd 140 NJ Eq 563, 55 A2d 289.
[7]
Mercado v. Security Bank Corp., G.R. No. 160445, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 501, 518.
[8]
[9]
[10]
Medina v. Rivera, 66 Phil. 155, 156 (1938); Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., G.R. No. 162704, July
28, 2005, 464 SCRA 572, 574.
[11]
Patricio v. Suplico, G.R. No. 76562, April 22, 1991, 196 SCRA 140, 146.
[12]
G.R. Nos. 57190-91, 58532, May 18, 1990, 185 SCRA 472.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Ruiz v. How, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1805, October 14, 2003, 413 SCRA 333, 340, citing Wicker v.
Arcangel, 242 SCRA 444 (1996).
In re Mison, Jr. v. Subido, G.R. No. 27704, May 28, 1970, 33 SCRA 30, 33.
Lee Yick Hon v. Collector of Customs, 41 Phil. 548, 552 (1921).
G.R. No. 130730, October 19, 2001, 367 SCRA 631, citing People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25
(1996); US v. Ckaveria, 29 Phil. 527 (1915).
Tan Me Nio v. Collector of Customs, 34 Phil. 944, 947 (1916).
THIRD DIVISION
MANUEL B. ARCENAS,
Complainant,
Present:
- versus -
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
JUDGE HENRY B. AVELINO,
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 15, 2007
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In the Agenda Report[4] dated June 14, 2006, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found respondent guilty of undue delay in violation of
Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary; and recommended that respondent be suspended from office without
salary and other benefits for three months on the ground of gross inefficiency.
On July 19, 2006, the Court required the parties to manifest their willingness
to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. On September 20,
2006, complainant complied in the affirmative. However, respondent failed to
comply with the Resolution of July 19, 2006. Thus, the Court, in its Resolution
of February 26, 2007, resolved to dispense with the filing of said manifestation.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary[5] mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within
the reglementary period of 90 days fixed by the Constitution and the law, is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.[6]
Record shows that on appeal, the RTC of Roxas City rendered a Decision[7] in
Civil Case No. 391 and remanded the case subject of the present complaint to the
court of origin for further proceedings. However, for reasons only known to
respondent, he sat on the case, so to speak, and reasoned that he already
inhibited himself from the case, seeing complainant's lack of faith and bias in his
(respondent's) action.
It is clear from the aforecited provision that the decision of the RTC in the
appealed
decision,
in
this
case
Civil
Case
No.
391,
is
immediately executory. Therefore, respondent's lackadaisical attitude in sitting
on the case for more than five months only to thereafter inhibit
himself therefrom, to the detriment and prejudice of the complainant, clearly
shows his utter disregard of settled rules and jurisprudence. It must be stressed
that the Rule was enacted to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases falling within its coverage.[8] It is therefore not
encouraging when it is the judge himself who occasions the delay sought to be
prevented by the Rule.[9]
It bears stressing that the publics faith and confidence in the judicial system
depends, to a large extent, on the judicious and prompt disposition of cases and
other matters pending before the courts.[10] Failure to decide a case or resolve a
motion within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring
magistrate.[11] The delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a
judge within the reglementary period of 90 days fixed by the Constitution and the
law is not excusable. It constitutes gross inefficiency warranting administrative
sanction from this Court.
As aptly observed by the OCA, it is unfortunate that despite having been
earlier fined by the Court for delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 391,
office for three months without salary and other benefits, effective upon receipt
of herein Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
THIRD DIVISION
Aurora E. Balajedeong,
Complainant,
Present:
- versus -
YNARES-SANTIAGO, C.J.
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
June 8, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In his Comment[2] dated 26 July 2006, respondent Judge Del Rosario claims
that Spouses Odi submitted their memorandum on 2 June 2003, while Colago
through his representative and herein complainant Balajedeong, submitted his
position paper on 30 June 2003. Respondent Judge Del Rosario admits that the
delay in the disposition of the subject case is due mainly to his failing health as he
claims that sometime in July 2003 and September 2003, he had been hospitalized
due to heart ailment and was advised to undergo by-pass operation. Thereafter,
he was hospitalized several times more. Respondent Judge Del Rosario further
states that there was a time when he was assigned as Presiding Judge of the
4th MCTC, Barbaza, Antique where he reported twice a week to conduct trial and
preliminary examination. Respondent Judge Del Rosario further informs this
Court that Civil Case No. 367, subject matter of this instant administrative
complaint, was already decided on 15 June 2006.
Respondent Judge Del Rosario failed to file his manifestation despite notice
sent to and received by him.
Resultantly, the case is submitted for decision based on the pleadings filed.
6. PROMPTNESS
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the
time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual
in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with
the administration of justice.
With respect to cases falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure, firstlevel courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and
position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to
render judgment.[9]
Section 10 of the Rules on Summary Procedure explicitly provides:
SEC.10. Rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and
position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render
judgment.
should
be
This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases
promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice
denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with
dispatch. Their failure to do so constitute gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction on them.
Respondent Judge Del Rosario ascribes the delay in the resolution of Civil
Case No. 367 to his failing health, as he was hospitalized several times due to heart
ailment. Even if he was stricken by an illness which hampered the due
performance of his duties, still it was incumbent upon respondent Judge Del
Rosario to inform this Court of his inability to seasonably decide the cases
assigned to him. His illness should not be an excuse for his failure to render the
corresponding decision or resolution within the prescribed period. While we
sympathize with his woes, the demands of public service cannot abide by his
illness.[15] In case of poor health, the Judge concerned needs only to ask this Court
for an extension of time to decide cases, as soon as it becomes clear to him that
there would be delay in his disposition of his cases.[16] We note that respondent
Judge Del Rosario made no such request. Also, if his health problems had indeed
severely impaired his ability to decide cases, respondent Judge Del Rosario could
have retired voluntarily instead of remaining at his post to the detriment of the
litigants and the public.
Respondent Judge Del Rosario also presented as an excuse to the delay in
deciding Civil Case No. 367 the additional work given to him when he was
assigned as Presiding Judge of the 4th MCTC, Barbaza, Antique, where he reported
twice a week to conduct trials and preliminary examinations. This will not
exonerate him. His failure to decide the case on time cannot be ignored. As we
ruled in Espaola v. Panay,[17] if the case load of the judge prevents the disposition
of cases within the reglementary periods, again, he should ask this Court for a
reasonable extension of time to dispose of the cases involved. This is to avoid or
dispel any suspicion that something sinister or corrupt is going on. The records of
this administrative matter do not show that any attempt was made by respondent
Judge Del Rosario to make such a request. Instead, he preferred to keep the case
pending, enshrouding the same in his silence.
Respondent Judge Del Rosario should have known that if his caseload,
additional assignments or designations, health reasons or other factors prevented
the timely disposition of his pending cases, all he had to do was to simply ask this
Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of his cases. The Court,
cognizant of the heavy case load of some judges and mindful of the difficulties
encountered by them in the disposition thereof, is almost always disposed to grant
such requests on meritorious grounds.[18] But for all his excuses, respondent Judge
Del Rosario failed to file any motion for extension despite the availability of this
remedy.
It must be noted also that respondent Judge Del Rosario was already
penalized for his first offense involving undue delay in A.M. No. MTJ-961091. He should have known better than to simply let the reglementary period
pass by again in another case.
All told, we find respondent Judge Del Rosario guilty of undue delay in
rendering a decision in Civil Case No. 367 which, under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of
the Revised Rules of Court, is classified as a less serious charge. Under Section
11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months,
or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
In the Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branches 29 and
59, Toledo City,[19] the Court observed the following factors in the determination of
the proper penalty for failure to decide a case on time:
We have always considered the failure of a judge to decide a case within
ninety (90) days as gross inefficiency and imposed either fine or suspension from
service without pay for such. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending
chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and
other factors, to wit: the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances- the
damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the
judge, etc. x x x.
In the present case, the delay for which respondent Judge Del Rosario is
being found liable pertains to only one case, Civil Case No. 367. There are the
mitigating circumstances of his admission of his fault to decide the case on time,
and his failing health. While we recognize respondent Judge Del Rosarios heavy
case load and his poor health, such factors cannot exonerate him from his
administrative liability. They can only serve to mitigate the imposable penalty.
As heretofore cited, records show that he was previously penalized in A.M.
No. MTJ-96-1091,[20] and was fined P8,000.00 with warning, for not deciding a
criminal case despite the lapse of three years, despite his reason for the inaction
being that he personally believed that he could not decide a case which was heard
by another judge.
In A.M. No. MTJ-03-1515-MTJ,[21] respondent Judge Del Rosario was
found administratively liable for his unjustified failure to comment on an
administrative complaint against him, and was fined P21,000.00. In A.M. No.
MTJ-94-949,[22] he was fined P5,000.00 with warning for Gross Misconduct and
Negligence for his refusal to comply with the directives of the OCA and of the
Commission on Audit.
In the present case, the fine of P30,000.00 recommended by the OCA is, to
our mind, too severe. We find the amount of P20,000.00 reasonable under the
premises.
As we have often stressed, the judge is the visible representation of the law
and, more importantly, of justice. Thus, he must be the first to abide by the law
and weave an example for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful to
avoid committing even the slightest infraction of the Rules.[23]
WHEREFORE, Judge Deogracias K. Del Rosario is found guilty of undue
delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 367 and is hereby ordered to pay
a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy
of this decision be attached to his personal records. The Court Administrator is
directed to furnish all concerned copies of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
[1]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
Re: Report of Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferada Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the
RTC, Branch 26, Argao, Cebu, A.M. No. 00-4-09-SC, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 125, 133.
Celino v. Judge Abrogar, 315 Phil. 305, 312 (1995).
Office of the Court Administrator v. Butalid, supra note 11 at 350.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Quizon, 427 Phil. 63, 76 (2002).
A.M. No. RTJ-95-1325, 4 October 1995, 248 SCRA 684, 687, citing Cruz v. Basa, A.M. No. MTJ-91598, 9 February 1993, 218 SCRA 551, 557.
Gonzalez-Decano v. Siapno, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1279, 1 March 2001, 353 SCRA 269, 278.
354 Phil. 8, 21 (1998).
Navarro v. Judge Del Rosario, 337 Phil. 1, 6 (1997).
Imbang v. Del Rosario, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 79.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Del Rosario, 13 December 1994, 239 SCRA 135.
Castillo v. Cortes, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1082, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 398.
FIRST DIVISION
P/SUPT. ALEJANDRO GUTIERREZ, PCI
ANTONIO RICAFORT, SPO4 RICARDO
G.
ONG,
and
SPO1
ARNULFO
MEDENILLA,
Complainants,
**
- versus -
Promulgated:
June 8, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
This administrative case stems from a joint complaint-affidavit[1] dated April
18, 2005 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by complainants
P/Supt. Alejandro Gutierrez, PCI Antonio Ricafort, SPO4 Ricardo G. Ong, and
SPO1 Arnulfo Medenilla, all of the Criminal Investigation and Detective Division
(CIDD) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), against then (now retired) Judge
Godofredo G. Hernandez, Sr. of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro charging the latter with:
1.
2.
Impropriety;
3.
Grave misconduct;
4.
5.
2.
Setting the said criminal cases for arraignment without the requisite
Informations having yet been filed in court.
In his Comment[3] dated May 31, 2005, the respondent judge denies the
accusations against him and dismisses the same as pure harassment calculated to
cast doubt on his character and integrity as a retiring judge. He then puts forth his
unblemished record in the government service since 1956.
(b)
Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the
investigating officer shall either dismiss it if
he finds
no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the
complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.
xxx
(c)
xxx
xxx
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the
respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his
witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for
his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and
sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of his
section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the
complainant. The respondent shall be allowed to file a
motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is apparent from the facts on record that the complainants were never
issued any subpoena to accord them the opportunity to file their counter-affidavits
to adduce evidence controverting those alleged in the criminal complaints against
them before the respondent judge issued the warrants of arrest. Moreover, the
warrants of arrest were issued without complying with the requisite conditions
therefor.
It was on August 23, 2004 that the complaints for qualified trespass to
dwelling and grave coercion were filed against Ernesto Cruz and five (5) John
Does before the salaof respondent judge. On August 24, 2004, a motion for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Ernesto Cruz was filed. Respondent
immediately granted said motion and issued a warrant for his arrest that same day.
On September 8, 2004, a Motion to Amend Criminal Complaint was filed by
Amylene, Imelda and Jackielou identifying the names of the
members of the CIDD rescue team including Gus Abelgas. Again, on the very
same day, warrants of arrest were hastily issued against herein complainants and
Gus Abelgas.
Indubitably, there was no preliminary investigation conducted as requi
red by the rules since no subpoena was issued to herein complainants for them to
file counter-affidavits. Furthermore, the inordinate haste attending the issuance of
the warrants of arrest against complainants, Ernesto Cruz, and Gus Abelgas belies
the conduct of preliminary examination and personal determination of probable
From the foregoing provision, there are three (3) conditions that must concur
for the issuance of the warrant of arrest by the municipal judge during a
preliminary investigation. The investigating judge must:
1.
Have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses by searching questions and answers;
2.
3.
The issuance of the warrants of arrest in this case was clearly irregular
since, not only did it lack a preliminary investigation, but the order granting
such issuance did not show any finding of a need to place complainants under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.[5]
Even if the judge finds probable cause, it is not mandatory for him to issue a
warrant of arrest. He must further determine the necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.[6] It is improper for a municipal judge to issue a warrant of arrest without
any finding that it was necessary to place the accused in immediate custody to
prevent frustration of the ends of justice.[7]
The procedure described in Section 6(b) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court is
mandatory and failure to follow the same would amount to a denial of due
process.[8] Thus, in the case of Sps. Arcilla v. Judge Palaypayan and Clerk of Court
Bajo,[9] the Court held:
While respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation on the same
day the complaint for estafa was filed, however, he did not notify the accused to
give him an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and evidence in his defense.
Worst, on the same day, respondent judge issued the warrant of arrest. Clearly, his
actuations manifest his ignorance of procedural rules and a reckless disregard of
the accused's basic right to due process.
the judiciary, judges are expected to have become already conversant with the
Rules, which they apply and rely on everyday in court. Years of service in the
bench simply negate any notion that a judge could be grossly ignorant of
procedural laws. It is thus completely inexcusable for the respondent who had been
with the judiciary for the last twelve (12) years to have acted the way he did in this
case.
Be that as it may, compassion works in respondents favor, what with the fact
that this is his first administrative case after more than a decade of judicial service,
let alone the circumstance that he has already compulsorily retired. OCAs
recommended penalty of FINE appears in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Godofredo G. Hernandez, Sr. is
found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and is ordered to
pay a FINE of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
*
**
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
On official leave.
Acting chairperson.
Rollo, pp. 1-12.
Joint Complaint-Affidavit; id. at 3.
Id. at 101-111.
Id. at 199-222.
Oktubre v. Judge Velasco, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1444, July 22, 2004, 434 SCRA 636.
Bagunas v. Fabillar, A.M. No. MTJ-97-1128, April 22, 1998, 289 SCRA 383.
Mantaring v. Roman, A.M. No. RTJ 93-064, February 26, 1996, 68 SCRA 670.
Cabilao v. Sardido, A.M. No. MTJ-93-818, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 94.
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1344, September 5, 2001, 364 SCRA 464.
Creer v. Fabillar, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1218, August 14, 2000, 337 SCRA 632.
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. JUSTO PARAS,
June 7, 2007
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
For resolution is this Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment[1] dated April
11, 2005, filed by herein petitioner-movant Rosa Yap Paras against respondent
Atty. Justo Paras, for the latters alleged violation of a suspension order earlier
meted upon him by the Court. The motion alleges:
4.
That the respondent in this case admits that he has continued his practice of law
and in fact filed pleadings in court after the receipt of suspension on the ground
that the alleged filing of his motion for reconsideration suspends or interrupt
(sic) the running of the period to appeal,
and prays that for his violation of the suspension order, the respondent be
declared in contempt of court and be disbarred.
On February 14, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution[3] finding Atty. Paras
guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the Court resolved to suspend Atty. Paras
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Per records, the aforesaid Resolution was received by Atty. Paras on March
18, 2005. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated March 28,
2005.[4]
In time, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 18, 2005,[5] denying for lack
of merit Atty. Paras motion for reconsideration, to wit:
Administrative Case No. 4947 (Rosa Yap Paras vs. Atty. Justo Paras) Acting on
the respondents motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2005 of the resolution of
February 14, 2005 which suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion for lack of merit.
(a)
(b)
(c)
After more than a year, or on September 12, 2006 Atty. Paras filed with the
Court a Manifestation[6], stating that he had completely and faithfully served his
one (1) year suspension from the practice of law from August 25, 2005, the day
after he received the denial resolution on his motion for reconsideration, to
August 24, 2006.
It appearing that Atty. Paras failed to file a comment on the Motion for
Contempt and/or Disbarment, the Court issued another Resolution
dated November 27, 2006requiring Atty. Paras to show cause why he should not
be held in contempt of court for such failure and to comply with the said
resolution within ten (10) days from receipt.
Here, we are called upon to impose on Atty. Paras the highest punishment
to an erring lawyer disbarment or to hold him in contempt for his failure to
comply with this Courts resolutions.
It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to recognize the authority
of the Supreme Court and obey its lawful processes and orders. Despite errors
which one may impute on the orders of the Court, these must be respected,
especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. It is
well to emphasize again that a resolution of the Supreme Court is not be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately or selectively.[10] Court orders are to be respected not because the
justices or judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect
and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the
government. This is absolutely essential if our government is to be a government
of laws and not of men.[11]
Here, Atty. Paras admitted that he had been less than prudent, and indeed
fell short, of his obligation to follow, obey and comply with the specific Order of
the Honorable Supreme Court contained in Its Resolution dated July 18, 2005 due
to his deteriorating health condition which required him to undergo a coronary
angiogram and bypass graft[12]. He likewise expressed his profound and
immeasurable sorrowness amidst regrets for his delayed compliance with the
Courts order.
Given the above, the Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in
the instant case, as well petitioner-movants counsels, to avoid further squabbles
and unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each other. An examination
of the records reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras
and petitioners counsels as evidenced by the number of administrative cases
between them. It is well to stress that mutual bickerings and unjustified
recriminations between attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession
and will not receive sympathy from this Court.[13] Lawyers should treat each other
with courtesy, fairness, candor and civility.[14]
All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as a sufficient sanction
for Atty Paras failure to promptly comply with its directives. The imposition of
this sanction in the present case would be more consistent with the avowed
purpose of a disciplinary case, which is not so much to punish the individual
attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and
the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court.[15]
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]