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Stewart Mills

2 February 2011

Changing public policy through public advocacy:


A case study of the Free South Africa Movement and
anti-Apartheid legislative change in the
United States
Essay question: The US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 was the
culmination of a long public advocacy campaign. Congress was successful in passing
this Act despite President Reagans attempt to veto the bill. Evaluate and discuss the
effectiveness of that campaign in the light of what you have learned during the course,
particularly referring to the template taught in the course.

Contents
Part 1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 2
Part 2. Methodology of the evaluation ................................................................... 4
Part 3. Public Advocacy:........................................................................................ 4
Changing Public Policy through popular pressure................................................. 4
Part 4. The Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) ............................................... 8
Part 5. Achievements of the Free South Africa Movement ................................... 8
Tactical successes .................................................................................................. 8
Grand strategy success ......................................................................................... 12
Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 13
References ............................................................................................................ 14
Appendix..16

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)

Changing public policy through public advocacy1:


A case study of the Free South Africa Movement and
anti-Apartheid legislative change in the
United States
The Free South Africa Movement [has] ignitedmass public demonstrations in the U.S. against both
apartheid and the administration's policy in the region[T]he Free South Africa Movement is not just
another "cause." It is a direct and creative political tactic, one rooted in the long tradition of
conscientious dissent. The Free South Africa Movement has been an antidote for the state of political
comatose[i]t has recruited new cadres of activists and inspired veterans in all other movements for
2
social change in the U.S.
William Lucy, Founder of the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists
and co-chair Free South Africa Movement, 18 December 1985

Part 1. Introduction
On 21 November 1984 (on Thanksgiving Eve), three African Americans: a lobbyist, a
commissioner of the US Commission of Civil Rights and the Congress delegate for
Washington DC met with the South African Ambassador and demanded the release of
13 South African labour union leaders who were arrested along with thousands of
black South Africans during a two day labour strike on 5 and 6 November.3
Secondly, they sought the release of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Govan
Mbekii, who had been imprisoned since the early 1960s and thirdly they sought for
the dismantling of Apartheid with a timetable for the task.4 They were asked to leave,
but, they refused and so were arrested. After a night in prison and a visit by the
mayor of Washington DC the three individuals held a news conference and
announced the formation of the Free South Africa Movement5(FSAM) whose
immediate goal was the three demands made to the South African Ambassador.6
The three who had been part of the civil rights movement in the 60s had until this
incident settled into the traditional roles of lobbying and shaping legislation7. The
three indicated that the Free South Africa Movement would coordinate a series of
direct actions out front of the South Africa embassy everyday at 3pm until the South
African Government and the US Government took a more proactive policy on ending
racial segregation in South Africa.8 This call to action, had in part resulted from
Randalls fury that the US abstained in the Security Council in response to the
1

Word count body of text 3858 words; Footnotes 1653 words.


William Lucy, Extensions of Remarks - Wednesday, December 18, 1985, 131 Cong. Rec. 37865
(1985), 37866-37867
3
Courtland Milloy, Blacks Form 'Free S. Africa Movement', The Washington Post (1974-Current
file ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Washington Post (1877 - 1994) pg. C1); Nov 24, 1984; Trans
Africa Forum, Alhaji Conteh, A Chronology of th Free South Africa Movement, TransAfrica Forum,
Washington DC, http://www.transafricaforum.org/files/FSAM%20Chronology.pdf (Accessed 1
February 2011).
4
Milloy, 1984; Robinson Randall, Defending the Spirit: a Black life in America, New York: Dutton,
1998, p. 152.
5
The campaign was first reported in the New York Times on 27 November 1984 (6 days after the first
arrest).
6
Milloy, 1984; Randall, 1998, p. 152.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
2

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)

November mass arrests and killings in South Africa. Over the following week 16
prominent persons, including politicians and union leaders were arrested as part of
this campaign, including amongst others, Rosa Parks9 and Yolanda King (daughter of
Martin Luther King Jr).10 One-and-a-half years later over 3,046 arrests had been
made as part of the campaign; including amongst others Peter, Paul and Mary 11
members of the folk trio12, Stevie Wondie ad Harry Belafonte13.
The culmination of the FSAM work was the enactment of the Comprehensive AntiApartheid Act of 1986.14 This was perhaps one of the most controversial pieces of
legislation to be made into Public Law in the United States in recent decades. This
American law placed significant economic sanctions on South Africa, despite an
attempt by, President Ronald Reagan of the United States to veto it. What was
remarkable about this bill was that it was a Republican-dominated Senate that
overrode a Republican Presidents veto on a foreign policy issue15. The last foreign
policy veto to be overridden, prior to this was in 1973.16
This essay will argue that a public advocacy campaign led by anti-Apartheid groups,
like the Free South Africa Movement, helped provide the necessary conditions for
bipartisan support of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (and a triumph
of the legislature over the executive). The success of this campaign itself was a result
of strong leadership within black Congress members, civil, religious and trade union
leaders.
Secondly, these economic sanctions on South Africa were a consequence of
dissenting Republicans who had lost confidence in the Presidents ability to articulate
a new policy on South Africa given his commitment to the failed policy of
constructive engagement. The Republicans (who had previously faithfully avoided
9

Rosa Parks was arrested 29 years to the day she was arrested in Montgomery. Nicole Lee, 25th
Anniversary of Free South Africa Movement, The Washington Informer, 3 December 2009
http://www.washingtoninformer.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2693:bynicole-c-lee&catid=59:archive&Itemid=121 (Accessed 30 January 2011).
10
2 Congressmen Held After Embassy Protest, New York Times (1923-Current file); Dec 1, 1984
ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007), pg. 10
11
They were a part of a group of 14 arrested for knocking on the South African embassy doors on
8/1/86.
12
Robin Toner, Bishop Tutu Hails Demonstrators Near the South African Embassy, New York Times
(1923-Current file); Jan 9, 1986; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007),
pg. A3
13
Robinson Randall, Defending the Spirit: a Black life in America, New York: Dutton, 1998, p. 154.
14
Official title: A bill to prohibit loans to, other investments in, and certain other activities with respect
to, South Africa, and for other purposes. Sponsor William Gray. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d099:HR04868:@@@T
15
Reagan made 78 vetoes during his term. Of these 9 were overridden. The only foreign policy issue
was overridden was on South Africa. 2444 HR4868 Presidential Vetoes: 1789-1988, Washington,
Senate Library, S. Pub. 102-12, February 1992, p. 543
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/presvetoes17891988.pdf; Presidential Vetoes, 1989
2000, S. Pub. 10710, Senate Library, Washington DC, October 2001, p. ix.
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/presvetoes.pdf (Accessed 27 January 2011).
16
G Treverton & P Varle, The United States and South Africa: The 1985 Sanctions Debate, Case
443 Instructor Copy, Institute of the Study of Diplomacy, George Washington University, 1992
http://www.princeton.edu/~bsimpson/Hist%20725%20Summer%202006/US%20and%20S%20Africa
%20the%201985%20sanctions%20debate.pdf (Accessed 30 January 2011).

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)

public disagreement on this issue) decided to side with the Democrats as they
believed it was imperative for targeted economic sanctions to be set-in-place, without
further delay, to avert South Africa from falling into full-blown guerrilla war and
ending with the succession of an unfriendly pro-Soviet Government in a new South
Africa.17 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the precursor for the bipartisan
support was the result of decades of distressing images of the plight of black South
Africans, decades of international condemnation, decades of civil societys response
within the transnational anti-Apartheid movement and the connection with a US
domestic audience between the US civil rights movement and the need for an end to
racial discrimination in South Africa.
Part 2. Methodology of the evaluation
This essay seeks to analyse and explore the effectiveness of a public advocacy
campaign (The Free South Africa Movement) in the light of what has been learnt
during a university course on Strategic Public Advocacy. The campaign will be
evaluated according to how its methods fit a general model to of public advocacy.
This general model for public advocacy will be constructed by synthesising the
approach of 6 authors: Staples18, Cohen19, Hunt20, Fisher21 and two generalist
models. Once the necessary elements of a campaign are established then a literature
review will be made of actions of the Free South Africa Movement. The principal
database used will be Factiva to analyse newspaper records of the FSAM movement,
principally looking at the New York Times and Washington Post in the 1980s and
early 19990s. A review will also be made of any books and journals published on the
issue, including the autobiography of Senator Dick Lugar who was involved in the
implementation of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 1986 and the work of
Randall Robinson who was the co-chair of the FSAM and president of TransAfrica.
Senator Lugar (who is still a senator) and the TransAfrica office were contacted by
phone and email to identify any further areas that would help in the analysis of the
campaign.
Part 3. Public Advocacy:
Changing Public Policy through popular pressure
Public Advocacy as Agenda-Setting
Firstly, in order to understand the effectiveness of the Free South Africa Movement
campaign a definition of public advocacy is required, its methods and a general model

17

Richard Lugar, Letters to the Next President, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988, p. 225
J Staples, Strategic Public Advocacy for Civil Society Template, LAWS3315 Class lecture,
University of New South Wales, 12 January 2011.
19
Cohen D, de la Vega, R and Watson G, Advocacy for Social Justice: A Global Action and reflection
guide, Kumarian Press Inc, 2001
20
J Hunt, The Jubilee 2000 Campaign in Australia, an unpublished document produced for Jubilee
Australia.
21
R Fisher & W Ury, Getting to Yes, 2nd edn, Century Business, London, 1992.
18

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)

of advocacy will need to be established.22 Public advocacy is a set of deliberate


actions designed to influence public policies or public attitudes in order to empower
the marginalised.23 It is the process of changing government policy through popular
pressure. It is a method used by civil society to set the public agenda24. It is an
example of political reform. This is distinct from non-violent revolution (Figure 1) as
we are seeing currently in Tunisia and possibly Egypt. Public advocacy is linked to
or includes the following related concepts: grassroots activism, public campaigning,
nonviolent social change, nonviolent protest and nonviolent action25. Public
advocacy is distinct from private advocacy which is a discrete (behind-closed doors)
methods of lobbying politicians for social change; although, private advocacy is a
necessary part of a public advocacy campaign. Human rights based advocacy has
included the work of abolitionists, suffragettes, The Red Cross26, feminist movement,
gay rights. Environmental public advocacy includes work of environmental
organizations like Greenpeace, WWF International Network, Australian Conservation
Foundation and the Wilderness Society.
The theory and methods of public advocacy are shaped by practitioners and
academics within a multi-disciplinary field. These disciplines includes, amongst
others, social movement theory, organizational theory and development studies
(Figure 2). Perhaps the most significant (but under-utilised) theorists for the theory
and methods of public advocacy is Gene Sharp in his The Politics of Nonviolent
Political Action27. Sharp is most well known amongst peace theorists, but his
potential contribution to the work of public advocates is enormous. Sharps work is
heavily influenced by Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. and he documents 198
different means (tactics) to respond to violence.
REVOLUTION

Violent
revolution

Nonviolent
revolution

REFORM

Government
change following
elections

Public policy change


following public
advocacy pressure

Figure 1. Public advocacy as governmental reform; as distinct from revolution which


involves the overthrow of government.
22

Literally, an advocate is one called in, or liable to be called upon, to defend or speak for Oxford
English dictionary, Second edition, 1989; online version November 2010.
<http://www.oed.com:80/Entry/3022>; accessed 29 January 2011. Earlier version first published in
New English Dictionary, 1884.
23
Samuel, John 'Public advocacy and people-centred advocacy: mobilising for social change', 2007
Development in Practice, 17:4, 615 - 621
24
Michael Howlett & M Ramesh, Agenda-setting : policy determinates policy ideas and policy
windows, Chapter 5, Studying Public Policy 2nd ed, Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press 2003, ,
p. 121
25
Kurt Schock, Nonviolent Action and Its Misconceptions: Insights for Social Scientists, Political
Science and Politics (2003), 36: 705.

Michael A. Meyer, Public Advocacy - Why the Red Cross and Red Crescent
should look before it leaps, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 315, 31-121996. http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jncu.htm (Accessed 30 January 2011).
26

27

Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Political Action, Porter Sargent Publisher, Boston: MA,
1973.

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)

Public advocacy research


Development studies

Political
theory

Peace theory

International
relations theory

Social movement
research

Organizational
theory

Sociology
Human rights law

Figure 2. Public advocacy involves a multidisciplinary approach to political change


Gene Sharps 198 tactics may be grouped into four main methods of public
advocacy28 and include methods of (1) persuasion: leaflets, posters, [internet], media;
(2) protest: picketing, marches, public meetings; (3) social noncooperation: boycotts,
strikes, civil disobedience; and/or (4) non-violent intervention: sit-in, jail-in (Figure
3). Sharps work also provides an invaluable insight into the dynamics of the power
relationship between the State and the citizen. Sharp demonstrates theoretically and
practically indeed the power that the people do possess. Sharps ability to articulate
the power dynamics involved in social change is invaluable to the success of a public
advocacy campaign (and as will be seen is a key element of the general public
advocacy model).

NONVIOLENT
ACTION
Nonviolent
Revolution

Private
advocacy
Lobbying

Persuasion
Leaflets, posters,
internet, media

PUBLIC
ADVOCACY

Reform
Nonviolent
intervention
Sit-in, jail-in

Protest
Picketing, marches,
public meetings,
vigils

Noncooperation
Boycotts, strikes
civil disobedience

Figure 3. Public Advocacy is a reform process that uses the methods of non-violent
action: including persuasion, protest, noncooperation and non-violent intervention.

28

Sharp did not speak in terms of public advocacy, but in terms of non-violent social change.

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)

Having looked at a definition of public advocacy and its methods it is necessary to


look at the general elements of a public advocacy campaign. Staples29, Cohen30,
Hunt31, Fisher32 and others have described essential features of a public advocacy
campaign. The question is how do the models and insights of each of these authors fit
together? To find some sense of unity I have constructed a table for the purpose of
comparing and contrasting each of these models (Appendix 1). From this table a
general method for public advocacy (Appendix 2) was established by grouping
similar factors. This general model for public advocacy identified the following as
key elements of a public advocacy campaign:

Problem recognition
Initial Goal creation (and continual goal reevaluation)
Recognition of powers to achieve the goals
Methods to ensure powers are compelled achieve the goals
Implementation of the campaign
Evaluation of the campaign

Problem
recognition

Initial Goal creation/


Goal revaluation

Evaluation of
the campaign

PUBLIC ADVOCACY
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
Implementation
of the campaign

Recognition of
powers to achieve
the goals

Methods to ensure powers


compelled to goal
achievement, include:
tactics (eg Gene
Sharps 198 methods)
alliances
communication
media
education

organisation
training
litigation
resources
fundraising

Figure 4. General advocacy model/ Public advocacy cycle


Having established a general theory of public advocacy (Appendix 2/Figure 4) we
now have the necessary tools to analyse the Free South Africa Movement.

29

J Staples, Strategic Public Advocacy for Civil Society Template, LAWS3315 Class lecture,
University of New South Wales, 12 January 2011.
30
Cohen D, de la Vega, R and Watson G, Advocacy for Social Justice: A Global Action and reflection
guide, Kumarian Press Inc, 2001
31
J Hunt, The Jubilee 2000 Campaign in Australia, an unpublished document produced for Jubilee
Australia.
32
Fishers specific insights are in dispute resolution and negotiation.

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)

Part 4. The Free South Africa Movement (FSAM)


The Free South Africa Movement was a US coalition that formed against Apartheid in
1984. The catalyst for the movement was the arrest of 13 black trade union leaders
and ongoing violence in South Africa; and the political intransigence of President
Reagan to call South Africa to account. The coalitions pinnacle achievement was the
legislative enforcement of economic sanctions on South Africa. The effect of the
sanctions may be questionable but the moral message this sent globally signified the
end was near for South Africas Apartheid. The FSAM finished with Nelson
Mandelas tour of the US in July 1990, although it was not until 1994 that the first
free and fair elections were held in South Africa.33
Part 5. Achievements of the Free South Africa Movement
Tactical successes
The Free South Africa Movement was an enormously successful campaign.34 It was
successful because it had wide public support, it was a national campaign and it was
pivotal in the passing of US legislation to place economic sanctions on South Africa.
From a campaigning point of view FSAM had a set of clear goals that found currency
within the public sphere, they had recognised the powers necessary to achieve those
goals. The methods (and the implementation of those methods) used to ensure those
powers were compelled to goal achievement were creative and popular. They
successfully placed the plight of black South Africans on the public agenda by a
series of high profile arrests, supported by a large number of people mobilised by the
unions and churches and civil society groups. They then capitalised on this public
attention by intensifying lobbying within Congress. The experience of TransAfrica in
lobbying as well as the support of members of the Congressional Black Caucus
played a key role in this. The ultimate factor in the success of the campaign was in
ensuring the support of Republican Senators in the call for economic sanctions.
Celebrity involvement in the daily protests out the front of the South African
embassy, backed by good media coverage helped provide legitimacy for the
campaign, which in turn created broader support. The royalty of the civil rights
movement were part of the campaign: Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King, Yolanda King
and Jesse Jackson35; as were music stars: Harry Belafonte, Stevie Wonder, the folk
trio - Peter, Paul and Mary36; movie stars like Paul Newman37 and Tony Randall; and
33

Alhaji Conteh, A Chronology of th Free South Africa Movement, TransAfrica Forum, Washington
DC, http://www.transafricaforum.org/files/FSAM%20Chronology.pdf (Accessed 1 February 2011).
34

A Klotz, Norms reconstituting interests: global racial equality and the US


sanctions against South Africa, International Organization, 49, 3, Summer 1995, 453.
35

Alhaji Conteh, A Chronology of th Free South Africa Movement, TransAfrica Forum, Washington
DC, http://www.transafricaforum.org/files/FSAM%20Chronology.pdf (Accessed 1 February 2011).
36
They were a part of a group of 14 arrested for knocking on the South African embassy doors on
8/1/86. Robin Toner, Bishop Tutu Hails Demonstrators Near the South African Embassy, New York
Times (1923-Current file); Jan 9, 1986; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 2007), pg. A3

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)

sport stars like Arthur Ashe. Over twenty members of the House of Representatives
took part in the protests (including black and white Congress members).38 Key leaders
in the struggle against Apartheid, like Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Bishop Desmond
Tutu were linked to the campaign. Desmond Tutus connection to the campaign and
level of support was demonstrated by the ability of FSAM to collect one million
letters in support of Bishop Tutu following criticism of Tutu by Rev Jerry Falwell, the
head of the Moral Majority. 39 The campaign was mirrored40 by protests across 40 US
cities.
FSAM from its beginning had a high quality media campaign. FSAM would hold
news conferences, TransAfrica staff were prolific on the telephone and sending media
releases. Robinson would spend the morning rallying supporters and media coverage
for the 3pm protest and then head to the protests at 3pm to do any interviews and
coordinate the protests41. FSAM was successful in connecting the US civil rights
issue with the quest for civil rights and an end to Apartheid in South Africa. Take for
example the following news story: At a news conference today Mr Lowerey who had
worked closely with Dr Martin Luther King Jr in the civil rights movement, said we
are expressing our moral outrage at the intensified oppression in South Africa. 42
The FSAM campaign was successful because of the ability of the organisers to
maintain daily protests out the front of the South Africa embassy in Washington DC
for over one year.43 TransAfrica was the key administrative and public face of the
campaign and consisted of 10,000 members.44 TransAfrica was able to bolster its
numbers at protests by the finance and labour of the Coalition of Black Trade
Unionists. Randall Robinson, described the input of William Lucy who was President
and founder of CBTU (and who was part of the steering committee of the FSAM) in
the following terms Lucy had delivered cash to our coffers and bodies for picket
lines by the thousands."45 Such alliances were another key feature to FSAMs
success. The steering committee of FSAM was Randall Robinson, TransAfrica (cochair), Walter Fauntroy, chair and founding member of the Congressional Black
Caucus (co-chair), Mary Frances Berry, Commissioner of US Commission on Civil
Rights, Sylvia Hill, Academic and community organizer, William Lucy, President of
37

New Tactics on South Africa, New York Times,ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York
Times (1851 - 2007), May 10, 1986, pg. 8.
38
Alhaji Conteh, A Chronology of th Free South Africa Movement, TransAfrica Forum, Washington
DC, http://www.transafricaforum.org/files/FSAM%20Chronology.pdf (Accessed 1 February 2011).
39
Robin Toner, Bishop Tutu Hails Demonstrators Near the South African Embassy, New York Times
(1923-Current file); Jan 9, 1986; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007),
pg. A3
40
New Tactics on South Africa, New York Times,ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York
Times (1851 - 2007), May 10, 1986, pg. 8.
41
Barbara Gamarekian, Lobbyist With a Target: South Africa, New York Times (1923-Current file);
Dec 8, 1984; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007), pg. 9
42
Congressman and Rights Leader Arrested at South Africa Embassy, New York Times (1923Current file); Nov 27, 1984; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007) pg.
A20.
43
New Tactics on South Africa, New York Times,ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York
Times (1851 - 2007), May 10, 1986, pg. 8.
44
Barabara Gamarekian, Lobbyist With a Target: South Africa, The New York Times, ProQuest
Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007), Dec 8, 1984, pg. 9.
45
Harry Belafonte, Maxine Waters to Host Tribute to Top Black Labor Leader, Bill Lucy, U.S.
Newswire. Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning, 1 April 1999.

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)

the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists and Roger Wilkins, Johns Hopkins University
Institute for Policy Studies Senior Fellow46.
The methods of the FSAM started off initially by gaining public attention though
protests at the front of the South African Embassy. Once the issue of South Africa
became more part of the public consciousness then the campaign entered a new phase
by calling on business and institutions to divest from South Africa. Randall Robinson
said he was [a]sking Americans to come home and cease underpinning the South
African Government 47 The timing of the launch of the campaign was also critical.
To help gain public attention for the launch the announcement for the new campaign
was made with the arrival of Bishop Desmond Tutu to Washington DC. This advance
also coincided on the day of 16 further arrests including Peter, Paul and Mary
members of the folk trio when they knocked on the South African embassy door.
The launch of the new campaign for corporate divestment was also symbolically
powerful. The launch was attended by several labour leaders. Owen Bieber, president
of the United Automobile Workers, said union members would be urged to cut their
shell credit cards in half and mail them to the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations. 48 Imagery of mail in thousands of credit cards
works at a variety of levels. Firstly, it is empowering for the consumer who feels they
have power to make a decision they may affect international situations, and secondly,
it is a warning to companies that invest in Apartheid South Africa that consumers will
place sanctions on businesses seen to be complicit in Apartheid.
The corporate divestment campaign was followed by a heightened49 campaign in
1986 to lobby Congress for a bill requiring total American divestment of South
Africa. On 18 June 1986 a Comprehensive sanctions bill was introduced by
Congressman Ronald Dellums (DCA) and passed within the House of
Representatives. The bill called for a total trade embargo against South Africa and
for full divestment of U.S. companies from South Africa.50
What was remarkable was that a version of this bill (H.R.4868) withstood a
presidential veto due to a Senate override (with a majority of Republicans support)
and ended up becoming lawPublic Law 99-440 on 12 October 1986 and yet the
previous year (1985), there had been an unsuccessful attempt to pass a similar bill
(H.R.1460).
It is interesting to note the 1985 bill also faced a presidential veto. Reagan cut a deal
with dissenting Republicans (like Senator Lugar) that he would make an own
46

Alhaji Conteh, A Chronology of th Free South Africa Movement, TransAfrica Forum, Washington
DC, http://www.transafricaforum.org/files/FSAM%20Chronology.pdf (Accessed 1 February 2011).
47
Robin Toner, Bishop Tutu Hails Demonstrators Near the South African Embassy, New York Times
(1923-Current file); Jan 9, 1986; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007),
pg. A3
48
Robin Toner, Shell Oil Boycott Urged; Pretoria Policy at Issue, New York Times (1923-Current
file); Jan 10, 1986; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007) pg. A7.
49
heightened because FSAMs strategy had been seeking legislative action from its inception, see:
Robinson Randall, Defending the Spirit: a Black life in America, New York: Dutton, 1998, p. 155.
50
Alhaji Conteh, A Chronology of th Free South Africa Movement, TransAfrica Forum, Washington
DC, http://www.transafricaforum.org/files/FSAM%20Chronology.pdf (Accessed 1 February 2011).

10

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)

executive order along the lines of the bill but with some exceptions51. In return
Reagan needed the bill to be taken off the table (which literally is what happened).
Given the inability to secure a cloture petition which would have shut down the
debate, Senator Richard Lugar, who was Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, through an unorthodox procedure (instigated by Sen Bob Dole) took the
committee report of the bill out of the Senate thus ending the debate. The Democrats
were outraged. Lugar and the dissenting Republicans agreed to such a move for fear
that they would not get the numbers to override any subsequent presidential veto.52
However, a year later, Lugar and fellow Republican colleagues weary of events
taking place in South Africa decided that this time they would seek an override in the
face of a new presidential veto. To complicate matters, Reagans advisers sought to
dissuade Republicans voting to override the bill as it would look bad on the President
who was to meet the Soviet leader the following week. A further sweetner for
Republicans was the clear conditionality that came with the sanctions. That is the
sanctions would be terminated if 5 conditions were met.53 Despite this the Senators
both Republicans and Democrats alike voted in favour of the sanctions and an
override of the presidents veto 78 votes for the override vs 21 against.54
The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 1986 was an important victory.55 This was
a victory that was recognised and named as such by South Africans in South Africa.56
This Act prohibited new US direct investments or the import to the US of South
African iron, steel, arms, farm products, coal uranium, textiles, gold coins amongst
others. Exemption were made for some strategic minerals. The Act symbolised the
exit from South Africa of considerable business interests. To give an example of the
success of the campaign for divestment, Culverson amongst others57 notes:
By the end of 1986, twenty-one states, sixty-eight cities, and ten of the nations's largest
counties had adopted divestment policies. Over 100 educational institutions had withdrawn
nearly a half-billion dollars from companies profiting from apartheid Some 350

51

Robin Toner, Shell Oil Boycott Urged; Pretoria Policy at Issue, New York Times (1923-Current
file); Jan 10, 1986; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007) pg. A7.
52
Richard Lugar, Letters to the Next President, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988, p. 227
53
Terminates the sanctions contained in title III of this Act and certain sanctions contained in title V
of this Act if South Africa: (1) releases political prisoners and Nelson Mandela from prison; (2) repeals
the state of emergency and releases all detainees held under such state of emergency; (3) urbans
political parties and permits political freedom for all races; (4) repeals the Group Areas Act and the
Population Registration Act and institutes no other measures with the same purposes; and (5) agrees to
enter into good faith negotiations with truly representative members of the black majority without
preconditions. Bill Summary & Status 99th Congress (1985 - 1986) H.R.4868 All Information
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d099:HR04868:@@@L&summ2=m&
54
The Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status 99th Congress (1985 - 1986) H.R.4868
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d099:HR04868:@@@Z
55
R Davies, D OMeara & S Dlamini, The Struggle for South Africa: A reference guide to movements,
organizations and institutions (new edition), Vol 1, Centre of African Studies Edurdo Mondlane
University, Zed Books, London, 1988, p. P5.
56
R Davies, D OMeara & S Dlamini, The Struggle for South Africa: A reference guide to movements,
organizations and institutions (new edition), Vol 1, Centre of African Studies Edurdo Mondlane
University, Zed Books, London, 1988, p. P5.
57
R Davies, D OMeara & S Dlamini, The Struggle for South Africa: A reference guide to movements,
organizations and institutions (new edition), Vol 1, Centre of African Studies Edurdo Mondlane
University, Zed Books, London, 1988, p. P5.

11

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)


58

American corporations operated in South Africa in 1984. Eighty of them, including GM ,


IBM, Coca Cola, Xerox, Eastman Kodak, Honeywell, Exxon, and McGraw-Hill, had pulled
out by 1987.59

On a more sombre note, despite the gains that the FSAM had made with the
legislative action, and the divestments from South Africa, TransAfricas head,
Robinson described how the US executive, over subsequent months, watered down
the impact of the sanctions through regulations that made the sanctions as leaky as a
sieve.60
Grand strategy success61
Having looked at tactical successes of the FSAM, now it is time to reflect on the
grand strategy successes (the initial goals or immediate goals that had prompted the
campaign). The immediate goals that FSAM declared in November 1984 was for the
release of the 13 labour union leaders, along with Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu
who had been imprisoned since the early 1960s62 and a more proactive policy63 by
both the South African Government and the US Government in ending racial
segregation in South Africa.64
In relation to the goal of political releases: Walter Sisulu was released in October
198965 and Nelson Mandela was released from prison on 11 February 199066. I was
unable to determine the status of the black union leaders who had been arrested in
1984 at the onset of the campaign. The beginning of the end of the FSAM occurred
in June 1990 with the welcome tour of Nelson Mandela. Roger Wilkins, who had
been part of the FSAM steering committee was the national coordinator for
Mandelas welcome67. The main purpose of Mandelas trip was to keep economic
sanction on South Africa in hope of creating greater pressure for social change 68.
The trip symbolised an end to FSAM, which as a public campaign ceased to make any

58

For a negative impact of the flight of GM see: General Motors fails to leave RSA quietly
http://sahistory.org.za/pages/chronology/thisday/1986-11-06.htm (Accessed 2 February 2011).
59
Donald R Culverson, The politics of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, 1969-1986,
111 Political Science Quarterly 1, 22 March 1996, p. 127
60
Robinson Randall, Defending the Spirit: a Black life in America, New York: Dutton, 1998, p. 172.
61
Grand strategy success is achievement of overall goals of the campaign as opposed to individual
tactical goals.
62
Courtland Milloy, Blacks Form 'Free S. Africa Movement', The Washington Post (1974-Current
file ProQuest Historical Newspapers The Washington Post (1877 - 1994) pg. C1); Nov 24, 1984
63
Conyers arrested in racial protest, New York Times (1923-Current file); Nov 28, 1984; ProQuest
Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007), pg. A2
64
Milloy 1984.
65
South Africa History Online, Walter Sisulu, Pretoria, South Africa
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/bios/sisulu,w.htm (Accessed 1 February 2011).
66
South Africa History Online, Nelson Mandela: Free at last, Pretoria, South Africa
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/special%20projects/mandela/bio_6.htm
67
John Kifner, Mandela Gets an Emotional New York City Welcome, New York Times (1923Current file); Jun 21, 1990; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007) pg.
A1
68
John Kifner, Mandela Gets an Emotional New York City Welcome, New York Times (1923Current file); Jun 21, 1990; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2007) pg.
A1.

12

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)

public engagements after Mandelas visit, and each original constituent organizations
returned to independent advocacy issues.
Conclusion
This essay has evaluated the effectiveness of a public advocacy campaign instigated
by the Free South Africa Movement in the 1980s in the United States and its effect in
encouraging the enactment of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. To
understand the success of the campaign a general advocacy model was developed
showing the key elements of a public advocacy campaign. This model brings
together the work of Staples, Cohen, Sharp and others to continue defining the
process and methods of public advocacy. This is a highly diversified field and will
continue to change given the broad nature of this discipline.
The success of the FSAM can be related to satisfying the key elements of a public
advocacy campaign. FSAM had a set of clear goals that had popular appeal, there was
clear leadership which recognised the powers necessary to achieve those goals. The
methods (and the implementation of those methods) used sparked off peoples
imaginations, were creative and popular and ensured those powers were compelled to
keep the movements goals on their agenda and ultimately in goal achievement. The
experience and relationships developed by of TransAfrica in lobbying as well as the
support of members of the Congressional Black Caucus played a key role in the
enactment of legislation imposing sanctions by the United States on South Africa.
The ultimate factor in the success of the campaign was in ensuring the support of
Republican Senators who weary of Reagans promises and concerned for civil war
overrode the Presidents veto to place economic sanctions of South Africa. This
move by the United States signalled the end of an era. It still took a further 3 years
before Nelson Mandela was released, but the US actions, despite some exceptions,
had made it clear that they would no longer offer South Africa unconditional support
until Apartheid was relinquished. FSAM had succeeded to bring about policy change
as a result of a highly sophisticated public advocacy campaign and a receptive popular
climate.

13

Stewart Mills (2-Feb-11)

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