POLITICS: 2007 VOL 27(3), 204207

Controversy
On Ontological and Epistemological
Gatekeeping: A Response to Bates and
Jenkins
Paul Furlong
University of Cardiff

David Marsh
University of Birmingham

As Colin Hay emphasises, it is always daunting, but interesting, to respond to people

you have taught. However, that in itself raises an important initial point. David
Marsh has often talked to his graduate students after they have come back from
conferences, and particularly graduate conferences, and they have commented
upon how the other graduate students they have met differ from their Birmingham
peers. Indeed, they report a view among many graduate students from elsewhere
(and it may be shared by staff) that many in the Birmingham Department are
obsessed with issues of ontology and epistemology. Of course, this is not the case,
but it is true that the Department over the last 10 years has taken these issues
seriously and that they are at the core of the Departments undergraduate and
postgraduate Political Analysis and Philosophy of Social Science modules, taught at
different times by David Marsh, Colin Hay, Paul Furlong and Magnus Ryner.
Indeed, Marsh and Stokers Theory and Methods in Political Science (2002) informed
the development of the Political Analysis undergraduate module at Birmingham
and, when Colin Hay took over the module, although he was concerned with the
same issues, he taught it differently and that led to the publication of his book
Political Analysis (Hay, 2002). In this context, we agree with Hay that Stephen Bates
and Laura Jenkins (2007) are too defensive about both the importance of ontological and epistemological issues and the contributions that the two books have
made to the development of an interest in these issues in British political science.1
However, our main concern here is to respond to Bates and Jenkins and we do so
by first examining their criticism of our treatment of ontology and epistemology
and then by addressing their contention that we act as gatekeepers.

I. Ontological and epistemological positions

Bates and Jenkins argue that we are inconsistent and inaccurate in our treatment
of ontology and epistemology. More specifically, they argue that we: distinguish
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between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism as ontological positions when

in fact they are epistemological positions; see realism as an epistemological position
when it is an ontological position; and view ontology as underpinning epistemology
in a way which is contentious. In sum, our response to these accusations is
acknowledge, but contend, the first, reject the second and defend our view of the
ontology/epistemology relationship, although, because Hay deals effectively with
the third point here, we will largely rest on his argument.
Bates and Jenkins argue that, in philosophy, foundationalism and antifoundationalism are usually treated as different epistemological traditions, yet
Furlong and I use the terms to distinguish between ontological positions. In retrospect, we should have dealt with this point, recognising that our treatment here was
not standard, and we shall do so in the next edition. However, we want first to
explain our use of that terminology, then argue that classifying ontological and
epistemological positions itself reflects positions on ontology and epistemology,
before finally claiming that our classification is a relatively open one and, as such,
closes off fewer options than other classifications for students just being introduced
to those issues.
In our view, it is crucial to distinguish between those social scientists who contend
that there is a real world out there and those who do not and we used the terms
foundationalist to characterise the former and anti-foundationalist to characterise
the latter,2 because, in our view, other extant terminology has more serious
problems.
Certainly, other terminology could be used. For example, we could call the foundationalists realists and the anti-foundationalists constructivists, but to do this
would make it difficult to view realism, and indeed constructivism, as epistemological positions, unless, of course, we dissolve the difference between ontology and
epistemology (see below). At the same time, we might have invoked other traditions of thought to distinguish, or not, between ontological positions. So, for
example, a critical realist might distinguish an ontological position which sees
agents as the key unit within society from one which sees structures as the key unit,
and both from one which sees the relationship between structure and agency as
dialectical.3 This has some appeal, but, to us, the problem is that this classification
does not do justice to what we have called an anti-foundationalist position. In
contrast, we might have argued, as many post-structuralists would, and in the end
Bates and Jenkins adopt a post-structuralist position, that it makes no sense to
distinguish between epistemology and ontology because our understandings of
both are co-constituted as social constructions. In our view, adopting such a position would involve rendering redundant important differences in the philosophy of
social science and that seems misguided in an introductory essay.
To us, this discussion indicates that classifications of ontological and epistemological
positions are themselves influenced by the ontological and epistemological stance of
the classifier. As such, we fundamentally disagree with Bates and Jenkinss implicit
view that it is possible to be analytically reflexive in a way which does not involve
intellectual gatekeeping. All intellectual analysis entails choice and selection and
the notion that there is some meta-meta-theoretical neutral position which does
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PAUL FURLONG AND DAVID MARSH

not involve choice, and thus intellectual gatekeeping, is seriously misleading. Consequently, we used a terminology which we recognise has problems, but we stand
by both the need to distinguish between these two broad ontological positions and
the view that our approach is a more open one than most alternatives.
Bates and Jenkins also argue that realism is an ontological, not an epistemological,
position. Here, our defence is stronger. It is true that, in philosophy, realism is often
seen as an ontological position, but that view is highly contested.4 However, this is
even more problematic in social science because, in that field, realism is clearly
associated with an epistemological, rather than an ontological,5 question: how can
we know about the deep structures, like class and gender, which are real, that is they
have an existence independent of the way we understand them, if we cannot directly
observe them? It is for this reason that we treat realism as an epistemological position.
Of course, a post-structuralist would deny that there are deep structures which
constrain and facilitate, but our aim was to introduce that possibility to students.
Bates and Jenkins contend that, in claiming that ontology precedes epistemology,
we are asserting a view which is contested. In our view, Hay has dealt effectively
with that criticism and we are happy to rest on his defence (Hay, 2007). However,
we would add one point and it both relates back to our earlier argument and leads
us into the next section. The argument against the view that ontology precedes
epistemology, which is associated with post-structuralism and either suggests that
the relationship is in the other direction or that the distinction between ontology
and epistemology is meaningless, involves a much stronger attempt to gatekeep
than that of which Hay and we stand accused. We return to this point below.

II. On gatekeeping and teaching and learning about

ontology and epistemology
This is the issue about which we feel most strongly and it is what disappoints us in
Bates and Jenkinss critique. Of course, we might ask how Bates and Jenkins, who
were taught by Hay and us and heavily exposed to the two books under discussion
here, have developed independent views if we are attempting to gatekeep. At no
stage do we, or indeed Hay, tell people what ontological and epistemological
positions to adopt. In fact, we go to some lengths to argue that there are many ways
of doing political science, which reflect different ontological and epistemological
positions; indeed, this has been something of a hobby horse of Marsh (Marsh and
Savigny, 2004; Marsh and Smith, 2001; Marsh and Stoker, 2002). Indeed, in our
view, the two main sets of gatekeepers in social and political science are the
positivists, who argue that there is only one way to proceed, that is to generate
hypotheses from theories which you then test and attempt to falsify, and the
post-structuralists and, as we have already argued, in their intervention Bates and
Jenkins seem to us to adopt post-structuralist clothes who argue that all knowledge is a social and cultural construct. Personally, we have no problem with those
who do research in those two traditions, but both traditions also need to acknowledge that there is good, and bad, research in their own, and in other, traditions.
We began by arguing that ontological and epistemological positions need to be
taken seriously. We end by claiming both that we do take them seriously and that,
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whatever its limitations, Theory and Methods, and we would argue Political Analysis,
have helped produce a broader and more sophisticated set of undergraduate and
graduate students in UK political science. Certainly, these issues are complex and
any attempt to classify positions and show how they relate to one another will
simplify these complexities. The key question is whether such classificatory
schemes provide a way of introducing students to the complexities without constraining their own attempts to explore them further. In our view, our discussion
provides a sound introduction which teachers and students can use as a starting
point and that is the position on which we are happy to rest.

Notes
1 It is not irrelevant that both of these books have sold well, been widely translated into other languages
and very widely cited; each having over 100 citations in a Google Scholar search. More importantly, the
two books have had a significant affect on undergraduate teaching in political science, with many
departments introducing a module which reflects the concerns of these books, and for which they are
used as textbooks; hence the sales.
2 Of course, if one dissolves the distinction between ontology and epistemology, or gives precedence to
the latter, then this argument almost inevitably falls; we return to that point below. It is also important
to recognise that others take a similar line to us; see Bevir and Rhodes (2003 and 2006) and Grix
(2004).
3 This classification was suggested to David Marsh by Justin Cruickshank, Sociology Department,
University of Birmingham.
4 For a very strong and effective defence of realism as an epistemological position see Harris (2005).
5 Although, of course, this epistemological position assumes an ontological position; that there is a real
world out there.

References
Bates, S.R. and L. Jenkins (2007), Teaching and Learning Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science,
Politics 27(1), pp. 5563.
Bevir, M. and R. Rhodes (2003), Reinterpreting British Governance, London: Routledge.
Bevir, M. and R. Rhodes (2006), Governance Narratives, London: Routledge.
Grix, J. (2004), The Foundations of Research, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Harris, S. (2005), The End of Faith, London: Free Press.
Hay, C. (2002), Political Analysis, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Hay, C. (2007), Does Ontology Trump Epistemology? Notes on the Directional Dependence of Ontology
and Epistemology in Political Analysis, Politics 27(2), pp. 115118.
Marsh, D. and G. Stoker (2002), Theory and Methods in Political Science, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Marsh, D. and H. Savigny (2004), Political Science as a Broad Church: The Search for a Pluralist
Discipline, Politics 24(3), pp. 155168.
Marsh, D. and M. Smith (2001), There is More than One Way to Study Political Science: On Different
Ways to Study Policy Networks, Political Studies 49, pp. 528541.

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