Villavicencio Vs.

Lukban
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of October
25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were signed as
laborers.
A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ, but the
mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.
Held:
The Supreme Court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was commendable, but
there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their domicile from manila to another place.
The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were
entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a
fundamental right that its suppression could considered tantamount to slavery.
The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode. "Ours is a
government of laws and not of men."

Tuason v. Register of Deeds 157 SCRA 613 (1988)

FACTS: Roman Tuason Retired public school teachers, Bought a house using all their money (retirement money
etc) Petitioners from Carmel Farms Inc. (Included in the friar estates) a piece of land in Caloocan City by virtue of
which they were issued a title in their names and they took possession of their property bec carmel farms did not
completely pay their debts. In 1973, President Marcos, exercising martial law powers, issued PD 293 cancelling the
certificates of titles of Carmel Farms and declaring the lands covered to be open for disposition and sale to members
of the Malacaang Association Inc.
ISSUE: WON
HELD: The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. Since he was never vested
with judicial power -- such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the SC and such inferior courts as may be
established by law -- the judicial acts done by him were under the circumstances alien to his office as chief
executive.
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National
Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution
confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said
resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the
petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the
Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not
submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of
respondents protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.
II.

THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest
filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution
of the National Assembly?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition.]
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking knowledge of
the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election
by resolution of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming
to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that
the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.
[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the
other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed
in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged
also in the Electoral Commission.

Marcos vs. Manlapus

177 SCRA 668
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his
family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners
assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically
Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has
been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right
involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the
Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the
right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the
national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's
country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to
return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right
to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as
part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has
determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during
the past few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Casibang v. Aquino
G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979
Makasiar, J.
Facts:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who
seasonably filed a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the
grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified
electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign
expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.
In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or
less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution
to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of
the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court declared that there
is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.
Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence
and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that
the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of
which principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI a political
question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that ... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution
relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government
should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI.
He further submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are
only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of
Article XVII.

The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9
of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and
are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure
of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative
Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire
local government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the
necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still
continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a
question or policy in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive
branch of the government.
Issue:
whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit
Held:
No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election
protest cases. The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit
of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect,
cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be
performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest and that subject to the constraints
specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been
the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a
candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced
proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elects right to
the contested office.
The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue
of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to
their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were
not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their
functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite
term of office given to them by said constitutional provision.
Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to
continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court
decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law
or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973
Constitution.
There is a difference between the term of office and the right to hold an office. Aterm of office is the
period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its
privileges and emoluments. A right to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers
and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the term refers to the period, duration of length of time during
which the occupant of an office is entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence,
although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not
foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the right of the private respondents to
continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the term
to the office, although the right of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the
term thereof, and that it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the
term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new
term. They hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is
now indefinite.

The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and
decide election protests: Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that all existing laws not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National
Assembly. And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971
which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected, and
according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution all courts existing at the time of the ratification of
this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with
this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in
force. Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and
exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners.
While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective
provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to
electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions.
General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section
9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid
constitutional provision.
General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests
of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order,
after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil
cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity,
legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated representative
or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.
In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a
justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the
incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent
Judge decides the election protest. The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its
jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a
prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid. Political questions should refer to
such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full
discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the
judiciary to pass upon.

Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax

Garcia Vs. Executive Secretary

FACTS:
On 27 November 1990, Cory issued Executive Order 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and
charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This

additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products
imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was
passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%.
Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6
of the Constitution which provides: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to
enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and
478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD:
Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all
other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not
follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue
measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to
authorize the President subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within
specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .

Araneta v Dinglasan
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Tuason, J.:
1.

Facts:
The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers
Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules and
regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.

2.

EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution
in the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.

3.

EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the
Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both
officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines
is forbidden by this EO.

4.

EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June
30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and

president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines
from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.
5.

Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in 1949.
was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the
respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect
YES.
1.
The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met
during the opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without
authority of law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not the first special session
after it.
2.
Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December
24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation
of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for election expenses in
November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or
after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based on the language of Act 671 that the
National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was
prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war.

CHIONGBIAN VS. ORBOS

(from Champ)

Congress passed the ORGANIC ACT FOR ARMM, calling for a plebiscite in Mindanao.
Only 4 provinces voted for the creation of ARMM (LanaoSur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi2)
The other provinces who did not vote for ARMM shall remain in the existing administrative regions, provided
that the PRESIDENT may by ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION, MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS.
So, President Cory issued EO 429 which reorganized those regions who did not vote for ARMM.
Petitioners are Congressmen who opposed the issuance of EO 429. They claim that President Cory had no
authority to restructure new administrative regions. They insist that the provinces should remain as they are.

ISSUE:
Whether the Organic Act for ARMM unduly delegates legislative power to the President by allowing Cory to merge
the existing regions by mere ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION.
Whether the Organic Act provided a standard to guide President Corys discretion.
DEFENSE: The SOLGEN argues that the Act is valid and there is no undue delegation but only a POWER TO FILL
UP THE DETAILS OF LEGISLATION which was given to Cory.
SC:
LAW VALID. NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT.
While the power to merge regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power traditionally lodged
with the President, in view of the POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.
Thus there is no abdication by Congress of its legislative powers in conferring on the President the POWER TO
MERGE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS.
As to the question of STANDARD, a legislative standard NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED. IT MAY SIMPLY BE
GATHERED OR IMPLIED. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be EMBODIED IN OTHER
STATUTES ON THE SAME SUBJECT as that of the challenged legislation.

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the STANDARD IS TO BE FOUND IN THE
SAME POLICY underlying the grant o the PRESIDENT in RA5434, THE POWER TO REORGANIZE THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. Under said law, the standard is to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in
the government, to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for acceleration socio-economic
development and to improve the service in the transaction of public business.
Since the original 11 administrative regions were established with this same law/ policy, it is but logical to suppose
that in authorizing the President to merge by administrative determination, the existing regions (following the
rejection of the ARMM by some regions), the purpose of Congress in enacting the Organic Act of ARMM was to
reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions.

Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes.
He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules
on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on
Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international.
II.

THE ISSUES
Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the
Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by
the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war
of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the
promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity
with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a
signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the
Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of
international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State
and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of
our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has

been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of
international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion, 322 SCRA 160, January 28, 2000

Facts :
On June 18, 199 , the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez. Secretary of Justice then ordered a
technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition request.
Pending evaluation, private respondent (Mark Jimenez) through counsel wrote a letter addressed to herein petitioner
requesting copies of official extradition request from the US Government. He requested ample time to comment and
for the matter to be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Secretary of Justice denied the said request specifically invoking our countrys responsibility to the Vienna
Convention on the law of Treaties that every treaty in force is binding upon parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith. Extradition is a toll of criminal law enforcement and to be effective must be processed
expeditiously.
Particularly in this case is the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Extradition is the process by which persons charged with or
convicted of crimes against the law of a State and found in a foreign state are returned by the latter to the former for
trial or punishment.
Pacta sunt servanda requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of
our countrys legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution.
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation.
Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
After the denial of the request letter, Mark Jimenez filed a petition against herein Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding
Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Thus, this petition is now at bar.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Lantion acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the temporary restraining order to herein petitioner
in performing his legal duties as Secretary of Justice.
Held : The Extradition Law provides Rules of Court shall apply, thus extradite has the basic right of notice and
hearing. The RP-US Extradition Treaty under the Incorporation Clause in case of conflict is not superior over a
national law. International law is given equal standing but not superior to national legislative enactment. The
principle lex posterior degorat oriori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In
States where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.
Thus, petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers
and to grant him (Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment and supporting evidence
There was only a void on some provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty as regards to the basic due process right
of a prospective extradite at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceeding.
RTCs decision is rendered moot and academic and herein petition is DISMISSED.