SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v.

LANTION
Facts:

On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the

Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S.

The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other
supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with
the request.

Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel

proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the
extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be
addressed.
Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in
the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the
completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is
in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069Philippine
Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have
been complied with by the Requesting Government.
Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary
investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution
inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized
disclosure of the information in the documents.
3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of
treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties.
4. The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and
prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent.
Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the
requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.

Issues:
1.
WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights
of notice and hearing. YES

2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as the removal of an accused

from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against
him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him
or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or government.

Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an

administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any
judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition

process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of

the prospective extradite.
This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest
of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request &
the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency
of the extradition petition in court.
Clearly, theres an impending threat to a prospective extraditees
liberty as early as during the evaluation stage.
Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the
consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical
assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the
deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite.
In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of
a criminal investigation.
There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only
in criminal prosecution.
But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of
an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or
property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal,
& such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty.
In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an
information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, &
to the deprivation of his liberty.
Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice &
hearing according to A3 14(1) & (2), as well as A3 7the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right
to access to official records & documents
The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a
criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in
deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite.
A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to
eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal
aspect of the process.
The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since
both procedures may have the same result the arrest and
imprisonment of the respondent.
The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil &
administrative proceedings.
Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting
their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein &
present their side.
Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:
a) When there is an urgent need for immediate action
(preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking
filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).
b) Where there is tentativeness of administrative action & the
respondent isnt prevented from enjoying the right to notice &
hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the
property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an
appointee)

Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them
had not been claimed.

2.
WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments
and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty? No.

The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the
suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions.

Both states accord common due process protection to their respective

citizens.

The administrative investigation doesnt fall under the three exceptions

to the due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the
Rules of Court.

c)

3.
WON theres any conflict between private respondents basic due
process rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty. No.

Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most

countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts.

Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil
of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at any
stage.
PEOPLE V LAGON
FACTS

On July 7 1976 a criminal action was filed with theCity Court of Roxas
charging Lagon with estafa forallegedly issuing a P4,232 check as
payment forgoods knowing she had insufficient funds.
However on Dec. 2, as the trial commenced, the City Courtdismissed
the information on the ground that thepenalty prescribed by law for
estafa was beyond thecourts authority to impose. Hence this petition
forreview.

ISSUE: WON the City Court had jurisdiction over the case
HELD: NO

It is settled doctrine that jurisdiction of a court incriminal law matters

is determined
by the
law
ineffect
at the
time
of the
commencement of thecriminal action and not the law in effect at the
timeof the commission of the offense charged.Under Sec 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,municipal judges in the
capitals of provinces andsub-provinces and judges of city courts shall
havelike jurisdiction as the CFI to try parties charged with
an offense within their
respective jurisdictions,
in
which penalties provided do not exceed prision correccional or fines no
exceeding P6,000 or both.At the time of the commission of the crime, theimposable penalty
under
Art
315
of
the
RPC
wasarresto mayor in its maximum period to prisioncorreccional it is
minimum period, falling well withinthe jurisdiction of the City Court.
But when theinformation was filed, PD 818 had increased theimposable
penalty to prision mayor in its mediumperiod.The real question raised by petitioner is whether thesaid doctrine
disregards the rule against retroactivityof penal laws.

It has been repeatedly held that incriminal prosecutions, jurisdiction is

not determinedby what may be meted out to the offender in aftertrial
but by the extent of the penalty which the lawimposes.
Once
jurisdiction
is
acquired
by
the
Court inwhich the information is filed, it is retainedregardless
of
whether the evidence proves a lesseroffense which carries a penalty
that would otherwisefall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court.In the instant case, should the information be refiledwith the RTC, the
court may not impose a moreonerous penalty upon Lagon.
Although the RTCretains subject-matter jurisdiction to try and
decidethe refiled case under PD 818, given the date of thecommission
of the
crime (before
effectivity of
PD818), the lower penalty provided in Art 315(otherwise within the
jurisdiction of the City Court)should be imposed.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved toDENY the petition

PEOPLE V BERIALES
Facts:

Ricardo Beriales, Benedicto Custodio and Pablito Custodio were

convicted of the crime of murder by CFI of Leyte.
They have allegedly murdered one Saturnina Gonzales Porcadilla on
September 14, 1974.
Upon the hearing, appellants counsel moved for a reinvestigation of
the case which was granted.
Trial court postponed hearing until December 17 and 18, 1974.
The fiscal filed a motion to defer the hearing until such time as the
reinvestigation shall have terminated.
The trial court, however, motu proprio cancelled the Dec. 17 & 18
hearing and reset the arraignment and trial to December 10 and 11,
1974.
At the December 10 hearing, counsel of appellants manifested to the
court that the city fiscal had set the reinvestigation on December 12,
1974 and had already sent subpoenas to the witnesses.
The court nevertheless proceeded to hearing the next day, December
11.
Upon appellants counsels insistence, the court relying on
constitutional mandate of the right to a speedy trial, re-scheduled the
hearing to December 13.
On the day of the trial, counsel asked to the court to wait for the City
Fiscal to appear since the Fiscal might be able to report on the
reinvestigation.
However, the court insisted on arraigning the appellants.
Appelants refused to give a plea because they are waiting for the
fiscal, the trial court entered a plea of Not Guilty for each of them.
Appellants counsel manifested that they could not go to trial without
the City Fiscal.
For the same reason, counsel refused to cross-examine the witnesses
presented. Counsel reiterated that they do not agree with the trial
when defense was called to present evidence.
Trial court considered the case to be submitted for decision and
announced promulgation of the decision on December 17.

Issues:
1.
2.
3.

Whether or not the trial court should hold the trial until after the
reinvestigation
Whether or not appellants were denied due process . YES
Whether or not the fiscal should be present during proceedings

Held:
1.

2.

3.

After the trial court granted the appellants motion for reinvestigation,
it became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the
arraignment and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have
conducted and made his report on the result of such reinvestigation.
When the trial court ignored the appellants manifestations objecting to
the arraignment and trial of the case, it committed a serious
irregularity which nullifies the proceedings because such procedure is
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Although fiscal turns over active conduct of trial to private prosecutor,
he should be present during the proceedings. While there is nothing in
the rule of practice and procedure in criminal cases which denies the
right of the fiscal to turn over the active conduct of the trial to a
private prosecutor, nevertheless, his duty to direct and control the
prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be present during
the proceeding.
Constitutional due process was violated, thus, case remanded to CFI for
arraignment and trial.
Court should have held in abeyance the trial while the report on einvestigation was still pending.
Consistent disregard of the defense objection on the arraignment, trial,
presentation of private prosecutors evidence, and rendition of
judgment violates due process.
Prosecutor or Fiscal entrusted with the investigation is duty bound to
take charge until final termination.
They shall have direction and control of the criminal prosecution over
private prosecutors

REPUBLIC vs. SUNGA

FACTS:

An information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial

Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents Rafael
Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. A hearing was set but was
postponed since Rafael Anadilla was not yet arrested by the
authorities.
The court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at
the same time set a new trial date.
However, 4 months before the trial date, the court a quo issued the
now assailed order which reads:
Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested
in the further prosecution of this case and there being no objection on
the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose
Anadilla, this case is hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the

accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted
and has no force and effect.
The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is
hereby ordered cancelled.
In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden
is hereby ordered to release said accused from their detention
immediately upon receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.
The order was based on an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE which was
executed and notarized by the victim and mentioned that:
a.
b.
c.

he was no longer interested in the further prosecution of the case

he had forgiven the accused
his material witnesses could not be located, and that without their
testimonies, the guilt of the accused could not be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

The provincial fiscal moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, but

was also denied.
Hence the petition and issue of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis
of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without a
motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal.
HELD:

The court cites a similar case Crespo v. Mogul in its when it answered
that the filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal
action.
The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the
authority to hear and determine the case.
When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the
arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either
voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the
Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon
the filing of the information in the proper court.
The rule is that once a complaint is filed, the disposition of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the court.
The fiscal cannot impose his opinion on the court when the case has
been submitted to it as his jurisdiction ends in the direction and control
of the prosecution of the case.
Only the court can decide what the best direction is for the case, as it
is within its exclusive jurisdiction.
In this case, almost 10 years have elapsed since the date of the filing
of the information, hence it was not unusual that the victim could not
find his witnesses, the testimonies of whom are needed to convict the
accused.
The fiscal still believed that he could convict the accused without thee
testimonies in his MR!

Although the Crespo doctrine holds that it is the courts duty to

judge whether a case should be dismissed, any move of the
offended part to dismiss the case, even without objection of
the accused, should first be submitted to the fiscal.
It is only after the fiscals hearing that the court should
exercise its duty to continue or dismiss the case.

PEOPLE V ILARDE
FACTS:

This is a case for adultery originated in the City of Iloilo. A man

caught his wife in an act of adultery.

The next thing he did was to execute an affidavit-complaint, which

he filed in the office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City.

In his affidavit he said, Im formally charging my wife and X and

would request this affidavit be considered as a formal complaint
against them.

While the case was pending before the fiscal for investigation, he
died.

So the Fiscal asked how he can file an information in court when

there is no complaint because the rule is, the complaint filed with
the fiscals office is not the complaint contemplated by law; there
must be a complaint filed signed by the offended party.

But in this case, the complainant was already dead. Although there
was an affidavit-complaint.

The fiscal knew that and so he prepared an information for

adultery charging the wife and her paramour.

In the information he stated: The undersigned City Fiscal upon

sworn statement originally filed by the offended party, xerox
copies of which are hereto attached as annexes A and B xxx So
what he did was to incorporate the affidavit of the deceased
offended husband in the information.

Now, the wife and the paramour moved to quash the information
alleging lack of jurisdiction upon the offense charged because
under Article 344 of the RPC, the requirement for the complaint of
adultery was not complied with citing the case of People vs.
Santos, 101 Phil. 798, where it was held that the complaint filed in
the fiscals office for a private crime is not the complaint
contemplated by law.

On that basis, RTC Judge Ilarde dismissed the case.

The prosecution went to the SC on certiorari.

HELD:

The respondent trial court is wrong.

The order of dismissal is hereby set aside and is directed to
proceed with the trial of the case.
It must be borne in mind, however, that this legal requirement
was imposed out of consideration for the aggrieved party who
might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial.
Thus, the law leaves it to the option of the aggrieved spouse to
seek judicial redress for the affront committed by the erring
spouse.
And this, to Our mind, should be the overriding consideration in
determining the issue of whether or not the condition precedent

prescribed by said Article 344 has been complied with.

For needless to state, this Court should be guided by the spirit,
rather than the letter, of the law.
In the case at bar, the desire of the offended party to bring his
wife and her alleged paramour to justice is only too evident.
Such determination of purpose on his part is amply demonstrated
in the dispatch [speed] by which he filed his complaint with the
fiscals office [because he filed the complaint the day after the
crime happened].
The strong and equivocal statement contained in the affidavit filed
with the Fiscal's Office that I am formally charging my wife of the
crime of adultery and would request that this affidavit be
considered as a formal complaint against them is a clear show
of such intent.
The ruling in People vs. Santos is not applicable to the case at
bar. In that case, the sworn statement was not considered the
complaint contemplated by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
because it was a mere narration of how the crime was committed.
Whereas, in the case at bar, in the affidavit-complaint submitted
by the offended husband, he not only narrated the facts and
circumstances constituting the crime of adultery, but he also
explicitly and categorically charged private respondents with the
said offense Im charging my wife and her paramour with
adultery.
Moreover, in Santos, the SC noted that the information filed by
the fiscal commenced with the statement the undersigned fiscal
accuses so and so, the offended party not having been mentioned
at all as one of the accusers. But in the present case, it is as if the
husband filed the case.
The affidavit of the husband here contains all the elements of a
valid complaint under Section 5, Rule I10 of the Rules of Court.
What is more, said complaint-affidavit was attached to the
information as an integral part thereof, and duly filed with the
court.
Therefore, the affidavit complaint became the basis of the
complaint required by Section 5.

PEOPLE V MADALI
Facts:

An appeal from the decision of the RTC Branch 81 of Romblon,

Romblon finding accused-appellantsguilty of the murder of
Reynaldo M. Abrenica and sentencing each of them to reclusion
perpetua. Thebody of Reynaldo was found by his wife on the
landing of the stairs of their house.

An autopsy con-ducted by Dr. Villaseor of the PNP Crime

Laboratory yielded to the conclusion that the cause of deathis
intracranial hemorrhage as a result of traumatic head injury.

Three years after Reynaldos death, the case was filed after an
alleged eyewitness, Mercy Villamor,surfaced and implicated the
accused-appellants.

Based on the testimony of this witness, the accused-appellants

were found guilty in the aforementioned decision.

The accused-appellants, in their appeal, alleged that the trial court

erred in failing to resolve doubtsand discrepancies in its findings of

HELD:

fact in favor of the accused and that the court erred in finding
credi-ble the testimonies of Mercy Villamor and Dr. Villaseor.
The complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief separate from
that which the OSG would file, byway of an answer to the brief of
accused-appellants. This motion was denied.
The OSG subsequentlyfiled a Manifestation recommending the
acquittal of accused-appellants. In view of the position takenby the
OSG, complainant filed a Memorandum for the Private
Complainant (after filing a Manifestationand Motion to File Brief)
which was noted by the Court.
Rule 122, Sec.1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final
order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. It
has been held that the wordparty in the provision includes not
only the government and the accused but other persons who may
be af-fected by the judgment.
The complainant has an interest in the civil liability arising from
the crime. Hence, in the prosecutionof the offense, the
complainants role is that of a witness for the prosecution.
Ordinarily, the appeal of the criminal cases involves as parties only
the accused, as appellants, andthe State, represented by the
SolGen, as the appellee. The participation of the private offended
partywould be a mere surplusage if the State were simply to
seek affirmation of a judgment of conviction.However, where the
OSG takes a contrary position and recommends, as in this
case, the acquittal of the accused, the complainants right to be
heard as regards indemnity and damages arises.
Nevertheless, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the accusedappellants conviction. Mercy Villamors testi-mony is riddled with
inconsistencies, improbabilities and uncertainties which relate
to material points. Evidence,to be believed, must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself be credible.

CRESPO VS MOGUL CASE DIGEST

FACTS:

Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit

Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a
motion for defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice.
However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment
was deferred in a much later date to afford time for the petitioner
to elevate the mater to the appellate court.
The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the CA.
The CA ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the
arraignment until further orders of the Court. Undersecretary of
Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for review
reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal and
directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused.
Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the

arraignment.
The accused then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of
prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA.

The CA dismissed the order and lifted the restraining order.

Issue: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed
by the Fiscal under orders fro, the Secretary of Justice and insists on
arraignment and trial on the merits.
HELD: YES

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced

by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal. 17

The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound

discretion of the fiscal.

The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction
and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. 19

It cannot be controlled by the complainant.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any

limitation or control.

The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal

or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe
elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power
to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.

Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to

dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information
be filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal

action.

The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the
authority to hear and determine the case.

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the

purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the
filing of the information in the proper court.

ROBERTS v CA
FACTS

Several thousand holders of 349 Pepsi crowns in connection with the

Number Fever Promotion filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City complaints against the petitioner officials of PEPSI.
The petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor a motion for
the reconsideration of the Joint Resolution and with the DOJ a Petition
for Review.
The petitioners also Motions to Suspend Proceedings and to hold in
Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they had
filed the aforesaid Petition for Review.
Respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying
the petitioners Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold In
Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and the public prosecutors
Motion to Defer Arraignment and (2) directing the issuance of the
warrants of arrest after and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993.

The petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition with application for a temporary restraining
order.
They contended therein that respondent Judge Asuncion had acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the aforementioned order.
The Court of Appeals then issued a resolution denying the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: WON public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of

discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest without examining the
records of the preliminary investigation.
HELD YES.

Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that no search

warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge.
It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor the Election
Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this
determination.
The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge.
It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause.
The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him.
By itself, the Prosecutors certification of probable cause is ineffectual.
It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if
any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutors
certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his
determination.
The teachings of the cases of Soliven3, Inting4, Lim5, Allado, and Webb
reject the proposition that the investigating prosecutors certification in
an information or his resolution which is made the basis for the filing of
the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the present case, nothing accompanied the information upon its
filing with the trial court. Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion
issued the assailed order directing, among other things, the issuance of
warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended information,
and Joint Resolution as bases thereof.
He did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutors
finding of probable cause.
And strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause;
he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest.
It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of
probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement
for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition,
conjecture, or even convincing logic.

PEOPLE v GUEVARRA
FACTS

-On or about April 8, 1980, in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, several armed men
namely Jaime Guevarra y Arcega, Poncing Abergas, Dan Tolentino,
Baldo de Jesus, Roming Longhair, Boy Tae, Boy Pogi, Chotse Doe alias
Bernabe Sulaybar y Hernandez, and Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan
Saksak", entered the house of the sps Cruz and robbed them of P3000
and jewelry.
Thereafter, Luisito Cruz was threatened by the men and forced to give
the keys to his car by Vergel Bustamante.
The members of the household were then made to enter a room and
were tied.
After the robbery, Priscilla Cruz was forcibly boarded in her own car by
5 of her kidnappers where she was held at knife and gunpoint.
She was then told she was being held for ransom of P50k but they had
to stop in San Rafael Bulucan to hire a truck because the car broke
down.
However, she was left at Valenzuela Bulacan as the men said the
kidnapping did not materialize.
The five men then boarded a taxi and the truck driver later took her
home.
On the same night, Luisito reported the incident which led to the
detention of Vergel Bustamante who was positively identified by
Priscilla.
Bustamante denied the allegations and interposed the defense of alibi,
claiming to be in Caloocan at the time of the crime.
His defense was rejected considering the proximity of Gapan and
Caloocan and since witnesses had positively identified him.
After a separate trial for Poncing Abergas and Vergel Bustamante alias
"Dan Saksak," inasmuch as Dan Tolentino, who had previously entered
of plea of "not guilty" could not be served with subpoenas, and the
other accused were reported to have died, judgment was rendered
finding the accused Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak" guilty of the
crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and sentenced to
suffer the death penalty, and to indemnify the offended party, Mrs.
Priscilla Cruz, in the amount of P5,000.00.
The accused Poncing Abergas, upon the other hand, was acquitted of
the charge.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES
1. WON TC erred in ordering the amendment of the information to include
Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak despite lack of proof that the 2 are 1 and
the same person. NO
2. WON there was no reinvestigation conducted to justify the filing of the
amended information. NO
3. WON the TC erred in convicting Bustamante upon the prosecution witnesses
contradictory and improbable testimonies and the appellants extra- judicial
confession. NO
4. WON the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom. NO
HELD
1.

NO.
The ff circumstances led the RTC judge of Nueva Ecija to believe that
Vergel Bustamante and Dan Saksak are one and the same person as

2.

3.

the accused is mentioned in each as Vergel Bustamante alias Dan

Saksak:
1. A subpoena issued by the MTC of Gapan; a Return of Service of
one subpoena; an order issued by the Municipal Court of Gapan
finding a prima facie case against the accused; and
2. the letter of transmittal of the records of the cases to the RTC of
Nueva Ecija stating Bustamante aka Dan Saksak was detained in
the Manila City Jail.
In, any case, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as
it is one affecting jurisdiction over the person and should have been
raised before the trial court in a motion to quash the information.
As the accused failed to do so, he is deemed to have waived his
objection to the information and is assumed to be satisfied with its
legality.
NO

NO

The reinvestigation is evidenced by the certification of the

Fiscal stating that there was reasonable ground to believe a
crime had been committed and that the accused were
informed of the complaint and given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence.
The said discrepancies in the testimonies were minor details
which could not destroy the substance of said testimonies.

4.

NO

As the highest degree of respect is accorded to the factual

findings of the TC, the issue of the credibility of the witnesses
cannot be raised.
Also, the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient
to support a finding of guilt even without the said extrajudicial confession.
No element of ransom exists as no ransom note was
presented in court.
Neither was there a demand for money in exchange for
Priscillas safe return.
Besides, the Amended Information failed to allege that the
kidnapping was for the purpose of extorting a ransom.
The rule is that an accused cannot be convicted of a higher
offense than that charged in the complaint or information.
Hence, Bustamante can only be convicted of kidnapping of a
female under Article 267 with the aggravating circumstances
of (a) the use of a motor vehicle and (b) the aid of armed men
bringing the penalty up to the maximum. However, due to
Article 3 Sec. 19 of the Constitution, the death penalty is
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED