35.

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. TOMAS CUENCA, et al.

G.R. No. 173297, March 6, 2013
Bersamin, J.
FACTS: Manuel D. Maraon, Jr. filed a complaint in the RTC against Tomas Cuenca, Marcelina
Cuenca, and Milagros Cuenca (collectively referred to as the Cuencas) for the collection of a
sum of money and damages. His complaint included an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment, which the RTC granted upon the posting of a bond executed in favor of
the Cuencas. Less than a month later, Maraon amended the complaint to implead Bramie
Tayactac as a defendant. Maraon later posted a bond issued by Stronghold Insurance. Two days
later, the RTC issued the writ of preliminary attachment. Enforcing the writ, the sheriff levied
upon the equipment, supplies, materials and various other personal property belonging to Arc
Cuisine, Inc. that were found in the leased corporate office/commissary or kitchen of the
corporation.
The Cuencas and Tayactac presented in the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Writ of
Preliminary Attachment on the ground of the action involving intra-corporate matters that were
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC, and there being another action pending
in the SEC as well as a criminal complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque City.
Maraon opposed the motion. The RTC denied the Motion, stating that the action, being one for
the recovery of a sum of money and damages, was within its jurisdiction. The Cuencas and
Tayactac moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same.
Thus, the Cuencas and Tayactac went to the CA on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the
orders of the RTC on the basis of being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The CA granted the petition and annulled and set aside the challenged
orders, dismissed the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded to the RTC for
hearing and resolution of the Cuencas and Tayactacs claim for the damages sustained from the
enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment.
The Cuencas and Tayactac then filed before the RTC a Motion to Require Sheriff to Deliver
Attached Properties and to Set Case for Hearing, praying inter alia that: the Branch Sheriff be
ordered to immediately deliver the attached properties to them; that Stronghold Insurance be
directed to pay them the damages being sought in accordance with its undertaking under the
surety bond; and that Maraon be held personally liable to them considering the insufficiency of
the amount of the surety bond. Stronghold Insurance filed its answer and opposition. In turn, the
Cuencas and Tayactac filed their reply. Maraon filed his own comment/opposition, arguing that
because the attached properties belonged to Arc Cuisine, Inc. 50% of the stockholding of which
he and his relatives owned, it should follow that 50% of the value of the missing attached
properties constituted liquidating dividends that should remain with and belong to him. The RTC
commanded Maraon to surrender all the attached properties to the RTC through the sheriff
within 10 days from notice. After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment, holding Maraon and
Stronghold Insurance jointly and solidarily liable for damages to the Cuencas and Tayactac.

Only Stronghold Insurance appealed to the CA. Finding no reversible error, the CA promulgated
its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. Stronghold Insurance moved for reconsideration,
but the CA denied it hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Could the Cuencas and Tayactac recover damages arising from the wrongful attachment
of the assets of Arc Cuisine, Inc. by claiming against the bond issued by Stronghold Insurance?
RULING: NO.
[] Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that unless otherwise authorized by law or
the Rules of Court every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Under the same rule, a real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or one who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Accordingly, a person ,
to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, should appear to be the
present real owner of the right sought to be enforced, that is, his interest must be a present
substantial interest, not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest. Where the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the ground for the motion to dismiss
is lack of cause of action. The reason for this is that the courts ought not to pass upon questions
not derived from any actual controversy. Truly, a person having no material interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action. Nor does a court acquire
jurisdiction over a case where the real party in interest is not present or impleaded.
The purposes of the requirement for the real party in interest prosecuting or defending an action
at law are: (a) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest
in the case; (b) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the
action; (c) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and (d) to discourage litigation and keep it within
certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy. [...] The rule on real party in interest ensures [...]
that the party with the legal right to sue brings the action, and this interest ends when a judgment
involving the nominal plaintiff will protect the defendant from a subsequent identical action. [...]
But the real party in interest need not be the person who ultimately will benefit from the
successful prosecution of the action. Hence, to aid itself in the proper identification of the real
party in interest, the court should first ascertain the nature of the substantive right being asserted,
and then must determine whether the party asserting that right is recognized as the real party in
interest under the rules of procedure. Truly, that a party stands to gain from the litigation is not
necessarily controlling. [...]
There is no dispute that the properties subject to the levy on attachment belonged to Arc Cuisine,
Inc. alone, not to the Cuencas and Tayactac in their own right. They were only stockholders of
Arc Cuisine, Inc., which had a personality distinct and separate from that of any or all of them.
The damages occasioned to the properties by the levy on attachment, wrongful or not, prejudiced
Arc Cuisine, Inc., not them. As such, only Arc Cuisine, Inc. had the right under the substantive
law to claim and recover such damages. This right could not also be asserted by the Cuencas and
Tayactac unless they did so in the name of the corporation itself. But that did not happen herein,
because Arc Cuisine, Inc. was not even joined in the action either as an original party or as an
intervenor.

36.
HEIRS OF LORENZO BUENSUCESO vs. LOVY PEREZ
G.R. No. 173926, March 6, 2013
Brion, J.
FACTS: German was the son and heir of Lorenzo Buensuceso, the farmer-beneficiary of an
agricultural lot in Nueva Ecija. The disputed lot was awarded to Lorenzo pursuant to Operation
Land Transfer under P.D. No. 27, and covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer. Upon Lorenzos
death, German allegedly immediately occupied the disputed lot and had been cultivating and
residing within its premises since then. German claimed that, in 1989, Lovy Perez forcibly
entered the disputed lot, thus, compelling him to file a petition for recovery of possession with
the PARAD.
In her answer with counterclaim, Lovy argued that she is the real and lawful tenant of the
disputed lot as evidenced by: (1) the duly acknowledged and registered contract of leasehold
between her and the landowner, Joaquin Garces, which Lorenzo signed as a witness; and (2) the
certifications issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) in Nueva Ecija, and by the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council stating
that she is the disputed lots registered agricultural lessee. She also claimed that she has been
paying the lease rentals to Garces, as shown by receipts, and the irrigation services beginning
1984 as certified to by the National Irrigation Administration, and that she is a bona fide member
of the Samahang Nayon.
The PARAD dismissed the petition, ruling that German failed to prove that he or his father,
Lorenzo, was the farm helper or the regular tenant-lessee of the disputed lot. In contrast, Lovy
successfully proved that she was the lawful tenant-lessee. German appealed the dismissal to the
DARAB, which affirmed in toto the PARADs decision. German sought reconsideration, which
he obtained in due course. In its resolution, the DARAB set aside its earlier decision and ordered
Lovy to surrender possession of the disputed lot to German. This time, the DARAB considered
the CLT as clear evidence of the Governments recognition of Lorenzo as the tenant-beneficiary
of the disputed lot entitled to avail of the statutory mechanisms under P.D. No. 27 for acquiring
its ownership. It maintained the presumption of the CLTs continued validity, as the record
neither showed that it was cancelled nor that grounds exist for its cancellation.
The case was elevated to the CA; the appellate court granted Lovys appeal and reversed the
DARAB resolution. The CA ruled that Lorenzo had long abandoned the disputed lot, which he
confirmed when he signed as a witness to the lease contract between Garces and Lovy; that, with
the execution of the lease contract, Lovy became the qualified farmer-beneficiary, who then
cultivated the disputed lot on her own account. Additionally, the CA declared that Lorenzos CLT
was not sufficient to constitute him as the owne since he failed to comply with the obligation to
pay the lease rentals that Section 26 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844 requires. The CA denied
Germans motion for reconsideration, prompting the present recourse.
ISSUE: Is the question of who between Lorenzo and German, on the one hand, and Lovy, on the
other, actually tilled and cultivated the disputed lot improper for a Rule 45 petition?

RULING: NO.
The rules invoked by the respondents are well settled: a Rule 45 petition is limited to questions
of law, and the factual findings of the lower courts are, as a rule, conclusive on this Court.24 The
question of who, between German and the respondents, is entitled to the continued possession of
the disputed lot involves factual issues and is not the proper subject of a Rule 45 petition.
Despite this Rule 45 requirement, however, our pronouncements have likewise recognized
exceptions, such as the situation obtaining here where the tribunals below conflict in their
factual findings. We note that the DARAB (in its resolution) in effect reversed its earlier decision
and the PARADs ruling while the CA, in turn, set aside the DARABs September 4, 2003
resolution. In this light, we cannot support the procedural objection raised

37.
AUGUSTO P. BALDADO vs. ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA
A.C. No. 9120, March 11, 2013
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Complainant Augusto P. Baldado was a former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar. He ran and won in the 2004 National and Local
Elections. Florentino C. Nival, a losing candidate during the said elections, filed a Petition for
Quo Warranto with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar against
complainant, questioning his qualifications as a candidate, as he was allegedly an American
citizen.
Complainant hired the legal services of respondent for the said case. Respondent filed an
Answer, and later filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court
over the case due to the failure of Florentino C. Nival to pay the appropriate filing or docket fee.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the motion is proscribed after the
filing of an Answer, as provided in Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration from the denial of the motion to dismiss. The trial
court denied the motion on the ground that there was no notice of hearing pursuant to Sections 4,
5 and 6, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent filed a second motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court for being a prohibited pleading under
Section 2, Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court soon rendered a Decision directing the issuance of a Writ of Quo Warranto ousting
complainant from the Office of the Sangguniang Bayan and declaring vacant his position as
Sangguniang Bayan member. Respondent received a copy of the Decision of the trial court, and
he had a period of five days within which to appeal the trial court's Decision to the COMELEC.
Complainant and his wife, having obtained their own copy of the trial court's Decision,
proceeded hurriedly to respondent and urged him to immediately file a notice of appeal from the
said decision. Respondent did not heed the prodding of complainant to file a Notice of Appeal,
because according to respondent, the notice of the decision could not be deemed to have been
officially received by him as the said decision had not yet been promulgated in open court;
hence, the prescriptive period to appeal would not toll yet.
Respondent leter filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer
for restraining order and/or injunction to annul or set aside the trial court's Resolutions. The First
Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It stated
that as the trial court hadacquired jurisdiction over the case, the remedy of complainant should
have been to appeal the trial court's Decision under Section 14, Rule 36 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, which provides that from any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party
may appeal to the COMELEC within five days after the promulgation of the decision. On the
other hand, certiorari, under Section 1, Rule 28 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is allowed
only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The COMELEC stated that petitioner lost his opportunity to appeal granted by
law.

Complainant hired a new counsel, who filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the
First Division of the COMELEC. However, the motion for reconsideration was denied for lack
of merit -- hence this administrative case against respondent.
It appears that respondent failed to appeal from the Decision of the trial court, because he was
waiting for a notice of the promulgation of the said decision, as Sections 12 & 14, Rule 36 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure state [...]
ISSUE: Was respondent correct in waiting for a notice of the promulgation of the trial courts
decision before appealing from the same?
RULING: NO.
The Court notes that respondent cited Lindo v. COMELEC in his Position Paper. Lindo v.
COMELEC should have enlightened respondent about his confusion regarding when the trial
court's Decision in an election case is promulgated, and when he should have filed an appeal
from the trial court's Decision with the COMELEC. As Lindo v. COMELEC stated:
[] Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially
announced, made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing,
coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel. [] The five-day period for
petitioner to file his appeal from the decision of the trial court commenced to run
from [the date of the receipt of petitioner's counsel of record of a copy of the
decision].
From the foregoing, herein respondent should have filed an appeal from the Decision of the trial
court within five days from receipt of a copy of the decision [...]
As regards the filing of the motion to dismiss after filing an Answer, Panganiban v. Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation held that the requirement that a motion to dismiss should be filed
within the time for filing the answer is not absolute. Even after an answer has been filed, a
defendant can still file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2)
litis pendentia (3) lack of cause of action, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would
constitute a ground for dismissal. In this case, respondent sought the dismissal of the quo
warranto case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Even if the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss, respondent could still have raised the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court in the
appeal of the trial court's decision to the COMELEC; however, no such appeal was filed.