Elections in Volatile Times: Exploring Strategies

for Preventing Post-Election Violence in Nigeria

By

Aliyu Mukhtar Katsina, PGDE., PhD

(amkatsina@gmail.com; 08036168944)

Department of General Studies,

Hassan Usman Katsina Polytechnic, Katsina

Text of a Public Lecture Delivered at the

Stakeholders Meeting on Violence-Free Election,
Organized by Funtua Consultative Forum (FCF), at
GGDSS Funtua, Katsina - Nigeria
January 6, 2015

Abstract
This lecture discusses election and post-election violence in Nigeria and strategies
for preventing its outbreak in 2015 and beyond. In this lecture, I show that in order
to understand the causes of post-election violence in Nigeria, one needs to
understand not only the nature of elections in Nigeria, the impartiality of the electoral
umpire, the commitment of the political class, the professionalism of the security
agencies, but the integrity of our judiciary as well. These factors prepare the ground,
and nurture the drivers and triggers of post-election violence in Nigeria in the past.
A proactive strategy, therefore, for preventing future recurrences would necessarily
be community-driven. The lecture concludes with exploring seven important
strategies, which stakeholders at the community levels could adopt to ensure the
absence of post-election violence.

Election is possibly the most important and prominent feature of a democratic

system of governance. It defines the politics of a state, allowing people to reach
conclusion regarding the type of political system, which it practices. There are
many reasons that make election not only important, but the key to distinguishing
between democratic and non-democratic systems of governance. For instance,
election allows people to decide their leaders. It also provides them with an
avenue through which they periodically review the terms of the social contract
entered with those leaders. Furthermore, it acts as a mechanism for punishing
those among their leaders who violate the terms of this social contract and for
reaffirming their confidence on those who remain truthful to its contents. In short,
election is not only for deciding who leads, but most importantly it is for ensuring
that those selected to lead remain truly accountable to the people (Agbaje &
Adejumobi, 2006).
This view of election is largely theoretical. It has little to do with the
reality on the ground in most African countries. In most of these states, Nigeria
inclusive, the experience with election is remarkably different. It is one of
disappointment and dashed hopes. Politicians undermine democratic tenets and
violate the sanctity of the law. Before election period in Nigeria, we always
witness a charged atmosphere full of blackmail, innuendoes, intimidation, and
threats of violence. During elections, our experience is not any different. In fact,
it is one of missing electoral officials, hijacked electoral materials, snatched
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ballot boxes, and substituted and shamelessly inflated result score-sheets

(Adebanwi & Obadare, 2011). On top of all of these institutional and systemic
failures, poor and innocent people have to lose their properties, sources of
livelihoods, and sadly, sometimes, even their lives under post-election violence
that has become an enduring feature of general elections in Nigeria. In all of these
situations, because of its structural incapacity and absence of political will, the
government appears helpless or simply busy governing to step in and decisively
address these problems. Since it abandons its responsibilities, the government
leaves the people to fend for themselves in these difficult times.
The question, therefore, is how can poor and innocent people barely eking
a living could be proactive and prevent the outbreak of post-election violence
especially in volatile places in these volatile times? The answer to this question
is what my lecture intends to explore today. Together with everyone here, whom
I presume to be interested in ensuring violence-free 2015 general elections in
Funtua and elsewhere, I hope to have an engaging and deeply enlightening
conversation. Structurally, the paper has the following sections. In section one,
the paper defines election and post-election violence. In section two, the paper
investigates election and the context of post-election violence in Nigeria. Section
three focuses on identifying and discussing the major drivers of post-election
violence in Nigeria. This section also discusses other triggers of violence in our
electoral politics. In section four, the paper discusses the need for proactive
community-driven strategies for preventing the outbreak of post-election
violence especially in volatile places. This section also outlines a number of
steps, which the paper considers important in achieving the objective of
preventing the outbreak of post-election violence in Funtua.

Understanding Post-Election Violence

A good starting point for our discussion is the meaning of post-election violence.
Scholars have different conceptions of post-election violence. For instance, Orji
and Uzodi (2012:10) see it as a specific act of electoral violence that occurs

after elections. Since Fischer (2002:9) defines electoral violence as random or

organized acts that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence and electoral
process through threat and other related activities, it would be best to first
disassemble the concept of violence generally. My view is that understanding the
concept of violence is central to our conceptualization of post-election violence.
Violence is a form of human activity, which is expressive and reactive in
nature to specific conditions in the society. It has two dimensions. The first is the
physical dimension. This is the most prominent form, which we often talk of as
both expressive and reactive to specific conditions in the society. Within the
purview of this form, we have physical harm, injury, assassination, arson,
destruction of lives and property, and riots. Physical violence, therefore, refers to
those calculated activities that physically hurt and injure a person or his
properties. Radical scholars such as Festus Iyayi (2003), Frantz Fanon (2001),
and Claude Ake (1978), however, speak of psychological violence as the second
distinctive dimension. In this respect, they see injustice, intimidation, blackmail,
wrongful acts, threat of physical injury, cruel policies of government designed to
exploit the people, and extravagance and ostentatious life style among the elites
as manifestations of psychological violence. Scholars in this stream reckon that
mental trauma hurts much more than physical injury.
With a broad view of violence such as this, it is possible for us to
appreciate the complexity of defining and demarcating the boundaries of
electoral violence. Determining, with a universal accuracy, what is electoral
violence; what are its manifestations; and what are its causes, therefore, is not as
simple or straightforward as we would want. From the definitions and
dimensions of violence that I highlighted above, it is apparent that electoral
violence is a broad concept that encompasses not just the physical attempts to
disrupt the flow of the entire election process, but also the mental and emotional
trauma of blackmail, which people suffer in order to achieve predetermined
goals. Here electoral process refers to the cycle involving preparations for the
elections, the actual conduct of the elections, and the outcome of the elections.

Let us look at how the disruption of each of these stages constitutes a form
of violence. In its preparation stage, violence generally appears in the form of
clash between opponents, assassination of political enemies, defacing of
campaign posters, attacking of campaign trains, blackmail, vicious propaganda,
intimidation, inflammatory speeches, and threats of violence. These acts are
violent in nature. Perpetrators commit them in order to give a specific party and
its candidates an advantage in the electoral competition. We all know, and in
some cases have witnessed, the various acts of violence, which politicians, their
agents, and their thugs commit on election days. As such, we need not to detain
ourselves with the exposition of violence on election days. Suffice it to say that
the most glaring examples of this type of violence include stealing of votes,
snatching of ballot boxes, use of thugs to intimidate opponents, etc.
Post-election violence comes in two shapes. The first, which we are all
too familiar with, includes protests, riots, arson, and destruction of lives and
properties under extreme circumstances. These violent acts that accompany the
announcement of results happen more or less due to perception, right or wrong,
that the process was dishonestly rigged or manipulated to achieve a
predetermined outcome. The second is more subtle and appears in the vicious
mudslinging, innuendoes, lies, propaganda, and hate-speeches from different
stakeholders. From the foregoing, we can say that electoral violence is any form
of violence that occurs and disrupts any stage or all of the stages of the electoral
process. As an aspect of election violence, post-election violence, on the other
hand, refers to all forms physical, mental, and emotional disturbances that follow
an election usually involving protests and destruction of lives and properties, and
lies and violent rhetoric.

Election and Post-Election Violence in Nigeria: The Context

It is important to understand at least two critical issues related to the theory and
practice of election in democratic states. The first critical issue relates to the logic
of election in a democratic state. Generally, this logic is that of peaceful and

management of conflicts and interests in the state. Election provides the most
institutionalized of these avenues for peaceful resolution of conflicts and
management of divergent interests. When, as is often the case, factions differ in
a state on how political issues should be resolved, election serves as the decisive
arbiter between these contending factions. Because of this purpose, it becomes
imperative to have a clearly defined legal framework regulating electoral politics
including process of selecting candidates, code of conduct for campaigns, etc.
The purpose of this legal framework is not simply to regulate electoral
contest although that is important, but also because it ensures impartiality,
uniformity, predictability, and general acceptability. This explains why in all
democratic states, there are sets of definite legal principles guiding the conduct
of electoral politics. In Nigerias Fourth Republic, we have not only
the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) but also
the 2011 Electoral Act (as amended) and other INEC issued guidelines serving
as this framework for electoral politics and competition (Katsina, 2014).
Consequently, blatant violation of this framework calls for punishment. Where
this is not the case, as is the experience with Nigeria, it becomes difficult to
restrain the people from resorting to extra-constitutional means to seek redress.
The most notable, it would appear, is in the form of post-election violence.
The last time we had a general election in Nigeria was in 2011.
Nevertheless, before then we have had seven general elections since the
independence of Nigeria from colonial rule in 1960. These general elections were
those of 1964, 1979, 1983, 1993, 1999, 2003 and 2007. Each of these elections
was unique and peculiar to its own political and historical context and
circumstance. Nonetheless, one thing that is common to them all is
the controversies that trailed their outcomes. There were widespread incidences
of violence including destruction of lives and properties. In some extreme cases,
such as the 1964, 1983, and 1993 general elections, soldiers used the aftermath
of those elections as their justifications for intervening and overthrowing the
subsisting democratic order.

I think it is in order to wonder out loud: what causes post-election violence

in Nigeria? In order to fully understand and explain this question we need to go
beyond the partisan excuses that issued forth from the discourses of most
analysts. We need to consider the following.

1. The nature of elections in Nigeria;

2. The commitment and sincerity of our political leaders;
3. The neutrality of the electoral umpire;
4. The integrity and impartiality of our judiciary; and
5. The professionalism of our security agents.

After all, these are the building blocks of credible elections. Without them, it is
practically pointless to talk of free elections in Nigeria. Looking closely at these
important institutions of electoral politics in Nigeria, none would pass muster
and inspire confidence in the public. Our leaders are desperate. INEC is weak, ill
prepared, and incompetent. Our security agents have become grossly partisan.
And our judiciary appears as corrupt and incapable of providing refuge to the
poor and the dispossessed protecting them from unjust political leadership.
Because of these factors, the people suffer helplessly. They are left to their
own devices without hope for justice and redress to the treachery and
disempowerment that define elections in this country. Naturally, the only door
open to them, especially the youths, is that of self-help. Self-help, as a political
idea, can take many shapes including boycotts, protests, civil disobedience, and
resistance movements. In Nigeria, however, the notion of self-help tragically
assumes the shape of previously suppressed anger finding expression in the form
of violence against the society arson, looting, destruction, even killings.

Drivers of Post-Election Violence in Nigeria

From the foregoing analysis, it must be clear to all of us that injustice is always
at the root of all political crises and social instability. Post-election violence is

not an exception. The basis of an election whether INEC was fair; whether all
candidates were treated equally; whether they had equal access to state resources;
what was the nature of the platform upon which they campaigned, competed, and
won or lost the election; whether moral levers of the society especially judiciary,
religious and community leaders, and professional bodies remained neutral or
partisan - determines its acceptability. It determines how people would view the
outcome, whether to accept it in good faith as a product of free and fair
competition or to reject it as a product of flawed and manipulated process.
In poor and under-developed countries, democracy is not just a system of
government. It is the vehicle conveying the people from despair and poverty to
hope and security. It does that through the institutions of election, popular
representation and political accountability. In turn, these remove corruption and
ensure good governance in the society. Good governance we must remember
entails prudent management of public resources. For battered people in Nigeria
and elsewhere, therefore, election is not just a political ritual repeated after every
four years. Election is not just a political fiesta where politicians compete for
oratorical prowess. For poor people, elections represent hope for good life
defined in terms of popularly elected and accountable leaders.
Dashing this hope and aspiration, as we have seen many times in the past,
hurt the people deeply. It leaves behind a scar of suspicion, anger, alienation,
frustration, despair, and dejection. For those people living in the rural areas, their
reaction appears in the form of apathy and resignation. However, for the urban
poor, where we have teeming youths who are unemployed and bubbling with
boundless energy, the reaction usually takes a more physically dangerous
dimension. They express it in the language of violence, looting and destroying
properties, and mowing of innocent lives. Clearly, therefore, the greatest drivers
of post-election violence are two.

1. Injustice: The first driver is the perception of injustice in the conduct of

the election usually in the counting of votes. This perception may not

necessarily be accurate. Nevertheless, once it subsists in the minds of the

people that something was wrong in the conduct of the election, counting
of the votes, or announcing of the result and declaring of a winner, it is
difficult to convince them otherwise. With this kind of feeling, the
tendency for violence is just few inches away. The dictum that justice
must not only be done, but must be seen by the public to have been done
is, in this respect, a very wise one.
2. Poor Economy: Poor economic development is the other driver of postelection violence in our country. This causes unemployment, poverty, and
social inequality among our people. By themselves, these are a great
fodder for instability and insecurity (Katsina, 2012). Where, however,
they meet ethically challenged political class as is the case with Nigeria,
these become perfect recipe for violence. It would appear from the way
our corrupt political class treat people, especially during election season
that they see poverty as a great tool of political mobilization. For a paltry
sum, INEC and security officials abandon their responsibilities on election
days. For a paltry sum, voters would rather think with their stomach rather
than their heads. Worst of all, for a paltry sum, youths surrender their
dignity and pride serve as thugs ready to cause trouble and wreak havoc
in our communities during election.

Besides these two main drivers, we have other smaller drivers that also serve as
the immediate triggers of post-election violence in Nigeria. Among these, we can
readily cite the following.

1. Ethnic solidarity and religious bigotry: Due to the precarious nature of

Nigeria's heterogeneous character, people tend to congregate towards
members from their ethnic groups and religions. Politicians enjoy this
condition and keep it alive because of the fact that it serves their purpose.
It enables them to resort to primordial sentiment in their quest for power

in the country. When they performed badly in elections, they blame their
opponents from other religions and tribes. Religious leaders preach hate
against others, just as tribal warlords promise hell for their opponents.
This has always been a portent weapon and trigger for violence after
election in Nigeria.
2. Compromised media: The unprofessional attitude of the mass media,
especially in eschewing moral restraints in deciding and reporting news is
also another trigger. It is debatable whether most of the violence that broke
out after the 2011 general elections would have broken out without the
push from the media.
3. State weakness: Apparent weakness and disinterest of the government in
taking charge at critical times further confounds the problem. In fact, in
many cases the government is as guilty as the crooked politicians and
hate-mongers among religious leaders and tribal warlords.

These three serve as triggers that often ignite post-election violence in most of
our communities. Devising proactive strategies of preventing the outbreak of
post-election violence, therefore, must move from the traditional to the
innovative and bold. People, need to be proactive, courageous, and inventive.

Anticipating Post-Election Violence and Preventing it

To be frank, the best and most effective means of preventing the outbreak of
post-election violence in our communities are not always the cheapest or
realistic. Otherwise, I would be tempted to observe that If we choose to be honest
in our interactions with each other, fair and just in our dealings, decent in our
competitions, and patriotic in our disposition to our community then we do not
have to fear any type of backlash from elections. However, because we are living
in the real world where greed and ambition drive our politics, these types of
suggestions sound a bit far-fetched, if not totally idealistic.

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Let us then focus on the following strategies. I believe these are not only
realistic, but also completely necessary if we truly intend to prevent the outbreak
of violence here in Funtua and elsewhere in this country.

1. Adoption of a common political framework: Stakeholders, particularly

traditional and community leaders, the ulama and clergy, civil society and
youths groups, need to work with the major political parties with the view
of designing and adopting a common framework that would define and
guide all forms of political interaction and competition in the community.
2. Public awareness campaign: It is important for stakeholders, especially
traditional and community leaders, security agents and civil society
groups to commence vigorous public awareness campaign. The objective
of this campaign should be to sensitize the public about the dangers of
ethnic and religious bigotry in our electoral politics. We must ensure that
ideational rather than emotional outburst should define electoral
competition at all levels in Nigeria.
3. Neutrality: Stakeholders need to engage INEC, security agencies, media,
and other relevant agencies on the need for neutrality in discharging their
mandates. As we have said, partisanship is a recipe for violence during
and after elections.
4. Respect the sanctity of the law: Stakeholders, especially traditional and
religious leaders need to encourage politicians to respect the law, and to
be decent and just in their dealings with each other.
5. Neighborhood watch groups: Stakeholders, especially community
leaders and security agents need to encourage the people, particularly
youths to form and nurture neighborhood watch groups. The goal is to
complement the efforts of statutory agencies in securing and defending
our neighborhoods.
6. Early warning system: All stakeholders, with no exception must join
hands together in order to evolve an early warning system and mechanism.

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This system should be simple, yet effective in detecting early indicators

of disaffection, discontent, and trouble among the people during election
season in various neighborhoods.
7. Community roundtable: Stakeholders should also consider the
possibility of establishing a form of a Roundtable the traditional and
community leaders, ulama and the clergy, security agencies, politicians,
civil society, and traders. This Roundtable should serve as a forum
providing a platform for discussing issues that affect the overall wellbeing of the community. This way, ethnic, religious, cultural, or political
tension could easily be detected and amicably resolved.

Conclusion
In the final analysis, these modest measures are neither unique nor noble. As
such, they would not be effective on their own unless we choose to make them
so. In other words, the utility of these strategies outlined above depends entirely
on the level of sincerity, commitment, diligence, and zeal, which we expend
towards ensuring their success. It is important for us to understand that honesty
and the ability and readiness to subordinate personal interests in favor of larger
social goals are the two greatest antidotes, which prevent the outbreak of violence
after election. Thus, as we prepare for the February 2015 general elections, the
task before us is to restrain our impulse, emotion, greed, and ambition even as
we seek to maximize our chances for political success under the freedom which
democracy provides. The possibility of peaceful, but credible general elections
in February and the general success of our country beyond, therefore, rests on
the choices we make or otherwise between now and then.

References
Adebanwi, W. & Ebenezer O. (2011). The Abrogation of the Electorate: A
Emerging African Phenomenon, Democratization, 18(2): 311-335.

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Agbaje, A. & Said A. (2006). Do Votes Count? The Travails of Electoral

Politics in Nigeria, Africa Development, 31(3): 25-44.
Ake, C. (1978). Revolutionary Pressures in Africa (London: Zed Books).
Fanon, F. (2001). The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin).
Fischer, J. (2002). Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Conflict and
Prevention (Washington, D.C.: IFES).
Iyayi, F. (2003). Violence (Lagos: Longman).
Katsina, A. M. (2014). Party Politics and Party Laws in New Democracies: The
Case of Nigeria in the Fourth Republic, 1999-2011, International
Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 4(2): 142-152.
Katsina, A. M. (2012). Nigerias Security Challenges and the Crisis of
Development: Towards a New Framework for Analysis, International
Journal of Developing Societies, 1(2-3):107-116.
Orji, N. & N. Uzodi (2012). Post-Election Violence in Nigeria: Experiences with
the 2011 Elections (Lagos: PLAC).

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