BAYOT VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.

155635, November 7, 2008

Facts:
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California,
Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and
Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996,
initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo,
Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On
February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96. On March 21,
2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity. On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss. To the
motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino
citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is
no valid divorce to speak of. RTC ruled against Vicente. CA ruled in favor of Rebecca
stating that the marriage between the spouses was already dissolved upon the grant of
divorce since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for such decree.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Guam was sufficient to
dissolve the marriage bond between them.
Thus, the application for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC
was no longer needed.
Arguments:
Petitioner: On March 21, 2001, Rebecca sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca
also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their
daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
Respondent: On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia,
the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior
judgment of divorce.
Supreme Court Ruling:
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one,
absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in
Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory

granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may
still be, a holder of an American passport.
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and
represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as
shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she
secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino
citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very
least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship
to govern her marital relationship.
Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident
in the text of the Civil Decrees.
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the
United States of America, a country which allows divorce.
Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated
through their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96
was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97
issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In
this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary.
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign
divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro
Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and
issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca
and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen
by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October
6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or
invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February
22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce
secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
BRAGANZA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy?
RULING:
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. Petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After
all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce
decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that
they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce
decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.

G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006

ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZCATINDIG, Respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The
marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems
that they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984,
Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil
Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce
action under its laws.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one
offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not
recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine
law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Perez has a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be
intervenor in Tristans petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife?
RULING:
No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan
was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the
Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a
citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to
his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a
Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to
obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute
divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. Petitioners claim that
she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus,
petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is
based.

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

Rodolfo San Luis vs Felicidad Sagalongos-San Luis

During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos dad) contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children.
On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death
of his dad Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had
already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to
marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because
this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo is bigamous.
HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there
is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law
and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the

proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of
the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

CATALAN V. CATALAN G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan, Petitioner

Louella A. Catalan-Lee, Respondent.

Ponente: Sereno J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and
Resolution regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Orlando B. Catalan.

This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
69875 dated August 6, 2004, which reverse the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage
between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of
bigamy, as well as the Resolution dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in
Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and
allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and
Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988,
Orlando married respondent Meropein Calasiao, Pangasinan.Contending that said
marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with
EusebioBristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not
a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits ensued. On October 10,
2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the respondent before appellate court and ruled in favor of
her reversing the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was dismissed by the appellate court. Petitioner contends that the
bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and her
children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances

and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that
the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage void
despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral
marriages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.
HELD:
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on
the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the
divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce oramensaetthoro;or the foreign law may
restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute.In such case, the RTC
would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous,
there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959
between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan
dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.However, if there was indeed a divorce
decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando, does not restrict
remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal
personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any
interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other
might subsequentlycontract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no
existing interest in Orlandos subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any
defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of
Orlando and Felicitas.In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree
and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando
was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same
allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of
moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from
P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the
instant case.

RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE (2008)

[ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ]

FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract
whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in
several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the
gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the
Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the
Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.

On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission, a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney
C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action
for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint
named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and
RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written
agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as Special Sales
Representative Agreement, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed
by the laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint
on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for
damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI
included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the
dispute namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and
citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines that
renders our local courts inconvenient forums.
ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF

FORUM NON CONVENIENS?
RULING:
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is
filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflictof-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of
sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its
voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any
other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action.
Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether
it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of
the case is fair to both parties.The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only
when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the
merits proceeds before the trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases,

may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Petitioners averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to
oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties
involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a
matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.

CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., Petitioner, vs. M/V "LOK MAHESHWARI," THE

SHIPPING CORPORATION OF INDIA, and PORTSERV LIMITED
G.R. No. 155014 November 11, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry
that is owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of India and principally owned by the
Government of India. It was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant
Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the
Vessel through a time charter to Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further
sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv
are corporations organized and existing under the laws of Canada.
On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent Petroleum, Ltd.
(Crescent), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Canada that is
engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil products for the use and operation
of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner
Crescent granted and confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile dated
November 2, 1995. As security for the payment of the bunker fuels and related services,
petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00 and
US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted with its supplier, Marine
Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another Canadian corporation, for the physical
delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.
On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels amounting
to US$103,544 inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to the Vessel at the port of
Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly
acknowledged and received the delivery receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to
petitioner Crescent for the US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner
Crescent issued a check for the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check
was duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice dated
November 21, 1995 to "Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners, and/or
Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V Lok Maheshwari" in the amount of
US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount on or before December 1, 1995.
The period lapsed and several demands were made but no payment was received. Also,
the checks issued to petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels
were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. As a consequence, petitioner Crescent
incurred additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking fees, and legal fees.

On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner
Crescent instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a sum of money with
prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary attachment" against
respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar.
On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the Vessel with bond
at P2,710,000.00. Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer for a temporary restraining
order and posted the required bond.
On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI, and Portserv
and/or Transmar through the Master of the Vessel. On May 28, 1996, respondents
Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer), filed an
urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneers letter of undertaking, to consider it as
counter-bond and to discharge the attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted
the motion; thus, the letter of undertaking was approved as counter-bond to discharge
the attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to maritime
lien under our laws on foreign vessel docked on Philippine port and supplies furnished
to a vessel in a foreign port?
RULING:
In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a vessel in a
foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether the court has or will exercise
jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the supplies were furnished, which
must be pleaded and proved.
The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such single-factor
methodologies as the law of the place of supply. The multiple-contact test to determine,
in the absence of a specific Congressional directive as to the statutes reach, which
jurisdictions law should be applied. The following factors were considered: (1) place of
the wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4)
allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign
forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable not only to personal injury claims
arising under the Jones Act but to all matters arising under maritime law in general
The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescents insistence on the application of P.D. No.
1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a maritime lien exists. Out of
the seven basic factors listed in the case of Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one
the law of the forum. All other elements are foreign Canada is the place of the
wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract; India

is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Applying P.D. No.
1521,a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind the enactment of
the law to develop the domestic shipping industry. Opening up our courts to foreign
suppliers by granting them a maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled
to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the
interests of the various foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most
significant interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the subcharterer which placed the orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the entity which
physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of contracting and
negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were delivered in Canada.

Mijares v. Ranada
[ G.R. NO. 139325, April 12, 2005 ]

Facts:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human
rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against
the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory
and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District
Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the
enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule
141, 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct
filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was
capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court
ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of
the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which
Petitioners had not paid.
Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.
Held:
Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required
for other actions not involving property. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the
filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of
the property in litigation. The Petitioners Complaint was lodged against the Estate of
Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District
Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of
pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this
might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have
jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested
with such jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or
subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But
here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveals that the
complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would
fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District
Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also
an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a)

of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for
the enforcement of foreign judgments is 7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving
property.