qxp:ASMA-Booklet cover
17/03/11
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Page 1
A320 Family
Electrical Flight Control System
ELAC/SEC/FCDC/Wiring Interface
TROUBLE SHOOTING TIPS
FOR MAINTENANCE USE
Purpose:
Please note:
CONTENT
This booklet contains:
Detailed content
Page
0 Index of examples
1 Introduction
1.1 EFCS architecture
10
11
1.4 Glossary
13
16
o Tips
17
19
IR1Failure
Elevatorservocontrolfaults
o CorrelationwiththeadequateE/W
21
F/CTLELAC2PITCHFAULT&F/CTLELEVSERVOFAULT
CHECKPRIORITYWIRING
o FlightControlpage displayandTroubleShooting
23
CONTENT
Page
26
o Advancedprocedureflowchart
27
29
Discriminateresetversusgenuinefailure
ACCLRMfaultwithELAC1/SEC2/SEC1underMEL
F/CTLELEVSERVOFAULTwithSEC2underMELduringtaxiwithoneengine running
AFS: ELACx
o HowtousePLRandAIRMAN
33
Descriptions
Example:Faultlinkedtoelevatorservocontrol
Example:Faultlinkedtospoilerservocontrol
Example:MultipleXDCRfailures
o TFUlinkedtoa TSMtask
39
o Faultswithout FailureMessage
40
PressureSwitchissue
4 Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.1 General recommendations
o Intermittent failure
44
o Wiring check
45
47
49
o Damaging failure
51
54
0
Index of examples
Index of examples
E/W or Maint. Status
F/ CTL Maint. Status
Failure Message
ELAC/SEC x COM/MON OR BUS3/2 FROM
IR1/2/3
IR1/2/3 - BUS3/2
R1/2/3
ELAC2 OR WIRING FROM L G ELEV POS
XDCR 34CE1
SEC2 OR WIRING FROM L G ELEV POS
XDCR 34CE1
L G ELEV POS XDCR 34CE1
Refer to page:
P19
p20
p21
p34
p22
p22
ELAC/SEC x
SEC1 OR WIRING FROM ACCLRM 1 12CE1
ELAC1 COM/MON OR WIRING FROM
ACCLRM 2 12CE2
ELAC2 COM/MON OR WIRING FROM
ACCLRM 4 12CE4
p28
p30
F/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT with No failure message but L G/R Y servo is
SEC2 under MMEL and only one boxed on status display
engine running
AFS: ELAC x
F/ CTL Maint. Status
ELAC/SEC x COM/MON OR BUS3/2 FROM
ADR1/2/3
ADR1/2/3 - BUS3/2
ADR1/2/3
F/CTL SPLR FAULT
L (R) SPLRx POS ERROR 31CEx
p31
p36
p38
p48
p32
p36
p36
p40
p41
p49/50/51
p49/50/51
p52/53
1
Introduction
EFCS Description
EFCS architecture
EFCS Description
Maintenance features
ELAC
1
ELAC
EFCS 1 FCDC
ELAC
2
ELAC
1
SEC
FCDC
EFCS 2
ECAM Warning
(E/W) generation
Failure message
generation
10
Fault Symptoms
NOTE
11
Glossary
ACCLRM
ACS
ADR
AFS
AIL
CFDIU
CFDS
DMC
E/W
EFCS
ELAC
ELEV
F/CTL
FCDC
FDIU
FWC
IR
LRU
MEL
P/B
P/SW
PFR
PLR
PTU
SEC
SERVO
SV
T/S
TFU
TSD
TSM
VLV
XDCR
Accelerometer
Alternating Current Supply
Air Data Reference
Automatic Flight System
Aileron
Centralized Fault Display Interface Unit
Centralized Fault Display System
Display Management Computer
ECAM Warning
Electrical Flight Control System
Elevator Aileron Computer
Elevator
Flight Control
Flight Control Data Concentrator
Flight Data Interface Unit
Flight Warning Computer
Inertial Reference
Line Replaceable Unit
Minimum Equipment List
Push Button
Pressure Switch
Post Flight Report
Previous Leg Report
Power Transfer Unit
Spoiler Elevator Computer
Servo control
Solenoid Valve
Trouble Shooting
Technical Follow-up
Trouble Shooting Data
Trouble Shooting Manual
Valve
Transducer
13
2
Find the correct TSM
task
14
2.1
Identification of the
correct TSM task
15
16
Tips
Differentiate class1 an class2 messages:
A same failure message might be either:
Class 1 Failure Messages associated with an ECAM Warning
Class 2 Failure Messages associated with a maintenance status F/CTL
Fault
symptoms
17
2.2
Fault examples
This paragraph aims at illustrating why it is essential to make
sure TSM task applies to the reported fault symptoms. This
enables to direct maintenance crew towards the most probable
trouble-makers.
18
IR1 Failure
If there is a failure of the IR1 or IR1 wiring, three different Failure Messages
can be elaborated by the FCDC depending on where the Fault is located
and which computers detect the fault.
SEC 1
ELAC 2
SEC 2
COM
COM
COM
COM
MON
MON
MON
MON
SEC 3
First terminal
block
BUS 3
BUS 2
IR1
IR1Faultdetected by
FailureMessage
Onecomputerunit
Ex:ELAC1COM
ELAC1COMOR
BUS3 FROMIR1
Two computerunitsonthesame
BUS
Ex:ELAC1COM&SEC1COM
IR1 BUS3
Twocomputers onBUS3andtwo
computeronBUS2
IR1
Mostprobablecomponent
involved
Computerorwiringto
firstterminalblock
IR1orwiringtofirst
terminalblock
IR1
19
Fault
detected by
FailureMessage
ELAC2
ELAC2ORWIRING
FROMLGELEV
POSXDCR34CE1
LGELEV
SERVOXDCR
ELAC 2
SEC2
SEC2ORWIRING
FROMLGELEV
POSXDCR34CE1
LGELEV
SERVOXDCR
ELAC 2
ELAC2and
SEC2
LGELEVPOSXDCR
34CE1 COME2/S2
LGELEV
SERVOXDCR
ELAC 2
Case
Mostprobablecomponentinvolved
SEC2
SEC 2
SEC 2
ELAC2orwiring
tofirstterminal
block
SEC2orwiringto
firstterminal
block
Servocontrolor
wiringtofirst
terminalblock
NOTE
If ELAC2 and SEC2 detect the same FAULT (case 3), the FAULT
comes from the servo transducer or the common part of the wiring.
Avoid computer removal.
20
FailureMessage
ELAC2
F/CTLELAC2PITCH
FAULT
LGELEV
SERVOXDCR
ELAC2
SEC2
E/W:F/CTL
LGELEV
SERVOXDCR
ELAC2
ELAC2and
SEC2
Case
E/W:F/CTLELEV
SERVOFAULT
Mostprobablecomponentinvolved
LGELEV
SERVOXDCR
SEC2
SEC2
ELAC2
SEC2
ELAC2orwiring
tofirstterminal
block
SEC2orwiringto
firstterminal
block
Servocontrolor
wiringtofirst
terminalblock
These logics and design principles have been used to elaborate applicable
TSM tasks. Each fault symptom corresponds to a specific TSM task
NOTE
1.
2.
Case
Detectedby
FailureMessage
Atleast, one
ELAC
CHECKPRIORITY
WIRING
F/CTLSIDESTICK
PRIORITY
Atleast, one
SEC
CHECKPRIORITY
WIRING
F/CTL
Atleast, one
ELACandone
SEC
CHECKPRIORITY
WIRING
F/CTLSIDESTICK
PRIORITYand F/CTL
In this case,
ELAC removal
shall be avoided
ECAMWarning
Probablecause
ELAC1,ELAC2,wiring
SEC1,SEC2,SEC3,
wiring
Common wiring,push
button
These logics and design principles have been used to elaborate applicable
TSM tasks. Each fault symptom corresponds to a specific TSM task
22
UTCPHATAWARNING
140602270000F/CTLELEVSERVOFAULT
UTCPHATAFAULTMESSAGE
140602279334LBELEVMODEXDCR 34CE3
Failure Message
incriminating the Left Blue
Elevator mode transducer
3
Advanced TroubleShooting guidelines
24
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.1
Advanced T/S
procedure
25
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.1)AdvancedT/Sprocedure
Whyanadvancedprocedure?
Some failures, particularly intermittent ones, might lead to
different fault patterns notably depending on their duration,
nature, etc ...
For instance, an intermittent failure may not be systematically
detected by all the involved computers inducing inaccurate fault
correlation and thus rendering trouble-shooting more difficult.
Also, opportunity has been taken to document specific fault
symptoms that might cause incorrect interpretation/action of
maintenance team.
This booklet section details an advanced T/S procedure
permitting to increase the trouble-shooting efficiency.
Adherence to these guidelines will:
facilitate identification of the most pertinent TSM task
permit to fix more quickly a fault
prevent useless computers/parts removals that might
result from lengthy trouble-shooting
26
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.1)AdvancedT/Sprocedure
Advancedprocedureflowchart
Identify failure
symptoms
(E/W & Failure
Message)
yes
no
Dedicated TSM
tasks
yes
no
no
No need of T/S
Refer to: Specific
cases not requiring
T/S p29 to 32
no
E/W associated with a
Failure Message
Specificconditions
mean:MEL,reset,AFS
yes
yes
Identify if possible
more accurate
failure symptoms
by correlation
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2
Typical cases and
situations
Specific cases not requiring T/S
oDiscriminate reset & genuine failure
oACCLRM fault with ELAC1 / SEC2 / SEC1 under MEL
oF/CTL ELEV SERVO FAULT with SEC2 under MEL
with one engine running
o AFS: ELAC x
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:SpecificcasesnotrequiringT/S
Resetof
E/W
FailureMessage
ELACx
F/CTL ELACxFAULT
ELACx
SECy
F/CTLSECyFAULT
SECy
Example:
associated with
UTCPHATAWARNING
Failure Message
235102270000F/CTLELAC1PITCHFAULT
235902270000F/CTLELAC1FAULT
UTCPHATAFAULTMESSAGE
2351 02279334ELAC1COMORWIRINGTOLBELEVSERVOVLV34CE3
235902279334ELAC1
signature of an ELAC1
a few minute after
reset
the original fault
T/S has to be performed based on the earlier Failure Message. In this example: ELAC1
COM OR WIRING TO L B ELEV SERVO VLV 34CE3
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:SpecificcasesnotrequiringT/S
SEC 1
ACCLRM 1
ELAC 1
supply
Circuit Breaker
POWER SUPPLY
ACCLRMwithout
powersupply
Case
MEL
ELAC1
ACCLRM1
E/W:F/CTL
FailureMessage:SEC1ORWIRINGFROMACCLRM112CE1
SEC1
ACCLRM2
E/W:F/CTL
FailureMessage:ELAC1COM/MONORWIRINGFROM
ACCLRM212CE2
ACCLRM4
E/W:F/CTL
FailureMessage:ELAC2COM/MONORWIRINGFROM
ACCLRM412CE4
SEC2
FaultthatdoesnotrequiresT/S
30
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:SpecificcasesnotrequiringT/S
Example:
Engine 1 > GREEN
hydraulics
Engine 2 > YELLOW
hydraulics
SEC 2 under MEL
Situation
Consequence
1.SEC2underMEL
SEC2notabletoservotheRYand
theLGservo
2.Engine2off
3.PTUinhibited
Yhydraulicnotavailable
ELAC2notabletotakeoverthe
pitchaxis
LGServoisboxedonthestatusdisplayandtheECAM
WarningF/CTLELEVSERVOFAULTappears
Explanation
ELACsarecapabletoachievepitch
controlifbothELEVs&THSAare
available
Neither SEC2norELAC2can
controltheLGSTCLdespitethe
availabilityoftheGhydraulic
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:SpecificcasesnotrequiringT/S
AFS: ELAC x
Design principle
As long as the ELACs are capable to achieve the Auto Pilot (AP) order, they send to
Auto Flight System (AFS) computers a discrete signals which allows the AP
engagement.
AFS: ELAC x indicates that one of the computers belonging to the Auto Flight System
does not receive anymore its AP engagement discrete inputs from the ELAC.
This might be an indication of:
a genuine failure of the discrete input interface
or the consequence of the inability for ELAC to perform AP order.
UTCPHATAWARNING
1403 06290000HYDBSYSLOPR
1403 06290000HYDBELECPUMPLOPR
UTCPHATAFAULTMESSAGE
1403 02279334AFS:ELAC1
2.
UTCPHATAWARNING
1316 02270000F/CTLELEVSERVOFAULT
UTCPHATAFAULTMESSAGE
1316 02273451LBELEVSERVOVLV34CE3
1316 02279334AFS:ELAC1
On the two above examples, ELAC1 cannot take over the pitch axis leading to the
inability of the ELAC1 to correctly perform the AP order. Consequently AP
authorization discrete inputs are not sent by the ELAC1 and AFS: ELAC1 is
displayed.
TSM content:
AP Engagement Authorization discrete inputs are monitored by the ELAC (wrap up).
An ELAC discrete input emission failure would be self-detected by the ELAC leading
to ELAC FAULT. AFS: ELAC1 failure message is thus unlikely attributable to the
ELAC.
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:HowtousePLRandAIRMAN
How to proceed:
a. Find failure messages incriminating same LRU in
PFR/PLR/AIRMAN
b. Find failure messages incriminating other XDCR
Refer to:
Example 1
Example 2
Example 3
Example 4
p34
p35
p36
p37-38
NOTE
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:HowtousePLRandAIRMAN
Example:
When several Failure Messages involving the same LRU are shown
in PFR/PLR/AIRMAN... comparison of the TSM task content enables
to identify more precisely the common point.
34
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:HowtousePLRandAIRMAN
SEC 1
ELAC 2
SEC 2
COM
COM
COM
COM
MON
MON
MON
MON
SEC 3
First terminal
block
BUS 3
BUS 2
ADR1
Example:
Original fault symptoms
ADR1 BUS3
ADR1
It can be concluded that the component at the origin of the fault is certainly the
common LRU (in this case ADR1) or the common wiring.
Using the Failure Message ADR1 or ADR1 BUS3 will lead you to a more
accurate TSM task.
When several Failure Messages involving the same LRU are shown
in PFR/PLR/AIRMAN... comparison of the TSM task content enables
to identify more precisely the common point.
35
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:HowtousePLRandAIRMAN
SEC
SV
Spoiler
servocontrol
XDCR
Fault symptoms A:
F/CTL SPLR FAULT
L (R) SPLRx POS ERROR 31CEx
Possible causes:
SEC,
Wiring from SEC to servovalve
Wiring from position transducer to SEC
Spoiler servocontrol
Fault symptoms B:
F/CTL SPLR FAULT
L (R) SPLRx POS XDCR 31CEx
Possible causes:
SEC,
Wiring from position transducer to SEC
Spoiler servocontrol
Analysis
The comparison of the possible causes listed in the TSM tasks enables to rule
out the Wiring from SEC to servovalve. It incriminates more precisely the
spoiler servocontrol transducer interface.
When several Failure Messages involving the same LRU are shown
in PFR/PLR/AIRMAN... comparison of the TSM task content enables
to identify more precisely the common point.
36
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:HowtousePLRandAIRMAN
Case
NumberofXDCR
FailureMessages
reportedonPFR
/PLR/AIRMAN
SingleXDCR
FailureMessage
Mostprobablecomponentinvolved
ELAC
XDCR1
ACS Wiring
XDCR2
Feedback
Wiring
ELAC
2
Two ormoreXDCR
FailureMessage
XDCR,feedback
wiring,orACS
wiringtofirst
terminalblock
XDCR3
XDCR1
XDCR2
ComputerorACS
wiringtofirst
terminalblock
XDCR3
37
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:HowtousePLRandAIRMAN
NOTE
Review of the PLR and AIRMAN enables to make sure that no other
XDCR fault linked to the same ACS has been previously experienced.
38
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:TFUlinkedtoaTSMtask
39
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:FaultswithoutFailureMessage
NOTE
AdvancedTroubleShootingguidelines
3.2)Typicalcasesandsituations:FaultswithoutFailureMessage
For each hydraulic system, the ELACs acquire the hydraulic status
using three different sensors: two pressure switches (P/SW) and
one pressure transmitter (P/XMTR).
Hydraulic status built by the ELACs is voted using the three pieces
of information.
FWC:
P/SW1
Highpress.
ELAC
FCDC
Per design: no
Failure Message
ELAC
senses a
Low press.
P/SW 2
Lowpress.
FWC
FWC sees:
High press.
ELAC not
available for pitch
P/XMTR
Lowpress.
Proper identification of the fault symptoms and adherence to the TSM will
direct trouble-shooting towards the failed P/SW or FWC.
41
4
Difficult TroubleShooting
42
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.1
General
recommendations
Intermittent failure
Wiring Check
43
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.1)Generalrecommendations:Intermittentfailure
Intermittent failure
Some failures are intermittent and thus not reproducible on
ground.
Trouble-shooting accomplishment is rendered more difficult as
efficiency of the corrective action cannot be confirmed.
In these cases, it is necessary to properly follow-up and monitor
the aircraft in order to make sure that the fault has been properly
cured.
NOTE
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.1)Generalrecommendations:Wiringcheck
Wiring check
Wiring check:
It consists of:
1. Continuity check,
2. Quality of the connections,
3. Short circuit / Insulation tests,
4. Resistance check.
How to interpret resistance measurement:
Resistance check has to be preferred for intermittent failure (better
than continuity). It may highlight possible corrosion, improper
contact or improper connector locking, contamination, moisture
ingress, etc
45
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.2
Typical faults
46
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.2)Typicalfaults: Discreteinterface/groundedsignal
Principle:
LRUx
MON
COM
DSO x
DSI x
MON
DSO y
DSI y
COM
ELAC2
Ground detected by
ELAC2 COM
DSI x
MON
DSI y
COM
SEC2
Removing SEC2 will remove the
ground point
For the concerned DSI, ELAC2 detects a COM/MON discrepancy. Failure message
will incriminate ELAC2 or wiring from LRUx while SEC2 is at fault.
Most of the time the failure is not detected by the faulty computer (SEC2 in this case).
If a failure of the discrete links is suspected, TSM task is 31-32-00-810932 is cross-referenced in the applicable TSM task.
This task consists in removing one by one all possibly involved computers
to identify the faulty one (see example here-after).
NOTE
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.2)Typicalfaults:Discreteinterface/groundedsignal
DSO 09 of ELAC1 is
connected to SEC1 & SEC2
As per TSM task 31-32-00-810-932, SEC1 & SEC2 must be removed from their
rack and the effect on the failure verified.
48
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.2)Typicalfaults:F/CTLALTNLAW&F/CTLDIRECTLAW
NOTE
49
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
Extract of FCOM
Volume 1 Chapter 27
Section 30
4.2)Typicalfaults:F/CTLALTNLAW&F/CTLDIRECTLAW
50
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.2)Typicalfaults: Damagingfailure
Damaging failure
51
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.2)Typicalfaults: Damagingfailure
Damaging failure
Example of a TSM task involving solenoid:
Caution: to avoid
swapping.
52
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.3
Useful tool for T/S
53
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.3)UsefultoolforT/S
Computer1
Servo1
Swapping
tool
Computer2
Servo2
Applicable references:
Elevators AMM 27-34-00-860-079
Ailerons AMM 27-14-00-760-001
Like a computer swapping which can prove that a computer is or not at the
origin of a fault, the swapping tool can enable to identify if a Servo Control or
the wiring is at the origin of a Fault.
54
Difficult Trouble-Shooting
4.3)UsefultoolforT/S
55
56