Additional Case LTD

G.R. No.
L-630
November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER
A.
KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in
December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought
to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground
that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case
to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that
court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko
appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our
Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to
withdraw the appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the
ruling laid down by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we
believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional
question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot
to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot
avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for
instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade the
constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a question
involving different considerations now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant
a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for
withdrawal was filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had
already been voted and the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal
stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion
was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all
register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein
respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as
against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly
defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would
be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court,
but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending
before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his
appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What
is material and indeed very important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the
regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and whether or not
after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive conviction as
to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the
constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that
might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be
taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question
may never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no
interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of
deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice
its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today
might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of
days and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We
are thus confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question
becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of
the Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces
all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and
fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation.
When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of
only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are
classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification
finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that
was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines,
and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical
meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly
members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said
that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means
"those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This
definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (SeeMontano vs. Insular
Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159;
Ramosvs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560;
Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it
has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be
classified as agricultural. In Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this
Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be
converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land
is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the
classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of
agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under
other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and
makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased
to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the
test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for
agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the
Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and
jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands"
was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including
residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the
Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known
classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where
such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its
framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with
their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.],
386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be
given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time
of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical
meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in
that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303;
L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed
to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain
meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction
requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense
in which they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict
literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a
legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that
"where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a
revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to
the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National
Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58,
59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or
corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that
residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural
lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public
lands" which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into
agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that
the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad
or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor
mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which
classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are
stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are
residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are
made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a
conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under
the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public
Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential
puposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the
right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance
of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public
Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could
be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only
be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act
is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative
construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive
Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in
answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of
Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial,
and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and
crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in
the Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification
adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the
Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term
'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This
definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to
be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral,
of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524;
Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of
the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which
determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land,
which may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if
he intends to use it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later
became the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the
cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the
constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p.
598.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice
under the Osmea administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor
General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government judicial, legislative and
executive have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their
alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural
resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens
themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this
result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural
resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of
public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above
indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1.
Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same
subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in
section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the
same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land"
under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to
"agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase
repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different
intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between
"agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But such
difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both
sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or
class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison,
then Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be
considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so
considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid
reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the
purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private
residential lands are as much an integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands
of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the
alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally
applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential lands will
eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition
of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential lands of the
public domain shall have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were
used and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no
private agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural"
introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to
land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the
first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties.
The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to
include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be
private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section
5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated.
Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands
that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the
first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in
the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a
view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands
not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only
residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities,"
and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes,
factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets,
golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in
appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to
the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and
which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of
Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals,
forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They
should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for
their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma,
Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a
speech delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The
exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real
estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea
of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the
speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and
natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per
cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be
compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause
instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely antionalize these two of our most
important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we
were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we
going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis
ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of
its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural
resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified
by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely,
Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article
XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is
certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the
National Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity.
Said section reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor
any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the
Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization
by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of
the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or
alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their
own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the
same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former
Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other
provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public
lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually
or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed,
except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public
domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose
charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine
Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or
pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and
only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in
force, but not thereafter:Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to
the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and
legalized by competent courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for
industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes:Provided, further, That in
the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and
in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations
or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this
Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or
improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years, under the
penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary case." (Public Land
Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands,
whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land
which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the
prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be
transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens
of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate
land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of
reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections
122 and 123 of which read as follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor
any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or
transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the
Philippines authorized thereof by their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous
Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in
the Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any
other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal
grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who
may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in
the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this
prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of
hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided,
further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in
this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to
persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under
the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to
alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of
five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the
only difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is
completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private
agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction
carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the
new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of
the means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the
public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant
case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more
absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land
including residential land whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows
mortgage of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification
consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a
consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that
are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition
embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear
implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the
Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the
Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage
which would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the
opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion
that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the
constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing
the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction
is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build
their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to
compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not
completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since
their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a
lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here
forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or
public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed,
without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-7096. May 31, 1956.]

IN RE: PETITION to Change Citizenship Status from Chinese to Filipino Citizen on
Transfer Certificates of Title issued to Heirs of Ricardo Villa-Abrille Lim; AND/OR, in
the alternative, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment to determine Citizenship status,
LORENZO VILLA- ABRILLE LIM, GUIGA VILLA-ABRILLE LIM, ROSALIA VILLA-ABRILLE
LIM, ADOLFO VILLA-ABRILLE LIM, SAYA VILLA-ABRILLE LIM, LUISA VILLA-ABRILLE LIM,
and CANDELARIA VILLA-ABRILLE TAN,Petitioners-Appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal, taken by the Republic of the Philippines, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, dated December 29, 1951, the dispositive part of which is:
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EN SU VIRTUD, el Juzgado falla esta causa:
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(a) Declara a los recurrentes Lorenzo, Guiriga, Rosalia y Adolfo appellidados Villa Abrille Lim
Cuidadanos filipinos;
(b) Ordena al Registrador de Titulos de la ciudad de Davao;
(1) que enmiende los Certificados de Transferencia de Titulos Nos. T-2365, T-2362, T-2367, T2360, T-2371, T-2363, T-2368, T-2366, T-2374, T-2370, T-2369, T-2372, T-2361, T-2364, haciendo
constar en todos y cada uno de los mismos, lo siguiente;
Lorenzo Villa Abrille Lim, filipino;
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(2) que enmiende los Certificados de Transferencia de Titulos Nos. T-2349, T-2347, T-2342, T2343, T-2348, T-2345, T-2344, T-2346, T-479, haciendo constar en todos y cada uno de los
mismos, lo siguiente:
Guiga Villa Abrille Lim, filipino;
(3) que enmiende los certificados de Transferencia de Titulos Nos. T-2354, T-2352, T-2353, T2355, T-2351, T-2356, T-2357, T-2358, T-2359, haciendo constar de todos y cada uno de los
mismos, lo siguiente:
Rosalia Villa Abrille Lim, filipina;
(4) que enmiende los Certificados de Transferencia de Titulos Nos. T-2324, T-2321, T-2323, T2322, T 2325, T-2331, T-2330, T-2319, T-2327, 2326, T-2320, T-2374, T-2329, T-2328, T-478,
haciendo constar en todos y cada uno de los mismos, lo siguiente:
Adolfo Villa Abrille Lim,
filipino.
(c) sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas.

This case was commenced by a petition filed on November 10, 1950. The theory of
the Petitionersis, substantially, as follows:
Petitioners Lorenzo, Guiga, Rosalia, Adolfo, Saya
and Luisa, all surnamed Villa Abrille, are descendants of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna
hereafter referred to as Lim Juna a Chinese subject who arrived in Davao, from China, in 1871
or 1872. On January 4, 1890, Lim Juna married Maria Loreto Tan Sipo or Sepo hereafter
referred to as Tan Sepo daughter of Tan Joson (a Chinese) and his common law wife, a Mora,
whose name appears nowhere. Prior thereto, however, Lim Juna and Tan Sepo had already had
extra marital relations, in consequence of which, Ricardo, Carlos and Luisa, all surnamed Villa
Abrille, were born on February 14, 1883, January 3, 1885 and December 22, 1889, respectively.
During wedlock, said spouses had two (2) children, namely, Cesareo and Candelaria, born,
respectively, on February 13, 1893 and December 2, 1895. Carlos and Cesareo became
naturalized citizens of the Philippines in 1935 and - according to the petition 1916 (before the
passage of our first naturalization law, Act No. 2927, approved on March 26, 1920) or
according to the testimony of Carlos 1925, respectively. Ricardo Villa Abrille, already
deceased, was survived by his children, Petitioners Lorenzo, Guiga, Rosalia, Adolfo and Saya, all
surnamed Villa Abrille. Saya, Luisa and Candelaria Villa Abrille are married, respectively, to Chiu
Kang Po, Huang Pit Lin and Abelardo Tan Chin Hoc, all Chinese subjects. In the language of the
petition, Lim Juna considered himself as a Spanish subject during the Spanish Regime and had
identified himself with the Filipinos, in all social and civil affairs, as well as contributed to civil
and social organization during the Spanish regime and later during the period of American
occupation. After residing continuously in the Philippines since 1871 or 1872, Lim Juna died
therein on March 9, 1943, leaving extensive holdings, among which were over 800 hectares of
agricultural lands and more than 30 hectares of urban lands, situated in Davao and registered
under the Torrens system. These properties passed by succession to his heirs, Petitioners herein,
who are referred to in the corresponding transfer certificate of title a list of which is annexed
to the petition as Chinese citizens, although they have considered themselves as Filipino
citizens, were educated in the public schools and intermingled and associated with the
Filipinos in a proper and irreproachable manner. We quote the prayer of the petition:
WHEREFORE, Petitioners, Lorenzo, Guiga, Rosalia, and Adolfo, all surnamed Villa-Abrille Lim,
pray for judgment declaring them to be Filipino citizens and issue an order directing the Register
of Deeds of Davao to change their citizenship status on the face of the Transfer Certificates of
Title herein before mentioned from Chinese to Filipino citizens;
AND/OR, in the alternative, Petitioners pray for a declaratory judgment determining the
citizenship status of all the herein named Petitioners, with a view of removing all doubt and
uncertainty as to their real status;
as to Petitioners Luisa Villa-Abrille, Candelaria Villa-Abrille
Tan, and Saya Villa-Abrille Lim, their citizenship from the time of their birth up to the time of
their marriage;
and as to Petitioners Lorenzo, Guiga, Rosalia, and Adolfo, all surnamed VillaAbrille Lim, the citizenship of their father, Ricardo Villa-Abrille Lim, at the time of his birth.
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The Republic of the Philippines objected to the petition, upon the ground that Petitioners are not
citizens of the Philippines;
that a declaratory judgment is not proper under the allegations of
the petition;
and that petitions for change of entry in a Certificate of Title should be filed in
the G.L.R.O. proceedings of the land in question.
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After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao found that Petitioners are citizens of the
Philippines, except Luisa, Candelaria and Saya, who although formerly enjoying such political
status, have lost it, owing to their marriage to Chinese nationals. Hence, the court issued the
order above referred to, dated December 29, 1951, in favor of Petitioners Lorenzo, Guiga,
Rosalia and Adolfo, all surnamed Villa Abrille.
Neither the petition nor the order appealed from cites the legal provision under
which Petitionersapply for an order directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to change their
citizenship status on the face of the Transfer Certificates of Title herein before mentioned from
Chinese to Filipino citizens, as prayed for in said petition. However, the language thereof and
the tenor of said order insofar as it directs the aforementioned officer to amend the
certificates of title in question by stating thereon that Lorenzo, Guiga, Rosalia and Adolfo Villa
Abrille are Filipinos suggest, and Petitioners admit in their brief, that they rely upon section
112 of Act No. 496, reading:
No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry
of a certificate of title or of a memorandum hereon and the attestation of the same by the clerk
or any register of deeds, except by order of the court. Any registered owner or other person in
interest may at any time apply by petition to the court, upon the ground that registered interests
of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and
ceased;
or that new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the
certificate;
or that any error, omission, or mistake was made in entering a certificate of any
memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate;
or that the name of any person on the
certificate has been changed;
or that the registered owner has been married;
or if
registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated;
or that a corporation which
owned registered land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same within three years
after its dissolution;
or upon any other reasonable ground;
and the court shall have
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jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may
order the entry of a new certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions,
requiring security if necessary, as It may deem proper:
Provided, however, That this section
shall not be construed to give the court authority to open the original decree of registration, and
that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of
a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs or assigns, without his
or their written consent.
Any petition filed under this section and all petitions and motions filed under the provisions of
this Act after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the
decree of registration was entered. (Italics supplied.)
Petitioner seemingly feels that the portion we have underscored, referring to cases of error,
omission or mistake, justifies the order appealed from. To our mind, however, it is clear that, in
the case at bar, they are not entitled to the benefits of said provision, inasmuch as:
(1) the
relief therein contemplated may be granted only in the original case in which the decree of
registration was entered;
(2) there is no allegation in the petition, and no evidence to the
effect, that the aforementioned reference, to Petitioners herein as Chinese citizens, was due to
any error, mistake or omission;
and (3) no evidence whatsoever having been introduced on
how Petitioners happened to be so referred in the certificates of title, the presumption is that the
same had in all respects, including said reference to Petitioners nationality been issued in
conformity with law, and that no error, mistake or omission had been committed in connection
therewith. Indeed, considering that Petitioners claim to have acquired their propriety rights by
inheritance, said transfer certificates of title must have been issued in accordance with a deed of
partition, either judicial or extra-judicial, stating that they are Chinese. This is, obviously, one of
the main reasons why said section 112 of Act No. 496 provides that all motions or petitions
under its provisions shall be entitled and filed in the original case in which the decree of
registration was entered. Had Petitioners herein adhered to this mandate, the G.L.R.O. records
of the lands in question would be before the Court and we would now have a concrete idea of
how they came to be described as Chinese in the transfer certificates of title above referred to.
Compliance with the requirement that the petition or motion for amendment of the certificates
of title shall be filed in the original registration cases is essential, therefore, to the relief provided
in said section and may not be dispensed with. Needless to say, Petitioners omission from
presenting any proof on the specific conditions under which they happened to be referred to as
Chinese in said certificates of title, leads to a conclusion unfavorable to them.
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May we grant a declaratory judgment determining the citizenship status of all the herein
namedPetitioners with a view of removing all doubt and uncertainty as to their real status, as
prayed for in their petition? Identical was the issue raised in the case of Hospicio Obiles vs.
Republic of the Philippines (4 Off. Gaz., 923), which was resolved by this Court unanimously in
the negative. We then said:
upon closer analysis, especially of the prayer of the petition and the allegation to the effect
that he is a Filipino citizen and is ready and willing to submit evidence to sustain this allegation,
what the Petitioners desires is to be declared a Filipino citizen in spite of his registration as a
Chinese citizen. As contended by the Solicitor General, Petitioners remedy is clearly not by an
action for declaratory relief.
cralaw
For the reason, therefore, that Petitioners action for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy,
because his desire is to be declared a Filipino citizen, and because the facts alleged in his
petition constitute no cause for a declaratory judgment, the judgment appealed from should be,
as it hereby is, affirmed, with costs against Petitioner-Appellant. (Italics supplied.)
We find absolutely no reason to depart from this view, which is squarely in point. What is more,
we have no change in the matter, for section 1, of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court says:
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights
or duties thereunder.
Pursuant to this provision, one cannot secure a declaratory relief except in an action to
determine any question of construction of validity arising under an instrument or statute or for
a determination of his right or duties thereunder. Petitioners do not seek a detention of any
such question or of their rights or duties under any instrument or statute. In short, the case at
bar is patently beyond the purview of said Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Wherefore, the order appealed from must be, as it is hereby reversed, with costs against
thePetitioners. It is SO ORDERED.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon,
Endencia, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-14869
Padilla,
Reyes,
A.,
Bautista
Angelo,
Reyes,
J.B.L.,
and
October 27, 1920
THE
DIRECTOR
OF
vs.
THE
ROMAN
CATHOLIC
ARCHBISHOP
JUSTA DE GUZMAN, ET AL., objectors-appellees.
LANDS, applicant-appelle,
OF
MANILA, objector-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In 1913, cadastral proceedings were begun to settle the title to a considerable tract of land situated in the Province
of Rizal. Thirteen of the cadastral lots were claimed by the municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal, the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and various private individuals. The judgment of the trial court adjudicated the
parcels in question to the private claimants. From this judgment both the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila and
the municipality of Cainta appealed, but subsequently the appeal of the latter wad dismissed for failure to
prosecute. The contest has thus narrowed down to one between the Church as appellant and various individuals as
appellees.
A ruling as to four of the lots can quickly be made. By stipulation during the trial, and by admission of counsel for
appellant, Policarpio Buenviaje is conceded to have title to lot 2187. As to lot 2186, the only evidence before us,
confirmed by the findings of the trial court, is, that Mamerta Roxas went into possession of the same in 1895; and
when counsel for the Church made his offer to present rebuttal testimony, he failed to mention this lot. Likewise, as
to lots 2213 and 2214, the only evidence before us, confirmed by the findings of the trial court, is, that Antonio,
Benito, and Gervasio dela Paz went into possession of the same in 1896; the record states that "ambas partes dan
por terminadas sus pruebas," while counsel for the Church in making his offer of rebuttal testimony again failed to
include these two lots.
A more difficult situation has arisen with reference to the nine remaining cadastral lots. To understand it, a brief
narration of the course of the proceedings in the trial court will have to be made.
The trial as to the land now before us opened with a stipulation to the effect that the composition title of the Church
with the spanish Government included this land. The Church presented one witness and rested. The private
oppositors then called their respective witnesses. Each endeavored to prove title by possession, best understood
by the following table:
Parcel No.
Oppositor.
Possession began
Acts of possession
2176, 2191, 2182
Justa de Guzman
1895
Planted rice; paid taxes
2178, 2180, 2190
Melecio S. Buenaventura
1882
Planted rice
2184, 2185
Justo S. Buenaventura
1885
Cultivation and harvest
2192
Justo Javier
1885
Planted rice; harvested.
Counsel for the Church, thereupon, made an offer to present additional testimony with reference to lots 2176, 2178,
2180, 2182, 2184, 2185, 2190, 2191, and 2192, or the lots above enumerated in the table. Three witnesses were
called to the stand, but each time, before any pertinent testimony could be secured from them, an objection was
made by counsel for the oppositors that the proof related to the evidence in chief of the Church, and this was
sustained by the court.
To resolve the facts into their simplest terms, it is evident that when an admission was made of the royal title, the
Church had shown that it was the legitimate owner of the land to which it refers. The most perfect title could,
however, be lost by abandonments. When, therefore, the private oppositors showed possession for the prescriptive
period, they had made their case, and the burden of proof had shifted. To overcome this burden, it was then
incumbent upon the Church to demonstrate that such possession had been interrupted, or that it was merely
possession through the tolerance of the Church.
This brings us to the specific consideration of assignment of error No. 2 of the appellant to the effect that the court
erred in refusing to admit evidence tendered by this claimant and appellant in answer to rival claims. A correct ruling
can most appropriately be arrived at by a consideration of the nature of cadastral proceedings, with reference to the
usual rules of trial practice and evidence.
The object of a cadastral petition, as all know, is that the title to the various lots embraced in the survey may be
settled and adjudicated. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, promoted by the Director of Lands, somewhat,
akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree. In one sense, there is no plaintiff and there is
no defendant. In another sense, the Government is the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants. (Act No. 2259,
sec. 10.) The trial is conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of Land
Registration. (Sec. 11.) As to this court, now abolished, the Land Registration Act provides that it "shall conform, as
near as may be, to the practice in special proceedings in courts of first instance." (Act No. 496, sec. 2) The Code of
Civil Procedure, which is thus brought into relation with the Cadastral Act, prescribes the order in which the trial
must proceed. (Secs. 56, 132). The usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence govern registration
proceedings.
Obviously, orderly procedure must be followed if injurious surprises and annoying delays in the administration of
justice are to be avoided. Evidence cannot be given piecemeal. The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case
out when he commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court.
"The proper rule for the exercise of this discretion," it has been said by an eminent author, "is, that material
testimony should not be excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested, although not in
rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of deceiving the defendant and affecting his
case injuriously." (1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 346.)
1awph!l.net
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly recognized, the Code of
Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change the order of the trial, and "for good reason, in
the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties "to offer evidence upon their original case." (Sec. 132.) These
exceptions are made stronger when one considers the character of registration proceedings and the fact that where
so many parties are involved, and action is taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not
always be expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formul, an opportunity should be given to parties to submit
additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims of title, if the ends of justice so require. (Rodriquez vs.
Director of Lands [1915], 31 Phil., 272; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abural [1919], 39 Phil., 996.)
We believe that the offer of counsel for the Church could property be classified as evidence in denial of an
affirmative fact; but that even if not technically rebuttal evidence, yet in the interest of justice and the ascertainment
of the truth it should be received. Whether such evidence would be sufficient to overcome the case which exists in
favor of the claimants of the nine lots cannot now be determined.
In so far as the judgment relates to lots No. 2186, 2187, 2213, and 2214, it is affirmed, and in so far as it relates to
lots Nos. 2176, 2178, 2180, 2182, 2184, 2185, 2190, 2191, and 2192, it is reversed, and the record shall be
returned to the lower court for the taking of additional evidence under the offer of counsel for the Church found on
page 83 of the stenographic notes. No finding as to costs is made in this instance. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 136965. March 28, 2001]
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEGUNDINA ROSARIO, respondent.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
This is an appeal[1] from the decision of the Court of Appeals [2] setting aside the order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City which denied respondent Segundina Rosarios
(hereafter, Segundina) motion to dismiss [3] and cancelled the notice of lis pendens annotated
on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042.
The Facts
There being no controversy as to the facts and the petition raising pure questions of law, we
adopt the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, as follows: [4]
On September 7, 1971, Datu Ditingke Ramos filed with the Court of First Instance, Quezon
City, an application for registration of title covering a parcel of land situated in Quezon City, with
an area of 100,000 square meters and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended. [5]
On August 31, 1972, petitioner University of the Philippines (hereafter, U. P.) filed with the
trial court a motion for intervention in the case, claiming that the land covered by the
application (by Datu Ditingke Ramos) is within its property described in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 9462.
On March 15, 1973, U.P. filed with the trial court an opposition and motion to dismiss Datu
Ditingke Ramos application for registration.
On June 6, 1973, the trial court issued an order which reads as follows:
Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the University of the Philippines and considering the
certification, sketch plan (Exhibits O and P). the testimony of the Acting Chief, Geodetic
Engineer as well as the written manifestation of the Land Registration Commission to the effect
that the land subject matter of this application and covered by plan SWO-15055 does not
encroach on the property of the University of the Philippines and that it is not inside any decreed
property, the motion to dismiss the application is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On June 8, 1973, the trial court First Instance decided the application as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application is hereby granted, declaring the applicant Rosario
Alcovendras Vda. de Ramos (surviving spouse of the original applicant who was substituted as
party applicant in the order of April 24, 1973) the absolute owner of the property applied for and
covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended, confirming her title thereto. Upon in the order
of April 24, 1973) the absolute owner of the property applied for and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO
15055, as amended, confirming her title thereto. Upon this decision becoming final, let the
required decree of registration be issued and after payment of corresponding fees, let the
certificate of title be issued in favor of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos, widow, Filipino and a
resident of Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On March 19, 1974, the trial court [8] issued an order stating:
The decision rendered by this Court in the above-entitled case under the date of June 8, 1973
having become final, the Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission is hereby directed
to comply with Section 21 of Act 2347.[9]
On May 8, 1974, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decree No. N-150604 in favor
of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos, pursuant to which the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
issued OCT No. 17 in her name.
On November 21, 1976, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City cancelled OCT No. 17 and
issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 also in the name of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de
Ramos due to errors in the technical description. [10]
On February 23, 1988, Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos executed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of Segundina Rosario (hereafter Segundina) covering the parcel of land embraced
in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619.
On June 11, 1988, fire razed the Quezon City Hall Building which housed the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 was one of the titles
destroyed by the fire.
Subsequently, Segundina Rosario requested the Register of Deeds to reconstitute Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 223619 resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT78195 (223619).
On March 11, 1993, U.P. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Quezon City [11] a
petition for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N-126671) 367316 naming
Segundina, Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City, among others, as respondents.
On November 10, 1994, Segundina caused the registration with the Register of Deeds of the
deed of absolute sale. Consequently, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 121042 in Segundinas name, resulting in the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-78195(223619).
On November 19, 1996, after the parties had presented their respective evidence, U.P. filed
an amended petition alleging that it is the true, absolute and registered owner of a parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
and that the unlawful acts of ownership being exercised by (Segundina) and (Bugnay
Construction and Development Corporation) as well as the existence of their spurious
certificates of title, create a cloud of doubt on the title of (U.P.).
In its third cause of action, U.P. prayed that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042 or the
reconstituted titles or derivatives thereof be declared null and void ab initio for being spurious
and fraudulently issued.
On May 15, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial court an omnibus motion for the dismissal
of U. P.s third cause of action in the amended petition as well as the cancellation of the notice
of lis pendensannotated on TCT No. 121042.
On November 10, 1997, the trial court denied Segundinas omnibus motion.
On December 30, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration
questioning the denial of her motion to dismiss and praying for the cancellation of the notice
of lis pendens.[12]
On April 16, 1998, the trial court [13] denied Segundinas motion for reconsideration and
motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens.[14]
On November 10, 1997, the trial court [15] again denied Segundinas omnibus motion to
dismiss and cancel notice of lis pendens.[16]
On May 26, 1998, Segundina filed with the Court of Appeals [17] a
certiorari[18] assailing the orders of the trial court denying her motion to dismiss.
petition
for
On September 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in favor of
Segundina. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the third cause of action is barred by res
judicata and that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Segundinas
motion to dismiss.[19] We quote its dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the Orders
dated November 10, 1997, and April 16, 1998, are declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE
insofar as they deny petitioners Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Cancel Notice of Lis
Pendens. The Third Cause of Action in respondent University of the Philippines Amended
Petition is ordered DISMISSED and the Notice of Lis Pendens annotated on TCT No. 121042,
CANCELLED. The writ of preliminary injunction, insofar as it relates to the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 121042, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.[20]
On October 26, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals, a motion for reconsideration
of the afore-quoted decision.[21]
[22]
On December 17, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal.[23]

Petitioners Submissions
First, U.P. contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously allowed Segundinas motion
to dismiss as Segundina has yet to prove in a full-blown hearing whether her reconstituted
title traces its roots to OCT No. 17. According to U.P., the issuance of Segundinas title was
highly anomalous.[24]
Second, U.P. assails the issuance of OCT No. 17 in LRC Case No. Q-239 as void ab
initio. According to U.P., the Court of First Instance never acquired jurisdiction over LRC Case Q239 as the requisite signature approval of the Director of Lands...over the survey plan...was
nowhere to be found.[25]
Third, U.P. asserts that the Court of Appeals ruled on unestablished factual issues...by
admitting all the photocopies annexed to respondent (Segundina) Rosarios petition as evidence
despite the fact that they all still remained subject to authentication and examination by the
parties before the trial court.[26]
Fourth, U. P. attacks the verification of Segundinas petition in the Court of Appeals as
defective.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

We outline the history of the title that Segundina holds (Title No. 121042): First, the land was
originally covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended, which the Court of First Instance
declared as not encroaching on the property of U.P. and as absolutely owned by Rosario
Alcovendras Vda. de Ramos. Thus, OCT No. 17 was issued in her name. Second, OCT No. 17
was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 was issued. Third, Rosario Alcovendas
Vda. de Ramos executed an absolute deed of sale over the land in favor
of Segundina. Fourth, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 was burned in the fire that razed
the Quezon City Hall. Fifth, Title No. 223619 was reconstituted and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-78195 was issued in its place. Sixth, Segundina registered the deed of absolute sale.
Thus, Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-78195 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
121042 was issued in Segundinas name.
In LRC Q-329 the trial court declared U.P. as having no interest in the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042. However, UPs contention that OCT No. 17 is void for
lack of the requisite signature approval of the Director of Landsover the survey plan [27] is
worth looking into.
P. D. No. 1529[28] requires the Director of Lands to sign and approve the survey plan for the
land applied for, otherwise, the title is void.
Sec. 17. What and where to file - The application for land registration shall be filed with the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file
together with the application all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey
plan approved by the Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has
furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all the annexes (emphasis
ours).
No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration proceedings until approved by the
Director of Lands.[29] The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory
character. Unless a plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of
Lands, the same are of no value.[30]
Thus, the allegation that the signature approval for the survey plan was nowhere to be found
is an important jurisdictional fact that must be ventilated before the trial court. In Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[31] this Court stated that void ab initio land titles issued cannot
ripen into private ownership. Thus, as OCT No. 17 is void and Segundina traces her rights to
OCT No. 17, her claim would have no basis as a spring cannot rise higher than its source. [32]
Further, the judgment in LRC Q-329 was subject to the qualification that If the parcel of land
is found to be inside decreed properties, this plan is automatically cancelled. [33]
Whether the land covered by OCT No. 17 is inside decreed property is an issue of fact that
can be best determined by the trial court after an examination of the evidence. We find
meritorious the trial courts rationale for denying Segundinas motion to dismiss. We quote:
To establish their respective rights over the disputed property, both plaintiff and respondents
submitted documentary exhibits, the genuineness and authenticity of which can only be proved
in a full blown trial.
There is no pretense that the foregoing conflicting claims entail determination of facts. It, thus,
become imperative that both parties be given their day in Court to avoid the danger of
committing a grave injustice if they were denied an opportunity to introduce evidence in their
behalf.
It is within this context that the Court considers it appropriate under the present stage of the
action to DENY the instant motion.[34]
Pending final ruling on the merits of the case, Segundinas motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court REVERSES the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on September 18, 1998, in CA-G. R. SP No. 47783.
In lieu thereof, the Court orders the case REMANDED to the trial court for trial on the merits.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on official business abroad.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 167707

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
- versus MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD

TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents.
October 8, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and
WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 173775
- versus THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to
secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose
Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 [3] issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm
crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003
inhabitants[4] who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.[5]
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
and
Natural
Resources (DENR)
Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. [7]
On November
10, 1978,
then
President
Ferdinand
Marcos
issued
Proclamation
No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in thePhilippines,
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTACircular 3-82[9] dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondentsclaimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 382 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. [10]
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not
place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed
part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, [11] as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 382 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No.
705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they
had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels
of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights
of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4)
respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes. [12]
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether
Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in
Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of
their respective memoranda. [13]
The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots
1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of
the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.[15] The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14,
a fallo reading:
1999,
the RTC rendered
decision
in
favor
of
respondents-claimants,
with
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly
situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and
in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by
respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself
constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It
ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. [18] The Circular itself recognized private ownership of
lands.[19] The trial court cited Sections 87 [20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging
private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as
part of the forest reserve.[22]
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. [23] The Republic then appealed to
the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us
DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court. [24]
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands
they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.[25] Hence, the present petition
under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved
forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of
agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer
zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part
of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, [27] Wilfredo Gelito,[28] and other
landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. [30] They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior
vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in
Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and
building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. [31]
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. [32] Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a)
of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the
subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a
need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally
involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.[33]
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose
any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands
in Boracay Island.[34]
G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER
OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST
SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV.
19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED
BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS
DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THEFACT THAT
THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS
THE
EXECUTIVE
DECLARATION
OF
THEIR
AREAS
AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE
FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064
VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF
PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC.
IV.
ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY,
OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION
4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO
APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE
LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?[35] (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707
and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 [36] in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; [37] (b) Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President
Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064[39] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed
to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and
executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the
public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes
as may be provided by law,[41] giving the government great leeway for classification. [42] Then the 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. [43] Of
these, onlyagricultural lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22,
2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
[40]
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.
[46]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.[47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain. [48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to
determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the
agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the
favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not
excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership.[49]
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of
the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in thePhilippines passed to the Spanish
Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. [51]
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory
claims.[52]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and
the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of
vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree. [54] Under Section 393 of
the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the
Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of
uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse, [56] from the date of its inscription.
[57]
However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the
Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State. [58]
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or
special grant;
(3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by
purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.[59]
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was
embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands
were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.
[61]
The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold
system) and by lease (leasehold system). [62] It also provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural
public lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the
Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]
x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No. 926
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
lands. x x x[65](Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.[66]
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the
first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted
corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase
lands of the public domain. [67] Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[68]
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the
second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to
Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For
judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or
since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1,
1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands, [70] and
privately owned lands which reverted to the State.[71]
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this
provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, [72] which provided for a simple thirty-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No.
1073,[73] which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.[74]
The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings. [76] Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants
should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of
the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed
by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. [78] It
governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages.[79]
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive
act of the government, such as an official proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. [81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and classified. [82]
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. [83] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
[84]
There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute.[85] The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to
have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. [86]
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006,
the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the
land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept
the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before
2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.[87]
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the
old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government (1909).[89] These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that
in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. [90]
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the
effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be
stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land
registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as
timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power
to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were
free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. [91] This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late
Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it stated, through
Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally
released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership,
citing the cases ofRamos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is
misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public
Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which
there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines
the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that
the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. [93]
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to
devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum inAnkron that the courts have a
right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown.[94]
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all
lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural
lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into
agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would
have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral
land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse,
would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under
the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No.
926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be
owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was,
in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural
uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this
Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted
in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a
question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it
is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral
land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry
and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for
agriculture, forestry, and mineral lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact,
we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show
that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists
some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry
or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as
agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the
discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular
case,having regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that
the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each
case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land
involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must,
therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is
a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that
the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it
is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said
classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148,
may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered
forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In
the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof.
Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act
(No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set aside and
reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs.
Director of Forestry, supra)[95](Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of
each case, except those that have already became private lands. [96] Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919
and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain. [97]
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933, [98] did
not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the propertys land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay
occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in
1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to
classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular
Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.[103]
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The
pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of
agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an
alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution [104] from acquiring agricultural land, which included
residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically
deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases
decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron andDe Aldecoa.[105] As We have already
stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the
authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued
possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No.
926[106] ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their
name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.
Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno inCruz v. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
[107]
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons
to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in theIslands. In short, the Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained
in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the
United States. The term public land referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property
of the government and the friar lands.
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
[108]
(Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered
public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as
public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as amass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands
are needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to
be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its
forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and
foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the
island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of
Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution [112] classifying lands of the
public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily
refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.
[113]
The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry[114] is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be
on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.[115] (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. [116] At any rate,
the Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable
agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural
land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in
1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among
other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of
private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an
agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which madeBoracay Island an agricultural
land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private lands [117] and areas declared as alienable and
disposable[118] does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82
makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3
provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the
island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact,
Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in
the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the
island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each,
as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of
Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and
marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance
in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands
for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability. [119]
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other
islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port
Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and
surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If
the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private
disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 [120] provide
that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.
[121]
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority
granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested
rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the
Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.[122] Absent such classification, the land remains
unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition. [123]
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96
hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side
of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the
area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation
No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into
agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can
no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until
Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the
public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive
from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the
public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,[124] the Court
stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state
that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands
leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land,
the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.
[125]
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of land. If the land had
never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification
under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice[126] on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is
the word reclassification. Where there has been no previous classification of public forest
[referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of
the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest
purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest
uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no reclassification of forest lands to
speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits
of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain,
denominated as public forest under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been
previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the
provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.[127]
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said
law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141,
namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.[128]
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert
portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public
domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of
1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act
presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear
from the wording of the law itself. [129] Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the
land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. [130]
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation
No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed
to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in
Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private
claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued
in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the
period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the
island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist
spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be
unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically
give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are
presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence
presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to
apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued
possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development
of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes
that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court
commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is
the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their
automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look
into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead [131] or sales patent,
[132]
subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one
such bill[133] now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a
law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the
island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the
classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by
trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy
balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and protection
are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as
destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice
Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that
should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more
have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation,
protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute
a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that
absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill
effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which
they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust
bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile
topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods
that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not
to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written
down in a lumbermans decalogue.[135]
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180067
June 30, 2009
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Trustee and APPLICANT, with its Executive Minister ERAO MANALO as
Corporate Sole Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the Republic of the Philippines assails the October
11, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85348, which affirmed the April 26, 2005
Decision2 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) in Paoay-Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in Land Registration
Case No. 762-C for Application for Registration of Title, entitled Iglesia Ni Cristo, Trustee and Applicant
with its Executive Minister Erao Manalo as Corporate Sole v. Republic of the Philippines as oppositor.
The Facts
Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre, particularly described as
follows:
A parcel of land (Plan Swo-I-001047, L.R.C. Rec. No. ______) situated in the Barrio of Baramban,
Municipality of Currimao, Province of Ilocos Norte, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2 by
the National Road (20.00 m. wide); on the SW. & NW., along lines 2-3-4 by lot 3946, Cads-562-D, Currimao
Cadastral Sketching, Bernardo Badanguio; on the NE., along line 4-1 by lot 3947, portion, Cads-562-D;
(Pacita B. Lazaro) and lot 3948, Pacita B. Lazaro, Cads-562-D, Currimao Cadastral Sketching x x x
containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND ONE (4201) SQUARE METERS. x x x
On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its
Application for Registration of Title before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao. Appended to the application were
thesepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, the technical description of subject lot, 3 the Geodetic
Engineers Certificate,4 Tax Declaration No. (TD) 5080265 covering the subject lot, and the September 7,
1970 Deed of Sale6 executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its appearance and deputized the
Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed an Opposition to INCs application.
The Ruling of the Cadastral Court
After the required jurisdictional publication, notification, and posting, hearing ensued where the INC
presented three testimonial witnesses,7 the MCTC, acting as cadastral court, rendered its Decision on April
26, 2005, granting INCs application. The decretal portion reads:
Wherefore, the application for registration is hereby granted. Upon finality of this decision, let an Order be
issued directing the Land Registration Authority to register and issue an Original Certificate of Title to the
applicant Iglesia Ni Cristo, as Corporation Sole, with official address at No. 1 Central Avenue, New Era,
Diliman Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.
The cadastral court held that based on documentary and testimonial evidence, the essential requisites for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over the subject lot have been complied with.
It was established during trial that the subject lot formed part of a bigger lot owned by one Dionisio
Sabuco. On February 23, 1952, Sabuco sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC which built a chapel on
the lot. Saturnino Sacayanan, who was born in 1941 and became a member of INC in 1948, testified to the
sale by Sabuco and the erection of the small chapel by INC in 1952. Subsequently, Sabuco sold the bigger
lot to Bernardo Badanguio less the small portion where the INC chapel was built.
Badanguio in 1954 then declared the entire bigger lot he purchased from Sabuco for tax purposes and
was issued TD 006114.8 In 1959, Badanguio also sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC for which a
Deed of Absolute Sale9 was executed on January 8, 1959. Jaime Alcantara, the property custodian of INC,
testified to the purchases constituting the subject lot and the issuance of TDs covering it as declared by
INC for tax purposes. Thus, these two purchases by INC of a small portion of the bigger lot originally
owned by Sabuco, who inherited it from his parents and later sold it to Badanguio, constituted the subject
lot.
On September 7, 1970, a Deed of Sale was executed by Badanguio in favor of INC formally ceding and
conveying to INC the subject lot which still formed part of the TD of the bigger lot under his name. This
was testified to by Teofilo Tulali who became a tenant of the bigger lot in 1965 and continued to be its
tenant under Badanguio. Tulali testified further that the ownership and possession of Sabuco and
Badanguio of the bigger lot were never disturbed.
Subsequently, TD 648510 was issued in 1970 in the name of INC pursuant to the September 7, 1970 Deed
of Sale. This was subsequently replaced by TD No. 406056 11 in 1974, TD 508026 in 1980, and TD 605153
in 1985.
For the processing of its application for judicial confirmation of title, subject Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao
Cadastre was surveyed and consisted of 4,201 square meters. With the presentation of the
requisite sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, technical description of the subject lot, Geodetic
Engineers Certificate, and Report given by the City Environment and Natural Resources Office special
investigator showing that the subject lot is within alienable and disposable public zone, the MCTC found
and appreciated the continuous possession by INC of the subject lot for over 40 years after its acquisition
of the lot. Besides, it noted that Badanguio and Sabuco, the predecessors-in-interest of INC, were never
disturbed in their possession of the portions they sold to INC constituting the subject lot.
Aggrieved, the Republic seasonably interposed its appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
85348.
The Ruling of the CA
On October 11, 2007, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision affirming the April 26, 2005
MCTC Decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
In denying the Republics appeal, the CA found that the documentary and testimonial evidence on record
sufficiently established the continuous, open, and peaceful possession and occupation of the subject lot in
the concept of an owner by INC of more than 40 years and by its predecessors-in-interest prior to the
conveyance of the lot to INC.
Hence, we have this petition.
The Issue
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE [MCTC] DECISION GRANTING
THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE EVIDENCE THAT THE LAND WAS DECLARED
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ONLY ON MAY 16, 1993, OR FIVE (5) YEARS
BEFORE THE FILING OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION ON NOVEMBER 19, 1998. 12
The Courts Ruling
May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject property has been declared as
alienable only after June 12, 1945? This is the sole issue to be resolved.
The petition is bereft of merit. The sole issue raised is not novel.
The Republics Contention
The Republic contends that subject Lot No. 3946 was certified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain only on May 16, 1993. Relying on Republic v. Herbieto,13 it argues that prior to said date,
the subject lot remained to be of the public dominion or res publicae in nature incapable of private
appropriation, and, consequently, INC and its predecessors-in-interests possession and occupation cannot
confer ownership or possessory rights and "any period of possession prior to the date when the lot was
classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded in the computation of the
period of possession."14
The Republic maintains further that since the application was filed only on November 19, 1998 or a scant
five years from the declaration of the subject lot to be alienable and disposable land on May 16, 1993,
INCs possession fell short of the 30-year period required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
(CA) 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
The Argument of INC
Respondent INC counters that the Court has already clarified this issue in Republic v. Court of
Appeals (Naguitcase), in which we held that what is merely required by Sec. 14(1) of Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, is that the "property sought to be
registered [is] already alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration of title is
filed."15 Moreover, INC asserts that the Herbieto pronouncement quoted by the Republic cannot be
considered doctrinal in that it is merely an obiter dictum, stated only after the case was dismissed for the
applicants failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of publication.
Necessity of declaration of public agricultural land as alienable and disposable
It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the persons claiming title to a public land
should show that their title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by
law.16 In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject lot has already been declared alienable and
disposable by the government on May 16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application for
registration was filed by INC.
Conflicting rulings in Herbieto and Naguit
It must be noted that this Court had conflicting rulings in Naguit and Herbieto, relied on by the parties
contradictory positions.
Herbieto essentially ruled that reckoning of the possession of an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title is counted from the date when the lot was classified as alienable and disposable, and
possession before such date is inconsequential and must be excluded in the computation of the period of
possession. This ruling is very stringent and restrictive, for there can be no perfection of title when the
declaration of public agricultural land as alienable and disposable is made after June 12, 1945, since the
reckoning of the period of possession cannot comply with the mandatory period under Sec. 14(1) of PD
1529.
In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the application of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that
the reckoning for the period of possession is the actual possession of the property and it is sufficient for
the property sought to be registered to be already alienable and disposable at the time of the application
for registration of title is filed.
A review of subsequent and recent rulings by this Court shows that the pronouncement in Herbieto has
been applied to Buenaventura v. Republic,17 Republic v. Diloy,18 Ponciano, Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development
Authority,19 and Preciosa v. Pascual.20 This Courts ruling in Naguit, on the other hand, has been applied
toRepublic v. Bibonia.21
Core issue laid to rest in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic (Malabanan),22 the Court upheld Naguit and abandoned the
stringent ruling in Herbieto.
Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 pertinently provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that which was adopted in Naguit,
the Court ruled that "the more reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration of title is filed."
The Court in Malabanan traced the rights of a citizen to own alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain as granted under CA 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by PD 1073, and
PD 1529. The Court observed that Sec. 48(b) of CA 141 and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 are virtually the same,
with the latter law specifically operationalizing the registration of lands of the public domain and codifying
the various laws relative to the registration of property. We cited Naguit and ratiocinated:
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the
Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek
registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant
and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June
1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945
cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have
already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of
Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a
bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.lavvphi1.net
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation
renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving
it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the
Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If
the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit.
The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the
provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and
disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail
of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing
fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter
dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the
requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it
suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning
Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
Naguit as affirmed in Malabanan more in accord with the States policy

Moreover, we wish to emphasize that our affirmation of Naguit in Malabananas regards the correct
interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 relative to the reckoning of possession vis--vis the declaration of
the property of the public domain as alienable and disposableis indeed more in keeping with the spirit of
the Public Land Act, as amended, and of PD 1529. These statutes were enacted to conform to the States
policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth
and remain true to the ideal of social justice.23 The statutes requirements, as couched and amended, are
stringent enough to safeguard against fraudulent applications for registration of title over alienable and
disposable public land. The application of the more stringent pronouncement in Herbieto would indeed
stifle and repress the States policy.
Finally, the Court in Malabanan aptly synthesized the doctrine that the period of possession required under
Sec. 14(1) of PD 1527 is not reckoned from the time of the declaration of the property as alienable and
disposable, thus:
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have
acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that
the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
INC entitled to registrable right over subject lot
With the resolution of the core issue, we find no error in the findings of the courts a quo that INC had
indeed sufficiently established its possession and occupation of the subject lot in accordance with the
Public Land Act and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, and had duly proved its right to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title over subject lot.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive on, and
cannot be reviewed on appeal by, this Court as long as they are borne out by the record or are based on
substantial evidence. The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors
of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. 24 This is applicable to the instant case.
The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the
respective halves of the subject lot, but is also tacked on to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest,
Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the
bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and occupationfrom
Sabuco, including those of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INChad been in the
concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of property. These had not been disturbed as attested to by respondents
witnesses.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the October 11, 2007 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 85348 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 133698. April 4, 2001]

ANTONIO TALUSAN and CELIA TALUSAN, petitioners, vs. HERMINIGILDO* TAYAG and JUAN
HERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
For purposes of real property taxation, the registered owner of a property is deemed the taxpayer
and, hence, the only one entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and the resultant proceedings relative to
an auction sale. Petitioners, who allegedly acquired the property through an unregistered deed of sale,
are not entitled to such notice, because they are not the registered owners. Moral lessons: real property
buyers must register their purchases as soon as possible and, equally important, they must pay their
taxes on time.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
November 20, 1997 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41586. The dispositive
portion of the challenged Decision is hereunder reproduced as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated February 4, 1993) of the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 7) in Baguio City in Civil Case No. 1456-R is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
plaintiffs/appellants.
Also assailed
Reconsideration.
is
the
April
27,
1998
CA
Resolution [2]which
denied
petitioners Motion
for
The questioned CA ruling affirmed the Decision [3] of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Baguio City in Civil Case No. 1456-R. The RTC, in turn, dismissed an action for the annulment of the
auction sale of a condominium unit, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651 and located in
Building IV, Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of this case in this wise: [4]

On June 28, 1988, [herein petitioners] filed a complaint wherein they alleged, inter alia, that:
--They bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651, from its former
owner, Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale:
--On October 15, 1985, [herein Respondent] Juan D. Hernandez, x x x sued x x x in his capacity as City
Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to the former owner Elias Imperial informing him that the above
described property would be sold at public auction on December 9, 1985, x x x to satisfy the delinquent
real estate taxes, penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the sum of P4,039.80,
representing total taxes due and penalties thereon;
--Elias Imperial and his entire family emigrated to Australia in 1974. Elias Imperial never authorized a
certain Dante Origan x x x to receive any letter or mail matter for and on his behalf;
--[Respondent] Hernandez sold the above-described property to [Respondent] Tayag for P4,400.00
without any notice to the former owner thereof, [or] to [petitioners], and without compliance with the
provisions of PD No. 464, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale;
--A final bill of sale was later issued in favor of the [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag. The assessed
value alone of the said property is P37,310.00 and the fair market value of the same is more than
P300,000.00 and both [respondents] knew these;
--The bid price of P4,400 is so unconscionably low and shocking to the conscience, thus, the sale for the
alleged unpaid taxes in the sum of P4,039.79, including penalties is null and void ab initio;
--[Petitioners] have been in actual possession of the Unit in question, since they bought the same from its
former owners, and their possession is open, public, continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners,
while [Respondent] Hermegildo Tayag has never been in possession of the said property;
--[Petitioners] through intermediaries offered to pay to the [respondents] the sum of P4,400 plus all
interests and expenses which [they] might have incurred x x x but said offer was rejected without any just
[or] lawful cause.
There is a need to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo.
They asked for: moral damages of not less than P50,000.00; exemplary damages of not less than
P20,000.00; attorneys fee of P30,000.00, plus appearance fee of P2,000.00 for every appearance; and
litigation expenses of not less than P5,000.00 to prosecute the case. (pages 3-8 of the Record)
On July 14, 1988, [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag filed his [A]nswer with [C]ounterclaim (pages 28-32 of
the Record), wherein he substantially denied the allegations in the complaint and, at the same time,
raised the following affirmative defenses, among others:
--(T)he ownership of the Condominium unit registered under Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651,
Baguio City, has been consolidated in his name by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x . The said decision has [become] final and executory as
evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;
--[Petitioners have] no cause of action against him, he being a buyer in good faith in a regular and lawful
public bidding in which any person is qualified to participate.
--The lower court has no jurisdiction over [petitioners] claim because the [petitioners] pray for the
annulment of the Certificate of the Sale and the Final Bill of Sale, which was affirmed by virtue of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x. The said decision
has [become] final and executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;
--The public auction sale complied with the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 464 hence, the
same is lawful and valid:
--[Respondent] Tayag is not bound by the alleged [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of the [petitioners] by Elias
[I]mperial, because it was not registered and recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City.
[Respondent] Tayag then prayed for the award in his favor, of: moral damages of at least P50,000.00;
exemplary damages; attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00; and, expenses of litigation.
[Respondent] Hernandez likewise filed an [A]nswer on July 18. 1988, wherein he denied the material
averments in the complaint and stated that no irregularity or illegality was committed in the conduct of
the proceedings with respect to the delinquent real property of Elias Imperial and the actuations of the
defendant herein were all within the limits of his authority and in accordance with the provisions of the law
pertaining to delinquent real property, particularly, P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real Property Tax
Code and therefore, no damages may be imputed against him. He also claimed, by way of affirmative
defenses, that:
--The complaint states no cause of action against the [respondent] herein:
--[Petitioners] have not complied with x x x Section 83 of P.D. No. 464 x x x thus, the case cannot
prosper;
--Granting that a Deed of Sale was actually issued in favor of the plaintiffs [because of] the fact that it is
unregistered, the same does not bind third persons including defendant herein.
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that on December 7, 1981, they had acquired the condominium
from Elias Imperial, the original registered owner, for P100,000. The sale was purportedly evidenced by a
Deed of Sale which, however, had not and thenceforth never been registered with the Register of Deeds.
Petitioners also averred that on December 9, 1985, Baguio City Treasurer Juan Hernandez sold the
property at a public auction due to nonpayment of delinquent real estate taxes thereon. The property was
sold to Respondent Herminigildo Tayag for P4,400 which represented the unpaid taxes.
Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. They cited
irregularities in the proceedings and noncompliance with statutory requirements.
Dismissing the Complaint, Branch 7 of the RTC of Baguio City cited the December 16, 1987 judgment
of Branch 6 of the same court in LRC Adm. Case No.207-R. This earlier Branch 6 Decision had
consolidated ownership of the condominium unit in favor of Respondent Tayag. The Branch 7 Decision
also cited the May 31, 1988 Order of Branch 5 of the same court which had granted a Petition for the
Cancellation of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651 in the name of Elias Imperial and directed the
Register of Deeds to issue a new Certificate of Title in the name of Respondent Tayag. According to the
trial court, the Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had already upheld the legality of the questioned
auction sale. Hence, to rule again on the same issue would amount to passing upon a judgment made by
a coequal court, contrary to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
Ruling of the CA
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling and ratiocination. The CA explained that LRC Adm.
Case No. 207-R had already ruled on the validity of the auction sale of the subject condominium unit. It
further sustained the validity of that sale, because the city treasurer complied with the requirements of
notice, publication and posting. It added that [i]f [petitioners] never received the notices sent to Elias
Imperial, then they have only themselves to blame for failing to register the deed of sale between them
and the former owner x x x.
Rejecting petitioners contention that the purchase price was inadequate, the CA ruled that such
inadequacy could not nullify the auction sale. It likewise held that petitioners had not established bad
faith on the part of respondents in conducting the auction sale. Finally, it agreed with the latters
contention that the former were remiss in causing the registration of the sale in their favor of the subject
property and they likewise did not fulfill their obligation to pay taxes. It [is] thus clear x x x they should
only have themselves to blame. Laws exist to be followed, failing in which the price must be paid.
Hence, this recourse.[5]
The Issues
Petitioners assigned the following alleged errors for the consideration of this Court: [6]
I.
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to consider that the petitioners were deprived of
their right to due process in this case due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of their former counsel
who failed to inform them of the decision in this case and protect their interest.
II.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to nullify the auction sale of the subject
property of petitioners due to alleged tax delinquency when there was no compliance with the mandatory
requirement of Section 46 of P.D. 464 that such notice of delinquency of the payment of the property tax
should be published.
III. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to consider the lack of personal notice of the
sale for public auction of the subject property to its owner which nullifies the said proceeding.
IV. FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in holding that the decision of the trial court in the
petition for the consolidation of the title case filed by the private respondent in LRC Admin. Case 207 is a
bar to this proceeding.
V. FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not nullifying the auction sale of subject property on equitable
considerations.
We deem it appropriate to simplify the issues in this wise: (1) whether the RTC Decision in LRC Adm.
Case No. 207-R is a bar to this proceeding; and (2) whether the auction sale of the subject condominium
unit should be annulled on the grounds of (a) non-publication of the notice of delinquency for the payment
of property tax, (b) lack of personal notice of the sale or public auction of the subject property and (c)
equitable considerations. As a preliminary matter, we shall also consider petitioners submission that they
were deprived of due process because of their counsels failure to inform them immediately of the receipt
of the CA Decision.
Preliminary Matter:
Negligence of Petitioners Former Counsel
Petitioners aver that their former counsel informed them of the CA Decision only on February 5, 1998,
more than two months after he had received a copy on December 3, 1997. According to petitioners, their
former counsels negligence effectively deprived them of their right to due process.
We disagree. Notwithstanding its late filing, their Motion for Reconsideration was accepted and
considered by the CA. Hence, this issue has become moot, a fact which petitioners themselves admitted
in their Memorandum: As a matter of fact, in the very resolution of the Court of Appeals of April 27, 1998
(Annex C to Petition) denying the motion for reconsideration, wherein the matter of inexcusable
negligence of counsel in not informing petitioners immediately of the decision of the court a quo, were
among the grounds thereof, it was held that the issues raised therein had already been considered in the
Decision of November 20, 1997. The Court of Appeals obviously considered that the Motion for
Reconsideration was validly filed by petitioners so that the Court of Appeals favorably considered the plea
of petitioners to be afforded due process by acting on the Motion for Reconsideration. Otherwise, it could
have just denied said Motion for late filing or simply noted the same without action. [7]
Moreover, petitioners themselves declared in their Reply Memorandum [8] that this matter is no longer
in issue: At any rate this issue was raised in the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the
appellate court and obviously it was favorably considered as the said Court denied the merit of said
Motion by stating that the issues raised have already been treated in the Decision, instead of outrightly
denying the same for late filing. Hence, this is no longer in issue in this proceeding. [9]
First Issue:
Bar by Earlier Judgment
Petitioners contend that the Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R, rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City (Branch 6), did not preclude the filing of a separate action to annul the auction
sale. Citing Tiongco v. Philippine Veterans Bank,[10] they aver that this RTC Branch had no jurisdiction to
rule on the validity of that sale. Hence, its Decision in the LRC case cannot bar the present proceedings.
Petitioners reliance on Tiongco is misplaced, considering that its factual incidents are different from
those of the present controversy. In that case, the trial court was acting on a Petition for the Surrender of
Certificates of Title. In LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R, the trial court was faced with a Petition for
Consolidation of Ownership. It had jurisdiction to rule on all matters necessary for the determination of
the issue of ownership, including the validity of the auction sale.
Indeed, this Court in several cases[11]has previously declared that a petition for the surrender of the
owners duplicate certificate involves contentious questions which should be threshed out in an ordinary
case, because the land registration court has no jurisdiction to try them.
Presidential Decree (PD) 1529, however, intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the
expeditious termination of cases. In more recent cases,[12] therefore, the Court declared that this Decree
had eliminated the distinction between general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the
latters limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court. Land registration courts, as
such, can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving
substantial issues.[13]
Thus, petitioners err in contending that the RTC is, in a land registration case, barred from ruling on
the validity of the auction sale. That court now has the authority to act not only on applications for
original registration, but also on all petitions filed after the original registration of title. Coupled with this
authority is the power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.
[14]
Especially where the issue of ownership is ineluctably tied up with the question of registration, the land
registration court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction. [15]
It is equally important to consider that a land registration courts decision ordering the confirmation
and the registration of title, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds the whole world.[16] Thus, the
trial courts ruling consolidating the ownership and the title of the property in the name of herein
respondent is valid and binding not only on petitioners, but also on everyone else who may have any
claim thereon.
Second Issue:
Validity of the Auction sale
Petitioners contend that the auction sale was invalid, because several requisites regarding notice and
publication were not satisfied. We are not convinced.
It has been held that matters of notice and publication in tax sales are factual questions that cannot
be determined by this Court.[17] Moreover, a recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as in this case,
generally precludes the determination of factual issues. This Court will not, as a rule, inquire into the
evidence relied upon by the lower courts to support their findings. [18] In this case, the CA had already ruled
on the question of compliance with the requirements of notice and publication in this wise:
In the case at bench, it cannot be denied that the requirements of notice, publication and posting have
been complied with by the public defendant prior to the auction sale wherein the subject condominium
unit was sold. x x x Ergo, there was nothing irregular in the questioned public auction -- thus, the validity
of the same must be upheld in accordance with the aforementioned cases. [19]
The CA ruling notwithstanding, we shall proceed to discuss these factual issues in order to assure
petitioners of a complete adjudication of their case, and not a mere disposition of procedural
technicalities.
The Non-Publication of Notice of Real Property Tax Delinquency
Petitioners assert that the tax sale should be annulled because of noncompliance with the
requirement of publication prescribed in Section 65 of PD 464.
In this regard, we note that unlike land registration proceedings which are in rem, cases involving an
auction sale of land for the collection of delinquent taxes are in personam. Thus, notice by publication,
though sufficient in proceedings in rem, does not as a rule satisfy the requirement of proceedings in
personam.[20] As such, mere publication of the notice of delinquency would not suffice, considering that
the procedure in tax sales is in personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city treasurer to
send the notice of tax delinquency directly to the taxpayer in order to protect the interests of the latter.
In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by registered mail to the permanent address
of the registered owner in Manila. In that notice, the city treasurer of Baguio City directed him to settle
the charges immediately and to protect his interest in the property. Under the circumstances, we hold
that the notice sent by registered mail adequately protected the rights of the taxpayer, who was the
registered owner of the condominium unit.
For purposes of the real property tax, the registered owner of the property is deemed the
taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and other
proceedings relative to the tax sale. Not being registered owners of the property, petitioners cannot claim
to have been deprived of such notice. In fact, they were not entitled to it.
Lack of Personal Notice of the Sale or of the Public Auction of the Subject Property
Petitioners also contend that the registered owner was not given personal notice of the public
auction. They cite Section 73 of PD 464, the pertinent portion of which is reproduced hereunder:
x x x. Copy of the notices shall forthwith be sent either by registered mail or by messenger, or through
messenger, or through the barrio captain, to the delinquent taxpayer, at the address shown in the tax rolls
or property tax records of the municipality or city where the property is located, or at his residence, if
known to said treasurer or barrio captain. x x x. (Underscoring supplied by petitioners in their
Memorandum)
According to petitioners, the notice of public auction should have been sent to the address appearing
in the tax roll or property records of the City of Baguio. That address is Unit No. 5, Baden #4105, Europa
Condominium Villas, Baguio City; not the known address or residence of the registered owner at 145 Ermin
Garcia Street, Cubao, Quezon City. They contend that notice may be sent to the residence of the
taxpayer, only when the tax roll does not show any address of the property.
The above-cited provision, however, shows that the determination of the taxpayers address to which
the notice may be sent is the treasurers discretionary prerogative. In this case, the city treasurer deemed
it best to send the notice of public auction to the residence of the taxpayer. The former validly exercised
this option, inasmuch as the address of the latter was known to him. Moreover, it was more practical and
favorable to the registered owner that the notice of delinquency be sent to his permanent residence in
Manila, because he was using the subject condominium unit merely as a vacation house and not as a
residence.
This Court in Pecson v. Court of Appeals [21] made a clear and categorical ruling on the matter, when it
declared as follows:
Under the said provisions of law, notices of the sale of the public auction may be sent to the delinquent
taxpayer, either (I) at the address as shown in the tax rolls or property tax record cards of the municipality
or city where the property is located or (ii) at his residence, if known to such treasurer or barrio
captain. (emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, for purposes of the collection of real property taxes, the registered owner of the property
is considered the taxpayer. Although petitioners have been in possession of the subject premises by
virtue of an unregistered deed of sale, such transaction has no binding effect with respect to third persons
who have no knowledge of it.
The importance of registration and its binding effect is stated in Section 51 of the Property
Registration Decree or PD 1529, which reads:
Sec. 51.
Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He
may use such forms, deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instrument as are sufficient in law. But
no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or
effect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only
as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Registry of Deeds to
make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the Office
of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies.
Thus, insofar as third persons are concerned, it is the registration of the deed of sale that can validly
transfer or convey a persons interest in a property. [22] In the absence of registration, the registered owner
whose name appears on the certificate of title is deemed the taxpayer to whom the notice of auction sale
should be sent. Petitioners, therefore, cannot claim to be taxpayers. For this reason, the annulment of
the auction sale may not be invoked successfully.
The Annulment of the Auction Sale on Equitable Considerations
As correctly pointed out by respondents, equitable considerations will not find application, if the
statutes or rules of procedure explicitly provide for the requisites and standards by which the matters at
bench can be resolved.
While it may be assumed that both petitioners and Respondent Tayag are innocent purchasers of the
subject property, it is a well-settled principle that between two purchasers, the one who has registered the
sale in ones favor has a preferred right over the other whose title has not been registered, even if the
latter is in actual possession of the subject property. [23]
Likewise, we cannot help but point out the fact that petitioners brought this misfortune upon
themselves. They neither registered the Deed of Sale after its execution nor moved for the consolidation
of ownership of title to the property in their name. Worse, they failed to pay the real property taxes
due. Although they had been in possession of the property since 1981, they did not take the necessary
steps to protect and legitimize their interest.
Indeed, petitioners suit is now barred by laches.[24] The law helps the vigilant, but not those who sleep
on their rights, for time is a means of obliterating actions. Verily, time runs against the slothful and the
contemners of their own rights.[25]
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is
hereby DENIED and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
the
assailed
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV,
FROILAN M. MANOTOK,
N, JJ.
Petitioners,
-
G.R. Nos. 162335 &

162605
versus -
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE,

Represented by TERESITA BARQUE
HERNANDEZ,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
December 18, 2008
Decision
and
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The perceived advantages of the Torrens system of registration of land titles have helped stabilize
land ownership in the Philippines. Its underlying principle is security with facility in dealing with land. [1] Its
fundamental purpose is to quiet title to land, to perpetually enjoin any question in the legality of the title,
[2]
hence, the titles issued under the system are indefeasible. Yet the Torrens system is imperfect in that it
remains susceptible to fraud, either in the original registration proceedings or in subsequent transactions.
[3]
These petitions feature apparently fraudulent practices relating to the attempts at registration of
the subject property. Necessarily, they call for the correct application of entrenched principles in land
registration. At the same time, they afford this Court the opportunity to again defend the Torrens system
against unscrupulous elements who use its formalities to actualize the theft of property, and to exert
judicial might in ensuring that fraud does not prevail in the end.
These petitions were referred to the Court en banc by the Special First Division which had initially
ruled on them, most comprehensively in a Decision dated 12 December 2005.[4] They were accepted by
the Court en banc in a Resolution dated 26 July 2006. Subsequently, the parties presented their various
contentions before the Court in an oral argument held on 24 July 2007, followed by the submission of their
respective memoranda. While the cases were under consideration of the Court en banc, the participation
of the Office of the Solicitor General was required, [5] and a set of new parties was allowed leave to
intervene.[6]
The antecedent facts are stated in full in our 2005 Decision, but are summarized herein for
convenience.
On 11 June 1988, a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall, immolating, among others, records
stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. That fire has attained notoriety due to the
numerous certificates of title on file with that office, which were destroyed as a consequence. The
resulting effects of that blaze on specific property registration controversies have been dealt with by the
Court in a number of cases since then.[7] These petitions are perhaps the most heated, if not the most
contentious of those cases thus far.
Respondents Heirs of Homer Barque (the Barques) filed a petition [8] with the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) for administrative reconstitution of the original of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
210177 (the Barque title) issued in the name of Homer Barque. They alleged that the Barque title was
among the records destroyed by the 1988 fire. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies
of the alleged owners duplicate of the Barque title, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan
FLS 3168-D covering the property.
Learning of the Barques petition, Severino M. Manotok IV, et al. (the Manotoks) filed their
opposition thereto. The Manotoks claimed that the lot covered by the Barque title formed part of the land
covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] (the Manotok title) in the name of Severino
Manotok, et. al. They further alleged that the Barque title was spurious.
A brief description of the property involved is in order. Both the Barques and the Manotoks titles
advert to land belonging to Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate situated in the then Municipality of Caloocan,
Province of Rizal. The Barque title actually involves two parcels of land as part of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad
Estate, with an aggregate area of 342,945 square meters, while the Manotok title concerns only one
parcel of land, but with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.
On 30 June 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer of the LRA, denied [9] the
petition for reconstitution of the Barque title, declaring that:
xxx
1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq.
Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate,
containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name
of Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213
datedFebruary 01, 1991;
2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr.
Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter
datedFebruary 19, 1997.
xxx
The Barques motion for reconsideration was denied by Atty. Bustos in an Order [10] dated 10
February 1998; hence, the Barques appealed to the LRA.
The LRA reversed Atty. Bustos on appeal. It ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have
required the submission of documents other than the owners duplicate certificate of title as basis for
denying the petition and should have confined himself to the owners duplicate certificate of title. The LRA
further found anomalies in the Manotoks title. It observed that:
Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and
convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid,
genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City
himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a
certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not
salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot
reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries
of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B.
L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity
of TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under
such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is
mandatory.
It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was
duly issued by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR
whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National
Capital Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the
custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section, DENRNCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No.
2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 .... Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to
Atty. Bustos confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the Technical
Records and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January
1997 addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan.
.
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no
records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer
print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly
entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession
Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and
Box Number 0400 and said computer print-out is duly supported by an Offical Receipt .
The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the
legal repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The documentary evidence
presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated by the
fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter.
Notwithstanding its conclusion that the Manotok title was fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted
that only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) could cancel the Manotok title as a Torrens title. It thus ruled,
[11]
that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT
No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation
of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the Barques with a prayer
that the reconstitution be ordered immediately. The LRA denied [12] the Manotoks motion for
reconsideration and the Barques prayer for immediate reconstitution.
Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The
Barques petition for review[13] was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, while the Manotoks petition for
review[14] was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. The Barques prayed that the LRA be directed to
immediately reconstitute the Barque title without being subjected to the condition that the Manotok title
should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Manotoks argued in
their own petition that the LRA erred in imputing that the Manotok title was spurious and fake.
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion for leave to intervene. [15] She
sought the dismissal of the cases in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 and claimed
ownership over the subject property.
On 13 September 2002, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [16] in CAG.R. SP No. 66700, denying the Barques petition and affirming the LRA Resolution. The Barques filed a
motion for reconsideration.[17] Subsequently, the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division
rendered an Amended Decision[18] dated 7 November 2003 wherein it held that:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith
petitioners valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177. [19]
The Manotoks filed a motion for the reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
66700, but this was denied.[20]
On the other hand, as to the Manotoks petition, CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [21] on 29 October 2003 which affirmed the resolution of the LRA.
[22]
The appellate court held that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the Barques petition
for reconstitution, since there was as yet no final judgment upholding or annulling the Barque title. The
Barques filed a motion for reconsideration of this ruling. [23] As had occurred with the Barques petition, the
Third Division of the Court of Appeals granted the Barques motion for reconsideration and on 24 February
2004, promulgated its Amended Decision[24] wherein it held that:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated
29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City to cancel petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents
TCT No. T-210177.
Aggrieved with the twin decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP
No. 66642, both ordering the cancellation of the Manotok title, the Manotoks filed separate petitions for
review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively. On 2 August
2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 162605 with G.R. No. 162335. [25]
On 12 December 2005, the Courts First Division rendered its Decision [26] affirming the two
decisions of the Court of Appeals. [27] The Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Courts
First Division denied in a Resolution dated 19 April 2006.[28] Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for
Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration, with their Motion for Reconsideration attached. The
Court denied the same in a Resolution dated 19 June 2006, and the Court further ordered that entry of
judgment be made.[29] Thus on 2 May 2006, entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.[30]
The Barques filed multiple motions with the Courts First Division concerning the execution of the
judgment, including a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession or For Execution. [31] In response, the
Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the Supreme Court En Banc (with prayer
to set motion for oral argument). In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the Special First Division referred
these cases to the Court en banc, and on 26 July 2006, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution
accepting the cases.[32]
On 7 September 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to intervene, to
which was attached their petition in intervention. [33] Movants alleged that the property subject of the
petition in G.R. No. 162335 and G.R. No. 162605 was owned by them. They claimed that their predecessorin-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511 which covered lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate. Moreover, they attached to their petition the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
that the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to be. [34] The Director of the
Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) recommended to the Director of the LMB that:
steps be taken in the proper court for the cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481(372302) and
all its derivative titles so that the land covered may be reverted to the State. [35]
Ultimately, the Court found it necessary to involve the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in these
cases, directing the OSG to file its Comment. The OSG filed its Comment on 04 April 2007. Oral arguments
were eventually held on 24 July 2007.
After the oral arguments, the Court required the parties, the intervenors, and the Solicitor General
to submit their respective memoranda.
I
As can be gleaned from the foregoing statement of facts, these petitions are attended by a few
procedural unorthodoxies, such as, for example, the Court en bancs move on the Special First Divisions
referral for reevaluation of these petitions when an entry of judgment had already been made in favor of
the Barques. Yet the prevailing consensus within the Court en banc was to proceed with the reevaluation
of these cases on a pro hac vice basis. There are good reasons for the Court to act in such rare manner in
these cases. Most urgently, the Court had felt that the previous rulings by the First Division and the
Special First Division warranted either affirmation or modification by the Court acting en banc.
It is a constitutional principle that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the [C]ourt in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
It has been argued that the 2005 Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with precedents of the Court,
and leaving that decision alone without the imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to undue
confusion within the bar and bench, with lawyers, academics and judges quibbling over whether the
earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard with respect to administrative reconstitution
of titles. Our land registration system is too vital to be stymied by such esoteric wrangling, and the
administrators and courts which implement that system do not deserve needless hassle.
The Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that this Court before had sanctioned the
recall entries of judgment. [36] The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final.
[37]
The militating concern for the Court en banc in accepting these cases is not so much the particular fate
of the parties, but the stability of the Torrens system of registration by ensuring clarity of jurisprudence on
the field.
It is beyond contention, even by the parties, that since the Court en banc resolved to accept these
petitions in 2006, we have effectively been reviewing the 12 December 2005 Decision of the Courts First
Division, as well as the Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June 2006 of that same Division. This Resolution
is the result of that review. As earlier stated, we have opted to do so on a pro hac vice basis to lend much
needed jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en banc can constitutionally provide.
II
In the context of an administrative reconstitution proceeding before the LRA, the Barques have
sought that the LRA exercise the power to cancel the Manotok title and forthwith cause the reconstitution
of their own title. The LRA refused to do so, although it did rule that the Manotok title was spurious and
thus subject to cancellation through the proper judicial proceeding. Upon appellate review of that LRA
decision, the Court of Appeals initially upheld the LRAs position, but ultimately, upon motion for
reconsideration, directed the cancellation of the Manotok title and the reconstitution of the Barque title.
Our succeeding discussion centers on the ordered mechanism for the cancellation of Torrens titles in
the Philippines.
To recall, both assailed Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals notably directed the cancellation
of the Manotok title even as it mandated the reconstitution of the Barque title. The obvious question is
whether the Court of Appeals was empowered to direct the annulment of the Manotok title through the
petitions raised before it by the Barques and the Manotoks. It could not.
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree,
provides that [a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack [and] cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. [38] Clearly, the cancellation of
the Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the
Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake. Nor could it
have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRAs administrative proceeding.
There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to annul Torrens titles
or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its exclusive original jurisdiction is
determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P. 129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of
judgments of the regional trial court.[39] Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the
Barques and the Manotoks petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction [40] over
the ruling of the LRA, also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court
to be able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the LRA, the
LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place.
Note that the Office of the Solicitor General, which acts as counsel for the government and its
agencies including the LRA, refutes the contention that the LRA has jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok
title, much less jurisdiction to rule on the validity of a certificate of title. It invokes the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC under Paragraph 2, Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, conferring jurisdiction on the RTC
over all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein x x
x. That the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over actions seeking the cancellation of title to real
property is so cardinal in our remedial law that it is reflected in hundreds if not thousands of examples in
jurisprudence.
Nonetheless, we may inquire whether, notwithstanding the statutory delineation of exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC, there is statutory basis for the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over the
cancellation of Torrens titles. If there is, we can perhaps assess such law separately from B.P. Blg. 129.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land Registration
Commissioner, as follows:
SEC. 6. General Functions
(1) The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the following functions:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land

registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registers of Deeds of
the corresponding certificates of title;
Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and other
personnel of the Commission;
Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of,
Registers of Deeds;
Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the
Court of First Instance throughout the Philippines with respect to the discharge
of their duties and functions in relation to the registration of lands;
Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the
registration of lands and issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, all needful rules and regulations therefor;
Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision
survey plans of properties titled under Act No. 496 except those covered by
P.D. No. 957.
Nowhere in the aforecited provision is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel titles. Indeed,
the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of the LRA to effect such
cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes
the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases. In fact, as we shall see shortly such laws take
great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution of title will not disturb
existing Torrenstitles.
It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok
title. The next matter of inquiry is whether the LRA had acted correctly in ordering, conditional as it may
have been, the administrative reconstitution of the Barque title.
Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, administrative reconstitution of titles is
permitted where the certificates of titles have been lost due to flood, fire and other force majeure. The
petitioner in such a case is required to execute an affidavit, containing the following averments:
(1) That no deed or other instrument affecting the property had been presented for
registration, or, if there be any, the nature thereof, the date of its presentation, as well as
the names of the parties, and whether the registration of such deed or instrument is still
pending accomplishment;
(2) That the owner's duplicate certificate or co-owner's duplicate is in due form without any
apparent intentional alterations or erasures;
(3) That the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation or investigation,
administrative or judicial, regarding its genuineness or due execution or issuance;
(4) That the certificate of title was in full force and effect at the time it was lost or destroyed;
(5) That the certificate of title is covered by a tax declaration regularly issued by the
Assessor's Office; and
(6) That real estate taxes have been fully paid up to at least two (2) years prior to the filing
of the petition for reconstitution.[41]
Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 26, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, further provides:
Sec. 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and subsequently found
or recovered, is not in the name of the same person in whose favor the reconstituted
certificate of title has been issued, the Register of Deeds or the party concerned should
bring the matter to the attention of the proper regional trial court, which, after due notice
and hearing, shall order the cancellation of the reconstituted certificate of title and render,
with respect to the memoranda of new liens and encumbrances, if any, made in the
reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, such judgment as justice and equity
may require: Provided, however, That if the reconstituted certificate of title has been
cancelled by virtue of any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, or by an
order of the court, and a new certificate of title has been issued, the procedure prescribed
above, with respect to the memorandum of new liens and encumbrances made on the
reconstituted certificate of title, after its reconstitution, shall be followed with respect to the
new certificate of title, and to such new liens and encumbrances, if any, as may have been
on the latter, after the issuance thereof. [42]
Rep. Act No. 6732 itself also states:
Section 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other
machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having
knowledge thereof.
Section 12. Any person who by means of fraud, deceit or other machination obtains
or attempts to obtain a reconstituted title shall be subject to criminal prosecution and, upon
conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment for a period of not less than two years but not
exceeding five years or the payment of a fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos but not
exceeding Two hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
Any public officer or employee who knowingly approves or assists in securing a
decision allowing reconstitution in favor of any person not entitled thereto shall be subject to
criminal prosecution and, upon conviction, shall be liable for imprisonment of not less than
five years but not exceeding ten years or payment of a fine of not less than Fifty thousand
pesos but not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos or both at the discretion of the court
and perpetual disqualification from holding public office.[43]
These provisions indubitably establish that the administrative reconstitution of Torrens titles is
intended for non-controversial cases, or especially where the subject property is not covered by an existing
title in favor of a person other than the applicant. Such an implication is consonant with the rule that the
reconstitution proceedings are not the venue for confirmation or adjudication of title, but merely a means
by which a previously adjudicated title whose original has been lost or destroyed may be reissued to its
owner.[44]
The Solicitor General pertinently cites the rule in Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela,
which we held that [t]he courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued
subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. [46] That such doctrine was established for
cases of judicial reconstitution does not bar its application to cases of administrative reconstitution. None
of the provisions pertaining to administrative reconstitution in Rep. Act No. 26 or 6732 extraordinarily
empowers the LRA to exercise jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution, where the property is already
covered by a Torrens title. After all, the LRA in such case is powerless to void the previous title or to
diminish its legal effect. Even assuming that the previously issued title is obviously fraudulent or attended
by flaws and as such cannot be countenanced by the legal system, the corrective recourse lies with the
courts, and not with the LRA.
[45]
If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the LRA, and it appears from the official
records that the subject property is already covered by an existingTorrens title in the name of another
person, there is nothing further the LRA can do but to dismiss the petition. The dismissal of such petition is
subject to judicial review, but the only relevant inquiry in such appellate proceeding is on whether or not
there is a previously existing title covering that property. Neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals at that
point may inquire into the validity of the title or the competing claims over the property. The only remedy
is an action before the RTC for the cancellation of the existing title, whether by the competing claimant or
by the OSG on behalf of the Republic.
III
The 2005 Decision placed heavy reliance on Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco,
where in the course of reviewing an action for judicial reconstitution of title, the Court opted not to
remand the reconstitution case filed by Molina to the court of origin in order to permit the appeals of
Ortigas and the Solicitor General, which had been improvidently disallowed by the trial court. Instead,
owing to the fatal infirmities of Molinas cause of action, the Court itself nullified the reconstituted titles
issued by the trial court. Ortigas had been cited by the Court of Appeals and also by the 2005 Decision, in
ruling on the Barques petition.
[47]
The unusual shortcut that occurred in Ortigas had become necessary because in that case the
trial court had denied or stricken out the notices of appeal respectively filed by Ortigas and the Solicitor
General from the order for reconstitution of Molinas titles. Had these notices of appeal been allowed, the
Court of Appeals would have then reviewed the trial courts decision on appeal, with the ultimately correct
resolution which was the annulment of Molinas titles. Ortigas was forced to institute a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus with this Court, praying for either of these alternative resultsthe more
prudent recourse of directing the trial court to act on the notices of appeal and to forward the case records
to the Court of Appeals, or the more immediate remedy of bypassing the appellate process and the Court
itself by directly annulling Molinas titles.
The Court of Appeals herein could not have equated its annulment of the Manotok title with that
undertaken by the Court in Ortigas since, unlike in Ortigas, the Court of Appeals was not endowed with the
proper appellate jurisdiction to annul the Manotok title. As earlier pointed out, since the LRA had no
original jurisdiction to cancel the Manotok title, it follows that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdictional
competence to extend the same relief, even while reviewing the LRAs ruling. Clearly, Ortigas cannot be
applied as a binding precedent to these cases. The fundamental jurisdictional defects that attended the
actions of both Divisions of the Court of Appeals have effectively diminished Ortigas as a persuasive
authority.
IV
The 2005 Decision accepted the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that the Manotok title
was spurious and accordingly sanctioned its cancellation, even though no direct attack on the title had
been initiated before a trial court. That the 2005 Decision erred in that regard is a necessary consequence
following our earlier explanation of why the mere existence of the Manotok title necessarily barred the LRA
from inquiring into the validity of that title.
Moreover, it would have been pointless for the LRA or the Court of Appeals to have ruled
definitively on the validity of the Barques claim to title. After all, since neither the LRA nor the Court of
Appeals could cause the cancellation of the Manotok title, any declaration that the Barque claim was valid
would be inutile and inoperable. Still, in order to effectively review and reverse the assailed rulings, it
would be best for this Court to test the premises under which the LRA and the Court of Appeals
had concluded that the Barques had a valid claim to title. The available record before the Court is
comprehensive enough to allow us to engage in that task.
The Barque title, or TCT No. 210177, under which the Barques assert title to Lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate, states that it was transferred from TCT No. 13900. [48] The Barques assert that they bought the
subject property from a certain Setosta. Thus, it could be deduced that TCT No. 13900 should have been
registered under the name of Setosta. However, it was not. TCT No. 13900 was registered under the name
of Manotok Realty, Inc.[49] This detracts from the Barques claim that the Manotoks do not have title to the
property, as in fact the Barque title was a transfer from a title registered under the name of the Manotoks.
The Barques have failed to explain the anomaly.
The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision plan, FLS-3168-D, made in favor of
Setosta. However, based on the records, it appears that there is a conflict as to its actual existence in the
files of the government. Revelatory is the exchange of correspondence between the LMB and the LRA. The
LMB did not have any copy of FLS-3168-D in the EDP listing,[50] nor did the LMB have a record of the
plan.[51] However, a microfilm copy of FLS-3168-D was on file in the Technical Records and Statistical
Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Capital Region (DENR-NCR). [52] The copy
with the Technical Records and Statistical Section, which bore the stamp of the LMB, was denied by the
LMB as having emanated from its office.[53]
Further, the letter dated 2 January 1997 from the LMB stated that the copy of FLS-3168-D as
verified from its microfilm file was the same as the copy sent by the Technical Records and Statistics
Section of the National Capital Region Lands Management Sector. [54] The LMB, however, denied issuing
such letter and stated that it was a forged document. [55] To amplify the forged nature of the document, the
LMB sent a detailed explanation to prove that it did not come from its office. [56] In a letter to the
administrator of the LRA, the hearing officer concluded that it is evident that there is an attempt to
mislead us into favorable action by submitting forged documents, hence it is recommended that this case
[be] referred to the PARAC for investigation and filing of charges against perpetrators as envisioned by this
office under your administration. [57]
There are significant differences between the technical description of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate
as stated in FLS-3168-D, the subdivision plan relied on by the Barques, and the technical description
provided by the DENR.[58] The DENR-confirmed technical description reads:
Bounded on the E., along line-2 by Payatas Estate; on the SE., by Tuazon Estate;
along line 3-4 by Lot 824; along line 4-5 by Lot 818; and on the N., along line 5-1
by Lot 822, all of Piedad Estate.[59]
However, if we examine the subdivision plan, there are critical changes with respect to the
boundaries named therein. In effect, the boundaries as described in the subdivision plan would read:
Bounded on the E., along line-2 by Diez Francisco; on the SE., by Diez Francisco;
along line 3-4 by Lot 824; along line 4-5 by Lot 826; and on the N., along line 5-1
by Lot 822, all of Piedad Estate.[60]
The Barques offered no credible explanation for the discrepancy between the subdivision plan it
relies on and the DENR record. They also do not contradict the finding of the National Archives that there
is no copy in its files of the deed of sale allegedly executed between Setosta and Barque. [61]
Lastly, in the 1st indorsement issued by the Land Projection Section of the LRA dated 23 August
2006, that Section stated that upon examination it was found out that the land as described in the Barque
title when plotted thru its tie line falls outside Quezon City. This is material, since Lot 823 of the Piedad
Estate is within the boundaries ofQuezon City. [62] A similar finding was made by the Land Management
Bureau (LMB). It attested that the line or directional azimuth of Lot No. 823 per the Barque title locates it
at 5,889 meters away from point 1 of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate. [63]
These discrepancies highlight the error of the LRA and the Court of Appeals in acknowledging the
right of the Barques to seek reconstitution of their purported Barque title. Even assuming that the petition
for reconstitution should not have been dismissed due to the Manotok title, it is apparent that the Barques
claim of ownership is exceedingly weak.
V
In the course of fully reevaluating these cases, the Court could not turn a blind eye on the evidence
and points raised against the Manotok title. The apparent flaws in the Manotoks claim are considerable
and disturbing enough. The Court, as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy, is a guardian of the
integrity of the land registration system of the Philippines. We will be derelict in our duty if we remain
silent on the apparent defects of the Manotok title, reflective as they are of a scourge this Court is
dedicated to eliminate.
Many of these flaws have especially emerged through the petition-for-intervention of Felicitas and
Rosendo Manahan, whom we have allowed to intervene in these cases. The Manahans had filed a petition
with the OSG seeking that it initiate cancellation/reversion proceedings against the Manotok title. That
petition was referred by the OSG to the LMB of the DENR, which duly investigated the claim of the
Manahans. The Chief of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended that the appropriate proceedings be
taken in the proper court for the cancellation of the Manotok title, through a Memorandum dated 17 April
2000.[64]
Around the same time, the LMB referred to the DENR Undersecretary for Legal Affairs Roseller S.
dela Pea a query on whether a deed of conveyance could be issued to Felicitas Manahan. The DENR
Undersecretary, in answering that query through a Memorandum dated 6 July 2000, pointed out that the
titles of the Manotoks could not have been derived from OCT No. 614, the mother title of Lot 823 of the
Piedad Estate.[65] The chain of transfers leading from OCT No. 614 to the Manotok title was a TCT No.
22813, purportedly issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. The copy of said
TCT No. 22813 submitted to the Court is truncated in the upper half, to the point that it is not visually
discernible what year the same was issued. More crucially, a certification was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal dated 7 January 2000stating thus:
After a thorough verification from the files of this Office, it appears that the documents
leading to the issuance of TCT No. 22813, Blk. T-92 cannot be found from the files of this
Office.[66]
These findings were twice verified with due diligence and reconfirmed by the DENR, according to
Undersecretary Dela Pea.[67]
The DENR also requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in conducting
the said investigation. The NBI examined various sales certificates and assignment of sales certificates in
the names of the purported predecessors-in-interest of the Manotoks Regina Geronimo, Modesto Zacarias,
and Felicisimo Villanuevacertificates that were all dated prior to 1930. In its Chemistry Report No. C-99152 dated 10 June 1999, the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI concluded that the said documents
could not be as old as it (sic) purports to be.[68]
According to the Manahans, the LMB did eventually forward to the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City a Deed of Conveyance for registration and mandatory issuance of title to Felicitas Manahan
as grantee, pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act. The registration of said Deed of
Conveyance was referred to the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority en consulta in 2001.
Also on record[69] is an Investigation Report on Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate dated 5 July 1989,
authored by Evelyn C. dela Rosa, Land Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO), NCR-North Sector and addressed to the CENRO Officer, North CENRO. It was narrated
therein that Lot No. 823 had actually been in the possession of a Valentin Manahan beginning in 1908. In
1939, Valentin Manahan applied for the purchase of the land, and he was issued Sales Certificate No. 511.
The Investigation Report stated:
Records show that the Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot 823, Piedad Estate, was
issued to Valentin Manahan as purchaser and transferred to Hilaria de Guzman Manahan as
(Assignee) and sold to Felicitas Manahan by way of Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 23,
1974. Based on my research at the Land Management Bureau (LMB), Central Office, it
appears that original claimant of lot 823 was Valentin Manahan. [70]
All told, these apparent problems with the Manotoks claim dissuade us from being simply content
in reflexively dismissing the administrative petition for reconstitution filed by the Barques. Indeed, we
have to take further action.
VI
The most formidable impediment to the Court reacting to the problems apparent in the Manotok
title is the fact that we are not engaged in the review of an original action for the cancellation of such title.
If, as in Ortigas, the validity of the questionable title were now properly at issue, the Court would without
hesitancy rule on such question. Because it is not, the matter of how next to proceed warrants more
deliberation.
The conservative approach would be to still affirm the continuing validity of the Manotok title until
the proper case for its cancellation is filed with the regional trial court. Within that context, it would also
be a plausible recourse for us is to direct the Solicitor General to duly investigate the circumstances
behind the transmission of Lot No. 823, formerly a Friar Land, to private persons. Thereafter, the Solicitor
General can file the appropriate proceedings for cancellation if warranted. However, it is already apparent,
following the evaluation of these cases, that there is evidenceunrefuted thus farindicating that the
Manotoks claim to title is just as flawed as that of the Barques.
Can the Court declare the Manotok title void? In the 2002 decision in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club,
the subject property therein had originally formed part of the Banilad Friar Lands. Cebu Country Club
had undertaken the administrative reconstitution of the title to the property, leading Alonso to file a
complaint for nullification of such title in order to vindicate his own claims to the property. Alonsos
complaint was dismissed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending with this
Court, the Solicitor General was required to comment on the validity of Cebu Country Clubs
administratively reconstituted title. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Cebu Country Club had not been
able to establish a clear title over the contested estate, and in the dispositive portion of its decision
[71]
declared that Lot No. 727 D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certificate of Title
Nos. 251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines.
The following year, the Court, acting on the motions for reconsideration in Alonso,[72] extensively
discussed why it had taken that extraordinary step even though the Republic of the Philippines, through
the Solicitor General, had not participated or intervened in that case before the lower courts.
It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the "Friar Lands" over
which the Government holds title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial
property of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the
requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.
xxx
It was thus primordial for the respondent to prove its acquisition of its title by clear
and convincing evidence in view of the nature of the land. In fact, it is essential for both
respondent and petitioners to establish that it had become private property. Both parties
failed to do so. As we have held earlier, petitioners have not succeeded to prove their claim
of ownership over the subject property.
xxx
Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it
is an iron-clad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. Since
respondent failed to present the paper trail of the property's conversion to private property,
the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent cannot be
counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land, remained part of the
patrimonial property of the Government. Possession of patrimonial property of the
Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, can not ipso facto ripen into
ownership. Moreover, the rule that statutes of limitation do not run against the State, unless
therein expressly provided, is founded on "the great principle of public policy, applicable to
all governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the
negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided."
xxx
Finally, our declaration that Lot 727-D-2 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate legally
belongs to the Government does not amount to reversion without due process of law insofar
as both parties are concerned. The disputed property is a Friar Land and both parties failed
to show that it had ceased to belong to the patrimonial property of the State or that it had
become private property. [73]
The Alonso approach especially appeals to us because, as in this case, the subject property therein
was a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120) may be disposed of by the Government
only under that law. Thus, there is greater concern on the part of this Court to secure its proper
transmission to private hands, if at all.
At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence for us to
warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates thus far is evidence not yet
refuted by clear and convincing proof that the Manotoks claim to title is flawed. To arrive at an ultimate
determination, the formal reception of evidence is in order. This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise
structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate evidence de novo. However, the Court of Appeals is
sufficiently able to undertake such function.
The remand of cases pending with this Court to the Court of Appeals for reception of further
evidence is not a novel idea. It has been undertaken before in Republic v. Court of Appeals [74] and more
recently in our 2007 Resolution in Manotok v. Court of Appeals. [75] Our following explanation
in Manotok equally applies to this case:
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the
Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the
evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office.
80 The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its
conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a
body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters,
including documentary evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before
it to the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court commissioned the
former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the
controversy, more particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real
Estate Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are 'open spaces'
and/or areas reserved for certain purposes,' determining in the process the validity of such
postulates and the respective measurements of the areas referred to." The Court of Appeals
therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's Report" shortly
thereafter. Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of
authority to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2,
Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a
commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or
otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. The order
of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the
commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is
likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to
him by the order of reference. In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of the
final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain herein. [76]
The primary focus for the Court of Appeals, as an agent of this Court, in receiving and evaluating
evidence should be whether the Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the
Government of Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. On that evidence, this Court
may ultimately decide whether annulment of the Manotok title is warranted, similar to the annulment of
the Cebu Country Club title in Alonso. At the same time, the Court recognizes that the respective claims to
title by other parties such as the Barques and the Manahans, and the evidence they may submit on their
behalf, may have an impact on the correct determination of the status of the Manotok title. It would thus
be prudent, in assuring the accurate evaluation of the question, to allow said parties, along with the OSG,
to participate in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. If the final evidence on record definitively
reveals the proper claimant to the subject property, the Court would take such fact into consideration as it
adjudicates final relief.
For the purposes above-stated, the Court of Appeals is tasked to hear and receive evidence,
conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions
within three (3) months from notice of this Resolution.
To assist the Court of Appeals in its evaluation of the factual record, the Office of the Solicitor
General is directed to secure all the pertinent relevant records from the Land Management Bureau and
the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and submit the same to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 12 June 2005, and the Resolutions dated 19 April and 19 June
2006 of the Courts First Division are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May
2006 is RECALLED. The Amended Decision dated 24 February 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Amended
Decision dated 7 November 2003 and the Resolution dated 12 March 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, and
the Resolutions of the Land Registration Authority dated 24 June 1998 and 14 June 1998 in Admin.
Recons. No. Q-547-A[97] are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in
accordance with this Resolution. The Court of Appeals is directed to raffle these remanded cases
immediately upon receipt of this Resolution.
This Resolution is immediately executory.

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G.R. No.

November 15, 1947

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. L-7096. May 31, 1956.]

EN SU VIRTUD, el Juzgado falla esta causa:

(c) sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas.

chan roblesvirt ualawlibrary

G.R. No. L-14869

October 27, 1920

2176, 2191, 2182

Planted rice; paid taxes

2178, 2180, 2190

Cultivation and harvest

Planted rice; harvested.

[G.R. No. 136965. March 28, 2001]

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEGUNDINA ROSARIO, respondent.

Hence, this appeal.[23]

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 167707

- versus MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD

G.R. No. 173775

- versus THE SECRETARY OF THE

the RTC rendered

G.R. No. 173775

G.R. No. 180067

June 30, 2009

Naguit as affirmed in Malabanan more in accord with the States policy

[G.R. No. 133698. April 4, 2001]

The CA summarized the antecedents of this case in this wise: [4]

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Non-Publication of Notice of Real Property Tax Delinquency

The Annulment of the Auction Sale on Equitable Considerations

G.R. Nos. 162335 &

HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE,

Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land

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