Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179754

November 21, 2012

JOAQUIN G. CHUNG, JR., PAZ ROYERAZ-SOLER, and MANSUETO MACEDA, Petitioners,

vs.
JACK DANIEL MONDRAGON, (deceased), substituted by his sisters namely: TEOTIMA M.
BOURBON, EMMA M. MILLAN, EUGENIA M. RAMA and ROSARIO M. CABALLES; CLARINDA
REGIS-SCHMITZ and MARIA LINA MALMISA, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In making the indictment that a courts decision fails in the fundamental mandate that no decision
shall be rendered without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, the demurring party should not mistake brevity for levity.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails 1) the November 23, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79615, which affirmed the May 19, 2003 Decision 3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Br. 24, Maasin City, Southern Leyte in Civil Case No. R-3248, which in turn
dismissed the herein petitioners Complaint for quieting of title, and 2) the September 2, 2007 CA
Resolution4 denying reconsideration thereof.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioners Joaquin G. Chung, Jr., Paz Royeras-Soler, and Mansueto Maceda are descendants of
Rafael Mondragon (Rafael) by his first wife, Eleuteria Calunia (Eleuteria), while respondent Jack
Daniel Mondragon5(Jack Daniel) is Rafaels descendant by his second wife, Andrea Baldos (Andrea).
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 224476 is registered in the name of "Heirs of Andrea Baldos
represented by Teofila G. Maceda" and covers 16,177 square meters of land in Macrohon, Southern
Leyte (the land).
Petitioners claim that from 1921 up to 2000, Rafael appeared as owner of the land in its tax
declaration, and that a free patent was issued in 1987 in the name of Andreas heirs upon application
of Teofila G. Maceda (Teofila), who is petitioners sister.
On the other hand, respondents claim that Andrea is the exclusive owner of the land, having
inherited the same from her father Blas Baldos. They add that during Andreas lifetime, she was in
lawful, peaceful and continuous possession thereof in the concept of owner; that in 1954, Andrea
conveyed a portion thereof to one Crispina Gloria de Cano via a document written in the vernacular

wherein she categorically stated that she inherited the land from her father and she was the true and
exclusive owner of the land; that after Andrea died in 1955, her son Fortunato Mondragon took over,
paying taxes thereon religiously; and when Fortunato died, his son Jack Daniel (herein respondent)
came into possession and enjoyment thereof.
On August 18, 2000, Jack Daniel sold a 1,500-square meter portion of the land to his co-respondent
Clarinda Regis-Schmitz (Regis-Schmitz).
On the claim that Jack Daniel had no right to sell a portion of the land and that the sale to Regis
Schmitz created a cloud upon their title, petitioners filed Civil Case No. R-3248, with a prayer that
Jack Daniel be declared without right to sell the land or a portion thereof; that their rights and those
belonging to the legitimate heirs of Rafael and Eleuteria be declared valid and binding against the
whole world; that the respondents be restrained from creating a cloud upon OCT No. 22447; and
that Jack Daniels sale to Regis-Schmitz be declared null and void.
After respondents filed their Answer, petitioners moved for judgment on the pleadings. In an October
16, 2002 Order,7 the trial court denied the motion. Notably, during proceedings taken on the motion,
petitioners made an admission in open court that respondent Jack Daniel is Andreas grandson and
heir.8
At the pre-trial conference, it was mutually agreed by the parties that the sole issue to be resolved is
whether Jack Daniel possessed the right to dispose a portion of the land. 9
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the court a quo rendered its May 19, 2003 Decision 10 dismissing the case. It held that with
the admission that Jack Daniel is an heir of Andrea, he being the latters grandson and therefore her
heir, he is thus a co-owner of the land which forms part of Andreas estate, and thus possesses the
right to dispose of his undivided share therein. The trial court held that petitioners remedy was to
seek partition of the land in order to obtain title to determinate portions thereof.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners appealed the dismissal, claiming that the trial courts Decision violated the constitutional
requirement that no decision shall be rendered without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.11 They continued to question Jack Daniels sale to RegisSchmitz, who they claim was married to a foreign national and thus disqualified from purchasing a
portion of the land; the non-registration of the sale; the alleged false claim on the deed of sale by
Jack Daniel that he is the exclusive owner of the land; and the lack of authority of the notary public
who notarized the sale.
The respondents countered that the sole issue that required resolution was, as circumscribed by the
trial court, the capacity of Jack Daniel to dispose of a portion of the land, and nothing more.
The CA sustained the trial court. It held that petitioners were bound by the agreement during pre-trial
and by the pre-trial order to limit the determination of the case to the sole issue of whether Jack

Daniel possessed the capacity to dispose a portion of the land. Since they did not object to the trial
courts pre-trial order, petitioners are bound to abide by the same. It concluded that the other issues
which were not related to Jack Daniels capacity to dispose deserved no consideration, citing the
pronouncement in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo12 that "the determination of issues at a
pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal."
The CA further ruled that contrary to petitioners submission, Civil Case No. R-3248 was decided on
the merits, as the trial court squarely addressed the issues and the evidence; that it having been
discovered through petitioners own admission in court that Jack Daniel was a co-heir, and thus coowner, of the land, all questions relative to his capacity to convey a portion thereof have therefore
been resolved in the affirmative.
On the other hand, the CA noted that while Jack Daniel is admittedly a direct descendant of Rafael
by his second wife Andrea, petitioners do not appear to be her heirs and instead are descendants of
Rafael by his first wife Eleuteria which thus puts their claimed title to the land in doubt; and that
although OCT No. 22447 cites Teofila, petitioners sister, it includes her in the title merely as the
purported "representative" of Andreas heirs and does not indicate her as an owner of the land.
Finally, the CA observed that it was Jack Daniel, and not the petitioners, who occupied the land.
Nevertheless, it affirmed the trial courts Decision.
Issues
The instant petition now raises the following issues for resolution:
1. NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULE VIII, SEC. 14, CONSTITUTION AND RULE 36 TO
DECLARE THE DECISION NULL AND VOID.
2. MISAPPREHENSION OF [SIC] TO THE TRUE AWARDEE OF OCT NO. 22447
TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
3. FAILURE TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT
CLARINDA REGIS SCHMITZ.
4. FAILURE TO DECLARE THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS AND DECISION AS NULL AND VOID FOR FAILING TO ESTABLISH THE
CONDITIONS SINE QUA NON TO SUPPORT THE ORDER AND DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT TO DISMISS THE CASE.
5. WHETHER X X X ATTY. PATERNO A. GONZALEZ WAS A DULY AUTHORIZED NOTARY
PUBLIC; PURPORTED COPY OF APPOINTMENT BEARS NO COURT SEAL, AS COURT
EVIDENCE.13
Petitioners Arguments
In their Petition, the petitioners, speaking through their counsel and co-petitioner Chung, persistently
argue, as they did in the CA, that the trial courts Decision violated the constitutional requirement that

no decision shall be rendered without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based. They claim that it is not true that Andrea is the owner of the land; that Jack
Daniels sale to Regis-Schmitz is null and void because she is disqualified from owning land in the
Philippines; that he had no right to sell the said portion, and the sale deprived them of their
supposed legitime; that their admission made in open court to the effect that Jack Daniel is an heir of
Andrea cannot supplant a declaration of heirship that may be issued by a proper testate or intestate
court; that the claim that Andrea is the true and lawful owner of the land is false; that when their
motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied, their judicial admission that Jack Daniel was
Andreas grandson and heir was expunged; and that Jack Daniels deed of sale with Regis-Schmitz
was a falsity for lack of authority of the notarizing officer.
Petitioners likewise argue that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of RegisSchmitz because her counsel did not possess the appropriate authority to represent her.
Petitioners thus pray that the CA Decision be set aside; that the Court quiet title to OCT No. 22447;
that the sale by Jack Daniel to Regis-Schmitz be declared null and void; and that the Court award
them P50,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and P30,000.00 attorneys fees.
Respondents Arguments
Respondents point out a defective verification in the Petition, and add that petitioners continue to
raise irrelevant issues such as the capacity of Regis-Schmitz to acquire a portion of the land and
the commission of the notary public which the CA properly disregarded. They point out that the CA
is correct in its observation that petitioners apparently do not possess the required title to maintain a
suit for quieting of title, they being strangers to OCT No. 22447 as they proceed from Eleuteria,
Rafaels first wife, and not his second wife Andrea, who in fact owns the land and in whose name it is
titled.
Respondents echo the trial court and the CAs common pronouncement that on account of
petitioners admission that Jack Daniel is an heir of Andrea, this makes him a co-owner of the land,
and as such, he possessed the capacity to dispose of his undivided share to Regis-Schmitz. This
admission, they argue, thus settled the lone issue in Civil Case No. R-3248 of whether Jack Daniel
may validly dispose of a portion of the land.
On the question of the notary publics commission, respondents argue that they have adduced
sufficient evidence to refute petitioners claim that the notary public, Atty. Paterno Gonzalez,
possessed the authority to notarize documents at the time. They direct the Courts attention to the
appointment issued by Executive Judge Fernando Campilan, Jr., the testimony of the latters clerk of
court confirming the issuance of the notarial commission, and Atty. Gonzalezs oath of office as
notary during the period in question.
Finally, on the issue that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Regis-Schmitz,
respondents point to the fact that since Regis-Schmitz appointed Jack Daniel as her attorney-in-fact
to represent her in Civil Case No. R-3248, no authority from her was required in order that Jack
Daniels counsel may represent her.

Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The constitutional requirement that every decision must state distinctly and clearly the factual and
legal bases therefor should indeed be the primordial concern of courts and judges. Be that as it may,
there should not be a mechanical reliance on this constitutional provision. The courts and judges
should be allowed to synthesize and to simplify their decisions considering that at present, courts are
harassed by crowded dockets and time constraints. Thus, the Court held in Del Mundo v. Court of
Appeals:
It is understandable that courts with heavy dockets and time constraints, often find themselves with
little to spare in the preparation of decisions to the extent most desirable. We have thus pointed out
that judges might learn to synthesize and to simplify their pronouncements. Nevertheless, concisely
written such as they may be, decisions must still distinctly and clearly express at least in minimum
essence its factual and legal bases.14 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court finds in this case no breach of the constitutional mandate that decisions must express
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based. The trial courts Decision is
complete, clear, and concise. Petitioners should be reminded that in making their indictment that the
trial courts Decision fails to express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
they should not mistake brevity for levity.
The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the plaintiff need to prove only two things,
namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to
be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a
legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding
beclouds its validity or efficacy."15
This case does not involve complex issues that require extensive disquisition. Quite the contrary, it
could have been resolved on a simple motion to dismiss. The trial court apparently was satisfied that
the first requisite, possession by petitioners of a legal or equitable title to the land, was complied
with; it concluded that petitioners held equitable title, being descendants of Rafael, albeit by his first
marriage to Eleuteria. The trial court assumed that although the land was titled in the name of "Heirs
of Andrea Baldos represented by Teofila G. Maceda", Rafael had a share therein on account of his
marriage to Andrea. From this assumption, the trial court then concluded that petitioners must at
least have a right to Rafaels share in the land, which right grants them the equitable title required to
maintain a suit for quieting of title. This assumption, nevertheless, is decidedly erroneous.
It is evident from the title that the land belongs to no other than the heirs of Andrea Baldos, Rafaels
second wife. The land could not have belonged to Rafael, because he is not even named in OCT
No. 22447. With greater reason may it be said that the land could not belong to petitioners, who are
Rafaels children by his first wife Eleuteria. Unless Eleuteria and Andrea were related by blood
such fact is not borne out by the record they could not be heirs to each other. And if indeed

Eleuteria and Andrea were blood relatives, then petitioners would have so revealed at the very first
opportunity. Moreover, the fact that Rafael died ahead of Andrea, and that he is not even named in
the title, give the impression that the land belonged solely to the heirs of Andrea, to the exclusion of
Rafael. If this were not true, then the title should have as registered owners the "Heirs of Rafael and
Andrea Mondragon", in which case the petitioners certainly would possess equitable title, they being
descendants-heirs of Rafael. Yet OCT No. 22447 is not so written.
Add to this is the fact that petitioners are not in possession of the land. A different view would have
been taken if they were. Indeed, not even the fact that their sister Teofila Macedas name appears in
OCT No. 22447 could warrant a different conclusion. Her name appears therein only a
representative of Andreas heirs. As mere representative, she could have no better right. 16
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, Civil Case No. R-3248 deserved no greater treatment
than dismissal. Petitioners do not possess legal or equitable title to be land, such that the only
recourse left for the trial court was to dismiss the case. Thus, said although they both arrived at the
correct conclusion, the trial court and the CA did so by an erroneous appreciation of the facts and
evidence.
Petitioners cannot, on the pretext of maintaining a suit for quieting of title., have themselves declared
as Andreas heirs so that they may claim a share in the land. If they truly believe that they are
entitled to a share in the land, they may avail of the remedies afforded to excluded heirs under the
Rules of Court, or sue for the annulment of OCT No. 22447 and seek the issuance of new titles in
their name, or recover damages in the event prescription has sent. 17
With these findings, the Court finds no need to consider the parties other arguments, founded as
they are on the erroneous pronouncements of the trial court and the CA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. Civil Case No. R-3248 is accordingly
DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 180076

November 21, 2012

DIONISIO MANANQUIL, LAUDENCIA MANANQUIL-VILLAMOR, ESTANISLAO MANANQUIL,

and DIANITA MANANQUIL-RABINO, represented by OTILLO RABINO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO MOICO, Respondent.**
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In order that an action for quieting of title may proper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal
or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject-matter of the action. Legal title
denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. In the absence of
such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the March 13, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81229, which reversed and set aside the January 2, 2001 Decision 3 of the
Malabon Regional Trial Court, Branch 74 in Civil Case No. 2741-MN, thus dismissing the said civil
case for quieting of title.
Factual Antecedents
Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form part of the land previously expropriated by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) and placed under its Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore
Development Project where occupants, applicants or beneficiaries may purchase lots on
installment basis. In October 1984, Lot 18 was awarded to spouses Iluminardo and Prescilla
Mananquil under a Conditional Contract to Sell. Lot 19, on the other hand, was sold to Prescilla in
February 1980 by its occupant.
In 1991, Iluminardo and Prescilla died without issue, but it turned out that Prescilla had a child by a
previous marriage namely Eulogio Francisco Maypa (Eulogio). After the spouses death,
Iluminardos supposed heirs (Mananquil heirs) his brothers and sisters and herein petitioners
Dionisio and Estanislao Mananquil (Estanislao), Laudencia Mananquil-Villamor (Laudencia), and
Dianita Mananquil-Rabino (Dianita) executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and
adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 and 19 in favor of Dianita. They took possession of Lots 18 and
19 and leased them out to third parties.
Sometime later, the Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997, Eulogio and two others, Eulogio
Baltazar Maypa and Brenda Luminugue, on the claim that they are surviving heirs of Iluminardo and
Prescilla, had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale, and a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Roberto Moico (Moico).
In May 1997, Moico began evicting the Mananquils tenants and demolishing the structures they built
on Lots 18 and 19. In June, the Mananquils instituted Civil Case No. 2741-MN for quieting of title
and injunctive relief.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, thus suspending eviction and demolition. After
trial on the merits, a Decision was rendered in favor of the Mananquils. The dispositive portion
thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering that a permanent injunction be issued enjoining defendant Roberto Moico to

refrain from threatening the tenants and destroying the improvements standing on the
subject properties and from filing the ejectment suits against the tenants;
2. Ordering the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale and the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1997 cancelled for having no force and effect;
3. Declaring plaintiffs to be rightfully entitled to the subject properties and the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Heirs of the plaintiffs to be valid and enforceable;
4. Ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following, to wit:
a. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P50,000.00 for and as attorneys fees; and
d. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Moico appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court. It held that the petitioners have failed to
show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have
x x x perfected their grant/award from the NHA so as to secure a firm, perfect and confirmed title
over the subject lots. It must be stressed that the Conditional Contract to Sell that covers Lot No. 18
stipulates several terms and conditions before a grantee of the NHA may legally acquire perfect title
over the land, and there should be no mistake that the same stipulations hold true with respect to Lot
No. 19. Inter alia, the more vital contractual conditions, are: (a) payment in installment of the price for
a specified period, (b) personal use of and benefit to the land by the grantee, and (c) explicit
prohibition from selling, assigning, encumbering, mortgaging, leasing, or sub-leasing the property
awarded x x x.5
The CA noted that Lots 18 and 19 must still belong to the NHA, in the absence of proof that
Iluminardo and Prescilla have completed installment payments thereon, or were awarded titles to the
lots. And if the couple disposed of these lots even before title could be issued in their name, then
they may have been guilty of violating conditions of the government grant, thus disqualifying them
from the NHA program. Consequently, there is no right in respect to these properties that the
Mananquils may succeed to. If this is the case, then no suit for quieting of title could prosper, for lack
of legal or equitable title to or interest in Lots 18 and 19.
Issues

The present recourse thus raises the following issues for the Courts resolution:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN PASSING UPON AN ISSUE NOT BEING
ASSIGNED AS ERROR IN THE APPELLANTS BRIEF OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND
NOT TOUCHED UPON DURING THE TRIAL IN THE COURT A QUO PARTICULARLY THE
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE SPOUSES ILUMINARDO AND PRESCILLA MANANQUIL
OF THE CONDITIONAL CONTRACT TO SELL PURPORTEDLY COVERING THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION, TO SUIT ITS RATIONALIZATION IN ITS QUESTIONED
DECISION JUSTIFYING THE REVERSAL OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO COMMITTED A GRIEVOUS ERROR IN CONSTRUING
THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 476 AND 477 OF THE CIVIL CODE AGAINST
PETITIONERS NOTWITHSTANDING THE POSITIVE CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN
THIS CASE POINTING TO THE PROPRIETY OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR QUIETING
OF TITLE.6
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners argue that the CA cannot touch upon matters not raised as issues in the trial court,
stressing that the NHA did not even intervene during the proceedings below to ventilate issues
relating to the rights of the parties to Lots 18 and 19 under the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore
Development Project. Petitioners claim that since the issue of violation of the terms of the grant may
be resolved in a separate forum between the Mananquils and the NHA, it was improper for the CA to
have pre-empted the issue.
On quieting of title, petitioners advance the view that since they are the legal heirs of Iluminardo
Mananquil, then they possess the requisite legal or equitable title or interest in Lots 18 and 19, which
thus permits them to pursue Civil Case No. 2741-MN; whatever rights Iluminardo had over the lots
were transmitted to them from the moment of his death, per Article 777 of the Civil Code. And among
these rights are the rights to continue with the amortizations covering Lots 18 and 19, as well as to
use and occupy the same; their interest as successors-in-interest, though imperfect, is enough to
warrant the filing of a case for quieting of title to protect these rights.
Respondent Moicos Arguments
Moico, on the other hand, argues that because the issue relating to Iluminardo and Prescillas
possible violation of the terms and conditions of the NHA grant is closely related to the issue of
ownership and possession over Lots 18 and 19, then the CA possessed jurisdiction to pass upon it.
Moico supports the CA view that petitioners failed to prove their title or interest in the subject
properties, just as he has proved below that it was his predecessor, Eulogio, who paid all obligations

relative to Lots 18 and 19 due and owing to the NHA, for which reason the NHA released and
cleared the lots and thus paved the way for their proper transfer to him.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The
competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants,
not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable
respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would
see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear
introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems
best. But "for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1)
the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy."7
1wphi1

Contrary to petitioners stand, the issue relating to the grant of rights, title or award by the NHA
determines whether the case for quieting of title may be maintained. If the petitioners are legitimate
successors to or beneficiaries of Iluminardo upon his death under the certificate of title, award, or
grant, or under the special law or specific terms of the NHA program/project then they possess the
requisite interest to maintain suit; if not, then Civil Case No. 2741-MN must necessarily be
dismissed.
From the evidence adduced below, it appears that the petitioners have failed to show their
qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his rights under the NHA program/project. They failed
to present any title, award, grant, document or certification from the NHA or proper government
agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla have become the registered
owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are qualified successors or
beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project, taking over Iluminardos rights after his
death. They did not call to the witness stand competent witnesses from the NHA who can attest to
their rights as successors to or beneficiaries of Lots 18 and 19. They failed to present proof, at the
very least, of the specific law, provisions, or terms that govern the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore
Development Project which would indicate a modicum of interest on their part. For this reason, their
rights or interest in the property could not be established.
It was erroneous, however, for the CA to assume that Iluminardo and Prescilla may have violated the
conditions of the NHA grant under the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project by
transferring their rights prior to the issuance of a title or certificate awarding Lots 18 and 19 to them.
In the absence of proof, a ruling to this effect is speculative. Instead, in resolving the case, the trial
court and the CA on appeal should have required proof that petitioners had, either: 1) a
certificate of title, award, or grant from the proper agency (NHA or otherwise) in the name of their
predecessor Iluminardo, or, in the absence thereof, 2) a right to succeed to Iluminardos rights to
Lots 18 and 19, not only as his heirs, but also as qualified legitimate successors/beneficiaries under

the Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project terms and conditions as taken over by
the NHA.8 Petitioners should have shown, to the satisfaction of the courts that under the NHA
program project governing the grant of Lots 18 and 19, they are entitled and qualified to succeed or
substitute for Iluminardo in his rights upon his death. As earlier stated, this takes the form of
evidence apart from proof of heirship, of course of the specific law, regulation or terms covering the
program/project which allows for a substitution or succession of rights in case of death; the
certificate of title, award or grant itself; or the testimony of competent witnesses from the NHA.
Proof of heirship alone does not suffice; the Mananquils must prove to the satisfaction of the courts
that they have a right to succeed Iluminardo under the law or terms of the NHA project, and are not
disqualified by non-payment, prohibition, lack of qualifications, or otherwise.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The March 13, 2007
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81229 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199146, March 19, 2014
HEIRS OF PACIFICO POCDO, NAMELY, RITA POCDO GASIC, GOLIC POCDO, MARCELA POCDO
ALFELOR, KENNETH POCDO, NIXON CADOS, JACQUELINE CADOS LEE, EFLYN CADOS, AND GIRLIE
CADOS DAPLIN, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEYINFACT JOHN
POCDO,Petitioners, v. ARSENIA AVILA AND EMELINDA CHUA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 assails the 12 October 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No.
91039. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 14 January 2008 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 61, in Civil Case No. 4710R, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
In June 2000, Pacifico Pocdo, who was later substituted by his heirs upon his death, filed a complaint to
quiet title over a 1,728square meter property (disputed property) located in Camp 7, Baguio City, and
covered by Tax Declaration 9606008106641. Pacifico claimed that the disputed property is part of Lot 43,
TS39, which originally belonged to Pacificos father, Pocdo Pool. The disputed property is allegedly different
from the onehectare portion alloted to Polon Pocdo, the predecessorininterest of the defendants Arsenia
Avila and Emelinda Chua, in a partition made by the heirs of Pocdo Pool. Pacifico alleged that the defendants
unlawfully claimed the disputed property, which belonged to Pacifico.
The facts of the case were summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

As it appears, in 1894, Pocdo Pool, who died in 1942, began his occupation and claim on three lots that were
eventually surveyed in his name as Lot 43, TS 39SWO36431, Lot 44, TS 39SWO36420 and Lot 45 TS
39SWO36429 with an area of 144,623 [sq.m.], 64,112 [sq.m.], and 9,427 square meters, respectively,
and situated at Residence Section 4, Baguio City. These lots were the subject of a petition to reopen judicial
proceedings filed by the Heirs of Pocdo Pool with the CFI of Baguio City in Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC
Case 211. The registration of the lots in the names of the petitioners were [sic] granted in October 1964,
but since the decision was not implemented within the 10 years [sic] prescribed period, the Heirs filed their
ancestral land claims with the DENR. In August 1991, Certificates of Ancestral Lands Claims (CALS) were
issued by the DENR for Lots 44 and 45, but Lot 43 was not approved due to Memorandum Order 9815
issued by the DENR Secretary in September 1998.
In the meantime, on September 14, 1960, Polon Pocdo, an heir of Pocdo Pool, ceded his rights over the
three lots to Pacifico Pocdo in exchange for a one hectare lot to be taken from Lot 43. However, Pacifico
entered into a contract with Florencio Pax and Braulio Yaranon on November 21, 1968 revoking the
agreement with Polon. In the contract, the 4,875 square meters where Polons house was located became
part of the 1hectare given to Pax and Yaranon in exchange for their services in the titling of Pacificos lands.
Polon filed a complaint in August 1980 [with] the Office of the Barangay Captain at Camp 7, Baguio City,
which was settled by an amicable settlement dated September 3, 1980 between Pacifico and Polon. They
agreed that Polon would again retain the 4,875 square meters and Pacifico would give the 5,125 square
meter area, the remaining portion of the 1hectare share of Polon, to be taken from Lot 43 after a
segregation.
On April 18, 1981, Polon entered into a Catulagan with Arsenia Avila authorizing the latter to undertake the
segregation of his onehectare land from Lot 43 in accord with the amicable settlement of September 3,
1980. In exchange, Polon would award to her 2,000 square meters from the 1hectare lot. After spending
time, money and effort in the execution of the survey, Avila gave the survey results to Polon prompting
Polon to execute a Waiver of Rights dated January 21, 1987. Accordingly, the subdivided lots were declared

for tax purposes and the corresponding tax declaration issued to Polon and Arsenia, with 8,010 square
meters going to Polon and 1,993 square meters to Avila.
On March 10, 2000, finding the amicable settlement, the Catulagan and Waiver of Rights in order, the
CENRO of Baguio City issued in favor of Avila a Certificate of Exclusion of 993 square meters from the
Ancestral Land Claim of the Heirs of Pocdo Pool over Lot 43.
On April 27, 2000, however, the Heirs of Polon Pocdo and his wife Konon filed an affidavit of cancellation with
OICCENRO Teodoro Suaking and on that basis, Suaking cancelled the Certificate of Exclusion. On May 8,
2000, Avila complained to the Regional Executive Director or RED the unlawful cancellation of her Certificate
of Exclusion, and on June 1, 2000, the RED issued a memorandum setting aside the revocation and
restoring the Certificate of Exclusion. On August 13, 2001, Avila filed an administrative complaint against
Suaking, and on July 16, 2002, the RED dismissed the lettercomplaint of Avila and referred the
administrative complaint to the DENR Central Office.
Acting on the motion for reconsideration by Avila [against oppositors Pacifico Pocdo, et al.], the RED in an
Order on October 28, 2002 set aside the July 16, 2002 order. The Affidavit of Cancellation dated April 27,
2002 filed by the heirs of Polon Pocdo was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the validity of the Amicable
Settlement, Catulagan and Deed of Waiver of Rights were recognized. The letter dated April 28, 2000 and
certification issued on May 31, 2000 by Suaking were ordered cancelled. Accordingly, the RED held that the
TSA applications of Arsenia Avila and others under TSA Application 15313, 15314, 15409 and 15410 should
be given due course subject to compliance with existing laws and regulations.
The DENR Secretary affirmed his Order in [his] Decision of May 14, 2004 in DENR Case 5599, with the
modification that the TSAs fo[r] the appellee Avila could now be made the basis of disposition through public
bidding and the appellant may participate in the bidding if qualified.
Pacifico Pocdo, as the appellant, went on appeal to the Office of the President which resulted in an
affirmance of DENR Secretarys decision on April 19, 2005 in OP Case 04H360.
As mentioned, having exhausted administrative remedies, the Heirs of Pacifico Pocdo challenged the OP
resolution before the Court of Appeals, but this petition was dismissed for having been filed late. The
Supreme Court dismissed the Heirs appeal from this decision.
The instant case, Civil Case 4710R, before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61 was filed by
Pacifico Pocdo against Arsenia Avila and Emelinda Chua in June 2000, just after the RED set aside Suakings
revocation on April 28, 2000 and ordered the restoration of Avilas Certificate of Exclusion. Since then, the
judicial proceedings have run parallel to the administrative case. 3
In a Resolution4 dated 14 January 2008, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The trial court held that the DENR had already declared the disputed property as public land, which the
State, through the DENR, has the sole power to dispose. Thus, the claim of petitioners to quiet title is not
proper since they do not have title over the disputed property. The trial court agreed with the DENR
Secretarys ruling that petitioner may participate in the public bidding of the disputed property if qualified
under applicable rules.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, asserting that the case is not limited to quieting of title since
there are other issues not affected by the DENR ruling, particularly the validity of the Waiver of Rights and
the Catulagan. Petitioners maintained that the DENRs ruling that the disputed property is public land did not
preclude the court from taking cognizance of the issues on who is entitled possession to the disputed
property and whether the questioned documents are valid and enforceable against Pacifico and his heirs.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners, in raising the issue of quieting of title, failed to allege any legal
or equitable title to quiet. Under Article 477 of the Civil Code, in an action to quiet title, the plaintiff must
have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.
Instead of an action to quiet title or accion reivindicatoria, the Court of Appeals stated that petitioners
should have filed an accion publiciana based merely on the recovery ofpossession de jure.
On the validity of the Catulagan and the Waiver of Rights, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners have no
right to question these since they were not parties to said documents had not participated in any manner in

their execution. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the contracting parties are bound by the stipulations of
the said documents. Those not parties to the said documents, and for whose benefit they were not expressly
made, cannot maintain an action based on the said documents.
Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts resolution, subject to the right of petitioners to file the
appropriate action.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:

chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS SHOULD JUST FILE THE NECESSARY
ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION BECAUSE SAID COURT HAS FAILED TO TAKE INTO
CONSIDERATION THAT RECOVERY OF POSSESSION IS PRECISELY ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION IN THE
PRESENT CASE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RTC HAD NO JURISDICTION SINCE IT IS THE
COURTS, NOT THE DENR, THAT HAS JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS INVOLVING POSSESSION OF LANDS,
EVEN ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE LAND IS A PUBLIC LAND.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BECAUSE THERE ARE OTHER
CAUSES OF ACTION OVER WHICH THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION, i.e. RECOVERY OF POSSESSION,
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF DOCUMENTS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS HAVE NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTY
THAT WOULD SUPPORT AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE WHEN TRIAL HAD NOT YET COMMENCED.
NONETHELESS, THE RECORD IS REPLETE OF PROOF THAT THE PETITIONERS HAVE RIGHTS/TITLE OVER
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.5
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
In the administrative case involving the disputed property, which forms part of Lot 43, the DENR ruled that
Lot 43 is public land located within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. In his Decision dated 14 May 2004 in
DENR Case No. 5599, the DENR Secretary stated:
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

Lot 43 is public land and part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation. This has already been settled by the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Benguet and Mountain Province dated 13 November 1922 in Civil
Reservation Case No. 1. The fact that the heirs of Pocdo Pool were able to reopen Civil Reservation Case No.
1, LRC Case No. 211 and secure a decision in their favor for registration of Lot 43 is of no moment. As held
in Republic v. Pio R. Marcos (52 SCRA 238), the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet had no
jurisdiction to order the registration of lands already declared public in Civil Reservation Case No. 1. Lot 43
being part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, disposition thereof is under Townsite Sales Application
(TSA). Precisely on this bone [sic] that Lot 43 was not awarded a Certificate of Land Ancestral Claim [sic]
under DENR Circular No. 03, series of 1990, because it is within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. 6
The DENR Decision was affirmed by the Office of the President which held that lands within the Baguio
Townsite Reservation belong to the public domain and are no longer registrable under the Land Registration
Act.7 The Office of the President ordered the disposition of the disputed property in accordance with the
applicable rules of procedure for the disposition of alienable public lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation, particularly Chapter X of Commonwealth Act No. 141 on Townsite Reservations and other
applicable rules.
Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore correct in
dismissing the complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine
who among the parties have better right over the disputed property which is admittedly still part of the
public domain. As held in Dajunos v. Tandayag:8
x x x The Tarucs action was for quieting of title and necessitated determination of the respective rights of
the litigants, both claimants to a free patent title, over a piece of property, admittedly public land. The law,

as relied upon by jurisprudence, lodges the power of executive control, administration, disposition and
alienation of public lands with the Director of Lands subject, of course, to the control of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
In sum, the decision rendered in civil case 1218 on October 28, 1968 is a patent nullity. The court below did
not have power to determine who (the Firmalos or the Tarucs) were entitled to an award of free patent title
over that piece of property that yet belonged to the public domain. Neither did it have power to adjudge the
Tarucs as entitled to the true equitable ownership thereof, the latters effect being the same: the exclusion
of the Firmalos in favor of the Tarucs.9
In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for an adjudication that a claim of title or
interest in property adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to
remove a cloud upon or quiet title to land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist.10 Under
Articles 47611 and 47712 of the Civil Code, the two indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1)
that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2)
that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity.13
In this case, petitioners, claiming to be owners of the disputed property, allege that respondents are
unlawfully claiming the disputed property by using void documents, namely the Catulagan and the Deed of
Waiver of Rights. However, the records reveal that petitioners do not have legal or equitable title over the
disputed property, which forms part of Lot 43, a public land within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. It is
clear from the facts of the case that petitioners predecessorsininterest, the heirs of Pocdo Pool, were not
even granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim over Lot 43, which remains public land. Thus, the trial
court had no other recourse but to dismiss the case.
There is no more need to discuss the other issues raised since these are intrinsically linked to petitioners
action to quiet title.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 12 October 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. CV No. 91039.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4656

November 18, 1912

RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and

VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and
MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, defendants-appellants.
Gaspar de Bartolome, in his own behalf.
B. Gimenez Zoboli, for appellees.

TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, from the judgment of October 5, 1907, whereby the
Honorable Dionisio Chanco, judge, absolved the defendants from the complaint, and the plaintiff
from a counterclaim, without special finding as to costs.
Counsel for the spouses Ricardo y Cruz and Vicente Ortiz y Felin de Pardell, the first of whom,
absent in Spain by reason of his employment, conferred upon the second sufficient and ample
powers to appear before the courts of justice, on June 8, 1905, in his written complaint, alleged that
the plaintiff, Vicente Ortiz, and the defendant, Matilde Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural
daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in
1875 and 1882, respectively; that Calixta Felin, prior to her death, executed on August 17, 1876, a
nuncupative will in Vigan whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta,
and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property; that, of the
persons enumerated, Manuel died before his mother and Francisca a few years after her death,
leaving no heirs by force of law, and therefore the only existing heirs of the said testatrix are the
plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and the defendant Matilde Ortiz; that, aside from some personal property and
jewelry already divided among the heirs, the testatrix possessed, at the time of the execution of her
will, and left at her death the real properties which, with their respective cash values, are as follows:
1. A house of strong material, with the lot on which it is built, situated on Escolta
Street, Vigan, and valued at
2. A house of mixed material, with the lot on which it stands, at No. 88 Washington
Street, Vigan; valued at
3. A lot on Magallanes Street, Vigan; valued at

P6,000.00
1,500.00
100.00

4. A parcel of rice land, situated in the barrio of San Julian, Vigan; valued at

60.00

5. A parcel of rice land in the pueblo of Santa Lucia; valued at

86.00

6. Three parcels of land in the pueblo of Candon; valued at

150.00
Total

7,896.00

That, on or about the first months of the year 1888, the defendants, without judicial authorization, nor
friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the
said properties and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of the
plaintiffs' interest; that, notwithstanding the different and repeated demands extrajudicially made
upon Matilde Ortiz to divide the aforementioned properties with the plaintiff Vicente and to deliver to
the latter the one-half thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and rents collected therefrom, the
said defendant and her husband, the self-styled administrator of the properties mentioned, had been
delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkept promises and other
excuses; and that the plaintiffs, on account of the extraordinary delay in the delivery of one-half of
said properties, or their value in cash, as the case might be, had suffered losses and damages in the
sum of P8,000. Said counsel for the plaintiffs therefore asked that judgment be rendered by
sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome, and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore
and deliver to the plaintiffs one-half of the total value in cash, according to appraisal, of the undivided
property specified, which one-half amounted approximately to P3,948, or if deemed proper, to
recognize the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz to be vested with the full and absolute right of ownership to the
said undivided one-half of the properties in question, as universal testamentary heir thereof together
with the defendant Matilde Ortiz, to indemnify the plaintiffs in the sum of P8,000, for losses and
damages, and to pay the costs.
Counsel for the defendants, in his answer denied the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 4, 6, 7, and 8
thereof, inasmuch as, upon the death of the litigating sister's brother Manuel, their mother, who was
still living, was his heir by force of law, and the defendants had never refused to give to the plaintiff
Vicente Ortiz her share of the said properties; and stated that he admitted the facts alleged in
paragraph 2, provided it be understood, however, that the surname of the defendant's mother was
Felin, and not Feliu, and that Miguel Ortiz died in Spain, and not in Vigan; that he also admitted
paragraph 3 of the complaint, with the difference that the said surname should be Felin, and likewise
paragraph 5, except the part thereof relating to the personal property and the jewelry, since the latter
had not yet been divided; that the said jewelry was in the possession of the plaintiffs and consisted
of: one Lozada gold chronometer watch with a chain in the form of a bridle curb and a watch charm
consisting of the engraving of a postage stamp on a stone mounted in gold and bearing the initials
M. O., a pair of cuff buttons made of gold coins, four small gold buttons, two finger rings, another
with the initials M. O., and a gold bracelet; and that the defendants were willing to deliver to the
plaintiffs, in conformity with their petitions, one-half of the total value in cash, according to
appraisement, of the undivided real properties specified in paragraph 5, which half amounted to
P3,948.
In a special defense said counsel alleged that the defendants had never refused to divide the said
property and had in fact several years before solicited the partition of the same; that, from 1886 to
1901, inclusive, there was collected from the property on Calle Escolta the sum of 288 pesos,
besides a few other small amounts derived from other sources, which were delivered to the plaintiffs
with other larger amounts, in 1891, and from the property on Calle Washington, called La Quinta,
990.95 pesos, which proceeds, added together, made a total of 1,278.95 pesos, saving error or
omission; that, between the years abovementioned, Escolta, and that on Calle Washington, La
Quinta, 376.33, which made a total of 1,141.71, saving error or omission; that, in 1897, the work of
reconstruction was begun of the house on Calle Escolta, which been destroyed by an earthquake,
which work was not finished until 1903 and required an expenditure on the part of the defendant
Matilde Ortiz, of 5,091.52 pesos; that all the collections made up to August 1, 1905, including the
rent from the stores, amounted to only P3,654.15, and the expenses, to P6,252.32, there being,

consequently, a balance of P2,598.17, which divided between the sisters, the plaintiff and the
defendant, would make the latter's share P1,299.08; that, as shown by the papers kept by the
plaintiffs, in the year 1891 the defendant Bartolome presented to the plaintiffs a statement in
settlements of accounts, and delivered to the person duly authorized by the latter for the purpose,
the sum of P2,606.29, which the said settlement showed was owing his principals, from various
sources; that, the defendant Bartolome having been the administrator of the undivided property
claimed by the plaintiffs, the latter were owing the former legal remuneration of the percentage
allowed by law for administration; and that the defendants were willing to pay the sum of P3,948,
one-half of the total value of the said properties, deducting therefrom the amount found to be owing
them by the plaintiffs, and asked that judgment be rendered in their favor to enable them to recover
from the latter that amount, together with the costs and expenses of the suit.
The defendants, in their counter claim, repeated each and all of the allegations contained in each of
the paragraphs of section 10 of their answer; that the plaintiffs were obliged to pay to the
administrator of the said property the remuneration allowed him by law; that, as the revenues
collected by the defendants amounted to no more than P3,654.15 and the expenditures incurred by
them, to P6,252.32, it followed that the plaintiffs owed the defendants P1,299.08, that is one-half of
the difference between the amount collected from and that extended on the properties, and asked
that judgment be therefore rendered in their behalf to enable them to collect this sum from the
plaintiffs, Ricardo Pardell and Vicenta Ortiz, with legal interest thereon from December 7, 1904, the
date when the accounts were rendered, together with the sums to which the defendant Bartolome
was entitled for the administration of the undivided properties in question.
By a written motion of August 21, 1905, counsel for the plaintiffs requested permission to amend the
complaint by inserting immediately after the words "or respective appraisal," fifth line of paragraph 5,
the phrase "in cash in accordance with the assessed value," and likewise further to amend the
same, in paragraph 6 thereof, by substituting the following word in lieu of the petition for the remedy
sought: "By reason of all the foregoing, I beg the court to be pleased to render the judgment by
sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore
and deliver to the plaintiffs an exact one-half of the total vale of the undivided properties described in
the complaint, such value to be ascertained by the expert appraisal of two competent persons, one
of whom shall be appointed by the plaintiffs and the other by the defendants, and, in case of
disagreement between these two appointees such value shall be determined by a third expert
appraiser appointed by the court, or, in a proper case, by the price offered at public auction; or, in
lieu thereof, it is requested that the court recognize the plaintiff, Vicenta Ortiz, to be vested with a full
and absolute right to an undivided one-half of the said properties; furthermore, it is prayed that the
plaintiffs be awarded an indemnity of P8,000 for losses and damages, and the costs."
Notwithstanding the opposition of the defendants, the said amendment was admitted by the court
and counsel for the defendants were allowed to a period of three days within which to present a new
answer. An exception was taken to this ruling.
The proper proceedings were had with reference to the valuation of the properties concerned in the
division sought and incidental issues were raised relative to the partition of some of them and their
award to one or the other of the parties. Due consideration was taken of the averments and
statements of both parties who agreed between themselves, before the court, that any of them might
at any time acquire, at the valuation fixed by the expert judicial appraiser, any of the properties in
question, there being none in existence excluded by the litigants. The court, therefore, by order of
December 28, 1905, ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to acquire, at the valuation determined by
the said expert appraiser, the building known as La Quinta, the lot on which it stands and the
warehouses and other improvements comprised within the inclosed land, and the seeds lands
situated in the pueblos of Vigan and Santa Lucia; and that the defendants were likewise entitled to
acquire the house on Calle Escolta, the lot on Calle Magallanes, and the three parcels of land
situated in the pueblo of Candon.

After this partition had been made counsel for the defendants, by a writing of March 8, 1906, set
forth: That, having petitioned for the appraisement of the properties in question for the purpose of
their partition, it was not to be understood that he desired from the exception duly entered to the
ruling made in the matter of the amendment to the complaint; that the properties retained by the
defendants were valued at P9,310, and those retained by the plaintiffs, at P2,885, one-half of which
amounts each party had to deliver to the other, as they were pro indivisoproperties; that, therefore,
the defendants had to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,212.50, after deducting the amount which the
plaintiffs were obliged to deliver to the defendants, as one-half of the price of the properties retained
by the former; that, notwithstanding that the amount of the counterclaim for the expenses incurred in
the reconstruction of the pro indiviso property should be deducted from the sum which the
defendants had to pay the plaintiffs, the former, for the purpose of bringing the matter of the partition
to a close, would deliver to the latter, immediately upon the signing of the instrument of purchase
and sale, the sum of P3,212.50, which was one-half of the value of the properties alloted to the
defendants; such delivery, however, was not to be understood as a renouncement of the said
counterclaim, but only as a means for the final termination of the pro indiviso status of the property.
The case having been heard, the court on October 5, 1907, rendered judgment holding that the
revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party,
that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides
those aforementioned, and absolved the defendants from the complaint and the plaintiffs from the
counterclaim, with no special finding as to costs. An exception was taken to this judgment by counsel
for the defendants who moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not
warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was denied,
exception whereto was taken by said counsel, who filed the proper bill of exceptions, and the same
was approved and forwarded to the clerk of this court, with a transcript of the evidence.
Both of the litigating sisters assented to a partition by halves of the property left in her will by their
mother at her death; in fact, during the course of this suit, proceedings were had, in accordance with
the agreement made, for the division between them of the said hereditary property of common
ownership, which division was recognized and approved in the findings of the trial court, as shown
by the judgment appealed from.
The issues raised by the parties, aside from said division made during the trial, and which have been
submitted to this court for decision, concern: (1) The indemnity claimed for losses and damages,
which the plaintiffs allege amount to P8,000, in addition to the rents which should have been derived
from the house on Calle Escolta, Vigan; (2) the payment by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the
sum of P1,299.08, demanded by way of counterclaim, together with legal interest thereon from
December 7, 1904; (3) the payment to the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of a percentage
claimed to be due him as the administrator of the property of common ownership; (4) the division of
certain jewelry in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz; and (5) the petition that the
amendment be held to have been improperly admitted, which was made by the plaintiffs in their
written motion of August 21, 1905, against the opposition of the defendants, through which
admission the latter were obliged to pay the former P910.50.
lawphil.net

Before entering upon an explanation of the propriety or impropriety of the claims made by both
parties, it is indispensable to state that the trial judge, in absolving the defendants from the
complaint, held that they had not caused losses and damages to the plaintiffs, and that the revenues
and the expenses were compensated, in view of the fact that the defendants had been living for
several years in the Calle Escolta house, which was pro indivisoproperty of joint ownership.
By this finding absolving the defendants from the complaint, and which was acquiesced in by the
plaintiffs who made no appeal therefrom, the first issue has been decided which was raised by the

plaintiffs, concerning the indemnity for losses and damages, wherein are comprised the rents which
should have been obtained from the upper story of the said house during the time it was occupied by
the defendants, Matilde Ortiz and her husband, Gaspar de Bartolome.
Notwithstanding the acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs, assenting to the said finding whereby
the defendants were absolved from the complaint, yet, as such absolution is based on the
compensation established in the judgment of the trial court, between the amounts which each party
is entitled to claim from the other, it is imperative to determine whether the defendant Matilde Ortiz,
as coowner of the house on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with her husband, to reside therein, without
paying to her coowner, Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part of the time, lived with her husband
abroad, one-half of the rents which the upper story would have produced, had it been rented to a
stranger.
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance
with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor
prevent the coowners from utilizing them according to their rights.
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the
house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde
occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister
Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of
the lower floor were rented and accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each coowner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use
and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners,
for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be
determined and every one of the coowners exercises, together with his other coparticipants, joint
ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and
Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the last
named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing outside of
the said province the greater part of the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands
for Spain, it is not at all strange that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to
collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the
latter, especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a turmoil;
and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of coownership of the defendants, who took
upon themselves the administration and care of the properties of joint tenancy for purposes of their
preservation and improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of
the rents which might have been derived from the upper of the story of the said house on Calle
Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for
the storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants. The
defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said house, did
not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living
therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as coowner of the property.
Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which entitled the
defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet in view of the fact that the record shows it
to have been proved that the defendant Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four
years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for

the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice, requires
that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could
have produced, had they been leased to another person. The amount of such monthly rental is fixed
at P16 in accordance with the evidence shown in the record. This conclusion as to Bartolome's
liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of the defendant coowner of the property, he
had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the house in question,
where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of
the rent which those quarters could and should have produced, had they been occupied by a
stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms on the lower floor that were
used as stores. Therefore, the defendant Bartolome must pay to the plaintiff Vicenta P384, that is,
one-half of P768, the total amount of the rents which should have been obtained during four years
from the quarters occupied as an office by the justice of the peace of Vigan.
With respect to the second question submitted for decision to this court, relative to the payment of
the sum demanded as a counterclaim, it was admitted and proved in the present case that, as a
result of a serious earthquake on August 15, 1897, the said house on Calle Escolta was left in ruins
and uninhabitable, and that, for its reconstruction or repair, the defendants had to expend the sum of
P6,252.32. This expenditure, notwithstanding that it was impugned, during the trial, by the plaintiffs,
was duly proved by the evidence presented by the defendants. Evidence, unsuccessfully rebutted,
was also introduced which proved that the rents produced by all the rural and urban properties of
common ownership amounted, up to August 1, 1905, to the sum of P3,654.15 which, being applied
toward the cost of the repair work on the said house, leaves a balance of P2,598.17, the amount
actually advanced by the defendants, for the rents collected by them were not sufficient for the
termination of all the work undertaken on the said building, necessary for its complete repair and to
replace it in a habitable condition. It is therefore lawful and just that the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz, who
was willing to sell to her sister Matilde for P1,500, her share in the house in question, when it was in
a ruinous state, should pay the defendants one-half of the amount expanded in the said repair work,
since the building after reconstruction was worth P9,000, according to expert appraisal.
Consequently, the counterclaim made by the defendants for the payment to them of the sum of
P1,299.08, is a proper demand, though from this sum a reduction must be made of P384, the
amount of one-half of the rents which should have been collected for the use of the quarters
occupied by the justice of the peace, the payment of which is incumbent upon the husband of the
defendant Matilde, as aforesaid, and the balance remaining, P915.08, is the amount which the
plaintiff Vicenta must pay to the defendants.
The defendants claim to be entitled to the collection of legal interest on the amount of the
counterclaim, from December 7, 1904. This contention can not be sustained, inasmuch as, until this
suit is finally decided, it could not be known whether the plaintiffs would or would not be obliged to
pay the sum whatever in reimbursement of expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in the repair work on
the said house on Calle Escolta, whether or not the defendants, in turn, were entitled to collect any
such amount, and, finally, what the net sum would be which the plaintiff's might have to pay as
reimbursement for one-half of the expenditure made by the defendants. Until final disposal of the
case, no such net sum can be determined, nor until then can the debtor be deemed to be in arrears.
In order that there be an obligation to pay legal interest in connection with a matter at issue between
the parties, it must be declared in a judicial decision from what date the interest will be due on the
principal concerned in the suit. This rule has been established by the decisions of the supreme court
of Spain, in reference to articles 1108, 1109, and 1110 of the Civil Code, reference on April 24, 1867,
November 19, 1869, and February 22, 1901.
With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the defendant Matilde for
his administration of the property of common ownership, inasmuch as no stipulation whatever was
made in the matter by and between him and his sister-in-law, the said defendant, the claimant is not
entitled to the payment of any remuneration whatsoever. Of his own accord and as an officious

manager, he administered the said pro indiviso property, one-half of which belonged to his wife who
held it in joint tenancy, with his sister-in-law, and the law does not allow him any compensation as
such voluntary administrator. He is merely entitled to a reimbursement for such actual and necessary
expenditures as he may have made on the undivided properties and an indemnity for the damages
he may have suffered while acting in that capacity, since at all events it was his duty to care for and
preserve the said property, half of which belonged to his wife; and in exchange for the trouble
occasioned him by the administration of his sister-in-law's half of the said property, he with his wife
resided in the upper story of the house aforementioned, without payment of one-half of the rents said
quarters might have produced had they been leased to another person.
With respect to the division of certain jewelry, petitioned for by the defendants and appellants only in
their brief in this appeal, the record of the proceedings in the lower court does not show that the
allegation made by the plaintiff Vicenta is not true, to the effect that the deceased mother of the
litigant sisters disposed of this jewelry during her lifetime, because, had she not done so, the will
made by the said deceased would have been exhibited in which the said jewelry would have been
mentioned, at least it would have been proved that the articles in question came into the possession
of the plaintiff Vicenta without the expressed desire and the consent of the deceased mother of the
said sisters, for the gift of this jewelry was previously assailed in the courts, without success;
therefore, and in view of its inconsiderable value, there is no reason for holding that the said gift was
not made.
As regards the collection of the sum of P910.50, which is the difference between the assessed value
of the undivided real properties and the price of the same as determined by the judicial expert
appraiser, it is shown by the record that the ruling of the trial judge admitting the amendment to the
original complaint, is in accord with the law and principles of justice, for the reason that any of the
coowners of a pro indiviso property, subject to division or sale, is entitled to petition for its valuation
by competent expert appraisers. Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of the joint owners, but is
beneficial to their interests, considering that, as a general rule, the assessed value of a building or a
parcel of realty is less than the actual real value of the property, and this being appraiser to
determine, in conjunction with the one selected by the plaintiffs, the value of the properties of joint
ownership. These two experts took part in the latter proceedings of the suit until finally, and during
the course of the latter, the litigating parties agreed to an amicable division of the pro
indiviso hereditary property, in accordance with the price fixed by the judicial expert appraiser
appointed as a third party, in view of the disagreement between and nonconformity of the appraisers
chosen by the litigants. Therefore it is improper now to claim a right to the collection of the said sum,
the difference between the assessed value and that fixed by the judicial expert appraiser, for the
reason that the increase in price, as determined by this latter appraisal, redounded to the benefit of
both parties.
In consideration of the foregoing, whereby the errors assigned to the lower court have been duly
refuted, it is our opinion that, with a partial reversal of the judgment appealed from, in so far as it
absolves the plaintiffs from the counterclaim presented by the defendants, we should and hereby do
sentence the plaintiffs to the payment of the sum of P915.08, the balance of the sum claimed by the
defendants as a balance of the one-half of the amount which the defendants advanced for the
reconstruction or repair of the Calle Escolta house, after deducting from the total of such sum
claimed by the latter the amount of P384 which Gaspar de Bartolome, the husband of the defendant
Matilde, should have paid as one-half of the rents due for his occupation of the quarters on the lower
floor of the said house as an office for the justice of the peace court of Vigan; and we further find: (1)
That the defendants are not obliged to pay one-half of the rents which could have been obtained
from the upper story of the said house; (2) that the plaintiffs can not be compelled to pay the legal
interest from December 7, 1904, on the sum expanded in the reconstruction of the aforementioned
house, but only the interest fixed by law, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, from the date of the
judgment to be rendered in accordance with this decision; (3) that the husband of the defendant

Matilde Ortiz is not entitled to any remuneration for the administration of thepro indiviso property
belonging to both parties; (4) that, neither is he entitled to collect from the plaintiffs the sum of
P910.50, the difference between the assessed valuation and the price set by the expert appraisal
solicited by the plaintiffs in their amendment to the complaint; and, (5) that no participation shall be
made of jewelry aforementioned now in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz. The said
judgment, as relates to the points appealed, is affirmed, in so far as its findings agree with those of
this decision, and is reversed, in so far as they do not. No special finding is made regarding the
costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 108952 January 26, 1995

NILO A. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND AUREA A. MERCADO, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
August 30, 1991 declaring private respondent a co-owner of the lot covered by TCT No. 123560 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. 1
The facts are well established in the disputed Decision, viz:
Plaintiff Aurea A. Mercado seeks the partition and reconveyance to her of one-half of
a real property located at No. 181 Esteban Abada Street, Quezon City, described as
Lot 17-A, Block 40 in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 123560 of the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City, containing an area of P1,000 square meters, more or less and
registered in the name of defendant Nilo A. Mercado.
Plaintiff Aurea A. Mercado is 69 years old, still single, a professor, holder of a degree
in Ph. D. Data of Philosophy, Research, Statistics and Measurement from the
University of Maryland, U.S.A and used to work in the United States. She is a
legitimate sister of Nilo A. Mercado.
Before she left for the United States in 1964 where she stayed up to 1984, she gave
her brother University of the Philippines. She wanted a property near U.P because
she planned to teach in the said university when she comes back. She was not given
any receipt for the money handed to her brother.
Sometime in 1967, she was informed through letters received from the Philippines
coming from her mother and sister that her brother Nilo had already purchased a
property located at No. 181 Esteban Abada Street, Quezon City. She never saw the
title of the property covered by TCT No. 123560.

In 1972, her brother went to the United States and visited her in her house at Jersey
City. On this occasion, she asked her brother about the purchase of the property. Her
brother responded telling her not to worry for he would give her a paper with respect
to that property. In 1978, her brother Nilo sent through their mother an affidavit (Exh.
A) wherein Nilo admitted the existence of co-ownership over the property.
Through letters, she communicated with her brother Nilo regarding the subject
property. In one of those letters (Exh. B), she told her brother to pay her for the lot. In
two other letters (Exh. C & D), the same property was the subject matter. She did not
receive any reply so she started calling him through the telephone, insisting on the
partition of the property because she committed the land as payment to the
contractor, Mr. Escora, who constructed her school building in Davao City.
Nilo A. Medina (sic), defendant herein, is 57 years old, a graduate of law UP class
1957 and a businessman by occupation. He testified that the plaintiff is his sister.
In 1967, he decided to buy a house and lot worth P95,000.00 located at 181 Esteban
Abada Street, Quezon City from the spouses Francisco Vargas and Teresita Vargas.
Out of his personal savings, money borrowed from his mother and sister Esmeralda
and P20,000.00 borrowed from his sister Aurea, he was able to pay the
downpayment of P38,000.00 to spouses Vargas. It was only upon his tender of the
downpayment that the spouses executed a Deed of Conditional Sale (Exh. 5). He
applied for a housing loan with the Social Security System (System for short) and
upon its approval by the System, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between
him and the spouse Vargas (Exhs. 1, 2, 3, 4 & 6).
He paid the amortization for the loan (Exh. 11). However, due to financial reverses,
the property was foreclosed by the System (Exh. 9). Fortunately, he was able to
redeem the property from the System in 1980 out of the insurance proceeds of his
burned property in Davao. A certificate of redemption (Exh. 10) was issued to him
and he caused the cancellation of the mortgage with the System.
As proof of his ownership, he has the tax declaration (Exh. 8), Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 123560 in his name (Exh. 7) and real property tax bill receipts evidencing
payment of real estate taxes on the property (Exhs. 13, 13-a).
The petition for certiorari was initially denied by this Court 2 in its Resolution on May 17, 1993 for noncompliance with our Revised Circular
1-88, for raising factual issues and for lack of reversible error committed by the respondent Court of
Appeals. 3 The Court also denied with finality petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated
July 14, 1993. The motion raised no substantial argument and the Court found no compelling reason to
grant it.
On August 23, 1993, however, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to file a Second Motion for
Reconsideration. He argued, among others, that even assuming the correctness of the factual
findings of the respondent Court of Appeals, still, there could not be any co-ownership of the subject

property. The Court required private respondent to comment and, in its Resolution of August 22,
1994, granted the Motion "in the interest of justice and considering the crucial importance of the
issue of extinguishment of co-ownership" and gave due course to the petition. 4 Extensive
memoranda were then filed by the petition.
We find no merit in the petition.
We sustain the finding of the respondent court that the subject property is co-owned by petitioner
and private respondent. This finding is based on the admission made by petitioner himself in his
Affidavit (Exh. "A") dated March 2, 1973, which states:
AFFIDAVIT
That I, NILO A. MERCADO, of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of Davao
City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, depose and
say the following:
That I am the co-owner of a residential land, including all the
improvements existing thereon, located at 81 E. Abada, Loyola
Heights, Quezon City, with my sister Aurea A.Mercado;
That being co-owners, we share equally over the above-mentioned
properties, including all the encumbrances and its obligations and
liabilities to the Social Security System and other governmental
agencies;
That I am executing this affidavit to inform the proper authorities
concerned that the parcel of residential land, including the residential
house, together with all its liabilities, is owned by me in co-ownership
with Aurea A. Mercado.
That I am executing this affidavit freely and voluntarily without any
force or intimidation imposed upon me.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 2(nd) day
of March, 1973, at the City of Davao City, Philippines.
This affidavit is high quality evidence. It contains admission against interest on the part of petitioner.
As a lawyer, petitioner cannot pretend that the plain meaning of his admission eluded his mind.
We now come to the issue of whether the mortgage of the subject property to the SSS, its
foreclosure and subsequent redemption by the petitioner extinguished private respondent's coownership. The applicable law is Article 493 of the New Civil Code which spells out the rights of coowners over a co-owned property, viz:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. (emphasis ours)
Pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his pro-indiviso share in the co-owned
property even without the consent of the other co-owners. Nevertheless, as a mere part owner, he
cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. The prohibition is premised on the elementary
rule that "no one can give what he does not have" (Nemo dat guod non habet). Thus, we held
in Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals, 5 viz:
. . . since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one-co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and
void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making
the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the
recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who
substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION
of the common property of the co-owners who possessed and administered it.
In the case at bench, it is established that petitioner, for his own benefit, borrowed money from the
SSS and mortgaged the subject property to the SSS on June 5, 1967 without the knowledge and
consent of his co-owner, herein private respondent. Necessarily, private respondent could not have
helped in the payment of the SSS loan nor could she have redeemed the subject property from the
SSS. Under these circumstances, it will not accord with the letter and intent of Article 493 of the Civil
Code to rule private respondent lost her part ownership of the subject property finds no warrant both
in law and in equity. It will be the height of absurdity to reward petitioner for his illegal act of
appropriating the share of private respondent in the subject property.
Prescinding from these premises, petitioner's reliance in the case of Tan vs. Court of Appeals 6 is
misplaced.
In Tan, the disputed property was mortgaged by spouses Tan Tiong Tick and Tan Ong Hun to China
Bank. Tan Tiong Tick died. He was survived by his widow and six children, including D. Annie Tan.
Meanwhile, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage. It was the highest bidder at the public auction.
Thereafter, the heirs of Tan Tiong Tick sought to nullify the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure
sale before the defunct CFI of Manila. The widow, Tan Ong Hun, died.
The one-year redemption period lapsed on July 6, 1973, but the heirs of the spouses Tan failed to
redeem the property. China Bank then consolidated its ownership over the disputed property and a
new title was issued in its name. In the meantime, a compromise agreement was forged between
China Bank and the Tan heirs. The Bank allowed the heirs to repurchase the property on or before
August 31, 1974, otherwise, it would dispose of the property to another party. Within the agreed

period, or on August 30, 1974, only petitioner D. Annie Tan repurchased the entire property using her
own funds. The bank, however, insisted that the repurchase be made for or in behalf of the other
heirs as well. Left without any choice, D. Annie Tan filed an action in court, asserting her exclusive
ownership over the property on the ground that the co-ownership between her and her brothers and
sisters had already been extinguished. We sustained her contention and ruled:
The first question which arises is the correctness of the assumption that there was a
co-ownership among the children of Tan Tiong Tick and Tan Ong Hun when the
petitioner purchased and property.
Since the lot and its improvements were mortgaged by the deceased parents, there
can be no question that a co-ownership existed amount the heirs during the period
given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption by one during this
period would have inured to the benefit of all . . . .
The records show, however, that when petitioner purchased the disputed property on
August 30, 1974, any co-ownership among the brothers and sisters no longer
existed. The period to redeem had expired more than one year earlier, on July 6,
1973. The respondent China Bank consolidated its ownership and a new title was
issued in the bank's name. When the heirs allowed the one year period to expire
without redeeming their parent's former property and permitted the consolidation of
ownership and the issuance of a new title, the co-ownership was extinguished. The
challenged ruling of the respondent court is, therefore, based on erroneous
premises.
Under Section 63-B of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration
Decree, in case of non-redemption, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, meaning
the respondent Bank in case of non-redemption, the purchaser at the foreclosure
sale, meaning the respondent Bank in this case, is entitled to a new certificate of title
in his name after filing the necessary papers with the Register of Deeds. (Spouses
Teofisto and Eulalia Verceles v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, et al., G.R. No.
62219, February 28, 1989). It becomes a ministerial duty to place the buyer in
possession of the property he now owns. (Banco Filipino v. Intermediate Appellate
court, G.R. No. 68878, 142 SCRA 44 [1986]. Ownership, therefore, passed to China
Bank and there was no more co-ownership among the heirs.
In is thus obvious that the Tan ruling is propped on a different factual setting and hence, is
inapplicable to the case at bench. In Tan, ". . . the heirs (i.e., the co-owners) allowed the one year
redemption period to expire without redeeming their parents' former property and permitted the
consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title . . ." 7 in favor of China Bank. By their
knowing acts of omission, the heirs in the Tan case allowed the extinction of their co-ownership. As
aforestated, private respondent did not know of the mortgage of their co-owned property in favor of the
SSS and the expiry date of its period of redemption. In other words, private respondent did not voluntary
relinquish at any period of time her pro-indiviso share in the subject property.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated August 30, 1991 and its
Resolution dated January 29, 1993, are affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 78178 April 15, 1988
DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-YBANEZ, NILDA PAULINOTOLENTINO, and SABINA BAILON, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO AFABLE, respondents.
Veronico E. Rubio for petitioners.
Mario G. Fortes for private-respondent.

CORTES, J.:
The fate of petitioners' claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a determination of whether or
not said petitioners are chargeable with such laches as may effectively bar their present action.
The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with notice of lis
pendens on March 13, 1981 against the defendant and herein private respondent, Celestino Afable.
The parcel of land involved in this case, with an area of 48,849 square meters, is covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1771 issued on June 12, 1931, in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina
Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share. Gaudencio
and Nenita are now dead, the latter being represented in this case by her children. Luz, Emma and
Nilda. Bernabe went to China in 1931 and had not been heard from since then [Decision of the Court
of Appeals, Rollo, p. 39].
It appears that on August 23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the said
land consisting of 16,283 square meters to Donato Delgado. On May 13, 1949, Rosalia Bailon alone
sold the remainder of the land consisting of 32,566 square meters to Ponciana V. Aresgado de
Lanuza. On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado the 16,283 square meters of land which
the latter had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. On December 3, 1975, John Lanuza,
acting under a special power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza, sold
the two parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr.
In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not registered under the
provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is. It appears that said land had been successively
declared for taxation first, in the name of Ciriaca Dellamas, mother of the registered co-owners, then
in the name of Rosalia Bailon in 1924, then in that of Donato Delgado in 1936, then in Ponciana de
Lanuza's name in 1962 and finally in the name of Celestino Afable, Sr. in 1983.

In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein petitioners, Afable claimed that he had acquired the
land in question through prescription and contended that the petitioners were guilty of laches.He
later filed a third-party complaint against Rosalia Bailon for damages allegedly suffered as a result of
the sale to him of the land.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision:
1. Finding and declaring Celestino Afable, a co-owner of the land described in
paragraph III of the complaint having validly bought the two-sixth (2/6) respective
undivided shares of Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon;
2. Finding and declaring the following as pro-indiviso co-owners, having 1/6 share
each, of the property described in paragraph III of the complaint, to wit:
a. Sabina Bailon
b. Bernabe Bailon
c. Heirs of Nenita Bailon-Paulino
d. Delia Bailon-Casilao;
3. Ordering the segregation of the undivided interests in the property in order to
terminate co-ownership to be conducted by any Geodetic Engineer selected by the
parties to delineate the specific part of each of the co-owners.
4. Ordering the defendant to restore the possession of the plaintiffs respective shares
as well as all attributes of absolute dominion;
5. Ordering the defendant to pay the following:
a. P5,000.00 as damages;
b. P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and;
c. to pay the costs.
[Decision of the Trial Court, Rollo, p. 37-38].
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court insofar as it held
that prescription does not he against plaintiffs-appellees because they are co-owners of the original
vendors. However, the appellate court declared that, although registered property cannot be lost by
prescription, nevertheless, an action to recover it may be barred by laches, citing the ruling in Mejia
de Lucaz v. Gamponia[100 Phil. 277 (1956)]. Accordingly, it held the petitioners guilty of laches and
dismissed their complaint. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

The principal issue to be resolved in this case concerns the applicability of the equitable doctrine of
laches. Initially though, a determination of the effect of a sale by one or more co-owners of the entire
property held in common without the consent of all the co-owners and of the appropriate remedy of
the aggrieved co-owners is required.
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil
Code.Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the acts and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate assign or mortgage it and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal
provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only
what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.[Ramirez v.
Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio
Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which
culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a coowner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced
the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null
and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a
co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of
possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or coowners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v.
Bandoy, supra.]
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were
not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of
some of the co-owners is an action. for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are
legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common property claimed [Ramirez v.
Bautista, supra].
As to the action for petition, neither prescription nor laches can be invoked.

In the light of the attendant circumstances, defendant-appellee's defense of prescription is a vain

proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, '(n)o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.' [Emphasis supplied.] In Budiong v. Bondoc [G.R. No. L-27702,
September 9, 1977, 79 SCRA 241, this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the
action for partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil
Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co- heir so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
Furthermore, the disputed parcel of land being registered under the Torrens System, the express
provision of Act No. 496 that '(n)o title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession' is squarely applicable. Consequently,
prescription will not lie in favor of Afable as against the petitioners who remain the registered owners
of the disputed parcel of land.
It is argued however, that as to the petitioners Emma, Luz and Nelda who are not the registered coowners but merely represented their deceased mother, the late Nenita Bailon, prescription
lies.Respondents bolster their argument by citing a decision of this Court in Pasion v.
Pasion [G.R.No. L-15757, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 486, 489] holding that "the imprescriptibility of a
Torrens title can only be invoked by the person in whose name the title is registered" and that 'one
who is not the registered owner of a parcel of land cannot invoke imprescriptibility of action to claim
the same.'
Reliance on the aforesaid Pasion case is futile. The ruling therein applies only against transferees
other than direct issues or heirs or to complete strangers. The rational is clear:
If prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally
unavailing against the latter's hereditary successors, because they merely step into
the shoes of the decedent by operation of law (New Civil Code, Article 777; Old Civil
Code, Article 657), the title or right undergoing no change by its transmission mortis
causa [Atus, et al., v. Nunez, et al., 97 Phil. 762, 764].
The latest pronouncement of this Court in Umbay v. Alecha [G. R. No. 67284, March 18, 1985, 135
SCRA 427, 429], which was promulgated subsequent to the Pasion case reiterated
the Atus doctrine. Thus:
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his
hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by
operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their
predecessor-in-interest. [Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251, 257].
Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein petitioners.
Well-stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely: (1) conduct on the part
of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the corporations

complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct
and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part
of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and, (4)
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is
not held to be barred [Go China Gun, et al. v. Co Cho et al., 96 Phil. 622 (1955)].
While the first and last elements are present in this case, the second and third elements are missing.
The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant's rights. However, the mere fact of
delay is insufficient to constitute, laches. It is required that (1) complainant must have
had knowledge of the conduct of defendant or of one under whom he claims and (2) he must have
been afforded an opportunity to institute suit. This court has pointed out that laches is not concerned
with the mere lapse of time. Thus:
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time
to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. Tijam, et al., v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA
29,35; Tendo v. Zamacoma, G.R. No. L-63048, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 78, 90].
The doctrine of "laches" or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and
unlike the statute of limitations, isnot a mere question of time but is principally a
question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted," [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra, p. 35]. [Emphasis supplied.]
It must be noted that while there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights, such delay was not
attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any opportunity to bring suit. In the first place,
petitioners had no notice of the sale made by their eldest sister. It is undisputed that the petitioner
co-owners had entrusted the care and management of the parcel of land to Rosalia Bailon who was
the oldest among them [TSN, July 27, 1983, p. 14]. In fact, Nicanor Lee, a son of Rosalia, who was
presented as a witness by the plaintiffs-petitioners, testified on cross-examination that his mother
was only the administrator of the land as she is the eldest and her brothers and sisters were away
[TSN, October 5, 1983, p. 15]. Indeed, when Delia Bailon-Casilao left Sorsogon in 1942 after she got
married, it was only in 1983 that she returned. Sabina on the other hand, is said to be living in
Zamboanga while Bernabe who left for China in 1931 has not been heard from since then.
Consequently, when Rosalia, from whom the private respondent derived his title, made the disputed
sales covering the entire property, the herein petitioners were unaware thereof.
In the second place, they were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit inasmuch as until 1981, they
were kept in the dark about the transactions entered into by their sister. It was only when Delia
Bailon-Casilao returned to Sorsogon in 1981 that she found out about the sales and immediately,
she and her co-petitioners filed the present action for recovery of property. The appellate court thus
erred in holding that 'the petitioners did nothing to show interest in the land." For the administration
of the parcel of land was entrusted to the oldest co-owner who was then in possession thereof

precisely because the other co-owners cannot attend to such a task as they reside outside of
Sorsogon where the land is situated. Her co-owners also allowed her to appropriate the entire
produce for herself because it was not even enough for her daily consumption [TSN, October 5,
1983, pp. 17-18]. And since petitioner was the one receiving the produce, it is but natural that she
was the one to take charge of paying the real estate taxes. Now, if knowledge of the sale by Rosalia
was conveyed to the petitioners only later, they cannot be faulted for the acts of their co-owner who
failed to live up to the trust and confidence expected of her. In view of the lack of knowledge by the
petitioners of the conduct of Rosalia in selling the land without their consent in 1975 and the
absence of any opportunity to institute the proper action until 1981, laches may not be asserted
against the petitioners.
The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of knowledge or notice on the part
of the defendant that the complainants would assert the right on which they base the suit. On the
contrary, private respondent is guilty of bad faith in purchasing the property as he knew that the
property was co-owned by six persons and yet, there were only two signatories to the deeds of sale
and no special authorization to self was granted to the two sellers by the other co-owners.
Even as the land here was misrepresented in the deeds of sale as "unregistered," the truth was that
Afable already had notice that the land was titled in the name of six persons by virtue of the
Certificate of Title which was already in his possession even before the sale. Such fact is apparent
from his testimony before the court a quo:
COURT:
Q: From whom did you get the certificate of Title?
A: When it was mortgaged by Ponciana Aresgado.
Q: It was mortgaged to you before you bought it?
A: Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, March 5, 1984, p. 12) When crossexamined, he stated:
Q: Mr. Witness, the original Certificate of Title was given to you in the
year 1974, was it not?
A: 1975.
Q: In 1975, you already discovered that the title was in the name of
several persons, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you discovered that it is in the name of several persons, you
filed a case in court for authority to cancel the title to be transferred in
your name, is it not?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was denied by the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon
because there was ordinary one signatory to the deed of sale instead
of six, was it not?
A: Not one but two signatories.
[Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Rollo, p. 35]
Such actual knowledge of the existence of other co-owners in whose names the lot subject of the
sale was registered should have prompted a searching inquiry by Afable considering the well- known
rule in this jurisdiction that:
... a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautions man to make such inquiry. [Gonzales v. IAC and
Rural Bank of Pavia, Inc., G.R. No. 69622, January 29, 1988).
Moreover, the undisputed fact is that petitioners are relatives of his wife. As a genuine gesture of
good faith, he should have contacted the petitioners who were still listed as co-owners in the
certificate of title which was already in his possession even before the sale. In failing to exercise
even a minimum degree of ordinary prudence required by the situation, he is deemed to have
bought the lot at his own risk. Hence any prejudice or injury that may be occasioned to him by such
sale must be borne by him.
Indeed, aware of the flaws impairing his title, Afable went to the herein petitioner Delia BailonCasilao, asking the latter to sign a document obviously to cure the flaw [TSN, July 27, 1983, p.6].
Later, he even filed a petition in the Court of First Instance to register the title in his name which was
denied as aforesaid.
It may be gleaned from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino Afable is not a buyer in
good faith. Laches being an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to the court with clean
hands.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the challenged decision of the Court
of Appeals is SET ASIDE, and the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014
RAUL V. ARAMBULO AND TERESITA A. DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, v. GENARO NOLASCO AND JEREMY
SPENCER NOLASCO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review of the 7 October 2008 Decision 1 and 30 July 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 76449, which reversed and set aside the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 51, dated 19 September 2002.
Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother Rosita Vda. De Arambulo,
and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana Maria V. Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio
V. Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo Nolasco (Iraida) are coowners of two (2) parcels of land located in Tondo,
Manila, with an aggregate size of 233 square meters. When Iraida passed away, she was succeeded by her
husband, respondent Genaro Nolasco and their children, Iris Abegail Nolasco, Ingrid Aileen Arambulo and
respondent Jeremy Spencer Nolasco.
On 8 January 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief under Article 491 of the Civil Code with the RTC of
Manila, alleging that all of the coowners, except for respondents, have authorized petitioners to sell their
respective shares to the subject properties; that only respondents are withholding their consent to the sale
of their shares; that in case the sale pushes through, their mother and siblings will get their respective 1/9
share of the proceeds of the sale, while respondents will get share each of the 1/9 share of Iraida; that
the sale of subject properties constitutes alteration; and that under Article 491 of the Civil Code, if one or
more coowners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts
may afford adequate relief.4
In their Answer, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for being premature. Respondents averred
that they were not aware of the intention of petitioners to sell the properties they coowned because they
were not called to participate in any negotiations regarding the disposition of the property.5
After the pretrial, two (2) issues were submitted for consideration:

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1.

Whether or not respondents are withholding their consent in the sale of the subject properties; and

2.

In the affirmative, whether or not withholding of consent of sale by the respondents is prejudicial to
the petitioners.6

On 19 September 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to give their
consent to the sale. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners and against
the respondents:
1.

Directing respondents Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Spencer A. Nolasco to give their consent to the
sale of their shares on the subject properties;

2.

Allowing the sale of the aforementioned properties;

3.

Directing the petitioners and the coowners, including the respondents herein to agree with the
price in which the subject properties are to be sold and to whom to be sold; and

4.

Directing the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned properties in the
following proportion:
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a.) Rosita V. Vda. De Arambulo

b.) Primo V. Arambulo
c.) Maximiano V. Arambulo
d.) Ana Maria V. Arambulo
e.) Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez
f.) Julio V. Arambulo
g.) Raul V. Arambulo
h.) Teresita A. dela Cruz
i.) Genaro Nolasco, Jr.
j.) Jeremy Spencer A. Nolasco
k.) Iris Abegail A. Nolasco
l.) Ingrid Aileen Arambulo

1/9
1/9
1/9
1/9
1/9
1/9
1/9
1/9
1/4
1/4
1/4
1/4

of
of
of
of

1/9
1/9
1/9
1/97

Going along with petitioners reliance on Article 491 of the Civil Code, the trial court found that respondents
withholding of their consent to the sale of their shares is prejudicial to the common interest of the co
owners.
Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal and the trial court gave due course to the appeal and the entire records
of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated 7 October 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the appeal and reversed the trial courts
decision. The Court of Appeals held that the respondents had the full ownership of their undivided interest in
the subject properties, thus, they cannot be compelled to sell their undivided shares in the properties. It
referred to the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code. However, the Court of Appeals, implying
applicability of Article 491 also observed that petitioners failed to show how respondents withholding of their
consent would prejudice the common interest over the subject properties.
Hence, the instant petition seeking the reversal of the appellate courts decision and praying for the
affirmance of the trial courts decision that ordered respondents to give their consent to the sale of the
subject properties. Petitioners emphasize that under Article 491 of the Civil Code, they may ask the court to
afford them adequate relief should respondents refuse to sell their respective shares to the coowned
properties. They refute the appellate courts finding that they failed to show how the withholding of consent
by respondents becomes prejudicial to their common interest. Citing the testimony of petitioner Teresita A.
Dela Cruz, they assert that one of the two subject properties has an area of 122 square meters and if they
decide to partition, instead of selling the same, their share would be reduced to a measly 30square meter
lot each. The other property was testified to as measuring only 111 square meters. Petitioners reiterate that
all the other coowners are willing to sell the property and give respondents their share of the proceeds of
the sale.
At the core of this petition is whether respondents, as coowners, can be compelled by the court to give
their consent to the sale of their shares in the coowned properties. Until it reached this Court, the
discussion of the issue moved around Article 491 of the Civil Code. We have to remove the issue out of the
coverage of Article 491. It does not apply to the problem arising out of the proposed sale of the property co
owned by the parties in this case.
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the provision of Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states:

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Art. 493. Each coowner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the coownership.

Upon the other hand, Article 491 states:

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Art. 491. None of the coowners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the
consent by one or more of the coowners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may
afford adequate relief.
As intimated above, the erroneous application of Article 491 is, in this case, an innate infirmity. The very
initiatory pleading below was captioned Petition For Relief Under Article 491 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners, likewise petitioners before the RTC, filed the case on the submission that Article 491 covers the
petition and grants the relief prayed for, which is to compel the respondent coowners to agree to the sale of
the coowned property. The trial court took up all that petitioners tendered, and it favored the pleading with
the finding that:
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x x x To this court, the act of respondents of withholding consent to the sale of the properties is not only
prejudicial to the common interest of the coowners but is also considered as an alteration within the
purview of Article 491 of the New Civil Code. x x x. Hence, it is deemed just and proper to afford adequate
relief to herein petitioners under Article 491 of the New Civil Code. 8
That a sale constitutes an alteration as mentioned in Article 491 is an established jurisprudence. It is settled
that alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has
been held implicitly to be an act of alteration.9 Alienation of the thing by sale of the property is an act of
strict dominion.10 However, the ruling that alienation is alteration does not mean that a sale of commonly
owned real property is covered by the second paragraph of Article 491, such that if a coowner withholds
consent to the sale, the courts, upon a showing of a clear prejudice to the common interest, may, as
adequate relief, order the grant of the withheld consent. Such is the conclusion drawn by the trial court, and
hinted at, if not relied upon, by the appellate court.
Ruling that the trial court erred in its conclusion, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on Article 493 in
support of the finding that respondents cannot be compelled to agree with the sale. We affirm the reversal
by the Court of Appeals of the judgment of the trial court.
1. There is coownership whenever, as in this case, the ownership of an undivided thing, belongs to different
persons.11 Article 493 of the Code defines the ownership of the coowner, clearly establishing that each co
owner shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits.
Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as coowners with full
ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not
affect the full ownership by the respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners
will sell shall be that which may be apportioned to them in the division upon the termination of the co
ownership. With the full ownership of the respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners sale of their
parts, the nature of the property, as coowned, likewise stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees shall
be coowners with the respondents. The text of Article 493 says so.
2. Our reading of Article 493 as applied to the facts of this case is a reiteration of what was pronounced
in BailonCasilao v. Court of Appeals.12 The rights of a coowner of a certain property are clearly specified in
Article 493 of the Civil Code. Thus:
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Art. 493. Each coowner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it[,] and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or [the] mortgage,
with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the coownership.
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a coowner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other coowners who did not consent to the sale. 13 This is
because under the aforementioned codalprovision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided
share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned
in common.14 Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid
with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to
private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a coowner of the disputed parcel of

land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the
enjoyment thereof.15
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a coowner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of
the entire property by one coowner without the consent of the other coowners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the coownerseller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a coowner of
the property.16 (Italics theirs).
Nearer to the dispute at hand are the pronouncements in the 1944 case of Lopez v. Vda. De
Cuaycong.17 Citing Manresa on Article 399 which is the present Article 493 of the Civil Code, the Court
said:
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x x x Article 399 shows the essential integrity of the right of each coowner in the mental portion which
belongs to him in the ownership or community.
xxxx
To be a coowner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of the disposal of
the thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it
necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the
interested parties be obtained.18 (Underscoring supplied).
The Court in Lopez further cited Scaevola:

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2nd. Absolute right of each coowner with respect to his part or share. With respect to the latter, each co
owner is the same as an individual owner. He is a singular owner, with all the rights inherent in such
condition. The share of the coowner, that is, the part which ideally belongs to him in the common thing or
right and is represented by a certain quantity, is his and he may dispose of the same as he pleases, because
it does not affect the right of the others. Such quantity is equivalent to a credit against the common thing or
right and is the private property of each creditor (coowner). The various shares ideally signify as many
units of thing or right, pertaining individually to the different owners; in other words, a unit for each
owner.19 (Underscoring supplied).
The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such by the Court, agree that coowners such as
respondents have over their part, the right of full and absolute ownership. Such right is the same as that of
individual owners which is not diminished by the fact that the entire property is coowned with others. That
part which ideally belongs to them, or their mental portion, may be disposed of as they please, independent
of the decision of their coowners. So we rule in this case. The respondents cannot be ordered to sell their
portion of the coowned properties. In the language of Rodriguez v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,20 each
party is the sole judge of what is good for him.21
3. Indeed, the respected commentaries suggest the conclusion that, insofar as the sale of coowned
properties is concerned, there is no common interest that may be prejudiced should one or more of the co
owners refuse to sell the coowned property, which is exactly the factual situation in this case. When
respondents disagreed to the sale, they merely asserted their individual ownership rights. Without
unanimity, there is no common interest.
Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced coowners may bring a suit for partition, which is one of
the modes of extinguishing coownership. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no coowner shall be
obliged to remain in the coownership, and that each coowner may demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil Code
states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the coowners cannot agree that it be allotted to
one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is
resorted to (a) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the coowners but because of
the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co
owners, and (b) the coowners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned
the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the coowners. 22 This is the result obviously aimed at by
petitioners at the outset. As already shown, this cannot be done while the coownership exists.
Essentially, a partition proceeding accords all parties the opportunity to be heard, the denial of which was
raised as a defense by respondents for opposing the sale of the subject properties.

The necessity of partition could not be more emphasized than in Rodriguez v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal,23 to wit:
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x x x That this recourse would entail considerable time, trouble and expense, unwarranted by the value of
the property from the standpoint of the [respondents], is no legal justification for the apportionment of the
property not agreeable to any of the coowners. Disagreements and differences impossible of adjustment by
the parties themselves are bound to arise, and it is precisely with such contingency in view that the law on
partition was evolved.24
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED without prejudice to the filing of an action for
partition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 76449 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-49731 September 29, 1988
ALFREDO SERING, petitioner,
vs.
RESTITUTO PLAZO and GERTRUDES SUAN, respondents.
Manuel Tesiorna and Noel P. Catre for petitioner.
Timoteo R. Quimpo, Jr. for respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
The application of settled principles is all that is needed to resolve the instant appeal. Article 487 of
the Civil Code provides that anyone of the co-owners of an immovable may bring an action in
ejectment. A co-owner may thus bring an ejectment action without joining the other co-owners, the
suit being deemed instituted for the benefit of all. 1 And the term, "action in ejectment," includes a suit of
forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio). 2
The proceeding at bar had its inception in a forcible entry suit filed by petitioner Sering against
respondent Spouses Restituto Plazo and Gertrudes Suan with the then Municipal Court of del
Carmen, Surigao del Norte. 3The case resulted in a judgment against the Plazos who thereupon
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte. In the latter court the Plazos learned that the
property subject of the suit was not owned solely by Sering but was owned in common by him and others.
This prompted the Plazos to move for the impleading of the other co-owners as parties plaintiff, on the
theory that they were indispensable parties. 4 The Court agreed and ordered Sering to amend his
complaint so as to include his co-owners as co-plaintiffs. Sering demurred claiming that under the law
anyone of the co-owners could bring suit for ejectment without joining the others. 5 The Plazos contended,
on the other hand, that the provision invoked by Sering had no application to forcible entry actions, but
only to suits of unlawful detainer. Because Sering failed to comply with the Courts order for amendment of
the complaint, the Trial Court dismissed his complaint. 6 It also thereafter denied his motion for
reconsidereration 7 Sering has come to this Court praying for the nullification and reversal of said order of
dismissal and that denying his plea for reconsideration.
The orders complained of are indeed tainted by serious error and should therefore be reversed and
set aside, upon the considerations set out in the opening paragraph of this resolution. The same
issues had been raised and resolved as early as eight (8) years before promulgation of the
contested orders. In Vencilao v. Camarento,decided in 1969, 8 this Court pertinently ruled as follows: 9
2. Anent the question of whether an action of forcible entry and detainer should be
brought in the name of all co-owners, We hold that under Article 487 of the new Civil
Code, any of the co-owners may bring the action ... . In forcible entry and detainer
action(s) the matter to be determined is simply the question of prior physical
possession. It having been alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff was in actual

possession of the properties, certainly the plaintiff alone, who was in actual
possession, could file the complaint.
The Court has been cited to no reason of substance for modifying or overruling this doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders dismissing the petitioner's complaint for ejectment and
denying reconsideration of the dismissal decree 10 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for resolution, with all deliberate dispatch, of the respondents'
appeal from the judgment of the inferior court. This Resolution is immediately executory.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 75884 September 24, 1987
JULITA GO ONG, FOR HERSELF AND AS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN OF STEVEN GO
ONG, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION and the CITY SHERIFF
OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 21, 1986 Decision

* of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV

No. 02635, "Julita Ong etc. vs. Allied Banking Corp. et al." affirming, with modification, the January 5, 1984 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-35230.

The uncontroverted facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
...: Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City Identified as Lot No. 12, Block 407, Psd
37326 with an area of 1960.6 sq. m. and Lot No. 1, Psd 15021, with an area of
3,660.8 sq. m. are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188705 in the name of
"Alfredo Ong Bio Hong married to Julita Go Ong "(Exh. D). Alfredo Ong Bio Hong
died on January 18, 1975 and Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of her
husband's estate in Civil Case No. 107089. The letters of administration was
registered on TCT No. 188705 on October 23, 1979. Thereafter, Julita Go Ong sold
Lot No. 12 to Lim Che Boon, and TCT No. 188705 was partially cancelled and TCT
No. 262852 was issued in favor of Lim Che Boon covering Lot No. 12 (Exh. D-4). On
June 8, 1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney-in-fact Jovita K. Yeo (Exh. 1)
mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied Banking Corporation to secure a loan of
P900,000.00 obtained by JK Exports, Inc. The mortgage was registered on TCT No.
188705 on the same date with the following notation: "... mortgagee's consent
necessary in case of subsequent alienation or encumbrance of the property other
conditions set forth in Doc. No. 340, Page No. 69, Book No. XIX, of the Not. Public of
Felixberto Abad". On the loan there was due the sum of P828,000.00 and Allied
Banking Corporation tried to collect it from Julita Go Ong, (Exh. E). Hence, the
complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the bank
had allegedly promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank
averred that it was plaintiff Julita Go Ong who promised to secure the court's
approval, adding that Julita Go Ong informed the defendant that she was processed
the sum of P300,000.00 by the JK Exports, Inc. which will also take charge of the
interest of the loan.
Concluding, the trial court ruled:

Absent (of) any evidence that the property in question is the capital of
the deceased husband brought into the marriage, said property
should be presumed as acquired during the marriage and, therefore,
conjugal property,
After the dissolution of the marriage with the death of plaintiff's
husband, the plaintiff acquired, by law, her conjugal share, together
with the hereditary rights thereon. (Margate vs. Rabacal, L-14302,
April 30, 1963). Consequently, the mortgage constituted on said
property, upon express authority of plaintiff, notwithstanding the lack
of judicial approval, is valid, with respect to her conjugal share
thereon, together with her hereditary rights.
On appeal by petitioner, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the appealed
decision (Record, pp. 19-22). The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
instituted by defendant against plaintiff shall be held in abeyance to await the final
result of Civil Case No. 107089 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, 6th Judicial
District Branch XXXII, entitled "IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
THE LATE ALFREDO ONG BIO: JULITA GO ONG, ADMINISTRATRIX". In
pursuance with which the restraining order of the lower court in this case restraining
the sale of the properties levied upon is hereby ordered to continue in full force and
effect coterminous with the final result of Civil Case No. 107089, the decision
appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
On April 8, 1986, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said decision (Ibid., pp. 24-29), but
in a Resolution dated September 11, 1986, respondent court denied the motion for lack of merit
(Ibid., p. 23). Hence, the instant petition (Ibid., pp. 6-17).
The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated November 19, 1986 (Rollo, p. 30), without
giving due course to the petition, resolved to require private respondent to comment thereon and it
did on February 19, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 37-42). Thereafter, in a Resolution dated April 6, 1987, the
petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their respective memoranda
(Ibid., p. 43).
Petitioner filed her Memorandum on May 13, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 45-56), while private respondent filed
its Memorandum on May 20, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 62-68).
The sole issue in this case is
WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER
PETITIONER'S ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL.
The instant petition is devoid of merit.
The well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great respect, carries
even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in the case at bar.

In brief, the lower court found: (1) that the property under the administration of petitioner the wife
of the deceased, is a community property and not the separate property of the latter; (2) that the
mortgage was constituted in the wife's personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix;
and (3) that the mortgage affects the wife's share in the community property and her inheritance in
the estate of her husband.
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted Section 7 of Rule
89 of the Rules of Court and cited several cases wherein this Court ruled that the regulations
provided in the said section are mandatory.
While petitioner's assertion may have merit insofar as the rest of the estate of her husband is
concerned the same is not true as regards her conjugal share and her hereditary rights in the estate.
The records show that petitioner willingly and voluntarily mortgaged the property in question
because she was processed by JK Exports, Inc. the sum of P300,000.00 from the proceeds of the
loan; and that at the time she executed the real estate mortgage, there was no court order
authorizing the mortgage, so she took it upon herself, to secure an order.
Thus, in confirming the findings of the lower court, as supported by law and the evidence, the Court
of Appeals aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, since the
mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix of the
estate of her husband.
Nevertheless, petitioner, citing the cases of Picardal, et al. vs. Lladas (21 SCRA 1483)
and Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla (10 SCRA 589), further argues that in the settlement proceedings
of the estate of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property of the marriage is
under administration. While such may be in a sense true, that fact alone is not sufficient to invalidate
the whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily entered into by the petitioner. An opposite view would
result in an injustice. Under similar circumstances, this Court applied the provisions of Article 493 of
the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners shall each have the full ownership of his part and the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership (Philippine
National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 [1980]).
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted in ruling
that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under administration, by authority of the
petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal share
and to her hereditary rights. The fact that what had been mortgaged was in custodia legis is
immaterial, insofar as her conjugal share and hereditary share in the property is concerned for after
all, she was the ABSOLUTE OWNER thereof. This ownership by hers is not disputed, nor is there
any claim that the rights of the government (with reference to taxes) nor the rights of any heir or
anybody else have been prejudiced for impaired. As stated by Associate Justice (later Chief Justice)
Manuel Moran in Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., 73 Phil. 618
The land in question, described in the appealed decision, originally belonged to Juan
Melgar. The latter died and the judicial administration of his estate was commenced
in 1915 and came to a close on December 2, 1924, only. During the pendency of the
said administration, that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar, daughter of the
deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui,
subject to the stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she would continue
in possession of the land as lessee of the purchase. On December 12, 1920, the
partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made, and the land in

question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In 1921, she conveyed, in payment of

professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of the defendant-appellee Nicolas
Rafols, who entered upon the portion thus conveyed and has been in possession
thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an action to recover
said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from the other defendants,
and while that case was pending, or about August 4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the
whole land in question to Generosa Teves, the herein plaintiff-appellant, after trial,
the lower court rendered a decision absolving Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of the
land conveyed to him by Susana Melgar, and declaring the plaintiff owner of the
other half by express acknowledgment of the other defendants. The plaintiff
appealed from that part of the judgment which is favorable to Nicolas Rafols.
The lower court absolved Nicolas Rafols upon the theory that Susana Melgar could
not have sold anything to Pedro Cui because the land was then in custodia legis, that
is, under judicial administration. This is error. That the land could not ordinary be
levied upon while in custodia legis,does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell
the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under
administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in
order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an
heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration,
in no wise stands in the way of such administration.
The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot adversely affect
the substantiverights of private respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal
partnership ended with her husband's death, and her hereditary rights accrued from the moment of
the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed
between her and the other heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.). Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the
Civil Code applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for
instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for the payment, say of a conjugal
debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite
judicial approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is
caused others, including the government.
Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage. An estoppel may arise from
the making of a promise even though without consideration, if it was intended that the promise
should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to
sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice (Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central
Bank, 70 SCRA 570).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 102380 January 18, 1993

HERODOTUS P. ACEBEDO and DEMOSTHENES P. ACEBEDO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, MIGUEL ACEBEDO, ALEXANDER ACEBEDO, NAPOLEON
ACEBEDO, RIZALINO ACEBEDO, REPUBLICA ACEBEDO, FILIPINAS ACEBEDO and YU HWA
PING, respondents.
Heminio L. Ruiz for petitioners.
Vicente D. Millora for private respondents.
Romero A. Yu for respondent Yu Hua Ping.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

The lower court's jurisdiction in approving a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs
and ordering herein administrator-petitioner Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining portions of said
properties, despite the absence of its prior approval as a probate court, is being challenged in the
case at bar.
The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties located in Quezon
City and Caloocan City, with a conservative estimated value of about P30 million. Said estate
allegedly has only the following unsettled claims:
a. P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due Quezon City;
b. P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due Caloocan City;
c. The unpaid salaries/allowances of former Administrator Miguel Acebedo, and the
incumbent Administrator Herodotus Acebedo; and
d. Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net estate.
The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners herein, and the others
are the private respondents.
Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before the respondent Court for sixteen years,
respondents-heirs filed a "Motion for Approval of Sale", on October 4, 1989. The said sale involved

the properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all of
which are registered in Quezon City, and form part of the estate. The consideration for said lots was
twelve (12) million pesos and by that time, they already had a buyer. It was further stated in said
Motion that respondents-heirs have already received their proportionate share of the six (6) million
pesos paid by the buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as earnest money; that the balance of P6,000,000.00 is more
than enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate. Thus, they prayed for the Court to direct
the administrator, Herodotus Acebedo (referred to as petitioner-administrator hereafter):
1. to sell the properties mentioned in the motion;
2. with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the claims against the Estate; and
3. to distribute the residue among the Heirs in final settlement of the Estate.
To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-administrator interposed an "Opposition to Approval of
Sale", to wit:
1. That he has learned that some of the heirs herein have sold some real estate
property of the Estate located at Balintawak, Quezon City, without the knowledge of
the herein administrator, without the approval of this Honorable Court and of some
heirs, and at a shockingly low price;
2. That he is accordingly hereby registering his vehement objection to the approval of
the sale, perpetrated in a manner which can even render the proponents of the sale
liable for punishment for contempt of this Honorable Court;
3. The herein Administrator instead herein prays this Honorable Court to authorize
the sale of the above mentioned property of the Estate to generate funds to pay
certain liabilities of the Estate and with the approval of this Honorable Court if
warranted, to give the heirs some advances chargeable against theirs (sic)
respective shares, and, for the purpose to authorize the herein Administrator, and the
other heirs to help the Administrator personally or through a broker, to look for a
buyer for the highest obtainable price, subject always to the approval of this
Honorable Court. 1
On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to be given a period of forty-five (45) days within
which to look for a buyer who will be willing to buy the properties at a price higher than
P12,000,000.00.
The case was set for hearing on December 15, 1989. However, by said date, petitioners have not
found any buyer offering better terms. Thus, they asked the Court, on February 8, 1990, for an in
extendible period of thirty days to look for a buyer.
Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document against
Yu Hwa Ping and notary public Eugenio Obon on February 26, 1990. He initiated this complaint
upon learning that it was Yu Hwa Ping who caused the notarization of the Deed of Conditional Sale
wherein allegedly petitioner-administrator's signature was made to appear. He also learned that after
he confronted the notary public of the questioned document, the latter revoked his notarial act on the
same.

On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed the civil action to secure the declaration by the Court
of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale.
The period granted herein petitioners having lapsed without having found a buyer, petitioner
Demosthenes Acebedo sought to nullify the Orders granting them several periods within which to
look for a better buyer. Respondents filed a comment thereon.
Having miserably failed to find a better buyer, after seven long months, petitioner-administrator filed
another "Opposition to Approval of Sale", dated May 10, 1990, maintaining that the sale should wait
for the country to recover from the effects of the coup d'etat attempts, otherwise, the properties
should be divided among the heirs.
On June 21, 1990, petitioners filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Mortgage and Lease some of the
Properties of the Estate". To this Motion, respondents filed an Opposition on the following grounds :
that the motion is not proper because of the pending motion to approve the sale of the same
properties; that said conditional sale was initiated by petitioner-administrator who had earlier signed
a receipt for P500,000.00 as earnest money; that the approval of the sale would mean Yu Hwa
Ping's assumption of payment of the realty taxes; that the estate has no further debts and thus, the
intestate administrator may be terminated.
On August 17, 1990, respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which, stated,
among others, to wit: 2
b. the motion filed by the heirs-movants, dated October 4, 1989, praying that the new
administrator be directed to sell the properties covered by TCT Nos. 155569,
120145, 9145 and 18709, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping is hereby denied; and
c. the new administrator is hereby granted leave to mortgage some properties of the
estate at a just and reasonable amount, subject to the approval of the Court.
On December 4, 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order resolving to call the parties to a
conference on December 17, 1990. The conference was held, but still the parties were unable to
arrive at an agreement. So, on January 4, 1991, it was continued, wherein the parties actually
agreed that the heirs be allowed to sell their shares of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping for the price
already agreed upon, while herein petitioners negotiate for a higher price with Yu Hwa Ping.
Petitioners, then, instead filed a "Supplemental Opposition" to the approval of the Deed of
Conditional Sale.
On March 29, 1991, the respondent Court issued the challenged Order, the dispositive portion of
which states, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated August 7, 1990, is hereby lifted, reconsidered and
set aside, and another one is hereby issued as follows:
1. Approving the conditional sale, dated September 10, 1989, executed by the heirsmovants, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining to their respective shares in the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 1945 and 18709 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City;

2. Ordering the administrator Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining portions of the
said properties also in favor of Yu Hwa Ping at the same price as the sale executed
by the herein heirs-movants;
3. Ordering Yu Hwa Ping to deposit with the Court the total remaining balance of the
purchase price for the said lots within TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice hereof;
4. The motion to cite former administrator Miguel Acebedo in contempt of court,
resulting from his failure to submit the owner's copy of TCT Nos. 155569, and
120145 is hereby denied. 3
Yu Hwa Ping, on April 4, 1991, deposited the remaining balance of the purchase price for the
properties subject of the Deed of Conditional Sale in the amount of P6,500,000.00.
Petitioners herein received the questioned Order on April 11, 1991. Twenty one (21) days thereafter,
they filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court reinstate its Order of August 17, 1990.
To this, private respondents filed their Opposition. 4
Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The
motions for reconsideration of herein petitioners were denied by the respondent Court on August 23,
1991.
On September 23, 1991, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, hoping for the
last time that they would be able to convince the Court that its Order dated March 29, 1991 in effect
approving the conditional sale is erroneous and beyond its jurisdiction.
On October 17, 1991, the respondent Court denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration for "lack of
merit".
On November 7, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Execution of the Order dated March
29, 1991. This was pending resolution when the petitioners filed this Petition for Certiorari.
The controversy in the case at bar revolves around one question: Is it within the jurisdiction of the
lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale
executed by respondents-heirs without prior court approval and to order herein Administrator to sell
the remaining portion of said properties?
We answer in the positive?
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, 5 this Court made a pronouncement that it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective
heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed out in a
separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of
an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be
made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate
court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in
issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.

We cannot countenance the position maintained by herein petitioners that said conditional sale is
null and void for lack of prior court approval. The sale precisely was made conditional, the condition
being that the same should first be approved by the probate court.
Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. 6 It is settled that
court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent's estate. However, reference
to judicial approval cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of the heirs to dispose of
their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs. 7
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right,
interest, or participation he may have in the property under administration. This is a matter which
comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court. 8
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same is under administration, is
based on the Civil Code provision 9 stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the
inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. 10
The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this right. 11 Although it is
mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership. 12 In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or
mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common. 13
As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose of property under
administration. In the case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., 14 it was said that the sale made
by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise,
stands in the way of such administration. The Court then relied on the provision of the Old Civil Code,
Article 440 and Article 339 which are still in force as Article 533 and Article 493, respectively, in the new
Civil Code. The Court also cited the words of a noted civilist, Manresa: "Upon the death of a person, each
of his heirs 'becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which
might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the
estate which remains undivided'."
Private respondents having secured the approval of the probate court, a matter which is
unquestionably within its jurisdiction, and having established private respondents' right to alienate
the decedent's property subject of administration, this Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
PREMISES considered, Petition is hereby DISMISSED. With Costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 61584 November 25, 1992

DONATO S. PAULMITAN, JULIANA P. FANESA and RODOLFO FANESA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIO PAULMITAN, ELENA PAULMITAN, ABELINO PAULMITAN, ANITA
PAULMITAN, BAKING PAULMITAN, ADELINA PAULMITAN and ANITO
PAULMITAN, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals,
dated July 14, 1982 in CA-G.R. No. 62255-R entitled "Alicio Paulmitan, et al. v. Donato Sagario
Paulmitan, et al." which affirmed the decision 2 of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Negros
Occidental, 12th Judicial District, Branch IV, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 11770.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, 3 left the two following parcels of land located
in the Province of Negros Occidental: (1) Lot No. 757 with an area of 1,946 square meters covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-8376; and (2) Lot No. 1091 with an area of 69,080 square
meters and covered by OCT No. RO-11653. From her marriage with Ciriaco Paulmitan, who is also now
deceased, Agatona begot two legitimate children, namely: Pascual Paulmitan, who also died in
1953, 4 apparently shortly after his mother passed away, and Donato Paulmitan, who is one of the
petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while the third petitioner, Rodolfo Fanes, is
Juliana's husband. Pascual Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona Sagario, is survived by the respondents,
who are his children, name: Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito, all surnamed
Paulmitan.
Until 1963, the estate of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles to the two lots
mentioned above remained in the name of Agatona. However, on August 11, 1963, petitioner Donato
Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself
Lot No. 757 based on the claim that he is the only surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. The affidavit
was filed with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental on August 20, 1963, cancelled OCT No.
RO-8376 in the name of Agatona Sagario and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35979 in
Donato's name.
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the same in favor
of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter. 5
In the meantime, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was forfeited and sold
at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental being the buyer. A
Certificate of Sale over the land was executed by the Provincial Treasurer in favor of the Provincial
Board of Negros Occidental. 6

On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the Provincial Government of
Negros Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09. 7
On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual Paulmitan filed on
January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a Complaint against
petitioners to partition the properties plus damages.
Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757 as an affirmative defense,
contending that the Complaint was filed more than eleven years after the issuance of a transfer
certificate of title to Donato Paulmitan over the land as consequence of the registration with the
Register of Deeds, of Donato's affidavit extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757. As
regards Lot No. 1091, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed in her Answer to the Complaint that she
acquired exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale executed in her favor by
her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental.
Acting on the petitioners' affirmative defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757, the trial
court issued an order dated April 22, 1976 dismissing the complaint as to the said property upon
finding merit in petitioners' affirmative defense. This order, which is not the object of the present
petition, has become final after respondents' failure to appeal therefrom.
Trial proceeded with respect to Lot No. 1091. In a decision dated May 20, 1977, the trial court
decided in favor of respondents as to Lot No. 1091. According to the trial court, the respondents, as
descendants of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan were entitled to one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1091, pro
indiviso. The sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did
not prejudice their rights. And the repurchase by Juliana P. Fanesa of the land from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental did not vest in Juliana exclusive ownership over the entire land
but only gave her the right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem the property. The trial
court ordered the partition of the land and directed petitioners Donato Paulmitan and Juliana P.
Fanesa to pay private respondents certain amounts representing the latter's share in the fruits of the
land. On the other hand, respondents were directed to pay P1,479.55 to Juliana P. Fanesa as their
share in the redemption price paid by Fanesa to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the second cause of action pleaded
in the complain as follows:
1. The deed of sale (Exh. "F") dated May 28, 1974 is valid insofar as the one-half
undivided portion of Lot 1091 is concerned as to vest ownership over said half
portion in favor of defendant Juliana Fanesa and her husband Rodolfo Fanesa, while
the remaining half shall belong to plaintiffs, pro-indiviso;
2. Lot 1091, Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Province of Negros Occidental, now
covered by TCT No. RO-11653 (N.A.), is ordered partitioned. The parties must
proceed to an actual partition by property instrument of partition, submitting the
corresponding subdivision within sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, and
should they fail to agree, commissioners of partition may be appointed by the Court;
3. Pending the physical partition, the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is
ordered to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. RO-11653 (N.A.) covering Lot 1091,
Pontevedra Cadastre, and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name

of plaintiffs and defendants, one-half portion each, pro-indiviso, as indicated in

paragraph 1 above;
4. Plaintiffs are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, defendant Juliana Fanesa the
amount of P1,479.55 with interest at the legal rate from May 28, 1974 until paid;
5 Defendants Donato Sagario Paulmitan and Juliana Paulmitan Fanesa are ordered
to account to plaintiffs and to pay them, jointly and severally, the value of the produce
from Lot 1091 representing plaintiffs' share in the amount of P5,000.00 per year from
1966 up to the time of actual partition of the property, and to pay them the sum of
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees as well as the costs of the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence this petition.
To determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the land in question, it is well to review,
initially, the relatives who survived the decedent Agatona Sagario Paulmitan. When Agatona died in
1953, she was survived by two (2) sons, Donato and Pascual. A few months later in the same year,
Pascual died, leaving seven children, the private respondents. On the other had, Donato's sole
offspring was petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa.
At the time of the relevant transactions over the properties of decedent Agatona Sagario Paulmitan,
her son Pascual had died, survived by respondents, his children. It is, thus, tempting to apply the
principles pertaining to the right of representation as regards respondents. It must, however, be
borne in mind that Pascual did no predecease his mother, 8 thus precluding the operation of the provisions in the Civil
Code on the right of representation 9 with respect to his children, the respondents. When Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan died intestate in 1952, her two (2) sons Donato and Pascual were still alive. Since it is wellsettled by virtue of Article 777 of the Civil Code that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent," 10 the right of ownership, not only of Donato but also of
Pascual, over their respective shares in the inheritance was automatically and by operation of law vested
in them in 1953 when their mother died intestate. At that stage, the children of Donato and Pascual did
not yet have any right over the inheritance since "[i]n every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones." 11 Donato and Pascual excluded their children as to the right to inherit
from Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, their mother.
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing away of her son
Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides: "Where
there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in
common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased." 12 Donato and Pascual
Paulmitan were, therefore, co-owners of the estate left by their mother as no partition was ever made.
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents, succeeded him in the
co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over an undivided
portion of the property passed on to his children, who, from the time of Pascual's death, became coowners with their uncle Donato over the disputed decedent estate.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot No. 1091 by virtue of two transactions,
namely: (a) the sale made in her favor by her father Donato Paulmitan; and (b) her redemption of the
land from the Provincial of Negros Occidental after it was forfeited for non-payment of taxes.

When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he
was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that portion which may be
allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. 13 The sale did not prejudice the rights of
respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land which they inherited from their father. It did not
vest ownership in the entire land with the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the
property 14 and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it is partitioned. InBailonCasilao v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, outlined the effects of a sale by
one co-owner without the consent of all the co-owners, thus:
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of
the Civil Code, Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and
even substitute another person its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other coowners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)].
This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other
disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would
correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common [Ramirez v.
Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia
and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and
the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent
Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel
of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of
substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of
the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-ownerseller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his
daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over the entire land but
merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided share of her father, thus making her the coowner of the land in question with the respondents, her first cousins.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa also claims ownership of the entire property by virtue of the fact that
when the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental bought the land after it was forfeited for nonpayment of taxes, she redeemed it.
The contention is without merit.
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to
the entire land subject of the co-ownership. Speaking on the same issue raised by petitioners, the
Court, in Adille v. Court of Appeals, 16 resolved the same with the following pronouncements:

The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership
over the property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioners' contention that the property subject of dispute
devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption within
the period required by law. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil
Code, Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand
redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with respect to his share
alone (CIVIL CODE, art. 1612, CIVIL CODE (1889), art. (1514.). While the records
show that petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses
therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to
end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no doubt that
redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and
to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by
renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of
the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the coownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a
vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to
a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its
totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners
to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title
thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the provision does not give to the
redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of
terminating a co-ownership.
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of the redemption
she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to reimbursed for half of the redemption price she
paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on behalf of her co-owners. Until
reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the subject property for the amount due her. 17
Finally, petitioners dispute the order of the trial court, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, for them
to pay private respondents P5,000.00 per year from 1966 until the partition of the estate which
represents the share of private respondents in the fruits of the land. According to petitioners, the land
is being leased for P2,000.00 per year only. This assigned error, however raises a factual question.
The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review. As a general rule,
findings of fact made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot
be reviewed on appeal. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-33158 October 17, 1985

VALENTINA G. VILLANUEVA, assisted by her husband SEVERINO FERI, ANTONIO G.
VILLANUEVA, ANGEL G. VILLANUEVA and OLIMPIA G. VILLANUEVA, assisted by her
husband F. DAGUIMOL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO C. FLORENDO, Judge of the CFI of Cagayan, Second Branch, ERLINDA V.
VALLANGCA, CONCEPCION G. VILLANUEVA and MACARIO K. VILLANUEVA, respondents.

CUEVAS, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 dated July 14, 1970 of the then Court of First Instance
of Cagayan Branch II, in Civil Case No. 1486-A, entitled "Valentina G. Villanueva, et al., plaintiffs, versus
Erlinda V. Vallangca, et al., defendants", the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment
1. Ordering the reformation and amendment of Exhibit "3" by deleting the phrase
located at the western side of the lot which is five and one half (5-) meters in width
and fifteen (15) meters long';
2. Declaring Erlinda Vallangca, married to Concepcion Villanueva absolute owners of
an Ideal and undivided share of one-half () of the land described in paragraph 2 of
the complaint, which was conveyed to them by Exhibit;
3. Ordering the partition of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint among
the heirs of Basilia Garcia;
4. Ordering the dismissal of the defendants' counterclaim; and
5. Ordering the Clerk of Court to return to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,000.00
deposited by them with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners and respondent Concepcion Villanueva are the children of spouses Macario Villanueva
(one of the respondents) and Basilia Garcia. Said spouses owned a small parcel of land with an area
of 165 square meters situated along Pres. Quezon St., in the Poblacion of Aparri, Cagayan.
Sometime in 1944, Basilia Garcia died intestate, leaving her husband, Macario Villanueva and
children (herein petitioners) as her sole and only legitimate heirs.

On May 13, 1964, the surviving spouse, Macario, without the subject lot having been partitioned,
sold in favor of Erlinda Vallangca, the wife of respondent Concepcion Villanueva, one-half or 82.5
square meters of the aforementioned lot, particularly the western portion thereof, measuring 15-
meters by 15 meters, for P1,100.00, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale marked as Exhibit "3". 2 Having
been informed of the sale, petitioners signified their intention to redeem the lot in question but respondent
vendee refused to allow such redemption contending that she is the wife of one of the legal heirs and
therefore redemption will not lie against her because she is not the "third party" or "stranger"
contemplated in the law.
Petitioners filed a complaint for rescission of sale and legal redemption of the portion sold to
Vallangca. The trial court, on July 14, 1970, rendered a decision ordering among other things, the
reformation of the Deed of Sale and declaring the vendee the absolute owner of the subject lot.
Petitioners now submit 3 that the lower court erred
(1) in holding that the property sold to Erlinda Vallangca, married to Concepcion Villanueva, is a
conjugal partnership property of the spouses, and therefore, the right of legal redemption will not lie
against Erlinda Vallangca and Concepcion Villanueva, instead of holding that Erlinda V. Vallangca,
being a "third person" or .stranger the right of legal redemption contemplated under Art. 1620 and, or
1088 (NCC) can be exercised as against the vendee in the sale;
(2) inordering for the formation and amendment Exh. 3 by deletion of the phrase "located at the
western side of the lot which is five and one-half meters in width and 15 meters long" instead of
annulling and rescinding the sale as called for under the circumstances; and
(3) in ordering the partition of the property described in par. 2 of the complaint among the heirs of
Basilia Garcia, where partition is not warranted considering that there is still pending before the
same court a separate action for partition of the same property filed by Concepcion Villanueva
against plaintiff-petitioners.
Art. 1620 of the New Civil Code provides:
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all
the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may
only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned
in common.
It is not disputed that co-ownership exists but the lower court disallowed redemption because it
considered the vendee, Erlinda Vallangca, a co-heir, being married to Concepcion Villanueva, and
the conveyance was held valid since it was in favor of the conjugal partnership of the spouses in the
absence of any statement that it is paraphernal in character. Within the meaning of Art. 1620, the
term "third person" or "stranger" refers to all persons who are not heirs in succession, and by heirs
are meant only those who are called either by will or the law to succeed the deceased and who
actually succeeds. In short, a third person is any one who is not a co-owner. 4 The vendee is related
by affinity to the deceased by reason of her marriage to one of the heirs and being married to Concepcion
does not entitle the vendee to inherit or succeed in her own right. She is not an heir of Basilia Garcia nor
included in the "family relations" of spouses Macario and Basilia as envisioned in Art. 217 of the Civil
Code.

Art. 217. Family relations shall in lude those:

(1) Between Husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
The co-owners should therefore be allowed to exercise their right to redeem the property sold to
Erlinda Vallangca. To deny petitioners the right of redemption recognized in Art. 1620 of the Civil
Code is to defeat the purpose of minimizing co-ownership and to contravene the public policy in this
regard. Moreover, it would result in disallowing the petitioners a way out of what, in the words of
Manresa, "might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which they have been
thrust." 5 Respondent seller Macario, as co-owner and before partition, has the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest or his Ideal share but not a divided part and one with boundaries as what
was done in the case at bar. It is an inherent and peculiar feature of co-ownership that although the coowners may have unequal shares in the common property quantitatively speaking, each co-owner has the
same right in a qualitative sense as any one of the other co-owners. In other words, every co-owner is the
owner of the whole and over the whole, he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the
owner of a portion which is truly abstract because until division is effected, such portion is not correctly
determined. 6
It appearing that a separate action for partition of the subject lot is still pending before the CFI of
Cagayan, the trial court's order of partition is, therefore, uncalled for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision dated July 14, 1970 of the then
CFI of Cagayan, Br. II, is accordingly REVERSED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44546 January 29, 1988
RUSTICO ADILLE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EMETERIA ASEJO, TEODORICA ASEJO, DOMINGO
ASEJO, JOSEFA ASEJO and SANTIAGO ASEJO, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
In issue herein are property and property rights, a familiar subject of controversy and a wellspring of
enormous conflict that has led not only to protracted legal entanglements but to even more bitter
consequences, like strained relationships and even the forfeiture of lives. It is a question that
likewise reflects a tragic commentary on prevailing social and cultural values and institutions, where,
as one observer notes, wealth and its accumulation are the basis of self-fulfillment and where
property is held as sacred as life itself. "It is in the defense of his property," says this modern thinker,
that one "will mobilize his deepest protective devices, and anybody that threatens his possessions
will arouse his most passionate enmity." 1
The task of this Court, however, is not to judge the wisdom of values; the burden of reconstructing
the social order is shouldered by the political leadership-and the people themselves.
The parties have come to this Court for relief and accordingly, our responsibility is to give them that
relief pursuant to the decree of law.
The antecedent facts are quoted from the decision 2 appealed from:
xxx xxx xxx
... [T]he land in question Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay located in Legaspi
City with an area of some 11,325 sq. m. originally belonged to one Felisa Alzul as her
own private property; she married twice in her lifetime; the first, with one Bernabe
Adille, with whom she had as an only child, herein defendant Rustico Adille; in her
second marriage with one Procopio Asejo, her children were herein plaintiffs, now,
sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro to certain 3rd
persons, period of repurchase being 3 years, but she died in 1942 without being able
to redeem and after her death, but during the period of redemption, herein defendant
repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed of extra-judicial
partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of his mother Felisa with
the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name alone also, so that
OCT. No. 21137 in the name of his mother was transferred to his name, that was in
1955; that was why after some efforts of compromise had failed, his half-brothers
and sisters, herein plaintiffs, filed present case for partition with accounting on the

position that he was only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed,-and this is
the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs, Emeteria Asejo was
occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that,
Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustained defendant in his position
that he was and became absolute owner, he was not a trustee, and therefore,
dismissed case and also condemned plaintiff occupant, Emeteria to vacate; it is
because of this that plaintiffs have come here and contend that trial court erred in:
I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property;
II. ... not ordering the partition of the property; and
III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the portion of the property
to vacate the land, p. 1 Appellant's brief.
which can be reduced to simple question of whether or not on the basis of evidence and law,
judgment appealed from should be maintained. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent Court of appeals reversed the trial Court, 4 and ruled for the plaintiffs-appellants, the
private respondents herein. The petitioner now appeals, by way of certiorari, from the Court's decision.
We required the private respondents to file a comment and thereafter, having given due course to
the petition, directed the parties to file their briefs. Only the petitioner, however, filed a brief, and the
private respondents having failed to file one, we declared the case submitted for decision.
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the
property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute devolved upon him
upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption within the period required by law. He
relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the
vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share alone. 5 While the
records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor,
that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of coownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement
from the remaining co-owners. 6 There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary
expense. Under the Civil Code:
ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and
to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by
renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of

the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the coownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro,
under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the
redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership
over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto in his name. 7But the provision does not give to the redeeming coowner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his name
terminate the existing co-ownership. While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said, liable to him
for reimbursement as and for their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to
the property owned in common. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. It
operates as a mere notice of existing title, that is, if there is one.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of the private respondents.
The Civil Code states:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is,
by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes.
We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the registration of the property.
The petitioner's pretension that he was the sole heir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial
settlement he executed preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a clear effort on his part to
defraud his brothers and sisters and to exercise sole dominion over the property. The aforequoted
provision therefore applies.
It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in taking over the property, did so either on
behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under Article
2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act
as trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, under the Article 1456. The evidence, of
course, points to the second alternative the petitioner having asserted claims of exclusive ownership
over the property and having acted in fraud of his co-heirs. He cannot therefore be said to have
assume the mere management of the property abandoned by his co-heirs, the situation Article 2144
of the Code contemplates. In any case, as the respondent Court itself affirms, the result would be
the same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable to the Private
respondents, his co-heirs.
This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that prescription bars any demand on
property (owned in common) held by another (co-owner) following the required number of years. In
that event, the party in possession acquires title to the property and the state of co-ownership is
ended . 8 In the case at bar, the property was registered in 1955 by the petitioner, solely in his name,
while the claim of the private respondents was presented in 1974. Has prescription then, set in?
We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must
have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to
certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is
clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, and (4)
he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
property for the period required by law. 9

The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites. We are not
convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership; on the contrary, he had deliberately kept the
private respondents in the dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He cannot
therefore be said to have "made known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one of the
private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a portion of the land up to the present, yet, the
petitioner has not taken pains to eject her therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought to recover
possession of that portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim, and only after the private
respondents had first sought judicial relief.
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, 10 but it has likewise
been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. 11 It is therefore no argument to
say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.
For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private respondents' claims commenced in 1974 over
the estate registered in 1955. While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten
years, 12 reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, 13 we, as we said, are not prepared to
count the period from such a date in this case. We note the petitioner's sub rosa efforts to get hold of the
property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of
extrajudicial settlement that he is "the only heir and child of his mother Feliza with the consequence that
he was able to secure title in his name also." 14 Accordingly, we hold that the right of the private
respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered the petitioner's act of
defraudation. 15 According to the respondent Court of Appeals, they "came to know [of it] apparently only
during the progress of the litigation." 16 Hence, prescription is not a bar.
Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer otherwise it is deemed waived, 17 and here, the petitioner never
raised that defense. 18 There are recognized exceptions to this rule, but the petitioner has not shown why
they apply.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision sought to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED,
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padil

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29727 December 14, 1988
PEDRO OLIVERAS, TEODORA GASPAR, MELECIO OLIVERAS and ANICETA MINOR, plaintiffsappellees,
vs.
CANDIDO LOPEZ, SEVERO LOPEZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ, EUGENIA LOPEZ, PRIMITIVO
GASPAR, CORAZON LOPEZ, ALEJANDRO CACAYURIN, FAUSTINA BOTUYAN, MODESTO
SALAZAR, ADORACION BOTUYAN, CLAUDIO GANOTICE and ENONG BOTUYAN, defendantsappellants.
Venancio B. Fernando for defendants-appellants.

FERNAN, C.J.:
This case exemplifies the Filipino custom of keeping inherited property in a prolonged juridical
condition of co-owner ship.
Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the Cadastral survey of Villasis, Pangasinan with an area of
69,687 square meters as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 15262. 1 In December, 1931,
Lorenzo Lopez died, 2 leaving said property to his wife, Tomasa Ramos and six (6) children. From that
time on, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not initiate any moves to legally partition the property.
More than twenty-one years later, or on February 11, 1953, Tomasa Ramos and her eldest son,
Candido Lopez, executed a deed of absolute sale of the "eastern undivided four thousand two
hundred and fifty seven-square meters (4,257) more or less, of the undivided portion of (their)
interests, rights and participation" over Lot 4685, in favor of the spouses Melecio Oliveras and
Aniceta Minor, in consideration of the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000). 3
On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed another deed of absolute sale of the "undivided"
four thousand two hundred and fifty-seven (4,257) square meters of the "eastern part" of Lot 4685 in
favor of the spouses Pedro Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar, also in consideration of P1,000. 4 Each of
the said documents bear the thumbmark of Tomasa and the signature of Candido.
In his affidavit also executed on February 11, 1953, Candido stated that a month prior to the
execution of the deed of sale in favor of Melecio Oliveras, he offered his: "undivided portion" of Lot
4685 to his "adjacent owners" but none of them was "in a position to purchase" said property. 5
Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale, the vendees, brothers Melecio and Pedro,
had been paying the real property taxes for their respectively purchased properties. 6 They also had
been in possession of their purchased properties which, being planted to palay and peanuts, were
segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 by dikes. 7

More than thirteen years later or on November 21, 1966, the counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote
the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez reminding them of the Oliverases' demands to partition the property so
that they could acquire their respective titles thereto without resorting to court action, and that,
should they fail to respond, he would be forced to file a case in court. 8 Apparently, the Lopezes did not
answer said letter since on December 15, 1966, the Oliveras brothers and their wives filed a complaint for
partition and damages 9 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.10
The Oliverases stated in their complaint that possession of the disputed properties was delivered to
them with the knowledge and consent of the defendants; that they had been paying the real estate
taxes thereon; that prior to the sale, said properties were offered to the other co-owners for sale but
they refused to buy them; that on February 18, 1953, the transactions were duly annotated and
entered in the Memorandum of encumbrances of OCT No. 15262 as adverse claims; and that their
desire to segregate the portions of Lot 4685 sold to them was frustrated by defendants' adamant
refusal to lend them the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 15262 and to execute a deed of partition of
the whole lot.
In claiming moral damages in the amount of P2,000.00 plaintiffs alleged that defendants also
refused to allow them to survey and segregate the portions bought by them. Plaintiffs prayed that the
court order the defendants to partition Lot 4685 and to allow them to survey and segregate the
portions they had purchased. They also demanded payment of P800.00 as attorney's fees and cost
of the suit.
In their answer, the defendants alleged that no sale ever transpired as the alleged vendors could not
have sold specific portions of the property; that plaintiffs' possession and occupation of specific
portions of the properties being illegal, they could not ripen into ownership; and that they were not
under any obligation to lend their copy of the certificate of title or to accede to plaintiffs' request for
the partition or settlement of the property. As special and affirmative defenses, the defendants
contended that the deeds of sale were null and void and hence, unenforceable against them; that
the complaint did not state a cause of action and that the cause or causes of action if any, had
prescribed.
Defendants averred in their counterclaim that despite repeated demands, plaintiffs refused and failed
to vacate the premises; that the properties occupied by the plaintiffs yielded an average net produce
in palay and peanuts in the amount of P1,600.00 annually, and that the complaint was filed to harass
them. They prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the payment of P1,600.00 per year from
1953 until plaintiffs shall have vacated the premises and P1,000.00 for attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs filed an answer to defendants' counterclaim, denying all the allegations therein and stating
that defendants never demanded that plaintiffs vacate the portions of Lot 4685 they had bought.
The lower court explored the possibility of an amicable settlement between the parties without
success. Hence, it set the case for trial and thereafter, it rendered a
decision 11 declaring valid the deeds of absolute sale 12 and ordering the defendants to allow the
segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685 by a licensed surveyor in order that the plaintiffs could obtain
their respective certificates of title over their portions of said lot.
In resolving the case, the lower court passed upon the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute
sale were what they purported to be or merely mortgage documents. It considered as indicia of
plaintiffs' absolute dominion over the portions sold to them their actual possession thereof without
any opposition from the defendants until the filing of the complaint, their payment of taxes thereon
and their having benefited from the produce of the land. The court ruled that the defendants'

testimonial evidence that the deeds in question were merely mortgage documents cannot overcome
the evidentiary value of the public instruments presented by the plaintiffs.
On the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were null and void considering that the land
subject thereof had not yet been partitioned, the court observed that the total area of 8,514 square
meters sold to plaintiffs by Candido was less than his share should Lot 4685 with an area of 69,687
square meters be divided among the six children of Lorenzo Lopez and their mother. In this
connection, the lower court also found that during his lifetime, and before Candido got married,
Lorenzo Lopez had divided Lot 4685 among his children who then took possession of their
respective shares. *
The defendants appealed said decision to this Court contending that the lower court erred in
declaring the two deeds of absolute sale as valid, in ordering the segregation of the sold portions of
Lot 4685 to enable the plaintiffs to obtain their respective certificates of title, and in not considering
their defense of prescription.
The extrinsic validity of the two deeds of absolute sale is not in issue in this case in view of the
finding of the trial court that the defendants admittedly do not question their due execution. 13 What
should pre-occupy the Court is the intrinsic validity of said deeds insofar as they pertain to sales of
designated portions of an undivided, co-owned property.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that before the partition of a land or thing held in
common, no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner
has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing. 14
However, the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not limitless. Under Article 494 and
1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years.
And, under the former article, any agreement to keep a thing or property undivided should be for a
ten-year period only. Where the parties stipulate a definite period of in division which exceeds the
maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void only as to the period beyond such
maximum. 15
Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in division of a property for more than twenty
years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period set by the
law. Otherwise, the 20-year limitation expressly mandated by the Civil Code would be rendered
meaningless.
In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-ownership for more than twenty
years. We hold that when Candido and his mother (who died before the filing of the complaint for
partition) sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they validly exercised dominion over them because, by
operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint for partition by the
Oliverases who, as vendees, are legally considered as subrogated to the rights of Candido over
portions of Lot 4685 in their possession, 16 merely served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's
otherwise accomplished act of terminating the co-ownership.
The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the complaint was filed thirteen years from the
execution of the deeds of sale and hence, as contended by the defendants-appellants, prescription
might have barred its filing under the general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the Civil Code, Article
494 specifically mandates that each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned. Hence, considering the validity of the conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor

and as subrogees of Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action for partition was timely and properly
filed. 17
We cannot write finis to this decision without commenting on the compliance with the resolution of
September 1, 1986 of counsel for defendants-appellants. In said resolution, the court required the
parties to move in the premises "considering the length of time that this case has remained pending
in this Court and to determine whether or not there might be supervening events which may render
the case moot and academic. 18 In his manifestation and motion dated August 12, 1987, said counsel
informed the Court that he had contacted the defendants-appellants whom he advised "to move in the
premises which is the land in question and to maintain the status quo with respect to their actual
possession thereon" and that he had left a copy of said resolution with the defendants-appellants" for their
guidance in the compliance of their obligations (sic) as specified in said
resolution." 19
Obviously, said counsel interpreted literally the Court's directive "to move in the premises." For the
enlightenment of said counsel and all others of similar perception, a "move in the premises"
resolution is not a license to occupy or enter the premises subject of litigation especially in cases
involving real property. A "move in the premises" resolution simply means what is stated therein: the
parties are obliged to inform the Court of developments pertinent to the case which may be of help to
the Court in its immediate disposition.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court insofar as it declares the validity of the two deeds of
sale and directs the partition of Lot 4685, is AFFIRMED. The lower court is hereby ordered to
facilitate with dispatch the preparation of a project of partition which it should thereafter approve.
This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46296 September 24, 1991
EPITACIO DELIMA, PACLANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA, VIRGILIO DELIMA, GALILEO DELIMA,
JR., BIBIANO BACUS, OLIMPIO BACUS and PURIFICACION BACUS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GALILEO DELIMA (deceased), substituted by his legal heirs,
namely: FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA, LILY D. ARIAS, HELEN NIADAS, ANTONIO DELIMA,
DIONISIO DELIMA, IRENEA DELIMA, ESTER DELIMA AND FELY DELIMA, respondents.
Gabriel J. Canete for petitioners.
Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial
court's judgment which declared as null and void the certificate of title in the name of respondents'
predecessor and which ordered the partition of the disputed lot among the parties as co-owners.
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the respondent appellate court and by the trial
court are as follows:
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in
Cebu by sale on installments from the government. Lino Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only
heirs three brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente
Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in question was issued on August 3, 1953 in
the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima.
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents, executed an affidavit of
"Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT
No. 3009 was issued on February 4,1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the
other heirs.
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon from
1954 to 1965.
On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial Court) an action for reconveyance
and/or partition of property and for the annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages against their
uncles Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was joined as party defendant by the
petitioners for his refusal to join the latter in their action.

On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion
of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the following are the declared
owners of Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate presently
covered by transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009, each sharing a pro-indiviso share of
one-fourth;
1) Vicente Delima (one-fourth)
2) Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely: Bibiano Bacus, Olimpio Bacus and Purificacion
Bacus (on-fourth);
3) Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely Epitacio, Pagano, Fidel, Virgilio and Galileo Jr., all
surnamed Delima (one-fourth); and
4) The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely Flaviana Vda. de Delima, Lily D. Arias, Helen
Niadas and Dionisio, Antonio, Eotu Irenea, and Fely, all surnamed Delima (onefourth).
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null and void and the Register of
Deeds of Cebu is ordered to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof another title
with the above heirs as pro-indiviso owners.
After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima since 1958, the heirs of Galileo
Delima are ordered to turn a over to the other heirs their respective shares of the
fruits of the lot in question computed at P170.00 per year up to the present time with
legal (interest).
Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the parties are ordered to petition
the lot in question and the defendants are directed to immediately turn over
possession of the shares here awarded to the respective heirs.
Defendants are condemned to pay the costs of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 54-55, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 19, 1977,
respondent appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and upheld the claim of Galileo Delima
that all the other brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had
already relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo
Delima) alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes
thereon (p. 26, Rollo).
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
1) In not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand partition of inheritance is
imprescriptible. If it does, the defenses of prescription and laches have already been
waived.

2) In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners.(p.13, Rollo)

The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not petitioners' action for partition is
already barred by the statutory period provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect
his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in
the disputed property. Article 494 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time,
not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new
agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty
years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or
co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be
held to benefit all. It is understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in possession of an
inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such
owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his coowners or co-heirs, is under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee (Bargayo v.
Camumot, 40 Phil, 857; Segura v. Segura, No. L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368).
Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the
actual possessor. In other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his coowners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Del Blanco v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694, December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 55).
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner
of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of
partition but of ownership (De Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Bargayo v. Camumot, supra; De los
Santos v. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811). In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition
can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the
property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order that such
possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation of the coownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been
made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive
(Valdez v. Olorga, No. L-22571, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71; Pangan v. Court of Appeals, No. L39299, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 375).
We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of partition and on
the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the

issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect
denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute of
limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of
the existence of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder (Castillo v. Court of Appeals, No. L18046, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 549). Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title
that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted
(Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31858, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 420).
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented by
Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo Delima and that on
February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in Ms name numbered TCT
No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear
repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by
Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As the
certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was
binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription. Hence, when
petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1968, such
action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly
asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this time.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 19, 1977 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA
MARIATEGUI,respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario
Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated December
24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del Rosario Mariategui,
et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro
Manila.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8).
During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia
Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria
del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children named Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and
left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named
Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had
three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and
Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still
unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described in the complaint
as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).

On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del
Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria,
Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot
No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act
No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus, on
April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently,
the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which
separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with
Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with
the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of
their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father
and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10).
Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the
complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although they
acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the parcels of land
as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on Appeal, p.
13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition of natural
children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in an order the
dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code
cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous application to this case. The
motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed
by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of
their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of children of their supposed
father. The evidence fails to sustain either premise, and it is clear that this action
cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court committed
an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco
(were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate children of their said
parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and
descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the
third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the
adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually acquired transfer
certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said

adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the
parties to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after
payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for
lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on December 7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred
private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether
or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their
successional rights over said estate. The resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the
resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased spouses
Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly
acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn, have continuously
enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the deceased Lupo
Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit
shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs
be declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful
shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is principally one
of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only
collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly
adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in
the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the
law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which
plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief
demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro
vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the
deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930.
This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that
"when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able
to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as
husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate
was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover,
the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no
divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules

of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA
502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135
SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following
rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation
of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs.
City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is
not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact
(Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. However,
considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided
under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events,
to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989).
Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children legitimate and
illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated
(Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate
is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts
contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private
respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents
required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the
same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as to
certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor details. The
nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the
private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that even
the trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana
Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay
pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are
legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in
Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does
not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the
heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the coownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the coownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156
SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs.
De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and
cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action
for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation
and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118
[1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the extrajudicial
partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in their own names
(Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice
of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of
repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when private respondents filed in
1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except the
unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful
shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the
petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in
spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who are
therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of
Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner
Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by their deceased father and
had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares.
As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No.
163 without any complaint from petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation
of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been
preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is
subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such
an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period
required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it
has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It
is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of

repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that
registration operates as a universal notice of title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription
can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the
petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely
may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant action
barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-45142 April 26, 1991

SIMPROSA VDA. DE ESPINA, RECAREDO ESPINA, TIMOTEO ESPINA, CELIA ESPINA,
GAUDIOSA ESPINA and NECIFORA ESPINA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. OTILIO ABAYA and SOFIA ESPINA and JOSE ESPINA, respondents.
Cipriano C. Alvizo, Sr. for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeking
the nullification of the orders issued by the respondent Judge Otilio Abaya, in his capacity as the
presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur, Branch II, Lianga, Surigao del Sur in
Civil Case No. L-108, entitled "Simprosa Vda. de Espina, et. al. v. Sofia Espina, et. al." dated May 9,
1975 dismissing the complaint for partition; July 25, 1975 denying the motion for reconsideration;
August 13, 1975 denying the second motion for reconsideration and March 15, 1976 denying
plaintiffs' notice of appeal.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Marcos Espina died on February 14, 1953 and was survived by his spouses, Simprosa Vda. de
Espina and their children namely, Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudiosa, Necifora, Sora and Jose, all
surnamed Espina. Decedent's estate comprises of four (4) parcels of land located at the Municipality
of Barobo Province of Surigao del Sur.
On August 23, 1973 an action for partition of the aforementioned parcels of land was filed by
petitioners Simprosa and her children Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudencia and Necifora.
The complaint alleges that parcel No. 1 is the exclusive property of the deceased, hence the same is
owned in common by petitioners and private respondents in eight (8) equal parts, while the other
three (3) parcels of land being conjugal properties, are also owned in common, one-half (1/2)
belongs to the widow Simprosa and the other half is owned by her and her children in eight (8) equal
parts.
It also alleges that parcel No. 1 has been subdivided into two lots. Lot No. 994 PL8-44 is covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 5570 in the name of one of the heirs, Sofia Espina, who acquired the
title as a trustee for the beneficiaries or heirs of Marcos Espina, while lot No. 1329 PCS-44 is
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3732 issued in the name of one of the heirs, Jose Espina

as trustee for the heirs of Marcos Espina. Said parcel of land is in the possession of petitioners and
private respondents who have their respective houses thereon.
Simprosa presently occupies parcel No. 2 while parcel No. 3 is occupied by Timoteo, although the
same is actually titled in the name of Sofia. Parcel No. 4 is occupied by Recaredo.
Petitioners have several times demanded the partition of the aforementioned properties, but
notwithstanding such demands private respondents refused to accede.
Private respondents alleged in their answer that in or about April, 1951, the late Marcos Espina and
his widow, Simprosa, together with their children made a temporary verbal division and assignment
of shares among their children. After the death of Marcos, the temporary division was finalized by the
heirs. Thereafter the heirs took immediate possession of their respective shares on April 20, 1952.
Private respondents took actual physical possession of their respective shares including the portions
ceded to them by Simprosa upon their payment of P50.00 each per quarter starting April, 1952 until
the latter's death pursuant to their contract of procession The assignment of shares was as follows:
(a) To the surviving spouses, (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina, herein plaintiffs, onehalf (1/2) of the parcel of land adjudicated to each of said plaintiffs-heirs and
defendants;
(b) To each of the following compulsory heirs, to wit:
1. To Recaredo (sic) Espina, one-half (1/2) portion which contains an area of one and
three-fourths (1 3/4) hectares and which forms part of Parcel 4 whose description is
given in paragraph III of the complaint, the said Parcel IV has been in the possession
of both Recaredo Espina and plaintiff Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April 20, 1952
until the present time;
2. To Timoteo Espina, one half (1/2) portion which contains an area of not less than
one-half (1/2) hectare and which forms part of Parcel 3 whose description is given in
paragraph III of the complaint, the said Parcel III was originally assigned by Marcos
Espina who thereupon obtained an Original Certificate of Title in her (sic) name but
was finally adjudicated to said Timoteo Espina in April, 1952, the other half (1/2)
portion of which parcel III was the share of the surviving spouses (sic), Simprosa
Vda. de Espina, and said Parcel III has been in the possession of said Timoteo
Espina and Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the present time as their
share;
3. To Cecilia (sic) Espina, Gaudiosa Espina and Necifora Espina, one-half (1/2)
portion, share and share alike which contains two (2) hectares and which forms part
of Parcel II whose description is given in paragraph III of the complaint, the other half
(1/2) of said Parcel III (sic) is the share of the surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda.
de Espina, and said Parcel III (sic) has been in the possession of said Cecilia. (sic)
Espina, Gaudiosa Espina and Necifora Espina and Simprosa Vda. de Espina from
April, 1952 until the present time;
4. To Sofia Espina, one-half (1/2) portion of the parcel of land included in the
deception of Parcel 1 in paragraph III of the complaint, the other half (1/2) of said
parcel being the share of the surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina and
having been ceded by said Simprosa Vda. de Espina to said Sofia Espina for a
valuable consideration payable quarterly at the rate of P50.00 beginning April, 1952

until her death, and said Sofia Espina has been regularly paying to said Simprosa
Vda. de Espina quarterly from April, 1952 the said amount of P50.00 until the present
time, and by virtue of said agreement, Sofia Espina obtained Original Certificate of
Title in her name of said parcel of land which is included in the description of said
parcel 1, as her exclusive property;
5. To Jose Espina, one-half (1/2) portion of the other parcel of land included in the
description of Parcel 1 in paragraph 1 of the complaint, the other half (1/2) of said
parcel being the share of the surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina and
having been coded (sic) by said Simprosa Vda. de Espina to said Jose Espina for a
valuable consideration payable quarterly at the rate of P50.00 beginning April, 1952
until her death, and said Jose Espina has been regularly quarterly paying to said
Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the present time, the said amount of
P50.00, and by virtue of said agreement, Jose Espina obtained Original Certificate of
Title in his name of said parcel of land which is included in the description of said
Parcel 1 as his exclusive property. (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
On February 13, 1974 private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging the
following grounds, to wit:
I
THAT THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT FAIL TO CONFER UPON THE
COURT COMPLETE AND LAWFUL JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITION SINE QUA NON CONCERNING SUIT
BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY.
xxx xxx xxx
II
THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY . . . . STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
xxx xxx xxx
III
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE, (Motion to Dismiss
Complaint, pp. 1-5;Rollo, pp. 34-38)
xxx xxx xxx
On May 9, 1975 the trial court granted the motion and thereafter dismissed the complaint. On May
23, 1975 petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the following grounds, to wit:
1. THAT THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL HAS NO LEGAL BASIS IN FACT AND IN
LAW.
2. THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT
BAR. (Rollo, p. 50)

However, petitioners' motion was denied in an order dated July 23, 1975. On August 11, 1975
petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration stressing that they were denied due process
when their motion was not heard. Again said motion was denied on August 13, 1975.
Thereafter, petitioners filed their notice of appeal on September 11, 1975 and a motion for extension
of time to file their Record on Appeal on September 18, 1975.
On March 15, 1976, the respondent judge disapproved petitioners' Record on Appeal and appeal
bond on the ground that the notice of appeal was filed out of time. Hence, this petition. The
petitioners raised four (,41) assignment of errors:
1. Whether or not an action for partition among co-heirs prescribes.
2. Whether or not an oral partition among co-heirs is valid.
3. Whether or not a hearing on a motion for reconsideration is indispensable the lack
of which is a deal of due process.
4. Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration is pro forma Rollo, p. 10)
Petitioners maintain that the present action is not for reconveyance but one for partition. Hence, the
rule insisted by the private respondents on prescriptibility of an action for reconcile conveyance of
real property based on an implied trust is not applicable in the case at bar. In addition, petitioners,
argue that private respondents cannot set up the defense of prescription or laches because their
possession of the property no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership. (Memorandum for
Petitioners, p. 7)
However, the private respondents stress that 'any supposed right of the petitioners to demand a new
division or partition of said estate of Marcos Espina has long been barred by the Statute of
Limitations and has long prescribed." (Memorandum for Private Respondents, p. 5)
The petitioners claim that the alleged oral partition is invalid and strictly under the coverage of the
statute of Frauds on two grounds, to wit:
Firstly, parcel No. 1 being an exclusive property of the deceased should have been divided into eight
(8) equal parts. Therefore, Simprosa . could only cede her share of the land which is 1/8 portion
thereof and cannot validly cede the shares of her then minor children without being duly appointed
as guardian.
Secondly, under Article 1358 of the New Civil Code, Simprosa could not have ceded her right and
that of her other children except by a public document. (Memorandum of Petitioners, pp. 8-9)
On the other hand, private respondents insist that the oral partition is valid and binding and does not
fall under the coverage of the Statute of Frauds.
Petitioners claim that they were denied due process when the motion for reconsideration was denied
without any hearing.
However, private respondents maintain that the hearing of a motion for reconsideration in oral
argument is a matter which rest upon the sound discretion of the Court.

Finally, petitioners stress that the second motion for reconsideration is not pro forma, thus, it
suspends the running of the period of appeal. Hence, the notice of appeal was timely filed.
On this point, private respondent maintain that the order of respondent judge dated March 1 5, 1976
disapproving petitioners' Record on Appeal and appeal bond may not properly be a subject of a
petition for certiorari. (Memorandum of Private Respondents, p. 13)
We find the petition devoid of merit.
We already ruled in Lebrilla, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 72623, December 18,
1989, 180 SCRA 188; 192) that an action for partition is imprescriptible. However, an action for
partition among co-heirs ceases to be such, and becomes one for title where the defendants allege
exclusive ownership.
In the case at bar, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition cannot be invoked because two of
the co-heirs, namely private respondents Sora and Jose Espina possessed the property as exclusive
owners and their possession for a period of twenty one (21) years is sufficient to acquire it by
prescription. Hence, from the moment these co-heirs claim that they are the absolute and exclusive
owners of the properties and deny the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer
one of partition but of ownership.
Anent the issue of oral partition, We sustain the validity of said partition. "An agreement of partition
may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in
common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of Frauds has no operation in this
kind of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance of property but simply a segregation and
designation of the part of the property which belong to the co-owners." (Tolentino, Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Edition, 182183 citing Hernandez v. Andal, et. al., G.R. No. L275, March 29, 1957)
Time and again, the Court stresses that the hearing of a motion for reconsideration in oral argument
is a matter which rests upon the sound discretion of the Court. Its refusal does not constitute a denial
of due process in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. (see Philippine Manufacturing
Co. v. Ang Bisig ng PMC et. al., 118 Phil. 431, 434)
The absence of a formal hearing on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration is thoroughly
explained in the order of the respondent judge dated August 13, 1975, which is hereunder quoted as
follows:
When the court issued its order of June 5, 1975 requiring counsel for defendants to
answer plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the court opted to resolve plaintiffs'
motion based on the pleadings of the parties, without further oral arguments. The
court considered the arguments of the parties stated in their pleadings as already
sufficient to apprise the court of the issues involved in said motion.
Plaintiffs' allegation that the Clerk of Court failed to calendar their motion for
reconsideration for oral argument has not deprived the plaintiffs of any substantial
right or his right to due process.
SO ORDERED. (Memorandum of Private Respondents, pp. 1213)

A cursory reading of the aforequoted order will show that there was indeed no formal hearing on the
motion for reconsideration. There is no question however, that the motion is grounded on the lack of
basis in fact and in law of the order of dismissal and the existence or lack of it is determined by a
reference to the facts alleged in the challenged pleading. The issue raised in the motion was fully
discussed therein and in the opposition thereto. Under such circumstances, oral argument on the
motion is reduced to an unnecessary ceremony and should be overlooked (see Ethel Case, et al. v.
Jugo, 77 Phil. 517, 522).
We adhere to the findings of the trial court that the second motion for reconsideration dated August
11, 1975 ispro forma, to it
The grounds stated in said motion being in reiteration of the same grounds alleged in
his first motion, the same is pro-forma. (Order dated March 15, 1976, p. 2, Rollo, p.
74)
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the second motion for reconsideration has not stated new grounds
considering that the alleged failure of the Clerk of Court to set plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration, although seemingly a different ground than those alleged in their
first motion for reconsideration, is only incidental to the issues raised in their first
motion for reconsideration, as it only refers to the right of plaintiffs' counsel to argue
his motion in court just to amplify the same grounds already deed by the court. (Ibid,
p. 3,Rollo, p. 75)
Therefore, it is very evident that the second motion for reconsideration being pro-forma did not
suspend the running of the period of appeal. Thus, the lower court committed no error when it held
that the notice of appeal was filed after the lapse of thirty five (35) days, which is clearly beyond the
period of thirty (30) days allowed by the rules.
Finally, it has been a basic rule that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal which had been lost.
(see Edra v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75041, November 13, 1989, 179 SCRA 344) A
special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or cure for failure to
file a timely petition for review oncertiorari (appeal) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Escudero v.
Dulay, G.R. No. 60578, February 23, 1988, 158 SCRA 69, 77)
The application of the abovecited rule should be relaxed where it is shown that it will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice. (Ibid, p. 77) However, as emphasized earlier, the case at
bar is totally devoid of merit, thus, the strict application of the said file will not in any way override
sub-substantial justice.
Therefore, the delay of five (5) days in filing a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a
record on appeal cannot be excused on the basis of equity.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the acts of respondent judge, in dismissing the
action for partition and in subsequently denying the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners,
does not amount to grave abuse of discretion.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-62251 July 29, 1985
IRENE TAC-AN-DANO, FELIPE G. TAC-AN, DIOSDADO G. TAC-AN and SOCORRO TAC-AN
GENOBATEN,petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALFONSO G. TAC-AN, respondents.
Felipe G. Tac-an for petitioners.
Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners herein seek to reverse the Decision of the then Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 63057R, as well as its Resolution which denied their Motion for Reconsideration, and to reinstate in toto the
Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, Oroquieta City, in Civil
Case No. 3092, for Recovery of Ownership of Coconut Trees and Damages filed by private respondent
against them.
Petitioners Irene Tac-an Dano, Felipe G. Tac-an, Diosdado G. Tac-an and Socorro Tac-an
Genobaten, and private respondent ALFONSO G. Tac-an, are brothers and sisters, children of the
deceased spouses Pio Tac-an and Luisa Guzman. Upon the demise of Pio Tac-an on March 12,
1948, his wife, Luisa, managed the entire estate, including an agricultural land of approximately 89
hectares at San Isidro, Misamis Occidental, until her death on April 18, 1971.
On September 28, 1971, intestate proceedings for the settlement of Luisa's estate were instituted by
petitioner Diosdado Tac-an before the Court of First instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 615. ALFONSO opposed the petition contending that one-half
of the new 6,159 coconut trees at the San Isidro property belonged to him in accordance with his
agreement with his late mother. Ultimately, on January 29, 1973, partition was ordered by the
intestate Court pursuant to a Compromise Agreement arrived at among the heirs. ALFONSO
claimed, however, that the partition was without prejudice to the prosecution of his claim in a
separate suit.
On January 31, 1975, ALFONSO filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership of Coconut Trees and
Damages against petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III,
Oroquieta City, docketed as Civil Case No. 3092, which he amended on April 3, 1975. He alleged
that sometime in 1944, upon the request of his late mother, and with the consent of petitioners, he
planted coconut trees on an agricultural land of their late father at San Isidro Seor Sinacaban,
Misamis Occidental, with an area of 89.7033 hectares: that part of the land was planted with sugar
cane which he gradually replaced with coconut trees, completing the work in 1957; that he and his
mother, during her lifetime, agreed, without objection from petitioners, that the coconut trees

including the fruits and produce thereof, would be equally divided between them; that their equal
sharing continued for fifteen (15) years; that upon the death of their mother, petitioner Diosdado Tacan filed in September 1971, Special Proceeding No. 615 with the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, Branch III, for the partition of the real and personal properties left by their parents, which
he opposed.
Petitioners, in their Answer, stated that ALFONSO's claim for improvements is barred by prior
judgment in Special Proceedings No. 615 rendered by the intestate Court on the basis of the
amicable compromise agreement entered into by the parties after concessions were given to
respondent for the settlement of said claim; that by virtue of said Decision, the land in San Isidro was
subdivided and adjudicated in equal shares among them; that the claim of respondent for one-half
() of the produce of the coconut trees was denied by the intestate Court in its Order of April 18,
1972, which had already became final; that the complaint states no cause of action; that the claim is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and is barred by the Statute of Limitations and/or
prescription.
On September 12, 1977, the trial Court, through Judge Mariano M. Florido, dismissed ALFONSO's
Complaint and rendered judgment, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for
lack of merit; and ordering the plaintiff, under the Counterclaim, to pay and deliver to
the defendants:
1. The amount of P21,000.00, representing the share of the defendants which the
plaintiff failed to give and deliver to the defendants from May, 1971 to September,
1971, with interest thereon at six (6) per cent per annum from the filing of defendants'
Counterclaim on July 3, 1975, until the amount is fully paid;
2. The forty (40) heads of cows representing the shares of the defendants in the
amicable settlement dated January 29, 1973 in Special Proc. No. 615, and the
additional forty (40) heads of cows representing the offsprings, which the cows of the
defendants would ordinarily have produced but which they failed to do so, to the
prejudice of the defendants, on account of the default of the plaintiff, or for a total of
eighty (80) heads of cows; or in case of failure of plaintiff to deliver the eighty (80)
heads of cows to the defendants, to pay to the defendants the amount of
P80,000.00, representing the value of the eighty (80) heads of cows at P1,000.00 per
head. plus interest thereon at six (6%) per cent per annum from the filing of
defendants' counterclaim on July 3, 1975, until fully paid;
3. The amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages;
4. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and in the further amount of
P5,000.00, as expenses of litigation; and
5. With costs against the plaintiff.
On appeal, the then Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the trial Court by allowing ALFONSO
to receive one-half of the produce of the coconut trees, reducing the number of cows, and
eliminating the award of damages and attorney's fees, as follows:

WHEREFORE, with the modifications that the plaintiff is entitled to receive one-half
(1/2) of the produce of coconuts in the land at San Isidro, Sinacaban, Misamis
Occidental to resume upon finality of this decision; that plaintiff should only return to
defendants 40 cows and if not possible the equivalent in value at the rate of P500.00
per head or a total of P20,000.00 with legal rate of interest at 6% from the filing of
defendants' counterclaim on July 3, 1975 until fully paid; the elimination of moral
damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects, without pronouncement as to costs in this
instance.
Before us now, petitioners, as defendants below, impugn the Decision of the Appellate Court
assigning to it the following errors:
I
The Court of Appeals committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not holding that the claim for improvements of
Alfonso Tac-an is barred by a prior final order in Special Proceeding No. 615 Res
Judicata.
II
The Court of Appeals committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction in not holding that the claim for improvements of
Alfonso Tac-an was likewise settled and adjudicated by the final decision embodying
the amicable compromise agreement of the parties for the partition of the estate in
Special Proceeding No. 615 Res Judicata.
III
The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it sanctioned the filing of this present independent civil action
relying mainly on the clarificatory orders (erroneously referred to by the Court of
Appeals as "decision") of Judge Melecio Genato which are contrary to the amicable
compromise agreement embodied and approved in the decision of Judge Mariano
Florido.
IV
The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in modifying the lower court decision by declaring that Alfonso Tac-an is
entitled to receive one-half () of the produce despite the fact that it emphatically
declared and held that no agreement existed between plaintiff and his mother.
V
Assuming arguendo that there was such agreement the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in enforcing it against petitioners.
VI

The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction in resolving the claim of Alfonso Tac-an by entitling him to one-half () of
the produce based on equity, justice and human considerations instead of applying
clear and specific provisions of law (positive laws).
VII
The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in applying laches and estoppel against defendants.
VIII
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not resolving the issue that this action is barred
by prescription relying on the illegal clarificatory orders of Judge Melecio Genato.
IX
The Court of Appeals likewise gravely erred in resolving the issue that this action is
barred by the Statute of Frauds also relying on the clarificatory orders of Judge
Genato.
X
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in modifying the decision of the lower Court by
ordering plaintiff to return to defendants only 40 heads of cows or if not possible the
equivalent in value at the rate of P500.00 per head or a total sum of P20,000.00
instead of the valuation of the trial Court.
XI
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in eliminating the award of P21,000.00
representing the share of petitioners which plaintiff failed to give or deliver for the
period from May 1971 to September 1971.
XII
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in deleting the award of moral damages,
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
On July 27, 1983, we denied the petition for lack of merit, and likewise denied on January 11, 1984,
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution. However, upon petitioners' Second Motion
for Reconsideration, we resolved to reconsider our Resolutions of July 27, 1983 and January 11,
1984 and gave due course to the Petition.
On res judicata and prescription
Petitioners contend that ALFONSO's suit for recovery of ownership of coconut trees is barred by
prior judgment in Special Proceedings No. 615. While it may be that the said intestate proceedings
did attain finality, it was subject to the clarificatory Order, dated April 24, 1973, issued by Judge
Melecio Genato reading:

The decision dated January 29, 1973, rendered by this Court based on the amicable
settlement of the heirs in this case is amended to be without prejudice to whatever
claim oppositor Alfonso Tac-an has over the improvements he had personally
introduced or caused to be introduced into the estate situated at Seor Sinacaban,
Misamis Occidental.
In his Order, dated June 19, 1973, resolving petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the same Judge
held that there was "no amendment" to the Decision dated January 29, 1973. 2
Those Orders were elevated on certiorari to this Court in G.R. No. L-37298 entitled Irene Tac-an
Dano, etc. vs. Hon. Melecio Genato, et al., which petition this Court dismissed for lack of merit on
February 12, 1974. 3
Premised on the foregoing, the defense of res judicata must fail and it has to be held that the right
was reserved to ALFONSO to pursue his claim for recovery of ownership of coconut trees.
Prescription can neither be invoked as against ALFONSO by reason of that reservation in his favor.
He filed suit two years after the Decision in the intestate proceedings had been rendered. Under
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, he had ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrued within
which to file suit upon a judgment.
On the Alleged Agreement
ALFONSO's complaint, filed in the trial Court, was completely based on an alleged oral agreement
between himself, as co- owner, and his mother as another co-owner, whereby he would be receiving
benefits from the mentioned coconut land more than he would be entitled to as co-owner. Both the
trial Court and the Appellate Court made the factual finding that the arrangement if at all, could have
referred only to the produce, with the difference that the former Court held that its effectivity ceased
after the mother's death and could not bind the other heirs; whereas the latter Court ruled that since
petitioners acquiesced in the arrangement during their mother's lifetime, they are now estopped from
asserting the contrary.
It is not disputed that the San Isidro property was the capital property of the father of the opposing
parties, and that Luisa, their mother, was not authorized by petitioners upon the death of their father,
to enter into contract with ALFONSO concerning the produce of their respective shares of said
property. It has been established, too, that the expenses incurred in planting coconut trees in said
land came from the common fund 4 and that concessions were given ALFONSO in the partition for his
work in converting the property into coconut land. So, whatever agreement the mother had with
ALFONSO regarding the produce of the coconut trees, could legally bind her share only, and chased
upon her death. Petitioners merely tolerated such sharing arrangement in deference to their mother's
commitment. This is shown by the fact that five months after her death, petitioners instituted the
proceedings for the partition of the estate of their deceased parents including the San Isidro property.
Accordingly, the doctrine of laches and estoppel as against petitioners cannot be successfully invoked.
Absent was any element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which another is misled
to his injury. 5
Moreover, the agreement between mother and son must be deemed superseded, for, on September
29, 1953, even during the lifetime of the mother, Original Certificate of Title No. 28 (Lot No. 1) in the
name of the deceased father, was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. RT-121 issued in the names
of "Felipe Tac-An Irene Tac-an, Alfonso Tac-an, Catalina Tac-an, Diosdado Tac-an, Socorro Tac-an
and Luisa Guzman, in pro indiviso share of one- seventh (1/7) each", the last named being the
surviving spouse (Exhibit "12"). It will be seen, therefore, that, after 1953, it was expressly made of

record that ALFONSO, his mother, and five (5) siblings (Catalina has since passed away) were coowners in equal shares. If, in fact, ALFONSO, had an agreement as to ownership of the trees and
produce with his mother, that was the time for him to have insisted on a lien to be specifically
included in the title. His mother, too, would have been in a position to confirm or deny the existence
of the agreement.
Additionally, as petitioners contend, to give ALFONSO the right to receive one-half () of the
produce of coconuts, as respondent Court did, would be to perpetuate a state of co-ownership,
contrary to Article 494 of the Civil Code, which limits co-ownership to a period of ten (10) years or at
most twenty (20) years.
On the Partition
It follows that ALFONSO's claim for recovery of ownership of the coconut trees and of the produce
thereof must fail. He should only be entitled to the share alloted to him in the "share raffle" embodied
in their compromise agreement and approved by the Court in Special Proceeding No. 615, dated
January 29, 1973, as follows:
5. The share raffle was conducted with respect to the "Coconut Lands" mentioned on
page 3 of the said partition proposal and the following result was registered:
1. Lot 1 was drawn in favor of Mrs. Socorro Tac-an Genobatan; Lot 2 was drawn in
favor of Mrs. Irene Tac-an Dano; Lot 3 was drawn in favor of oppositor Alfonso Tacan; Lot 4 was drawn in favor of Atty. Felipe Tac-an, and Lot 5 was drawn in favor of
Diosdado Tac-an.
xxx xxx xxx
7. ... The administrator of the estate is hereby ordered to make a tentative partition of
the coconut land located at Seor Sinacaban into five (5) shares based not only on
the area, but also on the value of the improvements thereon within a period of ten
(10) days from today, and that the heirs hereby agree to draw another raffle in order
to determine the share that would correspond to them in the drawing of lots, except
the share of Alfonso Tac-an, the oppositor, which is agreed by the heirs to be that
area where his house is standing and that the farm house be adjudicated to
him. 6 (Emphasis ours)
The sharing in the Compromise Agreement submitted before the intestate Court with respect to the
partition of the cows should also be maintained. The Courts, as a rule may not impose upon the
parties a judgment different from their Compromise Agreement. 7 The pertinent sharing agreement
reads:
7. With respect to the number of cows, as of today, there are seventy-one (71) heads
of cows. It has been agreed by the parties and their counsel that Alfonso Tac-an will
get 3/7 of this number or of whatever number of cows there are belonging to the
estate, and the remainder 4/7 of the cows shall be divided equally by the four (4)
remaining heirs which would give them the equivalent of 1/7 share of the said cows.
If actually the number of cows as counted by the administrator is only 71, let it be
divided in accordance with the agreement of the parties and the remaining one head
of cow be turned over to the administrator for evaluation and the administrator may
sell it and distribute the actual proceeds among the heirs. ... 8

Consonant, therefore, with our finding that ALFONSO is not entitled to one-half () of the produce of
the San Isidro property, he should give to petitioners, as ruled by the trial court, their share which he
failed to deliver from May 1971 to September 1971, or the amount of P21,000.00 plus interest
thereon at six (6) per cent per annum from the filing of petitioners' counterclaim on July 3, 1975, until
the amount is fully paid.
As to the award of damages, there being no evidence of fraud and bad faith committed by
ALFONSO, the elimination by respondent Appellate Court of the award of moral damages, attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation to petitioners should be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment under review, this court RESOLVES:
1] The elimination of the award of moral damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to
petitioners is hereby AFFIRMED.
2] The award in favor of private respondent, Alfonso G. Tac-an, of one-half of the produce of the
coconut trees from the coconut lands situated at San Isidro Seor Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental, is
hereby SET ASIDE;
3] Private respondent, Alfonso G. Tac-an, is hereby ordered to pay to petitioners the amount of
P21,000.00 representing the latter's share in the produce of the coconuts from May 1971 to
September 1971 with six (6) per cent interest thereon per annum from the filing of the counterclaim
on July 3, 1975 until the amount is fully paid; and
4] The parties are enjoined to abide by the terms of their Compromise Agreement in the partition of
the heads of cattle.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 57092 January 21, 1993

EDGARDO DE JESUS, REMEDIOS DE JESUS, JUANITO DE JESUS, JULIANA DE JESUS,
JOSE DE JESUS, FLORDELIZA DE JESUS, REYNALDO DE JESUS, ERNESTO DE JESUS,
PRISCILO DE JESUS, CORAZON DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PRIMITIVA FELIPE DE JESUS, respondents.
Jose B. Soriano for petitioners.
Jose A. Aguiling and Paquito C. Ochoa for private respondent.

MELO, J.:
This has reference to a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 59613 (December 24, 1980, Sison, P.V., Cenzon. Asuncion [P], JJ)
which reversed the decision dated September 7, 1975 of the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
In consequence, the appellate court dismissed herein petitioners' complaint and declared private
respondent Primitive Felipe de Jesus to be the absolute owner entitled to the possession of the land
in question to the exclusion of petitioners.
The property in dispute is a parcel of residential land situated in Dampol 2nd, Pulilan, Bulacan,
bounded on the North by a Vereda: on the South, by the Provincial Road; on the East, by Catalino
Tayag (Tayao); on the West, by Macario de Leon, containing an area of 2565 square meters (Brief
for the Petitioners, p. 3), and covered by Tax Declaration No. 2383 of the Office of the Provincial
Assessor of Bulacan, in the name of Victoriano Felipe (Exh. "5-C").
Respondent appellate court found the above-described parcel of land to be the same parcel of land
which was
. . . the subject of the Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli (Exh. 1) executed on
November 25, 1932, by Emilia Camacho (surviving widow of Catalino Esguerra),
Jose C. Esguerra and Socorro Esguerra, conveying or selling this land to the
spouses, Victoriano Felipe and Guillerma de la Cruz, with right to repurchase the
same within a period of five years, but that the vendors-a-retro failed to repurchase
the land. The vendors-a-retro were the heirs of the deceased Catalino Esguerra.
Since the date of the sale the spouses Victoriano Felipe and Guillerma de la Cruz,
possessed and lived on this land. The appellant [herein private respondent] was
living with her parents on the land, and upon their deaths, she continued to live on
and possess the same. (pp. 33-34, Rollo.)

On November 29, 1961 private respondent executed a sworn statement declaring herself the only
heir of the deceased Victoriano Felipe and adjudicating to herself the ownership of the land in
question (Exh. "4").
More than twelve years later or on April 27, 1973, petitioners herein filed in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, an action for recovery of ownership and possession and quieting of title to the
abovementioned piece of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 2383, alleging among others: "that
their grandfather, Santiago de Jesus during his lifetime owned the residential lot; that Santiago de
Jesus died before the outbreak of World War II, leaving three (3) sons, namely: Mariano, Exequiel,
and Jose, all surnamed de Jesus; that Mariano de Jesus died on September 3, 1956 leaving eight
(8) surviving children, namely: Edgardo, Remedios, Juanita, Juliano, Jose, Flordeliza, Reynaldo, and
Ernesto, all surnamed de Jesus and all of them plaintiffs; that Exequiel de Jesus died on April 3,
1948, survived by two (2) children Priscilo and Corazon, both surnamed de Jesus, also plaintiffs
in this case; while Jose de Jesus died before the outbreak of World War II without any issue . . . "(p.
35, Record on Appeal).
The trial court found for the plaintiffs, petitioners herein. The dispositive portion of the decision dated
September 7, 1975 reads:
FOR ALL OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) Declaring the plaintiffs as having the better right to ownership and possession of
the residential lot in question by virtue of hereditary succession;
(2) Ordering the defendant to surrender the ownership and possession of the said
property to the herein plaintiffs;
(3) Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 for and as
attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 56-57, Record, on Appeal.)
As earlier intimated, on appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the trial court in a
decision promulgated on December 24, 1980
(pp. 32-38, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, finding serious errors to have
been committed by the trial court in its judgment, the same is hereby set aside and
another one entered, dismissing the complaint, and declaring the appellant to be the
absolute owner, and entitled to the possession of this land in question, to the
exclusion of plaintiffs-appellees. (p. 38, Rollo.)
Thus, the instant petition for review on certiorari which was filed with this Court on August 13, 1981
(p. 9, Rollo) with the following assigned errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT WHICH AWARDED THE RESIDENTIAL LOT IN QUESTION TO THE
PETITIONERS BY VIRTUE OF HEREDITARY SUCCESSION AND ORDERED THE

PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO SURRENDER THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION

OF THE SAME TO THEM.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LAND DESCRIBED IN
THE PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT IS THE SAME LAND WHICH IS THE SUBJECT
OF THE SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE (Exh. 1) EXECUTED ON
NOVEMBER 5, 1932 BY THE ESGUERRAS IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
TO BE THE ABSOLUTE OWNER AND ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION OF THE
LAND IN QUESTION TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONERS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THIS LAND WAS
PURCHASED BY THE PARENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FROM THE
HEIRS OF THE LATE CATALINO ESGUERRA ON NOVEMBER 5, 1932 AND THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND HER PARENTS HAD BEEN IN OPEN,
CONTINUOUS, ADVERSE, PUBLIC AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE
SAME SINCE 1932 UP TO THE PRESENT, IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER.
In effect, the sole issue in this petition boils down to this question: Who has the right to the
ownership and possession of the residential lot subject matter of the case, petitioners by virtue of
hereditary succession, or private respondent who claims ownership through purchase of the property
by her parents?
According to the trial court, petitioners have the better right but according to the appellate court, the
property rightly belongs to private respondent. In view of the fact that the findings of the trial court
and the appellate court are contrary to each other, this Court shall exercise its authority of reviewing
the evidence in order to arrive at the correct facts based on the record (Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 117 SCRA 346 [1982]; Quality Tobacco Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 187
SCRA 210 [1990]; Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 1 [1990]; Shauf vs. Court of Appeals,
191 SCRA 713 [1990] ; Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 645 [1991).
It is not disputed that petitioners are the heirs of their late grandfather, Santiago de Jesus; what is in
dispute is their claim that the residential lot in question belonged to their grandfather and therefore
theirs by hereditary succession (Brief for the Respondent, pp. 8-9). Neither is it contradicted that
Santiago de Jesus was married to Maria Reyes, a widow with three children by a prior marriage,
namely: Basilio, Violeta, and Guillerma, the last having been the mother of herein private respondent
(tsn, August 15, 1974, pp. 14-15; September 16, 1974, pp. 14-15, 39-41).
The only documentary evidence of Santiago de Jesus' alleged ownership of the residential lot in
question is Tax Declaration No. 2384 (Exh. "A") in the name of Victoriano Felipe. Therein, Felipe
claimed ownership for tax purposes of a house of mixed materials and a nipa roof, valued at
P190.00 and constructed on the lot or "solar" belonging to Santiago de Jesus. The statement therein
regarding Santiago de Jesus' ownership of the lot is supported by the testimony of petitioners

Edgardo de Jesus and Corazon de Jesus-Masiglat, and three other witnesses. They asserted
personal knowledge of said fact which, they swore, was also common knowledge in Dampol 2nd,
Pulilan, Bulacan (tsn, August 15, 1974, p. 16; September 16, 1974, pp. 18, 39). As a child, for
instance, witness Antonio Roxas was frequently in the house of his aunt, Maria Reyes, a sister of his
mother. When his aunt was still alive, she told him and his mother, in the presence of Victoriano
Felipe, that she had no right at all over the property, including the old house, as it really belonged to
Santiago de Jesus (tsn, September 16, 1974, pp. 39, 46-49).
On the other hand, private respondent presented a contract of sale with right of repurchase,
"Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" (Exh. "1"), entered into in 1932 between her parents, Victoriano
Felipe and Guillerma de la Cruz, and the vendors-a-retro Emilia Camacho, Socorro Esguerra, and
Jose Esguerra; a "Sinumpaang Salaysay"; or an affidavit of adjudication which private respondent
executed in 1961 (Exh. "4"); and tax declarations and official receipts.
On the evidentiary value of these documents, it should be recalled that the notarization of a private
document converts it into a public one and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity (Joson vs. Baltazar, 194 SCRA 114 [1991]). This is so because a public document duly
executed and entered in the proper registry is presumed to be Valid and genuine until the contrary is
shown by clear and convincing proof (Asido vs. Guzman, 37 Phil. 652 [1918]; U.S. vs. Enriquez, 1
Phil. 241 [1902]; Favor vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 308 [1991]). As such, the party challenging
the recital of the document must prove his claim with clear and convincing evidence (Diaz vs. Court
of Appeals, 145 SCRA 346 [1986]).
There is no doubt that the pacto de retro deed of sale has assumed the character of a public
document, having been notarized by then Justice of the Peace Francisco Makapugay, Jr. in his
capacity as Notary Public Ex-Oficio. Hence, it is presumed valid and authentic until proven
otherwise. Petitioners, however, challenge this presumption of validity and authenticity. They contend
that private respondent's non-production of Tax Declaration No. 5096, specifically mentioned in Exh.
"1" as containing the description of the piece of land subject of the "Kasulatang-Biling-MabibilingMuli" shattered such presumption and rendered suspect the latter document (Brief for the
Petitioners, pp. 9, 19-22).
While both Socorro Olarte, a signatory to the "Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" as one of the
vendors-a-retro, and private respondent testified that the land subject of the sale was covered by Tax
Declaration No. 5096 in the name of the original owner Catalino Esguerra (tsn, October 21, 1974, p.
6 and December 18, 1974, pp. 3-5), they could not produce a copy of said tax declaration.
Capitalizing on said omission, petitioners presented a certified true copy of said Tax Declaration No.
5096 (Exh. "G") covering the year 1948 and which, however, concerns a piece of lot owned by a
certain Teodoro Sinson. Further, petitioners also produced certified true copies of Tax Declarations
Nos. 2214 (Exh. "H"), 2215 (Exh "I") and 2216 (Exh. "J"), all in the name of Catalino Esguerra as
owner, and all for the year 1967.
Pablo H. Domingo, Senior Deputy Assessor, who was subpoenaed to present in court Tax
Declaration No. 5096 in the name of Catalino Esguerra identified the above-mentioned certified true
copies of tax declarations as having been issued by the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan
(tsn, March 12, 1975, pp. 13-14). However, he said he could not bring with him a copy of Tax
Declaration No. 5096 in the name of Catalino Esguerra as the records of the Office of the Provincial
Assessor only started with the year 1948 because the old Assessor's Office was burned down during
the early part of the liberation (Transcript, March 12, 1975, pp. 5-6, 12).
It is significant to note that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 5096 (Exh. "G") described
therein as bamboo land, was previously covered by Tax Declaration No. 233 for the same owner,

while Tax Declaration No. 2383 (Exh. "5-C") beginning with the year 1948 and covering the
residential lot in question declared in the name of Victoriano Felipe, cancelled Tax Declaration No.
5326 (Exh. "5-C-1"). An uncertified copy of said Tax Declaration No. 5326 for Victoriano Felipe
purporting to commence with the year 1939 allegedly superseded Tax Declaration No. 252 in the
name of Catalino Esguerra
(Exh. "3").
In other words, the piece of residential lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 2383 (Exh. "5"), or by Tax
Declaration No. 252 (Exh. "3") at around the time of the alleged sale, until superseded by Tax
Declaration No. 5326 (Exh. "5-C-1") beginning with the year 1939, is not the piece of land covered
by Tax Declaration No. 5096 specifically referred to in Exh. "1" as the subject of the "KasulatangBiling-Mabibiling-Muli". Thus, the fact that Guillerma de la Cruz, mother of private respondent, made
real property tax payments purportedly on Tax Declaration No. 5096 for the years 1935 (Exh. "2-d"
and "2-e") and 1936 (Exh. "2-b") and probably for the years 1933, 1934, 1937 and 1938, in the name
of Catalino Esguerra neither alters the fact that the piece of land covered by Tax Declaration No.
2383 (Exh. "5") is not the subject of the "Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" (Exh. "1") nor
demonstrates that the payments were made for the residential lot under litigation.
It is, therefore, evident that Tax Declaration No. 5096 was inexistent at the time of the alleged sale.
By a simply analysis of the different tax declarations presented as evidence in this case, it is likewise
clear that when by virtue of the alleged sale, a new tax declaration numbered 5326, was made in
1938 in the name of Victoriano Felipe (Exh. "5-C-1"), what was cancelled was Tax Declaration No.
252 (Exh. "3"), not Tax Declaration No. 5096 which supposedly covered the property subject of the
"Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli". It should be noted that the property under Tax Declaration No.
5326 bears an identical description to the property under litigation. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is
that, without any legal basis, Victoriano Felipe had declared himself the owner of the disputed
property for tax purposes. Tax Declaration No. 5326 thereafter became the basis for Tax Declaration
No. 2383 in 1948 (Exh. "5-C") until it was cancelled and new tax declarations were made in the
name of private respondent, viz., Tax Declaration No. 9453 in 1962 (Exh. "5-b"), then Tax
Declaration No. 2657 in 1967 (Exh. "5") and finally Tax Declaration No. 2962 in 1974 (Exh. "5-A").
As earlier stated, Guillerma de la Cruz had also been paying real property tax on the house
described as located in Dampol 2nd in the name of Victoriano Felipe under Tax Declaration No.
14984 since 1933 (Exh. "2-C"), and then under Tax Declaration No. 3975 since 1941 (Exh. "2-4")
until 1947, and under Tax Declaration No. 2384 in 1948. By a twist of fate, however, Tax Declaration
No. 2384 describes the house, among others, as located in the residential lot belonging to Santiago
de Jesus or "solar de Santiago de Jesus" (Exh. "A-1"). While real property tax continued to be paid
under the latter declaration until 1958 (Exh. "2-y"), by stating in said tax declaration that his house
was located in the land of Santiago de Jesus. Victoriano Felipe recognized and admitted the
ownership of Santiago de Jesus over the residential lot involved herein. Such admission puts to
naught the claim of private respondent for when one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration or omission of the latter in relation to the property is evidence against the former (Rolleza
vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 354 (1989]).
The authenticity of the signature of Victoriano Felipe in the deed of sale with right to repurchase is
also in question. Both Moises de Jesus and Antonio Roxas testified that Victoriano Felipe could not
even vote as he did not know how to read and write (tsn, September 16, 1974, pp. 30, 42). Although
Socorro Esguerra Olarte identified the signature of Victoriano Felipe on the "Kasulatang-BilingMabibiling-Muli" as his (tsn, October 21, 1974, p. 13), she also testified that Victoriano Felipe has a
brother who looked exactly like Victoriano (tsn, October 21, 1974, p. 36). On the issue, all that
private respondent could say was that her father studied the cartilla (tsn, January 24, 1975, p. 8).

Under the circumstances, there is strong, convincing, and conclusive proof of the nullity and falsity of
Exhibit "1". Its evidentiary nature cannot, therefore, be sustained (Legaspi vs. Court of Appeals, 142
SCRA 82 [1986]). Even if the document were to be considered simply as a private document, it
would still need evidence of its due execution and authenticity even if it is already more than 30
years old as it cannot be considered unblemished by any circumstance of suspicion (Heirs of
Demetria Lacsa vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 234 [1991]).
Consequently, the affidavit of adjudication executed by private respondent on May 21, 1961 (Exh.
"4"), has no evidentiary value as it has become baseless. Furthermore, private respondent falsely
stated therein that she is the only heir of Victoriano Felipe for, at the time of its execution, her
mother, Guillerma de la Cruz, was still living. Guillerma de la Cruz died on April 23, 1964 (Exh. "B"),
three years after the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (Exh. "4") was executed. Moreover, the tax receipts
and declarations of ownership for tax purposes upon which private respondent basically anchors her
claim, are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership; they only become evidence of ownership
acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property (Tabuena
vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650 [1991]; Rojas vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 709 [1992]).
On the issue of ownership by acquisitive prescription, private respondent contends: "Granting that it
was formerly owned by their late grandfather, they (petitioners) have lost whatever right they may
have over the land by extinctive prescription" for the reason that she, private respondent has
acquired the same by acquisitive prescription (Brief for the Respondents, p. 9), citing Section 41 of
the old Code of Civil Procedure which states:
Sec. 41. Title to Land by Prescription. Ten years of actual adverse possession by
any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land,
uninterruptedly, continuously for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or
otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued,
shall vest in every actual possessor of such land, a full and complete title . . . .
Corazon de Jesus Masiglat testified that from 1930 to 1952, the period of time she was living in the
house her grandfather erected on the contested property, her grandmother, Victoriano Felipe,
Guillerma de la Cruz, and private respondent also lived there (tsn, July 16, 1974, p. 23). She was
corroborated by petitioner Edgardo de Jesus who also testified that in 1932 up to the time of his
death in 1948, Exequiel de Jesus was taking charge of the property and that while the parents of
private respondent were the ones paying the real property taxes the money therefor came from
Exequiel (tsn, July 16, 1974, pp. 11-14). Witness Salvador Esguerra testified that Victoriano Felipe
began to reside in the house when he married Guillerma de la Cruz and that Corazon and her father,
Exequiel, also resided there after the death of Santiago de Jesus (tsn, August 15, 1974, pp. 14, 21,
22). Moises de Jesus, for his part, testified that while Victoriano Felipe started staying in the property
only when the children of Santiago de Jesus had died, Corazon de Jesus continued to reside there
(tsn, September 16, 1974, p. 27).
In her own defense private respondent first testified that Corazon de Jesus never lived with them
and that Exequiel de Jesus never went to their place (tsn., October 11, 1974, pp. 35-36). She did not
contradict, however, the testimony of Edgardo de Jesus on rebuttal that he himself at the age of 12
used to stay in the house and was witness to the occasion when Corazon fell in a ditch going
towards their place, that as a result of such accident, Corazon sustained a permanent deformity on
one hand; and that Corazon left the place only in 1952 when she got married (tsn, April 23, 1975, pp.
23-24). Neither did private respondent or her witnesses traverse the testimony of Corazon de
Jesus-Masiglat, also on rebuttal, that since childhood she had been residing in the house owned by
her grandfather Santiago de Jesus, together with private respondent and the latter's parents, and
actually left the place only in 1952: that her parents as well as her child died in that house; and that

private respondent was, in fact, the one who caused the registration of her child's death (tsn, April
23, 1975, p. 25). Even Socorro Esguerra Olarte, witness for private respondent, testified that she
remembers Exequiel de Jesus as he was always around whenever she visited the place and he was
the one who got santol fruits for her sometimes (tsn, September 23, 1974, p. 17).
It thus appears that Victoriano Felipe was residing in the house of Santiago de Jesus simply
because he was married to Guillerma de la Cruz, daughter of Maria Reyes by a first marriage, who,
obviously, was living with her mother who had taken Santiago de Jesus for her second husband. In
effect, their possession of the contested lot was neither exclusive nor in the concept of owner.
Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under a claim of
title or it must be adverse or in the concept of owner or concepto de dueo(Ordoez vs. Court of
Appeals, 188 SCRA 109 [1990]; Coronado vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 814 [1990]; Manila
Electric Company vs. Intermediate Appelate Court, 174 SCRA 313 [1989]).
In this case, Victoriano Felipe and his family were residing in the land by mere tolerance. There is no
way of knowing how the house on the lot was described in Tax Declaration Nos. 14984 and 3975,
but, to repeat, in Tax Declaration No. 2384 which commenced with the year 1948 (Exh. "A"), the
house was described as constructed on the lot or solar of Santiago de Jesus up to the year 1961
when private respondent was still paying property tax (Exh.
"2-x").
Significantly, the "Kasulatang-Biling-Mabibiling-Muli" was not even given to private respondent by her
parents; she admitted having found it in the house although they mentioned its existence to her
when they were still alive (tsn, December 18, 1974, pp. 18-19). Under the circumstances, the
prescriptive period cannot be considered to have accrued during the lifetime of Victoriano Felipe.
It is interesting to note that when private respondent executed her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (Exh. "4")
adjudicating the disputed lot to herself on the basis of the contract of sale as no repurchase had
been made by the vendors of retro, Exequiel de Jesus was already dead and Corazon de JesusMasiglat was no longer residing in the property in question. As she was in possession of the
property, private respondent then had it declared in her name for real property tax purposes under
Tax Declaration No. 9453 (Exh. "5-b") thereby cancelling Tax Declaration No. 2383 (Exh. "5-b-1")
which was in the name of Victoriano Felipe.
As to Tax Declaration No. 2384, the last vestige of Santiago de Jesus' ownership of the property in
question, there is no evidence on record as to whether private respondent had it cancelled, had a
new declaration made on the property in her name, or whether she continued paying tax after her
payment for the year 1961. It was established, however, through the testimony of Salvador
Esguerra, that the old house was demolished and a new bungalow was constructed on the lot (tsn,
August 15, 1974, pp. 23-24).
To create a fundamental basis for her claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription, private
respondent mortgaged the questioned property to the Rural Bank of Pulilan (Exh. "5-b") not as a
mere possessor but as an owner thereof. She also registered both the mortgage and the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" (tsn, December 18, 1974, p. 23). However, she never attempted to obtain a
certificate of title over the property. This omission indicates, to say the least, that private respondent
realizes her lack of any lawful claim of ownership over the property for while registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership, it is evidence of such title over the particular property (Avila v. Tapucar,
201 SCRA 148 [1991]).
Private respondent's pretensions to acquisitive prescription may not succeed even under Act No.
190, the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Section 41 thereof, good faith and just title are not required

for purposes of acquisitive prescription; adverse possession in either character ripens into ownership
after the lapse of ten years (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 619 [1979]; Quilisado vs, Court of
Appeals, 182 SCRA 401 [1990]; Ongsiaco vs. Dallo, 27 SCRA 161 [1969]; Miraflor vs. Court of
Appeals, 142 SCRA 18 [1986]). The just title required for acquisitive prescription to set in is not "titulo
verdadero y valido" such title which by itself is sufficient to transfer ownership without the
necessity of letting the prescriptive period elapse, but only "titulo
colorado" or such title where, although there was a mode of transferring ownership, still
something is wrong because the grantor is not the owner (Doliendo vs. Biannesa, 7 Phil. 232 [1906]
cited in Solis vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 678 [1989]), and incidentally, it may perhaps be
mentioned that prescription running even after the effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30,
1950, continued to be governed by Section 41 of the Old Civil Code (Solis vs. Court of
Appeals, supra).
Under the present Civil Code, the prescriptive period required for acquisition of immovable property
is ten years if the possession is in good faith, and thirty years if in bad faith (South City Homes, Inc.
vs. Republic, 185 SCRA 693 [1990]). Such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of
the disputed property for thirty years must be conclusively established (San Miguel Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 722 [1990]).
Reckoned from the time she executed the affidavit of adjudication in 1961, eleven years after the
New Civil Code had taken effect, private respondent's possession of the contested lot is far too short
of the prescriptive period of thirty years considering that her possession is in bad faith. The filing of
the petition for recovery of ownership and possession and quieting of title by petitioners on April 27,
1973 was well below the acquisitive prescriptive period for private respondent, which is thirty years
under Article 1141 of the present Civil Code. In this case, the statutory period of prescription is
deemed to have commenced when petitioners were made aware of a claim adverse to them
(Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 270 [1987]), that is, when the affidavit of
adjudication was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds which, at the earliest may be considered
to be in 1974, when private respondent was able to secure a tax declaration in her name.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby SET ASIDE and the
decision of the trial court, dated September 7, 1975, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 77976 November 24, 1988
MAXIMO GABRITO, ROGER LIBUT, CARMELITA UY, LIZA DE VERA, thru her Attorney-in-Fact,
JESUS DE LOS SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NINTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. NICIAS O. MENDOZA, Presiding
Judge Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, ET AL., respondents.
Cornelio C. Cardenas and Valeriano S. Peralta for petitioners.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary injunction and restraining order of the
decision of the Court of Appeals * dated March 4, 1987 in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 08710, "Maximo Gabrito et al. vs. Hon. Nicias O.
Mendoza and Roberto Tan et al.," affirming the April 2, 1986 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City ** which also affirmed the
decision of MTCC, Branch V, Olongapo City, and the Resolution of respondent court dated March 30, 1987 denying herein petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.

The appeal originated as an unlawful detainer complaint filed by herein private respondents with the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch V, Olongapo City.
The antecedent facts as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
The spouses Roberto Tan and Benita Ching-Tan filed a complaint in the Municipal
Trial Court against defendants Maximo Gabrito, et al., alleging that they are the
possessors and legal owners of the property situated at No. 107 Gordon Ave., New
Kalalake, Olongapo City as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 4-2046. The
defendants are leasing portions of this parcel of land, each paying the corresponding
monthly rentals due thereon.
On the leased portion, the defendants constructed buildings and have allowed other
persons to sublease the same for commercial purposes.
As the spouses Tan have no other property where they could construct their
residential house, the spouses Tan notified the defendants (in January 1984) that
they intend to personally use the land to build their house thereon and gave
defendants three (3) months to vacate the premises and remove the structures and
improvements which defendants had constructed thereon.

In April 1984, defendants requested for an extension of time within which to vacate,
which was granted by the spouses Tan. However, from that time on, defendants also
stopped paying monthly rentals due on the land they leased.
In view of this, in July 1984, defendants were told to leave the premises and to pay
rentals in arrears. As defendants refused to comply with both demands, the matter
was brought to the Barangay Council for settlement. As no agreement was reached,
a certification to file action was issued to the spouses Tan. Hence, the Tans filed an
action for unlawful detainer with damages against Gabrito, et al.
In answer to the complaint, defendants Gabrito, et al. denied the material allegations
of the complaint and alleged that: they are builders in good faith over the land as
provided in Article 448 of the Civil Code; the land where the houses of defendants
were built is a public land, not yet awarded nor titled to anybody; plaintiffs's alleged
predecessor-in-interest not being the owner thereof could not have passed nor
transferred ownership thereof to them (plaintiffs) considering that Gloria Carillo's
Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (X-4-4320) has not yet been acted upon by the
Bureau of Lands; plaintiffs and their predessors-in-interest are absentee applicants
over the land, hence, are disqualified to own the same; plaintiffs have never been in
possession of the land while the defendants are in actual physical possession
thereof; the sale of plaintiffs' alleged predecessor-in-interest in favor of plaintiffs is
null and void for being in violation of P.D. No. 1517 as defendants being lessees of
the land have the right of first refusal thereof.
Defendants brought a counterclaim for damages against the plaintiffs. (Rollo, Annex
"C", pp. 39-40).
Respondent Municipal Trial Judge applied the rule on summary procedure in this case, rendered its
decision dated November 22, 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for all the defendants to vacate the
parcel of land described in par. 3 of the complaint, removing therefrom the buildings
and any other improvements respectively owned by them; and to pay plaintiffs the
following as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises:
Maximo Gabritoat
P250.00 per month from April 1984 until he vacates the premises;
Roger Libutat
P150.00 per month from May 1984 until he vacates the premises;
Liza de Veraat:
P150.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises; Carmelita Uyat
Pl 70.00 per month from April 1984, until she vacates the premises.
for all defendants to pay, in equal shares, damages by way of attorney's fees in the
amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS ( P1,000.00 ) as well as costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35).
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (Civil Case No. 450-08-5), the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court was affirmed in its decision dated April 2, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premised on all the foregoing consideration and finding no prejudicial

and reversible error was ever committed by the lower Court, the Court affirms in
toto the decision being appealed, with costs against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex 'B' p. 38).
On review, herein respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court Branch LXXIV, and ruled;
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review herein is DISMISSED for lack of merit. (Rollo,
Annex "C", p. 44).
On March 16, 1987, the petitioner filed their "Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to the
Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Further Proceedings" which was denied by the Ninth
Division of respondent Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated March 30, 1987 and granted the
Motion for Immediate Issuance of a Writ of Execution filed by private respondents (Annex "F", Rollo,
pp. 57-58).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed on April 13, 1987.
On April 21, 1987, Acting Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, authorized the grant of Temporary
Restraining Order in this case which was confirmed by the Second Division of this Court in its
Resolution dated April 27, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 86, 87, 88).
In a Resolution dated June 8, 1987, petitioners were required to comment on the motion dated April
26, 1987 (Rollo, p. 94) of counsel for respondents, praying to set aside the temporary restraining
order issued on April 21, 1987 and to issue a writ of execution pending appeal or to allow the Court
of Appeals to proceed with the execution of the decision pending appeal (Rollo, p. 115), which was
complied with by petitioners on July 22, 1987 (Rollo, p. 143).
In the resolution of October 5, 1987 (Rollo, p. 187) the petition was given due course and the parties
were required to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice. Petitioners'
memorandum was submitted on December 3, 1987 (Rollo, p. 196). Respondents submitted their
memorandum on April 12, 1988 (Rollo, p. 235). Petitioners raised the following issues:
1. That a Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case for
Unlawful Detainer under Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, where the plaintiffs
are merely the legal possessors and recent transferees of a public land, and the
defendants are the absolute owners of the building existing on the same land, for a
number of years already.
2. That the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXIV, Olongapo City, ought to
have dismissed the action for Unlawful Detainer and as the same was also heard on
appeal by the said Court on this jurisdictional challenge.
3. The market value of the residential houses or buildings of the defendants on the
said land is approximately P170,000.00, and it was with plaintiffs' predecessor-ininterest, one Gloria Carillo-Potente that defendants caused said structures to be
erected on said land plaintiffs having only acquired from said predecessor, by means
of a Deed of Sale of such rights sometime on January 5, 1984.

4. Upon this frame of facts which are admitted in the Decision of both Courts, only a
Court of General Jurisdiction, a Regional Trial Court, can have the competence to try
and decide the same: the Court of Special Limited Jurisdiction, cannot take
cognizance of such facts as an action for Unlawful Detainer.
5. Arguendo, that the Court of Origin has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause
of action for Unlawful Detainer, it should have not heard the case in accordance with
the Rules of Summary Proceedings, and based its Decision on an Affidavit hearing,
as the question of ownership was being contested between plaintiffs and defendants,
with respect to whom was the preferred grantee to the same land, and which falls
under the complete administration and control of the Bureau of Lands.
6. In fact, the Court of Origin, Branch V, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Olongapo,
should have suspended the proceedings, as there was an Administrative Protest
being heard by the District Land Office of Olongapo City.
7. On the question of suspension of proceedings denied by the Court of Origin,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch V, Olongapo City, an action for certiorari was
filed before Branch LXXIII of Regional Trial Court, Olongapo City, Civil Case No. 3990-85, and although a Restraining Order against Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch V, City of Olongapo, was issued, the same was already academic as by that
time said Municipal Trial Court, Branch V, Olongapo City, has already rendered its
Decision in favor of private respondent hereat, plaintiff therein.
8. Branch LXXIV, Regional Trial Court, Olongapo, in its Decision rendered on appeal,
did not pass upon such matters, specified supra, so as to reverse the Decision of the
Court of Origin: the subject Decisions, have not considered the due process rights of
petitioners toward their residences and structures, the same are facing the risk of
condemnation and destruction without fair hearing, and such improvements have an
aggregate value of Pl70,000.00, more or less.
9. Respondent Honorable Judge Mendoza of Branch LXXIV, Regional Trial Court,
Olongapo, may have been misled by the citation of authority, case of Vda. de
Bocaling vs. Laguna, et al., 54 SCRA, 243, relied upon by appellees, said case being
totally inapplicable to the facts of this case.
10. Respondent Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Lumanlan, without regard to the fif'teen (15)
days period finality of the Order and/or Writ of Demolition, harrassed herein
petitioners, notwithstanding the pendency of matters involved to their extreme
discomfort and anxiety.
11. The Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Annex "C", sustained the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court and ignored the vital issues posed for resolution:
A Motion For Reconsideration, copy is hereto attached as Annex "D", was presented,
precisely to stress the same but, a pointed or precise ruling upon such issues was
avoided in the Resolution dated 30th of March, 1987, true copy attached herein as
Annex "E".
12. On the other (sic) upon Motion of private respondents, the Tans, despite
Opposition thereto, Writ of Execution pending appeal was issued and respondent
Deputy Sheriff Lumanlan enforced the same, copy of which is hereto attached as

Annex "F": true copy of Notice to Vacate served by said respondent Deputy Sheriff to
petitioners is attached as Annex "G" herein.
13. Per Annex "D" Motion For Reconsideration a constitutional point, was reared
forth, on first impression, per proviso of Sec. 10, Art. XIII-new, 1986 Constitution,
relevant to demolition and resettlement, and, Resolution, dated 30th March, 1987,
Annex "E", of the Honorable Appellate Authority, avoided said constitutional question,
without passing upon the same.
14. Of Jurisdictional matters: Decision dated March 4, 1987, of the Honorable Court
of Appeals was, received on March 6, 1987, Motion For Reconsideration was filed on
March 16, 1987, and Resolution dated 30th of March, 1987, denying Motion for
Reconsideration was received on April 1, 1987: thus, this Petition is filed within the
15 day period. (Rollo, pp. 4-8).
All of which boil down to the main issue of whether or not an action for unlawful detainer is the
proper action to oust petitioners from their occupation of the land in dispute.
There is no question as to the ownership of the land in litigation as both petitioners and private
respondents admit that the same is a public land and owned by the government. The bone of
contention is, who has a better right to possess the land which definitely falls under the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court and the rule of summary procedure may properly be applied.
In a preliminary conference held pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
defendants admitted that they entered the premises as lessees and had been paying rentals for the
use of the land to Gloria Carillo, private respondents' predecessor-in-interest (Order dated May 15,
1985 in Civil Case No. 2511, MTC, Olongapo City, Branch V; Rollo, pp. 72-73). When requested to
vacate the premises, petitioners asked for an extension of time which request was granted.
However, petitioners failed to vacate the premises and also stopped paying rentals. In view of said
admissions, petitioners had unquestionably recognized private respondents' prior right of possession
over the questioned property.
<re||an1w>

Petitioners' allegation in their answer that they are builders in good faith over the land as provided for
in Article 448 of the Civil Code is untenable. As ruled by this Court, Article 448 of the Civil Code,
applies only where one builds on land in the belief that he is the owner of the land, but does not
apply where one's interest in the land is that of a lessee under a rental contract (Balucanag v.
Francisco, 122 SCRA 498 [1983]). More than that, it has been settled that the mere fact that, in his
answer, defendant claims to be the exclusive owner of the property from which plaintiff seeks to eject
him is not sufficient to divest the Municipal Trial Court of jurisdiction (Vivar v. Vivar, 8 SCRA 847, 849
[1963]; De Santa vs. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 52 [1985]).
In addition, this Court held in Bocaling v. Laguna, et al (54 SCRA 243, 250 [1973]) that:
The rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner, are not possessors in good faith
because he knew that their occupancy of the premises continues only during the life
of the lease, and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their
improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they are
reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows
reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the value of their improvements if the
lessor so elects.

Petitioners contend that the above cited case is "completely inapplicable to the case at bar, because
the genesis case of Ejectment therein was subjected to a compromise Agreement" (Rollo, p. 18).
Such contention is, however, untenable. One of the issues raised in the above-cited case was
whether or not lessees are builders and/or possessors in good faith entitled to reimbursement for the
value of their improvements. The Court categorically resolved the issue in the negative without
qualification nor even a reference to the compromise agreement alluded to by the petitioner.
In a later development, petitioners filed a supplemental memorandum submitting the decision of the
Bureau of Lands dated June 7, 1987, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Miscellaneous Sales Application No. 4320
of Benita Ching Tan should be, as hereby as it is rejected forfeiting to the government
whatever amount had been paid on account thereof. The miscellaneous sales
application of Maximo Gabrito, Carmelita Uy, Roger Libut and Liza de Vera shall
continue to be given due course after a subdivision survey of the portion occupied by
them shall have been made at their pro-rata expense.
SO ORDERED.
In view thereof, petitioners maintain that they are the lawful owners of the buildings and the legal
possessors of subject land and that the records of the court proceedings show the pendency of the
administrative protest before the Bureau of Lands between the same litigating parties (Rollo, pp.
166-167).
Respondents countered that the decision of the Bureau of Lands granting preferential right to the
petitioners to apply for the subject parcel of land is still on appeal before the Department of Natural
Resources. 1 Hence, said decision which is not yet final, cannot affect the outcome of this case because
the authority given to the land department over the disposition of public land does not exclude the courts
from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the character of the land notwithstanding (Rollo, pp. 246247).
The contention of private respondents is well taken.
This issue has long been laid to rest by this Court. As early as the case of Pitarque v. Sorilla (92 Phil.
55 [1952]), this Court ruled that:
The vesting of the Lands Department with authority to administer, dispose of, and
alienate public lands must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the
Government of the exercise of their respective functions of powers thereon, such as
the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of peace by the police and the
authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory actions arising
therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition.
Said ruling was reiterated in Bahayang v. Maceren, 96 Phil 390 (1955); in Molina v. De Bacud, 19
SCRA 56 (1967) and in Rallon v. Ruiz, Jr., 28 SCRA 331 (1969). In the latter case, the Court
specifically ruled on the jurisdictional question, as follows:
Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public lands to determine
the issue of physical possession (in forcible entry cases before the inferior court) on
the better right of possession (in accion publiciana cases before court of first
instance). And this is because the issue of physical possession raised before the

courts is independent of the question of disposition and alienation of public lands

which should be threshed out in the Bureau of Lands.
The above ruling was further reiterated in Francisco v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (121 SCRA 380 [1983]) and in a recent case of National Development Co., et al. v.
Hervilla, G.R. No. 65718, June 30, 1987 (151 SCRA 520), where it was held that:
It is now well settled that the administration and disposition of public lands are
committed by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and ultimately to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. The jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is
confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants of public lands
or to cases which involve disposition and alienation of public lands. The jurisdiction of
courts is limited to the determination of who has the actual, physical possession or
occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before municipal courts)
or, the better right of possession (in accion publiciana, in cases before the Court of
First Instance, now Regional Trial Court).
And even more recently in the case of Guerrero v. Amores, et al., G.R. No.
L-34492 promulgated on March 28, 1988, the Court clearly stated that "pending final adjudication of
ownership by the Bureau of Lands, the Court has jurisdiction to determine in the meantime the right
of possession over the land." Corollary thereto, the power to order the sheriff to remove
improvements and turn over the possession of the land to the party adjudged entitled thereto,
belongs only to the courts of justice and not to the Bureau of Lands.
In the same case, the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies with
reference to public lands, was further clarified by this Court as follows:
On the other hand, the application of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as a condition precedent to the filing of a juridical action is confined to
controversies arising out of the disposition of public lands (Geukoko vs. Araneta, 102
Phil. 706 (1957); Marukot vs. Jacinto, 98 Phil. 128 (1957), alienation of public lands
(Rallos vs. Ruiz, Jr., supra) or to the determination of the respective rights of rival
claimants to public lands (Pitarque vs. Sorilla, supra) and not to possessory actions
involving public lands which are limited to the determination of who has the actual,
physical possession or occupation of the land in question (Rallos vs. Ruiz,
Jr., supra).
<re||an1w>

In fact, the Bureau of Lands in its decision of June 7, 1987, admitted the jurisdiction of the courts to
decide the case on the question of physical possession, although not on the question of ownership
(Rollo, p. 179).
Under the circumstances, a careful study of the records failed to show any cogent reason to disturb
the findings of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities and of the Regional Trial Court, both of Olongapo
City, and finally of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the temporary
restraining order is lifted. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.