Aggression and Violent Behavior 19 (2014) 447453

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Aggression and Violent Behavior

Shame and aggression: Theoretical considerations

Jeff Elison a,, Carlo Garofalo b, Patrizia Velotti c
a
b
c

Adams State University, Psychology Department, 208 Edgemont Blvd., Alamosa, CO 81101, United States
Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Dynamic and Clinical Psychology, Via degli Apuli, 1, 00185 Rome, Italy
University of Genoa, Department of Educational Sciences, Corso Andrea Podest, 2, 16126 Genoa, Italy

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Received 17 December 2013
Received in revised form 8 February 2014
Accepted 8 May 2014
Available online 20 May 2014
Keywords:
Shame
Anger
Aggression
Violent behavior
Emotion regulation

a b s t r a c t
Within the shame literature, anger and aggression are widely recognized as responses to shame. Recent ndings
on the affective neuroscience of social pain suggest multiple models by which social pain (e.g., shame) and anger/
aggression may be linked. These models describe the mechanisms underlying the prominent role of shame in interpersonal aggression, a role revealed by many dozens of studies. Anger and aggression in response to shame
may be viewed as emotion regulation, coping strategies, and evolutionary adaptations. Unfortunately, these attempts at coping with shame may be adaptive or maladaptive. Indeed, aggression may be an adaptive defensive
response to physical pain and many physical threats that, through evolutionary processes, came to be linked to
shame once social pain co-opted the affective response to physical pain. In a related article (Velotti, Elison, &
Garofalo, 2014), we review the many contexts and populations in which aggression manifests, providing further
evidence for the models proposed here. Thus, a more complete understanding of anger and violent behavior requires consideration of social pain, shame, and shame-regulation, for which physical pain serves as a useful
model.
2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Contents
1.
2.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Negative emotionality and aggression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.
From the study of anger to the focus on shame . . . . . . . . .
3.
Evolutionary and psychobiological perspectives linking shame to aggression
4.
Strategies for shame-regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.
Conclusions: pain and threat-defense: models for shame and aggression .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. Introduction
Consider the commonalities in the following three scenarios. In response to insecurity, a man with borderline personality disorder verbally abuses his partner, the very person whose love he fears losing.
Following repeated bullying and exclusion, a normally meek student
retaliates with sts against one of her persecutors. After being
embarrassed by a comment regarding his competence, a man spreads
rumors denigrating his boss via email. These scenarios illustrate a similar chain of events, a chain supported by empirical studies and
Corresponding author at: Psychology Department, 208 Edgemont Blvd., Alamosa, CO
81101, United States. Tel.: +1 719 587 8175; fax: +1 719 587 7176.
E-mail addresses: jeff_elison@msn.com (J. Elison), carlo.garofalo@uniroma1.it
(C. Garofalo), patrizia.velotti@unige.it (P. Velotti).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2014.05.002
1359-1789/ 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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consistent with multiple theories reviewed in this paper. First, each

scenario begins with a social threat: personal devaluation, a decline in
relational value, status, or rank (DeWall & Bushman, 2011; Elison,
2005; Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 1997, 2007; Leary & Guadagno, 2011;
MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). Second, these declines threaten the basic universal need to belong (Baumeister &
Leary, 1995; DeWall & Bushman, 2011). Third, threatening this basic
human need elicits negative emotional reactions (Baumeister & Leary,
1995; DeWall & Bushman, 2011), all of which are members of the
basic emotion family shame (feelings of inferiority, embarrassment, humiliation; Elison, 2005; Izard, 1977; Nathanson, 1992; Scheff, 1987;
Tomkins, 1963; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). Fourth, shame an alarm
warning us of these threats of social exclusion is physically painful,
as well as emotionally painful (Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny,
2009; Eisenberger, 2011; Elison, 2005; MacDonald & Leary, 2005;

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J. Elison et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 19 (2014) 447453

Miller & Leary, 1992). Fifth, discomfort in the form of pain is sufcient to
elicit anger (Berkowitz, 2012; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Finally, anger
motivates aggression in some instances (Berkowitz, 2012; Davey, Day, &
Howells, 2005; Novaco, 1994, 2007). Taken together, these points of
commonality represent a psychobiological chain linking shame to
anger and aggression.
Research and theory on shame and exclusion support this linkage,
approaching it in terms of coping/defense/emotion-regulation (Crowe,
2004; Elison, Lennon, & Pulos, 2006; Lewis, 1971; Nathanson, 1992;
Scheff, 1987, 2009; Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2012; Tangney &
Dearing, 2002; Tomkins, 1963), evolutionarily adaptive strategies
(Gilbert, 1997, 2007; MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Weisfeld & Dillon,
2012), action tendencies or action readiness (Frijda, 2010), and psychobiology (Berkowitz, 2012; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Dickerson et al.,
2009; Eisenberger, 2011; Eisenberger, Way, Taylor, Welch, &
Lieberman, 2007; Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, Lejuez, & Gunderson, 2010;
MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Indeed, our central argument is that
shame and anger are so closely associated because the power of shame's
social selection pressure (i.e., social exclusion) required multiple
strategies (i.e., emotion-regulation or coping) that co-opted previous
adaptations. These adaptations include physical pain components
(Eisenberger, 2011; Elison, 2005), humans' general threat-defense
mechanism (MacDonald & Leary, 2005), and dominant versus submissive displays and behaviors related to rank (Gilbert, 1997; Weisfeld &
Dillon, 2012). Such adaptations are enabled by underlying neurological
structures or pathways. In this article, we argue that many instances of
aggression would be better understood as reactions to shame.
In a related article (Velotti, Elison, & Garofalo, 2014-in this issue), we
review the shame and aggression literatures in order to explore the
many contexts in which the shameaggression link is evident. Across
the board, those studies are consistent with, and provide further evidence for, the evolutionary and psychobiological links from shame to
anger and aggression described here. In both articles, we stress the
point that social threats are ubiquitous, taking endless forms manifesting in intimate partner violence, bullying, antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, as well as minor occurrences of
slights, embarrassments, and mistakes in everyday life.
2. Negative emotionality and aggression
Negative emotions are characterized by specic neural pathways
(Lane, Fink, Chau, & Dolan, 1997) and neuropsychological mechanisms
(Taylor, Dickerson, & Klein, 2002), and the link between negative emotions and aggression is often reported in the literature (DeWall,
Anderson, & Bushman, 2012; Elison & Harter, 2007; Gilligan,
2003; Scheff, 2011; Scheff & Retzinger, 2002; Shanahan, Jones, &
Thomas-Peter, 2011; Steiner et al., 2011; Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel,
Harty, & McCloskey, 2010; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Thomaes, Stegge,
Olthof, Bushman, & Nezlek, 2011; Walker & Knauer, 2011). In an attempt to nd a common theoretical ground underlying the emotion
aggression relationship, many authors highlight the possible causal
role of traumatic experiences during childhood (Levinson & Fonagy,
2004; Moftt & Caspi, 2001; Pffin & Adshead, 2004), as well as
relative poverty and social disadvantage (Fonagy, 1999). Moreover,
negative emotionality heightens dysregulation, triggering aggressive
behavior (Roberton, Daffern, & Bucks, 2012). Of particular relevance to
the current review, experimental results do indeed demonstrate that
social exclusion and shame diminish self-regulation, increasing anger
and aggression (Dansie, 2006; DeWall & Bushman, 2011; Jones &
Elison, 2013; MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Thomaes et al., 2011; Wright,
Gudjonsson, & Young, 2008).
Due to the recent shift of attention toward discrete emotions and
their specicity in the interpersonal encounter (Van Kleef, 2009;
Velotti, Zavattini, & Garofalo, 2013; Walle & Campos, 2012), some authors recommend disentangling the broad concept of negative emotionality by focusing on the inuences of specic emotions in predicting

aggressive behavior (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999). To date, most

researchers interested in the study of the emotionaggression link
have focused their attention on the well documented role of anger
(Berkowitz, 2012; Davey et al., 2005; Novaco, 1994, 2007), with few
studies (e.g., Izard et al., 2008) examining other emotions. The role of
these latter feelings may be more subtle and perhaps more insidious.
2.1. From the study of anger to the focus on shame
In this paper, we focus on neurobiological and evolutionary perspectives that help elucidate the links from shame to aggression, as well
as the importance of shame-regulation in mediating these links.
Shame is a painful, self-focused affect, depicted as one of the most difcult emotions to identify and to attribute to oneself (Lewis, 1971). It is
conceptualized as an affect elicited by devaluation of the self, especially
when the shamed is aware of having violated a standard held by others
(Elison, 2005; Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 2007; Gilligan, 2003; Nelissen,
Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2013; Scheff, 1987, 2009). Although many
theorists view shame as being exceptionally painful, even devastating
to one's sense of self (e.g., Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2002), we
believe this to be a very Western perspective (Elison, 2005). Shame
varies in intensity. It can be horribly painful at times, yet, at other
times, it can be so mild that it is experienced at non-conscious levels
(Elison, 2005; Scheff, 1988). Moreover, both shame and its anticipation
are ubiquitous in modern societies, yet shame is largely invisible (Scheff,
1988). Within this review, we conceptualize shame as a basic emotion
family, which includes embarrassment, humiliation, and mortication
as members (Elison, 2005; Izard, 1977; Nathanson, 1992; Scheff, 1988;
Tomkins, 1963; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). Therefore, our use of
the term shame is broad, encompassing all of these painful emotional
experiences, which share devaluation of the self as their common
antecedent.1
According to Fonagy (2004), the act of violence () is rarely one of
blind rage. Rather, it is a desperate attempt to protect the fragile self
against the onslaught of shame, mostly innocently triggered by another
(p. 42). In pathological cases such as borderline personality disorder,
where shame may be experienced as having power to destroy the self,
violence toward the other might be the only way of reducing the
discomfort (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; Nathanson, 1994). From an evolutionary perspective, shame warns of a potential threat to one's life, via
impending social exclusion; violence, in turn, is best understood as a
defense. While borderline personality disorder and social exclusion illustrate the extreme dynamics of shame, everyone faces negative evaluations by others and associated loss of status, rank, or reputation. We
now turn to details of evolutionary and neurobiological mechanisms.
3. Evolutionary and psychobiological perspectives linking shame
to aggression
Explanations for a fairly direct link between shame and anger/
aggression can be made at two levels of analysis. At the higher, psychological level, the link between shame and anger follows from an evolutionary perspective. Shame, anger, and aggression are responses to loss
of rank, status, or relational value (DeWall & Bushman, 2011; Dickerson
et al., 2009; Elison, 2005; Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 1997, 2007; Weisfeld &
Dillon, 2012). In this context, shame and aggression are viewed as evolutionary adaptations in response to the demands placed on members of
social species that organize themselves into rank hierarchies. Gilbert
(1997) describes two types of hierarchies: dominance and attraction.
1
Distinctions between shame and guilt are controversial. Some theorists would include
guilt in the shame family. Others view shame as maladaptive and guilt as adaptive, with
guilt being unrelated or negatively related to anger and violence (e.g., Tangney, Stuewig,
& Mashek, 2007). We view guilt as an emotional situation with which a number of basic
emotions may be associated (Elison, 2005; e.g., shame due to implications for the self versus sadness for the effects of one's actions on others). Therefore, guilt experiences t within our denition and review only to the degree that they are laden with shame.

J. Elison et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 19 (2014) 447453

Members' rank within each type is maintained by different strategies. In

dominance hierarchies, rank is based on a member's physical power via
threats of harm or actual aggression (Gilbert, 1997; Weisfeld & Dillon,
2012). High-ranking, dominant members threaten or attack lowerranking members during conicts over rank or resources. The former
may even stand more erect, puff themselves up, or raise the hair on
their backs to increase their size. In response, low-ranking members
demonstrate their submissiveness and understanding of the rank differential by retreating or cowering, displaying submissive postures.
Cowering often involves gaze aversion to avoid eye contact, and shrinking, such as holding the tail between the legs and dropping the shoulders. The opposite nature of these dominance versus submissive
displays illustrates what Darwin (1872) called the principle of antithesis. Just as displays of anger and threats of aggression by dominant
members control the behavior of non-dominant members (e.g., dogs
over a food bowl), displays of submission by low-ranking members
also serve to control the behavior of dominant members. The submissive display conveys the message that the low-ranking individual
accepts its position and intends to back-down, thus effectively
circumventing an attack.
In contrast, rank in attraction hierarchies is maintained by conspecics' opinions or liking or acceptance of each other (Gilbert, 1997;
Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). These assessments of attraction may be
based on virtually any identiable characteristic (e.g., appearance, intelligence, humor, prosocial behavior). In most cases, they are based on
some combination of multiple characteristics. As humans, we feel
pride when admired and shame (embarrassment, etc.) when others
think poorly of us (see also Leary's similar sociometer model; Leary &
Guadagno, 2011). Others' evaluations are conveyed through negative
comments or looks, disapproval, contempt, or mocking. Across human
and non-human primates, perception of status, dominance behaviors,
shame, and pride appear to involve the orbitofrontal cortex (Weisfeld
& Dillon, 2012). Similarly, social threats produce increased levels of cortisol and immune system activity in humans (e.g., proinammatory cytokines, related to inammation; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Dickerson
et al., 2009), just as do physical threats to humans and other primates.
Further evolutionary continuity is evidenced by the similarity of submissive and dominant displays in other species and shame and pride,
respectively, in humans (Elison, 2005; Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 1997;
Keltner & Harker, 1998; Tracy & Robins, 2007; Weisfeld & Dillon,
2012). Pride involves making oneself larger and more prominent, similar to upright stances and pilo-erection observed in other species (Tracy
& Robins, 2007). Tracy and Robins suggest that the human pride expression may have evolved from similar expressions in ancestral species. In
contrast to pride, shame involves gaze aversion, as well as visible and
phenomenological shrinking. Again, the expression probably evolved
in earlier species and manifests similarly in humans, although shame
may be a uniquely human emotion. Just as cowering in response to a
physical threat communicates a great deal of information and may
avert the attack, the submissive posture of shame in response to a relational threat communicates understanding of the relational dynamics
(Elison, 2005; Fessler, 2007; Keltner & Harker, 1998). The shamed understands that they have been evaluated negatively, rank or acceptance
or inclusion have been threatened. The nonverbal display of shame
also conveys a person's emotional pain and may elicit sympathy or
forgiveness.
Gilbert (1997) asserts that attraction hierarchies evolved from dominance hierarchies, co-opting many of their associated mechanisms
(e.g., nonverbal displays, aggressive defense), but both types of hierarchies coexist within human and non-human social structures. Thus,
anger and aggression in response to threatened rank may be similar,
whether the threat comes from physical dominance or social evaluation.
Just as a non-human animal may switch between strategies (e.g.,
cower rst, then defend when actually attacked), humans deploy
the cower-versus-defend strategies as alternatives (Elison, Pulos, &
Lennon, 2006). However, they are not necessarily distinct. A shamed

449

individual may start with one and then switch to the other, especially
if the rst is not effective. For example, he may apologize, but become
angry when the apology is not accepted. Or he may use them in some
combination, at a point along a continuum. For example, he may display
shame or embarrassment, yet attempt to blame the other.
As an evolutionary adaptation, shame has neurological and endocrinological substrates, such as the previously mentioned orbitofrontal
cortex activation and hormonal changes; however, we now turn to
the neurological basis for the chain of events from devaluation to emotional pain (i.e., shame), to physical pain, to anger, and to aggression.
The chain of events linking shame and anger/aggression at the
lower, neurological level of analysis is based on two relatively recent observations or theories. First, social exclusion elicits physical pain
(Eisenberger, 2011; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). Second,
physical pain may be sufcient to elicit anger (Berkowitz, 2012).
To begin the chain, many theorists believe that the threat of
social exclusion (or loss of status, rank, or relational value) was the
reoccurring challenge that led to shame as an evolutionary adaptation
(Elison, 2005; Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 2007; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012).
Thus, shame is a social emotion. Moreover, shame is clearly an aversive,
painful emotion. Eisenberger et al. (Eisenberger, 2011; Eisenberger
et al., 2003) demonstrated that social exclusion elicits physical pain. Although researchers (Elison, 2005; Miller & Leary, 1992) had previously
suggested that the function of shame is analogous to pain, Eisenberger
et al. (2003) fMRI study demonstrated similar patterns of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) activity in response to social exclusion and physical
pain. The authors suggest:
Because of the importance of social bonds for the survival of
most mammalian species, the social attachment system may
have adopted the neural computations of the ACC, involved in pain
and conict detection processes, to promote the goal of social
connectedness.
[p. 291]
Numerous subsequent studies have explored the mechanism of social pain (see Eisenberger, 2011 for a review). Thus, there is solid evidence from affective neuroscience linking shame to physical pain.
Next, Berkowitz's (2012) cognitive-neoassociation model makes the
nal links between physical pain and anger and aggression. In this
model, anger is elicited by aversive conditions, such as physical pain
or discomfort without the higher-level cognitive appraisals outlined
by competing theories. Thus, the path from shame to pain to anger is apparent. Furthermore, his model emphasizes the importance of automatic, unconscious, anger-related scripts, just as Nathanson (1992) views
shame-regulation strategies as automatic scripts that often involve
anger. In some cases, anger activates automatic scripts that lead to aggression, often primed by features of the situation, without controlled
cognitive evaluations. Berkowitz explicitly mentions that even
shame (2012, p. 324) may be sufcient to elicit anger and, in turn, aggression via anger-related scripts. Berkowitz acknowledges that anger
can be elicited by shame or emotional pain, but the argument becomes
more compelling given the evidence from Eisenberger's (2011) work
that shame elicits physical pain. In summary, Eisenberger's ndings
and Berkowitz's theory ll the gaps, providing a clear chain of events
from devaluation to emotional pain in the form of shame, to physical
pain, to anger, and nally to aggression.
Expanding on the social pain discoveries, MacDonald and Leary
(2005) reviewed numerous studies of social animals, human and nonhuman, involving exclusion, rejection, or isolation, concluding that
cues indicating threat of social exclusion (e.g., shame) trigger the
same affective pain associated with physical threats. Furthermore, due
to the link between social and physical pain, social pain elicits the
same threat-defense mechanisms as physical pain: ght, ight, or freezing. MacDonald and Leary's hypotheses, while based on the social pain
observations of Eisenberger et al. (2003), are consistent with the

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J. Elison et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 19 (2014) 447453

dominance and attraction hierarchies described by Gilbert (1997).

More importantly, their social-threat-defense hypothesis is consistent
with increases in cortisol and immune system activity in humans
(Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Dickerson et al., 2009), which are also responses to physical threats in humans and other primates. MacDonald
and Leary do not describe the nonverbal displays of fear versus exclusion, but their hypotheses would clearly account for the observed similarities discussed previously.
Of most importance in understanding the shameaggression link is
their hypothesis that the ght response is common due to the fact
that evolution capitalized on the existence of physical pain, co-opting
the physical pain mechanism and its associated threat-defense strategies. Thus, threat-defense is deployed in response to social pain, in
spite of the fact that the ght response is less likely to be adaptive in response to social threats than to physical threats. Furthermore, they note
that in order to be effective, the threat-defense mechanism to physical
pain is often deployed rapidly and automatically, even prior to conscious evaluation, sometimes as a panic response (consistent with
Berkowitz's anger scripts). Thus, physical pain may result in maladaptive defensive aggression (e.g., shoving a loved one who accidently
stepped on one's toes), even against someone not responsible for the
pain. Even if a shamed individual does not respond automatically, social
pain (like physical pain) can disrupt the cognitive resources necessary
for behavior regulation. Unfortunately, because the same threatdefense mechanism is deployed in response to social pain, the same
two byproducts are evident: maladaptive defensive aggression, even toward innocent bystanders.
Thus, from multiple perspectives, shame and anger/aggression may
be biologically linked as alternative strategies (action tendencies or
action readiness; Frijda, 2010) for controlling threat. In this case, what
is being controlled is a relational threat (e.g., drop in rank or level of
acceptance) from conspecics. Deployment of these strategies is
moderated by individual differences and sensitive to immediate
conditions (DeWall & Bushman, 2011; DeWall, Twenge, Bushman, Im,
& Williams, 2010; Eisenberger et al., 2007; Jones & Elison, 2013;
MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Maner, Miller, Schmidt, & Eckel, 2010).
Eisenberger et al. (2007) reported higher levels of dACC activation
(dorsal anterior cingulate cortex) following a social exclusion manipulation, and higher levels of trait aggression, and rejection sensitivity in
participants with the MAOA-L (monoamine oxidase-A) allele. They
interpreted these ndings as being consistent with the hypothesis that
men and women who were more sensitive to negative evaluation experienced greater emotional pain, leading to greater defensive aggression.
Maner et al. (2010) reported changes in progesterone, a marker of
afliative motivation, in response to social exclusion. Whether these
changes represented increases or decreases was moderated by individual differences in social anxiety and rejection sensitivity. Moreover,
levels of progesterone and afliative motivation varied with immediate
conditions, being higher when rejection sensitive participants were
given the opportunity to socially connect with others, after initial exclusion. Similarly, even minor acceptance by a single stranger has been
found to reduce aggression (DeWall et al., 2010). Thus, opportunities
for social acceptance may be protective against withdrawal and aggression; neither is the default response. Conversely, aggression may
be most common when individuals feel completely rejected (stigmatized or shamed), with no chance of regaining social connection
(MacDonald & Leary, 2005), just as physically threatened individuals
are most likely to ght when there is no opportunity for conciliation
or withdrawal.
4. Strategies for shame-regulation
Two of the major challenges in the study of shame are assessing unacknowledged shame feelings and the variety of ways in which people
react to, cope with, or regulate shame. Individuals who experience
shame may cope with it in different ways after recognition, or may

willfully or unconsciously avoid it, producing unacknowledged shame

(Elison, Lennon, & Pulos, 2006; Harper, 2011; Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1987,
2009; Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2012). The threat-defense strategies
discussed in the previous section map nicely to several shame responses
historically noted in the shame literature. In this section, we discuss the
different trajectories in which the shameaggression link manifests.
Many authors have noted the various ways in which people respond
to experiences of shame, sometimes framing these responses as coping
or defense (Crowe, 2004; Elison, Lennon, & Pulos, 2006; Lewis, 1971;
Nathanson, 1992; Scheff, 1987, 2009; Stuewig et al., 2010; Tangney &
Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow,
1996; Tangney et al., 2007; Tomkins, 1963; Wright et al., 2008). In keeping with current thinking regarding the fuzzy distinctions between coping and defense, as well as the importance of emotional and behavioral
self-regulation, we will refer to these responses as shame-regulation
strategies. Nathanson's (1992) Compass of Shame model incorporates
many previously documented shame-regulation strategies by describing four families (i.e., categories) of scripts used to manage experiences
of shame. Although many responses to shame are adaptive, he asserts
that all of the strategies described by his model are employed
maladaptively, to varying degrees.
Anger is a common response to shame as noted by all the authors
listed in the previous paragraph, and consistent with the social pain/
threat-defense model, in this case the ght strategy (MacDonald &
Leary, 2005). Nathanson's shame-regulation model includes internalized self-directed anger, self-disgust, and even self-harm in a response
style he labels attack self. Just as a person may be angry at oneself for
carelessly smashing one's own thumb, one may experience selfdirected anger when social injury (e.g., shame, embarrassment) is
one's own fault. Alternately, blame, anger, and aggression may be externalized in what Nathanson calls attack other. Just as other-directed
anger is a common response when someone else is to blame for one's
physical pain, other-directed anger is a common response when someone else is to blame for one's social pain (e.g., Elison & Harter, 2007). Indeed, Tangney and colleagues describe shame as largely maladaptive,
due in part to these inward- and outward-directed anger and aggression
responses (Stuewig et al., 2010; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney
et al., 1996, 2007).
Although the attack self and attack other responses appear to be opposites, they are correlated (Elison, Pulos, & Lennon, 2006). Immediately following the shaming event, an individual may rst internalize
anger; however, given minutes or hours to reframe the situation, they
may come to blame others, externalizing their anger. Conversely, an individual may react initially with outward-directed anger, only to feel remorse over blaming others and then turn the anger inward. Lewis
(1971) wrote of similar feeling traps, leading Scheff (1987, 2009) to
extend the idea to recursive shame-based spirals. In these traps or spirals, shame may result in more shame, fear, or anger. Shameshame
and shameanger spirals, in which negative affect is directed inward toward the self, may lead to depression or self-harm, as in Nathanson's attack self. Shameanger spirals, in which anger is directed outward may
lead to violence, as in Nathanson's attack other. Intense forms of this latter spiral have been referred to by Scheff and Lewis as shame-rage
spirals or humiliated fury (see also Thomaes et al., 2011), with humiliation viewed as a variant of shame. Indeed, among the emotions studied by Elison and Harter (2007), ratings of humiliation intensity were
most highly correlated with violent ideation toward self (rs = .72)
and toward others (rs = .88), with shame and embarrassment being
signicant, but weaker predictors of violent ideation. Elison and Harter
concluded that humiliation and these shame-regulation strategies
played a role in the vast majority of school shootings, where self-harm
(i.e., suicide; attack self) and harm to others (attack other) were apparent (see also Leary, Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003).
Supporting the importance of shame-regulation and the link between shame and anger, Elison et al. validated a measure of shameregulation strategies, the Compass of Shame Scale (CoSS; Elison,

J. Elison et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 19 (2014) 447453

Lennon, & Pulos, 2006; Elison, Pulos, & Lennon, 2006) based on
Nathanson's model (1992, 1994). Positive correlations were observed
between the attack self and attack other subscales and independent
measures of hostility and anger. With regard to pathology, Campbell
and Elison (2005) investigated relationships between Nathanson's
shame-regulation strategies and psychopathic personality traits. Primary and secondary psychopathy scores were positively correlated with
attack other scores. When primary and secondary psychopathy scores
were partialed from one another, primary psychopathy was negatively
correlated with attack self scores, while secondary psychopathy was
positively correlated. Similarly, Nystrm and Mikkelsen (2013) found
a positive correlation between psychopathic personality traits and
more unconscious and externalized shame-regulation strategies in adolescents. Wright et al. (2008) reported that offense-related shame feelings were associated with more difculties in anger management
among an incarcerated sample. Most compellingly, experimental studies have also demonstrated self- and other-directed anger in response
to shame (Dansie, 2006; Jones & Elison, 2013; Thomaes et al., 2011).
All these ndings are consistent with the evolutionary and neurobiological explanations for the strength of the shameanger link described in
Section 2.
A third shame-regulation strategy in Nathanson's model is avoidance, in which individuals attempt to bar shame from awareness. Most
of the authors mentioned in this section have described something similar, labeling it disavowal, denial, escape, or minimization. Lewis (1971)
insightfully identied what she called bypassed shame. In these cases,
shame-regulation is successful in minimizing the feeling and awareness
of shame, sometimes to the point of completely keeping it from consciousness. It may or may not manifest later. If it does appear, it may
take the form of anger and aggression. She recognized that the sudden
appearance of anger in the absence of any obvious trigger is, in some
cases, the result of bypassed shame. Scheff (2009), again expanding
on Lewis's contributions, extols the importance of recognizing bypassed
shame in understanding depression and violence. Given the denial-like
nature of avoidance strategies, they can be difcult to identify in face-toface settings and transcripts. Although self-report assessment presents
an even greater challenge (i.e., asking someone to self-report what
they want to keep from consciousness), Campbell and Elison (2005)
found signicant correlations between CoSS avoidance scores and primary and secondary psychopathy.
The nal shame-regulation strategy in Nathanson's (1992) model,
withdrawal, is another commonly recognized response to shame
(Crowe, 2004; Elison, Lennon, & Pulos, 2006; Lewis, 1971; Scheff,
1987, 2009; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tomkins, 1963). Like anger,
withdrawal is consistent with the social pain/threat-defense model, in
this case the ight or submission strategies (MacDonald & Leary,
2005). Because shame is typically the result of negative evaluations by
others, an individual desires to be free from their judgments. If possible,
shamed individuals may simply leave the situation; if not, they may
wish they could disappear. In either case, they typically internalize
their sense of inferiority during withdrawal. Unfortunately, withdrawal
sometimes takes a passive-aggressive form, whereby the person fantasizes about revenge. Elison and colleagues have observed moderateto-high correlations between withdrawal and attack other scores in
every study they have performed with the CoSS. Further support for
the withdrawalaggression link comes from Cook (1996) who reported
strong correlations between shame and the MCMI-II Passive-Aggressive
scale and his own measure of attack other. Similar to their ndings
with regard to internalization in the form of attack self, Campbell
and Elison (2005) reported that primary psychopathy was negatively correlated with withdrawal scores, while secondary psychopathy
was positively correlated, after partialing. Again, Nystrm and
Mikkelsen (2013) reported parallel results in their study with adolescents, noting an unexpected association between more conscious
and internalized shame-regulation strategies and higher rates of
psychopathic traits.

451

In summary, an understanding of shame-regulation strategies reveals multiple pathways from shame to violence, all of which are consistent with the evolutionary perspectives presented in Section 2.
Responses to shame may be viewed as action tendencies or changes in
action readiness (Frijda, 2010), deployed with some degree of exibility
dependent on past history and immediate conditions, rather than hardwired reexes. Indeed, inexible patterns of responding in which a person fails to be sensitive to one's environment are maladaptive, even an
indication of psychopathology (Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Kashdan &
Rottenberg, 2010; Nathanson, 1992, 1994). As an assessment tool, the
CoSS appears to effectively assess shame-regulation strategies and demonstrates the importance of shame and shame-regulation in understanding anger and violence.
5. Conclusions: pain and threat-defense: models for shame
and aggression
Our basic argument is that research and theory support a chain of
events linking shame to anger and aggression. The chain begins with
relational devaluation in its limitless forms, which elicits shame
acknowledged or not. Shame, including forms such as embarrassment
and humiliation, is a form of social pain. As an adaptation, social pain
co-opted the physical pain mechanism, along with the general threatdefense mechanism (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Therefore, the chain,
all too often, ends in anger or aggression. Although anger and aggression
may be viewed as coping/psychological defense/emotion-regulation,
the theories and evidence reviewed here suggest that these strategies
are based on evolutionary adaptations. Unfortunately, aggression may
serve the short-term interests of the shamed at a cost to others and
even the long-term interests of the self.
Although defensive strategies of anger and aggression in response to
social threats may generally be less adaptive than in response to physical threats, we do not mean to suggest that they are exclusively maladaptive. Social threats are epitomized by attempts to publicly
disparage or humiliate one's character, such as non-physical bullying,
slander, or libel. Under such circumstances, one's reputation, rank, job,
and relationships may be threatened. As a threat-defense response,
anger may be the necessary motivator to take action, such as verbally
confronting the attacker publicly, or even in court. In ancient times, as
well as today, even aggression may be an appropriate and effective response in some contexts.
In a related article (Velotti et al., 2014-in this issue), we discuss in
greater detail specic contexts and populations that provide evidence
for the shameaggression link: couple violence, familial homicide, sexual assaults, narcissistic injuries, adolescent and incarcerated populations. In addition, data on moderators such as self-esteem and
rejection sensitivity are reviewed. Finally, examples from psychopathology and implications for treatment are presented. Across the board,
those studies are consistent with, and provide further evidence for,
the evolutionary and psychobiological links from shame to anger and
aggression described here. In both articles, we stress the points that social threats are ubiquitous, from minor to serious, and that anger and violence are common responses. Therefore, in both articles, we advocate
for more research on the chain of events linking shame to aggression,
as well as on shame-regulation strategies, adaptive and maladaptive.
Such research should employ physical pain and humans' general
threat-defense mechanisms as models to better understand social pain
and its correlates. Understanding anger and aggression as threatdefense mechanisms, or shame-regulation strategies, deployed in response to social threats and motivated by social pain is crucial to designing effective therapeutic and social interventions to reduce violence.
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