Yale University Department of Music

The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity by Roman Ingarden; Adam Czerniawski;
Jean G. Harrell
Review by: Stephen Davies
Journal of Music Theory, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 169-176
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of the Yale University Department of Music
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NOTES
1. Karl van Jan, Musici scriptoresgraeci (1895; reprint, Hildesheim: Olms, 1961), pp.
252.17-253.3
2. Inexplicably the Greek for syntonic is given in the masculine, plural, accusative,
syntonous.
3. This anomoly was pointed out by GiovanniBattistaBenedetti in a series of letters to
Cipriano de Rore written in the early 1560s and printed in Benedetti'sDiversarum
speculationum mathematicarumet physicorum liber (Turin, 1585). Apparently the
gradualchange of pitch in a just tuned vocal performancewas not uncommonduring
the sixteenth century. See Claude V. Palisca, "Scientific Empiricism in Musical
Thought," Seventeenth Century Science and the Arts, ed. Hedley Howell Rhys
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 113-120.

The Workof Music and the Problemof Its Identity

by RomanIngarden
Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1986.
Translatedfrom the originalPolish by AdamCzerniawski;
Editedby Jean G. Harrell.
Includes(pp. 159-173)Max Rieser's"RomanIngardenand His Time",reprintedfrom TheJournalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism39 (1971)
xvi, 181pp.
REVIEWER
StephenDavies
This bookby the PolishaestheticianRomanIngarden(who died in 1970)
was first publishedin Polish more than twentyyears ago, but the present
editionis the firstEnglishtranslation.Originallythe workwas intendedto
be partof the bookknownin Englishas TheLiteraryWorkofArt (firstpublished in Polish in 1931;in English in 1973) in which a unifiedtheoryof
the arts was to be presented,but eventuallyit appearedseparately.As the
title suggests,Ingarden'smainconcernhere lies with the ontologicalstatus
of the musicalwork.In additionto his text, the book containsa Prefaceby
the translator,AdamCzerniawski,and a reviewof Ingarden'scontribution
to aestheticswrittenby Max Rieser.
In generalIngardendistinguishesthe musical work both from "ideal"
and "real"objects (whethermentalor material).In particular,he distinguishes the musical work from its performances,the composer'sor the
listeners'mental experiences, and from the score. The strategyof the
argumentis the same in each case-he tries to show that statementstrue
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of the musicalworkare trueneitherof "ideal"objectsnor of the "real"objects in which the musical work might be concretised.
The essentialsof Ingarden'sview of intentional,"ideal",and "real"objects wouldappearto be this: An intentionalobject is one which depends
for its existenceon consciousmindsand upon real objectsfrom which its
presencecan be abstractedor inferred.This is not to say that intentional
in the sense thattheirpropertiesare determinedby
objectsare "subjective"
the beliefs or desiresof any particularperson;their propertiesare subject
to inter-personalverification.Intentionalobjects would cease to exist if
conscious beings were expungedfrom the world, or if the real objects
throughwhichtheirpresenceis detectedweredestroyed.Intentionalobjects
are abstractin thatthey are not presenteddirectlyto perception,but they
are locatedin time in thatthey may be createdor destroyed.By contrast,
"ideal"objects(such as numbers,universalsand the like) dependfor their
existence neitheron conscious minds nor on their instantiation."Ideal"
objectsare abstractin thatthey standoutsidespace and time; they can be
neithercreatednor destroyed,althoughthey may be "discovered.""Real"
objects,whicharegiven immediatelyto perception,also do not dependfor
their existenceon consciousminds. They are autonomous,whereasintentional objectsare heteronomous.But, in contrastto "ideal"objects,"real"
objectsexist concretelyin spaceandtime andcan be createdor destroyed.
Ingarden'sterminologyand treatmenthere derives from Brentanovia
Husserl,butthe distinctionwhichhe drawsdoes not rely uponanyparticular metaphysicalsystem.A philosopheras farin spiritfromHusserlas Karl
Popperhas madea similardistinction.His notionof "WorldThree"objects
correspondsclosely to Ingarden'saccountof intentionalobjects.'
Ingardencharacterizesthe musicalworkas an intentionalobject. If all
conscious beings were to be removedfrom the world, musical works(as
opposedto successionsof sound)would cease to exist. Like other intentional objects, the continuedexistence of a musical work dependsupon
"real"objects from which the work may be inferred-notations,performances,and the like. Clearlythe musicalworkis not an "ideal"object in
thatit is createdat a particulartime andcouldbe destroyedby the destruction of the realobjectsuponwhichits existencedepends(including,as well
as scores, recordingsandaccuratememoriesof them). Neitheris it a "real"
object,sinceit is notgivendirectlyto perceptionandhasno spatiallocation.
Strictlyspeaking,I takeit thatthe score andanyperformancewouldbe
classed by Ingardenas intentionalobjects, in thattheir existencedepends
upon the conscious recognitionof their significanceas a notationor performance.Butclearlyhe believesthat,as an intentionalobject,the musical
work is more abstractthan its score or any performanceof it. I take the
point to be this: The score, as a notation,transcendsthe markson paper
with which it is correlated.Similarly,the performance(its themes, etc.)
transcendsthe sound-basiswhich is given directly to perception.The
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musicalwork, though,is yet moreabstractin thatit transcendsthese transcendences.Moreover,whereasscoresandperformancesaredeterminatein

their qualities, musical works are indeterminatein permittingmany possible, butequallyfaithful,performances.Thus, the musicalworkis doubly
removedfrom the real world. But, in its ultimatedependenceon real objects, the musical work is not so abstractas "ideal"objects are.
SUMMARYThe musical work is distinguishedin a numberof ways
from (A) its performances(ChapterOne), (B) an auditoryexperienceof a
performance(ChapterTwo), and (C) its score (ChapterThree). (A) It persists in time (althougha temporalstructureis immanentwithinit) without
a spatiallocation, whereasits performancesstartand end, and take place
at particularlocations. The musical work is unique, by contrastwith the
multiplicityof its possible performances.A performancemanifestsitself
directlyin the auditoryexperiencesof the listenerandis univocallyandultimatelydeterminedby its "lowest"soundproperties,whereasthe perception
of the musicalworkis mediatedby its performancesandmanyof the qualities of the musical work are indeterminate(for example, its exact pitch,
tempoand colouringare not determinedby the musicalnotation).(B) The
performanceof a workcontainsthemes and the like, but auditoryexperience is fluid. No theme is the contentof auditoryexperience,althoughthe
auditoryexperienceof sound refersthe listenerto the theme. And just as
the propertiesof the performancetranscendthe auditoryexperienceof the
performance,so the propertiesof the musicalworktranscendthe properties
of its performances.(C) Not all musicalworkshavebeennotated.The notation has propertieswhichthe musicalworklacks(forexample,a pagesize).
The score is a set of signs with imperativalimport,andjust as a sign differs
from its referent,so the score differsfrom the musicalwork.
Whatfeaturesare displayedby musicalworks(ChapterFour)?Musical
worksarenot to be distinguishedfromothersound-constructs
(forexample,
birdsongs) in havinga specificorderingof soundsor in giving rise to melodic gestalts, since sound-constructsmay possess these propertiesalso.
Whereasmusicmaybe expressiveor representational
in intent,these properties are extra-musicalphenomenain their natureand origin and, so, do
not distinguishmusicfrommeresound-constructs.
Neitheris musicdistinct
in possessing "meaning".Music (unlike literaturefor example)lacks the
stratification
on whichsignificationdepends.2Rather,musicis distinguished
frommeresound-constructs
in beingan intentionalandnot a "real"object.
Unlike"real"objects,a musicalworkhas no spatiallocation.The musical
work is not a particularas are materialobjectsof perception;the musical
workis a supra-individual
in thatitsparticularity
arisesfroma selectionfrom
realmodesof existence.Moreover,a musicalworkis supra-temporal
in that,
whilst it has an "immanent"
temporalstructure,it exists as a totalityin real
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time from the momentof its creation;the temporalityof its structureis

revealedin realtimeonly throughthe work'sconcretizationin performance.
The openingand the close of a musicalworkare not datablemomentsin
realtime andthereis no "before"or "after"a musicalworkas therealways
is withdatablemomentsin realtime. Thus,a musicalworkandits structure
frameof the real world. Only wherethe
standoutsidethe spatio-temporal
does the questionof a conmusicalworkis expressiveor representational
nectionwith the real worldarise.
A musicalwork is comprisedof both soundingand non-soundingelements(ChapterFive). Amongstthe soundingelementsdisplayed(in at least
color.
some) musicalworksare melody,harmony,rhythmandinstrumental
musical
in
least
elements
the
some)
displayed (at
Amongst non-sounding
worksare a quasi-temporalstructure,movementplus a quasi-spacewithin
which this movementoccurs, form, emotionalqualities inherentin the
elements.Where
music itself, emotions(or persons)and representational
the "owners"of emotions expressedor the subjectsrepresentedmust be
suppliedimaginativelyby the listener,the expressedemotionor the representedsubjectbelongsto, withoutbeing partof, the music. Both sounding
and non-soundingelements may contributeto the aestheticvalue of the
work, but no such elementspossess inherentaestheticvalue.
As we have alreadyseen, the musicalwork, accordingto Ingarden,is
an intentionalobjectwith its originalsourcein a specific"real"object(the
markswhich comprisethe score) and its groundof continuedexistencein
a seriesof other"real"objects(the sound-basesof performances)(Chapter
Six). A recordingof the workas given or directedby its composeris a record of a performance,and not of the workitself. As an intentionalobject,
the musicalwork dependsfor its existenceon certain"real"objects-the
intentionalacts of composers,meansof preservinga schemaof the work
and makingthat schema concrete, and the experiencesof listeners.The
musicalwork is, therefore,heteronomousratherthan autonomous.But it
is distinctfromand referredto by the "real"objectson which its existence
depends. The musical work is a supra-individualwith a supra-temporal
structurewithpurelyqualitativeindividuality.It generatesandexistswithin
framewithinwhich "real"objectsare located.
its own spatio-temporal
How does a musicalworkconsistingof manyproductsand partsform
a unifiedwhole (ChapterSeven)?(Ingardenreadilyallowsthatnot all musical worksare unifiedand is here concernedonly to explainthe unity of
those which are.) A conditionof hearinga phraseof the work as partof
a whole is that it be heardreachingboth into the work'spast and future.
In a unifiedworkthe partsnot only succeedeach other,they maydovetail
intoeachother,theymaycompleteeachotherthroughharmonyor contrast,
and they may sharethe same emotionalquality.Similarly,the movements
postulate,completingand fulfilling,each other.The breakbetweenmovements is a partof the work, revealingthe unity of that which it divides.
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of the previous
The breakshouldbe long enoughto allowthe "after-sound"
movementto dissipate,but not so long as to erase the memoryof the previous movement.In orderto fulfill its functionthe breakshouldbe filled
with silence and neitherwith applausenor the eating of sweets!
How is the identityof a musicalwork maintainedthroughtime in the
light of changingstyles of performance(ChapterEight)?The score of a
workis indeterminatewith respectto manyaspectsand concretedetailsof
performance,so many equally faithful performances,each differently
revealingthe piece as possessingaestheticvalue, are possible. Everyperformancewhich matchesthe score and does not extendbeyondthe possibilities of the work as containedin the score is "proper".So, historical
changesin styles of performancedo not challengethe work'sidentity,for
there is no single object which is the work. If we mistakenlybelieve that
the identityof the workis alteredwhen it is given a "proper"but unorthodox interpretation,
this is only becausewe tend to identifythe work with
some possibleperformancewhich strikesus as high in aestheticvalue. Yet
some new interpretation
of the work, whilst losing thatwhich was aesthetin
the
valuable
orthodox
ically
reading,may reveal in the work hitherto
unperceivedelementsof equalaestheticvalue. Modem recordingsby composersallowus to returnto the worknot as the "original"but rather,to one
of its possible profiles. And the work, as under-determined
by its score,
containsthe possibilityof quitedifferent,but equally"proper"andaesthetically valuable,performanceswhich, by virtue of being "proper",will be
performancesof the same, enduringwork.
GENERAL
REMARKS
AND CRITICISMS.
There is no doubtthat this
is a finebook, richin detailandinsight,whichwill be of considerableinterest to those with a concernwith the philosophyof music. The arguments
are clear and easy to read (for which, no doubt, thanksis owed to the
translatoras well as the author).In particular,the discussionin the first
threechaptersis uncommonlythoroughandperceptive,andthe finalchapter cannotfail to be of interestin view of the currentconcernwith authenticity in performance-practice.
Nevertheless,the treatmentof some issues is (unavoidably)dated. For
example, Ziffs provocativediscussion of the identity of musical works
could not easily be accommodatedby Ingarden.3
And the interestedreader
shouldcompareIngarden's
views withrecentaccountsof the ontologyof the
musicalwork.'In general,Ingarden'sassertionthata musicalwork stands
apartfrom the real world and is to be understoodexclusivelyon its own
termssits ill with the (now predominant)view thatthe aestheticproperties
of worksof artaredeterminedin partby theirhistoricalcontext.5(He discusses the issue on pp. 55-61, butI findhis remarksunconvincing.)In the same
vein, his tendencyto dismissmusicalexpressivenessand representation
as
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extra-musicalphenomenais cursory,and it is a shamethathe did not address the problemsof accountingfor the way in which music may present
expressiveand representational
qualities.6
The remarksabovebearupona worryI haveaboutthe views presented
in ChapterEight. Ingardenquitecorrectlyrecognisesthatdifferent-sounding performancesmay be equallyauthentic(or "proper")and equally,but
differently,revealingof aestheticvalue. But he implies, I think, that"propriety"allows more latitudeto the performerthan normallywe wouldbe
preparedto concede.The scoreof a musicalworkis a convention-governed
notationalsystemand thatwhich is determinedby the score dependsupon
the conventionsin termsof which it is to be read. These conventionshave
changedthroughtime and, so, the identityof the workis called into question if the score is performedin accordancewith conventionsother than
those in termsof whichthe scorewas written.'In suggestingthatstylisticalIngardenfails to
ly very differentperformancesmightbe equally"proper",
take accountof the fact that a score must be understoodin its social and
historicalcontextif a readingof the score is to leadto a performancewhich
is undeniablya performanceof the composer'swork. If Ingardencovers
himself againstthis objection,he does so in insistingthat, as well as accordingwith the score, all the remainingqualitiesrevealedin the performancemustnot extendbeyondthe possibilitiesof the workas a schema(p.
is not
this qualificationof his mainline on "propriety"
150). Unfortunately,
expandedupon.
views is mentionedbothby CzerniOne obviousobjectionto Ingarden's
concenawskiand HaroldOsborne.8The objectionis invitedby Ingarden's
trationon pre-1950'smusic in the Europeantradition.It is this: Whereas
the identityof the worksdiscussedby Ingardenmightbe determinedin part
by their scores, not all music derivesits identityin this way.Czerniawski
notes that, for jazz and pop music, the work is constitutedby the performance;in such cases the music is, as it were, but an excusefor the performance. Osbornemakes a similar point with respect to Indianclassical
music and folk music. Further,he observesthat some electronicmusic is
composedon recordwithoutfurtherperformancesbeingenvisagedand, as
such, is fully determinateand unique.And he notes, to turnthe coin over,
thataleatoricmusic allows for an indeterminacy(for examplein the order
of the movements)which goes beyondthat which Ingardenallows.
It seems to me that Ingarden,who acknowledgesthat not all music
dependsfor its existenceon a score, might go some way to meetingthis
criticism. What matters,on his account, is the fact that a musical work
dependsupon, whilst transcending,"real"objects,and this will be equally
trueof the cases of score-lessmusicmentionedabove.However,the objection retainssome force. Ingardenwrites as if a musicalworkalwaystranscends a performanceof it, and the examplescited abovesuggestthatthis
is not universallytrue- not all musicalworksaredoublyremovedfromthe
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real world. Wherethe objectionamountsto the chargethatmusicalworks

show more ontic varietythan is acknowledgedby Ingarden'streatment,it
continuesto hold.
Osbornealso disagreeswith Ingarden'sclaim that musical works lack
reality.This objectionis perhapsmisplacedonce it is notedthatIngarden's
use of the notionof "real"objectis technicaland somewhatrestrictive-he
meansby it somethinglike "thatwhichmaybe givendirectlyto perception".
(It is becauseI regardIngarden'suse of 'real'as technicalthat, unlikehim,
I have placedthe term in scare quotes.) CertainlyIngardenmight reasonably reject Osborne'ssuggestion-that the work is a continuingset of
performancesguided by a score-on the groundsthat this set has many
propertieswhich cannottruly be predicatedof the work and vice versa.
A relatedobjectionmight have more force: In ChaptersFive and Six
with melodies,
Ingardenwrites of the musicalwork as a supra-individual
instrumentalcolor, and so forth. By ChapterEight the musicalwork has
become a set of possibilitieswhich may be realizedin differentways in
differentperformances.Of these waysof characterizingthe musicalwork,
I preferthe second.The firstcharacterization
of the workmisleadinglysuggests thatthe workis a kindof object/event,albeita non-realandsomewhat
indeterminateone, whereasthe second sees the workmoreas a functional
relationbetweenthe composer,the score, the performer,andthe audience.
These waysof characterizingthe work strikeme as significantlydifferent,
althoughIngardenseems not to sharethis intuition.
treatmentof musicalunity rathertoo phenomFinally,I find Ingarden's
enological;he describesthe natureof the experienceof a musical work's
unity ratherthanexplainingthe basis for thatexperience.Possiblythe explanationwould have led to a discussionof technicalitieswhich Ingarden
did not wish to pursue.But it is surprising,perhaps,thathe did not mention
the theoriesof Reti and Schenker.And the issues raisedby the analysesof
the musicalbases for musicalunity are worthyof philosophicalscrutiny.
A furtherpointon Ingarden's
views on musicalunity:Czerniawskiis sceptical that the worksof the mastersare so unifiedas Ingardenwouldappear
to believe. Giventhe alacritywith which MozartandHaydnwereprepared
to substitutemovementsfrom work to work, he may well be rightin this.
NOTES
1. See Unended Quest, London, Fontana, 1976 (Revised Edition).
2. For an account of Ingarden'snotion of stratificationsee pp. 50-54 and the essay by
Max Rieser included in the book.
3. See "The Cow on the Roof', The Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973): 713-723.
4. See, for example, N. Wolterstorff,Worksand Worldsof Art (Oxford:ClarendonPress,
1980); KingsleyPrice, "Whatis a Piece of Music?",TheBritishJournal ofAesthetics,
22 (1982): 322-336; James C. Anderson, "Musical Kinds",The British Journal of

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5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

Aesthetics,25 (1985): 43-49; Ren6eCox, 'A Defence of Musical Idealism",TheBritish Journal of Aesthetics, 26 (1986): 133-142.
See, for example, KendallL. Walton,"Categoriesof Art", ThePhilosophical Review,
74 (1970): 334-367.
Recent and detailed treatmentsof these topics have been offeredby Peter Kivy-see
The CordedShell (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1980), and Soundand Semblance (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1984).
I have discussed such mattersin 'Authenticityand Musical Performance",TheBritish
Journal of Aesthetics, 27 (1987): 39-50.
Adam Czerniawski, "Translator'sPreface",pp. vii-xvi; Harold Osborne, Review of
The Workof Music and the Problemof Its Identity,TheBritishJournal of Aesthetics,
27 (1987): 181-183.
I havediscussed such mattersin 'AttributingSignificanceto UnobviousMusical Relationships",The Journal of Music Theory,27 (1983): 203-213.

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