Case 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 1 of 18 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, THE CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Defendant. CIVIL NO. 1:14-CV-01025-RB-SMV MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF INTERVENOR ALBUQUERQUE POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION'S MOTION TO INTERVENE (FRCP RULE 24)Case 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 2 of 18 I. INTRODUCTION Il, BACKGROUND. I ARGUMENT. A. The APOA is entitled to intervene as a matter of right .... 1. The APOA’s Motion to Intervene is timely 2. APOA has significant, protectable interest in the subject matter of this litigatio : 3. Am edverse decision in this form would impair the APOA's ability to protec its contac rights with the Ciy and impede enoreement of ts city ordinance bargaining rights. . 4, The APOA's interest will not be adequately represented by the City. B. Alternatively, the court should permit APOA to intervene permissively.. CONCLUSIONCase 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 3 of 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES US. v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9 Cir. 2002)... 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,9, 10, 11 San Jose Mercury News, Ine, v. US, Dist. Court -N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9 Cir. 1999)... Nikon Corp. v. ASM Lithograph B.¥., 222 FRD. 647, 649-50 (N.D. Cal. 2004)... SW. Ctr, for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 818 (9 Cir. 2001)......... Portland Fire Fighters Association, Local 43 v. City of Portland, 16 PECBR 245 (1995) 6... Freedom from Religious Foundation, Inc. v. Geithner, 644 F.3d 836, 843-44 (9th Cir. 2011 eel Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1989) .. FEDERAL STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 2B USC. §§ 1331. 42USC. § 14141. Fed, R. Civ. P. 24.. NMSA 1978, §10-7E-I 0 26 (2003)..ssssevsssesssseseersssnneseeseesnsannetsescesssessessessemnsssnene D Albuquerque, N.M., Revised Ordinances, ch. 3, art, Il, §§3-2-1 to 18 (1977, as amended through 2002)... seaman . a 1,811Case 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 4 of 18 L IytRopuction Plaintiff, The United State of America (“United States”), has filed a Complaint against the City of Albuquerque (“City”), alleging numerous issues regarding the Albuquerque Police Department to include a systematic use excessive force by its police officers against citizens of the City of Albuquerque without justification. The police officers are members of a long standing labor union, the Albuquerque Police Officers’ Association (“APOA"), As a result of this action and negotiations between the City and the Department of Justice, a Settlement Agreement was negotiated without the APOA which materially alters the APOA's Colle: Bargaining ‘Agreement ("CBA") and the City Ordinance with regard to the APOA’s bargaining rights with the City. It is the opinion of the APOA the one-hundred and five (105) page Settlement Agreement, proposes sweeping changes to the City of Albuquerque Police Department ("APD"), its standards, policies, and procedures that significantly undermine the collective bargaining rights of the APOA and its members. The liberal standards of intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 provide the APOA with the right to intervene in this action, H. Background ‘The APOA is a labor union that represents a bargaining unit of swom, certified employees of the APD from the rank of Lieutenant down, The APOA and the City of Albuquerque ("City") have been parties to a CBA for a period of approximately forty (40) years. ‘The CBA governs the terms and conditions of employment for the bargaining unit. Under the New Mexico Public Employee Bargaining Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 10-7E-1 to 26 (2003) ("PEBA"), and the City of Albuquerque Labor-Management Relations Ordinance, Albuquerque, NM,, Revised Ordinances, ch. 3, art. II, §§3-2-1 to 18 (1977, as amended through 2002)Case 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 5 of 18 (CLMRO") the City and the APOA must collectively bargain in good faith the terms and conditions of employment for the APOAs members. On November 12, 2014, the United States filed a Complaint against the City under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §14141, to remedy a pattern and practice of the use of excessive force by officers of the City’s police department that deprives persons of rights, privileges or immunities secured and protected by the Fourth Amendment. As a remedy, the United States seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as authorized by 42 U.S.C. §14141(b) to include a declaration or finding by this Honorable Court that the City is engaged in a pattem and practice of depriving people of their constitutional rights and Order directing that the City, its officers, agents, and employees refrain from engaging in any type of pattem or practice of the use of excessive force as complained of herein. Further, for an Order directing the City, its officers, agents, and employees adopt and implement policies, procedures, and practices to remedy the pattern or practice of the use of excessive force as claimed herein; and an Order directing the City fo adopt systems that identify, correct, and prevent the use of excessive force that deprive persons of their rights, privileges or immunities as secured and protected under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. ‘The United States and the City by acquiesce have asked this Honorable Court to approve a Settlement Agreement between the United States and the City (“Settlement Agreement”) Under the Settlement Agreement this Court would move to enforce the Settlement Agreement centered into by the parties and would monitor, along with a third party, to be chosen by the respective parties hereto, to ensure the relief sought in the Complaint filed herein is achieved. ‘As more fully explained below, the Settlement Agreement requires the City to implement changes that the APOA believes violates the CBA between the APOA and the City. TheCase 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 6 of 18 Settlement Agreement also alters terms and condi nis of employment without requiring the City to bargain in good faith with the APOA over those mandatorily negotiated bargaining subjects. Well established case law instructs that the APOA, on behalf of its members, has a protectable interest in the merits and remedies of the Complaint and the Settlement Agreement because the Complaint seeks changes in working conditions of members of the APOA. Further, the Settlement Agreement seeks remedies which conflict with CBA entered into between the APOA and the City. The Settlement Agreement infringes in the rights of members of the APOA which ate protected by state statute and the City Ordinance, TH. Argument ‘A. APOA is entitled to intervene as a matter of right, ‘The APOA satisfies each element of the four- part test for determining when intervention as of right under Fed. R. Civ, P, 24(a) as warranted. Under this test, the APOA must show that: (1) Its motion is timely; (2) Ithas a "significant protectable interest relating to the property or transaction of the subject matter of this action"; (3) Its so situated that "the disposition of this action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect its members’ interests"; and (4 The “existing parties may not adequately represent the applicant's interests." ‘The test is applied liberally and in favor of any potential interveners. “By allowing parties with a practical interest in the outcome of a particular case to intervene, [courts] often prevent or simplify future litigation involving related issues; at the same time [courts] allow an additional interested party to express its views before the court.” See U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9 Cir, 2002). The court's analysis is guided "primarily by practical and equitableCase :14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 7 of 18 considerations, not technical distractions.” See SW. Cir. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 818 (9" Cir, 2001) When ruling on a motion to intervene, "[eJouris are to take well- pleaded, nonconclusory allegations in the motion to intervene, the proposed complaint or answer in intervention, and declarations supporting the motion as true{.]" /d. at 820. 1 The APOA motion to intervene is timely, To assert timeliness, the court examines: (1) stage of litigation; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for and length of any delay. San Jose Mercury News, Ine, v. U.S. Dist Court -N, Dist, (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9" Cir. 1999). A motion to ervene may be filed at either the merits phase or the remedial phase of the litigation. The APOA would claim that its motion is timely filed as this litigation is in its earliest stages. There has been no discovery conducted and no dispositive motions filed or decided. Neither the United States nor the City have basis to assert prejudice and there has been no delay by the APOA. The APOA’s motion is timely. See City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 398, (finding union filed its motion to intervene one-and-a-half months after the suit was filed); San Jase Mercury News, Inc, 187 F.3d at 1101 (finding motion to intervene timely filed twelve weeks after basis for intervention occurred); Nikon Corp. ». ASM Lithograph B.V., 222 F.R.D. 647, 649-50 (N.D. Cal, 2004) (motion timely when no dispositive motions have been decided), 2 ificant, protectable interest in the subject mé litigation, The second prong of the intervention analysis requires that the APOA possess an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject matter ofthis litigation. The APOA has a significant protectable interest in this action if it asserts an interest that is protected under some law, and the legal relationship between itself and the City.Case 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 8 of 18 The relationship requirement is met “if the resolution of the plaintiff's claims will affect the intervenor. The "interest" prong is not a clear-cut or bright-line rule, because “[n]o specific legal or equitable interest is established." Instead, the interest prong directs courts to make a “practical, threshold inquiry,” and ‘is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process." City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 398 As an example, the Ninth Circuit District Court has previously held that a labor union, such as the APOA, has a legally protectable interest in both the merits and remedies of litigation between the United States and an employer when that litigation impacts state-law collective bargaining obligations. In City of Los Angeles, a case neatly identical to the case at hand, the United States alleged the City of Los Angeles engaged in a pattern and practice of depriving individuals of constitutional rights through the use of excessive force, false arrests, improper searches and seizures in violation of 42 U.S.C. §14141. Before filing the suit, the parties agreed to enter into a consent decree that would resolve the suit. Accordingly, on the same day the United States filed the complaint the parties filed a "Joint Application to Enter Consent Decree" and lodged a proposed consent decree with the district court. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 396, ‘The Los Angeles Police Protective League (“League”), the labor union representing the Los Angeles police officers, responded by moving to intervene in the ection, The League claimed that the consent decree was incompatible with the labor agreement between the League and the City, The district court denied the League’s motion to intervene as a matter of right and its motion, in the alternative, for permissive intervention. /a.Case 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 9 of 18 ‘The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the League had a protectable interest in the merits and remedies of the case because the complaint: (1) sought injunctive relief against members of the League; (2) raised factual allegations that the member officers had committed unconstitutional acts in the line of duty; and (3) sought remedies which could affect terms of the labor agreement between the League and the City under which members of the League were employed. Id. at 399. ‘With respect to the League's interest in the merits of the litigation, the court explained the allegations in the complaint alone provided the League with a protectable interest. The Police League claims a protectable interest because the complaint seeks injunctive relief against its member officers and raises factual allegations that its member officers committed unconstitutional acts in the line of duty. These allegations alone ere sufficient to demonstrate that the Police League had a protectable interest in the merits phase of the litigation. Id. at 399. Further, the court explained the League had a separate, independent protectable interest in the remedy sought by the United States because the consent decree conflicted with the provisions of the labor agreement between the City of Los Angeles and the League and also infringed on state-law bargaining rights: The Police League has state Iaw rights to negotiate about the terms and conditions of its members! employment as LAPD officers and to rely on the collective bargaining agreement that is a result from those negotiations. These rights give it an interest in the consent decree at issue. Thus, the Police ‘League’s interest in the consent decree is two-fold. To the extent it contains or might contain provisions that contradict terms of the officers’ (collective bargaining agreement], the Police League has an interest. Further, to the extent it is disputed whether or not the consent decree conflicts with the (collective bargaining agreement], the Police League has the right to preserve its views on the subject to the district court and have them fully considered in conjunction with the district court's decision to approve the consent decree. Id. at 400 (citation omitted).Case 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 10 of 18 ‘The APOA has a protectable interest in the merits of the underling action brought by the United States. The United States has alleged the City of Albuquerque has allowed its officers to ‘engage in a pattern and practice of depriving individuals of their constitutional rights through excessive force, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §14141, The United States seeks relief against the City and its employees who are members of the APOA. Further, the City raises factual allegations that the member officers have committed unconstitutional acts in the line of duty. Thus, like the League in City of Los Angeles, the APOA has a protectable interest in the merits of the dispute between the United States and the City. Further, the APOA has a separate, independent protectable interest in the remedy sought by the United States because the Settlement Agreement conflicts with provisions of the CBA negotiated between the City and the APOA which infringes upon the APOA's state-law and City Ordinance bargaining rights. That is, the United States is requiring the City to modify its policies, practices, and procedures, which has significant collective bargaining ramifications. The City has already agreed to implement those changes before even broaching, let alone negotiating such changes through collective bargaining negotiations with the APOA. ‘The Settlement Agreement conflicts with the APOA’s long standing CBA with the City which provides for the establishment of an equitable and peaceful procedure for resolution of differences and the establishment of rates of pay, hours of work, and other conditions of ‘employment. As an example, the Settlement Agreement proposes new guidelines regarding the implementation of discipline for alleged misconduct. Disciplines and the resulting issue of job security are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining under the terms of the CBA. See Portland Fire Fighters Association, Local 43 v, City of Portland, 16 PECBR 245 (1995) TheCase 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 11 of 18 City, despite this process, cannot unilaterally change the levels and imposition of discipline to be imposed on APOA members. Under the LMRO, the City must bargain in good faith and reach an agreement with the APOA before it can implement changes to mandatory subjects of bargaining, like discipline. The APOA contends if the City is allowed to proceed with the implementation of this Settlement Agreement and the resulting new policies it will have committed an unfair labor practice under ‘the LMRO and resulting in litigation before the Labor Board and possibly the District Court. ‘The APOA would argue even if some of the proposed changes are considered permissive subjects of bargaining, the City is stil obligated to negotiate any policy or procedure which impacts mandatory compensation, work hours, safety, safety related training and disciplinary standards, The APOA, because of the relief sought against its members and the factual allegations made, without subject to challenge, has a protectable interest in the merits of this litigation. Further, the APOA because of the rights to collective bargaining protected under state-law and City Ordinance, has a protectable interest in any remedy sought by the parties. See U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9" Cir, 2002). 3 An adverse decision in this form would impair the APOA's ability to piotect jts contractual rights with the City and impede enforcement of its city ordinance bargaining rights. Fed. R. Civ, P. 24 (a) requires an applicant for intervention as a matter of right be "so situated that disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest." City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 397. Fed R. Civ. P. 24(a) does not require the intervener's interest be legally impaired; the relevant inquiry is whether the intervenes interest "may" be impaired "as a practical matter." iCase 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 12 of 18 In the City of Las Angeles, the Ninth Circuit found that the Police League satisfied this third prong of the intervention analysis because the Police League's continuing ability to protect and enforce its contract provisions could be impaired or impeded by consent decree between the United States and the City. See City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 401. Denial of the APOA's request to intervene would impair the ability the APOA to protect its contractual rights with the City. Should the Court approve the Settlement Agreement, the conflict between the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the existing policy and procedures will impose obligations on the City to change such policies and procedures and will likely result in breach of the CBA by the City. Without the APOA’s involvement this action, adjudicating the conflict between the Settlement Agreement and the CBA will severely impact the substantial legal interests of the APOA in upholding its rights under the CBA on behalf of its members. Further, this Settlement Agreement between the United States and the City will impede the rights of the APOA's members by changing their terms conditions of employment without first satisfying the bargaining obligations imposed by the City Ordinance. As the court noted in the City of Los Angeles, a settlement agreement that overrides state law bargaining rights- even if court-approved- impedes the legal rights of bargaining unit members. /d. at 401. 4. he APOA's interest will not be adequately represented by the City. ‘The APOA satisfies the final prong for intervention because the City may not adequately represent the APOA's interest in this matter. To assess adequate representation, the court considers: (1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all the intervener's arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether the would-be intervener would offer the necessary elements to the proceedings that other parties would neglect. The prospective intervener bears the burden of demonstrating the existing parties do not adequately represent its interest.Case 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 13 of 18 City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 398 (citations omitted), The requirement of inadequate representation is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his interest by existing parties "may be" inadequate. Zd. Normally, a presumption of adequate representation generally arises when a representative is a governmental body or officer charged by law with representing the interest of the absentee. Jd. at 401, However, this presumption arises when the government is acting on behalf of its constituency that it represents; the situation is different when the government acts as an employer. The presumption does not apply to parties who are antagonists in the collective- bargaining processes. id. at 402. For this reason, the court in City of Los Angeles found the Police League's interest diverged from those of the City of Los Angeles held that the City of Los Angeles would not adequately represent the League's interests, Id. at 402, The same results of apply here, The City cannot and will not adequately represent the APOA's interest because the City and the APOA are antagonistic in the collective bargaining process, As an example, in 2010 the City unilaterally breached the CBA by reducing wages. The resulting litigation is pending in the District Court. Further, te CBA negotiation took five (5) ‘years to complete. Further, the Settlement Agreement and the underlying theories of liability that had been placed in this matter are clear evidence of such divergence. Further, the fact that the APOA had to file a Prohibited Practice Complaint regarding the City's Settlement Agreement to implement widespread changes to policies, procedures and standards is evidence of 2 violation of the CBA. Lastly, the Settlement Agreement itself is evidence of the nature of the changes called for and the impact it will have on the working conditions of members of the APOA. The APOA and the City stand at an adversarial position, as a result of the entry of this Settlement Agreement and, therefore, the City cannot adequately protect the APOA's interests. 10Case 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 14 of 18 B. Alternatively, the court should permit APOA to intervene permissively. Permissive intervention is governed in pertinent part by Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (6)(2)(B), which provides "On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who...has a claim or defense the shares with the main action a common question of law or fact" Thus, "a court may grant permissive intervention where the applicant for intervention shows (1) independent grounds for jurisdiction; (2) to the motion is timely; and (3) the applicant's claim or defense, and the main action, have a question of law or a question of fact in common. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 403. ‘The threshold requirements for permissive intervention are clearly met in this instance, The court has independent grounds for asserting jurisdiction over the APOA. The Complaint alleges that APOA members have deprived persons of rights, privileges and immunities secured or protected by the Constitution of the United States, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 14141, and secks injunctive relief against the APOA's members, The Court has federal question jurisdiction over these claims. See 28 U.S.C, §1331. This is sufficient to establish this court's independent grounds for jurisdiction, See Freedom from Religious Foundation, Inc. ». Geithner, 644 F.3d 836, 843-44 (9th Cir. 2011) (in federal-question cases, the jurisdictional requirement for permissive intervention is met ifthe intervener relies on the same federal statute as the plaintiff, ‘As noted above, this motion is timely and allowing the APOA to intervene will not delay the litigation, Ferther, questions of law or fact are shared with the existing parties, The APOA. seeks to defend its member officers against allegations of police misconduct, The APOA also seeks to address the viability of the remedies in the Settlement Agreement and to present evidence as to why many of those remedies are inappropriate given the conflict with the CBA and the legal rights guaranteed under the LMRO. The APOA, at this time, does not seek to bring uwCase 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 15 of 18 claims. The APOA's intervention would neither delay nor alter factual background of these claims, ‘As demonstrated above, the APOA's interest is distinct fiom, and not adequately represented by, the City. The APOA brings an important distinct perspective to this case; the APOA's prospective that will assist the Court's resolution of this matter and further judicial ‘economy by avoiding further litigation. The APOA will represent interests in this litigation that may not otherwise be represented, and its participation will contribute to the equitable resolution, of this conflict, See Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1989), Permissive intervention should be granted will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of an existing party's rights, where the movant’ interest is not adequately represented by existing party, and ‘where judicial economy will benefit from the intervention. The APOA’s Motion to Intervene should be granted as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The APOA will submit a proposed answer to the parties for review upon approval of the relief sought herein. WV. ;CLUSION For the reasons describes above, the APOA would request the Court grant its Motion to Intervene es a Defendant as a matter of right under Fed R. Civ.P.24(a) or, in the alternative, permissively under Fed R. Civ.P.24(b). Respectfully submitted, SANCHEZ, MOWRER & DESIDERIO, P.C. (s! Frederick M. Mowrer FREDERICK M. MOWRER Attorney for Albuquerque Police Officers’ Association PO Box 1966 Albuquerque, NM 87103 Telephone: (505) 247-4321 12Case 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 16 of 18 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18" day of December, 2014, | electronically filed the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Intervener Albuquerque Officers’ Association's Motion to Intervene (FRCP Rule 24) with the Cleric of Court using the CM/ECF System, which will send notification of such filing to the following: ELIZABETH M. MARTINEZ Executive Assistant U.S. Attorney MICHAEL H. HOSES Assistant U.S. Attomey, Civil Di mn, Chief RUTH F. KEEGAN Assistant U.S, Attomey United States Attomey's Office District of New Mexico P.O. Box 607 Albuquerque, NM 87103 Telephone: (505) 346-7274 Fax: (505) 346-7205 Email: Elizabeth Martinez@usdoj.gov VANITA GUPTA Acting Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division JONATHON M. SMITH Chief LUIS E. SAUEDO Counsel to the Chief COREY M. SANDERS PAULKILLEBREW Trial Attomeys Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 Telephone: (202) 305-3239 Fax: (202) 514-4883 Email: Paul killebrew@usdoj.gov Luis.e.saucedo@ustoj.gov (s/ Frederick M, Mowrer FREDERICK M. MOWRER DAVID J. TOUREK City Attorney, for Defendant City of Albuquerque P.O. Box 2248 Albuquerque, NM 87103 (505)768-4500 diourek@cabq.gov SCOTT T. GREENWOOD Special Counsel to the City of Albuquerque 312 Walnut Street, Suite 1600 Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 (513) 943-4200 Law@scottgreenwood.comCase 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 17 of 18 claims, The APOA'S intervention would neither delay nor alter factual background of these claims. As demonstrated above, the APOA's interest is distinct from, and not adequately represented by, the City. The APOA brings an important distinct perspective to this case; the APOA's prospective that will assist the Cours resolution of this matter and further judicial economy by avoiding further litigation. The APOA will represent interests in this litigation that may not otherwise be represented, and its perticipation will contribute to the equitable resolution of this conflict. See Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1989). Permissive intervention should be granted will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of an existing party's rights, where the movant's interest is not adequately represented by existing party, and where judicial economy will benefit from the intervention. The APOA's Motion to Intervene should be granted as required by Fed, R. Civ. P, 24(a). The APOA will submit a proposed answer to the parties for review upon approval of the relief sought herein. CONCLUSION For the reasons describes above, the APOA would request the Court grant its Motion to Intervene as a Defendant as a matter of right under Fed R. Civ.P.24{a) or, in the alternative, permissively under Fed R. Civ.P.24(b). ___Respecttflly submitted, __ SANCHEZ, MOWRER & DESI Association PO Box 1966 Albuquerque, NM 87103 Telephone: (505) 247-4321 12Case 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV Document 41 Filed 12/19/14 Page 18 of 18 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18" day of December, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Intervener Albuquerque Officers’ Association's Motion to Intervene (FRCP Rule 24) with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF System, which will send notification of such filing to the following: ELIZABETH M. MARTINEZ Executive Assistant U.S, Attorney MICHAEL H. HOSES Assistant U.S, Attomey Civil Division, Chief RUTH F. KEEGAN Assistant U.S. Attorney United States Attorney's Office District of New Mexico P.O. Box 607 Albuquerque, NM 87103 Telephone: (505) 346-7274 Fax: (505) 346-7205 Email: Elizabeth Martinez@usdoj.gov VANITA GUPTA Acting Assistant Attoriey General Civil Rights Division JONATHON M. SMITH Chief LUIS E, SAUEDO Counsel to the Chief COREY M. SANDERS PAUL KILLEBREW Trial Attorneys Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Section 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 Telephone: (202) 305-3239 (202) 514-4883, : Paul killebrew@usdoj.gov Luis.e,saucedo@usdoj.gov DAVID J. TOUREK City Attomey, for Defendant City of Albuquerque P.O. Box 2248, Albuquerque, NM 87103 (505)768-4500 dtourek@cabgq.gev SCOTT T. GREENWOOD Special Counsel to the City of Albuquerque 312 Walnut Street, Suite 1600 Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 (513) 943-4200 Law@scottgreenwood.com