), 2015 MBCA 9
Date: 20150126
Docket: AR13-30-08071
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
- and KENNETH TOBY ROULETTE
(Accused) Appellant
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
G. G. Brodsky, Q.C.
for the Appellant
D. L. Carlson and
A. Y. Kotler
for the Respondent
Appeal heard:
October 15, 2014
Judgment delivered:
January 26, 2015
MacINNES J.A.
[1]
murder.
[2]
See: 2013 MBQB 156, 298 Man.R. (2d) 12; 2013 MBQB 232, 298 Man.R. (2d) 83
Page: 2
that the judge erred in respect of any of the issues, and accordingly, I would
dismiss the accuseds appeal.
Facts
[4]
(Glow) and Philip Asham (Asham), separately contacted the police with
information pertaining to the killings. At the time Glow and Asham did so,
they were each in custody on unrelated charges and provided the information
in the hope that, in exchange, the charges against them would be dropped.
[6]
agreement.
charges against him were stayed (although he disputes that that occurred in
exchange for his evidence).
[8]
Page: 3
accused was arrested on March 3, 2010, and charged with first degree
murder in respect of the deaths of Henderson and Baptiste. In the course of
the trial, forensic evidence was introduced which linked the accused to the
murders in several ways. As well, there was evidence that the accused made
statements to each of Glow and Asham in which he admitted killing the two.
He told Glow that he was starting a business of murder for hire, that these
were his first job and that if Glow, or anyone Glow knew, needed such
work done, he was available. The accused telephoned Asham shortly after
the killings and told Asham that he had just murked i.e., murdered, two
guys.
[9]
information from the Crown concerning the Crowns case and of undue
delay in bringing the matter to trial. Ultimately, the accused moved to have
Page: 4
the charges stayed by reason of the imperfect disclosure and the delay.
Although the judge agreed that there had been some delay attributable to the
Crown, he dismissed the accuseds application for a judicial stay.
[12]
counsel and the judges charge to the jury, and after deliberation, convicted
the accused of both counts.
Grounds of Appeal
[14]
The accused asks that this court set aside the conviction in respect
of both counts and order a new trial. He raises eight issues, which can be
condensed to five, for consideration on the appeal, namely:
1. Did the judge err in failing to find a breach of Charter ss. 7
Page: 5
The accused argues that the issues on appeal raise questions of law
and thus, the standard of review with respect to each is that of correctness.
[16]
The Crown asserts that, with respect to issue number one, the
As well, the Crown argues that, to the extent the accused seeks a
Page: 6
As to issue number two, the Crown argues that both the application
of s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code (the Code), and the decision whether to
admit hearsay evidence for its truth, are issues within the discretion of the
judge. Absent an error in principle, the decisions are entitled to deference.
[19]
The Crown agrees with the accused that the third and fifth issues
The Crown submits that the fourth issue on appeal involves the
regarding issues three and five) is correct as regards the standard of review
pertaining to each of the issues on appeal.
[22]
1.
Page: 7
and the incompleteness of the disclosure, deprived him of the ability to make
full answer and defence to the charges. This delay, he says, was contrary to
the principles of fundamental justice and contributed to the trial not being
conducted within a reasonable time in breach of his rights under ss. 7 and
11(b) of the Charter. In the result, the accused submits that a judicial stay of
proceedings ought to have been entered under s. 24(1) of the Charter.
[24]
are concerns traditionally raised under the common law doctrine of abuse of
process and says that there is no distinction at law between the common law
doctrine of abuse of process and Charter requirements regarding abusive
conduct.
[26]
The accused refers to Babos, wherein the court said that there are
Page: 8
(3)
The accused argues that both the main and the residual categories are
engaged in this case.
[28]
been prejudiced in, or has suffered an adverse effect on, his ability to make
full answer and defence by the delayed and incomplete disclosure.
[29]
The prejudice, says the accused, was so severe that the only
remedy was either a stay of proceedings or the refusal of the judge to admit
Glows preliminary inquiry evidence at the trial.
[31]
As well, the accused submits that although the judge found that the
Page: 9
Crown was responsible for significant delay and held that the delay, in
particular, the late disclosure, was conduct for which the Crown should not
be proud (at para. 83), he erred in not appropriately considering step two of
the test by failing to turn his mind in any meaningful way to the
consideration of an alternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice.
[32]
The Crown argues that the accuseds assertion that his s. 11(b)
This argument, says the Crown, was accepted by the judge, who
found that there had been four months of excessive delay in the period
leading up to the scheduling of the preliminary inquiry and that the Crown
was responsible for three of those four months.
Notwithstanding, he
concluded that, given the serious nature of the charges and the societal
interest in criminal prosecutions being decided on their merits, the delays did
not warrant the remedy of a stay of proceedings. His decision, submits the
Crown, is entitled to considerable deference.
[34]
proceedings for abuse of process under ss. 7 and 24(1) of the Charter
because the alleged disclosure deficiencies compromised trial fairness and
undermined the integrity of the judicial process, the Crown asserts that the
accuseds arguments before the judge were not framed in abuse of process
and says that the accused is thus attempting to raise a Charter argument not
made at trial. Such an argument, says the Crown, should only be allowed in
Page: 10
The Crown submits that the judge concluded that, although late,
for the most part the disclosure was received by the accused well before the
trial and that his right to full answer and defence had not been prejudiced.
The Crown says that that conclusion was amply supported by the evidence.
[36]
conclusion that the accuseds ability to defend himself had not been
prejudiced was not unreasonable. Moreover, a stay of proceedings is an
extraordinary remedy only granted in the clearest of cases. The Crown
argues that the judges finding that this was not such a case is entitled to
deference. Further, as regards the accuseds attempt to advance a new
Charter argument on appeal, the Crown asserts that he has not demonstrated
an exceptional circumstance where such a new argument need be entertained
in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Analysis
[37]
June 10, 2013. He reserved his decision, which was delivered June 25,
2013. The judges reasons for decision are very thorough and demonstrate
clearly that he was completely alive to the evidence submitted on the motion
and to the relevant issues and the law as argued by counsel before him.
[38]
piecemeal, the judge found that, for the most part, it had been provided to
Page: 11
defence counsel prior to the preliminary inquiry and certainly prior to the
commencement of trial. Ultimately, the judge concluded that the accused
had not shown that his right to make full answer and defence had been
detrimentally impacted and thus denied the accuseds request for relief on
the ground that his s. 7 Charter rights had been infringed.
[39]
imperfect disclosure had resulted in a delay of the proceedings such that the
accused was deprived of his right to be tried within a reasonable time, the
judge thoroughly considered the timelines of the proceedings from March 3,
2010, the date of the charge, until June 10, 2013, the date the motion was
argued (contemplating that the trial would commence on September 9, 2013,
which it did).
[40]
Page: 12
these charges, they do not warrant a stay of proceedings (at para. 83). He
therefore dismissed the accuseds claim under s. 11(b) of the Charter.
The standard of appellate review is one of significant deference
[42]
[43]
[44]
remedy, that the judge should refuse to admit the preliminary inquiry
evidence of Glow. The judge did not do so, but instead deferred that request
to trial. As will be seen in issue number two, the judge did deal at trial with
the admissibility of Glows preliminary inquiry evidence. There was no
error in deferring that matter to the trial.
2.
Glow?
[45]
The accused says that the judge erroneously ruled that the Glow
Glow because he did not have important disclosure upon which to challenge
Page: 13
Glow, disclosure that was in the possession of the Crown before the
preliminary inquiry.
[47]
The accused says that the dilatory disclosure by the Crown resulted
evidence did not meet the requirement of threshold reliability and says that
much of his testimony was inconsistent with the evidence of other witnesses.
Page: 14
[51]
reliability: Glow had a motive to lie; his testimony was given in exchange
for a stay of his charges and those of his girlfriend, Delores Saari (Saari);
and that certain information was not disclosed to the accused until moments
before the testimony of Saari at trial. These factors, says the accused, go to
threshold reliability, not ultimate reliability.
[52]
The accused also argues that, despite the fact Glows evidence was
time of the preliminary inquiry does not result in a finding of a lack of full
opportunity to cross-examine a witness.
[54]
Page: 15
of the judge.
Moreover, the Crown argues that if the evidence should not have
been admitted under s. 715(1) of the Code, it certainly should have been
admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.
[58]
between the testimony of Glow and the evidence of other witnesses and that
the judge, in fact, listed a number of areas where Glows testimony was
consistent with that provided by other witnesses.
[59]
While
the
judge
acknowledged
that
there
were
some
inconsistencies, that, says the Crown, is not determinative of the test for
threshold reliability.
[60]
motive to lie because his testimony was being given in exchange for the
staying of his charges and those of Saari. As regards the latter, the Crown
asserts that there was no evidence whatsoever that Saaris charges had
anything to do with Glows decision to cooperate with the police. In fact,
Page: 16
the authorities may have coloured his evidence was thoroughly canvassed in
his cross-examination at the preliminary inquiry and was, therefore,
available for the jurys review at trial. The Crown asserts that Glows
motive to co-operate with the authorities did not preclude the admission of
his preliminary inquiry testimony, particularly given the extensive additional
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness attached to the preliminary
inquiry proceeding.
Analysis
[62]
In the course of the trial, the Crown moved for admission of the
preliminary evidence of Glow under s. 715(1) of the Code and for leave to
play to the jury an audiotape of Glows preliminary inquiry testimony.
[63]
Page: 17
the trial both the preliminary inquiry testimony of Glow and the audiotape of
his testimony.
[66]
arguments that, because he had not received full disclosure from the Crown
at the time Glow testified at the preliminary inquiry, he did not have full
opportunity to cross-examine Glow, thus, the admission of his evidence at
trial would be unfair to him.
[67]
874, 256 O.A.C. 268, where the court wrote (at para. 68):
The better approach, in my view, is to limit consideration of the
Page: 18
judge, and that is so even if all of the criteria set forth in s. 715(1) have been
met. In R. v. Potvin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525, Wilson J. cautioned that the
circumstance which would give rise to the exercise of discretion to exclude
will be relatively rare and that the discretion to prevent unfairness is not a
blanket authority to undermine the object of s. 643(1) [now s. 715(1)] by
excluding evidence of previous testimony as a matter of course (at p. 548).
[70]
It was with that in mind that the judge then embarked upon a
and the underlying evidence. I see no error in his conclusions that the
complaints did not warrant a finding of trial unfairness.
Page: 19
[72]
was one involving the exercise of discretion by the judge. As such, the
standard for appellate intervention is very high. I see no reversible error on
fact or law in the decision of the judge. In my view, his decision is correct
and certainly not so clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice. There is no
basis for appellate intervention.
As a result, I need not deal with the argument pertaining to
[73]
Did the judge err in instructing the jurors that they could not draw an
adverse inference from the Crowns failure to call certain witnesses and did
that instruction reverse the burden of proof?
[74]
The accused argues that the judge instructed the jury that they
could draw no inference from the Crowns decision not to call certain
witnesses. This argument is advanced in respect of a number of witnesses,
particularly, Black John, Steve, Sean Sorenson (Sorenson), and Kevin Huber
(Huber).
[75]
The accused says that the first three witnesses could have given
evidence pertaining to the sale by Glow of the television set stolen from
Baptistes apartment at the time of the murders, which evidence may or may
not have supported Glows evidence concerning the sale.
Page: 20
[76]
As for the witness Huber, who was with Asham at the time Asham
says he received a phone call from the accused, the accused argues that he
may or may not have supported Ashams evidence that the accused told him
that he had just murked, i.e., murdered, two guys.
[77]
Further, the accused says that the judge did not instruct the jury
that they could not draw an adverse inference against the accused from the
accuseds decision not to call certain witnesses, nor did he remind the jury
that the accused was not required to call evidence to prove his innocence.
[78]
powers in presenting its case, that this discretion lies at the heart of the
adversarial process and that it is rare for a court to interfere. But, argues the
accused, when the Crown elects not to call a witness, particularly one the
accused needs the jury to hear in order to make full answer and defence, and
who the jury was told would be called, the accused is put in an untenable
position, because, if he is required to call a witness, he loses his ability to
cross-examine and his right to argue last.
[79]
Page: 21
the onus from the Crown having to prove guilt to the accused having to
prove innocence.
[81]
before the judges charge, the judge advised defence counsel that a
correcting instruction would be necessary and defence counsel replied, I
anticipated that. Defence counsel, submits the Crown, now argues that, by
giving this correcting instruction, the judge reversed the burden of proof and
required the accused to establish his innocence.
[83]
The Crown argues that the judge was correct in his observing that,
where neither side chooses to call a witness, the jury is not to speculate as to
what that witness might have said had he or she been called, but rather must
decide the case on the basis of the evidence that has been presented. The
Page: 22
The Crown asserts that modern disclosure rules put both Crown
and accused in essentially the same position to assess the relative merits of
presenting certain witnesses. It says the law is well settled. The fact that the
calling of a witness by the accused might restrict his ability to cross-examine
or remove his ability to argue last is of no moment.
[86]
The Crown says the accused could have called whatever evidence
he thought appropriate in this case. However, it was not open to the accused
to decline to do so and then invite the jury to speculate that, had a witness
been called, his/her evidence would have been beneficial to the accused.
[87]
Analysis
[88]
does not support an adverse inference and, as such, it is improper for counsel
to invite the jury to do so. Nor, generally, should the judge do so.
[89]
This was made clear in R. v. Jolivet, 2000 SCC 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R.
Page: 23
There are exceptions to the general rule, but none apply in this case.
[90]
do so.
[92]
meeting was held and the judge advised that a correcting instruction would
be necessary and given in his jury charge. He then did so, as follows:
I do, however, wish to make some comments about some of the
matters which were made during the course of yesterdays
submissions.
During his submission, [defence counsel] made mention of the
fact that Black John or Steve or [Sorenson], the individuals,
according to Mr. Glow and/or Ms. Saari, who had involvement in
the sale of the TV, were not called as witnesses, perhaps inviting
you to infer that they would not have supported the evidence of
Mr. Glow and Ms. Saari about a TV in their home. You cannot
make such an inference. Who knows what these people would
have said? They may have supported Mr. Glow or they may
Page: 24
have not supported Mr. Glow. To infer anything about what they
may have said would be speculation. Remember that I told you
that although you may wish the evidence was more complete in
certain areas, you will have to reach verdicts on the evidence as it
stands. You should not speculate about what others may have
said if they had been called as witnesses.
The same applies to Mr. Huber. [Defence counsel] noted that he
was not called. Again, you can make no inference unfavourable
to the Crown based upon Mr. Hubers absence. By so doing, you
are speculating that Mr. Huber would not support Mr. Asham and
you cannot speculate.
[Defence counsel] also made mention that there might have been
a number of people that evening who saw [the accused] and no
one came to give evidence to say that [the accused] was wearing
a jacket that was found in the dumpster. The absence of such
people again does not allow you to infer that [the accused] was or
was not wearing that jacket. You must draw any inference from
the evidence. It is up to you whether you conclude that the DNA
evidence regarding that jacket, coupled with other evidence that
you heard, is enough to convince you that [the accused] was
wearing that jacket on that occasion or not. But you cannot use
the fact that no evidence was called from people who actually
saw [the accused] wearing that particular jacket to come to your
conclusion on that issue.
A similar point can be made about [defence counsels] reference
to the lack of wiretaps and blood spatter evidence. You cannot
draw any inferences against the Crown from the lack of such
evidence because you again would be speculating what that
evidence would be. In addition, you cannot presume that such
evidence or indeed other investigative techniques would have
been reliable or even appropriate in the first place. No evidence
was led as to what proper investigation practice is and you should
not assume that you know what it is and what it is not and what
such a technique, even if its available, would have yielded. You
must make your decision on the evidence given to you in this
case.
Page: 25
judge created any inference that the accused should have called the
witnesses in question. Nor did the judge shift the onus of proof from the
Crown to the accused.
Page: 26
[94]
Did the judge err by allowing the introduction of evidence that the
accused had been in custody, had the number 187 tattooed on his arm
and was involved in drug trafficking?
[95]
The accused argues that the judge erred in allowing the admission
That evidence was that Asham had met the accused while they
The accused says the Crown wanted this information before the
jury to establish that the murders were planned and were therefore first
degree murder, and to support its application to have Glows evidence
admitted at trial.
[98]
The accused submits that while the judge gave the jury a limiting
instruction as to the use the jury could make of this evidence, the limiting
instruction was insufficient. It was given only once at the conclusion of the
Crowns direct examination of Asham and was not repeated during the
judges charge to the jury.
[99]
instruction at all, was given by the trial judge when other impermissible
character evidence was given before the jury. Specifically, he says that
Page: 27
The accused submits that the jury was not aware that they could
not use this bad character evidence from Glow and Saari about the accused
to determine whether the accused was more likely to have committed the
crimes charged. As well, that the lack of instruction as to how the evidence
could be used was even more problematic in this case because the jury was
warned to be careful of the testimony of the unsavoury witnesses Glow and
Asham.
[101]
Page: 28
[103]
accuseds gang or crew and Glow testified that the accused told him that he
was starting a murder-for-hire operation named either MS13 or 187.
[104]
and deliberation with Glow testifying that the accused said the murders in
question were his first job.
[105]
The Crown submits that this evidence is not prejudicial in the legal
sense, that is, it did not encourage the jury to draw an inappropriate
inference. Rather, says the Crown, if believed, it would have led to the
entirely legitimate conclusion that the accused had committed the murders as
part of the job to which he referred, and, thus, that they were planned and
deliberate.
evidence.
[106]
Further, the Crown asserts that the judge carefully instructed the
jury as to the use of the evidence. In fact, the judge specifically instructed
the jury that it would be wrong to use that evidence to conclude that the
accused would be more likely to have committed the offences with which he
was charged.
[107]
Not only was that instruction given by the judge in the course of
the trial evidence, but, says the Crown, contrary to the accuseds assertion,
the warning was repeated again in the judges final charge to the jury.
[108]
The Crown asserts, therefore, that there is no basis for belief that
Page: 29
Analysis
[109]
balance its probative value against its prejudicial effect. The evidence was
not prejudicial in the legal sense, but its probative value was significant. If
believed by the jury it could lend credence to the evidence of Asham and
Glow. It could explain why the accused was prepared to contact each of
them following the murders, both because the accused knew each of them
and knew that they themselves were involved in criminal activity.
Moreover, it could provide some common-sense explanation as to why the
accused would have been prepared to make the disclosures to them, which
they say he did, concerning his involvement in the murders. The evidence
also could lead the jury to the conclusion that the murders were committed
as part of a job and were therefore planned and deliberate, thus supporting a
conclusion of guilt for first degree murder.
[111]
the jury as to how the jury was to use the bad-character evidence and, in
particular, as to how it could not use that evidence. He gave a caution in that
regard in the course of the trial and in his charge to the jury at the conclusion
of the trial.
[112]
and his caution to the jury as to how the evidence could be used was clear
and correct. There is no basis here for appellate intervention in respect of
Page: 30
The accused argues that, in order for him to make full answer and
defence, it was necessary that he knew the case that he was required to
answer. He says that he repeatedly requested witness contact information
from the Crown, but that those requests were denied.
[114]
concerns respecting the witnesses, but never explained what those concerns
were, nor answered how those unexplained security concerns overrode the
accuseds presumption of innocence.
[115]
on the witness list read to the jury at the outset of the trial. While the Crown
subpoenaed Sorenson, it did so only a few days before the trial began and
never brought Sorenson to the trial.
[117]
week after the trial had started and that, not only did the Crown refuse to
bring Sorenson to court, it had previously refused to tell the accused where
Sorenson was located.
Page: 31
[118]
Thus, argues the accused, the judge erred in finding that the
The Crown argues that, while the accused says his rights were
violated when the Crown failed to call certain witnesses or bring them to
court, the accused sought no relief at trial concerning either complaint. No
motions were made, no evidence was called, no rulings were issued and,
accordingly, there is little for this court to review on appeal.
[120]
The Crown says that the witnesses to whom the accused refers
were tangential at best, that when they were located and/or produced,
defence counsel called none of them and, in some cases, made little effort
even to speak to them. The Crown located Sorenson in a British Columbia
penitentiary on September 13, 2013.
immediately and, six days later, defence counsel had made no attempt to
contact Sorenson, let alone explore ways to bring his evidence to trial.
[121]
The Crown says that many of the witnesses to whom the accused
Crown or the defence can have access to the witness if the witness is
prepared to give access. Likewise, both are entitled to subpoena the witness.
[123]
Page: 32
accommodate the accused, nor to bring witnesses to court for the accused.
[124]
It appears that, in this case, the Crown agreed simply that it would
days of the trial. The trial was scheduled to continue for five weeks. It
would appear that defence counsel did not contact Sorenson for the purpose
of attempting to interview him, nor did he take any steps to attempt to bring
him to Winnipeg to testify at trial. As well, no motions were made by
defence counsel concerning the possible attendance of Sorenson as a
witness, although much allocated trial time remained.
Page: 33
[127]
Glow testified that he sold the television between 8:00 and 9:00
a.m. on the morning immediately following the murders, the murders having
occurred about four hours earlier.
inquiry was that he contacted Black John, a person whom he knew bought
things like this, and that Black John brought a gentleman with him who
looked at the television and then bought it.
[129]
in connection with the sale of the stolen television. Although he did not
have all of the police notes concerning this at the time of the crossexamination, he did have the note of Constable Reid from the January 6,
2011 interview of Sorenson. In that note was reference to the belief that the
stolen television from the double homicide at 729 Maryland Street on
January 31, 2009, was in Sorensons possession at some point following the
murder (at approximately 9:00 a.m. on January 31, 2009). There was, as
well, reference to the fact that another officer had stated that Glow sold the
television the next morning to Sorenson for $600.
[130]
Page: 34
cross-examine Glow with the view of attacking his evidence on that point.
[131]
but did testify at trial and was considered a Vetrovec witness for purposes of
her trial evidence. She testified that the television was sold approximately
two days after it was received by Glow to a couple of people who attended
their apartment to make the purchase. Clearly, her evidence was in conflict
with that of Glow as to when the sale occurred.
[132]
evidence consistent with that of Saari and, thus, inconsistent with Glow for
the purpose of using that inconsistent evidence to attack Glows credibility.
Defence counsel acknowledged, however, that, while he wanted Sorenson
produced as a witness, he did not know what Sorenson would actually say
on the issue if called as a witness. It may or may not have supported Glows
evidence.
[133]
the preliminary inquiry despite having Cst. Reids note, in the final result,
defence counsel was able to attack Glows credibility at trial as regards the
sale of the television set based upon the contradictory trial evidence of Saari.
Page: 35
[135]
Lastly, contrary to the accuseds assertion, the jury was not told by
production of the potential witness Sorenson. This court reviews for error.
Here, there is, therefore, nothing to review or with which to interfere, nor is
there any merit to the point argued.
Conclusion
[138]
not persuaded of any error by the judge. There is no basis for appellate
intervention and thus, I would dismiss the appeal.
MacInnes J.A.
I agree:
Beard J.A.
I agree:
Monnin J.A.
Page: 36