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4, JANUARY 29, 1962

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Galang vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-17248, January 29, 1962.
BEATRIZ GALANG, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAXIMO QUINIT and
RODRIGO QUINIT, respondents.
Appeal and error; Evidence; Finding of Court of Appeals on credibility not reviewable
on appeal by certiorari.The findings of the Court of Appeals on the credibility of
evidence are beyond the power of review of the Supreme Court on appeals by
certiorari.
Moral damages; Breach of promise to marry; Collection of damages not allowed.
Moral damages for breach of promise to marry are not collectible. (Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals, L-14628, September 30, 1960)
APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
R. Meris-Morales for petitioner.
De Santos, Herrera & Delfino for respondent
CONCEPCION, J,:

This is an action against Rodrigo Quinit and his o f ather Maximo Quinit to recover
damages claimed to have been
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Galang vs. Court of Appeals
sustained by plaintiff Beatriz Galang for an alleged breach of promise on the part of
Rodrigo Quinit to marry her. In due course, the Court of First Instance of Baguio, in
which the case was originally instituted, rendered a decision sentencing the
defendants jointly and severally to pay the sums of P275.00, by way of actual
damages, P5,000.00, as moral damages, and P500.00, as attorney's fees, apart

from the costs. On appeal, taken by the defendants, the Court of Appeals absolved
Maximino Quinit, and accordingly, reversed said decision insofar as he is concerned,
and modified it as regards Rodrigo Quinit, by eliminating the awards for moral
damages and attorney's fees. The case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by
plaintiff Beatriz Galang.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it appears that plaintiff "and Rodrigo Quinit were
engaged, but Rodrigo's parents were strongly opposed to their marriage"; that "from
April 27, 1955", plaintiff "and Rodrigo lived as husband and wife in the house of
Adolfo Dagawan located at Colorado Falls, Tuba, Mountain Province, until May 3 . wh
en Rodr igo lef t and never retu rned "both were from the same town of Sison,
Pangasinan, and their love relations started in the year 1953, the two having
exchanged a long series of love letters since then until they separated", and that "at
the time when they went to Colorado Falls, both were of age."
The evidence on other pertinent facts is, however, conflicting. In the language of
the decision appealed from, plaintiffalso referred to therein as appelletried to
prove
"x x x that Rodrigo courted her in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged,
albeit Rodrigo's mother was opposed to their marriage; that on April 15, 1955
Rodrigo and his father went to her house and her marriage with Rodrigo were
arranged, with the concurrence of her mother, appellant Maximino Quinit having
agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of the marriage, with the
exception of the wedding dress of appellee; that they agreed to have the marriage
celebrated in Baguio, for which reason on April 27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the
latter's father left for Baguio; that upon arriving at Colorado Falls, however,
Maximino made them alight from the bus and took them to the house of Adolfo
Dagawan with whom Maximino
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Galang vs. Court of Appeals
agreed that appellee and Rodrigo would stay in said house, Maximino to pay P5.00
daily for their lodging and asked Dagawan to make all arrangements for their
wedding in Baguio and to act as their sponsor; that after making these
arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo remained in Dagawan's
house where they lived as husband and wife until May 9, that on May 7, appellee
and Rodrigo, accompanied by Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a marriage
license but failed because Rodrigo did not have a residence certificate, although

both prospective contracting parties signed the corresponding application; that on

May 9, on the pretext that he was going to their hometown to get his residence
certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado Falls and never returned; that when appellee
returned to their hometown (Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that Rodrigo's
parents had spirited him away because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was
unsavory."
Upon the other hand, the defendants sought to establish that Rodrigo and plaintiff
"x x x were engaged; that Rodrigo's parents were opposed to their marriage; that
while Rodrigo was agreeable to marrying appellee, he wanted the marriage to take
place after his graduation, while appellee was impatient and wanted the marriage to
be held at an earlier date; that on April 26, 1955, in view of Rodrigo's continued
relations with appellee, his parents told him to leave the parental home, for which
reason on that date he left their house with his belongings and some gantas of rice;
that before leaving their hometown he passed by the house of appellee and told her
what had happened and further told her that he was intending to go to Manila to
look for a job; that appellee convinced him to go, instead, to Colorado Falls where
they could discuss their plans and so there he wentfollowed later by appellee
both staying at the house of Dagawan; that because Rodrigo persistently refused to
marry appellee, the latter's relatives, accompanied by policemen and constabulary
soldiers, arrived at the place and tried to intimidate him; that in view of his
continued refusal they brought him down to Sison where he was allowed to go
home; that thereupon his parents placed him under the custody of Mayor Madriaga
of the neighboring town of Rosario where he stayed from May 1, to June, 1955; that
sometime during the month of June, Adolfo Dagawan sought Rodrigo on the pretext
that he was going to tell him something important and was able to lure him to a
secluded place where he was made to sign an application for a marriage license;
that because of his nonappearance before a notary public, the latter refused to
acknowledge the application.
"With respect to Maximino Quinit the evidence for appellants tends to show that he
had never agreed to have his son marry appellee nor to give a dowry to the latter;
that he did not go with appellee and Rodrigo to Colorado Falls and that
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Galang vs. Court of Appeals
he did not concoct, much less carry out any plan to have his son satisfy his lust and
then get rid of appellee."

The court of first instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the Court of Appeals
considered her evidence unworthy of credence, and, hence, absolved Maximino
Quinit. Plaintiff maintains that the Court of Appeals had erred in the appreciation of
the evidence, but the findings of said Court on the credibility of said evidence are
beyond our power of review on appeal by certiorari and, consequently, conclusive
upon us.
It is next urged that said Court had also erred in not awarding moral damages to
plaintiff, who insists that moral damages for breach of promise to marry are
collectible under our laws, but this question has already been settled adversely to
plaintiff's pretense in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628 (September 30,
1960).
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is here-. by affirmed, therefore,
without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes
and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
Decision affirmed.
NOTES
Certiorari -will not lie to review findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.Questions
of fact cannot be passed upon in the Supreme Court on appeal by certiorari (Tan Si
Kiok vs. Tiacho, 79 Phil. 696). The application for certiorari is an independent action,
not a part or continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment
complained of. An independent action does not interrupt the course of a cause
unless there be a writ of injunction stopping it (Palomares vs. Jimenez. L-4513, Jan.
31, 1952).
Certiorari will not lie to control the actuations of the trial courts, acting within their
respective jurisdiction. They may be wrong or they may be correct in the
appreciation of the facts and the application of the law but errors of fact and of law
are not correctible by certiorari
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or mandamus (Valencia, et al. v. Victoriano, 50 O.G. 5810; Ello v. Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Antique, et al., 49 Phil. 152; Mago, et al. v. Judge Abao, 50 O.G.
5886; Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cavite, 49 Phil. 398).
Errors merely of judgment or of procedure and not of jurisdiction are correctible by
appeal and not by certiorari (Santos v. Pecson, et al., 79 P hil. 261; Abogan, et al. v.
Go Sam, et al., L-3658, December 23, 1950; Delos v. Mapa, 46 Phil. 791; Gonzales v.
Sales, 49 Phil. 1; So Chu v. Nepomuceno, 29 Phil. 208).
While certiorari may be more expeditious than appeal, nevertheless, it will not lie as
a substitute for appeal, unless the right to appeal has .been lost through the court's
own fault (Dais v. Court of First Instance, 51 Phil. 396; Cavan vs. Wislizenus, 48 Phil.
632; Silvestre v. Torres, 57 Phil. 885. See also Ventura v. Yatco, L-11223, March 16,
1959; 56 O.G. 7042).
In appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be raised (SVS Pictures, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, L-9075, January 29, 1960). The interest of justice would be better
served if the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings
where the appealed decision failed to state facts essential to the determination of
the claim. Usually, the case should be dismissed (Ibid).
Requisites for award of moral damages.In order that moral damages may be
awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish,
fright and the like (Darang v. Belizar, L-19487, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 214). While
no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be
awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court (Article
2216), it is nevertheless, essential that the claimant should satisfactorily prove the
existence of the factual basis of the damages (Article 2217) and its causal
connection to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though
incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer (Algarra v. Sandejas, 27 Phil. 284; Malonzo v. Galang, L-13851, July
27, 1960). [Galang vs. Court of Appeals, 4 SCRA 55(1962)]