LABOR RELATIONS

DOCTRINES RUBIO J.
STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS
ABARIA VS. NLRC
-

MCCHI vs the union

Union has no legal personality.
Not duly registered
Union have conflicts with its mother
union (NFL)

Not being a legitimate labor organization nor

the
certified
exclusive
bargaining
representative of MCCHIs rank-and-file
employees,
NAMA-MCCH-NFL
cannot
demand from MCCHI the right to bargain
collectively in their behalf. 45 Hence, MCCHIs
refusal to bargain then with NAMA-MCCHNFL cannot be considered an unfair labor
practice to justify the staging of the strike.46
Strike and picketing activities conducted by
union officers and members were illegal
Art. 263 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended,
provides:
ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. x
xx
(b) Workers shall have the right to engage in
concerted
activities
for
purposes
of
collective bargaining or for their mutual
benefit and protection. The right of
legitimate labor organizations to strike and
picket and of employers to lockout,
consistent with the national interest, shall
continue to be recognized and respected.
However, no labor union may strike and no
employer may declare a lockout on grounds
involving
inter-union
and
intra-union
disputes.
As borne by the records, NAMA-MCCH-NFL
was not a duly registered or an
independently registered union at the time it
filed the notice of strike on March 13, 1996
and when it conducted the strike vote on
April 2, 1996. It could not then legally
represent
the
union
members.
Consequently, the mandatory notice of
strike and the conduct of the strike vote
report were ineffective for having been filed
and conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which
has no legal personality as a legitimate labor
organization, in violation of Art. 263 (c), (d)
and (f) of the Labor Code and Rule XXII,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code.

1 | Page

CASE

YSS
EMPLOYEES
UNION
LABORATORIES INC
-

2012
VS.

YSS

Company vs union
Company retrenched 11 employees
Sec of labor assumed jurisdiction
What
is
the
effect
of
assumption?
Can the ER choose who is to be
reinstated?

Note: art 263 (g)

[I]t must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and
264 of the Labor Code have been enacted
pursuant to the police power of the State,
which has been defined as the power
inherent in a government to enact laws,
within constitutional limits, to promote the
order, safety, health, morals and general
welfare of society. The police power,
together with the power of eminent domain
and the power of taxation, is an inherent
power of government and does not need to
be expressly conferred by the Constitution. x
x x.20
The grant of these plenary powers to the
Secretary of Labor makes it incumbent upon
him to bring about soonest, a fair and just
solution to the differences between the
employer and the employees, so that the
damage such labor dispute might cause
upon the national interest may be minimized
as much as possible, if not totally averted,
by avoiding stoppage of work or any lag in
the activities of the industry or the
possibility of those contingencies that might
cause detriment to the national interest.21
In order to effectively achieve such end, the
assumption or certification order shall have
the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout.
Moreover, if one has already taken place, all
striking workers shall immediately return to
work, and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit
all
workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike
or lockout.22
YSS Laboratories vigorous insistence on the
exclusion of the retrenched employees from
the coverage of the return-to-work order
seriously impairs the authority of the
Secretary of Labor to forestall a labor
dispute that he deems inimical to the

LABOR RELATIONS
DOCTRINES RUBIO J.

CASE

2012

national economy. The Secretary of Labor is

afforded plenary and broad powers, and is
granted great breadth of discretion to adopt
the most reasonable and expeditious way of
writing finis to the labor dispute.

to be reinstated in the middle of the first

term.16 We held that the NLRC was merely
trying its best to work out a satisfactory ad
hoc solution to a festering and serious
problem.17

NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF DUSIT HOTEL

NIKKO CHAPTER VS. CA

The peculiar circumstances in the present

case validate the Secretary's decision to
order payroll reinstatement instead of actual
reinstatement. It is obviously impracticable
for the Hotel to actually reinstate the
employees who shaved their heads or
cropped their hair because this was exactly
the reason they were prevented from
working in the first place. Further, as with
most labor disputes which have resulted in
strikes, there is mutual antagonism, enmity,
and animosity between the union and the
management. Payroll reinstatement, most
especially in this case, would have been the
only avenue where further incidents and
damages could be avoided. Public officials
entrusted with specific jurisdictions enjoy
great confidence from this Court. The
Secretary surely meant only to ensure
industrial peace as she assumed jurisdiction
over the labor dispute. In this case, we are
not ready to substitute our own findings in
the absence of a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion on her part.

Employees who shaved their heads

When sec of labor assumed jurisdiction

and order reinstatement what is the
meaning of reinstatement?

We held in University of Immaculate

Concepcion, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor:
With respect to the Secretary's Order
allowing payroll reinstatement instead of
actual reinstatement for the individual
respondents herein, an amendment to the
previous Orders issued by her office, the
same is usually not allowed. Article 263(g) of
the Labor Code aforementioned states that
all workers must immediately return to work
and all employers must readmit all of them
under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
phrase "under the same terms and
conditions" makes it clear that the norm is
actual reinstatement. This is consistent with
the idea that any work stoppage or
slowdown in that particular industry can be
detrimental to the national interest.13
Thus, it was settled that in assumption of
jurisdiction cases, the Secretary should
impose actual reinstatement in accordance
with the intent and spirit of Art. 263(g) of
the Labor Code. As with most rules,
however, this one is subject to exceptions.
We held in
Manila Diamond Hotel
Employees' Union v. Court of Appeals that
payroll reinstatement is a departure from
the rule, and special circumstances which
make actual reinstatement impracticable
must be shown.14 In one case, payroll
reinstatement was allowed where the
employees previously occupied confidential
positions,
because
their
actual
reinstatement, the Court said, would be
impracticable and would only serve to
exacerbate the situation. 15 In another case,
this Court held that the NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it allowed
payroll reinstatement as an option in lieu of
actual reinstatement for teachers who were

2 | Page

6 categories of illegal strike

In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers
Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor
Relations Commission, we cited the various
categories of an illegal strike, to wit:
Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller,
lists six (6) categories of an illegal strike,
viz.:
(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific
prohibition of law, such as strike by
employees
performing
governmental
functions; or
(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement
of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor
Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or
(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful
purpose, such as inducing the employer to
commit an unfair labor practice against nonunion employees; or
(4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the
pursuit of its objective, such as a

LABOR RELATIONS
DOCTRINES RUBIO J.
widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for
example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e)
of the Labor Code]; or
(5) [when it] is declared in violation of an
existing injunction[, such as injunction,
prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE
Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of
the Labor Code]; or
(6) [when it] is contrary to an existing
agreement, such as a no-strike clause or
conclusive arbitration clause.18
Why is the strike illegal?
1. Committed with illegal acts (shaving
their heads)
2. No strike, no lockout policy on the
existing CBA
3. Shaving their heads was a violation
to their duty to bargain collectively
4. Violation of 30 day cooling off and 7
day strike ban
5. Illegal acts such as forming human
barricades and blocing the driveways

Consequences
Regarding the Union officers and members'
liabilities for their participation in the illegal
picket and strike, Art. 264(a), paragraph 3 of
the Labor Code provides that "[a]ny union
officer who knowingly participates in
an illegal strike and any worker or
union
officer
who
knowingly
participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment
status x x x." The law makes a distinction
between union officers and mere union
members. Union officers may be validly
terminated from employment for their
participation in an illegal strike, while union
members have to participate in and commit
illegal acts for them to lose their
employment status. Thus, it is necessary for
the company to adduce proof of the
participation of the striking employees in the
commission of illegal acts during the strikes.
JACKBILT INDUSTRIES INC VS. JACKBILT
EMPLOYEES WORKERS UNION-NAFLUKMU

3 | Page

CASE
-

2012

construction
crisis
1997,
ER
temporary shutdown
EEs protested, striked, NLRC TRO,
union disregarded, strike is definitely
illegal.
ER dimissed EEs because of the
illegal strike, LA held ER liable for
illegal dismissal because it did not
file a petition to declare the strike
illegal.

Petition to declare the strike illegal is

not necessary
The principle of conclusiveness of
judgment, embodied in Section 47(c), Rule
39 of the Rules of Court,24 holds that the
parties to a case are bound by the findings
in a previous judgment with respect to
matters actually raised and adjudged
therein.
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code prohibits
any person engaged in picketing from
obstructing the free ingress to and egress
from the employers premises. Since
respondent was found in the July 17, 1998
decision of the NLRC to have prevented the
free entry into and exit of vehicles from
petitioners compound, respondents officers
and employees clearly committed illegal
acts in the course of the March 9, 1998
strike.1awphi1 The use of unlawful means in
the course of a strike renders such strike
illegal. Therefore, pursuant to the principle
of conclusiveness of judgment, the March 9,
1998 strike was ipso facto illegal. The filing
of a petition to declare the strike illegal was
thus unnecessary. Consequently, we uphold
the legality of the dismissal of respondents
officers and employees. Article 264 of the
Labor Code further provides that an
employer may terminate employees found
to have committed illegal acts in the course
of a strike.28 Petitioner clearly had the legal
right to terminate respondents officers and
employees.
APAP VS. PAL
-

Labor dispute, union strike

Sec of labor assumed jurisdiction,
return to work order
Pilots returned but already past the
deadline as shown from the logbook
signed by the pilots

Is there a need for a new proceeding to

determine who shall be terminated

LABOR RELATIONS
DOCTRINES RUBIO J.
because of failure to return back to
work? NO
There is no necessity to conduct a
proceeding to determine the participants in
the illegal strike or those who refused to
heed the return to work order because the
ambiguity can be cured by reference to the
body of the decision and the pleadings
filed.1avvphi1
A review of the records reveals that in NCMB
NCR NS 12-514-97, the DOLE Secretary
declared the ALPAP officers and members to
have lost their employment status based on
either of two grounds, viz: their participation
in the illegal strike on June 5, 1998 or their
defiance of the return-to-work order of the
DOLE Secretary. The records of the case
unveil the names of each of these returning
pilots. The logbook with the heading "Return
To Work Compliance/ Returnees" bears their
individual
signature
signifying
their
conformity that they were among those
workers who returned to work only on June
26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by
DOLE. From this crucial and vital piece of
evidence, it is apparent that each of these
pilots is bound by the judgment. Besides,
the complaint for illegal lockout was filed on
behalf of all these returnees. Thus, a finding
that there was no illegal lockout would be
enforceable against them. In fine, only those
returning pilots, irrespective of whether they
comprise the entire membership of ALPAP,
are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE
Resolution.
True, the dispositive portion of the DOLE
Resolution does not specifically enumerate
the
names
of
those
who
actually
participated in the strike but only mentions
that those strikers who failed to heed the
return-to-work order are deemed to have
lost their employment. This omission,
however, cannot prevent an effective
execution of the decision. As was held in
Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, any ambiguity may be
clarified by reference primarily to the body
of the decision or supplementary to the
pleadings previously filed in the case. In any
case, especially when there is an ambiguity,
"a judgment shall be read in connection with
the
entire
record
and
construed
accordingly."
OLISA ET AL VS. ESCARIO

4 | Page

CASE
-

2012

union walked out to support canete

(an officer of the union) who is
charged with oral defamation case in
barangay
company
dismissed
the
union
officers, illegal strike (except canete),
now the union strike
NLRC issued TRO, LA, NLRC, CA strike
is illegal

the strike is illegal

PINA retaliated by charging the petitioners
with ULP and abandonment of work, stating
that they had violated provisions on strike of
the collective bargaining agreement (CBA),
such as: (a) sabotage by the insertion of
foreign matter in the bottling of company
products; (b) decreased production output
by slowdown; (c) serious misconduct, and
willful disobedience and insubordination to
the orders of the Management and its
representatives; (d) disruption of the work
place by invading the premises and
perpetrating commotion and disorder, and
by causing fear and apprehension; (e)
abandonment of work since June 28, 1993
despite notices to return to work individually
sent to them; and (f) picketing within the
company premises on June 15, 1993 that
effectively barred with the use of threat and
intimidation the ingress and egress of PINAs
officials,
employees,
suppliers,
and
customers.
are members of union who participated
an illegal strike who was subsequently
reinstated entitled to backwages? NO.
Petitioners not entitled to backwages
despite their reinstatement: A fair days
wage for a fair days labor. The petitioners
argue that the finding of no abandonment
equated to a finding of illegal dismissal in
their favor. Hence, they were entitled to full
backwages.
The petitioners participation in the illegal
strike was precisely what prompted PINA to
file a complaint to declare them, as striking
employees, to have lost their employment
status. However, the NLRC ultimately
ordered their reinstatement after finding
that they had not abandoned their work by
joining the illegal strike. They were thus
entitled only to reinstatement, regardless of
whether or not the strike was the
consequence of the employers ULP,

LABOR RELATIONS
DOCTRINES RUBIO J.
considering that a strike was not
renunciation of the employment relation.

CASE
a

As a general rule, backwages are granted to

indemnify a dismissed employee for his loss
of earnings during the whole period that he
is out of his job. Considering that an illegally
dismissed employee is not deemed to have
left his employment, he is entitled to all the
rights and privileges that accrue to him from
the employment. The grant of backwages to
him is in furtherance and effectuation of the
public objectives of the Labor Code, and is in
the nature of a command to the employer to
make a public reparation for his illegal
dismissal of the employee in violation of the
Labor Code.
That backwages are not granted to
employees participating in an illegal strike
simply accords with the reality that they do
not render work for the employer during the
period of the illegal strike. According to G&S
Transport Corporation v. Infante:
With respect to backwages, the principle of
a "fair days wage for a fair days labor"
remains as the basic factor in determining
the award thereof. If there is no work
performed by the employee there can be no
wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer
was able, willing and ready to work but was
illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed
or otherwise illegally prevented from
working. xxx In Philippine Marine Officers
Guild v. Compaia Maritima, as affirmed in
Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v.
Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, the
Court stressed that for this exception to
apply, it is required that the strike be legal,
a situation that does not obtain in the case
at bar. (emphasis supplied)
The petitioners herein do not deny their
participation in the June 15, 1993 strike. As
such, they did not suffer any loss of earnings
during their absence from work. Their
reinstatement sans backwages is in order, to
conform to the policy of a fair days wage for
a fair days labor.
Under the principle of a fair days wage for a
fair days labor, the petitioners were not
entitled to the wages during the period of
the strike (even if the strike might be legal),
because they performed no work during the
strike. Verily, it was neither fair nor just that
the dismissed employees should litigate

5 | Page

2012

against their employer on the latters

time.Thus, the Court deleted the award of
backwages and held that the striking
workers were entitled only to reinstatement
in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc.
(Manila Diamond Hotel) v. Manila Diamond
Hotel Employees Union, considering that the
striking employees did not render work for
the employer during the strike.