G.R. No.

88017 January 21, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LO HO
WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and
REYNALDO TIA y SANTIAGO, defendants. LO HO WING alias PETER
LO, defendant-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This case involves the unlawful transport of metamphetamine, a regulated
drug under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. One of its derivatives is
metamphetamine hydrochloride, notoriously known in street parlance as
"shabu" or "poor man's cocaine."
Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio
Lim and Reynaldo Tia, were charged with a violation of Section 15, Article III
of the aforementioned statute otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, before Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Only
appellant and co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were convicted. They were
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P25,000.00 each, and
to pay the costs. Their co-accused Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state
witness. The pertinent portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1987, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, without authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliver, dispatch or
transport 56 teabags of Metamphetamine, a regulated
drug.

tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in the
importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning.
After an evaluation of the information thus received, a project codenamed
"OPLAN SHARON 887" was created in order to bust the suspected
syndicate.
As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep
penetration agents' was carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of
those recruited was the discharged accused, Reynaldo Tia (hereinafter
referred to as Tia).
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat (hereinafter referred
to as Lim) by another confidential agent named George on August 3, 1987.
Lim expressed a desire to hire a male travelling companion for his business
nips abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired.
Lim and Tia met anew on several occasions to make arrangements for a trip
to China. In the course of those meetings, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo
(hereinafter referred to as appellant), whom Tia found out to be the person
he was to accompany to China in lieu of Lim.
As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly submitted reports of his
undercover activities on the suspected criminal syndicate. Meanwhile, the
officer-in-charge of OPLAN SHARON 887, Captain Luisito Palmera, filed
with his superiors the reports submitted to him, and officially informed the
Dangerous Drugs Board of Tia's activities.
On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a
Philippine Airlines flight. Before they departed, Tia was able to telephone
Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected date of return to the
Philippines as declared in his round-trip plane ticket-October 6, 1987 at two
o'clock in the afternoon.

Contrary to law. 1
The antecedent facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a

The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia and appellant boarded a train
bound for Guangzhou, in the People's Republic of China. Upon arriving
there, they checked in at a hotel, and rested for a few hours. The pair
thereafter went to a local store where appellant purchased six (6) tin cans of
tea. Tia saw the paper tea bags when the cans were opened for examination

during the purchase. Afterwards, they returned to the hotel. Appellant kept
the cans of tea in his hotel room. That evening, Tia went to appellant's room
to talk to him. Upon entering, he saw two other men with appellant. One was
fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning substance on a piece of
aluminum foil using a cigarette lighter. Appellant joined the second man and
sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance. Tia asked the latter
what they would be bringing back to the Philippines. He was informed that
their cargo consisted of Chinese drugs. Tia stayed in the room for about
twenty minutes before going back to his room to sleep.
The next day, October 6,1987, the two returned to Manila via a China
Airlines flight. Appellant had with him his red traveling bag with wheels.
Before departing from Guangzhou however, customs examiners inspected
their luggage. The tin cans of tea were brought out from the traveling bag of
appellant. The contents of the cans were not closely examined, and
appellant was cleared along with Tia.
The plane landed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), then
named Manila International Airport, on schedule. Lim met the newly-arrived
pair at the arrival area. Lim talked to appellant, while Tia, upon being
instructed, looked after their luggage. After Lim and appellant finished their
conversation, the latter hailed a taxicab. Appellant and Tia boarded the
taxicab after putting their luggage inside the back compartment of the
vehicle. Lim followed in another taxi cab.
Meanwhile, a team composed of six operatives headed by Captain Palmera
was formed to act on the tip given by Tia. On the expected date of arrival,
the team proceeded to the NAIA. Captain Palmera notified the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) Detachment at the airport for coordination. After a
briefing, the operatives were ordered to take strategic positions around the
arrival area. Two operatives stationed just outside the arrival area were the
first ones to spot the suspects emerging therefrom. Word was passed on to
the other members of the team that the suspects were in sight. Appellant
was pulling along his red traveling bag while Tia was carrying a shoulder
bag. The operatives also spotted Lim meeting their quarry.
Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first
spotted them followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the operatives

overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path forcing
the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other taxicab carrying Lim
sped away in an attempt to escape. The operatives disembarked from their
car, approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage
compartment. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back
compartment of the vehicle. The operatives requested from the suspects
permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red
traveling bag owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab, one of the
operatives, pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and
pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white powder
resembling crushed alum came out of the bag. The sergeant then opened
the tea bag and examined its contents more closely. Suspecting the
crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three traveling bags
opened for inspection. From the red traveling bag, a total of six (6) tin cans
were found, including the one previously opened. Nothing else of
consequence was recovered from the other bags. Tia and appellant were
taken to the CIS Headquarters in Quezon City for questioning.
Meanwhile, the second taxicab was eventually overtaken by two other
operatives on Retiro Street, Quezon City. Lim was likewise apprehended
and brought to the CIS Headquarters for interrogation.
During the investigation of the case, the six tin cans recovered from the
traveling bag of appellant were opened and examined. They contained a
total of fifty-six (56) paper tea bags with white crystalline powder inside
instead of tea leaves.
The tea bag opened by Sgt. Cayabyab during the search and seizure was
sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory for preliminary examination. Tests
conducted on a sample of the crystalline powder inside the tea bag yielded a
positive result that the specimen submitted was metamphetamine. Samples
from each of the fifty-six (56) tea bags were similarly tested. The tests were
also positive for metamphetamine. Hence, the three suspects were indicted.
In rendering a judgment of conviction, the trial court gave full credence to the
testimonies of the government anti-narcotics operatives, to whom the said
court applied the well-settled presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties.

Appellant now assigns three errors alleged to have been committed by the
trial court, namely:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON THE ACCUSED AS
ILLEGAL.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY
OF
DELIVERING,
DISPATCHING
OR
TRANSPORTING METAMPHETAMINE, A REGULATED
DRUG.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING
REYNALDO
TIA
TO
TESTIFY
FOR
THE
PROSECUTION. 2

The contentions are without merit. As correctly averred by appellee, that

search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto. As set
forth in the case of Manipon, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 these are: [1] a search
incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of
evidence in plain view (emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the case
clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a moving
vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on
appellant and his co-accused.
In this connection, We cite with approval the averment of the Solicitor
General, as contained in the appellee's brief, that the rules governing search
and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a
moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is
so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judgea requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity. 4 We might add that a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought." 5

We affirm.
Anent the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the warrantless
search and seizure made against the accused is illegal for being violative of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. He reasons that the PC-CIS officers
concerned could very well have procured a search warrant since they had
been informed of the date and time of a arrival of the accused at the NAIA
well ahead of time, specifically two (2) days in advance. The fact that the
search and seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle, appellant
argues, does not automatically make the warrantless search herein fall
within the coverage of the well-known exception to the rule of the necessity
of a valid warrant to effect a search because, as aforementioned, the antinarcotics agents had both time and opportunity to secure a search warrant.

In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the
trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the
country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from
surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was
touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the
expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But such
knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requirements
for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that
there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still
be present in such a case.

The second assignment of error is likewise lacking in merit. Appellant was

charged and convicted under Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, which reads:
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, dispose, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug (emphasis supplied).
The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or
dispatching fifty-six (56) tea bags containing metamphetamine, a regulated
drug. The conjunction "or' was used, thereby implying that the accused were
being charged of the three specified acts in the alternative. Appellant argues
that he cannot be convicted of "delivery" because the term connotes a
source and a recipient, the latter being absent under the facts of the case. It
is also argued that "dispatching' cannot apply either since appellant never
sent off or disposed of drugs. As for "transporting," appellant contends that
he cannot also be held liable therefor because the act of transporting
necessarily requires a point of destination, which again is non- existent
under the given facts.
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative
acts of which appellant and his co-accused were charged in relation to the
facts of the case. There is no doubt that law enforcers caught appellant and
his co-accused in flagrante delicto of transporting a prohibited drug. The
term "transport" is defined as "to carry or convey from one place to
another." 6 The operative words in the definition are "to carry or convey." The
fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act
of transporting was committed. It is immaterial whether or not the place of
destination is reached. Furthermore, the argument of appellant gives rise to
the illogical conclusion that he and his co- accused did not intend to bring
the metamphetamine anywhere, i.e. they had no place of destination.
The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited
drug was interrupted by the search and arrest of the accused. Interruption
necessarily infers that an act had already been commenced. Otherwise,
there would be nothing to interrupt.

Therefore, considering the foregoing, since the information included the acts
of delivery, dispatch or transport, proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
commission of any of the acts so included is sufficient for conviction under
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum
prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. It is a
wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it
cannot be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is
what constitutes the offense punished and suffices to validly charge and
convict an individual caught committing the act so punished, regardless of
criminal intent. 7
As to the third assigned error, appellant contests the discharge of accused
Reynaldo Tia to testify for the prosecution on the ground that there was no
necessity for the same. Appellant argues that deep penetration agents such
as Tia "have to take risks and accept the consequences of their
actions." 8 The argument is devoid of merit. The discharge of accused Tia
was based on Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which reads in part:
Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness.
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the
prosecution before resting its case,the court may
direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with
their consent so that they may be witnesses for the
state . . . (emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the discharge of an
accused is left to the sound discretion of the lower court. The trial court has
the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule
exist. 9In the instant case, appellant does not allege that any of the
conditions for the discharge had not been met by the prosecution. Therefore,
the discharge, as ordered by the trial court, stands.
Finally, appellant alleges that the testimony of Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab
regarding the facts surrounding the commission of the offense proves that
the discharge of accused Tia is unnecessary. The allegation is baseless.

Appellant himself admits that the sergeant's testimony corroborates the

testimony of the discharged accused. The fact of corroboration of the
testimonies bolsters the validity of the questioned discharge precisely
because paragraph (a) of the aforequoted rule on discharge requires that the
testimony be substantially corroborated in its material points. The
corroborative testimony of the PC-CIS operative does not debunk the claim
of the prosecution that there is absolute necessity for the testimony of
accused Tia.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and
the appeal is thereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994

MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA CRUZ,
MIRASOL LUGATIMAN, and GERTRUDES GONZALES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search and
seizure is not merely a pleasing platitude. It vouchsafes our right to privacy
and dignity against undesirable intrusions committed by any public officer or
private individual. An infringement of this right justifies an award for
damages.
On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the
Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute
official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their
Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the authority to
"undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal
sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." 1
Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation received information that
private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes
Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any
authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was
tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the
Philippine Constabulary (PC).
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner de Guzman, Captain
Renato M. Peafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of the Reaction
Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon City went to the stores of
respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized
the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents'
stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private
respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items were
then turned over by Captain Peafiel to petitioner corporation for
safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private
respondents. 2 During its pendency, petitioner de Guzman exacted from

private respondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE THOUSAND ONE

HUNDRED PESOS (P3,100.00) in order to be dropped from the complaint.
On December 6, 1983, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal
of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. On
February 6, 1984, he also ordered the return of the seized items. The seized
items were not immediately returned despite demands. 3 Private
respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover
their goods. Even then, not all the seized items were returned. The other
items returned were of inferior quality.

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs (private respondents) and

against defendants (petitioners), ordering the latter jointly and severally;

Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144 against the petitioners
for sums of money and damages. 4 In its Decision dated January 9, 1987,
the trial court ruled for the private respondents, thus:

3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) the amount of P10,000.00 each, or a total

of P30,000.00, for and as moral damages; and P5,000.00 each, or a total of
P15,000.00, for and as exemplary damages; and

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against

defendants, ordering the latter jointly and severally:

4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and

litigation expenses.

1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff Mirasol Lugatiman with

interest at 12% per annum from January 12, 1984, the date of the last
receipt issued, until fully paid;

Costs of the case a quo and the instant appeal are assessed jointly and
severally against defendants-appellants (petitioners) MHP Garments, Inc.
and Larry de Guzman.

2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the 26 pieces of
girl scout items not returned;

SO ORDERED.

3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for and as moral damages and
P15,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and

1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff (respondent) Mirasol

Lugatiman and cancel her application for distributor's license;
2. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of P2,000.00 for the
unreturned 26 pieces of girl scouts items with interest at 12% per annum
from June 4, 1984 (date the complaint was filed) until it is fully paid;

In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Costs against the defendants.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING LIABILITY FOR

DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE SEIZURE
OF THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On January 18, 1989,
its Fifth Division, 5 affirmed the Decision with modification, thus:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT THE

MANNER WITH WHICH THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WAS TORTIOUS BUT PENALIZED INSTEAD THE
PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF CONFISCATION.

4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION; and, as modified, the dispositive portion thereof now reads
as follows:

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS AND AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
We affirm.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from
unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also
those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved. 6 In the case at bench, the seizure was made
without any warrant. Under the Rules of Court, 7 a warrantless search can
only be undertaken under the following circumstance:
Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure
of private respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation received information
that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time are not
established in the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman
then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. They reported
to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made
on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were
seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and
the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time
for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant.
Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized
the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for
damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private

respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench,

the search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for
the seizure. Probable cause for a search has been defined as "such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 8 These
facts and circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to
justify their warrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary
investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for
unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods.
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the
Philippine Constabulary that conducted the raid and their participation was
only to report the alleged illegal activity of private respondents.
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been
included in the complaint for violation of the private respondents'
constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners.
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 9 we ruled for the recovery of
damages for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer
or private individual, thus:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also
be adjudged.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) Illegal search;
(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and
35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights
have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from
the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary
damages may also be awarded.
xxx xxx xxx
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is
not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make
such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the
effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have
abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an
end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this
remedy is in the nature of a tort. (emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, 10 the Court En Banc explained
the liability of persons indirectly responsible,viz:
[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32.
The law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or
indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to
the aggrieved party.
xxx xxx xxx

While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights
would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damages suits, it should
nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil
Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible
for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
xxx xxx xxx
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly"
should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the
ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its
violations. (emphasis supplied)
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court
correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners
were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents
against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid
pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. 11 As correctly
observed by respondent court:
Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing
appellees' (respondents') merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for
unfair competition against appellees (respondents) were for the protection
and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such being the case, it is,
thus, reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it was upon appellant
(petitioner) corporation's instance that the PC soldiers conducted the raid
and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances should answer the trial
court's query posed in its decision now under consideration as to why
the PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise to
appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry
de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts
items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the
same extent as the officers themselves. 13 So with the petitioner corporation
which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the
PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a
time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.

Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was precisely crafted on March 9,

1983 to safeguard not only the privilege of franchise holder of scouting items
but also the citizen's constitutional rights, to wit:
TITLE: APPREHENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED MANUFACTURERS AND
DISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING OF
SAID PARAPHERNALIA.
ABSTRACT:
Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, to
apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and distributors of
Scout paraphernalia, upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or
search warrant with a judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law; and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used as
evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body. Orders
the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions. 14
Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, petitioners miserably
failed to report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of
the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant. Private respondents'
rights are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to transient
needs. 15 Petitioners did not have the unbridled license to cause the seizure
of respondents' goods without any warrant.
And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have
filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any
other relief, 16 in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of
Money with Damages. Again, they did not.
We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize
the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have
suffered. 17 Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit.,
moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no
doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety,
and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private
respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure
of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies. Respondent Cruz
declared:

I felt very nervous. I was crying to loss (sic) my goods and capital because I
am doing business with borrowed money only, there was commotion created
by the raiding team and they even stepped on some of the pants and
dresses on display for sale. All passersby stopped to watch and stared at me
with accusing expressions. I was trembling and terribly ashamed, sir. 18
Respondent Lugatiman testified:
I felt very nervous. I was crying and I was very much ashamed because
many people have been watching the PC soldiers hauling my items, and
many/I (sic) heard say "nakaw pala ang mga iyan" for which I am claiming
P25,000.00 for damages. 19
While respondent Gonzalez stated thus:
I do not like the way the raid was conducted by the team sir because it
looked like that what I have been selling were stolen items that they should
be confiscated by uniformed soldiers. Many people were around and the
more the confiscation was made in a scandalous manner; every clothes, Tshirts, pants and dresses even those not wrapped dropped to the ground. I
was terribly shamed in the presence of market goers that morning. 20
Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award
of exemplary damages. 21 It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and
sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all
encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done both by
government and indirectly by private entities.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9,
1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for the unreturned
twenty-six (26) pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%)
interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon finality of
this Decision until the payment thereof. 22 Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Padilla, Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.