No. L-16749.January 31, 1963.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased,
Executor and Heir-appellees, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
Private International Law; Determination of citizenship; U.S. citizenship not lost by
stay in Philippines before independence.The citizenship that the deceased
acquired in California when he resided there from 1904 to 1913 was never lost by
his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States until
1946, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he
was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon
his California citizenship by acquiring another.
Same; Validity of testamentary provisions; Meaning of national law in Article 16,
Civil Code; Conflict of law rules in California to be applied in case at bar.The
national law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to any
general American Law, because there is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. It can
therefore refer to no other than the private law of the state of which the decedent
was a citizen. In the case at bar, the State of California prescribes two sets of laws
for its citizens, an internal law for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law
rules for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Hence, reason demands that
the California conflict of law rules should be applied in this jurisdiction in the case at
bar.
Same; Same; Domicile; Factors considered in determining aliens domicile in the
Philippines.An American citizen who was born in New York, migrated to California,
resided there for nine years, came to the Philippines in 1913, and very rarely returned to California and only for short visits, and who appears to have never owned
or acquired a home or properties in that state, shall be considered to have his
domicile in the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Rule of resorting to the law of the domicile in determining
matters with foreign element involved.The rule laid down of resorting to the law of
the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should
govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court of domicile bound to apply its own law as directed
in the conflict of law rule of decedents state; Application of the renvoi doctrine.
The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946 Civil Code, refers back the case,
when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of domicile can not and should not refer the

case back to California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination, because the case will then be tossed back and forth between the
two states. If the question has to be decided, the Philippine court must apply its own
law as the Philippines was the domicile of the decedent, as directed in the conflict of
law rule of the state of the decedent, California, and especially because the internal
law of California provides no legitime for natural children, while the Philippine law
(Articles 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Philippine law to be applied in case at bar.
As the domicile of the deceased, who was a citizen of California, was the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child of the latters legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law,
pursuant to Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Intsance of Davao, Cusi, Jr., J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant. [Aznar vs. Garcia,
7 SCRA 95(1963)]
LABRADOR,J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated
September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor,
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime,
and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs.
Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951
and contains the following provisions:
3.I declare x x x that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
(now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years
ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.

4.I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants
except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxxxx
7.I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at
any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria
Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid
to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month
until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon,
is exhausted..
xxxxx
12.I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from
the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or
mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may
be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: x x x

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final
account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it
denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged
that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not
be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several
foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case
were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also

alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged

natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the
time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights
and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniels Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record
on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various
motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD
E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING
FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN
FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question
that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellees brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show
that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New
York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school
teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport Sheridan with Port
of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He
stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there
for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was
teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensens next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came
back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again
returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year,
1939.
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military
Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left
for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits 6, CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits AA, BB and CCDaney; Exhs. MM, MM-l, MM-2-Daney and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after
the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he
executed at his lawyers offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St.
Lukes Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we
are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he
returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties
in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines
and make home in the State of California.
Sec.16.Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to

denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of

Laws, p. 29).
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared
that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in
accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
The terms residence and domicile might well be taken to mean the same thing,
a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a
technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been.
And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it.
But if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or
months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be
called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing
only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former home, he could
not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the
exercise of intention as well as physical presence. Residence simply requires bodily
presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. Residence, however, is
a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to
the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only
proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART.16.Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term national law is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in

the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to
its citizens only and in force only within the state. The national law indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply
to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the
executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of
his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions
of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated,
it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellants opposition and is not denied.
We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the
case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executors behalf that as the
deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law
thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination
of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensens will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance
therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedents domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: When the Conflict of Laws rule of the
forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the
purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign
law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the
renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter
back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have
been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the endless chain of
references which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the
renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the

original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule.
It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have
accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the
second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule
of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead
that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still
more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law
problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or
both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the
forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the
Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman.
The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land
is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these
cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties
in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to
the internal law. Thus, a persons title to land, recognized by the situs, will be
recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties,
will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable
property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among Xs next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the
conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the
law of the deceaseds last domicile. Since by hypothesis Xs last domicile was
France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to
French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and
decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would
show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this property should
be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased,
thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things
the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to
apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that
this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will
follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule
of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers
the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense.
The German term for this judicial process is Ruckverweisung. (Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as
governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the
conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a
question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances,
has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the
doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the Renvoyer to
send back, or the Ruchversweisung, or the Weiterverweisung, since an affirmative
answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign
law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be
decided according to the law of the forum. x x x (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the doctrine of renvoi, has been advanced. The theory
of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question
before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its
rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the
rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The
doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities.
(2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its
application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are
to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign
state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory
the law of a country means the whole of its law.
xxxxxxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1)Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of
foreign laws.
(2)Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall
respect:

(a)The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.
(b)The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that
one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination
of a question to the same system of law.
xxxxxxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of
an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his
domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality
that is the English law he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession
and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own
intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are
not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting
to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary
law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will
directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he
was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions
about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions
about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules
should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the
property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of
the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in
the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The
New York court has said on the point: The general principle that a dispostiton of a
personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of
the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one
of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the
process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the

practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in
Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply
the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled
abroad.
It is argued on appellees behalf that the clause if there is no law to the contrary in
the place where the property is situated in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code
refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of
the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in
the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our
Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946,
which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testators
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of
his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and
should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back
and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law
as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question
has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil
Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of
the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40
Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52
Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the
decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e.,
the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United
States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that
there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical
with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of

California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine
Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned
to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law
on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
Decision reversed and case returned to lower court with instructions that partition
be made as the Philippine law on succession applies.
Notes.The words amount of successional rights used in Article 16 of the Civil
Code refer to the extent or amount of property that each heir is legally entitled to
inherit from the estate available for distribution (Collector v. Fisher, et al., L-11622
and L-11668, Jan, 23, 1960).
The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country and is domiciled in another. It does not apply to a case where the decedent
was a citizen of Texas and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. (Bellis vs.
Bellis, et al., L-23678, June 6, 1967, 20 SCRA 358). [Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA
95(1963)]

No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Wills; Succession; Conflict of laws; Renvoi doctrine.The doctrine of renvoi is
usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country and is domiciled
in another. It does not apply to a case where the decedent was a citizen of Texas
and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that, even assuming that
Texas has a conflicts rule providing that the domiciliary law should govern
successional rights, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but it would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex rei sitae, which calls for the application of the

law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, where the
properties involved are found in the Philippines.
Same; Foreign laws.In the absence of proof as to the conflicts rule of Texas, it
would be presumed to be the same as our local conflicts rule.
Same; Applicability of national law to succession; Capacity to succeedThe
decedent's national law governs the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and capacity to
succeed.
Same; Third paragraph of article 17 of New Civil Code does not modify article 16.
The third paragraph of article 17 of the New Civil Code is not an exception to the
second paragraph of article 16. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article," when it
incorporated article 11 of the old Civil Code as article 17, while reproducing without
substantial change the second paragraph of article 10 of the old Civil Code, as
article 16. The legislative intent must have been to make the second paragraph of
article 176 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As a further indication of this legislative intent, Congress
added a new provision, under article 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed
is governed by the decedent's national law,
Same; Legitimes; Statutes; Special and general provisions.Whatever public policy
and good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congres has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. It has
specifically chosen the decedent's national law to govern, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Same; Testamentary provision that successional right to decedent's estate would be
governed by law other than his national law is void.A provision in a foreigner's will
that his properties should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not in
accordance with his national law is void, being contrary to article 16 of the New Civil
Code.
Same; System of legitimes does not apply to estate of a citizen of Texas.Where
the decedent was a citizen of Texas and under Texas laws there are no forced heirs,
the system of legitimes in Philippine law cannot be applied to the succession to the
decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the decedent's
will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositorsappellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON. J.P., J,:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964. approving the project of
partition f iled by the executor in 'Civil Case No. 37089 therein.
The. facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry
A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis. Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid f
or, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied,
the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died, a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila
on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary
E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released
from time to time accordingly as the lower court approved and allowed the various

motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account
of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of
Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00,
and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in
the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of ?120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executorpursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and
Testamentdivided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of
the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs
of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of
which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1 After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration
and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the
national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide
for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court
on June 11, 1964, oppositorsappellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must applyTexas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine
of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31,
1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in
a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the
conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3
Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they
never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that

their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article
17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law
of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide
that
"ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. "However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found."
"ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent."
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17. paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country."
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code,while reproducing without substantial change
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must
have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succes-sions. As
further indication of this legislative intent. Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter. alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones,

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two willsone to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estatearguing from this that
he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter
the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void. for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10now Article 16of
the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine
law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.In Philippine Trust Company vs. Bohanan, 60 O.G. 4615, it was held that the
validity of the provisions of the will of a citizen of Nevada should be governed by his
national law, the law of Nevada. Since the Nevada law allows a citizen of Nevada to
dispose of all his property according to his will, the testamentary provisions therein,
depriving his wife and children of what should be their legitimes under Philippine
law should be respected and the project of partition made in accordance with. his
will should be approved,
In Aznar vs. Christensen Garcia, 61 O.G. 7302, it was held that, where the deceased
citizen of California was domiciled in the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of
his will should be governed by Philippine law, pursuant to article 946 of the
California Civil Code, and not by the internal law of California. [Bellis vs. Bellis, 20
SCRA 358(1967)]

[No. 35694. December 23, 1933]

ALLISON D. GIBBS, petitioner and appellee, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor and appellant. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY
OF MANILA, respondent and appellant.

1.HUSBAND AND WlFE; RlGHT OF A CALIFORNIA MARRIED WOMAN TO ACQUIRE

LANDS IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS.The attention of the court has not been called
to any law of California that incapacitates a married woman from acquiring or
holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sit.
2.ID. ; ARTICLE 9, CIVIL CODE, CONSTRUED.Article 9 of the Civil Code treats of
purely personal relations and status and capacity for juristic acts, the rules relating
to property, both personal and real, being governed by article 10 of the Civil Code.
Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms, is applicable only to "Spaniards" (now, by
construction, to citizens of the Philippine Islands).
3.JONES LAW; PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW.The Organic Act of the Philippine
Islands (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones Law") as regards the
determination of private rights, grants practical autonomy to the Government of the
Philippine Islands. This Government, therefore, may apply the principles and rules of
private international law (conflict of laws) on the same footing as an organized
territory or state of the United States.
4.ARTICLE 10, CIVIL CODE, CONSTRUED.The second paragraph of article 10, Civil
Code, applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the
Philippines in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law
is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the
successional rights; in other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be
invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property
within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
5.HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PROPERTY.Under the provisions of the Civil
Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the acquisition of any
conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein
equal to that of her husband, subject to the power of management and disposition
which the law vests in the husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no
obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present case, her share in the conjugal
property is transmitted to her heirs by succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil
Code; cf. also Coronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)
6.ID.; ID.The wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested
of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands
covered by certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their
acquisition to the date of her death.
7.ID. ; ID. ; INHERITANCE TAX.The descendible interest here in question in the
lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this
transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter
40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Imperial, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants.
Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf.
BUTTE, J.:

This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, requiring
the register of deeds of the City of Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880,
28336 and 28331, covering lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
and issue in lieu thereof new certificates of transfer of title in favor of Allison D.
Gibbs without requiring him to present any document showing that the succession
tax due under Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been paid.
The said order of court of March 10, 1931, recites that the parcels of land covered
by said certificates of title formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison
D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto,
California, on November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death she and her
husband were citizens of the State of California and domiciled therein.
It appears further from said order that Allison D. Gibbs was appointed administrator
of the estate of his said deceased wife in case No. 36795 in the same court, entitled
'ln the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in said
intestate proceedings, the said Allison D. Gibbs, on September 22, 1930, filed an ex
parte petition in which he alleged "that the parcels of land hereunder described
belong to the conjugal partnership of your petitioner and his wife, Eva Johnson
Gibbs", describing in detail the three tracts here involved; and further alleging that
his said wife, a citizen and resident of California, died on November 28, 1929; that in
accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are
citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband,
belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration; that the
conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs, deceased, has no
obligations or debts and no one will be prejudiced by adjudicating said parcels of
land (and seventeen others not here involved) to be the absolute property of the
said Allison D. Gibbs as sole owner. The court granted said petition and on
September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjudicating the said Allison D. Gibbs to be
the sole and absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of
California. Gibbs presented this decree to the register of deeds of Manila and
demanded that the latter issue to him a "transfer certificate of title".
Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code provides in part
that:

"Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any document
transferring real property or real rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by way of
gifts mortis causa, legacy or inheritance, unless the payment of the tax fixed in this
article and actually due thereon shall be shown. And they shall immediately notify
the Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding provincial treasurer of the
non-payment of the tax discovered by them. * * *"
Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of the City of Manila,
declined to accept as binding said decree of court of September 22, 1930, and
refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D.
Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid.
Thereupon, under date of December 26, 1930, Allison D. Gibbs filed in the said court
a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the
corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of any
inheritance tax. After due hearing of the parties, the court reaffirmed said order of
September 22, 1930, and entered the order of March 10, 1931, which is under
review on this appeal.
On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court of origin for new trial
upon additional evidence in regard to the pertinent law of California in force at the
time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of evidence with
reference to the dates of the acquisition of the property involved in this suit and
with reference to the California law in force at the time of such acquisition. The case
is now before us with the supplementary evidence.
For the purposes of this case, we shall consider the following facts as established by
the evidence or the admissions of the parties: Allison D. Gibbs has been
continuously, since the year 1902, a citizen of the State of California and domiciled
therein; that he and Eva Johnson Gibbs were married ed at Columbus, Ohio, in July,
1906; that there wa no antenuptial marriage contract between the parties; that
during the existence of said marriage, the spouses acquired the following lands,
among others, in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property:
1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title
No. 20880, dated March 16, 1920, and registered in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs
casado con Eva Johnson Gibbs"."
2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title
No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, in which it is certified "that the spouses Allison D.
Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple" of the land therein
described.
3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title
No. 28331, dated April 6, 1927, which states "that Allison D. Gibbs married to Eva
Johnson Gibbs" is the owner of the land described therein; that said Eva Johnson
Gibbs died intestate on November 28, 1929, leaving surviving her her husband, the

appellee, and two sons, Allison J. Gibbs, now aged 25, and Finley J. Gibbs, now aged
22, as her sole heirs at law.
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax on inheritances,
legacies, and other acquisitions mortis causa" provides in section 1536 that "Every
transmission by virtue of inheritance * * * of real property * * * shall be subject to
the following tax." It results that the question for determination in this case is as
follows: Was Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death the owner of a descendible
interest in the Philippine lands above-mentioned?
The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and
extent of the title, if any, that vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs under the three
certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9
of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her title under said
certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California
govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the
Civil Code.
Article 9 of the Civil Code is as f ollows:
"The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal
capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country." It is argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in
community real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right and must,
therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal status, that is, the law of
California. But our attention has not been called to any law of California that
incapacitates a married woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign
jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sit. There is not the slightest doubt that
a California married woman can acquire title to land in a common law jurisdiction
like the State of Illinois or the District of Columbia, subject to the common-law
estate by the curtesy which would vest in her husband. Nor is there any doubt that
if a California husband acquired land in such a jurisdiction his wife would be vested
with the common law right of dower, the prerequisite conditions obtaining. Article 9
of the Civil Code treats of purely personal relations and status and capacity for
juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both personal and real, being governed
by article 10 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms, is applicable
only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to citizens of the Philippine Islands).
The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, known
as the "Jones Law") as regards the determination of private rights, grants practical
autonomy to the Government of the Philippine Islands. This Government, therefore,
may apply the principles and rules of private international law (conflict of laws) on
the same footing as an organized territory or state of the United States. We should,
therefore, resort to the law of California, the nationality and domicile of Mrs. Gibbs,

to ascertain the norm which would be applied here as law were there any question
as to her status.
But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the lower court's decision
rests upon the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code which is as follows:
"Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law ,of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the
country in which it may be situated."
In construing the above language we are met at the outset with some difficulty by
the expression "the national law of the person whose succession is in question", by
reason of the rather anomalous political status of the Philippine Islands. (Cf.
Manresa, vol. 1, Cdigo Civil, pp. 103, 104.) We encountered no difficulty in applying
article 10 in the case of a citizen of Turkey. (Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil, 867.) Having
regard to the practical autonomy of the Philippine Islands, as above stated, we have
concluded that if article 10 is applicable and the estate in question is that of a
deceased American citizen, the succession shall be regulated in accordance with
the norms of the State of his domicile in the United States. (Cf. Babcock Templeton
vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130, 137; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.)
The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the
entire community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband;
that he is the absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of the
death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue
of the fact that when the death of the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires
the community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife,
but because she never had more than an inchoate interest or expectancy which is
extinguished upon her death. Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke (167 Cal., 415,
419), the court said: "The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California)
are uniform to the effect that the husband does not take the community property
upon the death of the wife by succession, but that he holds it all from the moment
of her death as though acquired by himself. * * * It never belonged to the estate of
the deceased wife."
The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing
by succession from his deceased wife, how can the second paragraph of article 10
be invoked? Can the appellee be heard to say that there is a legal succession under
the law of the Philippine Islands and no legal succession under the law of California?
It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or
testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines in accordance with the
law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the
order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the

second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested
with a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine
Islands.
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law. ed., 1028, 1031), the
court said:
"It is a principle firmly established that to the law of the state in which the land is
situated we must look for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and
transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. (United
States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; 3 L. ed., 287; Clark vs. Graham, 6 Wheat, 577; 5 L.
ed., 334; McGoon vs. Scales, 9 Wall., 23; 19 L. ed., 545; Brine vs. Hartford F. Ins. Co.,
96 U. S., 627; 24 L. ed., 858.)" (See also Estate of Lloyd, 175 Cal., 704, 705.) This
fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code
as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner
thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated."
It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478:
"In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sit, the
respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence of an
antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the property is
situated, irrespective of" the domicile of the parties or of the place where the
marriage was celebrated." (See also Saul vs. His Creditors, 5 Martin [N. S.], 569; 16
Am. Dec., 212 [La.] ; Heidenheimer vs. Loring, 26 S. W., 99 [Texas].)
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs.
Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must
be determined in accordance with the lex rei sit.
It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as community
property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife. Under the law of
the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her husband. Article
1407 of the Civil Code provides:
"All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the
absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife." Article
1395 provides:
'The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law applicable to the
contract of partnership in all matters in which such rules do not conflict with the
express provisions of this chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the husband may
dispose by will of his half only of the property of the conjugal partnership." Article
1426 provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal partnership and after inventory
and liquidation, "the net remainder of the partnership property shall be divided
share and share alike between the husband and wife, or their respective heirs."

Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the
wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested
with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband, subject to the power
of management and disposition which the law vests in the husband. Immediately
upon her death, if there are no obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present
case, her share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her heirs by succession.
(Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code; cf. also Coronel vs. Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)
It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands,
vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine
lands covered by certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of
their acquisition to the date of her death. That appellee himself believed that his
wife was vested of such a title and interest is manifest from the second of said
certificates, No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, introduced by him in evidence, in
which it is certified that "the spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the
owners in fee simple of the conjugal lands therein described."
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was
transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls
within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative
Code which levies a tax on inheritances. (Cf. Re Estate of Majot, 199 N. Y., 29; 92 N.
E., 402; 29 L. R. A. [N. S.], 780.) It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine
the "order of succession" or the "extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil
Code, supra) which would be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of
California which was in effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.
The record does not show what the proper amount of the inheritance tax in this
case would be nor that the appellee (petitioner below) in any way challenged the
power of the Government to levy an inheritance tax or the validity of the statute
under which the register of deeds refused to issue a certificate of transfer reciting
that the appellee is the exclusive owner of the Philippine lands included in the three
certificates of title here involved.
The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed with directions to
dismiss the petition, without special pronouncement as to the costs.
Avancea, C. J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.
Street, J., dissents.
Order reversed. [Gibbs vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 59 Phil. 293(1933)]