PART 1

REVIEW: 1987 Phil. Constitution

ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
ARTICLE XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may
be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares
thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements
of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be
acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of forest lands and national
parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be
conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide for such period as it
may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.
Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs,
shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social,
and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common
good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall
have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.

ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.
A. THE SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION IN THE PHILS.
1. Modes of Acquiring Original Titles
a. History
b. Registration of Original Titles and Deeds
2. Concept of Title
a. Original
b. Derivative
3. The TORRENS System
a. History
b. Purpose
Separate opinion of J. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary (2000)
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses and
Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner [1] wrote:[2]
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past-dependent,' of the
professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic
terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering
history. It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of
youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic
direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history.
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the
Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of
land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its
distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul
shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional
mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to
correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.
Cario vs. Insular
Cario vs Insular Government, 41 Phil 935
(Land Titles and Deeds Native Title)
Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for
more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land
when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under
the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is
no prescription against the Crown.
Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.
Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:
It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has
been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way
from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.
There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim
of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the
theory of jura regalia.
Legarda vs. Saleeby
Legarda vs Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; GR No. 8936, October 2, 1915
(Land Titles and Deeds Purpose of the Torrens System of Registration)
Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land
where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of

registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in
1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.
Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the name of two
persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed
that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to
hold title and will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question
of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which
may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid
the possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.
Alba vs. Dela Cruz
(Land Titles and Deeds Registration under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem)
Facts: Petitioner heirs sought the registration of two parcels of agricultural land and the court entered a decree
directing the registration in favor of the petitioners, as co-owners subject to the usufructuary rights if the widower
of the petitioners sister. Respondent tenant filed a motion for the revision of the case upon the ground that he is
the absolute owner of the disputed lands, having inherited them from his father, who had a state grant for the
same.
Issue: WON modification of the decree as to exclude said land will prosper.
Held: No, the main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. Upon the presentation in court
if an application for the registration of the title to lands, the theory under the Torrens system is that all occupants,
adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have a right
to appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the proceeding is against the world.
A proceeding is in rem when the object of the action is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard
on the strength of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest.
DBT Contruction vs. Panes
G.R. No. 167232, July 31, 2009
DBT Mar-bay Construction, Inc.
vs Ricaredo Panes, etc.
Ponente: Nachura
Facts:
A parcel of land was conveyed by Regalado to DBT through a dacion en pago for services rendered. On June 24,
1992, the respondents Panes and his sons filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages and petition for
injunction against Regalado and DBT.
In the complaint, Ricaredo alleged that he is the lawful owner of the land which he had declared for taxation
purposes in his name. Respondents alleged that per certificate issued by the DENR the land was verified to be
correct and on file.
Respondents also claimed the Ricaredo and his immediate family had been and still are in actual possession of the
subject property, and their possession preceded the 2nd world war. To perfect his title, Ricaredo filed with the RTC
QC.
Respondents averred that in the process of complying with the registration, it was found out that a portion of the
land was with the subdivision plan of Regalado which was conveyed by Regalado to DBT.
On December 28, 1993, then defendants Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura (Spouses Tabangcura) filed their
Answer with Counterclaim, claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value when they bought a house
and lot covered by TCT No. 211095 from B.C. Regalado, the latter being a subdivision developer and registered
owner thereof, on June 30, 1986. When respondent Abogado Mautin entered and occupied the property, Spouses
Tabangcura filed a case for Recovery of Property before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97 which rendered a decision
in their favor.
On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it is the legitimate owner and occupant of the subject
property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by B.C. Regalado in the formers favor; that respondents were not
real parties-in-interests because Ricaredo was a mere claimant whose rights over the property had yet to be

determined by the RTC where he filed his application for registration; that the other respondents did not allege
matters or invoke rights which would entitle them to the relief prayed for in their complaint; that the
complaint was premature; and that the action inflicted a chilling effect on the lot buyers of DBT.
RTC's Ruling:
The testimony of Ricaredo that he occupied the property since he was only 16 had not been rebutted; Ricaredo's
occupation and cultivation of the land for more than 30 years vested him equitable ownership.
DBT filed a motion for reconsideration based on the grounds of prescription and laches. While this motion was still
pending, judge Bacalla died.
Then an intervenor claimed that portions of the subject land was part of the estate of certain Don Jose de Ocampo.
CA's Ruling: CA reversed and set aside the RTC Orders dated November 8, 2001 and June 17, 2002 and reinstated
the RTC Decision dated June 15, 2000. The CA held that the properties described and included in TCT No. 200519
are located in San Francisco del Monte, San Juan del Monte, Rizal and Cubao, Quezon City while the subject property
is located in Brgy. Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City. Furthermore, the CA held that Engr. Vertudazo's testimony
that there is a gap of around 1,250 meters between Lot 503 and Psu 123169 was not disproved or refuted. The CA
found that Judge Juanson committed a procedural infraction when he entertained issues and admitted evidence
presented by DBT in its Motion for Reconsideration which were never raised in the pleadings and proceedings prior
to the rendition of the RTC Decision. The CA opined that DBT's claims of laches and prescription clearly appeared to
be an afterthought. Lastly, the CA held that DBT's Motion for Reconsideration was not based on grounds
enumerated in the Rules of Procedure.
Issues:
(1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of prescription and laches as raised in the latter's Motion for
Reconsideration? (2) Which between DBT and the respondents have a better right over the subject property?
Held:
(1) Affirmative. The facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and
satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established
by the evidence. However, the conclusion reached by the RTC in its assailed Order was erroneous. The RTC failed to
consider that the action filed before it was not simply for reconveyance but an action for quieting of title which is
imprescriptible.
Therefore, laches will not apply to this case, because respondents' possession of the subject property has rendered
their right to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by laches. Moreover, since
laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal
so as to avoid injustice.
Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is baseless. Under Article 1126
of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be
governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD No. 1529, provides that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.
Consequently, in the instant case, proof of possession by the respondents is immaterial and inconsequential.
Note:
- action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. When an action for reconveyance is based on fraud, it
must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place
from the issuance of the original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of
title or transfer certificate of title. The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the RD
constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken
place at the time of registration.
c.

Principles
Sps. Vilbar vs. Opinion

TORRENS SYSTEM Principle

G.R. No. 176043; January 15, 2014 (2D)
SPOUSES BERNADETTE and RODULFO VILBAR vs. ANGELITO L. OPINION
FACTS This is the case of conflicting claims over two parcels of land in a subdivision more particularly designated
as Lots 20 and 21.

 The first claimant here is the Spouses Vilbar who bought said lots under contracts to sell with the subdivision
developer Dulos Realty and Development Corporation (or Dulos Realty for Brevity) sometime in July 1979.
Spouses Vilbar took possession of Lot 20 (B) in the concept of owners and exercised acts of ownership (or occupied
the same), with the permission of Dulos Realty after making an advance payment thereon. Later on, in 1981
Spouses Vilbar also took possession of Lot 21 and obtained tax declarations thereon in their name and paid its
realty taxes. Subsequently, they mortgaged Lot 21 to a bank and used the proceeds of the loan to pay in full the
purchase price of Lot 20
Upon full payment of the purchase price for Lot 20, Dulos Realty executed a duly notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of the spouses and delivered to them the owners duplicate copy of the TCT (No. S-39849). However,
they were not able to register and transfer the title in their name because the developer allegedly failed to have the
lot formally subdivided despite its commitment to do so, until its President, Juan B. Dulos (Juan), died without the
subdivision being accomplished. But eventually she was able to obtain title (TCT No. 36777) although she only
presented the contract to sell.
But it turned out that said lots were among those levied upon by (a certain) Gorospe, Sr., the former Board
Chairman and CEO of Dulos Realty by virtue of a Court judgment he obtained for recovery of benefits, privileges
and various allowances that said developer failed to pay him as Chairman. These lots were sold at public auction
with Gorospe emerging as highest bidder for which TCT Nos. 44797 (Lot 20) and 44796 (Lot 21) were issued in his
name. Subsequently, he mortgaged said lots to herein respondent, Opinion, and when Gorospe defaulted in paying
Opinion the obligation secured by said mortgage, the lots were awarded to him at an Extra-Judicial Foreclosure Sale.
When the Sps. Vilbar learned about such titles, they filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court against Opinion
claiming the latter is a buyer in bad faith because Gorospes titles from which Opinion derived the titles were
acquired in bad faith. The spouses pointed out that as an officer of Dulos Realty, Gorospe should have known that
the subject lots were already sold to them. To prove the spouses claim, they presented (1) the copies of the
contracts to sell on the two lots; (2) the Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 20; (3) the Real Estate Mortgage Agreement
with the bank over Lot 21; (4) original Official Receipts issued by SLR for installment payments of the purchase price
of the lots; (5) owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 36777 in her name; and, (6) tax declarations and receipts.
On one hand, respondent Opinion alleged that he is a buyer in good faith because before entering into the
mortgage agreement with Gorospe, he had verified with the Registry of Deeds that there were no annotations or
encumbrances registered in the titles of Lots 20 and 21. Further, he was assured by Gorospe that the spouses were
merely tenants of the lots and not the owners. RTC ruled in favor of Opinion declaring him to have better right
over Lots 20 and 21. Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 20 was never annotated in the transfer cert of title. TCTs
in the hands of respondent were the ones which cancelled the titles of Dulos Realty over the lots and not the TCT
presented by the spouses Vilbar. Issuance of TCT No. 36777 (TCT respecting LOT 21) was questionable because
there was no proof that the purchase price was already paid since only the Contract to Sell was available.
Registry of Deeds of Pasay itself certified that the TCT respecting Lot 21 is presumed not to be validly issued.
Herein petitioners only had an inchoate right over the property, said the RTC. This decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals (CA). ISSUE: Were the RTC and CA correct? HELD: YES. The evidence proves that respondent
Opinion lawfully acquired his title over the lots. Gorospe, Sr. cannot be considered to be in bad faith because he was
not the one who executed and signed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners. Bad faith cannot be
presumed and there was no clear and convincing proof that Gorospe had knowledge of such transaction. A review
of the documents presented by the Spouses in support of their claim of ownership, the SC reached a conclusion
same with that of as that of the RTC. With regard to Lot 20, spouses Vilbar brag of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Dulos Realty in their favor and aver that they have the owners copy of TCT No. S-39849 and are presently
enjoying actual possession of said property. However, these are not sufficient proofs of ownership. For some
unknown reasons, the spouses Vilbar did not cause the transfer of the certificate title in their name, or at the very
least, annotate or register such sale in the original title in the name of Dulos Realty. This, sadly, proved fatal to their
cause. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that "(1) a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein." Having no certificate
of title issued in their names, spouses Vilbar have no indefeasible and incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support
their claim. Further, it is an established rule that (2) "registration is the operative act which gives validity to the
transfer or creates a lien upon the land." (3) "Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of
title x x x is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title." Failing to annotate
the deed for the eventual transfer of title over Lot 20 in their names, the spouses Vilbar cannot claim a greater right
over Opinion, who acquired the property with clean title in good faith and registered the same in his name by going
through the legally required procedure. Petition denied; Decision of the CA affirming the ruling of the RTC affirmed.
Tomas vs.Tomas
[G.R. No. L-36897. June 25, 1980.]

SPOUSES FLORENTINO S. TOMAS and FRANCISCA CARINO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. EUSEBIA TOMAS, defendant,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, SANTIAGO, ISABELA BRANCH, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Plaintiff spouses, Florentino S. Tomas and Francisca Cario, are the owners of a parcel of land located in
Malasian, Santiago, Isabela (now Saguday, Nueva Vizcaya) since 1929, which they obtained through a homestead
patent with Original Certificate of Title No. 1-4620. Through fraud and misrepresentation, one Eusebia Tomas
succeeded in having OCT No. 1-4620 cancelled, and obtained in her name TCT No. 8779, Isabela, now TCT 350
Nueva Vizcaya, with which she obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank branch in Santiago, Isabela, as a
security, mortgaging the land with the bank for the loan of P2,500.00. Florentino Tomas discovered the fraudulent
acts of Eusebia Tomas when he himself applied for a loan from the Philippine National Bank, and offered as a
collateral the same land already mortgaged by Eusebia Tomas to the bank. In the action plaintiffs filed on April 14,
1964 to declare TCT - 350, Nueva Vizcaya, null and void, against Eusebia Tomas.
After trial, the court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
(a) declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8779, now Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-350 in the name of
defendant Eusebia Tomas null and void; (b) declaring the deed of extra-judicial settlement executed by defendant
Eusebia Tomas null and void; (c) declaring Original Certificate of Title No. I-4620 and its file and owner's copy
revived; (d) condemning defendant Eusebia Tomas to pay the plaintiffs in the amount of P950.00 as attorney's fee
and P55.80 representing the Actual expenses of the plaintiffs; (e) declaring the mortgage in favor of the Philippine
National Bank without force and effect against the plaintiffs, and (f) ordering defendant Eusebia Tomas to pay the
costs of this proceedings." The Philippine National Bank appealed from the judgment declaring the mortgage in its
favor without force and effect.
Issue: Whether the mortgage of the land in favor of the appellant bank is valid or not as against appellees.
Held: There is no dispute that the mortgagor Eusebia Tomas is not the owner of the land in question, the true
owner being the appellees, who had always been in possession of said land since they applied for it by way of
homestead patent. The owner's duplicate of OCT No. I-4620 covering the land in favor of appellee Florentino Tomas
had always been with the latter, and was never lost as falsely and fraudulently misrepresented by Eusebia Tomas in
her petition for a new owner's duplicate of OCT No. I-4620. Alleging however, good faith so as to invoke the
protective provision of the Land Registration Act (Section 39, Act 496), pointing to the fact that the certificate of
title, TCT - 350 Nueva Vizcaya presented by Eusebia Tomas as mortgagor was in her name, and showed no
encumbrance over the land, the appellant bank contends that its right as mortgagee must be fully respected, as a
mortgagee in good faith.
Verily, the resolution of the issue raised in this appeal hinges on whether the appellant is a mortgagee in good faith
and for value, for if it is, and without anything to excite suspension as it claims, it is protected in the same way as a
purchaser in good faith and for value is protected under Section 39 of Act 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act.
We, indeed, find more weight and vigor in a doctrine which recognizes a better right for the innocent original
registered owner who obtained his certificate of title through perfectly legal and regular proceedings, than one who
obtains his certificate from a totally void one, as to prevail over judicial pronouncements to the effect that one
dealing with a registered land, such as a purchaser, is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate of title of
the vendor, for in the latter case, good faith has yet to be established by the vendee or transferee, being the most
essential condition, coupled with valuable consideration, to entitle him to respect for his newly acquired title even
as against the holder of an earlier and perfectly valid title. There might be circumstances apparent on the face of
the certificate of title which could excite suspicion as to prompt inquiry, such as when the transfer is not by virtue of
a voluntary act of the original registered owner, as in the instant case, where it was by means of a self-executed
deed of extra-judicial settlement, a fact which should be noted on the face of Eusebia Tomas' certificate of title.
Failing to make such inquiry would hardly be consistent with any pretense of good faith, which the appellant bank
invokes to claim the right to be protected as a mortgagee, and for the reversal of the judgment rendered against it
by the lower court.
B. CLASSIFICATION AS CLASSIFICATION AS TO OWNERSHIP (Art 419-425)
CHAPTER 3
PROPERTY IN RELATION TO THE PERSON TO WHOM IT BELONGS
Art. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. (338)
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth. (339a)
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial
property. (340a)
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of
the patrimonial property of the State. (341a)
Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial
property. (343)
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city
streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service
paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to
the provisions of special laws. (344a)
Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively. (345a)
1.

Public Dominion
KINDS OF PUBLIC LAND
a. Alienable and Disposable
b. Non-alienable and Indisposable
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty

Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic

2.
3.
4.

Municipal Corporations
a. Government or proprietary purpose
b. Patrimonial or private/corporate
Individual/Corporation
Ancestral domain/Ancestral land
Separate opinion of J. Puno in Cruz vs. Secretary (see above)