In this article, Fred Riggs examines the concept of modernity (particularly in the context of industrialization, democratization, and
nationalism), and how it has helped shape the administrative
states we know today.
Industrialization has vastly expanded both the tasks assigned to
all contemporary governments and the resources (domestic and
international) placed at their disposal. This has not only
increased the needfor efficient and humane public administration, but it has also magnified the necessity fir bureaucratic
power in order to ensure competent and impartial management of
public affairs but, regrettably, it also enhances opportunities for
corruption and mismanagement.
The effect of democratization has been to replace monarchs with
representative institutions capable of controlling and directing
increasingly complex bureaucracies while ensuring officials the
autonomy and stable guidelines they need. When these institutions fail to function effectively, as they often do, public administration can collapse and, in many cases, angered public officials,
led by military officers, seize power and establish bureaucratic
polities marked by corruption and even greater inefficiency.
Nationalism has played a fiindamental role in the creation of
modern democracies. Unfortunately, however, in many countries,
including the United States, strains generated by imperial conquests and mass migrations have now created a host of inter-ethnic tensions andpitijully weak states where traditional concepts of
public administration based on assumed national unity are put to
severe tests.
Modernity
Bureaucracy has been a fundamental institution of
government for several thousand years. All traditional empires and many premodern kingdoms developed more or less elaborate bureaucraciesthose of
the Chinese, Roman, and Ottoman Empires are
among the most familiar. As hierarchies of appointed
officials, bureaucracies were never democratic in
structure or purposethey were designed to enable
monarchs to administer domains under their authority, to expand those domains, and to protect them
from aggressive neighboring peoples. To these
ancient functions, modern democracies have added
many new tasks driven by the requisites of representative governance, industrialization, and nationalism.
Modernity, therefore, has vastly expanded the
functions of traditional bureaucracies, transforming
them into formidable dragons. The dragon of modern bureaucracy resembles traditional bureaucracy as
a form of hierarchic organization designed to dominate and control subject populations and to do so
efficiently. Its new forms evolved in the context of
modern imperialism: In order to rule their empires,
even the most democratic of the modern states developed mechanisms of colonial administration that
permitted far-away metropoles to maintain longterm domination over conquered peoples. In short,
no bureaucracies, modern or traditional, are democratic; they are instead administrative and hierarchic.
However, democratizing countries were able to
import bureaucratic structures and bring them under
popular control. Under such control, representative
governments could use bureaucracies to provide public services that have become increasingly necessary
for the populations of all modern states. However,
modern bureaucracies can also function as organs of
domination and exploitation, as we can easily see in
many countries where arbitrary and oppressive
even totalitarianregimes rely on bureaucracies to
sustain and maintain their ruthless domination. The
key variable has not been any fundamental transformation in the structure of bureaucratic organizationrather, it has involved the establishment of
new political structures able to maintain popular
control over the conduct and performance of
appointed public officials.
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My purpose, here is to describe how three aspects of modernityindtistrialism, democracy, and nationalismhave impinged
on bureaucracy in the world today, especially in the liberated new
states that have emerged on the ashes of collapsed empires.
Industrialization
tion.
In all traditional empires, I believe, capitalists were politically
marginalized in preference to other groups whose values were
shared by the ruling elites. But as a bourgeoisie gained power, it
also gained wealth by means of the technological innovations and
investments required for large-scale production. Concurrently, the
organization of corporations protected by political allies, legal
sanctions, and social acceptance (Riggs, 1994) protected industrialists from the tendency of all preindustrial rulers and officials to
extract wealth from merchants by confiscating their goods, imposing tributes, and, above all, blocking their access to power.
Industrialization involved much more than changes in the technology of production; it also required a revolution in its organization and management. The use of modern budgeting, accounting,
and auditing methods in both private enterprise and public service
evolved interactively in the public and private sectors. Moreover,
the higher levels of production resulting from industrialization
made salaried bureaucracies feasible by raising the levels of national
income and thereby providing the necessary taxable resources. To
maintain a salaried bureaucracy, it was also necessary to establish
payroll systems outside the control of any officer's immediate superiors. Traditionally, governments often paid superiors who, in turn,
paid their subordinates part of what they received, retaining the
surplus for themselves. To sustain a payroll system, by contrast, it
became necessary to budget and plan, to improve tax collection, to
audit and evaluate performance, to determine salary scales, and to
establish all the staff (overhead) services typical of modern public
administration.
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Democratization
Since modern public administration is symbiotic with industrialization rather than with democracy, and since it can be used to
oppress people as well as to serve them, we need to understand
how the institutions of representative government can most effec-
Oligocracies
The basic principle of democracy as an aspect of modernity
involves the replacement of top-down monarchic authority with
bottom-up representationdominated subjects were to be
replaced by free citizens able to participate in governance and
choose their governors. However, this process rarely involved a
comprehensive political transformation. At best, many people
under a state's control were never given equal rights as citizens
they remained unrepresented. The familiar slogan of the American
Revolution (no taxation without representation) persists as an
expression of the stubborn resentment of those who are nominally
but not actually represented in the power structures of most modern so-called democracies. In the American case, conquered peoples,
imported slaves, women, and the poor were not enfranchised when
the Constitution was proclaimed, and the greatest modern powers
(including the United States) as they extended their imperial conquests, brought large numbers of subjects under their control. We
need, I think, a concept that includes the semi-democracies that
extend the rights of citizenship and representation in government
to some people but deny them to others. I use the word oligocracy
to refer to this composite form of democracy with oligarchy.
The bureaucracies serving any oligocracy experience a kind of
political schizophrenia. On the one hand, they are compelled to
respect the interests and rights of citizens who are, in principle,
their "masters." On the other hand, they can govern more or less
arbitrarily the "subjects" who are unrepresented in the polity. The
oligocratic context means that in even the most democratic polities, complete control over bureaucratic performance is never possible. Actually, even within the heartlands of modern democracies,
cynicism about the role and functions of bureaucracy often prevails. In this context, think about the New Public Administration
movement: it sought to democratize bureaucracy by inducing officials to be more responsive to the clienteles they affected and had
to work with. No doubt these efforts were extremely high-minded,
but how successful were they?
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I mention this nnovement as evidence that even among specialists in American public administration, feelings of disillusionment
and despair about bureaucratic conduct are widespread in America.
How much more pervasive must antibureaucratic sentiment be
among dominated peoples, whether they are subject to imperial
control, or, after independence they fall under the rule of authoritarians, including bureaucrats (both civil servants and military officers). The fundamental problem confronting all the liberated states
was not how to redesign their modernized bureaucracies but rather
how to bring them under the effective control of responsible and
representative political institutions. How to transform domineering bureaucrats into responsible public servants was doubly daunting for countries liberated from imperial rule because the colonial
officers who had shaped their images of public administration were
never accountable to representatives of the people over whom they
ruled.
Bureaucratic Modernization
A recognition that Western monarchies were replaced by
oligocracies rather than democracies may help us understand the
dynamics of modernity and bureau power. While industrialism
and democracy reinforced each other in their homelands, industrialism also powered the imperialist drive to gain control over
sources of raw materials and potential markets. Thus governments
that gained control over modern bureaucracies to meet the needs
of their citizens could also manage colonial bureaucracies designed
to maintain domination over subjects living in remote places. The
forces that led to the establishment of representative institutions at
home resisted the democratic empowerment of conquered peoples
while also undermining the vitality of their traditional political
institutions.
No doubt the maintenance of effective control over bureaucracy
is a fundamental problem in all countries, but it is especially
poignant in democracies where notions of popular sovereignty lead
citizens to view officials as public servants, who should serve the
people unselfishly by providing services and implementing policies
approved by the general public through their elected representatives. Such expectations did not prevail in traditional forms of
authoritarianism, where a ruler's subjects were expected to serve the
rulers and not to demand rights of their own. The abuse of power
by appointed officials was not only expected, it was also accepted
in such environments, and this contributed to the stability of premodern forms of authoritarianism. When modernization spread to
dependent countries, however, it spread democratic norms that led
the citizens of the new states to expect their governments to respect
and meet their needs. When this did not happen, we should not be
surprised if they responded with anger and supported revolutionary movements, coups led by military officers, or revolts by
oppressed minorities.
It has never been easy in even the most democratic countries for
the organs of representative government to sustain effective control
over their bureaucracies. No doubt socialization by means of good
educational preparation and in-service training programs for public
officials can help, but on the job, do we not also need the continuotis presence of auditors and monitors who, representing the public interest, under legislative control, can reward responsible
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Nationalism
The fundamental problems of modernity, however, cannot be
fully explained by reference to the rise of industrialism and democracy, as important as these factors are. In addition, we must consider a third factor: nationalism. In the newly liberated post-imperial
states, this factor (in the form of ethnonationalism) will increasingly threaten the viability of all regimes, but, I believe, democracies
will have a better chance of solving these problems than authoritarian regimesespecially weak anarchism. The role of bureaucracies
in dealing with ethnic nationalism is decisiveabove all with
problems of representative bureaucracy.
Most writers about nationalism treat it as an independent phenomenon not linked with the other dimensions of modernity, but
in my opinion, its real significance becomes apparent only when it
is viewed as part of the broader process that started with the Peace
of Westphalia (in the middle of the seventeenth century) making
sovereignty its central slogan. This watershed event marked the
end of the Holy Roman Empire and the European myth that all
rulers were part of a single imperial and sacred hierarchy of authority and legitimacy. The new era was to be one in which sovereign
states, each with their own borders and subject populations, could
act on their own authority. Rival kings began to link their increasingly questionable sovereignty as rulers to the sovereignty of their
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Perversity of Modernization
Since all modern empires proclaimed their support for the three
basic values of industrialism, democracy, and nationalism, but were
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Summary
To generalize about some of the implications of modernity for
public administration and bureaucracy, consider these three
hypotheses:
1. Maladministration, Bad management linked with industrialization (the first leg of modernity) leads to disorder, hostility
toward elites, and the collapse of good government.
2. Bureau Power, Bureaucratic domination, a widespread corollary of maladministration, promotes anarchy and blocks democratization (the second leg of modernization).
3. Authority, State nationalism built the foundation for
widespread acceptance of popular sovereignty in modern democracies, but the rise of ethnic nationalism is now eroding public
authority. Thus one of the three pillars of modernity has become
its enemy. More explicitly, nationalism validated the right of the
secularized state to appoint officials vested with the authority to
administer public policies, to enforce the law, to collect taxes, to
maintain security, and to perform many other necessary public
functions. By contrast, ethnic nationalism challenges the authority
of states and their officeholders. It encourages revolts against public officials and, by undermining their authority, it enhances lawlessness and the spread of violence.
This third aspect needs special emphasis as we approach a new
millennium in which endemic localized violence due to ethnic
nationalism in weak states will likely become increasingly pervasive, replacing the macrolevel violence between contending empires
that has characterized the recent past. During the last two cen-
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Polanyi, Karl, Conrad M, Arensberg, and Harry W, Pearson (1957), Trade
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