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2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

MELQUIADES
FERNANDEZ alias Moding, and FEDERICO CONRADO, defendantsappellants.
FACTS: Moding and Federico raped Rebecca Soriano, a 15 year old housemaid. Both
the accused conspired and confederated to commit rape while one was successfully
having carnal knowledge with the victim, the other was holding her hands and
thereafter the latter was the one raping the victim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accesed are both principally liable
RULING: YES, Both are principally liable for direct participation and
indispensable cooperation in the two (2) crimes of rape committed. In
multiple rape, each defendant is responsible not only for the rape personally
committed by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because each one
of them cooperated in the commission of the rape perpetrated by the others, by
acts without which it would not have been accomplished.
4. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO
MADLANGBAYAN Y BONET, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: Antonio Madlangbayan robbed and killed Enrique Fellarme (took 300php
from his pocket and his Seiko watch worth 300php). Accused made an extrajudicial
confession; he disclosed his participation in the hold-up stabbing of the deceased,
together with a certain "Boy Marino," "Imping" and "Rody" they call themselves
the Bahala Na Gang. In answer to a question, he stated that he could recognize
and identify the man they stabbed.
The defendants alibi was that he was at the residence of his uncle (but it was
barely 500 to 600 meters away from the scene of the crime it was not impossible
for the accused to have gone there between the hours mentioned) and his
extrajudicial confession was coerced from him. He claims that when he refused to
affix his thumbmark, he was boxed by Patrolman Cuevas and his companions.
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial confession is sufficient to sustain the conviction.
RULING: YES. The reason for this is that the extrajudicial confession made by the
accused was corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus delicti means the
substance of the crime, the fact that a crime has actually been committed.
The evidence of corpus delicti must be independent of the extrajudicial confession.
However, it does not mean that every element of the crime must be made out apart
from the confession, but merely that there should be some evidence apart from the
confession tending to show that the crime has been committed (See People vs.
Batangan, 54 Phil. 834).
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6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CELESTINO ABAPO,


accused-appellant.
FACTS: Accued was proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt to have cold-bloodedly
committed the murders of Edgardo Bondoc Tagubanza and Alfredo Rarang. He filed
an appeal stating that the trial court failed in giving credibility to his testimony. The
higher court finds no evidence to support his claim. Hence he should therefore be
dealt with with the full force of the law.
However, the trial court committed a mistake in imposing the penalty of "life
imprisonment" apparently on the belief that it is the English version of reclusion
perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is substantial difference between Reclusion Perpetua
under the Revised Penal Code and Life Imprisonment when imposed as a penalty by
special law
RULING: YES. As noted from the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, the
trial court imposed the penalty of "life imprisonment" for the crime of murder.
Hence, we would like to reiterate our admonition in the case of People vs. Penillos
(205 SCRA 546, 565-566), likewise quoted under Administrative Circular No. 6-92
dated October 12, 1992 re: the correct application of the penalties of reclusion
perpetua and life imprisonment, thus:
(1) Evidently, it considered the latter as the English translation of the former, which
is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent case of
People vs. Baguio (196 SCRA 459, 469), this Court held:
(2) The Code does not prescribe the penalty of "life imprisonment" for any of the
felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses
penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special laws. Reclusion perpetua
entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes
eligible for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely:
perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as "life imprisonment"
which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another,
does not appear to have any definite extent or duration.
As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, reiterated in People vs. Pilones, and in the
concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People vs. Sumadic, this Court
already made it clear that reclusion perpetua, is not the same as imprisonment for
life or life imprisonment. Every judge should take note of the distinction and this
Court expects that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other.
8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MAGALLANO and MARCELO MAGALLANO, accused-appellants.

DIOMEDES

FACTS: Elfonio (victim) after having missed to hit the bird with a slingshot went
towards the said bird. At that point, Marcelo Magallano emerged from a clearing in
a nearby sugarcane plantation and talked to Elfonio. In a little while, appellant
Diomedes Magallano stealthily approached from behind the two and, without much
ado, hacked Elfonio with a bolo in plain sight.
In the defendants appeal, they questioned whether the passage of Republic Act No.
7659 has transformed the indivisible nature of reclusion perpetua into a divisible
one because of its "defined duration" ranging from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Reclusion Perpetua shall be classified as a divisible pentalty
because of RA 7659
RULING: NO. After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative
history of R.A. No. 7659, the Court concludes that although Section 17 of R.A. No.
7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one
(1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original
classification as an indivisible penalty. Reclusion perpetua remains as an indivisible
penalty without any minimum, medium or maximum period. As such, it should be
imposed in the case at bar in its entire duration in accordance with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code regardless of the presence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime.
10. G.R. No. 76490. October 6, 1995.*
ISAGANI SABINIANO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RODOLFO MARTINEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: The accounting division accordingly prepared Treasury Warrant No.
BO2.285.701 in the sum of P9,775.00. The treasury warrant was signed by Vedasto
Martinez, as auditor, and petitioner Sabiniano, as chief of the budget and fiscal
division. Petitioner Rodolfo Martinez, a casual employee of the Bureau of Lands,
approached Pedro Velasco, the Bureau's cashier in its office at the Casman Building
in Quezon City, and asked the latter to encash the treasury warrant. Since Velasco
had then no available cash, his help was instead sought by petitioner Martinez to
have the treasury warrant encashed at the Bureau of Treasury. Velasco agreed but,
not knowing the payee (Eutiquio Hedrosello) personally, he asked petitioner
Martinez to endorse the warrant. Velasco then introduced petitioner Martinez to the
teller who, in turn, asked Velasco to likewise endorse the warrant. The warrant was
thereupon encashed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime commited was malversation thru
falsification or only estafa thru falsification.
RULING: The courts below correctly convicted petitioner of estafa thru falsification
of public documents instead of malversation thru falsification of public documents,
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the crime for which he was charged in the information. The reason for this is that
when a casual employee of the Bureau of Lands encahsed a treasury warrant by
affixing his signature thereon, when in fact the treasury warrant is not payable to
him. He is not an accountable officer.
12. JOSE L. GAMBOA and UNITS OPTICAL SUPPLY COMPANY, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BENJAMIN LU HAYCO, respondents.
FACTS: Benjamin Lu Hayco was a former employee of petitioner company in its
optical supply business at Sta. Cruz, Manila. On January 5, 1973, 124 complaints of
estafa were filed against him by the petitioner company. After the procedural
preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Fiscal filed seventy-five (75) cases of
estafa against said accused, being then an employee of the Units Optical Supply
Company and having collected and received from customers of the said company of
different sum of money in payment for goods purchased from it and did then and
there misappropriate, misapply and convert the said sum to his own personal use
and benefit by depositing the said amount in his own name and personal account.
Accused asserted that the seventy-five (75) informations were mere components of
only one crime, since the same were only impelled by a single criminal resolution or
intent. The lower court dismissed the petition on the ground that the series of
deposits and the subsequent withdrawals thereof involved in the criminal cases
were not the result of only one criminal impulse on the part of private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act committed by the accused constitutes delito
continuado?
RULING: NO. The reason for this is that the abstractions were not made at
the same time and on the same occasion, but on variable dates. Each day
of conversion constitutes a single act with an independent existence and
criminal intent of its own. All the conversions are not the product of a
consolidated or united criminal resolution, because each conversion is a
complete act by itself. Specifically, the abstractions and the accompanying
deposits thereof in the personal accounts of the employee cannot be similarly
viewed as continuous crime. Delito continaudo or continuous crime means a
single crime consisting of a series acts arising from a single criminal resolution or
intent not susceptible of division.
Moreover, the necessary elements of estafa may separately take place in different
territorial jurisdictions until the crime itself is consummated. The moment,
however, that the elements of the crime have completely concurred or
transpired, then an individual crime of estafa has occurred or has been
consummated. The term continuing must be understood in the sense
similar to that of transitory and is only intended as a factor in
determining the proper venue or jurisdiction for that matter of the
criminal action pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
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Other related facts:


Article 48 of our Revised Penal Code shall not be applied in this case. ART 48
provides: when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
The intention of the Code in installing this particular provision is to regulate the two
cases of concurrence or plurality of crimes which in the field of legal doctrine are
called real plurality and ideal plurality. There is plurality of crimes or concurso
de delitos when the actor commits various delictual acts of the same or different
kind.
Ideal plurality distinguished from real plurality.Ideal plurality or concurso ideal
occurs when a single act gives rise to various infractions of law. This is illustrated by
article 48: (a) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
(described as delito compuesto or compound crime); and (b) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing another offense (described as delito complejo or
complex proper). Real plurality or concurso real, on the other hand, arises when
the accused performs an act or different acts with distinct purposes and resulting in
different crimes which are juridically independent. Unlike ideal plurality, this real
plurality is not governed by article 48.
Requisites for continuous crime,In order that it may exist, there should
be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of
penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and
purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the
perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.
14. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOPE VIENTE Y
MAPILI, accused-appellant.
FACTS: Lope Viente y Mapili was charged with the violation of Republic Act No.
6539, otherwise know as the Anti-Carnapping Act, by then and there poking a gun
at the nape of one Narciso Cabatas y Limora, driver of an Isuzu passenger jeepney
with Plate No. DVB-424. The accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of carnapping or violation of Republic Act 6539 and is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of thirty (30) years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proper penalty to be imposed is under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
RULING: YES. Where crime (e.g., carnapping) is punished by a special law,
sentence of conviction must impose an indeterminate penalty, not a fixed one.
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16. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs.
BIENVENIDO VENUS, defendant and appellant.
FACTS: Bienvenido Venus was charged guilty of the crime of robbery in an
inhabited house. The accused plead guilty. The information in the complaint also
stated that the accused is a habitual delinquent. The trial court took into account
the aggravating circumstance of recidivism because the date of the conviction of
the accused for the crime of theft is specified in the information, but it refused to
consider the defendant-appellant a habitual delinquent under the provisions of
article 62 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is a recidivist or habitual delinquent.
RULING: RECIDIVIST. Accused cannot be considered a habitual delinquent (or
multi-recidivism) but only a recidivist because of the insufficiency of the allegation
on this point in the city fiscal's information.
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CONFINEMENT IN A REFORMATORY; CHARACTER OF THE ORDER
OF CONFINEMENT.Orders issued for the confinement of a minor in the Philippine
Training School for Boys, whatever their number, do not constitute condemnatory
prison sentences.
2. ID.; ID.; "PRESO FUGADO"; BENEFITS OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
Confinement in the Philippine Training School for Boys is not imprisonment, and
the minor so confined, who escapes from said institution, does not have the status
of a preso fugado (escaped prisoner), and is not excluded from the benefits afforded
by the Indeterminate Sentence Law. [People vs. Soler, 63 Phil. 868(1936)]
18. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs.
CARLOS SOLER Y RODRIGUEZ (alias DANKLIN SOLER), , defendant and
appellant.
FACTS: Accused was found guilty of theft. This being his fourth conviction, he is
deemed as a habitual delinquent sentenced to the additional penalty of seven
years, four months and one day of prision mayor, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, in accordance with the provisions of article 62, subsection 5,
paragraph (b), of the Revised Penal Code.
The defense stated that accused cannot be considered as habitual delinquent
as the latter has not ever been convicted of any said crimes prior to the commission
of the crime of theft.
The fiscal, is of the opinion that the accused is not entitled to enjoy the benefit
afforded by Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, which establishes
indeterminate sentence on the ground that he has twice escaped from the
Philippine Training School for Boys where he was confined.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the accused shall be excluded from the benefits afforded by
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
RULING: NO. In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so
hold: (1) That orders issued for the confinement of a minor in the Philippine Training
School for Boys, whatever their number, do not constitute condemnatory prison
sentences; (2) that confinement in the Philippine Training School for Boys is not
imprisonment, and the minor so confined, who escapes from said institution, does
not have the status of a preso fugado (escaped prisoner), and is not excluded from
the benefits afforded by the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
20. PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.
FACTS: Pablo C. Francisco humiliated his employees. He was thereafter accused of
multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five of
his employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four
different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
After almost ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati found Francisco,
guilty of grave oral defamation, in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him. He
is sentenced to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of
each case, as alleged in the informations. However, he was acquitted in for
persistent failure of the offended party, to appear and testify.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation
RULING: YES. The multiple prison terms imposed against the accused finding him
guilty of several offenses in one decision should not be added up, and their total
should not be determinative of his eligibility for, may his disqualificsation from
probation since the law uses the word maximum and not total term of
imprisonment.
22. MARCELO DE LEON, petitioner and appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS, respondent and appellee.
FACTS: Marcelo de Leon and others were charged with the crime of illegal detention
and were sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court. On the 19th day of
November, 1909, the Honorable W. Cameron Forbes, Acting Governor-General,
extended to the defendant a conditional pardon. Marcelo de Leon, was transferred
to the Iwahig Penal Colony, but for some reason or other was later transferred again
to Bilibid;
On the 17th day of November, 1913, the Honorable Francis Burton Harrison,
Governor-General, issued a conditional pardon to the plaintiff, the condition being
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that he should not be guilty of any crime or infraction of the law, the punishment for
which should be a year or more of imprisonment, during the rest of the unexpired
time of his sentence of imprisonment already imposed;
On the 15th day of June, 1914, by a letter from the Honorable Ignacio Villamor,
Executive Secretary, to the Director of Prisons, it appears that the GovernorGeneral, by reason of representations made to him by the prison authorities,
directed the cancellation of the conditional pardon signed by him under date of
November 17, 1913;
The said conditional pardon of His Excellency the Governor-General of the 17th of
November, 1913, had never been delivered nor communicated to the plaintiff,
neither had the same been accepted by him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conditional pardon should be granted to the convict if it
is not yet been delivered or accepted by the latter
RULING: NO. Conditional pardon is certainly a contract between two parties: the
Chief Executive, who grants the pardon, and the convict, who accepts it. It does not
become perfected until the convict is notified of the same and accepts it with all its
conditions.
Pardon was neither delivered nor accepted before it was canceled by the order of
the Governor-General. The same being canceled before delivery or acceptance, it
was without force or effect and the petition for the writ of habeas corpus based
upon the same must be denied.
24. EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINO, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: Lourdes Cruz, wife of Romulo Cruz, had been suffering from a vaginal
bleeding, they went to Morong Emergency Hospital and was attended by Dr.
Patrocinio Angeles. Lourdes Cruz was operated on by the complaint Dr. Patrocinio
her uterus which contained three (3) dead foetal triplets was removed that the
operation was successful and her bleeding was arrested.
Dr. Emiliano Francisco (formerly a member of the Courtesy Medical Staff on the
Morong Emergency Hospital) and Atty. Harry Bernardino together interviewed the
spouses about the operation. Dr. Francisco said that the operation was not correctly
done and Mrs. Cruz should not have been operated on and that if he were the one
he would not conduct an operation but only curettage. Atty. Harry Bernardino that
the physicians in Morong Emergency Hospital were no good, are incompetent and
they are not surgeons and told Romulo Cruz that he could file charges for murder
through reckless imprudence.
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Dr Angeles charged the accused of grave oral defamation but was modified by the
Court of Appeals finding petitioners guilty of the crime of simple slander instead of
grave oral defamation. Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
present case was instituted, alleging that the defamatory remarks committed were
a greater offense of grave oral defamation. It was filed before the Fiscal's office only
thirty-nine (39) days after the incident in question which is still within the
prescriptive period.
ISSUE: Whether or not filing if complaint in the Fiscals office interrupts the
prescription period
RULING: YES. Filing of a denuncia or complaint for intriguing against honor or
grave oral defamation even in the Fiscals office interrupts period of prescription;
Reason -- As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a
preliminary investigation, a proceeding in the Fiscals Office may terminate without
conviction or acquittal. Clearly, therefore, the filing of the denuncia or complaint for
intriguing against honor by the offended party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave
oral defamation, even if it were in the Fiscals Office, 39 days after the alleged
defamatory remarks were committed (or discovered) by the accused interrupts the
period of prescription.
Moreover, statements made by a person that a doctor had in effect committed a
mistake in the diagnosis and management of his patient, which is merely a criticism
in a physicians management of a case is not libelous.
26. CABELIC VS GERONIMO ????????
28. In the matter of the petition of Antonio Infante for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus. ANTONIO INFANTE, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE
PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent-appellant.
FACTS: Infante was convicted of murder. He was granted a conditional pardon and
released from imprisonment, the condition being that "he shall not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines". On April 25, 1949, Infante was found guilty of
driving a jeep without license. On July 13, 1950, "by virtue of the authority conferred
upon His Excellency, the President, by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code", the Executive Secretary ordered Infante re-arrested and re-committed to the
custody of the Director of Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, for breach of the condition of
the aforesaid pardon.
HELD: Unless the petitioner's pardon be construed as above suggested, the same,
instead of an act of mercy, would become an act of oppression and injustice. We can
not believe that in exchange for the remission of a small fraction of the prisoner's
penalty it was in the Executive's mind to keep hanging over his (prisoner's) head
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during the rest of his life the threat of recommitment and/or prosecution for any
slight misdemeanor such as that which gave rise to the order under consideration.
There is another angle which militates in favor of a strict construction in the case at
bar. Although the penalty remitted has not, in strict law, prescribed, reimprisonment
of the petitioner for the remainder of his sentence, more than ten years after he was
pardoned, would be repugnant to the weight of reason and the spirit and genius of
our penal laws. If a prisoner who has escaped and has given the authorities trouble
and caused the State additional expense in the process of recapturing him is
granted immunity from punishment after a period of hiding, there is at least as
much justification for extending this liberality through strict construction of the
pardon to one who, for the same period, has lived and comported as a peaceful and
law-abiding citizen.
Not improper to consider in this connection is the circumstance that the prisoner's
general conduct during his long confinement had been "excellent", which had
merited his classification as a trustee or penal colonist, and that his release before
the complete extinguishment of his sentence could have been intended as a reward
for his past exemplary behavior with little or no thought of exacting any return from
him in the form of restraint from law violations, for which, after all, there were
independent and ample punishments.
30. CLEMENTE LACESTE, petitioner, vs. PAULINO SANTOS, Director of
Prisons, respondent.
FACTS: Clemente Laceste and Nicolas Lachica were found guilty for the crime of
rape against Magdalena de Ocampo. Lachica married the victim and was
accordinglyreleased from the criminal prosecution by virtue of Section 2 Art. No.
1773 and Art.448 of the Penal Code then in force which provided that such a
marriageextinguished penal liability.However, under the Revise Penal Code, Laceste
is now also entitled (RPC tookeffect January 1, 1932) to the benefits accruing from
such marriage in accordance tothe last paragraph of Article 344 of the RPC which
provides: In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape,
themarriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguishcriminal action
or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. Theprovisions of this paragraph
shall also be applicable to co-principals,accomplices and accessories after the fact
of the above-mentionedcrimes.
ISSUE/S: (1) Whether or not marriage benefits the accused even if the latter has
already serving sentence (2)Whether or not Article 344 of the RPC shall be applied
retroactively in thecase at bar.
RULING: (1) YES. If done in good faith, marriage benefits the accused even if the
latter has already serving sentence ;(2)Article 344 shall be applied retroactively. The
case at bar is an exemption tothe general rule that laws are prospective, not
retrospective (lex prospicit, nonrespicit). The situation in the case favors the
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accused therefore article 22 of the RPCshall apply. Article 22 provides that: Penal
laws shall have a retrospective effect in so far as they favor theperson guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal.

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