THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 163351. June 21, 2005]

ANTONIO V. NUEVA ESPAA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

At about 11:15 a.m. on May 15, 1998, petitioner Antonio E. Nueva Espaa was
driving a passenger bus owned by Vallacar Transit, Inc. He was then traversing the
national highway of Calag-Calag, Ayungon, Negros Oriental and was southbound going
to Dumaguete City. While negotiating a curve, the passenger bus collided with a
northbound Honda motorcycle. As a result, Reynard So, the driver of the motorcycle,
and Nilo Castro, the person riding in tandem with him, were killed. An information for
reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide was filed against petitioner who was
also accused of failing to extend aid or assistance to the victims.
[1]

During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented Julito Dayuday and Florencio
Banico as eyewitnesses to the collision. The father of So and the mother of Castro were
also called to the witness stand to substantiate their respective claims for damages.
Julito Dayuday, a resident of Calag-Calag, Ayungon, Negros Oriental, testified that
he was waiting for a ride to Dumaguete City when the collision between the bus and the
Honda motorcycle occurred. He saw the bus coming from the north going to Dumaguete
City and, in the opposite direction, a pedicab being followed by a Suzuki motorcycle and
a Honda motorcycle on which So and Castro were riding. Upon approaching the curve
on the highway, the bus swerved from its lane and struck the Honda motorcycle. The
motorcycle snagged onto the left front fender of the bus and was dragged about 24
meters to the right of the southbound lane. So had been thrown to the ground by the
time the bus finally stopped. Dayuday testified that he saw the accused get off the bus
with the conductor and the passengers but, instead of assisting the victims, he casually
walked away from the scene of the accident.
Florencio Banico, on the other hand, was a passenger of the bus driven by
petitioner. He corroborated the testimony of Dayuday that the bus hit the motorcycle
while it was negotiating a curve on the highway of Calag-Calag. He also stated in court
that the accused left the scene of the accident while the victims lay dying on the road.
He heard Castro shouting for help while So was unconscious. He testified that nobody
helped the victims.
The father of So testified that his son was 30 years old at the time of his death and
he was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. He was likewise a sugar cane

planter and maintained a sari-sari store. Sos father claimed that his son was
earning P30,000 a month from his copra business and sari-sari store, and P50,000 a
month from selling sugar cane. He added that his family spent P87,200 for the wake
and funeral. He also demanded payment of attorneys fees of P30,000.
[2]

The mother of Castro, on the other hand, testified that her son was 26 years old
when he died. He worked as welder in Manila and earned P8,000 a month. She
allegedly spent P30,000 for her sons wake and burial.
For the defense, SPO2 Dolger Germundo, SPO3 Hilbert Arinaza, Roche Taburasa
and the petitioner himself were called to the witness stand.
SPO2 Germundo, a policeman, testified that he found the southbound bus in its
proper lane when he arrived at the site after the collision. He did not see any tire or skid
marks which meant that the point of impact was at the center of the road, as stated by
the prosecution witnesses. In his sketch and photograph of the accident, the
passenger bus and the Honda motorcycle were at the outer part of the southbound
lane, which was the lane the bus was traversing at the time of the accident. Due to the
positions of the colliding vehicles, he concluded that it was the motorcycle that rammed
into the bus.
[3]

[4]

SPO3 Arinaza of the Philippine National Police testified that he was on his way to
Dumaguete City on board the bus driven by petitioner. At the time of the accident, he
was seated behind petitioner-driver and felt the Honda motorcycle smash into the bus.
Taburasa, for his part, claimed he was the driver of the Suzuki motorcycle So tried
to overtake when they were both nearing the curve on the highway of Calag-Calag. He
claimed the collision occurred because the Honda motorcycle overshot its lane in its
attempt to overtake him. He corroborated the declaration of SPO3 Arinaza that Sos
motorcycle hit the left front fender of the bus.
When petitioner (the accused) was called to the witness stand, he denied the
accusations against him. He testified that the Honda motorcycle swerved out of its lane
and veered towards the bus, resulting in the collision. After the incident, he allegedly
went down the bus to aid the victims and even helped carry them into the vehicle that
brought them to a nearby hospital. He thereafter went to a police station to report the
incident.
The trial court gave no credence to the defense witnesses and convicted petitioner
of the crime charged. The dispositive part of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds accused, ANTONIO

VILLANUEVA NUEVA ESPAA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO DOUBLE HOMICIDE, and
aggravated by his failure to help the victim, as provided for Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, and appreciating in his favor the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, is hereby imposed the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto
mayor as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correcional as
maximum, and to pay the following damages:

TO THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM REYNARD SO

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

P2,997,000.00 indemnity for loss of earning capacity of victim

14,200.00 for expenses of the wake
20,000.00 for funeral parlor
12,000.00 for the tomb
53,000.00 for cost of burial site
30,000.00 for attorneys fees
200,000.00 for moral damages
100,000.00 for exemplary damages

P3,429,200.00 TOTAL AMOUNT

which total amount shall bear interest at the rate of TWELVE (12%) percent
per annum from the date of this decision until the same is paid.
TO THE HEIRS OF VICTIM NILO CASTRO
1)
2)
3)
4)

P1,728,000.00 indemnity for loss of earning capacity

20,000.00 for funeral expenses
200,000.00 for moral damages
50,000.00 for exemplary damages

P1,998,000.00 TOTAL AMOUNT

which total amount shall bear interest at the rate of TWELVE (12%) percent
per annum counted from the date of this decision until the same is fully paid.
Cost against accused.
So ordered.

[5]

Via a petition for review, petitioner appealed the judgment of the court a quo to the
Court of Appeals. On November 2, 2003, the appellate court modified the assailed
judgment:

Consequently, the penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneous. The appellant
should suffer the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correcional, as
minimum, to EIGHT (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
As to the civil liability, particularly the indemnity for the loss of the earning capacity
of the victims, the formula last enunciated by the Supreme Court is:
Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross-living
expenses annual (50% of

gross annual
income)
Thusly, since the victim Reynard So was earning P80,000 a month at the time of his
death when he was thirty (30) years old, his lost earning capacity should be computed
as follows:
x = 2 (80 30) x [P960,000.00 P480,000.00)
3
x = 33.4 x P480,000.00
x=

x P16,032,000.00

With respect to the victim Nilo Castro, he was earning P8,000.00 a month when he
died at the age of twenty-six (26). His lost earnings were:
x = 2 (80 26)

[P96,000.00 P48,000.00]
3

x = 36 x P48,000.00
x = P1,728,000.00
which the trial court correctly computed.
The other items of damages awarded are correct.

[6]

The appellate court likewise provided for the subsidiary liability of petitioners
employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the
decision read:
[7]

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, subject to

MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed; the indemnity for loss of earning
capacity of the victim Reynard So; the reckoning date of the start of the 12% interest
imposed; and the subsidiary civil liability of the accused appellants employer, all as
herein-above indicated. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

[8]

In this appeal before us, petitioner insists that he should not be made liable for the
mishap as it was actually the Honda motorcycle that rammed into the bus he was
driving. He seeks the reversal of his conviction for reckless imprudence resulting in
double homicide. The issues raised by him can be summarized as follows:

1. the ruling of the Court of Appeals is untenable and contrary to law because the
evidence of the prosecution is incompatible with the physical evidence on record;
2. the award of damages in the (total) amount of more than P18 Million is untenable
and contrary to jurisprudence and law.[9]

On the first issue, the Court does not ordinarily pass upon the findings of fact of the
trial court, specially if they have been affirmed on appeal by the appellate court. The
trial court was able to observe the witnesses and their demeanor on the stand and was
in a position to scrutinize and discern whether they were telling the truth. Without any
clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be
disturbed. In the case at bar, we see no reason to deviate from the rule. The Court is in
full agreement with the trial court and with the Court of Appeals regarding petitioners
liability for the crime charged against him.
[10]

[11]

On the second issue, however, we deem it necessary to modify the award of

damages given by the lower courts.
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be recovered: (1) a
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in proper cases.
CIVIL INDEMNITY ex delicto
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to award civil indemnity ex
delicto to the heirs of the victims. The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is
granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the
crime. Hence, based on recent jurisprudence , the award of civil indemnity ex
delicto of P50,000 each for the heirs of both So and Castro is in order.
[12]

[13]

ACTUAL DAMAGES: INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF EARNING

CAPACITY AND OTHER COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
With respect to indemnification for loss of earning capacity, the Court, in the case
of People vs. Mallari, enunciated:
[14]

The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for
loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages therefore may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence if there is testimony that the victim was
either (1) self-employed, earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, and judicial notice is taken of the fact that in the victim's line of work, no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
[15]

In this case, neither of the two exceptions applied. The earnings of So and Castro
were both above the minimum wage set by labor laws in their respective workplaces at
the time of their death. This being the case, the general rule of requiring documentary
evidence of their earning capacities finds application. Unfortunately for their heirs, no
such proof was presented at all. It was therefore erroneous for both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals to award compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity on
the basis alone of the oral testimonies of Sos father and Castros mother.
[16]

The lack of documentary evidence notwithstanding, since loss was actually

established in this case, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000 each may be
awarded to the heirs of So and Castro, respectively. Under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code, temperate or moderate damages (which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages) may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.
[17]

With respect to other compensatory damages, the Court in People v.

Agudez declared that competent evidence must likewise be presented to support the
claim for such damages. In the case at bar, the father of So claimed that he
spent P87,200 for the wake and burial of his son but all he was able to support with
receipts were the payment to the funeral parlor of P20,000 and the cost of the burial site
of P53,000.
[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

Regarding the claim for reimbursement of the actual expense allegedly incurred by
the mother of Castro, the Court opts to award her temperate damages, in lieu of actual
or compensatory damages, because she failed to submit any evidence in support
thereof. Again, temperate damages should instead be given since it was to be expected
that she spent for the burial and funeral services although the amount thereof was not
determined with certitude.
[22]

MORAL DAMAGES
The award for moral damages by the court a quo, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, should be adjusted for being excessive. While courts have a wide latitude in
ascertaining the proper award for moral damages, the award should not be to such an
extent that it inflicts injustice on the accused. The award of P200,000 as moral damages
each for the heirs of So and Castro, respectively, should accordingly be reduced
to P50,000.
[23]

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may also be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Here,
petitioner failed to render aid or assistance to his victims after the collision. Based on
the prevailing jurisprudence, the award for exemplary damages for homicide is P25,000.
[24]

[25]

ATTORNEYS FEES
We affirm the award of P30, 000 for attorneys fees made by the trial court and the
appellate court. Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation may be recovered when exemplary damages have been awarded, as in this
case.
SUMMARY
To summarize, the heirs of the deceased Reynard So are entitled to the following:

P 50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto

73,000 actual damages
25,000 temperate damages
50,000 moral damages
25,000 exemplary damages
30,000 attorneys fees
P 253,000 TOTAL
[26]

The heirs of Nilo Castro are also entitled to the following:

50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto

50,000 temperate damages
50,000 moral damages
25,000 exemplary damages
30,000 attorneys fees
P 205,000 TOTAL
[27]

SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY
We adopt the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals regarding the subsidiary
liability of petitioners employer, Vallacar Transit Inc., under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. An employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employees civil liability in
the criminal action if it can be shown that: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of
industry; (2) the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3)
the accused is insolvent. However, subject to prevailing jurisprudence, the subsidiary
liability may be enforced only upon a motion for subsidiary writ of execution against
Vallacar Transit, Inc. and upon proof that petitioner is insolvent.
[28]

IMPRISONMENT

[29]

Lastly, we are also constrained to amend the penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals. The imposable penalty, under Article 365 (2) of the Revised Penal Code for
homicide resulting from reckless imprudence in the use of the motor vehicle is prision
correcional in its medium and maximum period, which ranges from 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years.
Under Article 64 of the same law, the penalty shall be divided into three equal
portions, each of which shall form one period. The offense having been attended by one
aggravating circumstance premised on the failure of petitioner to aid his victims, the
penalty shall be increased but it cannot exceed the penalty provided by law in its
maximum period. Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
petitioner is thus entitled to a minimum term to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is arresto mayor in any of its periods, to prision correcional maximum.
Accordingly, petitioner should suffer the penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 6 years of prision correcional, as maximum.
[30]

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as

to the award of damages and the penalty imposed, as already discussed. The total
amount of damages shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the finality of
this decision.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban,
JJ., concur.

(Chairman),

Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio-Morales, and Garcia,

[1]

Similarly construed to be a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law resulting in death under Article 365 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code.

[2]

P14,200 for the wake; P20,000 for funeral expenses; P53,000 as cost of burial site.

[3]

Exhibit A, Rollo, p. 194.

[4]

Exhibit K, Rollo, p. 192.

[5]

Decided by Honorable Ismael O. Baldado, Presiding Judge, 7 th Judicial Region, Branch 45, Bais
City; Rollo, pp. 103-104.

[6]

Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. with the concurrence of Associate Justices Josefina
Guevarra-Salonga and Arturo D. Brion, 11th Division; Rollo, pp. 81-82.

[7]

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in
any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices or
employees in the discharge of their duties.

[8]

Rollo, p. 83.

[9]

Rollo, p. 31.

[10]

People v. Caete, 433 Phil. 781 (2002); People v. Lining, 433 Phil. 797 (2002).

[11]

People v. Salvador, 433 Phil. 692 (2002).

[12]

People v. Opuran, G.R. No. 147674, 17 March 2004, 425 SCRA 654.

[13]

Id.

[14]

G.R. No. 145993, 17 June 2003, 404 SCRA 170; see also People vs. Ibaez, G.R. No. 148627, 28 April
2004.

[15]

Id.

[16]

Under Wage Order No. NCR-06 which covered Nilo Castro (and which took effect on 6 February 1998,
the minimum wage at the time of the accident was P198.00 per day. Likewise, in Wage Order No.
ROVII-6 which covered Reynard So (and which was approved on 10 March 1998), the minimum
wage in Negros Oriental for the agriculture sector was P130.00.

[17]

Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad, G.R. No. 159636, 25 November 2004.

[18]

Id.

[19]

G.R. No. 138386-87, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 692.

[20]

Supra, at 4.

[21]

Exhibits E and I.

[22]

Supra.

[23]

People v. Samson, 427 Phil. 248 (2002).

[24]

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, supra.

[25]

Talay v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 256 (2003); People vs. Catubig, 416 Phil. 103 (2001).

[26]

In lieu of award for loss of earning capacity.

[27]

P25,000 as temperate damages, in lieu of the award for loss of earning capacity of Nilo Castro, and
another P25,000 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages which was not proved by
documentary evidence.

[28]

Carpio v. Doroja, G.R. No. 84516, 5 December 1989, 180 SCRA 1, as cited in The Revised Penal
Code annotated by Luis B. Reyes.

[29]

Basilio v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 21 (2000).

[30]

Article 64, Revised Penal Code.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005]

MELBA QUINTO, petitioner, vs. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER

PACHECO, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a

Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about
eleven years old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents
Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and
Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert. [1] Wilson
assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a
grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system. [2]
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and
Wilson, entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a
meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep. [3] After a while, respondent
Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left [4] without
saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged
again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the
boys lifeless body down in the grassy area. [5] Shocked at the sudden turn of events,
Garcia fled from the scene.[6] For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of
petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilsons mother, and informed her that her son had died.
Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed her.[7]
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been
conducted. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint
against the respondents for Wilsons death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and
petitioner Quinto.[8] Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the
drainage system catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared
that he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system while riding
on his carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of
the NBI performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy report
containing the following postmortem findings:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with white long
sleeves and dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a niche-apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.
Laryngo tracheal lumina congested and edematous containing muddy
particles with bloody path.
Lungs hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains
bloody froth.
Brain autolyzed and liquefied.
Stomach partly autolyzed.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory.[9]
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and
Pacheco in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for
homicide by dolo against the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac,
charging the respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:

That at around 8 oclock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the Municipality of
Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy,
conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert
where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who testified
on direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the victims head and the
abrasion on the latters left forearm could have been caused by a strong force coming
from a blunt instrument or object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea also indicated
that the victim died of drowning, as some muddy particles were also found on the
lumina of the larynx and trachea (Nakahigop ng putik). Dr. Aguda stated that such
injury could be caused when a person is put under water by pressure or by force. [11] On
cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on the scalp was caused by
a strong pressure or a strong force applied to the scalp coming from a blunt instrument.
He also stated that the victim could have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his head
could have hit a blunt object.

Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilsons
head could have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of
water, the boy could have died by drowning.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared that the
4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilsons face could have also been caused
by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He
also stated that the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was no sign of
strangulation.[12]
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had
admitted the pictures showing the drainage system including the inside portions thereof,
[13]
the prosecution rested its case.
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also held
that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of
preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilsons death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil
aspect of the case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING

THAT NO PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSEDAPPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON
QUINTO.[14]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on December
21, 2001. It ruled as follows:

The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a
finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of.
Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex
delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising
therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the
criminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)[15]
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the following issues:
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL

LIABILITY, LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR
CIVIL LIABILITY.
II

WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD

RESPONDENTS CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.[16]
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities, surmises and
speculations when it held that Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his head
hitting the stones in the drainage system since the culvert was slippery; or (b) he might
have been bitten by a snake which he thought was the prick of a fish fin, causing his
head to hit hard on the top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost consciousness due to
some ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges that the trial court erred in
ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any ill motive on the part of the respondents to
kill the victim, and in considering that respondent Andres even informed her of Wilsons
death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the Medico-Legal
Expert, Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and number of the injuries sustained by the
victim which caused his death; as well as the locus criminis. The petitioner insists that
the behavior of the respondents after the commission of the crime betrayed their guilt,
considering that respondent Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent Andres to bring
out Wilsons cadaver, while respondent Andres returned inside the drainage system only
when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting for his friend Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to show that
either or both the respondents caused the death of her son and, as such, are jointly and
severally liable therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the prosecution
failed to adduce any evidence to prove that they committed the crime of homicide and
caused the death of Wilson, they are not criminally and civilly liable for the latters death.
The petition has no merit.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. [17] The civil liability of
such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.[18]When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. [19] With the
implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged
into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. [20]
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society,
to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. [21] The sole
purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused. [22] While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove the

cause of action of the private complainant against the accused for damages and/or
restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there
is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where the
civil liability may arise does not exist.[23]
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended. [24] Natural refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course
of human life or events, while logical means that there is a rational connection
between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony
committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that
cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.[25]
There must be a relation of cause and effect, the cause being the felonious act of
the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The
cause and effect relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing
conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones patologica
del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la predisposicion del ofendido);
the physical condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del herido); or the
concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors (la
falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the conditions supervening the felonious act
such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene. [26]
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
(a)

there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the
resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign
from the felonious act of the accused; or

(b)

the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.[27]

If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in
jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its
nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the
factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual
act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. [28]A different doctrine
would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and
essential safeguard.[29] This Court has emphasized that:

Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon
the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of
homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a

wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and
punishment. [30]
In People v. Quianzon,[31] the Supreme Court held:

The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case similar
to the present, the following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences
of his act and in this case, the physical condition and temperament of the offended
party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the
violence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the
wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which
determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that
the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc. [32]
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo.
In People v. Delim,[33] the Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused for homicide or murder:

In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which
consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendants agency in the
commission of the act. Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the
objective; second, the subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in
murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged
to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the
deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that
defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for
the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there
must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was
deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such
evidence may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the
victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively
presumed.[34]
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private
complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of
evidence. Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that
presented by the defendant, he is not entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not
sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the defendants. [35]

Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how preponderance of
evidence is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In
determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the
witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also
their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.
The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.[36]
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the
prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil
liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the
respondents for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective testimonies of
Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr.
Dominic Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp.
But as to how the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He
presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt object
or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard
and his head hit a hard object:
COURT:

The Court would ask questions.

Q
A

Q
A
Q

So it is possible that the injury, that is the hematoma, caused on the back of the
head might be due to the victims falling on his back and his head hitting a
pavement?
Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is strong
enough and would fall from a high place and hit a concrete pavement, then it is
possible.
Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the head hit the
pavement, the injury might be caused by that slipping?
It is also possible.

So when the victim was submerged under water while unconscious, it is possible
that he might have taken in some mud or what?
Yes, Sir.

So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still breathing?

Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also would indicate that
the victim was still alive when he was placed under water.[37]

The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the victims face
could have been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement:
Q
A

The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it be caused by
the face rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement?
Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a rough surface.

Q
A

Rough surface?
Yes, Your Honor.

When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were there no signs that the
victim was strangled?
There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.[38]

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the deceased might
have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit his head on the pavement, thus:
Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been caused when the
victim fell down and that portion of the body or occipital portion hit a blunt object
and might have been inflicted as a result of falling down?
A - If the fall if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also possible.[39]

The trial court took into account the following facts:

Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that there were
stones inside the culvert. (See Exhibit D to D-3). The stones could have caused
the victim to slip and hit his head on the pavement. Since there was water on the
culvert, the portion soaked with water must be very slippery, aside from the fact that
the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head and lost consciousness, he will naturally
take in some amount of water and drown.[40]
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its conclusion
based on the said findings.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its assessment of probative weight of the evidence of the parties,
and its conclusion anchored on such findings, affirmed no less by the CA, are given
conclusive effect by this Court, unless the trial court ignored, misapplied or
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the
outcome of the case. The petitioner failed to show any justification to warrant a reversal
of the findings or conclusions of the trial and appellate courts.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia
testified that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he
refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco inside. [41] Respondent Andres had no
flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had one.
Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused the
abrasion on the left forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether the

abrasions on the face and left forearm of the victim were made ante mortem or post
mortem.
The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both
the respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently,
any blunt object or instrument that might have been used by any or both of the
respondents in hitting the deceased.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious
crimes for no reason at all.[42] However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased
is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated on the
person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any illmotive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was
invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent Andres
used to go to their house and play with her son before the latters death:
Q
A

Do you know this Dante Andres personally?

Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son after going from
her mother who is gambling, Sir.

Q
A

But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?
Yes, Sir.

Q
A

Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is around?
(Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.)[43]

When the petitioners son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent
Andres who brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her sons
death. Even after informing the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent Andres
followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy area where the deceased was:
Q
A

Did not Dante Andres follow you?

He went with me, Sir.

So when you went to the place where your son was lying, Dante Andres was with
you?
No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was there at the
culvert, I ran immediately. He [was] just left behind and he just followed, Sir.

A
Q
A

So when you reached the place where your son was lying down, Dante Andres
also came or arrived?
It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.[44]

In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause

of action for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1]

TSN, 2 May 1997, p. 23.

[2]

TSN, 13 January 1997, pp. 6-7.

[3]

Records, pp. 70-73. (Exhibits D to D-3)

[4]

Id. at 8.

[5]

Id.

[6]

Id.

[7]

TSN, 6 June 1997, p. 18.

[8]

Records, p. 8. (Exhibit A)

[9]

Id. at 67.

[10]

Id. at 1.

[11]

TSN, 17 September 1997, pp. 5-7.

[12]

Id. at 12-13.

[13]

Records, pp. 70-73. (Exhibits D to D-3)

[14]

CA Rollo, p. 75.

[15]

Rollo, p. 59.

[16]

Id. at 15.

[17]

Article 100, Revised Penal Code.

[18]

Article 104, Revised Penal Code.

[19]

Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

[20]

Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140576-99, December 13, 2004.

[21]

Ibid.

[22]

Id.

[23]

Section 2, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

[24]

Article 4, paragraph 1. Revised Penal Code.

[25]

Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181 (1957).

[26]

Cuello Colon, Codigo Penal, 12 ed., 1968, pp. 335-336.

[27]

Cuello Colon, Doredo Penal, Vol. 1, p. 278.

[28]

People v. Cutura, 4 SCRA 663 (1962).

[29]

People v. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1 (1934).

[30]

Id. at 4.

[31]

62 Phil. 162 (1935).

[32]

Id. at 168-169.

[33]

396 SCRA 386 (2003).

[34]

Id. at 399-400.

[35]

Francisco, Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, 1997 ed., Vol. VII, Part II, p. 431.

[36]

Rollo, p. 51.

[37]

TSN, 17 September 1997, pp. 10-11.

[38]

Id. at 12-13.

[39]

Rollo, p. 43.

[40]

Ibid.

[41]

TSN, 2 May 1997, p. 17.

[42]

People v. Delim, supra.

[43]

TSN, 6 June 1997, p. 8.

[44]

Id. at 18.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143380. April 11, 2005]

OLIMPIO
PANGONOROM
and
CORPORATION, petitioners,
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

METRO
MANILA
TRANSIT
vs. PEOPLE
OF
THE

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This is a petition for review[1] to annul the Decision[2] dated 29 November 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14764, as well as its Resolution [3] dated 5 May
2000 denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
5 February 1993 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79 in
Criminal Case No. Q-90-11397.
The Charge
On 21 March 1990, Assistant City Prosecutor Rosario U. Barias filed an Information
charging Olimpio Pangonorom (Olimpio) with reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with multiple slight physical injuries, committed as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the driver
and person in charge of a motor vehicle (MMTC-passenger bus) with plate No. NVJ999 TB Pil. 89, did, then and there unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and
operate the same along E. de los Santos Ave., Quezon Avenue this City, in a
careless, reckless and imprudent manner, by then and there driving the same without
due regard to traffic laws and regulations and without taking the necessary precautions
to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by such carelessness,
recklessness and imprudence said motor vehicle so driven by him to strike and collide
with an [I]suzu [G]emini car with plate No. NAR-865 L Pil. 89, belonging to Mary
Berba and driven by Carlos Berba y Remulla, thereby causing damages in the total
amount of P42,600.00, Philippine Currency; as a consequence thereof said Carlos

Berba sustained physical injuries for a period of less than nine (9) days and
incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time
and also his passengers namely: Mary Berba y Matti and Amelia Berba y Mendoza
sustained physical injuries for a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated
them from performing their customary labor for the same period of time, thereafter,
abandoned said offended parties without aiding them, to the damage and prejudice of
the said offended parties in such amount as may be awarded to them under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Arraignment and Plea
When arraigned on 26 June 1990, Olimpio, with the assistance of counsel, entered
a plea of not guilty.[6]
The Trial
The prosecution presented five witnesses: (1) Carlos R. Berba; (2) Mary M. Berba;
(3) Amelia Berba; (4) Edward Campos; and (5) Enrico B. Estupigan.
On the other hand, the defense presented three witnesses: (1) Olimpio himself; (2)
Milagros Garbo; and (3) Nenita Amado.
The facts, as summarized by the trial court, are as follows:

The evidence of the prosecution shows that on July 10, 1989 at around 9:00 P.M.
Carlos R. Berba was driving an Isuzu Gemini car bearing Plate No. NAR-865 L Pil.
89 belonging to his mother Mary Berba. With him inside the car were his mother
Mary Berba who was seated in front beside him and his auntie Amelia Berba who was
at the back seat. They were cruising along EDSA coming from the direction of
Makati and headed towards the intersection of EDSA and Quezon Boulevard but upon
nearing 680 Appliances along EDSA, Quezon City, their car was bumped from behind
by MMTC Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. NVJ-999 TB Pil. 89 driven by herein
accused Olimpio Pangonorom thereby causing damages to their car which was
estimated at P42,600.00 (Exhs. F, F-1). The front and rear portions of their car
incurred damages because by reason of the strong impact at the rear portion of their
car, it was pushed forward and bumped the car in front of it, then it rested near the
island. The bus driven by the accused still travelled a distance of 20 meters from the
point of impact. The accused left his bus but they came to know his name is Olimpio

Pangonorom. Their car was a total wreck as shown in its photographs (Exhs. B and
C).
Carlos Berba noticed this bus following them closely at Nepa Q-Mart up to the point
of collision. His car was running along the second lane of EDSA from the island.
The MMTC bus driven by the accused was running very fast, kept on switching lane
until it finally occupied the second lane and bumped his car. Carlos Berba sustained
cuts on his shoulder and back because of broken glasses and was treated at East
Avenue Medical Center. He incurredP1,000.00 for medication (Exhs. G to G-3).
Mary Berba sustained contusion, hematoma and abrasion (Exh. H). Amelia Berba
sustained abrasion on his right elbow (Exh. K). Both were also treated at East Avenue
Medical Center.
Edward Campos and Enrico Bantique Estupigan, passengers of MMTC Bus driven by
the accused explained that their bus was running at 70-80 kph when it swerved to the
right to avoid hitting a van stranded at the left side of the island but in the process it
hit and bumped an Isuzu Gemini car in front of it. The rear portion of the Isuzu
Gemini car was smashed and the front part was also damaged as it hit the Lancer car
running ahead. The bus driver, herein accused, fled from the scene.
It was a rainy day, road was slippery, the rain had just stopped but was still drizzling.
The defense on the other hand presented accused Olimpio Pangonorom, Milagros
Garbo, Nenita Amado and documents marked as Exhs. 1 to 15 with sub-markings.
Accused Olimpio Pangonorom testified that he was a driver since 1976, having
worked as a truck driver in Mindanao, then employed as driver of Silangan Transit up
to 1981 and from 1981 up to the present is a driver of Metro Manila Transit. He is a
holder of professional drivers license with OR No. 15160307 (Exhs. 1, 1-A). On July
10, 1989 he drove MMTC bus from Monumento to Baclaran and vice-versa. He was
driving MMTC bus between 7:00 8:00 P.M. along EDSA headed towards
Monumento when upon reaching infront of 680 Appliances his bus was involved in a
vehicular accident. It was drizzling, his bus was running at a speed of 70 kph along
the third lane of EDSA going to Monumento and an Isuzu Gemini car ahead of him
was on his left side running along the second lane of EDSA at a distance of 30 meters
away. When the car was at a distance of 20 meters away and before reaching the
stalled vehicle, it swerved to the right without signal light, so he blew his horn,
stepped on his brakes, but since the street was downgrade, it was raining and slippery,
his brakes failed to control his bus, thus hit and bumped the Isuzu Gemini car. He
identified the Isuzu Gemini car and damages sustained by the car in the photograph
marked as Exh. C. His bus slided after he applied his brakes because the street was
slippery. He reported at their garage after the accident, left his vehicle and went back

at the scene with a wrecker. The passengers of the Isuzu car were brought to the
hospital.
The training officer of MMTC, Milagros Garbo, testified on the procedure of the
company in hiring an applicant driver and the requirements to be submitted by the
applicant. An applicant for a driver of MMTC as what had been done to the accused
before he was admitted as company driver of MMTC must pass an interview,
seminars, written examination, actual driving test, psycho-physical test, road test, line
familiarization test, defensive driving seminar, drivers familiarization seminar, and
traffic rules and environment seminar. Documents they required to be submitted by
an applicant driver were NBI Clearance, Residence Certificate, Professional Drivers
License, and Official Receipts of payment of required fees for drivers license (Exhs.
1 to 15).
The internal control relative to the supervision of their drivers was explained by
witness Nenita Amado, a transport supervisor of MMTC. She supervises and gives
instructions and recommendations on bus rules and regulations to their drivers. They
have ten (10) comptrollers, thirty-six (36) dispatchers, seven (7) field supervisors,
sixty (60) inspectors and four (4) service wreckers who helped in the supervision of
the drivers and conductors of MMTC. They have centralized radio that monitor the
activities of their drivers during their travel. Her instructions to the drivers were to
avoid accident, obey traffic rules and regulations and to be courteous to passengers. [7]
On 5 February 1993, the trial court rendered its Decision with the following
dispositive portion:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds accused Olimpio Pangonorom guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
slight physical injuries and sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of thirty (30)
days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended parties of the damages incurred by
their Isuzu Gemini car in the sum of P42,600.00 and to reimburse the medical
expenses of Carlos R. Berba in the sum ofP182.50, Amelia Berba in the sum of
P217.50 and Mary Berba in the sum of P45.00.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioners appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. [9]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals ruled that the finding that Olimpio drove the passenger bus in
a negligent manner, considering the circumstances of weather and road condition, is a
finding of fact of the trial court that is entitled to respect. The Court of Appeals stated
that it is a settled rule that factual findings of trial courts are accorded great respect
unless it can be shown that they overlooked some circumstances of substance which, if
considered, will probably alter the result. The Court of Appeals held that no such
circumstance was overlooked in this case.
The Court of Appeals ruled that even if it were true, as Olimpio claimed, that the car
Carlos Berba (Carlos) was then driving occupied Olimpios lane while the car was 20
meters away, it is a safe distance for a vehicle to switch lanes. The Court of Appeals
held that if only Olimpio did not drive very fast and considered that the street was
downgrade and slippery, he could have easily avoided the accident by applying his
brakes.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the testimonies of Edward Campos (Edward)
and Enrico Bantigue, who were passengers of the MMTC bus, are worthy of credence.
The Court of Appeals stated that they are neutral witnesses who had no motive to testify
against Olimpio. They testified that: (1) the MMTC bus was running at 70-80 kilometers
per hour; (2) the bus swerved to the right to avoid hitting a van stranded at the left side
of the island; and (3) in the process, the bus hit and bumped the Gemini car ahead of it.
Edward further testified that Olimpio earlier overtook another bus. Edward stated that it
was for this reason that the MMTC bus went into the lane where the stalled van was
located. The Court of Appeals held that the MMTC bus was the one switching lanes.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[10]
On 28 December 1999, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision. Petitioners asserted that the Court of Appeals
erred in finding Olimpio negligent in driving the subject bus. Petitioners also asserted
that Carlos was the one switching lanes and was therefore the one negligent in driving
his car. Petitioners stated that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the MMTC
was not subsidiarily liable for Olimpios civil liability in the instant case. Petitioners
stated that the testimonies of witnesses Milagros Garbo and Nenita Amado, as well as
Exhibits 1 to 15, proved that the MMTC exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its drivers.[11]
On 5 May 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution [12] denying the motion for
reconsideration. With the assailed decision having amply discussed, considered and
ruled upon the issues that petitioners raised in their motion for reconsideration, the
Court of Appeals held that there was no cogent reason for it to reverse the assailed
decision. The Court of Appeals also held that the MMTC was already estopped in
assailing the trial courts decision considering that the MMTC never appealed the
decision within the reglementary period.

The Issues
Petitioners have presented the following for our consideration:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in sustaining the trial courts
findings of facts instead of considering certain facts and circumstance raised by
petitioners that properly cast an element of reasonable doubt.
2. Whether Estoppel applies to MMTC.[13]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is without merit.
In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or
even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors.[14]
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for having sustained the trial courts findings of
fact. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals failed to consider certain
circumstances that would warrant a reversal of the factual findings of the trial court.
Petitioners claim that Carlos negligence in switching lanes to avoid hitting a
stranded van caused the collision. Petitioners assert that Carlos was negligent because
he transferred to the lane where Olimpio was then driving along without first blinking his
signal light and with his car only 20 meters away from the bus. This being so,
petitioners assert that they should not be held responsible for Carlos negligence.
Petitioners assertions have no merit. The issue of whether a person is negligent is
a question of fact.[15] Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, when they affirm the
findings of fact of the trial court, are binding on this Court, unless the findings of the trial
and appellate courts are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the
judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts. [16] We hold that the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in upholding the factual findings of the trial court.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or
occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Olimpio is a professional driver who has been in the employ of the MMTC since
1984.[17] As a public utility driver, Olimpio should have as his primary concern the safety
not only of himself or of his passengers, but, also the safety of his fellow motorists.
Considering that it had just rained, it was still drizzling and the road was slippery when

the subject incident took place,[18] Olimpio should have been more cautious and prudent
in driving his passenger bus.
Based on Olimpios testimonial admission, he was driving at 70 kilometers per
hour. He testified he was familiar with the road. [19]Therefore, he ought to have known
the downhill slope coming from the Nepa-Q Mart. [20] As the bus was moving downhill,
Olimpio should have slowed down since a downhill drive would naturally cause his
vehicle to accelerate. However, instead of slowing down, Olimpio admitted he was
running very fast. Thus, Olimpio testified:

Atty. ANTONIO:
Q

It was nighttime Mr. Witness, will you tell us whether you were able to
see this vehicle you were following?

Yes, sir.

Will you tell us how did you notice this vehicle?

Because I saw its tail light, sir.

Q

Before this vehicle you were following reached the place where this
stalled vehicle was, do you know where was this vehicle proceeded?

FISCAL:
I think he is incompetent, Your Honor.
COURT:
Sustained.
Atty. ANTONIO:
Q

Before your vehicle reached the place where this stalled vehicle was,
what did you notice if any?

I noticed that the vehicle I was following Isuzu Gemini before reaching
the stalled vehicle suddenly swerved to the right and I was already
approaching, sir.

Before this Isuzu Gemini car you were following suddenly swerved to
the right, how far were you?

About twenty (20) meters, sir. It suddenly swerved to the right and I
was running very fast because it was downward.

And when you noticed this Isuzu Gemini suddenly swerved to the right,
what if any did you do?

I blew my horn and stepped on my brakes, sir. Considering that it was

raining and slippery I cannot control.

And after your were not able to control your vehicle despite the
precaution you made, what happened?

I bumped him, sir.[21] (Emphasis supplied)

The only conclusion that we can draw from the factual circumstances is that Olimpio
was negligent. He was hurrying to his destination and driving faster than he should
have. The fact that after Olimpio stepped on the brake, the bus still traveled a distance
of 20 meters before it finally stopped, and the car, after it was hit, was thrown 10 to 15
meters away,[22] only prove that Olimpios bus was running very fast.
Olimpios claim that Carlos suddenly transferred to his lane to avoid hitting a van
stranded at the left side of the island could hardly carry the day for him. Olimpio says
that the distance between the car and the bus before the car allegedly swerved to the
bus lane was 20 meters. Therefore, at that point, Olimpio still had the opportunity to
avoid the collision by slowing down or by stepping on the brake. However, what Olimpio
did was to continue running very fast.
Another telling proof of Olimpios negligence is the testimony of Edward, a
passenger of the MMTC bus who was seated at the right front seat nearest to the door
of the bus.[23] Edward recounted the incident, thus:

Q
A

You said that there was a van parked which the Metro Manila
tried to avoid. Where was that van parked?

It was stranded above the middle island of the road, sir.

COURT:
Q

When you said of the road you are referring to EDSA?

Yes, Your Honor.

FISCAL:
Q

So when it swerved to avoid hitting the parked van, what happened?

Transit

x
Q

Mr. Witness, did you notice this stalled vehicle before you reached the
place where it was stalled?

No, sir.
Q

Even when the lights of the Metro Manila Transit were on, you did not
notice it?

Actually, sir, he was overtaking another bus so thats why he did not
notice this stalled van.

Who was overtaking another bus?

A

It was too late, sir, when he noticed that there was a car slowly
cruising EDSA so when he swerved he was very fast so it was too late
to avoid the car. He just braked, the road was slippery so he could not
swerve because the bus might turn over.

MMTC bus, sir, because it stopped at the MMC office near Timog and
then it overtook another moving bus. He went to the left side overtaking
that bus.
x

Atty. ANTONIO:
Q

Are you a driver?

Yes, sir.
Q

And if circumstances similar to that incident that happened, it would be

prudent for you to swerve also, is it not?

At that condition, sir, Id rather brake than swerve, it is slippery.

Q

Mr. Witness, will you tell how far was this MMTC bus when it swerved
in relation to the place where the stalled vehicle was?

I guess, sir, it was a few seconds before too late because when it
swerved the bus was already tilting, so it is a matter of seconds.

Atty. ANTONIO:

It was a matter of seconds?

Yes, sir.

So if you were in this position stopping would not be sufficient

precautionary measure, was it not?

Before that, sir, he overtook that bus so if he did not overtake that
bus he would have seen the parked van. Being a driver myself the
way he overtook was dangerous, it was so close that you could not
see the other lane.

x
Q

Will you please explain Mr. Witness, how this MMTC bus hit the car
when you claimed that the car was running ahead of the bus?

There was this stalled van and there was this bus, now this was the
Gemini car, this slowed down to avoid also the stalled van, it swerved so
the bus was here running very fast and then noticed the van so it
swerved also and the Gemini here was of course slowed down to avoid
that van, the bus was still running fast then after swerving it was too
late for him to notice that there was this car running slowly by the bus, he
stepped on the brake.

Do you mean to say Mr. Witness, that both the Isuzu vehicle and the
MMTC bus were running on the same course?

Yes, sir.[24] (Emphasis supplied).

Edwards declarations that the bus was running very fast and that Olimpio did not
see the stranded van because he earlier overtook another bus are clear and
categorical. There is no evidence of any ill or improper motive on Edwards part that
would discredit his testimony. He was not in any way related to the complainants.
Neither was the defense able to show that some form of consideration induced Edward
to testify for the prosecution. The defense did not even try to rebut Edwards testimony.
When there is nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives,
his positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under solemn oath
deserve full faith and credit.[25]

Petitioners likewise fault the Court of Appeals for having ruled that the MMTC is
already estopped from assailing the trial courts decision considering that the MMTC
never appealed the same within the reglementary period.
We have carefully gone over the records of this case and found that when
petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal with the trial court on 8 March 1993, the MMTC
already appealed the civil aspect of this case. We quote petitioners Notice of Appeal:

The ACCUSED and his employer, Metro Manila Transit Corporation, by their
undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully give notice that
they are appealing, as they hereby appeal, the Decision dated February 5, 1993, which
was received on February 23, 1993, to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
Decision is contrary to the facts, law and settled jurisprudence.
Metro Manila Transit Corporation likewise interposes an appeal with respect to the
civil aspect of this case because of its subsidiary liability as employer of the accused
under the Revised Penal Code.[26]
It is therefore not correct for the Court of Appeals to state in its Resolution [27] dated 5
May 2000 that the MMTC failed to appeal seasonably the issue of its alleged nonsubsidiary liability[28] as Olimpios employer.
However, due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a
defense in the present case. The law involved in the present case is Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Articles 100 [29] and 102[30] of the same Code, which
reads thus:

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
duties.
Pursuant to Article 103, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employees
civil liability in a criminal action when there is adequate evidence establishing (1) that he
is indeed the employer of the convicted employee; (2) that he is engaged in some kind
of industry; (3) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties;
and (4) that the execution against the employee has not been satisfied due to
insolvency.[31]
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and
103 are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable.
Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.[32]
The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee
in the criminal action.[33] In the present case, there exists an employer-employee

relationship between petitioners, the MMTC is engaged in the transportation industry,

[34]
and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act and found to have committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties. [35] However, there is no proof here of Olimpios
insolvency. The judgment of conviction against Olimpio has not attained finality. This
being so, no writ of execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only after
proof of the accused-employees insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer
be enforced.[36]
In short, there is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employers subsidiary
civil liability unless it appears that the accused-employees primary liability cannot in the
first instance be satisfied because of insolvency. This fact cannot be known until some
time after the verdict of conviction shall have become final. And even if it appears prima
facie that execution against the employee cannot be satisfied, execution against the
employer will not issue as a matter of course. [37] The procedure for the enforcement of a
judgment will have to be followed. Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio
becomes final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against him is
returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of
execution be issued against the MMTC after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is
still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily liable with its accused-employee
considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpios insolvency.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. The Decision dated 29 November
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14764 finding petitioner Olimpio
Pangonorom GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple slight physical injuries, as well as its Resolution dated 5 May 2000 denying the
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
JJ., concur.

Jr.,

C.J.,

(Chairman),

Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna,

[1]

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

[2]

Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofilea, with Associate Justices Omar U. Amin and Jose L.
Sabio, Jr., concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-30.

[3]

Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[4]

Penned by Judge Godofredo L. Legaspi. Records, pp. 164-168.

[5]

Records, p. 1.

[6]

Ibid., p. 12.

[7]

Records, pp. 165-167.

[8]

Ibid., p. 168.

[9]

Rollo, p. 35.

[10]

Ibid., p. 30.

[11]

CA Rollo, pp. 119-124.

[12]

Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. and
Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring. Rollo, pp. 32-33.

[13]

Ibid., pp. 16 and 18.

[14]

People v. Jubail, G.R. No. 143718, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 478; People v. Saludes, G.R. No.
144157, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 590; People v. Melendres, Jr., G.R. No. 134940, 30 April 2003,
402 SCRA 279.

[15]

Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, G.R. No. 131541, 20 October 2000, 344 SCRA 76.

[16]

China Airlines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129988, 14 July 2003, 406 SCRA 113; Romago
Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 964 (2000); Austriav. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
133323, 384 Phil. 408 (2000); Halili v. CA, 350 Phil. 906 (1998).

[17]

Records, pp. 132, 145-146.

[18]

TSN, 22 April 1991, pp. 5, 9 and 13; TSN, 5 May 1992, pp. 6, 8-9 and 11.

[19]

TSN, 5 May 1992, p. 10.

[20]

Ibid., pp. 7- 9, and 11.

[21]

TSN, 5 May 1992, p. 8.

[22]

TSN, 17 October 1990, p. 12; TSN, 22 April 1991, p. 7; TSN, 5 May 1992, p. 9.

[23]

TSN, 22 April 1991, p. 9.

[24]

TSN, 22 April 1991, pp. 4-5, 10, 13-14 and 16.

[25]

People v. Balili, G.R. No. 125908, 5 September 2002, 388 SCRA 376; People v. Gonzales, 432 Phil.
449 (2002); People of the Philippines v. Quening, 424 Phil. 48 (2002).

[26]

Rollo, p. 35.

[27]

Ibid., p. 32.

[28]

CA Rollo, p. 119.

[29]

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.

[30]

Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. In
default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where
a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided
that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the
care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.

[31]

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 456; Baza
Marketing Corporation v. Bolinao Security and Investigation Service, Inc., 202 Phil. 478 (1982);
Joaquin, et al. v. Aniceto, et al., 120 Phil. 1100 (1964).

[32]

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 456; Alvarez v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-59621, 23 February 1988, 158 SCRA 57.

[33]

Carpio v. Doroja, G.R. No. 84516, 5 December 1989, 180 SCRA 1; Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, No. L59621, 23 February 1988, 158 SCRA 57; Pajarito v. Seeris, No. L-44627, 14 December 1978,
87 SCRA 275.

[34]

Rollo, p. 11; Exhibit 10, Records, pp. 145-146; TSN, 2 June 1992, p. 6.

[35]

Records, pp. 164-168.

[36]

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, supra note 31.

[37]

Ozoa v. Vda. De Madula, No. L-62955, 22 December 1987, 156 SCRA 779.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127089. November 19, 2004]

RAFAEL RENDON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and

INOCENCIA D. MAGRARE, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 7, 1996 affirming the conviction of petitioner herein Rafael Rendon for homicide
in Criminal Case No. 4181.
Rafael Rendon, petitioner herein, and his wife Teresita, were charged with the crime
of murder for the death of Rodolfo Magrare. The complaint, dated November 6, 1989,
stated as follows:

That on or about 5:30 oclock more or less in the afternoon of October 28, 1989, at
Brgy. Bia-an, Municipality of Hamtic, Province of Antique, Philippines, and within
the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Circuit Trial Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, then and there
wil[l]fully, unlawfully, and feloniously with intent to kill and with treachery,
[grabbed], [and] grappled with the use of bolo and spear (Bangkaw), stabbed the
victim, RODOLFO MAGRARE, and [as] a result thereof, said RODOLFO
MAGRARE DIED instantaneously.
Contrary to law.

[1]

After joint trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Antique, Branch 11,
found the spouses Rendon guilty only of homicide:

WHEREFORE in view of all the foregoing premises, accused Rafael Rendon and
Teresita Rendon are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide for the death of Rodolfo Magrare for which the penalty of reclusion
temporal is imposed under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. [A]pplying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being one mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstances to offset the former, accused
are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) day of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day

of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of Rodolfo Magrare, and
another sum of P15,470.00 spent in relation thereto.
[2]

Rafael and his wife moved for the reconsideration of the above decision and on
August 18, 1993, the trial court modified its ruling:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:
Accused Rafael Rendon is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide for the death of Rodolfo Magrare for which the penalty of reclusion
temporal is imposed under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being one mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstances to offset the [same], accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term ranging from six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal or maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of P50,000.00 for the death of Rodolfo Magrare, and another sum of P15,000.00 spent
in relation thereto.
Anent accused Teresita Rendon, the [c]ourt finds her guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of slight physical injuries and hereby sentenced to suffer a definite prison
term of ten (10) days.
[3]

From this judgment, Rafael appealed to the Court of Appeals. He was not joined,
however, by his wife, Teresita. The Court of Appeals then rendered the questioned
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, we find no reversible error in the appealed Decision, which is hereby

AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

[4]

The conviction was based on the following facts as found by the Court of Appeals:

x x x The spouses Rodolfo and Inocencia Magrare and the couple Rafael and Teresita
Rendon were neighbors in Bia-an, Hamtic, Antique. In the afternoon of October 28,
1989, Rodolfo Magrare and his wife sat on a pile of sand by the roadside in front of
their house whiling away their time. By and by, Rafael Rendon with a sheathed bolo
hanging by his side went directly to Rodolfo. Suddenly, the bolo was unsheathed and
a struggle between the two ensued. The protagonists fell to the ground and rolled over
a number of times. Then Rafael and rose left behind a totally wounded Rodolfo.

Rodolfo sustained a stab wound at the left side of his neck, incised wound at the
buttock and five (5) abrasions in different parts of his body. He died as a result of the
wound in his neck. Rafael also suffered a lacerated wound in his left arm and four (4)
incised wounds in his hands. He immediately went to the police station and
voluntarily surrendered.
[5]

In the instant petition, the main issues brought before this Court are:

WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MIS- APPREHENSION

OF FACTS;
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE CONFLICTING;
WHETHER OR NOT SIMULTANEOUS HEARINGS ARE ALLOWED.

[6]

At the outset, this Court notes that the petition is anchored on a plea to review the
factual conclusions reached by the trial court. Such a task, however, is foreclosed by
the rule that in petitions for certiorari as a mode of appeal, as in the present case, only
questions of law distinctly set forth may be raised. These are the questions that do not
call for any examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.
[7]

Furthermore, petitioner claims self-defense. He argues that the evidence he

presented to prove this claim was not taken into consideration by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. It is the rule that where the accused invokes self-defense, it is
incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in
defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution.
[8]

To prove self-defense, petitioner brought forward the witness Larry Sarion, who
testified that on the day the incident happened, he was at petitioners house helping him
saw some logs. According to Sarion, they stopped and rested at around 3:30 p.m., and
walked to the house of petitioners father, which was one kilometer away. At around
5:30 p.m., they proceeded back to petitioners house and as they were walking, the
victim Magrare blocked them and asked petitioner, Why are you smiling? Petitioner
allegedly answered that he was not, but Magrare immediately grabbed petitioners bolo.
The bolo was in a sheath hung at the waist of petitioner. Magrare was not able to
completely grab the bolo away from petitioner and the two men struggled for its
possession. However, Magrare fell on the ground and was hit on the neck by the bolo.
The witness further testified that the two men still continued to struggle for around
fifteen minutes. He also saw petitioners wife helping petitioner strike Magrare.
[9]

On the other hand, the prosecution presented two witnesses: (a) Leticia Ferreras,
a neighbor of the Magrares, and (b) Inocencia Magrare, the widow of the victim.
Both witnesses testified that on that fateful day, at around 5:30 p.m., while they were
sitting with the victim on a pile of sand in front of the house of the Magrares, petitioner
came to them, unsheathed his bolo, and poised himself to attack Magrare. Petitioner, at
[10]

[11]

first, was unable to hit the victim since the latter was able to grab the hand of the
former. The two men then struggled for possession of the bolo, but Magrare fell and
was hit on the neck by the bolo. Petitioner then called out to his wife for help. His wife
came out carrying a spear and started thrusting the spear at the back of Magrare. The
victims wife also testified that petitioner and his wife dragged her husband a few meters
away from where the fight began. The two then ran away after they saw that the victim
had stopped moving.
This Court agrees with the Solicitor Generals observation that there are
diametrically opposed versions of how the event happened. When this Court is asked
to go over the evidence presented by the parties, and analyze, assess and weigh the
same to ascertain if the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, was correct in
according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence and, eventually, to the totality
of the evidence of one party or the other, the Court will not do the same. Moreover, the
rule is that the conclusions of the lower court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled
to great weight and respect. Unless there are substantial facts and circumstances that
have been overlooked, which if considered might affect the result of the case, such
findings are generally not disturbed on appeal. In the present case, this Court finds no
cogent reason to depart from the findings of the lower court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. When the trial courts factual findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon the Court.
[12]

[13]

[14]

Petitioner also claims that he was not physically fit enough to dare to attack a bigger
and stronger man like the victim, Magrare. He further asserts that, in fact, he walks with
a limp, a result of a past leg injury. To prove this, petitioner brought forward Dr. Sme
Panes as witness. Dr. Panes testified that he treated petitioner for a leg fracture from
January 22, 1988 to February 28, 1988. Upon cross-examination, however, Dr. Panes
admitted that such an injury may heal in only thirty days. This Court notes that the
attack against Magrare happened on October 28, 1989, more than one year after
petitioner allegedly suffered the alleged fracture.
[15]

Finally, this Court cannot give credence to the allegation of petitioner that the
hearing on July 9, 1990 was held inside the chambers of the presiding judge, and not in
open court. An examination of the records does not show that there was anything
unusual by the way the trial was being held. Furthermore, the transcripts do not show
any objection from petitioners counsel or any statement made on record that the
manner by which the trial was held was highly unusual and directly infringed upon the
rights of petitioner as the accused in the case.
[16]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
JJ., concur.

Jr.,

C.J.,

(Chairman),

Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio,

[1]

Records, p. 3.

[2]

Rollo, pp. 22-36.

[3]

Records, pp. 215-218.

[4]

Rollo, p. 21.

[5]

Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 1; Rollo, p. 17.

[6]

Petition, p. 7; Rollo, p. 9.

[7]

Cormero v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 291 (1995).

[8]

People v. Mercado, 159 SCRA 453 (1988).

[9]

Testimony of Larry Sarion, July 19, 1991.

[10]

Testimony of Leticia Ferreras, May 11, 1990.

[11]

Testimony of Inocencia Magrare, June 14, 1990.

[12]

Elayda v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 349 (1991).

[13]

People v. Baluarte, 60 SCRA 356 (1974), Cortez v. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 139 (1988), People v.
Lapitaje, et al., 397 SCRA 674 (2003).

[14]

People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 118912, May 28, 2004.

[15]

Testimony of Dr. Sme Panes, August 28, 1998.

[16]

Records, pp. 55-56.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004]

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out
becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment
by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its
subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the
subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has
become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the March 29, 2000 and the March 27, 2001 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was
dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
[1]

[2]

[3]

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the
appeal is ordered DISMISSED.
[4]

The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

[5]

The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:

On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of

four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay
damages as follows:
a.

to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as

indemnity for his death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral
expenses, his unearned income for one year at P2,500.00 a
month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and
the further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;

b.

to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as

indemnity for her death, the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses,
her unearned income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the
further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00 as
attorneys fees[;]

c.

to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as

indemnity for her death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the
sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30
years at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for
moral damages;

d.

to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital

expenses, doctors fees of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic
surgeon,P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at
least P150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity of her limbs,
and moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;

e.

to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical

expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral
damages;

f.

to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical

expenses, P800.00 for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral
damages;

g.

to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical

expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss earnings
of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00;

h.

to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital

expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines
andP50,000.00 as moral damages;

i.

to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical

expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages
and P5,000.00 as moral damages;

j.

to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital

bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for
loss of income and P5,000.00 as moral damages;

k.

to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota

Hi-Ace Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost
of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount
of P22,698.38 as actual damages;

The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused,
shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against
accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing]
that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when
appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed
the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the
judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to
[petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its
brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of
[petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is
confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our
resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed
the instant motion to dismiss. (Citations omitted)
[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the
civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against
the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently
the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to

amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the
accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and
the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the
accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.

[7]

The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:

A.
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of
its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused.
B.
Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57)
and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.
[8]

There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision,
petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has
not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding
the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes
the place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:

Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be
placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the
government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double
jeopardy. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused
should have been given a more severe penalty. On the other hand, the offended
parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the
accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should
have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.
[9]

[10]

[11]

Appeal by the Accused

Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon
motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps
bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
[12]

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when
they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are
deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.
[13]

Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the
appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado
succinctly explains the principle in this wise:

x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the
trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his
appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule
124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x
[14]

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit
to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the
judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they
are deemed to have waived the appeal.
[15]

[16]

Finality of a Decision

in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule
120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:

A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty
is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when
the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender
to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.
[17]

Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of
innkeepers, as follows:

In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general
or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article
103 which reads:

The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in
the discharge of their duties.

Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue
raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has
clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
x x x

xxx

x x x

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed
impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal
action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of
conviction meted out to the employee.
[18]

[19]

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil
actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil
actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain
separate, distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution based on the same
act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be
reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from
the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for
the same act or omission.
[24]

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising
from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising
from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed
separately, the ex delictocivil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the
offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the
criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.
[25]

This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states
that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
[26]

Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case

and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be
accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the
criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it,
because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not interpose an
appeal. Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which the employer
appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
[27]

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that,
strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact
should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their
employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the
former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
[28]

Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard

Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his
criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are
apparent from its Appellants Brief filed with the CA and from its Petition before us,
both of which claim that the trial courts finding of guilt is not supported by competent
evidence.
[29]

[30]

[31]

An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the
appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. This is the risk involved
when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate courts
have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to
increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.
[32]

[33]

[34]

If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee
becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has
already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal
would thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him
could become subject to modification without his consent.

We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively
waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not
appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal
procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made
the judgment of the court below final. Having been a fugitive from justice for a long
period of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is
now final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc ruled:
[35]

[36]

There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused
himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the
benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it
either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been
submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to
appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x.
[37]

By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and
placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process,
he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at
his option. Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the
appellate court.
[38]

[39]

Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to
surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.
[40]

Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case
against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal;
and that the judgment in the criminal case against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner
argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,
Alvarez v. CA and Yusay v. Adil do not apply to the present case, because it has
followed the Courts directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the criminal
cases against their employees. By participating in the defense of its employee, herein
petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading
cases.
[41]

[42]

[43]

Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability,

petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employers
liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for
the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and
103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.
Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
[44]

[45]

In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended
party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In
effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
[46]

[47]

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable
them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By
the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees
without the latters consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or
defeating the judgment.
[48]

The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive

upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard
to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the
employee.
[49]

Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be

adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted
employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime
was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the
execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.
[50]

The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the
determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer
may fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal
action in which the employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced; and in
a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
[51]

Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accusedemployee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains
subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains
that since the accused-employees conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary
liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of
conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping
bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case
into two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-employee.

The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case
against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It
is the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped
bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the
former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary
civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become
final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has
also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the
concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil
liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that
what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent
upon the employees criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso
facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee and upon proof of the
latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil
liability, but also his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.
[52]

It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of
due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such
exercise. Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied with.
[53]

[54]

[55]

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely

harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded. Indeed, deviations from the
rules cannot be tolerated. In these times when court dockets are clogged with
numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so
as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.
[56]

[57]

[58]

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning
party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of
the case.
[59]

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the

proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of
due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.
In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court,
deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
[60]

All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary
liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an

employer-employee relationship; that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry;

and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the
admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag
to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioners
driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x. Neither
does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused
while he was in the discharge of his duties.
[61]

WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is
hereby DENIED, and
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

the

assailed

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1]

Rollo, pp. 9-28.

[2]

Id., pp. 30-34. Penned by Justice Mariano M. Umali and concurred in by Justices Conrado M. Vasquez
Jr. (Division chair) and Edgardo P. Cruz (member).

[3]

Id., pp. 36-37.

[4]

CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 34.

[5]

Annex G of the Petition; rollo, pp. 115-124.

[6]

CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 31-33.

[7]

The case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 24, 2002, upon this Courts receipt of
respondents Memorandum signed by Assistant Solicitors General Carlos N. Ortega and Roman
G. del Rosario and Associate Solicitor Elizabeth Victoria L. Medina. Petitioners Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Ramon M. Nisce, was received by the Court on April 9, 2002.

[8]

Petitioners Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 200.

[9]

Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II (2001, 9th revised edition), p. 502.

[10]

Ibid.

[11]

People v. Ursua, 60 Phil. 252, August 1, 1934.

[12]

This is substantially the same as the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

[13]

People v. Del Rosario, 348 SCRA 603, December 19, 2000.

[14]

Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, supra, p. 540.

[15]

Ibid.

[16]

Ibid., citing People v. Mapalao, 274 Phil. 354, May 14, 1991.

[17]

People v. Enoja, 378 Phil. 623, December 17, 1999.

[18]

Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity & Diversity (2000 ed.), pp. 211-212.

[19]

Id., p. 212.

[20]

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of
another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1)

Freedom of religion;

(2)

Freedom of speech;

(3)

Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4)

Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5)

Freedom of suffrage;

(6)

The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7)

The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8)

The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9)
The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
(10)

The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11)

The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12)
law;

The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to

(13)
The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of
grievances;
(14)

The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15)

The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16)
The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17)
Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to
confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18)
Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(19)

Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendants act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct
civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any
criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes
a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
[21]

ART. 33.
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil

action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
[22]

ART. 34.
When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily
liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil
action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance
of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

[23]

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter. (1902a)

[24]

Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity & Diversity, supra, p. 214.

[25]

Id., pp. 214-215.

[26]

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.

[27]

Petitioners Memorandum, p. 13; rollo, p. 205.

[28]

Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670, July 31, 1956.

[29]

CA rollo, pp. 66-108.

[30]

Rollo, pp. 9-28.

[31]

Appellants Brief, p. 14; CA rollo, p. 84.

[32]

Lontoc v. People, 74 Phil. 513, December 29, 1943.

[33]

People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383, December 9, 1999.

[34]

Lontoc v. People, supra; United States v. Abijan, 1 Phil. 83, January 7, 1902. See also 11 of Rule 124
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

[35]

Francisco, Criminal Procedure (1996, 3rd ed.), p. 520.

[36]

73 Phil. 366, October 31, 1941.

[37]

Id., p. 369, per Abad Santos, J.

[38]

Francisco, Criminal Procedure, supra, p. 520.

[39]

Ibid.

[40]

People v. Enoja, supra.

[41]

Supra at note 28.

[42]

158 SCRA 57, February 23, 1988.

[43]

164 SCRA 494, August 18, 1988.

[44]

Lagazon v. Reyes, 166 SCRA 386, October 18, 1988.

[45]

Alvarez v. CA, supra.

[46]

Martinez v. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1, May 13, 1948.

[47]

Ibid.

[48]

Yusay v. Adil, supra; Pajarito v. Seeris, 87 SCRA 275, December 14, 1978.

[49]

Lagazon v. Reyes, supra; Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc., supra.

[50]

Ozoa v. Vda de Madula, 156 SCRA 779, December 22, 1987.

[51]

Ibid.

[52]

Alvarez v. CA, supra; Martinez v. Barredo, supra.

[53]

Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, 384 SCRA 466, July 11, 2002.

[54]

Oro v. Judge Diaz, 361 SCRA 108, July 11, 2001; Mercury Drug Corp. v. CA, 390 Phil. 902, July 13,
2000; Ortiz v. CA, 299 SCRA 708, December 4, 1998.

[55]

Pedrosa v. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, June 14, 1996; Del Rosario v. CA, 241 SCRA 553, February 22, 1995.

[56]

Casim v. Flordeliza, 374 SCRA 386, January 23, 2002.

[57]

People v. Marong, 119 SCRA 430, December 27, 1982.

[58]

Del Rosario v. CA, supra.

[59]

Videogram Regulatory Board v. CA, 265 SCRA 50, November 28, 1996.

[60]

Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, supra.

[61]

Petition for Review, p. 2; rollo, p. 10; Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 2; rollo, p. 194.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113433. March 17, 2000]

LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, and FE ADVINCULA,respondents. Sc
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks
to annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
October 27, 1992 and January 5, 1994, respectively. The decision sustained the Order
dated April 7, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166, denying due
course to petitioners appeal from the Judgment in Criminal Case No. 70278 and
allowing execution against the petitioner of the subsidiary indemnity arising from the
offense committed by his truck driver.
[1]

[2]

[3]

The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:

On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double homicide
and double physical injuries. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 70278.
[4]

The information against him reads: Scmis

"The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz of
the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Double Homicide and Double Physical Injuries, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the municipality of
Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person in
charge of a dump truck with plate no. NMW-609 owned and registered in
the name of Luisito Basilio, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and
regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to
prevent damage to property and avoid injuries to persons, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate said
dump truck in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a
result of which said dump truck being then driven by him hit/bumped and
sideswiped the following vehicles, to wit: a) a motorized tricycle with plate
no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto Abuel thereby causing damage in the

amount of P1,100.00; b) an automobile Toyota Corona with plate no. NAL

-138 driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing damage in the amount of
P2,190.50 c) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NW-9018 driven by
Ricardo Sese y Julian thereby causing damage of an undetermined
amount d) an automobile Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. PHE-283 driven
by Angelito Carranto thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount
and 3) a Ford Econo Van with plate no. NFR-898 driven by Ernesto
Aseron thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount; that due to
the strong impact caused by the collision, the driver Ricardo Sese y Julian
and his 3 passengers including Danilo Advincula y Poblete were
hit/bumped which directly caused their death; while the other 2
passengers, namely; Cirilo Bangot sustained serious physical injuries
which required medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days
which incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same
period of time and Dominador Legaspi Jr. sustained physical injuries
which required medical attendance for a period of less than nine days and
incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period
of time.
Contrary to law." Mis sc
After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment dated February 4, 1991,
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death of
Danilo Advincula and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months, as minimum to six (6) years
of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of danilo
Advincula P30,000.00 for the latters death, P31,614.00, as actual and
compensatory damages. P2,000,000.00 for the loss of his earning
capacity. P150,000.00, as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as attorneys
fees, plus the costs of suit."
[5]

Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the above judgment
became final and executory.
Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular accident accused
Simplicio Pronebo was employed as the driver of the dump truck owned by petitioner
Luisito Basilio.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a "Special
Appearance and Motion for Reconsideration" praying that the judgment dated February
4, 1991, be reconsidered and set aside insofar as it affected him and subjected him to a
subsidiary liability for the civil aspect of the criminal case. The motion was denied for
[6]

lack of merit on September 16, 1991. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on September
25, 1991. Mis spped
[7]

[8]

On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the
subsidiary civil liability of petitioner Basilio.
[9]

On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders. One denied due course and
dismissed Basilios appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. The
other directed the issuance of a writ of execution against him for the enforcement and
satisfaction of the award of civil indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991.
[10]

[11]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court with the Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated September
16, 1991, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated
February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of the petitioner was concerned, and
(2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the issuance of a writ of execution against
the petitioner. Before the appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not afforded due
process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the accused
Pronebo in the criminal case.
[12]

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated October 27, 1992,
disposing as follows: Spped
"ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is DENIED DUE
COURSE and should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of
persuasive force and effect."
[13]

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on November 24, 1992. This
was denied in a Resolution dated January 5, 1994. Hence this petition for review.
[14]

[15]

Now, petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that respondent Court of Appeals
erred:
I. ... IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
JUDGMENT OF 4 FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY AS REGARDS BOTH THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS WHEN THE ACCUSED APPLIED FOR PROBATION AT THE
PROMULGATION.
II. ... IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN ACCUSED
OR A PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 70278, HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO
FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF
SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST HIM.

III. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS

DAY IN COURT IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. Jo
spped

IV. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE

AUXILIARY RELIEF OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION "IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE
EMPLOYER".
V. IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT IN
ABUSE OF AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
[16]

The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals erred and committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule 65 filed by petitioner
against the trial court. To resolve it, we must, however, also pass upon the following:
(1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court become final
and executory when accused applied for probation at the promulgation?
(2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for Reconsideration
concerning civil liability decreed in the judgment if he is not a party to the
criminal case?
(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ of
preliminary injunction? Spped jo
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be heard by the trial court to
prove the absence of an employer-employee relationship between him and accused.
Nor that, alternatively, the accused was not lawfully discharging duties as an employee
at the time of the incident. While these assertions are not moved, we shall give them
due consideration.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding
where the award is made. However, before execution against an employer ensues,
there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an
employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of
industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he
commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent.
[17]

[18]

[19]

In Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court observed that the
drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceeding
is that the alleged employer is not afforded due process. Not being a party to the case,
he is not heard as to whether he is indeed the employer. Hence, we held: Miso

"To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged
employer, this Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Seeris
(supra) to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability
of the alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus. It was explained
therein that the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability
may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as
still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in
the suit."
[20]

There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an

accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the
criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the
judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard,
which is the essence of due process.
[21]

Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his
truck that was involved in the incident. Further, it was the insurance company, with
which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the
stipulations in their contract. Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings,
despite knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show
employer-employee relationship. With the convicts application for probation, the trial
courts judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our view that the lower court
did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due process. He had all his
chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he was not the
employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time. Nex old
[22]

[23]

[24]

Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the enforcement of
judgment. Even assuming that he was not properly notified of the hearing on the motion
for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an opposition
thereto, which he did on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that there was no
employer-employee relationship between him and accused and that the latter was not
discharging any function in relation to his work at the time of the incident. In addition,
counsel for private respondent filed and duly served on December 3, 1991, and
December 9, 1991, respectively, a manifestation praying for the grant of the motion for
execution. This was set for hearing on December 13, 1991. However, counsel for
petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered in open court that the matter
be submitted for resolution. It was only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioners counsel
filed a counter-manifestation that belatedly attempted to contest the move of the
private prosecutor for the execution of the civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial
court issued the Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary liability. Given
the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree with petitioner that the trial court denied
him due process of law. Neither can we fault respondent appellant court for sustaining
the judgment and orders of the trial court. Mani kx
[25]

[26]

[27]

Accordingly, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated October 27, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Maniks

Rollo, pp. 21-58.

Id. at 63-70.
[3]
Id. at 60-61.
[4]
Records, p. 36.
[5]
Id. at 40.
[6]
Id. at 41-47.
[7]
Id. at 52-53.
[8]
Id. at 54.
[9]
Id. at 55-56.
[10]
Id. at 561.
[11]
Id. at 66-68.
[12]
Id. at 2-21.
[13]
Rollo, p. 69.
[14]
Records, pp. 578-593.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 60-61.
[16]
Id. at 36.
[17]
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding
article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
[18]
Rule 111, Sec. 1: Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
[19]
Yonaha vs. CA, 255 SCRA 397, 402 (1996).
[20]
Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982).
[21]
National Federation of Labor vs. National Labor Relations Commissions, 283 SCRA 275, 284 (1997).
[22]
TSN, July 8, 1992, p. 12.
[23]
Id. at 13.
[24]
Id. at 28.
[25]
Rollo, pp. 101-109.
[26]
Records, pp. 253-254.
[27]
Id. at 255-256.
[1]
[2]

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146584. July 12, 2004]

ERNESTO FRANCISCO y SPENOCILLA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19110 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, finding petitioner Ernesto Francisco guilty of violating
Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum,
as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, with
the accessory penalties corresponding to the latter, and to pay the corresponding value
of the subject pieces of jewelry.
[1]

[2]

The Indictment
The petitioner was charged of violating P.D. No. 1612 under the Information filed on
June 23, 1993, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That in or about the month of November 1991, in the municipality of Meycauayan,

Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused Ernesto Francisco y Spenocilla, with intent to gain for himself, did
then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously buy, receive, possess and
acquire from one Pacita Linghon y Liza, not the owner, several pieces of jewelry, to
wit:
One (1) pair of earrings (Heart Shape) --- P 400,000.00
One (1) White Gold Bracelet
---150,000.00
One (1) Diamond Ring
---100,000.00
One (1) Ring with Diamond
---5,000.00

with the total value of P655,000.00, belonging to Jovita Rodriguez y Cruz, which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft.
Contrary to law.

[3]

The petitioner was arraigned, with the assistance of counsel, and entered a plea of
not guilty. Trial forthwith ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution
Jovita Rodriguez was a resident of Barangay Manggahan, Rodriguez, Rizal. She
was engaged in business as a general contractor under the business name J.C.
Rodriguez Contractors. Macario Linghon was one of her workers. She and her
husband, the former Municipal Mayor of Rodriguez, Rizal, acquired several pieces of
jewelry which were placed inside a locked cabinet in a locked room in their main
house. Jovita hid the key to the cabinet inside the room. The couple and their son
resided inside a compound. They hired Pacita Linghon, Macarios sister, as one of their
household helpers us sometime in February 1989. Pacita swept and cleaned the room
periodically. Sometime in May 1991, she left the employ of the Rodriguez family.
[4]

[5]

Sometime in the third week of October 1991, Pacita contacted her brother Macario,
who resided in Sitio Baloongan, Barangay Paltok, Meycauayan, Bulacan, and asked
him to sell some pieces of jewelry. She told Macario that a friend of hers owned the
jewelry. Macario agreed. He then went to the shop of petitioner Ernesto Erning
Francisco located at Pacheco Street, Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan, which had a
poster outside that said, We buy gold. Macario entered the shop, while Pacita stayed
outside. Macario offered to sell to Ernesto two rings and one bracelet. Ernesto agreed
to buy the jewelry for P25,000, and paid the amount to Macario. He also gave
MacarioP300 as a tip.
[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

Sometime in November 1991, Pacita asked Macario anew to sell a pair of

earrings. He agreed. He and a friend of his went to the shop of Ernesto and offered to
sell to Ernesto the pair of earrings for P18,000. The latter agreed and paid Macario the
amount. Ernesto gave a P200 tip to Macario. After these transactions, Macario saw the
petitioner in his shop for about five to six more times and received some amounts.
[10]

[11]

Sometime in November 1991, Jovita was asked to be a principal sponsor at a

wedding. She was shocked when she opened the locked cabinet containing her
jewelry, and found that the box was empty. She noticed that the lock to the cabinet was
not broken. Among the pieces of jewelry missing were one pair of diamond heartshaped earrings worth P400,000; one heart-shaped diamond ring worthP100,000; one
white gold bracelet with diamond stones worth P150,000; and one ring with a small
diamond stone worth P5,000. She suspected that it was Pacita who stole her
jewelry. She was, however, occupied with her business ventures that she had little time
to gather evidence and charge Pacita.

On August 19, 1992, Jovita filed a complaint for theft against Pacita and her mother
Adoracion Linghon with the Counter-Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police
in Camp Crame, Quezon City. She stated that she owned several jewels, viz: one (1)
heart-shaped pair of earrings with diamond worth P400,000; one (1) heart-shaped ring
with diamond worth P100,000; one (1) white gold bracelet with diamond stones
worth P150,000; and, one (1) ring with a small diamond stone worth P5,000. She also
averred that Pacita had stolen the pieces of jewelry, and that she and her mother
Adoracion disposed of the same.
A team of police investigators, including PO1 Santiago Roldan, Jr. of the CounterIntelligence Group, invited Pacita and Adoracion to Camp Crame, Quezon City, for
investigation in connection with Jovitas complaint. Pacita arrived in Camp Crame
without counsel and gave a sworn statement pointing to the petitioner as the person to
whom she sold Jovitas jewelry. On August 23, 1992, Pacita gave a sworn statement to
PO1 Roldan, Jr., admitting that she sold one pair of heart-shaped earrings with
diamond, one white gold bracelet, one heart-shaped diamond ring, and one ring with
big and small stones to Mang Erning of Meycauayan, Bulacan, for the total price
of P50,000 to cover the cost of her fathers operation and for food. When asked about
the full name of the person to whom the jewelry was sold, Pacita replied that she knew
him only as Mang Erning.
Pacita accompanied a group of five police officers, which included SPO1 Dremio
Peralta and PO1 Roldan, Jr. to the shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Pacita pointed to the
petitioner as the Mang Erning who had purchased the jewelry from her. The
policemen alighted from their vehicle and invited the petitioner for questioning in Camp
Crame. Upon his insistence, the petitioner was brought to the police station of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. When they were at the police station, the petitioner, in the
presence of SPO4 Valdez, offered an amount of P5,000 to the policemen as a bribe, for
them not to implicate him in the case. PO1 Roldan, Jr. rejected the offer. They again
invited the petitioner to go with them to Camp Crame, but the petitioner refused and
demanded that the policemen first secure a warrant for his arrest should they insist on
taking him with them.
[12]

[13]

Nevertheless, Pacita was charged with qualified theft in the Regional Trial Court of
San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
2005. Adoracion was also charged with violating P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law),
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1992. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
[14]

Meanwhile, Jovita succeeded in convincing Macario to testify against the petitioner,

assuring him that he would not be prosecuted for violation of P.D. No. 1612. Macario
agreed to testify against the petitioner.
PO1 Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta executed a joint affidavit on their investigation.
On September 1, 1992, Jovita executed a sworn statement in the office of the police
station of Meycauayan, Bulacan, charging the petitioner of buying stolen jewelry
worth P655, 000. A criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of P.D. No.
1612 was filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 92-13841. During the preliminary investigation, Pacita and Macario
[15]

testified that they sold a set of earrings, bracelet and two rings to the petitioner
for P50,000 at his shop in Meycauayan, Bulacan. According to Pacita, she found the
jewelry belonging to Jovita while she was cleaning the room in the house, and that she
brought the jewelry home. The court found probable cause against the petitioner, and
issued a warrant for his arrest.
[16]

On June 23, 1993, an Information was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor with the
RTC charging the petitioner with violating P.D. No. 1612.
In the meantime, on August 20, 1993, judgment was rendered by the RTC of San
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, finding Pacita guilty of
theft and Adoracion guilty of fencing under P.D. No. 1612, beyond reasonable doubt.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in these cases, as

follows:
1.
In Crim. Case No. 2005, finding accused Pacita Linghon y Liza GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, as defined and penalized under Art. 308
in relation to Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing her to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of Nine (9) years and Four (4) months of prision mayor as
minimum to Eighteen (18) years, Two (2) months and Twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal as maximum, to return to complainant Jovita Rodriguez the unrecovered
stolen pieces of jewelry subject of this case and if restitution is not possible, to
indemnify the said complainant in the amount of P1,300,000.00; and to pay the costs.
2.
In Crim. Case No. 1992, finding accused Adoracion Linghon y Liza GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of PD 1612, otherwise known as
the Anti-Fencing Law, and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of Twelve (12) years
of prision mayor; to indemnify complainant Jovita Rodriguez in the amount
of P45,000.00; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

[17]

The Case for the Petitioner

The petitioner testified that he was a resident of Calvario, Meycauayan,
Bulacan. He had a shop located at Pacheco Street, Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
where he bought and sold jewelry. He had been in this business since 1980. He did
not transact with Pacita regarding Jovitas missing jewels. In fact, he did not even
know Jovita and met her only during the preliminary investigation of the case before the
MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He, likewise, denied knowing Pacita Linghon, and
claimed that he first saw her when she accompanied some policemen in civilian clothes
to his shop, where he was thereafter invited to Camp Crame for investigation. He saw
[18]

[19]

[20]

Pacita again only during the preliminary investigation of the case. The petitioner also
averred that he had no transaction with Macario of whatever nature.
[21]

[22]

The petitioner further testified that when the policemen in civilian clothes
approached him in his shop, they asked who Mang Erning was, as the sign in his shop
carried such name. When he responded to the question, the policemen identified
themselves as members of the police force. The petitioner then gave them his full
name. When the policemen invited him for questioning, he refused at first. Eventually,
he agreed to be interrogated at the municipal hall, where the policemen insisted on
bringing him to Camp Crame. He told them that he would go with them only if they had
a warrant of arrest. He denied ever offering any bribe to the policemen.
[23]

[24]

[25]

On November 29, 1995, the court rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating P.D. No. 1612. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1.
Finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Pres.
Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
10 years and 1 day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum, with the accessory penalties corresponding to the
latter.
2.
Ordering the accused to pay to private complainant Jovita Rodriguez the
corresponding value of the subject items of jewelries (sic):
one (1) pair of earrings, heart shaped
one (1) white gold bracelet
one (1) diamond ring
one (1) ring with diamond
TOTAL VALUE

P400,000.00
150,000.00
100,000.00
5,000.00
P655,000.00

with 6% interest on all amounts due from the filing of the information on June 23,
1993 until said amounts have been fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

[26]

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals contending that:
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF

PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE ALL HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION

EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING ON THE CONTRADICTING

TESTIMONY (sic) OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF A

PROSECUTION WITNESS AS TO THE ALLEGED ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
OFFER OF BRIBE WITHOUT SHOW OF MONEY.
V

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.

[27]

On December 29, 2000, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the
RTC.
[28]

The Present Petition

In the present recourse, petitioner Ernesto Francisco asserts that:

The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts decision finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the (sic) Presidential Decree No. 1612,
otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law.
The Court of Appeals erred in relying on the conflicting testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, all of which consisted of hearsay evidence.
[29]

The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt. He avers that the prosecution failed to prove that
Pacita stole the jewelry subject of the charge, and that Macario sold the said pieces of
jewelry to him. He, likewise, posits that the prosecution failed to present Pacita as its
witness to prove that she stole the pieces of jewelry and sold the same to him, and to
adduce in evidence the jewelry allegedly sold to him. He contends that the testimonies
of Macario and PO1 Roldan, Jr., on his investigation of Jovitas complaint for theft, are
hearsay evidence. The appellant argues that assuming that Macario sold the subject
jewelry to him, Macario had no personal knowledge that the same belonged to

Jovita. The petitioner avers that the testimony of Macario, the principal witness of the
prosecution, is inconsistent on substantial matters; hence, should not be given credence
and probative weight.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the
prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime charged. It asserts that the
first element was proved through Pacitas conviction for theft in Criminal Case No. 2005;
the second element was shown to exist with moral certainty via the testimony of
Macario identifying the petitioner as the one who bought the subject pieces of jewelry,
corroborated by the testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the third element was proven by
evidence showing that the petitioner had been in the business of buying and selling
jewelry for a long period of time, and that he had the expertise to know the correct
market price of the jewelry he purchased from Macario and Pacita. The OSG asserts
that the petitioner must have been put on his guard when the subject pieces of jewelry
worth P655,000 were sold to him for only P50,000. It contends that the inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses referred to by the petitioner were minor,
and could not be made as a basis to disregard the trial courts findings of facts, which
are entitled to great respect and credit.
[30]

[31]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery
or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said
article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for
himself or for another. Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates
a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of
any good, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.
The stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is
merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution
to prove the crime of fencing.
[32]

[33]

We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution mustered the
requisite quantum of evidence, on the basis of the testimony of Jovita, that Pacita stole
the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main house of her then
employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and the loss thereof, and
narrated that Pacita had access to the cabinet containing the pieces of jewelry.
We, however, agree with the petitioner that the decision of the RTC of Rizal, Branch
76, in Criminal Case No. 2005 convicting Pacita of theft does not constitute proof

against him in this case, that Pacita had, indeed, stolen the jewelry. There is no showing
that the said decision in Criminal Case No. 2005 was already final and executory when
the trial court rendered its decision in the instant case.
On the second element of the crime, the trial and appellate courts held that the
prosecution proved the same beyond reasonable doubt based on the testimony of
Jovita during the trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; that Pacita had confessed
to Jovita that she sold some of the jewelry to the petitioner; the joint affidavit of PO1
Roldan, Jr. and SPO1 Peralta on their investigation of the complaint of Jovita; the
testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr. relating to said investigation; the RTC decision in Criminal
Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005; the testimonies of Pacita and her brother Macario during
the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 before the MTC of
Meycauayan as shown by the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the
proceedings; the supplemental sworn statement of Pacita on August 23, 1992 in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, and, the testimony of Macario before the trial court.
However, we find and so hold that
First. Jovitas testimony in Criminal Cases Nos. 1992 and 2005, that Pacita had
confessed to her that she had sold four pieces of jewelry to the petitioner, is
inadmissible in evidence against the latter to prove the truth of the said admission. It
bears stressing that the petitioner was not a party in the said criminal cases. The wellentrenched rule is that only parties to a case are bound by a judgment of the trial
court. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment of said case. Jovita did not
reiterate her testimony in the said criminal cases during the trial in the court a quo. The
prosecution did not present Pacita as witness therein to testify on the admission she
purportedly made to Jovita; hence, the petitioner was not able to cross-examine
Pacita. The rule is that the acts or declarations of a person are not admissible in
evidence against a third party.
[34]

[35]

Second. The testimony of Pacita during the preliminary investigation in Criminal

Case No. 92-13841, as well as her supplemental affidavit, is, likewise, inadmissible
against the petitioner since Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. The petitioner was,
thus, deprived of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine a witness against
him.
Third. The testimony of PO1 Roldan, Jr., that on August 23, 1992, Pacita pointed to
the petitioner, while the latter was having a drinking spree, as the person who bought
the subject jewelry from her, is indeed admissible in evidence against the petitioner. It is,
likewise, corroborative of the testimony of Macario. However, such testimony is
admissible only to prove such fact - that Pacita pointed to the petitioner as the person to
whom she sold the subject jewelry; it is inadmissible to prove the truth of Pacitas
declaration to the policemen, that the petitioner was the one who purchased the jewelry
from her. It must be stressed that the policemen had no personal knowledge of the said
sale, and, more importantly, Pacita did not testify in the court a quo. Indeed, the
petitioner was deprived of his right to cross-examine Pacita on the truth of what she told
the policemen.

Fourth. On the other hand, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case No. 92-13841 is admissible in evidence against the
petitioner since he testified for the prosecution and was cross-examined on his
testimony during the preliminary investigation.
In fine, the only evidence of the prosecution to prove that the petitioner purchased
the jewelry from Macario and Pacita are the following: the testimony and affidavit of
PO1 Roldan, Jr.; and, the testimony of Macario during the preliminary investigation and
trial in the court a quo.
Although the well-entrenched rule is that the testimony of a single witness is
sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction, it is required that such testimony
must be credible and reliable. In this case, we find the testimony of Macario to be
dubious; hence, barren of probative weight.
[36]

Macario admitted when he testified in the court a quo that his testimony during the
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841 and his testimony in the court a
quo were inconsistent. He even admitted that some portions of his testimony on direct
examination in the court a quo were inconsistent with his testimony on crossexamination and on re-direct examination. These admissions are buttressed by the
records of the case, which show that such inconsistencies pertained to material points
and not merely to minor matters. Thus, during the preliminary investigation in Criminal
Case No. 92-13841, Macario admitted that on October 10, 1991, he and his sister
Pacita sold two rings and one bracelet to the petitioner for P25,000, while in November
1991, he and Pacita sold a pair of earrings to the petitioner for P25,000. On direct
examination in the court a quo, Macario testified that he and Pacita sold the earrings to
the petitioner in May 1992, not in November 1991, and only for P18,000. On crossexamination, Macario testified that he and his sister Pacita went to the petitioners shop
in Meycauayan, Bulacan and sold the subject jewelry on both occasions. On further
cross-examination, Macario changed his testimony anew, and declared that he sold the
jewelry to the petitioner for P18,000 and not P25,000; only to change his testimony
again, and declare that he sold the jewelry for P25,000. However, Macario testified
during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 92-13841 that when he
transacted with the petitioner for the second time, he was with a friend, and not with his
sister Pacita. On redirect examination, Macario declared that in October 1991, he and
Pacita sold four (4) pieces of jewelry, namely, two rings, one bracelet and a pair of
earrings, contrary to his testimony on direct examination. He also testified that he and
his sister sold the earrings in November 1991. Because of the contradicting accounts
made by Macario, the court made the following observations:
Court
q

According to you, you were nalilito but you gave the correct answer, you are not
nalilito here but you gave the wrong answer. Bakit ganoon, sabi mo nalilito ka
roon (sic) pero ang sagot mo pala tama. Dito hindi ka naman nalilito, bakit
mali. Bakit ka nalilito eh tama iyongP25,000.00. Hindi ka nalilito, mali ang sabi
mo.

Because I am scare[d] here thats why I gave the wrong answer.

You better think about it.

I was confused, Sir.[37]

The testimonies of Macario are even contrary to the averments of the Information,
that the petitioner received the said jewelry from Pacita.
Assuming, for the nonce, that the petitioner purchased the said jewelry from
Macario, there is no evidence on record that the petitioner knew that they were
stolen. Significantly, even Macario did not know that the jewelry was stolen. He
testified that his sister Pacita told him before he sold the jewelry to the petitioner that
they belonged to a friend of hers.
Atty. Lerio
Q

At that time you and your sister sold those jewels to Mang Erning did do you
know already [that] it was Mrs. Rodriguez who is the owner of those jewels?

No, Sir, I do not know.

And who do you know was the owner of that jewels and that time you and your
sister sold those jewels to Mang Erning?

According to my sister, it is (sic) owned by a friend of hers.

Court
Q

How did you come to know of this Mang Erning?

Only at that time when we brought the jewels.

But previous to that, do you know him?

No.[38]

Macario learned, after the case against Pacita had already been filed in the trial
court, that the jewelry was, after all, owned by Jovita. However, he failed to inform the
petitioner that the said jewelry was stolen. Following is the testimony of Macario:
Atty. Lerio
Q

When you learned that those jewels were owned by Mrs. Rodriguez, did you, if at
all, informed (sic) Mang Erning about it?

Court
Q

No basis, when did you come to know that the jewels belong to Mrs. Rodriguez?

In 1992, when my sister already had a case.

What did you do when you come (sic) to know about that?

I was not able to do anything but just to help my sister with her case and also to
help the case of Mrs. Rodriguez.

Atty. Lerio
Q

After that, after knowing that these jewels are (sic) owned by Mrs. Rodriguez, was
there any occasion where you (sic) able to inform Mang Erning that those jewels
were owned by Mrs. Rodriguez?

No more, I have no more time.[39]

The prosecution cannot even validly argue that the petitioner should have known
which pieces of jewelry were stolen, considering that Macario was selling the same
for P50,000 when the said pieces stolen from Jovita were alleged to be worth P655,000.
This is so because the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient competent evidence to
prove the value of the said stolen articles. The prosecution relied solely on the bare and
uncorroborated testimony of Jovita, that they were worth P655,000:
Atty. Lerio
Q

Now, will you tell this Court some of those jewels which you own?

I own several jewels and the one (sic) in question are: 1-pair of earrings, diamond
heart-shaped P400,000.00; 1-ring, heart-shaped diamond worth P100,000.00; 1bracelet, white gold full of stones, diamond worth P150,000.00; 1-diamond ring
with small stones worth P5,000.00. So, all in all, the jewelry is (sic)
worth P665,000.00.[40]

When asked by the trial court to declare the present market value of the stolen
jewelry, Jovita merely declared:
Atty. Lerio
Q

Now again, when did you acquire those jewels if you can still remember?

I remember several years ago when my husband is (sic) alive.

Court
Q

Please tell the court, [is] the market value of the jewels the same today?

No, that is (sic) the market value several years ago.

So, can you explain [if] the market value, more or less, [is] the same today?

No. The price, if we will appraise now, is much bigger.[41]

When required by the petitioner, through counsel, to bring to the court any receipts
reflecting the price of the pieces of jewelry to show that she purchased the same, Jovita
answered that she had no such receipts. Thus:
Court
Q

You bought it from [a] private person?

Yes, Your Honor.

Atty. Bernal
Q

What then is your proof that you bought these jewelries (sic) from a private
person?

Atty. Lerio
That was already answered, Your Honor. She said, no receipt.[42]

In People v. Paraiso, we cited our ruling in People v. Marcos that an ordinary

witness cannot establish the value of jewelry, nor may the courts take judicial notice of
the value of the same:
[43]

[44]

[A]nd as we have ruled in the case of People vs. Antonio Marcos, an ordinary
witness cannot establish the value of jewelry and the trial court can only take judicial
notice of the value of goods which are matters of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration. The value of jewelry is not a matter of public
knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable demonstration and in the absence of
receipts or any other competent evidence besides the self-serving valuation made by
the prosecution, we cannot award the reparation for the stolen jewelry.
[45]

It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had
knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and
circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that
the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to
prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial court to
determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on the value
of the property; otherwise, the court will fix the value of the property at P5.00,
conformably to our ruling in People v. Dator:
[46]

In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof relative to their value, this Court fixed
the value of the bag and its contents at P100.00 based on the attendant circumstances
of the case. More pertinently, in the case of People vs. Reyes, this Court held that if
there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the
prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the
accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving
the value of P5.00.
[47]

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19110 affirming the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecutions
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Bennie A. Adefuin-dela Cruz, with Associate Justices Salome A. Montoya
and Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr., concurring.

[2]

Penned by Judge Candido R. Belmonte.

[3]

Records, p. 2.

[4]

TSN, 18 August 1993, p. 4.

[5]

TSN, 19 October 1993, p. 3.

[6]

TSN, 20 May 1994, p. 4.

[7]

Id. at 8.

[8]

TSN, 29 March 1995, p. 5.

[9]

TSN, 6 July 1994, p. 7.

[10]

Id. at 13-14.

[11]

Id. at 9-10.

[12]

TSN, 24 November 1993, p. 10.

[13]

Exhibit C.

[14]

Presided by Judge Jose C. Reyes, Jr.

[15]

Exhibit A.

[16]

Exhibit F.

[17]

Exhibit D.

[18]

TSN, 29 March 1995, p. 5.

[19]

Id. at 7.

[20]

Id. at 8.

[21]

TSN, 19 May 1995, p. 7.

[22]

TSN, 29 March 1995, p. 20.

[23]

Id. at 10.

[24]

Id. at 12.

[25]

Id. at 24.

[26]

Records, pp. 451-452.

[27]

CA Rollo, pp. 43-44.

[28]

Id. at 125.

[29]

Rollo, p. 13.

[30]

Id. at 54-55.

[31]

Id. at 58.

[32]

Capili v. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 45 (2000); Tan v. People, 313 SCRA 220 (1999) citing DizonPamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63 (1994).

[33]

Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, supra.

[34]

Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 370 SCRA 208 (2001).

[35]

Rule 130, Section 28 of the Rules of Evidence.

[36]

People vs. Araneta, 335 SCRA 1 (2000); People vs. Lotoc, 307 SCRA 471 (1999).

[37]

TSN, 6 July 1994, pp. 359-360. (Italics, ours)

[38]

TSN, 20 May 1994, p. 12.

[39]

Id. at 13.

[40]

TSN, 1 August 1989, pp. 5-6.

[41]

TSN, 18 August 1993, p. 7.

[42]

TSN, 19 October 1993, p. 16.

[43]

319 SCRA 422 (1999).

[44]

308 SCRA 660 (1999).

[45]

People v. Paraiso, supra.

[46]

344 SCRA 236 (2000).

[47]

Ibid.

TAN VS PEOPLE 313 SCRA 220

Facts: Manuelito Mendez was

one of the employees of complainant Rosita

Lim, proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries. Mendez left the companyand Lim
thereafter
noticed
that
materials
valued
about
P48,000
were
missing. Mendez was arrested and he thereafter admitted to the crime. He
asked for forgiveness and he pointed to Ramon C. Tan, petitioner, as the one
who bought the stolen items. Complainant Lim never filed charges
against Mendez.

Issue: Whether

the petitioner

may be held

liable for fencing.

Held: Before

the enactment of PD 1612, the fence could only be

prosecuted as an accessory after the fact of robbery or theft. Presently, the
accessory could be prosecuted under the RPC or as the principal under PD
1612.
The essential elements of fencing are: 1) a crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; 2) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice
inthe crime, with intent to gain, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in
any article, item, object or anything of value derived from the proceeds ofthe
crime; and 3) the accused knows, or should have known that the article or
object
was
derived
from
the
proceeds
of the
crime.
Lim reported no loss to the police, therefore it cannot be held for certain
that the crime of theft was committed. Thus, the first element of the crimeof
fencing is absent; that is, the commission of the crime of robbery or theft.
There was no evidence of corpus delicti as theft or robbery was not proved.
What is more, there was no showing that the accused knew or should have
known that the stolen articles were the ones sold to him. Without the
petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he cannot be guilty of
fencing.

EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 173473

Appellee,
Present:

Puno, C.J.,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
- versus -

Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Azcuna,
Tinga,

Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
Reyes,
Leonardo-De Castro, and
Brion, JJ.
BETH TEMPORADA,
Appellant.

Promulgated:
December 17, 2008

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us for review is the February 24, 2006 Decision [1] of

the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification the May 14,
2004 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
33, convicting accused-appellant Beth Temporada of the crime of
large scale illegal recruitment, or violation of Article 38 of the
Labor Code, as amended, and five (5) counts of estafa under
Article 315, par. (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The antecedents, as found by the appellate court, are as

follows:

From September 2001 to January 2002, accused Rosemarie

Baby Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan and Jojo Resco
and appellant Beth Temporada, all employees of the Alternative Travel
and Tours Corporation (ATTC), recruited and promised overseas
employment, for a fee, to complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. as
technician in Singapore, and Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyn Estacio
and Dennis Dimaano as factory workers in Hongkong. The accused
and appellant were then holding office at Dela Rosa Street, Makati City
but eventually transferred business to Discovery Plaza, Ermita,
Manila. After complainants had submitted all the requirements
consisting of their respective application forms, passports, NBI
clearances and medical certificates, the accused and appellant, on
different dates, collected and received from them placement fees in
various amounts, viz: a) from Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. 57,600.00; b) from
Dennis Dimaano P66,520.00; c) from Evelyn Estacio P88,520.00; d)
from Soledad Atle P69,520.00 and e) from Luz Minkay
P69,520.00. As none of them was able to leave nor recover the
amounts they had paid, complainant lodged separate criminal
complaints against accused and appellant before the City Prosecutor of
Manila. On November 29, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Restituto
Mangalindan, Jr. filed six (6) Informations against the accused and
appellant, one for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under Article 38
(a) of the Labor Code as amended, and the rest for five (5) counts
of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Information for large scale illegal recruitment reads:

Criminal Case No. 02-208371:

The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE BABY

ROBLES, BERNADETTE M. MIRANDA, BETH TEMPORADA,
NENITA CATACOTAN and JOJO RESCO x x x.

That in or about and during the period comprised

between the months of September 2001 and January
2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, representing themselves to have the power and
capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers
for employment abroad, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise employment to
REGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., DENNIS T. DIMAANO, EVELEYN V.
ESTACIO, SOLEDAD B. ATTE and LUZ MINKAY without first
having secured the required license from the Department
of Labor and Employment as required by law, and charge
or accept directly or indirectly from said complainant[s]
the amount of PH57,600.00, PH66,520.00, PH88,520.00,
PH69,520.00, PH69,520.00, respectively, as placement
fees in consideration for their overseas employment,
which amounts are in excess of or greater than that
specified in the scheduled of allowable fees prescribed of
the POEA and without reasons and without fault of the
said complainants, failed to actually deploy them and
failed to reimburse them the expenses they incurred in
connection with the documentation and processing of
their papers for purposes of their deployment.

Contrary to law.

Except for the name of private complainant and the amount

involved, the five (5) Informations for estafa contain substantially
identical averments as follows:

Criminal Case No. 02-208372:

The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE BABY

ROBLES, BERNADETTE M. MIRANDA, BETH TEMPORADA,
NENITA CATACOTAN and JOJO RESCO x x x.

That in or about and during the period comprised

between November 23, 2001 and January 12, 2002,
inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and
helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud ROGELIO A. LEGASPI,

JR., in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by

means
of
false
manifestations
and
fraudulent
representations which they made to said ROGELIO A.
LEGASPI, JR., prior to and even simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud, to the effect that they have the
power and capacity to recruit and employ ROGELIO A.
LEGASPI, JR., as technician in Singapore and could
facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given
the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
induced and succeeded in inducing said ROGELIO A.
LEGASPI, JR., to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and
delivered to said accused the amount of P57,600.00 on
the strength of said manifestations and representations
said accused well knowing that the same were false and
fraudulent and were made solely for the purpose of
obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the amount of
P57,600.00, which amount, once in their possession, with
intend to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to
their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR. in the aforesaid
amount of P57,000.00 Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law.

The other four (4) Informations for estafa involve the following
complainants and amounts:

1.

DENNIS T. DIMAANO

P66,520.00

2.

EVELYN V. ESTACIO

P88,520.00

3.

SOLEDAD B. ATLE

4.

LUZ T. MINKAY

P69,520.00
P69,520.00[3]

Only appellant was apprehended and brought to trial, the

other accused remained at large. Upon arraignment, appellant
pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. After joint trial,

on May 14, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment convicting appellant

of all the charges:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the GUILT of
accused Beth Temporada BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, judgment is
hereby rendered CONVICTING the said accused, as principal of the
offenses charged and she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment; and the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum,
to nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum for
the estafa committed against complainant Rogelio A. Legaspi, Jr.; the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correctional as minimum to ten (10) years and one day of prision
mayor as maximum each for the estafas committed against
complainants, Dennis Dimaano, Soledad B. Atte and Luz T. Minkay; and
the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correctional as minimum, to eleven (11) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum for the estafacommitted against Evelyn
Estacio.

The accused is also ordered to pay jointly and severally the

complainants actual damages as follows:

1.

Rogelio A. Legaspi Jr. P57,600.00

2.

Dennis T. Dimaano

66,520.00

3.

Evelyn V. Estacio

88,520.00

4.

Soledad B. Atte

66,520.00

5.

Luz T. Minkay

69,520.00

SO ORDERED.[4]

In accordance with the Courts ruling in People v. Mateo,[5] this

case was referred to the CA for intermediate review. On February

24, 2006, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the

RTC:
WHEREFORE, with MODIFICATION to the effect that in Criminal
Cases Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, & 02-208376, appellant is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as maximum; and in Criminal
Case No. 02-208374, she is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
minimum, as maximum, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.[6]

Before this Court, appellant ascribe the lone error that the
trial court gravely erred in finding her guilty of illegal recruitment
and five (5) counts of estafa despite the insufficiency of the
evidence for the prosecution.

We affirm the Decision of the CA, except as to the

indeterminate penalties imposed for the five (5) counts of estafa.

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and

placement thusly:
ART. 13. Definitions. x x x

(b)
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising

or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or

not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three (3) elements

must concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority
required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment
and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the
activities within the meaning of recruitment and placement
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the
same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group.[7]

In the case at bar, the foregoing elements are present.

Appellant, in conspiracy with her co-accused, misrepresented to
have the power, influence, authority and business to obtain
overseas employment upon payment of a placement fee which
was duly collected from complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Dennis
Dimaano, Evelyn Estacio, Soledad Atle and Luz Minkay. Further,
the certification[8] issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and the testimony of Ann Abastra Abas, a
representative of said government agency, established that
appellant and her co-accused did not possess any authority or
license to recruit workers for overseas employment. And, since

there were five (5) victims, the trial court correctly found
appellant liable for illegal recruitment in large scale.

Appellant insists that she was merely an employee of ATTC

and was just echoing the requirement of her employer. She
further argues that the prosecution failed to prove that she was
aware of the latters illegal activities and that she actively
participated therein. In essence, she controverts the factual
findings of the lower courts.

The contention is untenable.

An employee of a company or corporation engaged in

illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with
his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously
participated in illegal recruitment.[9] Appellant actively took part in
the illegal recruitment of private complainants. Rogelio Legaspi
testified that after introducing herself as the General Manager of
ATTC, appellant persuaded him to apply as a technician in
Singapore and assured him that there was a job market therefor.
In addition to the placement fee of P35,000.00 which he paid to
accused Bernadette Miranda, he also handed the amount of
P10,000.00 to appellant who, in turn, issued him a receipt for the
total amount of P45,000.00. Upon the other hand, Soledad Atle
and Luz Minkay, who applied as factory workers in Hongkong

through co-accused, Emily Salagonos, declared that it was

appellant who briefed them on the requirements for the
processing of their application, and assured them and Dennis
Dimaano of immediate deployment for jobs abroad. For her part,
Evelyn Estacio testified that aside from the placement fee of
P40,000.00 that she paid to co-accused Baby Robles in
connection with her purported overseas employment, she also
gave appellant P10,000.00 for which she was issued a receipt for
the amount of P5,000.00.

The totality of the evidence, thus, established that appellant

acted as an indispensable participant and effective collaborator of
her co-accused in the illegal recruitment of complainants. As
aptly found by the CA:
Without doubt, all the acts of appellant, consisting of introducing
herself to complainants as general manager of ATTC, interviewing and
entertaining them, briefing them on the requirements for deployment
and assuring them that they could leave immediately if they paid the
required amounts, unerringly show unity of purpose with those of her
co-accused in their scheme to defraud private complainants through
false promises of jobs abroad. There being conspiracy, appellant shall
be equally liable for the acts of her co-accused even if she herself did
not personally reap the fruits of their execution. We quote with
approval the trial courts findings on the matter:

xxx It is clear that said accused conspired with

her co-accused Rosemarie Baby Robles, Bernadette M.
Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, and Jojo Resco in convincing
complainants xxx to apply for overseas jobs and giving
complainants Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay and Dennis
Dimaano guarantee that they would be hired as factory
workers in Hongkong, complainant Rogelio Legaspi, as

Technician in Singapore and Evelyn Estacio as quality

controller in a factory in Hongkong, despite the fact that
the accused was not licensed to do so.

It should be noted that all the accused were

connected with the Alternative Travel and Tours
Corporation (ATTC). Accused Beth Temporada introduced
herself as ATTCs General Manager. Saod accused was
also the one who received the P10,000.00 given by
complainant Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. and the P10,000.00 given
by complainant Evelyn Estacio as payment for their visa
and plane ticket, respectively. [10]

Consequently, the defense of appellant that she was not aware of

the illegal nature of the activities of her co-accused cannot be
sustained. Besides, even assuming arguendo that appellant was
indeed unaware of the illegal nature of said activities, the same is
hardly

defense

in

the

prosecution

for

illegal

recruitment. Under The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos

Act of 1995, a special law, the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale is malum prohibitum and not malum in se.[11] Thus, the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary and the fact alone
that the accused violated the law warrants her conviction. [12]

In the instant case, we find no reason to depart from the

rule that findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are generally accorded great
respect by an appellate court. The assessment of credibility of
witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because it is in the
position to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of

the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which

opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. [13] Further, there is
no showing of any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses in testifying against appellant. Absent such improper
motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and
their testimony is entitled to full weight and credit.

Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042 prescribes the penalty of life

imprisonment and a fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more
than P1,000,000.00 for the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale or by a syndicate. The trial court, therefore, properly meted
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 on the
appellant.

Anent the conviction of appellant for five (5) counts

of estafa, we, likewise, affirm the same. Well-settled is the rule
that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor
Code

may,

for

the

same

acts,

be

separately

convicted

for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. [14] The elements
of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a
third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation.[15] The same evidence proving appellants criminal
liability for illegal recruitment also established her liability
for estafa. As previously discussed, appellant together with her

co-accused defrauded complainants into believing that they had

the authority and capability to send complainants for overseas
employment. Because of these assurances, complainants parted
with their hard-earned money in exchange for the promise of
future work abroad. However, the promised overseas employment
never materialized and neither were the complainants able to
recover their money.

While we affirm the conviction for the five (5) counts

of estafa, we find, however, that the CA erroneously computed
the indeterminate penalties therefor. The CA deviate from the
doctrine laid down in People v. Gabres;[16] hence its decision
should be reversed with respect to the indeterminate penalties it
imposed. The reversal of the appellate courts Decision on this
point does not, however, wholly reinstate the indeterminate
penalties imposed by the trial court because the maximum terms,
as determined by the latter, were erroneously computed and
must necessarily be rectified.

The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d)
of the RPC, when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is
prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum. The
minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere
within prisin correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Consequently, the

RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for the five estafa cases at
4 years and 2 months of prisin correccional since this is within
the range of prisin correccional minimum and medium.

On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the

prescribed penalty of prisin correccional maximum to prisin
mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of
imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00,
provided

that

the

total

penalty

shall

not

exceed

20

years. However, the maximum period of the prescribed penalty

of prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum is
not prisin mayor minimum as apparently assumed by the
RTC. To

compute

the

maximum

period

of

the

prescribed

penalty, prisin correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum

should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which
portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with
Article 65[17] of the RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum
period

of prisin

correccional maximum

to prisin

mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8

years.[18] The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be
added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years, at the discretion of the court. [19]

In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded

shall be subtracted by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be

divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded

as was done starting with the case of People v. Pabalan[20] in
consonance with the settled rule that penal laws shall be
construed

liberally

in

favor

of

the

accused. The

doctrine

enunciated inPeople v. Benemerito[21] insofar as the fraction of a

year was utilized in computing the total incremental penalty
should,

thus,

be

modified. In

accordance

with

the

above

procedure, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentences

imposed by the RTC should be as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, where the amount

defrauded was P57,600.00, the RTC sentenced the accused to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin
correccional as minimum, to 9 years and 1 day of prisin
mayor as

maximum. Since

the

amount

defrauded

exceeds

P22,000.00 by P35,600.00, 3 years shall be added to the

maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere
from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion
of the court). The lowest maximum term, therefore, that can be
validly imposed is 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisin
mayor, and not 9 years and 1 day of prisin mayor.

In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02208376,

where

the

amounts

defrauded

were

P66,520.00,

P69,520.00, and P69,520.00, respectively, the accused was

sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months

of prisin correccional as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day
of prisin

mayor as

maximum

three estafa cases. Since

P22,000.00

by

for

the

P44,520.00,

each

amounts
P47,520.00,

of

the

defrauded
and

aforesaid
exceed

P47,520.00,

respectively, 4 years shall be added to the maximum period of

the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the
court). The lowest maximum term, therefore, that can be validly
imposed is 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisin mayor, and
not 10 years and 1 day of prisin mayor.

Finally, in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, where the amount

defrauded was P88,520.00, the accused was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisin
correccional as minimum, to 11 years and 1 day of prisin
mayor as

maximum. Since

the

amount

defrauded

exceeds

P22,000.00 by P66,520.00, 6 years shall be added to the

maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere
from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion
of the court). The lowest maximum term, therefore, that can be
validly imposed is 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of reclusin
temporal, and not 11 years and 1 day of prisin mayor.

Response to the dissent.

In

the

computation

of

the

indeterminate

sentence

for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), the Court has consistently followed the doctrine espoused
in Pabalan and

more

fully

explained

in Gabres. The

dissent

argues that Gabres should be reexamined and abandoned.

We sustain Gabres.

I.

The formula proposed in the Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice

Ruben T. Reyes, i.e., the maximum term shall first be computed
by applying the incremental penalty rule, and thereafter the
minimum term shall be determined by descending one degree
down the scale of penalties from the maximum term, is a novel
but erroneous interpretation of the ISL in relation to Article 315,
par. 2(a) of the RPC. Under this interpretation, it is not clear how
the maximum and minimum terms shall be computed. Moreover,
the legal justification therefor is not clear because the meaning of
the terms penalty, prescribed penalty, penalty actually
imposed, minimum term, maximum term, penalty next
lower in degree, and one degree down the scale of penalties

are not properly set out and are, at times, used interchangeably,
loosely and erroneously.

For purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to first clarify

the meaning of certain terms in the sense that they will be used
from here on. Later, these terms shall be aligned to what the
dissent appears to be proposing in order to clearly address the
points raised by the dissent.

The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general

prescription for the felonies defined therein which consists of a
range of period of time. This is what is referred to as the
prescribed penalty. For instance, under Article 249[22] of the
RPC,

the

prescribed

penalty

for

homicide

is reclusin

temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of

imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for attending or
modifying circumstances which when present in the commission
of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed
on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the
imposable

penalty. In

the

case

of

homicide

which

is

committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no

mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC
shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this
imposable penalty, the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also

called a straight penalty) which is the penalty actually

imposed on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.

Concretely, in U.S. v. Saadlucap,[23] a pre-ISL case, the

accused was found guilty of homicide with a prescribed penalty
ofreclusin temporal. Since there was one ordinary aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstances in this case, the
imposable

penalty

is reclusin

temporal in

its

maximum

period, i.e., from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years. The

court then had the discretion to impose any prison term provided
it is within said period, so that the penalty actually imposed on
the accused was set at 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusin
temporal,[24] which is a single fixed penalty, with no minimum or
maximum term.

With the passage of the ISL, the law created a prison term
which consists of a minimum and maximum term called the
indeterminate sentence.[25] Section 1 of the ISL provides
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x.

Thus, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending

circumstances, could be properly imposed under the RPC. In
other words, the penalty actually imposed under the preISL regime became the maximum term under the ISL
regime. Upon the other hand, the minimum term shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. To
illustrate, if the case of Saadlucap was decided under the ISL
regime, then the maximum term would be 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusin temporal and the minimum term could be
anywhere within the range of prisin mayor (6 years and 1 day to
12

years)

which

is

the

penalty

next

lower

to reclusin

temporal. Consequently, an indeterminate sentence of 10 years

of prisin mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusin temporal as maximum could have possibly been
imposed.

If we use the formula as proposed by the dissent, i.e., to

compute the minimum term based on the maximum term after
the attending or modifying circumstances are considered, the
basis for computing the minimum term, under this interpretation,
is

the

imposable

penalty[26] as

hereinabove

defined. This interpretation is at odds with Section 1 of the ISL

which clearly states that the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense. Consequently, the

basis for fixing the minimum term is the prescribed penalty,

[27]

and not the imposable penalty.

In People v. Gonzales,[28] the Court held that the minimum

term must be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the
offense without regard to circumstances modifying criminal
liability.[29] The Gonzales ruling that the minimum term must be
based on the prescribed penalty without regard to circumstances
modifying criminal liability is only a restatement of Section 1 of
the ISL that the minimum term shall be taken from within the
range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty (and
from nowhere else).[30]

Further, the dissent proceeds from the erroneous premise

that its so-called regular formula has generally been followed in
applying the ISL. To reiterate, according to the dissent, the
regular formula is accomplished by first determining the
maximum term after considering all the attending circumstances;
thereafter, the minimum term is arrived at by going one degree
down the scale from the maximum term. As previously discussed,
this essentially means, using the terms as earlier defined, that the
minimum term shall be taken from the penalty next lower to the
imposable penalty (and not the prescribed penalty.) In more
concrete terms and using the previous example of homicide with
one ordinary aggravating circumstance, this would mean that the

minimum term for homicide will no longer be based on reclusin

temporal (i.e., the prescribed penalty for homicide) but reclusin
temporal in its maximum period (i.e., the imposable penalty for
homicide with one ordinary aggravating circumstance) so much
so that the minimum term shall be taken from reclusin
temporal in its medium period (and no longer from prisin
mayor) because this is the penalty next lower to reclusin
temporal in its maximum period. The penalty from which the
minimum term is taken is, thus, significantly increased. From
this example, it is not difficult to discern why this
interpretation radically departs from how the ISL has
generally been applied by this Court. The dissents regular
formula is, therefore, anything but regular.

In fine, the regular formula espoused by the dissent

deviates from the ISL and established jurisprudence and is, thus,
tantamount to judicial legislation.

II.

There is no absurdity or injustice in fixing or stagnating the

minimum term within the range of prisin correccionalminimum
and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months). Preliminarily, it must be emphasized that the minimum
term taken from the aforementioned range of penalty need not be

the same for every case of estafa when the amount defrauded
exceeds P12,000.00. In People v. Ducosin,[31] the Court provided
some guidelines in imposing the minimum term from the range of
the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty:
We come now to determine the minimum imprisonment
period referred to in Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act provides that
this minimum which shall not be less than the minimum imprisonment
period of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the
offense.[32] We are here upon new ground. It is in determining the
minimum penalty that Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts in the
fixing of penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever
had. The determination of the minimum penalty presents two
aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination of the
extreme limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and second, the
broad question of the factors and circumstances that should guide the
discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty within the
ascertained limits.

xxxx

We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the

minimum penalty, namely, the considerations which should guide the
court in fixing the term or duration of the minimum period of
imprisonment. Keeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and
prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness (Message of the Governor-General, Official
Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider
the criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of
society. This opens up an almost limitless field of investigation and
study which it is the duty of the court to explore in each case as far as
is humanly possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not be
standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the individual, with due
regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the social order.

Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors

that should be considered are: (1) His age, especially with reference to
extreme youth or old age; (2) his general health and physical

condition; (3) his mentality, heredity and personal habits; (4) his
previous conduct, environment and mode of life (and criminal record if
any); (5) his previous education, both intellectual and moral; (6) his
proclivities and aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his
demeanor during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime
committed; (8) the manner and circumstances in which the crime was
committed; (9) the gravity of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No.
4103 excepts certain grave crimes this should be kept in mind in
assessing the minimum penalties for analogous crimes).

In considering the criminal as a member of society, his

relationship, first, toward his dependents, family and associates and
their relationship with him, and second, his relationship towards
society at large and the State are important factors. The State is
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social
organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but
also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other
social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to
individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not
heretofore known in these Islands. With the foregoing principles in
mind as guides, the courts can give full effect to the beneficent
intention of the Legislature.[33]

Admittedly, it is possible that the court, upon application of the

guidelines in Ducosin, will impose the same minimum term to one
who

commits

an estafa involving

P13,000.00

and

another

involving P130 million. In fact, to a lesser degree, this is what

happened in the instant case where the trial court sentenced the
accused to the same minimum term of 4 years and 2 months
of prisin correccional in Criminal Case Nos. 02-208372, 02208373, 02-208375, 02-208376, and 02-208374 where the
amounts defrauded were P57,600.00, P66,520.00, P69,520.00,
P69,520.00 and P88,520.00, respectively. However, there is no
absurdity and injustice for two reasons.

One, while it is possible that the minimum term imposed by

a court would be the same, the maximum term would be greater
for the convict who committed estafa involving P130 million
(which would be 20 years of reclusion temporal) than the convict
who swindled P13,000.00 (which could be anywhere from prisin
correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum or from 4 years,
2 months and 1 day to 8 years).[34] Assuming that both convicts
qualify for parole after serving the same minimum term, the
convict sentenced to a higher maximum term would carry a
greater burden with respect to the length of parole surveillance
which he maybe placed under, and the prison term to be served
in case he violates his parole as provided for in Sections 6 [35] and
8[36] of the ISL. Under Section 6, the convict shall be placed under
a period of surveillance equivalent to the remaining portion of the
maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release and
discharge by the Board of Pardon and Paroles. Further, the
convict with the higher maximum term would have to serve a
longer period upon his re-commitment in prison in case he
violates his parole because he would have to serve the remaining
portion of the maximum term, unless the Board of Pardon and
Paroles shall, in its discretion, grant a new parole to the said
convict as provided for in Section 8.

Although the differences in treatment are in the nature of

potential liabilities, to this limited extent, the ISL still preserves
the greater degree of punishment in the RPC for a convict who

commits estafa involving a greater amount as compared to one

who commits estafa involving a lesser amount. Whether these
differences in treatment are sufficient in substance and
gravity involves a question of wisdom and expediency of
the ISL that this Court cannot delve into.

Two, the rule which provides that the minimum term is

taken from the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty is, likewise, applicable to other offenses punishable under
the RPC. For instance, the minimum term for an accused guilty of
homicide with one generic mitigating circumstance vis--vis an
accused guilty of homicide with three ordinary aggravating
circumstances would both be taken from prisin mayor the
penalty next lower to eclusion temporal. Evidently, the convict
guilty of homicide with three ordinary aggravating circumstances
committed a more perverse form of the felony. Yet it is possible
that the court, after applying the guidelines in Ducosin, will
impose upon the latter the same minimum term as the accused
guilty of homicide with one generic mitigating circumstance. This
reasoning can be applied mutatis mutandis to most of the other
offenses punishable under the RPC. Should we then conclude that
the ISL creates absurd results for these offenses as well?

In fine, what is perceived as absurd and unjust is actually

the intent of the legislature to be beneficial to the convict in

order to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent

unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness.[37] By the legislatures deliberate design,
the range of penalty from which the minimum term is taken
remains fixed and only the range of penalty from which the
maximum term is taken changes depending on the number and
nature of the attending circumstances. Again, the reason why the
legislature elected this mode of beneficence to a convict revolves
on questions of wisdom and expediency which this Court has no
power to review. The balancing of the States interests in
deterrence and retributive justice vis--vis reformation and
reintegration of convicts to society through penal laws belongs to
the exclusive domain of the legislature.

III.

People v. Romero,[38] De Carlos v. Court of Appeals,

[39]

Salazar

v.

People,[40] People

v.

Dinglasan[41] and,

by

analogy,People v. Dela Cruz[42] do not support the formula being

proposed by the dissent.

The instant case involves a violation of Article 315, par. 2(a)

of the RPC.[43] The penalty for said violation is

ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). Any person who shall

defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:

1st. The penalty of prisin correccional in its maximum period

to prisin mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos,
and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided
in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin
mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be. x x x

In contrast, Romero, De Carlos, and Salazar involved violations of

Article 315 of the RPC as amended by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1689[44] because: (1) the funds defrauded were
contributed

by

stockholders

or solicited

by

corporations/associations from the general public, (2) the amount

defrauded was greater than P100,000.00, and (3) the estafa was
not

committed

by

syndicate. Section

of

P.D.

1689 provides
Sec. 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other
forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to
death if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting
of five or more persons formed with the intention of carrying out the
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the
defraudation results in the misappropriation of money contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang
nayon(s)", or farmers association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.

No.

When not committed by a syndicate as above defined,

the penalty imposable shall be reclusin temporal to reclusin
perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds 100,000
pesos. (Emphasis supplied)

Since the prescribed penalty is reclusin temporal to reclusin

perpetua, the minimum terms were taken from prisin mayor,
which is the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. [45] As
can

be

seen,

these

cases

involved

different

penalty

structure that does not make use of the incremental

penalty rule due to the amendatory law. Thus, the comparison
of these cases with Gabres is improper.

Meanwhile,
was estafa through

in Dinglasan,
bouncing

the

checks

felony
which

is

committed
punishable

under Article 315 par. 2(d) of the RPC as amended by Republic

Act (RA) No. 4885[46]

Sec. 1. Section Two, Paragraph (d), Article Three hundred fifteen of Act
Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and fifteen is hereby amended to read
as follows:

Sec. 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or

fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:

(d)
By postdating a check, or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover
the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check

to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three

(3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee
or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

and P.D. No. 818[47]

Sec. 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false

pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall
be punished by:

1st. The penalty of reclusin temporal if the amount of

the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but not exceed 22,000 pesos, and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty shall be termedreclusin perpetua; x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

Here, the prescribed penalty of prisin correccional maximum

to prisin mayor minimum was increased to reclusin temporal by
the amendatory law. Consequently, the penalty next lower
to reclusin temporal is prisin mayor from which the minimum
term was taken. This is the reason for the higher minimum term
in

this

case

as

compared

consistent withGabres

to Gabres. In

fact, Dinglasan is

Since the face value of Check No. 029021, for which appellant is
criminally liable for estafa, exceeds P22,000, the penalty abovecited
must be imposed in its maximum period, adding 1 year for each
additional P10,000. Pursuant to People vs. Hernando, G.R. No.
125214, Oct. 28, 1999, an indeterminate sentence shall be imposed on
the accused, computed favorably to him. In this case, the
indeterminate sentence should be computed based on the maximum
period of reclusin temporal as maximum, which is from 17 years, 4
months, and 1 day to 20 years. The minimum period of the
sentence should be within the penalty next lower in degree as
provided in the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prisin mayor, which
is
from
6
years
and
1
day
to
12
years
imprisonment. Considering that the excess of the fraud committed,
counting from the base of P22,000, is only P4,400, which is less than
the P10,000 stated in P.D. 818, there is no need to add one year to the
maximum penalty abovecited.[48] (Emphasis supplied)

As in Gabres, the penalty next lower (i.e., prisin mayor) was

determined without considering in the meantime the effect of the
amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00 on the prescribed
penalty (i.e., reclusin temporal).

Finally, Dela Cruz involved a case for qualified theft. The

prescribed penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher than
simple theft. Incidentally, the penalty structure for simple
theft[49] and estafa is similar in that both felonies (1) requires that
the prescribed penalty be imposed in its maximum period when
the value of the thing stolen or the amount defrauded, as the
case may be, exceeds P22,000.00, and (2) provides for an
incremental penalty of 1 year imprisonment for every P10,000.00
in excess of P22,000.00. It should be pointed out, however, that
the prescribed penalty for simple theft is prisin mayor minimum

and

medium

while

in estafa it

is

lower

at prisin

correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum.

Being two degrees higher, the prescribed penalty for

qualified theft is, thus, reclusin temporal medium and maximum,
while the minimum term is taken from the range of prisin
mayor maximum to reclusin temporal minimum, which is the
penalty

next

lower

to reclusin

temporal medium

and

maximum. The penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty is

determined without first considering the amount stolen in excess
of

P22,000.00

consistent

with Gabres. In

fact, Dela

Cruz expressly cites Gabres

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be anywhere within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the
offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. Since the penalty
prescribed by law is reclusin temporal medium and maximum, the
penalty next lower would be prisin mayor in its maximum period
to reclusin temporal in its minimum period. Thus, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence shall be anywhere within ten (10) years and
one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

The maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which, taking

into consideration the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code. Since the amount involved
in the present case exceeds P22,000.00, this should be taken
as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of
the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence, not in
the
initial
determination
of
the
indeterminate
penalty. (citing Gabres)
Thus,
the
maximum
term
of
the
indeterminate penalty in this case is the maximum period of reclusin
temporal medium and maximum, which ranges from eighteen (18)

years, two (2) months, and twenty one (21) days to twenty (20) years,
as computed pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code.[50] (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, none of these cases supports the Dissenting

Opinions
computed

thesis
based

that
on

the
the

minimum

term

maximum

term. Quite

contrary, Dinglasan and Dela

Cruz are

should

be
the

consistent

with Gabres.

IV.

The argument that the incremental penalty rule should not

be considered as analogous to a modifying circumstance stems
from

the

erroneous

interpretation

that

the

attending

circumstances mentioned in Section 1 of the ISL are limited to

those modifying circumstances falling within the scope of Articles
13 and 14 of the RPC. Section 1 of the ISL is again quoted below

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an

offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the

court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the

maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The plain terms of the ISL show that the legislature did not
intend to limit attending circumstances as referring to Articles
13 and 14 of the RPC. If the legislature intended that the
attending circumstances under the ISL be limited to Articles 13
and 14, then it could have simply so stated. The wording of the
law clearly permits other modifying circumstances outside of
Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC to be treated as attending
circumstances for purposes of the application of the ISL, such as
quasi-recidivism under Article 160[51] of the RPC. Under this
provision, any person who shall commit a felony after having
been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such
sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new
felony. This circumstance has been interpreted by the Court as a
special aggravating circumstance where the penalty actually
imposed is taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum
period without regard to any generic mitigating circumstances.
[52]

Since quasi-recidivism is considered as merely a special

aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree is

computed

based

on

the

prescribed

penalty

without

first

considering said special aggravating circumstance as exemplified

in People v. Manalo[53] and People v. Balictar.[54]

The question whether the incremental penalty rule is

covered within the letter and spirit of attending circumstances
under the ISL was answered in the affirmative by the Court
in Gabres when it ruled therein that the incremental penalty rule
is analogous to a modifying circumstance.

Article 315 of the RPC pertinently provides

ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). Any person who shall defraud

another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished
by:

1st. The penalty of prisin correccional in its maximum

period to prisin mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of
the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin
mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be. x x x

Under Gabres, prisin

correccional maximum

to prisin

mayor minimum is the prescribed penalty[55] for estafa when the

amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00. An amount defrauded in

excess of P22,000.00 is effectively considered as a special

aggravating circumstance in the sense that the penalty actually
imposed shall be taken from the prescribed penalty in its
maximum period without regard to any generic mitigating
circumstances. Consequently, the penalty next lower in degree is
still based on the prescribed penalty without in the meantime
considering the effect of the amount defrauded in excess of
P22,000.00.

What is unique, however, with the afore-quoted provision is

that when the amount defrauded is P32,000.00 or more, the
prescribed penalty is not only imposed in its maximum period but
there is imposed an incremental penalty of 1 year imprisonment
for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20
years. This incremental penalty rule is a special rule applicable
to estafa and theft. In the case of estafa, the incremental penalty
is added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or to
anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years) at the
discretion of the court, in order to arrive at the penalty actually
imposed (i.e., the maximum term, within the context of the ISL).

This unique characteristic of the incremental penalty rule

does not pose any obstacle to interpreting it as analogous to a
modifying circumstance, and, hence, falling within the letter and

spirit of attending circumstances for purposes of the application

of

the

ISL. Under

the

wording

of

the

ISL,

attending

circumstances may be reasonably interpreted as referring to

such circumstances that are applied in conjunction with certain
rules in the Code in order to determine the penalty to be actually
imposed based on the prescribed penalty of the Code for the
offense. The incremental penalty rule substantially meets this
standard. The circumstance is the amount defrauded in excess of
P22,0000.00 and the incremental penalty rule is utilized to fix the
penalty actually imposed. At its core, the incremental penalty
rule is merely a mathematical formula for computing the penalty
to be actually imposed using the prescribed penalty as starting
point. Thus, it serves the same function of determining the
penalty actually imposed as the modifying circumstances under
Articles 13, 14, and 160 of the RPC, although the manner by
which the former accomplishes this function differs with the
latter. For this reason, the incremental penalty rule may be
considered

as

merely

analogous

to

modifying

circumstances. Besides, in case of doubt as to whether the

incremental penalty rule falls within the scope of attending
circumstances under the ISL, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of inclusion because this interpretation is more favorable
to the accused following the time-honored principle that penal
statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused.[56] Thus, even if the Dissenting Opinions
interpretation

is

gratuitously

conceded

as

plausible,

as

betweenGabres and the dissents interpretation, Gabres should be

sustained since it is the interpretation more favorable to the

accused.

V.

The claim that the maximum term should only be one

degree away from the minimum term does not make sense
within the meaning of degrees under the RPC because
the minimum and maximum terms consist of single fixed
penalties. At any rate, the point seems to be that the penalty
from which the minimum term is taken should only be one degree
away from the penalty from which the maximum term is taken.

As

general

rule,

the

application

of

modifying

circumstances, the majority being generic mitigating and ordinary

aggravating circumstances, does not result to a maximum term
fixed beyond the prescribed penalty. At most, the maximum term
is

taken

from

the

prescribed

penalty

in

its

maximum

period. Since the maximum term is taken from the prescribed

penalty and the minimum term is taken from the next lower
penalty, then, in this limited sense, the difference would naturally
be only one degree. Concretely, in the case of homicide with one
ordinary aggravating circumstance, the maximum term is taken
from reclusin temporal in its maximum period which is within the
prescribed penalty of reclusin temporal, while the minimum term

is taken from prisin mayorwhich is the penalty next lower

to reclusin temporal; hence, the one-degree difference observed
by the dissent.

In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the

maximum term can exceed the prescribed penalty. Indeed, at its
extreme, the maximum term can be as high as 20 years
of reclusin
at prisin

temporal while

the

prescribed

correccional maximum

to prisin

penalty

remains

mayor minimum,

hence, the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty from

which

the

minimum

term

is

taken

remains

at

anywhere

within prisin correccional minimum and medium, or from 6

months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In this sense, the
incremental penalty rule deviates from the afore-stated general
rule.[57]

However, it is one thing to say that, generally, the penalty

from which the minimum term is taken is only one degree away
from the penalty from which the maximum term is taken, and
completely another thing to claim that the penalty from which the
minimum term is taken should only be one degree away from the
penalty from which the maximum term is taken.

The one-degree difference is merely the result of a general

observation from

the application

of

generic

mitigating

and

ordinary aggravating circumstances in the RPC in relation to the

ISL. Nowhere does the ISL refer to the one-degree difference as
an essential requisite of an attending circumstance. If the
application of the incremental penalty rule deviates from the onedegree difference, this only means that the law itself has provided
for an exception thereto. Verily, the one-degree difference is
a mere consequence of the generic mitigating and ordinary
aggravating

circumstances

created

by

the

legislature.

The

difficulty of the dissent with the deviation from its so-called onedegree difference rule seems to lie with the inability to view these
attending circumstances as mere artifacts or creations of the
legislature. It does not make sense to argue that the legislature
cannot

formulate

attending

circumstances

that

operate

differently than these generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating

circumstances, and that,expectedly, leads to a different result
from the one-degree differencefor it would be to say that the
creator can only create one specie of creatures. Further, it should
be reasonably assumed that the legislature was aware of these
special circumstances, like the incremental penalty rule or
privileged mitigating circumstances, at the time it enacted the ISL
as well as the consequent effects of such special circumstances
on the application of said law. Thus, for as long as the
incremental penalty rule is consistent with the letter and spirit of
attending circumstances under the ISL, there is no obstacle to
its treatment as such.

VI.

Much has been said about the leniency, absurdity and

unjustness of the result under Gabres; the need to adjust the
minimum

term

of

the

indeterminate

penalty

to

make

it

commensurate to the gravity of the estafa committed; the

deterrence effect of a stiffer imposition of penalties; and a host of
other similar reasons to justify the reversal of Gabres. However,
all these relate to policy considerations beyond the wording of the
ISL in relation to the RPC; considerations that if given effect
essentially seek to rewrite the law in order to conform to one
notion (out of an infinite number of such notions) of wisdom and
efficacy, and, ultimately, of justice and mercy.

This Court is not the proper forum for this sort of

debate. The

Constitution

forbids

it,

and

the

principle

of

separation of powers abhors it. The Court applies the law as it

finds it and not as how it thinks the law should be. Not too long
ago in the case ofPeople v. Veneracion,[58] this Court spoke about
the dangers of allowing ones personal beliefs to interfere with the
duty to uphold the Rule of Law which, over a decade later, once
again assumes much relevance in this case:
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of
justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were
allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, the law becomes

meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise

of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its
authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law,
and ought to protect and enforce it without fear or favor, resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs. [59]

VII.

Mr. Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna proposes an interpretation of

the incremental penalty rule based on the phrases shall be
termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code found in
the last sentence of said rule, viz:

ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). Any person who shall

defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall be
punished by:

1st. The penalty of prisin correccional in its maximum

period to prisin mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of
the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case
may be. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

While this interpretation is plausible, Gabres should still be

sustained because in construing penal statutes, as between two
reasonable[60] but contradictory constructions, the one more
favorable to the accused should be upheld, which in this case is
Gabres. The reason for this rule is elucidated in an eminent
treatise on statutory construction in this wise:

It is an ancient rule of statutory construction that penal statutes

should be strictly construed against the government or parties seeking
to enforce statutory penalties and in favor of the persons on whom
penalties are sought to be imposed. This simply means that words
are given their ordinary meaning and that any reasonable doubt
about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to a
criminal statute. This canon of interpretation has been accorded the
status of a constitutional rule under principles of due process, not
subject to abrogation by statute.

The rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed has

several justifications based on a concern for the rights and freedoms of
accused individuals. Strict construction can assure fairness when
courts understand it to mean that penal statutes must give a clear and
unequivocal warning, in language people generally understand, about
actions that would result in liability and the nature of potential
penalties. A number of courts have said:

the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly

construed is a fundamental principle which in our
judgment will never be altered. Why? Because the
lawmaking body owes the duty to citizens and subjects of
making unmistakably clear those acts for the commission
of which the citizen may lose his life or liberty. Therefore,
all the canons of interpretation which apply to civil
statutes apply to criminal statutes, and in addition there
exists the canon [of strict construction] . The burden lies
on the lawmakers, and inasmuch as it is within their
power, it is their duty to relieve the situation of all doubts.

xxxx

Additionally, strict construction protects the individual against

arbitrary discretion by officials and judges. As one judge noted: the
courts should be particularly careful that the bulwarks of liberty are not
overthrown, in order to reach an offender who is, but perhaps ought
not to be, sheltered behind them.

But also, for a court to enforce a penalty where the

legislature has not clearly and unequivocally prescribed it
could result in judicial usurpation of the legislative
function. One court has noted that the reason for the rule is to guard
against the creation, by judicial construction, of criminal offenses not
within the contemplation of the legislature. Thus the rule requires that
before a person can be punished his case must be plainly and
unmistakably within the statute sought to be applied. And, so, where a
statute is open to more than one interpretation, it is strictly construed
against the state. Courts further rationalize this application of the rule
of strict construction on the ground that it was not the defendant in the
criminal action who caused ambiguity in the statute. Along these same
lines, courts also assert that since the state makes the laws, they
should be most strongly construed against it. [61] (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)

Thus, in one case, where the statute was ambiguous and

permitted two reasonable interpretations, the construction which
would impose a less severe penalty was adopted. [62]

WHEREFORE, the

Decision

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

is MODIFIED with respect to the indeterminate penalties imposed

on appellant for the five (5) counts of estafa, to wit:

(1)

In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused is

sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months ofprisin correccional as minimum, to 9 years,
8 months and 21 days of prisin mayor as maximum.

(2)

In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02208376, the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty

of

years

and

months

of prisin

correccional as minimum, to 10 years, 8 months and 21

days of prisin mayor as maximum for each of the
aforesaid three estafa cases.

(3)

In Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused is

sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months ofprisin correccional as minimum, to 12 years,
8

months

and

21

days

of reclusin

temporal as

maximum.

In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals

is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
NAZARIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICOAssociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Justice

Associate

RUBEN T. REYES

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]

CA rollo, pp. 121-136. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Amelita G.
Tolentino and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring.
[2]

Penned by Hon. Reynaldo G. Ros.

[3]

CA rollo, pp. 121-124.

[4]

Id. at 125-26.

[5]

G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

[6]

CA rollo, p. 135.

[7]

People v. Gamboa, G.R. No. 135382, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 451, 458.

[8]

Exhibits A, L, and L-1.

[9]

People v. Cabais, G.R. No. 129070, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 553, 561.

[10]

CA rollo, pp. 9-10.

[11]

Supra note 7 at 462.

[12]

Id.

[13]

People v. Guambor, G.R. No. 152183, January 22, 2004, 420 SCRA 677, 683.

[14]

People v. Ballesteros, G.R. Nos. 116905-908, August 6, 2002, 386 SCRA 193, 212.

[15]

Id. at 213.

[16]

335 Phil. 242 (1997).

[17]

ARTICLE 65. Rule in Cases in Which the Penalty is Not Composed of Three Periods. In cases in which the
penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the
foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions the time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one
period of each of the three portions.
[18]

People v. Saley, G.R. No. 121179, July 2, 1998, 291 SCRA 715, 753-754.

[19]

Id. at 755.

[20]

331 Phil. 64 (1996).

[21]

332 Phil. 710, 730-731 (1996).

[22]

ARTICLE 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another
without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty
of homicide and be punished by reclusin temporal.
[23]

3 Phil. 437 (1904).

[24]

Id. at 440.

[25]

The penalty is considered indeterminate because after the convict serves the minimum
term, he or she may become eligible for parole under the provisions of Act No. 4103, which
leaves the period between the minimum and maximum term indeterminate in the sense that
he or she may, under the conditions set out in said Act, be released from serving said period
in whole or in part. (People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109, 114 [1933])
[26]

In the other portions of the dissent though, there is also the impression that the basis is the penalty actually
imposed as hereinabove defined. Whether it is the imposable penalty or penalty actually imposed, the dissents
interpretation contravenes the ISL because the minimum term should be fixed based on the prescribed penalty.
[27]

See Aquino and Grio-Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1997 ed., pp. 772-773; Padilla, Criminal Law:
Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1988 ed., pp. 211-214.
[28]

73 Phil. 549 (1941).

[29]

Id. at 552.

[30]

The dissent cites several cases to establish that Gonzales has not been followed in cases outside of estafa. An
examination of these cases reveals that this assertion is inaccurate.

1. Sabang v. People, G.R. No. 168818, March 9, 2007, 518 SCRA 35; People v. Candaza, G.R. No.
170474, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 280; People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 169060, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA

660; People v. Hermocilla, G.R. No. 175830, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 296; People v. Abulon, G.R. No. 174473,
August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 675.

Gonzales was applied in these cases.

2. People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 169078, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 555; Garces v. People, G.R. No.
173858, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 827belongs to the class of cases involving accessories and accomplices as well
as the frustrated and attempted stages of a felony.

Strictly speaking, these cases do not deviate from Gonzales. Here, the prescribed penalty for the principal
and consummated stage, respectively, should be merely viewed as being lowered by the proper number of degrees in
order to arrive at the prescribed penalties for accomplices and accessories as well as the frustrated and attempted
stages of a felony. In turn, from these prescribed penalties, the minimum term is determined without considering in
the meantime the modifying circumstances, as in Gonzales.

3. Garces v. People, G.R. No. 173858, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 827belongs to the class of cases
involving privileged mitigating circumstances.

These cases are, to a certain extent, an exception to the rule enunciated in Gonzales. Here, the prescribed
penalty is first reduced by the proper number of degrees due to the existence of a privileged mitigating circumstance.
As thus reduced, the penalty next lower in degree is determined from which the minimum term is taken. To the
extent that the privileged mitigating circumstance, as a modifying circumstance, is first applied to the prescribed
penalty before the penalty next lower in degree is determined, these cases deviate from Gonzales. However, this
interpretation is based on the special nature of a privileged mitigating circumstance as well as the liberal
construction of penal laws in favor of the accused. If the privileged mitigating circumstance is not first applied to the
prescribed penalty before determining the penalty next lower in degree from which the minimum term is taken, it
may happen that the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence would be lower than the minimum term, or that
the minimum and maximum term would both be taken from the same range of penaltyabsurdities that the law
could not have intended. These special considerations which justified a deviation from Gonzales are not present in
the instant case. As will be shown later, Gabres is a reasonable interpretation of the ISL in relation to Article 315,
par. 2(a) of the RPC, and any contrary interpretation would be unfavorable to the accused.
[31]

59 Phil. 109 (1933).

[32]

This wording of Act No. 4103 was later amended to the current wording minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense by Act No. 4225.
[33]

Supra note 31 at 116-118.

[34]

Similarly, in the instant case, the maximum term imposed on the accused increased as the amount defrauded
increased in the various criminal cases filed against her as a consequence of the incremental penalty rule.
[35]

Sec. 6. Every prisoner released from confinement on parole by virtue of this Act shall, at such times and in such
manner as may be required by the conditions of his parole, as may be designated by the said Board for such purpose,
report personally to such government officials or other parole officers hereafter appointed by the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence for a period of surveillance equivalent to the remaining portion of the maximum sentence
imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence as herein provided.
The officials so designated shall keep such records and make such reports and perform such other duties hereunder
as may be required by said Board. The limits of residence of such paroled prisoner during his parole may be fixed
and from time to time changed by the said Board in its discretion. If during the period of surveillance such paroled
prisoner shall show himself to be a law-abiding citizen and shall not violate any of the laws of the Philippine Islands,
the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may issue a final certificate of release in his favor, which shall entitle him to
final release and discharge.
[36]

Sec. 8. Whenever any prisoner released on parole by virtue of this Act shall, during the period of surveillance,
violate any of the conditions of his parole, the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may issue an order for his re-arrest
which may be served in any part of the Philippine Islands by any police officer. In such case the prisoner so rearrested shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally
committed to prison, unless the Board of Indeterminate Sentence shall, in its discretion, grant a new parole to the
said prisoner.
[37]

Supra note 31 at 117.

[38]

G.R. No. 112985, April 21, 1999, 306 SCRA 90.

[39]

G.R. No. 103065, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 397.

[40]

G.R. No. 149472, October 15, 2002, 391 SCRA 162.

[41]

G.R. No. 133645, September 17, 2002, 389 SCRA 71.

[42]

383 Phil. 213 (2000).

[43]

Estafa committed by using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
[44]

Effective April 6, 1980.

[45]

See Article 61 of the RPC.

[46]

Effective June 17, 1967.

[47]

Effective October 22, 1975.

[48]

Supra note 41 at 80.

[49]

ARTICLE 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1.
The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if
the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin
mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be. x x x
[50]

Supra note 42 at 227-228.

[51]

ARTICLE 160. Commission of Another Crime During Service of Penalty Imposed for
Another Previous Offense Penalty. Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any
person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before
beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.

Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall
be pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original
sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching said age, unless by reason of his
conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.
[52]

See People v. Perete, 111 Phil. 943, 947 (1961).

[53]

G.R. No. L-55177, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 98, 110.

[54]

G.R. No. L-29994, July 20, 1979, 91 SCRA 500, 511.

The dissent argues that the use of quasi-recidivism as an example of an attending circumstance which is
outside the scope of Article 14 of the RPC is inappropriate because quasi-recidivism is sui generis. The argument is
off-tangent. The point is simply that quasi-recidivism is not found under Article 14 of the RPC yet it is treated as an
attending circumstance for purposes of the application of the ISL in relation to the RPC. Hence, there are
attending circumstances outside the scope of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. For the same reason, the incremental
penalty rule is a special rule outside of Article 14 which, as will be discussed later on, serves the same function as
modifying circumstances under Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. See also Reyes, L.B., The Revised Penal
Code, 14th ed., 1998, p. 766.
[55]

The common thread in the RPC is to fix the prescribed penalty as the starting point for
determining the prison sentence to be finally imposed. From the prescribed penalty, the
attending circumstances are then considered in order to finally fix the penalty actually
imposed. Further, the designation of a prescribed penalty is made in individual articles, or
prescribed penalties are individually designated in separate paragraphs within a single
article. Under Article 315, the penalty for estafa when the amount defrauded is over
P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00 and when such amount exceeds P22,000.00 is
lumped within the same paragraph. Thus, the penalty of prisin correccional maximum
to prisin mayor minimum may be reasonably considered as the starting point for the
computation of the penalty actually imposed, and hence, the prescribed penalty when the
amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00. As will be discussed shortly, the amount defrauded
in excess of P22,000.00 may then be treated as a special aggravating circumstance and the

incremental penalty as analogous to a modifying circumstance in order to arrive at the

penalty actually imposed consistent with the letter and spirit of the ISL in relation to the
RPC.
[56]

People v. Ladjaalam, 395 Phil. 1, 35 (2000).

[57]

Cases involving privileged mitigating circumstances would, likewise, deviate from this general rule since the
maximum term would be taken from a penalty lower than the prescribed penalty. See note 13.
[58]

G.R. Nos. 119987-88, October 12, 1995, 249 SCRA 244.

[59]

Id. at 251.

[60]

The aforesaid phrases are broad enough to justify Mr. Justice Azcunas interpretation, however, they are vague
enough not to exclude the interpretation under Gabres. The said phrases may be so construed without being
inconsistent with Gabres. (See Articles 90 and 92 of the RPC)
[61]

3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 59:3 (6th ed.)

[62]

Id. citing Buzzard v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 641, 114 S.E. 664 (1992).

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 158797

Appellee,
Present:
Puno, J.,
Chairman,
- versus -

Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr.,
Tinga, and
Chico-

Nazario, JJ.

ELPIDIO ENRIQUEZ, JR. and

Promulgated:

EMILIANO ENRIQUEZ,
Appellants.

July 29, 2005

x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez were convicted

of kidnapping by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite City,
Branch 16, and each was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as minimum to reclusion perpetua as
maximum.[1] They appealed to the Court of Appeals which not
only affirmed their convictions but imposed upon each of the
appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[2]

The Court of

Appeals refrained from entering judgment and certified the case

to us pursuant to the second paragraph of Sec. 13 of the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure.[3]

On July 8, 1985, Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez

were charged with kidnapping in the Regional Trial Court of Cavite
City, Branch 16. The Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of January 1985, in
the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
the
abovenamed
accused,
conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with
the use of firearm (nickel plated revolver), motor
vehicle (tricycle) and by simulating public authority, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
forcibly kidnapped Alexander Pureza y Mendoza by the
point of [a] gun (revolver) and forcibly loaded said
Alexander M. Pureza to (sic) a yellow colored tricycle
(Hazel) with Plate No. MTC H8242 and brought
somewhere else and detained in an undisclosed place
for more than five (5) days since the kidnapping took
place and up to the present time could not be located,
with the aggravating circumstances of the use of a
firearm, force, motor vehicle and simulation of public
authority.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Both pleaded not guilty to the charge during arraignment. Trial

ensued.

The prosecution evidence shows that at about 6:50 p.m. of

January 24, 1985, Rogelio Andico, Edwin Pugay, Esmi Saquilayan,
and twenty-one-year old Alexander Pureza were conversing in
front of the Barangay Hall of Silangan, Rosario, Cavite. Appellant
Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., alias Bonggo, who was dressed in military
fatigue pants, camouflage jacket, brown hat, and wearing dark
glasses, arrived on board a tricycle driven by appellant Emiliano
Enriquez, alias Emil Tate. After Bonggo alighted, Emil parked the
tricycle about ten (10) meters away from the group. Bonggo then
pulled out a .38 caliber revolver from his jacket and warned the
group, Huwag kayong tatakbo, awtoridad ako. He singled out
Alexander Pureza, poked his gun at him and ordered him, Sama
ka sa kin. He dragged Alexander to the tricycle, and forced him

to board the same. The tricycle sped off. Alexander Pureza was
never seen again or heard from since then.

Rogelio Andico, who was left behind after his companions

scampered away, hurried to Alexanders house and informed his
parents about the incident. At about midnight of the same day,
Rogelio gave his statement[5] to the police upon the advice of his
uncle,

Atty.

Ernesto

Andico,

the

Vice-Mayor

of

Rosario,

Cavite. Rogelio executed two other statements on January 25 and

29, 1985. [6]

Feliciano Castro, a resident of Rosario, Cavite, corroborated

Rogelios testimony. He testified that at about 6:30 to 7:00 p.m. of
January 24, 1985, he was waiting for a ride when he saw
Alexander Pureza being pushed by appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr.
into a waiting tricycle driven by appellant Emiliano Enriquez.
[7]

Alexander was struggling to free himself. Feliciano did not do

anything to help or tell anyone what he witnessed. He feared for

his life because Bonggo was the grandson of then Mayor Calixto
Enriquez of Rosario, Cavite. At that time, many people just
disappear or get killed in Rosario. It was only in July 1987 when
Mayor Calixto Enriquez was no longer mayor that he revealed the
above information to P/Lt. Col. Rogelio Pureza, the victims father.

The two appellants had a different story to tell. They denied

any involvement in the kidnapping and interposed the defense of
alibi. Appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. testified that he was in Bulan,
Sorsogon from January 21 to 24, 1985 with his live-in partner
visiting her sick father. He left Sorsogon in the morning of January
24 and arrived at Rosario, Cavite at about 11:00 p.m. to midnight
of the same day. He went to sleep immediately upon arrival, and
was awakened at 1:00 a.m. when the police picked him up for
investigation.

Appellant Emiliano Enriquez claimed that he did not leave his

house during the night in question as he was taking care of his
child. He also alleged that his tricycle had a broken shock
absorber.

In addition, appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. ascribed improper

motive on the part of prosecution witnesses Andico and Castro.
He alleged that Rogelio Andico testified against him because he
caused the arrest of Rogelios uncle, Antonio Andico, known as
the king pusher of Rosario, Cavite. He also charged that
Feliciano Castro testified against him because Castro is a trusted
employee and bodyguard of Jose Abutan, the uncle of Col. Pureza.
He further alleged that Col. Pureza filed the case at bar against
him in retaliation for having been implicated in the case involving
the killing of his (Elpidios) father.

After trial, appellants were found guilty as charged and

meted indeterminate prison terms, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds the accused Elpidio Enriquez, Jr. alias Bonggo and
Emiliano Enriquez alias Tate GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
and hereby sentences them to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment consisting of seventeen (17)
years,
four
(4)
months
and
one
(1)
day
of reclusion temporal,
as
minimum,
to reclusion
perpetua, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim P50,000.00. (underlining supplied)[8]

Appellants elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which

affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. As
aforestated, the appellate court did not apply the Indeterminate
Sentence Law but imposed upon the appellants the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the
appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DENIED. The
assailed decision dated May 28, 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16 finding herein

accused-appellants Elpidio
Enriquez,
Jr. and Emiliano Enriquez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping is hereby AFFIRMED
with modification in that We hereby sentence them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Accordingly, let this case be certified and the

entire records hereof elevated to the Supreme Court for
review pursuant to Sec. 13 (2), Rule 124 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure.[9] (emphasis supplied)

Appellants

state a lone assignment of error in their

Appellants Brief, viz: that the lower court gravely erred in finding
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping
despite the insufficiency of the evidence. More specifically,
appellants assail the credibility of prosecution witness Rogelio
Andico because he did not give his eyewitness account of the
alleged kidnapping in one sworn statement only but executed two
supplemental statements as well. They allege that the execution
of three statements to the police shows that Andico was a
coached witness. They argue that Andicos excuse for the
piecemeal testimony,i.e., he was nervous and confused at the

time he gave his first statement to the police, is not worthy of

belief considering that he gave his statement to Col. Purezas
men.

Appellants likewise contend that prosecution witness

Feliciano Castro does not deserve credence because it took him

two (2) years to report the incident which is counter to the natural
tendency of a person who witnessed a crime to report the same
at the earliest possible opportunity.

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

We hold that the execution of not one but three statements

to the police does not necessarily render prosecution witness
Andico incredible. Andico testified in court and was crossexamined by counsel for appellants. Andico testified in a clear
and straightforward manner detailing how Alexander Pureza was
taken at gunpoint and spirited away by appellants on the night of
January 24, 1985, never to be seen or heard from again. His
testimony was given credence both by the trial court and the

Court of Appeals. We find no reason to disturb their calibration of

the credibility of Andicos testimony.

To be sure, the first statement, by itself, executed by Andico

at midnight of January 24, 1985 sufficiently proved the elements
of the crime of kidnapping charged against the appellants. In this
statement,[10] Andico

categorically

narrated

how

his

friend

Alexander Pureza, a private citizen, was taken at gunpoint by

appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., who did not have authority to do
so, with the connivance and participation of a tricycle driver. The
victim was never seen or heard from again. In his second
statement executed on January 25, 1985, [11] Andico merely added
that appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., aside from being dressed in
military-like clothes, likewise introduced himself to them as
someone in authority. This addition is a superfluity for the purpose
of proving the crime of kidnapping against the appellant. It is
undisputed that at the time the Information was filed on July 8,
1985,[12] the victim had been missing for more than five (5)
months, more than the five (5) days deprivation of liberty

required under the former Art. 267 [13] of the Revised Penal
Code. Alexander Pureza has not been seen again or heard from
since his abduction on January 24, 1985. The former Art. 267
mentioned four circumstances for the crime of kidnapping to be
committed,[14] but they need not be present simultaneously as the
presence of just one circumstance is enough to establish the
crime.[15] Hence, the added circumstance of simulation of public
authority alleged in Andicos second sworn statement was
unnecessary. Examining the third supplemental sworn statement,
[16]

Andico merely supplied the name of the tricycle driver whom

he saw but did not immediately recognize. This is not fatal as

there is the testimony of Feliciano Castro who identified appellant
Emiliano Enriquez as the tricycle driver to corroborate Andicos
account. Although Castro reported the incident only two (2) years
after the incident, his reason for not reporting the same
immediately, i.e., fear for his life, is reasonable considering that
one of the appellants is the grandson of the incumbent mayor. His
initial reluctance is not unusual and is a matter of judicial notice.
[17]

Appellants attempt to discredit Andico by imputing improper

motive upon him for testifying in the case, i.e., that Andico
testified

to

avenge

his

Uncle

Antonio

Andico

who

was

apprehended by Narcom agents at the instigation of appellant

Elpidio

Enriquez,

Jr.,

cannot

succeed.

For

one,

the

exact

relationship between Rogelio and Antonio Andico was not proved.

The uncle-nephew relationship was merely speculated from the
fact that Rogelio called Erning Andico, the brother of Antonio, as
mama or uncle.[18] Appellant Elpidio Enriquez, Jr., admitted that
he does not know the exact relationship between Rogelio and
Antonio Andico.[19] But even if Antonio was Rogelios uncle, their
relationship is not enough reason for Rogelio to avenge Antonios
apprehension. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that
the natural interest of Rogelio, who is a friend of the victim, in
securing the conviction of the guilty would deter him from
implicating a person other than the true culprit. [20] Col. Purezas
alleged motive for filing this case against appellant Elpidio
Enriquez, Jr., i.e., Col. Pureza filed this case in retaliation for
having been implicated in the case involving the killing of
Elpidios father, is equally tenuous. The facts show that Col.

Pureza had been cleared of any involvement in the killing of

Elpidios father by the Investigating Panel of the Judge Advocate
Generals Office.[21] A contrario, it is Elpidio who may have the
reason to retaliate at Col. Pureza who walked away from the
charge.

We join the lower courts in rejecting appellants alibi. In the

case of Elpidio, we find it incredible that he did not inform the
police about his alibi when he was brought in for questioning just
hours after he came back from Bulan, Sorsogon. Neither did his
mother, who followed him to the police station, nor his live-in
partner, who was allegedly his companion in Sorsogon, say
anything to the police to defend him. Their silence was deafening.
It was almost a month later or only on February 20, 1985 that
Elpidio

foisted

the

defense

of

alibi

in

his

counter-

affidavit[22] submitted during the preliminary investigation of the

case. We have repeatedly ruled that alibi is an inherently weak
defense because it is easy to fabricate and is highly unreliable,

[23]

more so when corroborated only by relatives and friends. [24] It

cannot stand against the positive identification of appellant by a

credible witness to the crime.[25]

On the other hand, appellant

Emiliano alleged that he was in his house taking care of his child
when the kidnapping took place, and that his tricycle, which was
allegedly used in the crime, had a broken shock absorber.
However, he admitted that his house was a mere ten (10) minutes
away from the place of the incident. [26] He also conceded that a
vehicle can run even without a broken shock absorber, although
he qualified that his tricycles shock absorber was seriously
broken.[27] We reiterate the age old rule that for alibi to prosper, it
is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else
when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission. [28]In the case at bar,
appellant Emiliano failed to show that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its

commission considering that his house was a mere ten (10)

minutes drive away from the barangay hall where the victim was
abducted.

In sum, we find that the guilt of appellants has been proven

beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. All the elements of
the crime of kidnapping, to wit: (1) the accused is a private
individual; (2) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention
or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense,
any of the four circumstances mentioned in Art. 267 of the
Revised Penal Code are present,[29] have been proven through the
eyewitness account of Rogelio Andico, corroborated by Feliciano
Castro, who have not been shown to have any improver motive in
testifying in this case.

Finally, we come to the correctness of the penalty. The 1987

Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death penalty unless

for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress

provides for it.[30]

Republic Act No. 7659[31] which classified

kidnapping as a heinous crime punishable by death took effect on

December 31, 1993. The crime at bar was committed in 1985. We
have ruled that R.A. No. 7659 cannot be applied to a crime that
transpired prior to its effectivity under the principle of nonretroactivity of penal laws which are unfavorable to the accused.
[32]

Consequently, reclusion perpetua is the only penalty that can

be imposed against the appellants. As correctly argued by the

Solicitor

General,

Act

No.

4103,

otherwise

known

as

the

Indeterminate Sentence Law, cannot be applied in the case of

appellants considering the proscription in Sec. 2 thereof, viz:
This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment x x x x

Indeed, in People v. Asturias,[33] Serrano v. Court of Appeals,[34] People v.

Lampaza[35] and People v. Tan,[36] to name a few cases, we in effect equated the
penalty of reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life-imprisonment for purposes of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that the latter law does not apply to
persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said penalty. Consequently, we
affirm the Court of Appeals in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in
imposing upon appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23589 convicting Elpidio Enriquez, Jr.
and Emiliano Enriquez of the crime of kidnapping.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO

S.

PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman,

Second

Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and

the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the

conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation

before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

HILARIO
DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

G.

[1]

Decision dated May 28, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 150-85.

[2]

Decision dated June 12, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23589.

Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of

death, reclusion
[3]

perpetua, or life imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the

court, after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall
render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment as the circumstances warrant.
However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment and
forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to
the Supreme Court for review.

[4]

Original Records, p. 1; Rollo, p. 26.

[5]

Exh. A, Original Records, p. 15.

[6]

Exhs. B and C, Id., pp. 24 and 36.

[7]

TSN, October 2, 1987, pp. 3-9; TSN, November 25, 1987, p. 10.

[8]

Supra at Note 1.

[9]

Supra at Note 2.

[10]

Supra at Note 5.

[11]

Supra at Note 6.

[12]

Original Records, p. 1.

[13]

Under the present Art. 267, the period of deprivation of liberty for
kidnapping to be committed is reduced to three (3) days only.

[14]

Namely: (1) If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted

more than five days; (2) If it shall have been committed
simulating public authority; (3) If any serious physical injuries
shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained,
or if threats to kill him shall have been made; and (4) If the
person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female, or a
public officer.

The present Art. 267 bears minor differences from the former Art.
267. The period mentioned in the first circumstance was reduced
from five (5) to three (3) days; and an exception in the fourth
circumstance was made if the accused is any of the parents of
the minor kidnapped or detained.

[15]

People v. Saldaa, G.R. No. 148518, April 15, 2004.

[16]

Supra at Note 6.

[17]

People v. Ramos, 309 SCRA 643 (1999); People v. Batidor, 303 SCRA 335
(1999); People v. Realin, 301 SCRA 495 (1999).

[18]

TSN, March 7, 1988, p. 14.

[19]

Id.

[20]

See People v. Bagcal, 350 SCRA 402 (2001).

See Elpidio Enriquez Jr.s Counter-Affidavit dated February

20, 1985,
[21]

Original Records, pp. 69-70.

[22]

Id., pp. 310-310A.

People v. Ejandra, 429 SCRA 364 (2004); People v. Guarin,

317 SCRA
[23]

234 (1999); People v. Limon, 306 SCRA 367 (1999); People v.

Lapay, 298 SCRA 62 (1998); People v. Galapin, 293 SCRA 474
(1998); People v. Devaras, 205 SCRA 676 (1992).

[24]

People v. Jerez, 285 SCRA 393 (1998).

People v. Dichoson, 352 SCRA 56 (2001); People v. Pabillano,

351 SCRA
[25]

237 (2001); People v. Ronas, 350 SCRA 663 (2001).

[26]

TSN, May 23, 1988, pp. 15-16.

[27]

Id., p. 9.

[28]

People v. Consejero, 352 SCRA 276 (2001).

[29]

People v. Mercado, 131 SCRA 501 (1984).

[30]

Sec. 19 (1), Article III, 1987 Constitution, which provides: Excessive fines
shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,

Amending
[31]

for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, and for Other Purposes.

[32]

People v. Salimbago, 314 SCRA 282 (1999).

[33]

134 SCRA 405 (1985).

[34]

247 SCRA 203 (1995).

[35]

319 SCRA 112 (1999).

[36]

359 SCRA 283 (2001).

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132376. April 11, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAMINA ANGELES

y CALMA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-appellant Samina Angeles y Calma was charged with four (4) counts of estafa and
one (1) count of illegal recruitment in the following informations:[1]

Criminal Case No. 94-140585 (Estafa)

That on or about September 8, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MARIA
TOLOSA DE SARDEA Y TABLADA in the following manner to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she
made to said Maria Tolosa de Sardea y Tablada to the effect that she had the power
and capacity to recruit and employ her as domestic helper in Paris, France, and could
facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet
the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said Maria Tolosa de Sardea y Tablada to give and deliver, as
in fact she gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P107,000.00 on the
strength of said manifestations and representations, accused well knowing that the
same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did
obtain the amount of P107,000.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent to
defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the same to her own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice
of said Maria Tolosa de Sardea y Tablada in the aforesaid sum of P107,000.00
Philippine Currency.
Criminal Case No. 94-140486 (Estafa)
That on or about September 8, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
MARCELIANO T. TOLOSA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said

MARCELIANO T. TOLOSA to the effect that she had the power and capacity to
recruit and employ him as contract worker in Paris, France and could facilitate the
processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in
inducing said Marceliano T. Tolosa accused well knowing that the same were false
and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the amount of
P190,000.00 which amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Marceliano T.
Tolosa in the aforesaid sum of P190,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Criminal Case No. 94-140487 (Estafa)
That on or about September 9, 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud PRECILA P.
OLPINDO in the following manner to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said Precila P.
Olpindo to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ her as
contract worker in Canada and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if
given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other
similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Precila P. Olpindo to give and
deliver, as in fact she delivered to said accused the amount of $2,550.00 on the
strength of said manifestations and representations, said Precila P. Olpindo accused
well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain,
as in fact she did obtain the amount of $2,550.00 which amount once in her
possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Precila P. Olpindo in the aforesaid sum of
$2,550.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of P61,200.00.
Criminal Case No. 94-140488 (Estafa)
That on or about the first week of September 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
VILMA S. BRINA in the following manner to wit: the said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said Vilma S. Brina
to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ her as contract
worker in Canada and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given
the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar
deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Vilma S. Brina to give and deliver, as
in fact she gave and delivered to said accused the amount of $2,550.00 on the strength
of said manifestations and representations, accused well knowing that the same were

false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact she did obtain the
amount of $2,550.00 which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the
same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Vilma
S. Brina in the aforesaid sum of $2,550.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency of
P61,200.00.
Criminal Case No. 94-140489 (Illegal Recruitment)
The undersigned accuses SAMINA ANGELES y CALMA of violation of Art. 38 (a)
Pres. Decree No. 1412 amending certain provisions of Book 1, Pres. Decree No. 442
otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the Philippines in relation to Article 13
(b) and (c) of said Code, as further amended in a large scale, as follows:
That sometime during the month of September 1994 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, representing herself to have the capacity to contract,
enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement
abroad to the following persons:
1.
4.

Marceliano T. Tolosa
2. Precila P. Olpindo
3. Vilma S. Brina
Maria Tolosa de Sardea y Tablada

Without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment.
The five (5) cases were consolidated and tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 50.
Maria Tolosa Sardea was working in Saudi Arabia when she received a call from her sister,
Priscilla Agoncillo, who was in Paris, France. Priscilla advised Maria to return to the Philippines
and await the arrival of her friend, accused-appellant Samina Angeles, who will assist in
processing her travel and employment documents to Paris, France. Heeding her sisters advice,
Maria immediately returned to the Philippines.
Marceliano Tolosa who at that time was in the Philippines likewise received instructions
from his sister Priscilla to meet accused-appellant who will also assist in the processing of his
documents for Paris, France.
Maria and Marceliano eventually met accused-appellant in September 1994 at Expert Travel
Agency on Mabini Street, Manila. During their meeting, accused-appellant asked if they had the
money required for the processing of their documents. On September 8, 1994, Maria gave

P107,000.00 to accused-appellant at Expert Travel Agency. Subsequently, she gave another

P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 as additional payments to accused-appellant.
Marceliano, on the other hand, initially gave P100,000.00 to accused-appellant but on
September 28, 1994, he gave an additional P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 to accused-appellant at
the United Coconut Planters Bank in Makati.
Analyn Olpindo met accused-appellant in Belgium. At that time, Analyn was working in
Canada but she went to Belgium to visit her in-laws. After meeting accused-appellant, Analyn
Olpindo called up her sister, Precila Olpindo, in the Philippines and told her to meet accusedappellant upon the latters arrival in the Philippines because accused-appellant can help process
her documents for employment in Canada.
Precila Olpindo eventually met accused-appellant at the Expert Travel Agency on September
7, 1994. Accused-appellant asked for the amount of $4,500.00, but Precila was only able to give
$2,500.00.
No evidence was adduced in relation to the complaint of Vilma Brina since she did not
testify in court.
Accused-appellant told Precila Olpindo and Vilma Brina that it was easier to complete the
processing of their papers if they start from Jakarta, Indonesia rather than from Manila. Thus, on
September 23, 1994, Precila Olpindo, Vilma Brina and accused-appellant flew to Jakarta,
Indonesia. However, accused-appellant returned to the Philippines after two days, leaving behind
Precila and Vilma. They waited for accused-appellant in Jakarta but the latter never
returned. Precila and Vilma eventually came home to the Philippines on November 25, 1994.
When she arrived in the Philippines, Precila tried to get in touch with accused-appellant at
the Expert Travel Agency, but she could not reach her. Meanwhile, Maria and Marceliano Tolosa
also began looking for accused-appellant after she disappeared with their money.
Elisa Campanianos of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency presented a certification
to the effect that accused-appellant was not duly licensed to recruit workers here and abroad.
In her defense, accused-appellant averred that, contrary to the prosecutions allegations, she
never represented to the complainants that she can provide them with work abroad. She insisted
that she was a marketing consultant and an international trade fair organizer. In June 1994, she
went to Paris, France to organize a trade fair. There she met Priscilla Agoncillo, a domestic
helper, and they became friends. Priscilla asked her to assist her siblings, Maria and Marceliano,
particularly in the processing of their travel documents for France. Accused-appellant told
Priscilla that she can only help in the processing of travel documents and nothing more. It was
Priscilla who promised employment to Maria and Marceliano. She received money from
complainants not in the form of placement fees but for the cost of tickets, hotel accommodations
and other travel requirements.
According to accused-appellant, she met Analyn Olpindo in Belgium while she was
organizing a trade fair. They also became friends and it was Analyn who asked her to help
Precila. Just like in the case of Maria and Marceliano, accused-appellant explained that her
assistance shall only entail the processing of Precilas travel documents to Canada.

After trial on the merits, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment
and four (4) counts of estafa and correspondingly sentenced her as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the aforementioned premises the accused SAMINA

ANGELES is hereby declared:
In Criminal Case No. 94-140489 for the crime of Illegal Recruitment, GUILTY (Art.
38 Labor Code) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 94-140485 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby
declared GUILTY and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In addition the accused is ordered to
reimburse the amount of One hundred seven thousand pesos (P107,000.00) to
complainant Maria Tolosa de Sardea. With costs.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140486 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby
declared GUILTY and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In addition the accused is ordered to
reimburse the amount of One hundred ninety thousand pesos (P190,000.00) to
complainant Marceliano T. Tolosa. With costs.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140487 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby
declared GUILTY and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In addition the accused is ordered to
reimburse the amount of Two thousand five hundred fifty dollars (US$2,550.00) or its
equivalent in Philippine currency of Sixty one thousand two hundred pesos
(P61,200.00), to complainant Precila P. Olpindo. With Costs.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140488 for the crime of Estafa the accused is hereby
declared GUILTY and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. In addition the accused is ordered to
reimburse the amount of Two thousand five hundred fifty dollars (US$2,550.00) or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency of Sixty one thousand two hundred pesos
(P61,200.00) to complainant Vilma S. Brina. With costs.[2]
Accused-appellant is now before us on appeal, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove
her guilt for estafa and illegal recruitment by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant points out that not one of the complainants testified on what kind of jobs
were promised to them, how much they would receive as salaries, the length of their employment
and even the names of their employers, which are basic subjects a prospective employee would
first determine.

In sum, accused-appellant posits that the prosecution did not present a single evidence to
prove that she promised or offered any of the complainants jobs abroad. Illegal recruitment is
committed when two (2) elements concur: 1) that the offender has no valid license or authority
required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and
2) that the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and
placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34.[3]
Article 13(b), of the Labor Code provides, thus:

(b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,

contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused-appellant gave complainants
the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work
such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. [4] To be
engaged in the practice of recruitment and placement, it is plain that there must at least be a
promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or
abroad.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant alleges that she never promised nor offered any job to
the complainants.
We agree.
A perusal of the records reveals that not one of the complainants testified that accusedappellant lured them to part with their hard-earned money with promises of jobs abroad. On the
contrary, they were all consistent in saying that their relatives abroad were the ones who
contacted them and urged them to meet accused-appellant who would assist them in processing
their travel documents. Accused-appellant did not have to make promises of employment abroad
as these were already done by complainants relatives. Thus, in the cross-examination of Maria
Tolosa de Cardena:
Atty. Dinglasan:
Q:

And you would likewise agree that Priscilla informed you that she can find an employment for
you once you entered Paris, is that correct?

A:

Yes, because according to her that is what Samina Angeles said to her.

Q:

But during that time you would agree that you do not know personally or met in person Samina
Angeles?

A:

Not yet sir.

Q:

In fact, even when you arrived in the Philippines, and actually met in person Samina Angeles,
you did not know who is Samina Angeles and what her business was then that time?

A:

I recognized because my sister sent me a picture of Samina Angeles.

Q:

So, it is clear that when you met Samina Angeles sometime on September 8, 1994, you were
already decided to go to Paris because you were then relying on the instruction from the advice of
Priscilla?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And that was the reason why you even terminated your employment contract in Saudi?

A:

Yes, sir.[5]

Precila Olpindo, on cross-examination, admitted thus:

Q:

You would like to confirm that before you and Samina met in the Philippines sometime in
September of 1995, you were already decided to leave for Canada as per advice of your sister?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And you likewise agree madam witness that even before you met the accused sometime in
September of 1995, you were already directed and informed by your sister Ana as to how much
and she will pay the accused Samina for the facilitation of your travel in going to Canada, is that
correct?

A:

Yes, sir.[6]

In the cross-examination of Marceliano Tolosa, thus:

Q:

Now, would you agree that your sister is working in Paris?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And for how many years working in Paris?

A:

Almost 5 years.

Q:

And how much was she earning or receiving in Paris, France?

A:

P20,000.00 or more, sir.

Q:

And it was for this reason she advised your sister then in Saudi Arabia and you to also go to Paris
because she will be receiving more in Paris, correct?

A:

She said when we follow to her office, sir.

Q:

So what your sister told you if youre also interested to go to Paris you can avail of the help of
Samina Angeles, so you can also leave for Paris and join her, is that correct?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And that was the reason why your sister wrote you a letter and gave instruction to go to accused
sometime on September, 1994, is that correct?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Now you would agree with me Mr. Witness prior to that date September 8, 1994 you dont know
personally the person of Samina Angeles and do not know anything about the nature of her
business or personal circumstances, is that correct?

A:

Yes, sir.[7]

Plainly, there is no testimony that accused-appellant offered complainants jobs

abroad. Hence, accused-appellant Samina Angeles cannot be lawfully convicted of illegal
recruitment.
Anent the four charges of estafa, Samina Angeles argues that the element of deceit
consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused made prior to or
simultaneously with the delivery of the sums of money is lacking in the instant case. She claims
that she never deceived complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability to
send them abroad for employment.
We are not persuaded.
Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of estafa are: (1)
the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage
or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person. Clearly, these elements are present in this case.[8]
Although Samina Angeles did not deceive complainants into believing that she could find
employment for them abroad, nonetheless, she made them believe that she was processing their
travel documents for France and Canada. They parted with their money believing that Samina
Angeles would use it to pay for their plane tickets, hotel accommodations and other travel
requirements. Upon receiving various amounts from complainants, Samina Angeles used it for
other purposes and then conveniently disappeared.
Complainants trusted Samina Angeles because she was referred to them by their own
relatives. She abused their confidence when she led them to believe that she can process their
travel documents abroad, thus inducing them to part with their money. When they demanded
from Samina their travel documents, she failed to produce them. Likewise, she failed to return
the amounts entrusted to her.
Clearly, Samina Angeles defrauded complainants by falsely pretending to possess the power
and capacity to process their travel documents.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00; if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty
provided shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00. However, the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.[9]
In People v. Ordono,[10] it was held:

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. The penalty next lower should
be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next

lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence.
Thus, in Criminal Case No. 94-140485, Maria Tolosa testified that she gave P107,000.00,
P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 to Samina Angeles. The Information, however, alleged that Maria
gave only P107,000.00. Samina Angeles could therefore be held accountable for only that
amount.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140486, Marceliano testified that he gave P100,000.00, P46,000.00
and US$1,500.00 to Samina Angeles. The Information however alleged that Marceliano gave
only a total of P190,000.00; hence that is the only amount that Samina Angeles could be held
accountable for.
In Criminal Case No. 94-140487, Precila testified that she gave US$2,550.00 to Samina
Angeles. The Information alleged that the equivalent amount thereof in Philippine Currency is
P61,200.00. Samina Angeles is therefore criminally liable for P61,200.00.
Complainant Vilma Brina did not appear in court to testify. Thus, the damage in the amount
of $2,550.00 alleged in Criminal Case No. 94-140488 was not proved.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 94-140485, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is found

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a
prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and is ORDERED to
indemnify Maria Sardea the amount of P107,000.00.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 94-140486, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a
prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and is ORDERED to
indemnify Marceliano Tolosa the amount of P190,000.00.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 94-140487, accused-appellant Samina Angeles is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a
prision term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eleven (11) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and is ORDERED to
indemnify Precila Olpindo the amount of P61,200.00.
(4) In Criminal Case No. 94-140488 for Estafa, accused-appellant Samina Angeles
is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

(5) In Criminal Case No. 94-140489 for Illegal Recruitment, accused-appellant

Samina Angeles is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

[1]

Records, pp. 24-30.

[2]

Penned by Judge Urbano C. Victorio Sr.

[3]

People v. Saley, 291 SCRA 715 [1998].

[4]

People v. Ong, 322 SCRA 38 [2000].

[5]

TSN, June 25, 1995, pp. 21-22.

[6]

TSN, July 27, 1995, p. 3.

[7]

TSN, September 5, 1995, pp. 20-21.

[8]

People v. Mercado, 304 SCRA 504 [1999].

[9]

People v. Ordono, 335 SCRA 331 [2000].

[10]

Ibid., citing People v. Gabres, 267 SCRA 581 [1997].