Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958

February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery
and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque
brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance.
Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas,
but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of
rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another
Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other
boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days
of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands
of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by
sixvintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once
on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and
brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the
persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed
on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact,
these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the
Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo,
who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to
escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu
with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros,
based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute
a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was
overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two
defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to
return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended
parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the
amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By
a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present.
Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is
again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case.
Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state
but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where

the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike
all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor
does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign
state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong
[1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first
time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are
still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of
another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war
with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who
commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article,
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the
same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the
physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four
hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred
and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity
specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of
saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code,
when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national
territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be
considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the
effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The
political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as
it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and
institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws
subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the
community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the
new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs.
McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the
Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the
Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws
of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and

provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as
they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or
superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened
practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official
Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were
meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1
of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code
applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by
the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are
similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This
must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in
the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to
define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against
the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute
books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits
the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found
in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly
death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the members of
Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the
law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to
piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical
construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy,
would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United
States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the
expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat
similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533)
to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no
longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the
Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of
the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United
States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena
perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war
with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles
153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article
154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as
authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an
offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of
saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the
penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court,
finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same

by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended,
of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was
taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the
natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of
lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to
impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the
death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the
women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his
nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the
judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is
reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy
and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by
the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together
with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and
severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part
of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW
JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Basilan,
Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM,
NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with triple
murder and frustrated murder said to have been committed according to the information as
follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan, Province of

Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused, being strangers and without
lawful authority, armed with firearms and taking advantage of their superior
strength, conspiring and confederating together, aiding and assisting one with
the other, with intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation against
persons and force upon things, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo
de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman
were riding, traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards
Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their
cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets, merchandise and other personal
belongings amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine
Currency; that the said accused, on the occasion of the crime herein abovedescribed, taking advantage that the said victims were at their mercy, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered
them to jump into the water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at
them which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio
de Guzman and wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have
performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
Qualified Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reasons of causes in dependent of their will, that is, said
Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid himself, and due
to the timely medical assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman
which prevented his death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and Omarkayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the
accused Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated
Murder as defined and penalized under the provision of Presidential Decree
No. 532, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision of Section 106 of the
Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme poverty of
the accused who are members of the cultural minorities, under a regime of so
called compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is
recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH
HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the
Larmitan Public Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7,
1979 and on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de
Castro and Anastacio de Guzman received goods from his store consisting of
mosquito nets, blankets, wrist watch sets and stereophono with total value of
P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods were received under an
agreement that they would be sold by the above-named persons and
thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to Aurea and keep part of
the profits for themselves. However these people neither paid the value of
the goods to Aurea nor returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15,
1979, Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that his group was held up
near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn).
On July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and
Anastacio de Guzman were brought by the PC seaborne patrol to Isabela,
Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident
that caused the death of his companions.

It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends
who were also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas
Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the goods they received from Alberto
Aurea. The goods they brought with them had a total value of P18,000.00
(pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a
pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in the house of Omarkayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram
and Julaide Siyoh, started selling their goods, They were able to sell goods
worth P 3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram
and Siyoh, went to sell their goods at another place, Sangbay, where they
sold goods worth P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island
at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house. However
that night Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon inquiry the following day
when Antonio de Guzman saw him, Kiram told the former that he slept at the
house of Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to BalukBaluk, a place suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell goods worth
P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the night but
Kiram did not sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk
accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used the pumpboat
of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They
arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and upon arrival
at the place Kiram and Siyoh going ahead of the group went to a house
about 15 meters away from the place where the group was selling its goods
(pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking with two
persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn).
After selling their goods, the members of the group, together with Kiram and
Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where
Siyoh positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine. On the
way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw another pumpboat painted red
and green about 200 meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly
after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots
were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58,
tsn). There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with
armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the same persons he saw
Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came
close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de
Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja Island,
Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and
their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram and his companions
ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the pants of
Antonio de Guzman, Kiram put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said
'It was good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen
while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into the
water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of
Kiram fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach
a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw
the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de
Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine
Army station at Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was
brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province (pp.
66-68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the
wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and
the two were arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was
wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat.
Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72,
tsn).

Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial

Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular
area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime
M. Junio, Provincial Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of
Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen and issued the corresponding death
certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution). (pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief,
pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of witnesses.
Who should be believed Antonio de Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or
Siyoh and Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that they were also the victims of the
crime? The trial court which had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses
and how they testified assigned credibility to the former and an examination of the record
does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and influence which was overlooked or
the significance of which was misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial court's
determination. Additionally, the following claims of the appellants are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram
house or on any of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say that
robbing the victims at Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family immediately suspect
and robbing the victims before they had sold all their goods would be premature. However,
robbing and killing the victims while at sea and after they had sold all their goods was both
timely and provided safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not
support this assertion. For as the prosecution stated: "It is of important consequence to
mention that the witness presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the
accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving team for the dead bodies but no PC
soldiers were ever presented to attest this fact. The defense may counter why the
prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily Event book? This matter has been
brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to an army detachment. The
Army is known to have no docket book, so why take the pain in locating the army soldiers
with whom the report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this
observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be true, why
the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused
testified against them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred from
the evidence of the defense so far presented showing reason why the lone survivor should
pervert the truth or fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as qualified piracy with triple
murders and frustrated murder? The point which makes us doubt the version of the defense
is the role taken by the PC to whom the report was allegedly made by the accused
immediately after the commission of the offense. Instead of helping the accused, the PC law
enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report of the accused or believing
in the version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently
with the latter's report and placed the accused under detention for investigation."
(Expediente,pp. 127-128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman,
and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de
Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that their husbands were killed by the
companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli
Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not the former. But this claim is baseless
in the face of the proven conspiracy among the accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently
proved in this case. In fact the following facts appear to have been
established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling,
the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman noticed that near the window of a
dilapidated house, both accused were talking to two (2) armed strangelooking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the pumpboat was chased and
overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized their captors to
be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two accused talked in
Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two accused, without
order from the two armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to the
captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and companion peddlers were

divested of their jewelries and cash and undressed while the two accused
remained unharmed or not molested. These concerted actions on their part
prove conspiracy and make them equally liable for the same crime (People
vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of
the will of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply
justifies the imputation of all of them the act of any of them (People vs.
Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de
Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no reason to
suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner different from his
companions. The incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the
case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons
killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e.
rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special
complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the
victims; were they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for
Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible
gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de
Guzman that the victims were hacked; that the appellants were armed with "barongs" while
Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and the
law, it is affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty
imposed shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to
the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Gutierrez, Jr., Dela Fuente, Alampay and
Patajo, JJ., concur.
Aquino, C.J., took no part.
Teehankee, J., for affirmance of death sentence.

Separate Opinions

CUEVAS, J., dissenting:

considering the gravamen of the offense charged the manner by which it was committed, I
vote to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court.

Separate Opinions
CUEVAS, J., dissenting:
considering the gravamen of the offense charged the manner by which it was committed, I
vote to affirm the death penalty imposed by the trial court.

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