Aesthetic Value, Ethics and Climate Change

EMILY BRADY
University of Edinburgh
ABSTRACT

Philosophical discussions of climate change have mainly conceived of it as a moral or ethical

problem, but climate change also raises new challenges for aesthetics. In this paper I show that,
in particular, climate change (1) raises difficult questions about the status of aesthetic
judgments about the future, or future aesthetics; and (2) puts into relief some challenging
issues at the intersection of aesthetics and ethics. I maintain that we can rely on aesthetic
predictions to enable us to grasp, in some sense, aesthetic value in environments affected by
climate change and, through a discussion of three hypothetical cases, I argue that although
moral considerations will press on aesthetic judgments, aesthetic value will not necessarily be
trumped by them.

Keywords: climate change, environmental aesthetics, aesthetic value, ethics.

1. Introduction

As a philosophical issue, climate change has been thus far conceived mainly as a problem in
moral and political philosophy, where discussion has focused on questions of responsibility,
justice, rights, etc. The principal concerns have revolved around the impacts of climate change
on humans and future generations. Recently, some philosophers have turned their attention to

2
issues in non-anthropocentric climate ethics, that is, harms to nature and the kinds of ethical
theories that might need to be developed in light of non-human rather than human
considerations.1 In both kinds of approaches, the general view is that climate change is a new
and unprecedented moral problem presenting a new set of challenges for ethical theory.
Does climate change also present a new set of challenges for aesthetics?2 Yes: because
of its vast temporal scale, climate change has been categorized as an intergenerational problem,
concerning not just present people and environments but also future ones, and this raises
questions not just for ethics but also for aesthetics. What can we reasonably say about the
aesthetic value of landscapes affected by climate change in the future? Should we care about
the aesthetic experiences of future people, especially if they are impoverished in some way by
the effects of climate change on the environment? These kinds of questions raise concerns
about the relationship between aesthetic and moral value. If climate change is understood as a
form of environmental harm, what are the implications for our appreciation of landscapes,
species, and processes affected by climate change? Can landscapes that have evolved through
the effects of climate change be beautiful? I will attempt to answer some of these questions
here and, more generally, my aims are to present a first attempt at setting up climate change as
an aesthetic problem and to consider the main issues that arise for any aesthetic analysis of it.
I begin by setting out the key features of climate change as it has been theorized as a
moral problem, moving on, then, to an examination of it as a problem for environmental
aesthetics. I shall argue, first, that climate change raises difficult questions about future
aesthetics, and, second, that it puts into relief some challenging issues at the intersection of

See Palmer, 2011; Nolt, 2011. Palmers work has been especially helpful for framing some of the problems
discussed in this paper.
2
To the best of my knowledge there is little if anything written on climate change from the perspective of
philosophical aesthetics, though there is work on how artists have responded to climate change. I take this to be a
different, though related, topic (see, e.g., Lippard, 2007).

3
aesthetics and ethics. I conclude that while climate change does present aesthetics with some
new concerns, these concerns are not unresolvable. Indeed, aesthetic value would appear to
continue to be deeply relevant and not trumped by moral considerations.

2. Climate Change as a Moral Problem

For scene-setting and context, I begin by sketching out some key features of climate change
and the features particular to it as a moral problem. One underlying assumption of this paper is
that global warming is largely human-induced. While there has always been climate variability,
we are seeing rises in global average temperatures on an unprecedented scale. This presents an
environmental problem with a distinctive spatial and temporal character. Its causes and effects
are dispersed across space, with human activity in many different places causing problems,
such as drought, in distant other places. Increases in temperatures are likely causing and
exacerbating more extreme weather events, melting of sea-ice and subsequent sea-level rises
which are having a range of effects on both natural environments and human societies in both
northern and southern hemispheres.
Climate change is also a severely time-lagged phenomenon. While the most reliable
scientific evidence draws on data from the last forty years or so to indicate current impacts and
near future impacts, much of our understanding of impacts are based on probabilistic
assessments reaching as far into the future as the end of the twenty-first century. These
assessments range from exceptionally unlikely to virtually certain. While there is strong
probability for a range of impacts, there is also considerable uncertainty about what forms
those impacts will take, as well as the nature of the impacts themselves.

4
These features make climate change a perfect moral storm.3 The dispersion of causes
and effects makes it difficult to pin down responsibility and address issues of climate justice.
There is a fragmentation of agency with emissions originating in individuals, institutions, and
industry across different parts of the globe at different times.4 Who exactly is responsible and
what do we owe people in distant places? How far back do we reach in terms of responsibility
for CO2 emissions? Because many of the impacts are projected into the future, this raises
complex intergenerational questions about how to act with regard to future nature and future
human societies.
Climate ethics has developed in response to this problem as more traditional ethical
theories have been seen as inadequate in the face of a problem situated on such an unusual
scale. Many of the new ethical approaches have developed as varieties of long-term
intergenerational, anthropocentric ethics, and how they may then feed into policies for
abatement and adaptation. But we also know that climate change will potentially harm
ecosystems and other non-human entities. Non-anthropocentric value theory raises questions
about non-instrumental valuing of nature, where nature can be ascribed value independently of
human use.5 This raises the question of what moral attitudes we ought to adopt in relation to
impacts on nature itself, where those impacts could result in serious loss in terms of
biodiversity depletion and mass extinctions. (For the sake of argument, I will assume that
animal suffering matters, and for some parts of the paper, I will also assume that ecosystems
and species have some kind of non-instrumental value, though I wont argue for these claims
here.)

Gardiner, 2011: 7; Gardiner, 2006.

Gardiner, 2011.
5
For example, in Taylors biocentrism (1986), biological individuals have a good of their own which generates a
duty of respect for nature.
4

5
I have more to say about the implications of non-anthropocentric value theory for
thinking through climate change and its relationship to aesthetics in section five below, but at
this stage we have enough information about the nature of the problem to move on to an
aesthetic analysis.

3. Climate Change as an Aesthetic Problem

Climate change is a complex problem that raises both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric
concerns. Where does aesthetics fit into this picture? There are various spheres in which we
might expect climate change to have aesthetic effects:

(a) Effects on nature itself, that is, on natural entities which are subject to relatively little
human influence;
(b) Technologies developed in response to climate change which become built elements in
landscapes or seascapes, e.g., structures for renewable energy, geoengineering, etc.
(c) Changes to the other human structures, including, for instance, denser urbanization,
crop changes, changes in transport modes, etc.

While there are many important questions related to technology and the built environment
and to other ways in which humans respond to climate change, for instance, through the arts
my discussion will be limited to (a). Climate change plays out on vast spatial and temporal
scales with serious impacts on nature. How might we pin down the aesthetic objects of this
pervasive phenomenon, given the ever-changing effects it is likely to have on nature? What are

6
the implications of this for aesthetic judgments and the aesthetic theories that enable us to
understand such judgments? Do we have the tools to address this new kind of problem?
To begin my analysis, I need to sketch out the notion of aesthetic value informing my
arguments. Aesthetic value is generated through appreciative experiences where we attend to a
things forms, perceptual properties (or qualities), and meanings for their own sake. I take
aesthetic properties to be dependent upon a structural base of non-aesthetic properties, and as
dependent upon valuers, rather than having a wholly independent status.6 On this kind of view,
aesthetic judgments have a strong experiential basis and are based in the subject in so far as
they are response-dependent. On this basis, aesthetic value can be classified as a type of
intrinsic or non-instrumental value, though I prefer the term non-instrumental because it
avoids some of the problems associated with various meanings of intrinsic value in the
environmental context.7 However, I see no inconsistency in holding that aesthetic value can
also function instrumentally in so far as it may contribute to human flourishing through
beneficial effects such as uplifting feelings, greater perceptual sensitivity, activation of
imagination, and so on. This relatively uncontroversial approach to aesthetic value provides a
foundation for contemporary theories of both artistic and natural aesthetics.
Recent work in environmental aesthetics would appear to be especially suited for
thinking through the issue of aesthetics and climate change. The aesthetic objects of climate
change will, in the main, overlap significantly with those already discussed in this sub-field of
aesthetics. Environmental aesthetics has emerged to address the environmental character of
natural objects as opposed to the object-centered approach typical of art, where the aesthetic

6
7

For this kind of approach, see Stecker, 2006; Levinson, 2001.

See the distinctions made by ONeill, 1992: 119-20.

7
object is conceived as fairly static and bounded, such as a painting or sculpture.8 The
environmental conception has also served as a critical response to the so-called scenic model
of aesthetic appreciation of nature, where the focus on scenes, akin to two-dimensional
paintings, has been held to be ocularcentric and narrow, failing to capture the variety of
multisensory and changing qualities of natural phenomena.9 The aesthetic properties of
individual living and non-living things, such as a bird or a stone, can be attended to as discrete
objects. More often, though, their properties are related to their settings in ways that are
significant to their appreciation. We can focus on the startling, eerie sound of a screech owl,
but this will be situated within some environment, say, having added force as it punctuates a
dark, tranquil night. Also, many objects of aesthetic attention are better described as
phenomena and processes the motion of waves building to a crest and breaking on a beach or
the changing weather pattern of sunlight and passing showers.
The environmental aspects of natural entities are often characterized by their dynamic
and changing character. Change can be understood in both spatial and temporal terms. Living
things move, grow, and decay at different rates. Ecological processes illustrate changes across
both time and space in the long and short term. These changes will be apparent in terms of
aesthetic properties that emerge with each new season, say, or over longer stretches of time.
Weather and changes from day to night will cause shifts in aesthetic qualities of the same place
within different time frames.10 Inorganic things, such as rocks, are subject to change through
erosion, and in this respect there may be changes in aesthetic properties over the long-term.

Some artworks can also have environing aspects, e.g., music, installation art, and some forms of environmental
art.
9
The scenic model has its roots in picturesque theory of the 18th and 19th centuries and has been criticized for
framing appreciation of nature only in scenic or artistic terms. The environmental approach presents part of the
answer to one of the organizing problems of natural aesthetics: what is it to appreciate nature as nature, rather than
as a work of art? See, e.g., Carlson, 2000.
10
See Saito, 2005; Hepburn, 2010.

8
So, how should we factor in climate change here? As global warming affects natural
processes, it will, at the same time, cause shifts in overall aesthetic character. 11 With glaciers
melting we are seeing increases in the number and size of glacial lakes. Warmer temperatures
are having a range of effects on ecosystems and species, e.g., earlier migration of birds and
earlier leaf-unfolding in the spring, with general poleward and upward shifts in ranges in plant
and animal species.12 Drought in more southern areas is causing landscape changes that will
ultimately shift away from agriculture while warmer and wetter places in northern areas will, in
the future, create changes in ecosystems there, perhaps leading to new agricultural landscapes.
These changes will mean both aesthetic losses and gains in terms of sounds, textures, smells,
colours, patterns, activity and movement, etc., in the environment.
Given that environmental aesthetics has developed to explain valuing of non-static,
environed types of objects and processes which change over time, it seems that we already
have a theory that can address shifts in aesthetic properties due to climate change, and the
subsequent shifts in overall aesthetic value that will follow. Further support for this claim can
be found in the ways that aesthetic value of nature is already understood within the context of
the unfolding of narratives.13 Gardeners are able to work with plants to create particular
qualities with some kind of life span (annual, perennial), and they usually have some idea of
how a garden might lose or gain aesthetic value depending on seasonal growth and other
factors such as drought. Though still an inexact science ecological restoration can give fairly
good predictions of how the restoration of a plant species, say, will enrich a landscapes
biodiversity, with subsequent changes in aesthetic qualities. National park legislation includes

11

I take aesthetic character, in this context, to be an emergent quality from constituent aesthetic qualities, and
the overall quality that gives a landscape a distinctive look or feel.
12
IPCC, 2007: 8.
13
Film and literature provide good cases from the arts. Also, environmental artists are conscious of how sitespecific conditions will interact with their works over time.

9
aesthetic criteria (usually described in terms of visual, landscape or scenic value) to provide the
means to preserve the character of a place and prevent damage that would destroy natural
beauty.
That environmental aesthetics has some of the theoretical tools to address the kinds of
entities and changes in those entities thrown up by climate change is perhaps not surprising
since climate change is, in the context in which Im considering it, an environmental problem.
But climate change is not just any environmental problem.14 It is forecasted to have unusually
strong impacts into the future. In the next section, I discuss this feature of it in relation to
aesthetic value.

4. The Time-Lag Problem and Future Aesthetics

We have seen that the effects of climate change are and will be far-reaching in spatial and
temporal terms. Discussions in climate ethics have pin-pointed the time-lag problem in
particular, where the temporally distant effects of climate change create a range of problems
for working out our responsibilities. When turning to aesthetic considerations, the time-lag
problem throws up a different set of issues. The aesthetic effects of climate change will not
only be situated within narratives which look both backwards and forwards in time, but many
of these effects will only occur in times and places beyond the immediate perception of current
appreciators. While standing on the edge of a vast canyon and enjoying its grandeur, we can
imagine the forces that have carved out and shaped its forms. But what about future processes,

14

The points made here and above raise the question of whether or not climate change really is a different sort of
aesthetic problem than, say, one of landscape change, ecological restoration or the future dynamics of some place.
In response, I would highlight the great scale and pervasiveness of climate change, and the kinds of distinctive
impacts these will have.

10
the results of which are not yet experienced? Can we say anything meaningful now about such
future aesthetics, of aesthetic objects not yet perceived, not yet valued?
Many philosophers hold that first-hand experience is essential for making aesthetic
judgments with a reliable epistemic basis. This view, sometimes called the experiential thesis
or acquaintance principle has stronger and weaker versions. 15 I favour the stronger version
for natural aesthetics because here our aesthetic judgments are largely based on direct
perceptual access to the object, in contrast to, say, the meanings conveyed in a novel. On this
basis some have argued that beauty and other aesthetic values are not rule-governed there are
no general criteria for beauty.16 We cannot infer from any set of non-aesthetic qualities some
particular aesthetic description, which makes it difficult to make reliable judgments secondhand, based on aesthetic testimony.17 This would seem to be more challenging in the context of
the changeable nature of many natural objects, processes, and environments, where aesthetic
properties are often more unstable. The upshot is that any attempt to make aesthetic judgments
in the present about future nature are likely to have a weaker justification because they will
lack the first-hand experiential feature. On the strong version of the experiential thesis, which I
support, it appears that we cannot make aesthetic judgments about the future at all.18 It will
only be possible to make predictions based on having some idea about how a set of nonaesthetic properties at some future point in time might produce a set of aesthetic qualities. We

For discussions of the experiential thesis, see Pettit, 1983; Budd, 2003.
In a well-known statement of the strong version, Frank Sibley argues: broadly speaking, aesthetics deals with a
kind of perception. People have to see the grace or unity of a work, hear the plaintiveness or frenzy in the music,
notice the gaudiness of a color scheme feel the power of a novel, its mood, or its uncertainty of tone.Merely to
learn from others, on good authority, that the music is serene, the play moving, or the picture unbalanced is of
little aesthetic value; the crucial thing is to see, hear, or feel. To suppose indeed that one can make aesthetic
judgments without aesthetic perception, say, by following rules of some kind, is to misunderstand aesthetic
judgment (Sibley, 1965: 137). See also: Sibley, 2001.
17
See recent work on aesthetic testimony, e.g., Meskin, 2004.
18
To clarify, in this section I am concerned with present people attempting to make aesthetic judgments about
future landscapes. Later, in the third case I discuss, I consider future people making judgments about
environments they experience first-hand.
15
16

11
might try relying on past aesthetic judgments with similar bases or representations like models
or other kinds of projections to formulate our predictions. Such predictions will rely on
projections of aesthetic qualities or character of some environment, based, for example, on
predictions of what changes in plants or bird life are likely to occur. In some ways, though, this
will be business as usual, in so far conservation biologists and others already make aesthetic
predictions of some kind. However, climate change is, by all accounts, an unprecedented
problem with effects on a scale not seen since the last ice age, and uncertainty about how those
effects will play out. So, one way or another this will be new territory for any questions
concerning the status of future aesthetic value in the world.
What are the implications of subscribing to the strong view, that is, that we cannot
make aesthetic judgments about the future, only aesthetic predictions? It could be argued that it
doesnt really matter because there is less at stake in the aesthetic domain compared to the
domains of knowledge or morality. Surely what matters is that we understand how peoples
basic needs will be met in the future and where our responsibilities lie in that respect,
compared to whether or not we understand what lies ahead in terms of future aesthetics. Two
responses are relevant here, one intrinsic and the other extrinsic to aesthetic judgment. First, we
do care about the normative force of our aesthetic judgments, about getting them right in the
sense of being fitting or appropriate to their object and fitting with the judgments of others
so, it matters that our aesthetic judgments aim at some kind of precision, if not of the scientific
kind.19 Second, working towards a reliable grasp of aesthetic data of the future will also have
practical implications in terms of planning how to conserve aesthetic value in places affected
by climate change, and aesthetic judgments will feed into that. Extrinsic concerns matter, more

19

Many philosophers agree that aesthetic judgments that are inappropriate, if not actually incorrect, are to be
avoided. For aesthetic judgments about nature, see the debate between scientific cognitivism and noncognitivism (Carlson, 2000; Parsons, 2008).

12
specifically, for three reasons: (1) aesthetic value plays an important role in supporting
conservation agendas and policy; (2) finding aesthetic value in nature provides some support
for adopting a moral attitude towards the environment, where finding something beautiful can
contribute to developing a caring attitude towards it; and (3) we ought to be concerned about
maintaining the quality of aesthetic experiences of future human societies because such
experiences contribute to human flourishing.20 Although I do not think we can make proper
aesthetic judgments about the aesthetic qualities of future landscapes, we can at least work
toward aesthetic predictions and make use of them in decision-making, even if their basis is
less certain. It will also be important to both the welfare of nature and human society for such
predictions to be based on our best possible grasp of how climate change will impact on the
aesthetic character of environments in the future.
Thus far, I have been considering climate change as an aesthetic problem relating to
change, especially changes into the future. But climate change has also been defined by nonanthropcentric climate ethics as constituting a form of human-induced environmental harm. By
aesthetically valuing the particular objects and events of climate change, we may find
ourselves in a position of appreciating something that has involved harm in one way or
another. In the next section, I address the moral pressure that climate change puts on aesthetic
valuing of nature, now and into the future.

20

Support for (1) and (2) can be found in various discussions, e.g., Brady, 2003; Carlson and Lintott, 2008. I take
(3) to be uncontroversial, but support can be found in, e.g., Dewey, 1934, and more recently, in Matthew Kierans
work. Point (3) raises an ethical question: if aesthetic experience contributes to human flourishing, should we care
about the aesthetic experiences of future people? I believe we should, whether or not one thinks that we can be
aesthetically harmed without knowing we have been. While people may be unlikely to die from impoverished
aesthetic experience, as they would from lack of food or water, having less impoverished experiences would be
preferable, in so far as such experiences may have emotional and cognitive benefits. It may be the case that future
people dont know what they have lost aesthetically and will experience aesthetic benefits from whatever
landscapes there are, even if those landscapes are less beautiful and less natural. Later in the paper when I discuss
the pervasive case, I say more about future people and aesthetic value.

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5. The Moral Challenge

To consider the moral challenge that climate change poses to aesthetics, I begin by outlining a
few relevant issues, the first of which takes us into the philosophy of art. Contemporary work
on the relationship between aesthetic and moral value takes various forms, but in aesthetics the
discussion has focused mainly on the debate between two kinds of positions, moralism and
autonomism. This debate focuses on whether or not there is an internal relation between a work
of arts moral character and its artistic value. The question arises in cases where, for example,
there is some kind of harm caused in the production of an artwork or where some morally
repugnant attitude is expressed in a novel. The question is usually posed in this way: do moral
defects in works of art count as aesthetic defects? In the current debate, the answers go roughly
like this.
Moralism holds that there is an internal relation, and that if, say, immoral attitudes are
expressed in an artwork, this will diminish its artistic value. There are more radical and
moderate versions of this view but the predominant one is moderate, arguing that moral
concepts, discourse and evaluation are embedded in works of art, so that the moral stance is
part of the appreciative stance we take to them. On this version the moral character of a work is
sometimes relevant to its artistic value. Some theories of moralism rely on cognitivism, which
holds that novels, films and other kinds of narrative art present stories with moral content that
is educative, and where this cognitive aspect is internal to artistic expression.21

21

Nol Carroll (1996), for example, adopts the moderate version. Berys Gaut (2007) has recently developed
ethicism, which is stronger than moderate moralism and puts emphasis on whether or not our responses are
merited. As he proposes it, ethicism is only applicable to artistic value, so for at least this reason I find Carrolls
position more useful for thinking through the moralists position with respect to aesthetic value of nature, even if,
as I point out below, it is aimed at narrative art forms.

14
According to autonomism, there is no internal relation, and artistic value is
conceptually distinct from a works moral character. Radical versions hold that moral concerns
have no bearing on aesthetic experience, let alone aesthetic value. More moderate versions
recognize the importance of appreciating aesthetic qualities for their own sake, and do not
reject ethical assessment of artworks, however, this assessment is always irrelevant to their
aesthetic value.22 One recent approach to moderate autonomism defines the position usefully as
the view that a person who makes a global moral judgement and a global aesthetic
judgement of the same object or event is not rationally required to adjust in light of or to
adjust in light of .23 Also, generally, autonomists are non-cognitivists, though this need not
involve a commitment to formalism.
In the cases discussed below, I argue from the perspective of moderate autonomism.
This tends to be a less popular position in current debates in the philosophy of art, where
moralism and moral content, arguably, carry more weight through narrative art forms such as
literature and film. Indeed, some have argued that moralism is easier to defend for narrative art,
and less easy for other forms, such as still life paintings. There has been little discussion of
these positions in natural aesthetics,24 but in that context, while there may certainly be ways of
conceiving of, say, ecosystems in narrative terms, the idea of moral content would seem to
carry less weight. This is not to say that ethical assessment is irrelevant or that moral concerns
do not arise, but only that the distinction between aesthetic and moral value may be clearer for
entities that do not possess the kinds of features that we see in narrative art. While natural
22

Moderate forms, sometimes referred to as sophisticated aestheticism, are held by Harold, 2011; Lamarque,
2010; Anderson and Dean, 1998.
23
Harold, 2011: 140.
24
See Foster, 1992; Carlson, 1976; Brady, 2003. Many of the ideas in Robert Elliots Faking Nature (1997)
suggest that he would be a moralist in the case of natural aesthetics (see, for example, remarks on p. 86). Also, the
theory of positive aesthetics could be construed as a type of moralism, in so far as it argues that wild nature is
only ever beautiful or aesthetically good, and can never be ugly (see discussions in Carlson and Lintott, 2008).
Concerning the relationship between aesthetics and environmental ethics more generally, see Carlson and Lintott,
2008; Carlson, 2010.

15
entities do carry all kinds of meanings for human beings that can be captured through, for
instance, expressive and projective properties, that meaning will typically be different in kind
and degree than what we find in a novel. The role of artistic (or authorial) intention is not
involved, a set of characters expressing objectionable views, or the intimate intertwining of
these features with an unfolding narrative. Nature myths present stories deeply connected to
natural entities for some people, but for others natural entities will not be intertwined with any
story, except perhaps one told by geology or ecology, though even here, on the autonomists
non-cognitivist approach, knowledge is not necessary for making appropriate aesthetic
judgments, though it may deepen or enrich appreciation.25 For the moderate autonomist, the
central focus of appreciation that is properly aesthetic will be perceptual and related features.
Some of these issues will, I hope, become clearer in light of the cases discussed.
In transposing the moralism-autonomism debate to natural aesthetics, an idea of how
moral character (or content) applies to an aesthetic natural entity is required. This brings us
back to the question of harm to non-human nature. In section one, I sketched out climate
change as a moral problem, and I pointed to how its impacts are causing harm to both human
societies and nature. More specifically, it has been claimed that its impacts are causing not just
indirect harm but direct harm to non-human nature, to species, ecosystems, organisms, and
sentient animals.26 That is, harm which is independent of how, e.g., impacts are causing
droughts that are setting back the interests of human populations. If one agrees that non-human
nature is morally considerable, then harming nature will be relevant when thinking through
climate change as a moral problem. Extreme weather events such as drought and flooding will
have adverse effects on ecosystems. Some species have already become extinct and mass

25
26

On the debate between scientific cognitivism and non-cognitivism, see Carlson 2000; Parsons, 2008.
Palmer, 2011: 271.

16
anthropogenic extinctions are predicted for the future. In so far as humans are responsible for
the changes that are causing these harms, humans are strictly liable.27
The relevant moral character of some natural entity, for the purposes of my argument
here, can be expressed in terms of how harm has played a role in the genesis of that thing. So, a
forest devastated by a fire that is part of the cycle of some ecosystem will not have a
problematic moral character whereas one caused by arson will. Biodiversity loss in some
ecosystem that can be traced with some certainty to climate change will present a case of harm
and so that ecosystem can be considered morally tainted. My approach will assume that only
humans can be held responsible for causing harm, and although natural disasters present a case
where humans may be harmed, for instance, by a devastating tsunami, as natural processes we
cannot hold them responsible. In any case, though I recognize that harm can have both human
and non-human causes, my concern here is harm to nature from human-induced climate
change.
So, the relevant framework for thinking through the problem is one where harm, from
anthropogenic climate change, is part of the genesis of some natural object, process or
phenomenon. I recognize that uncertainty will be a factor here. There will be different views of
what constitutes a healthy or functioning ecosystem, and its a matter of debate as to the
27

I should note that the harm caused by climate change can be seen as largely unintentional, but it can be argued
that even though not intended, the harmful effects of human actions should have been (and should be) foreseen, if
we establish the baseline as 1990, when the first IPCC report on climate change was published. This point is also
relevant to thinking through the idea of a moral defect in art cases versus nature cases. Whether or not one thinks
that understanding artistic intentions matter in the interpretation and evaluation of art, artworks involve human
intentions whereas natural processes do not. In cases of climate change, many of the harms that are part of some
things genesis are not like moral defects in works of art where those defects are directly attributable to individual
novelists, painters, etc. creating works of art with particular aims in mind (and expressing attitudes through the
artwork). There will probably be a much more direct connection between the origin of the moral defect (the artist)
and the artwork that contains that defect (the artwork) than in harms caused by climate change. In the latter, due to
the dispersion of causes and effects, the connection between the agent of harm and that harm as it affects some
natural object will be much more indirect (e.g., Anna flying to a conference in France and the subsequent effects
of these emissions on an ecosystem in some other region). In any case, the salient point I want to bring from art to
nature is that there is some moral concern that is raised by the artwork, a concern that, some argue, will have some
bearing on the works value.

17
parameters of any particular ecosystem, thus making it potentially difficult to pinpoint the
object and harm in question. Also, can we pinpoint changes in some natural thing that
originate in climate change versus those due to other factors? Add to this the level of
uncertainty concerning the effects of climate change into the future. Uncertainty doesnt
prevent us from drawing conclusions about the relationship between aesthetic value and harm,
but it should be kept in mind.
Lets now consider the kinds of cases where moral considerations arise. I begin with
losses or gains in aesthetic value that are grasped through the perception of aesthetic qualities
at one point in time and in one place. Call this the standard case of aesthetic experience of
climate change. Someone diving among coral reefs bleached through water acidification will
find light, uniformly coloured forms situated in bluish water. The coral forms, a field of spiky
or lumpy shapes rising out of the sand, will be interesting in themselves. For a diver less
familiar with the healthy state of coral reefs or the ways in which theyve been affected by
climate change, the experience will simply be one of interestingly-shaped things amidst
vibrant-coloured water. For the more experienced diver and amateur naturalist, the aesthetic
qualities are the same, but these will be set within some knowledge of context the states of
healthy coral reefs, teeming with life, movement, variety and vibrant colours. The diver is
likely to feel regret and concern for the detrimental effects of climate change on marine
environments. This may give a poignant, tragic tone to the experience. In this sort of case, the
background knowledge of the experienced diver is likely to result in a different judgment. In
making a comparative judgment, this diver may find the coral reef interesting, but less
beautiful than other reefs seen before. The ground of the divers judgment is not moral
concern, however, even if theres awareness of the harmful causes of the bleaching. Rather, the
grounds of the judgment are the perceptual features of the reef supplemented by previous

18
experience of other reefs.28 Moral considerations, while relevant to the ecological state of the
reef, do not affect its aesthetic value, even if they might appear to phenomenologicallyspeaking. It can be difficult to pry apart aesthetic and moral concerns in experience, but the
conceptual distinction becomes clear when we examine the bases for each judgment.29 Again,
there is no internal relationship between moral and aesthetic value here. Instead, we can
explain the second divers experience as one where some kind of moral content comes into the
experience, giving it a tragic overtone.
Consider another version of the standard case where there is some new aesthetic value
in the world due to climate change. Imagine a beautiful bird species that begins to appear in
more northern areas of Europe. It grows in abundance in response to warmer temperatures and
new habitats created by climate change. Suppose someone appreciating that birds delightful
song has no knowledge about how it got there. A bird-watcher comes along and remarks on
this new species and how it has become part of the landscape. Both appreciators find the bird
marvellous in its song and flight, but it could be argued that the causal role harm plays in the
existence of the bird in a new place affects its aesthetic value in some way. Moderate moralism
argues that aesthetic value is subject to ethical appraisal, existing within the wider context of
life-enhancing and life-denying considerations. So, finding beauty in the bird either condones
climate change and the human actions underlying it, or the bird and its species represent lifedenying qualities because its very beauty is linked, if indirectly, to harm. As Cheryl Foster puts
it in her discussion of appreciating a polluted sunset, To endorse destructive processes

28

Of course, it may be that the less experienced diver would have a basic grasp of what most coral reefs should be
like, but I will assume they dont have such experience in this case.
29
I would also argue, along pluralistic lines, that in this case neither aesthetic judgment is more appropriate than
the other. One feeds in knowledge of healthy ecosystems and previous experience of reefs, while the other is lessinformed though still could be aesthetically rich in terms of sensitivity and attention to detail. Stecker (1997)
argues along similar lines.

19
which result in wanton environmental degradation, is to perpetuate a form of life-denial.30 For
the moralist then, the birds beauty is potentially diminished, and we will be under moral
pressure to cease appreciating it.31
This seems an odd reaction though, and again, the autonomists conceptual distinction
makes more sense. Its difficult to pin down what kind of internal relation there could be
between the beauty of the bird and climate change harm. Though harm may form part of an
explanation of its arrival in a new place, the aesthetic qualities the lovely harmony of its song
or its light, floating movement are not themselves diminished by recognition of that harm.
We can imagine a conversation between the appreciator and birder about the strange luck of
climate change, as both destructive but also productive, and in this case the result is one of
added beauty in the landscape. But this is not evidence of the moral affecting aesthetic value,
rather, all it shows is that moral issues arise in the situation. Moderate autonomism doesnt
deny that moral concerns arise, but it does hold that they remain external to aesthetic value.32
A second kind of case is less standard because it involves aesthetic experiences of the
same place by the same person where that place has changed over time in significant ways.
Lets call this the narrative case. This case turns on whether there are losses in aesthetic value
or just changes. Imagine someone appreciating the aesthetic qualities of a marshland that dries
out and gradually becomes a woodland. There will be different aesthetic qualities and,
following from this, different aesthetic values at different points in time. Will there be losses in
30

Foster, 1992: 213.

The moralist might reply here that the autonomist has exaggerated their position in this case, and that actually
the bird case presents one where harm is, causally, very indirect and less entangled in the aesthetic features of the
object than in other cases. However, its difficult to see the strength of this reply given their view that aesthetic
appreciation must be understood as taking place within a wider context of life-enhancing ethical considerations
(Foster, 1992: 213). Climate change would appear to fit the bill in terms of a wider context.
32
Even when introducing another appreciator with a more holistic grasp, such as an ecologist, the distinction still
holds. We can imagine a case where something is beautiful and harmful to the local ecology, such as non-native
species that may arrive in new places due to climate change, where there is direct harm caused by the species
suppose it crowds out some other species. In this kind of case, though the harm is more direct than in the bird
case, I would still contend that harm is extrinsic to aesthetic value.
31

20
aesthetic value? Yes, aesthetic qualities associated with the marsh will be lost, perhaps
particular smells and sounds and the sparkling effects of water contrasted with the rich green
and brown colours of the reeds. There will also be new aesthetic qualities in different plant and
bird life, new sounds of insects, perhaps some mammals will find a new habitat in the
woodland. Here, the moralist will say that the harm involved in the genesis of the place will put
pressure on aesthetic appreciation as the marsh dies away, with subsequent aesthetic loss, and
it may be challenging to appreciate what has replaced it at each point in time as the transition is
observed. For the autonomist, there is a shift in aesthetic qualities, with the loss of some
qualities and the emergence of new, positive ones, yet this will not affect the ascription of
aesthetic value to the woodland. A feeling of loss for what existed before may become part of
how we react on each new visit to this place, but it may also be mixed with delight as new
features are discovered.
How we address the narrative case turns to some extent on the issue of climate harm
versus climate change. The question has arisen as to whether or not some harms might be
better construed in terms of ecosystem change. Given the time-lag issue, one has to ask
whether some changes brought on by global warming are really just like, and not any worse
than, existing cases where one type of ecosystem gradually changes into another one with
ecological value.33 If we construe this as a case of change rather than harm, then the moral
pressure on aesthetic judgment seems to disappear. I think the issue is trickier though. We
know harm has some role to play, even in more extended time scenarios. In light of this, moral
concerns will arise in the ways I have tried to capture above, e.g., in terms of a feeling of loss,
despite the emergence of new life. We might contrast this conclusion with cases of more abrupt
change, as in the coral-bleaching case, which will give different kinds of answers for the
33

See Palmer, 2011: 280ff.

21
moralist and autonomist. In abrupt change, such as coral-bleaching, though aesthetic qualities
will also shift, there is likely to be a greater loss in both aesthetic and ecological terms, which
is down to the fact that the shift in qualities is more directly linked to harm through water
acidification, and the result is just a lifeless ecosystem.
In light of the cases already discussed and before moving to a third type of case, let me
pause to clarify a couple of key points. We can observe that moral considerations arise and
penetrate our aesthetic experiences, and they will do so in ways that other kinds of thought
content enter into appreciation. Sometimes a new emotional tone emerges, or the emotions
surrounding the experience become more complex. We may ponder moral issues as part of the
experience, or perhaps even ignore them, but this will not constitute a change in aesthetic
value.
Also, my discussion above (and below) illustrates the effects of abrupt kinds of humaninduced climate change versus more long-term or slow-paced change. Abrupt changes were
able to witness now may have a sharper psychological effect creating more difficult and
poignant aesthetic experiences, whereas changes not witnessed, perhaps those that have
become a distant memory, can mean aesthetic experiences which are less challenging.
A third kind of case identifies some possible world in the future perhaps not so
fictional where everything aesthetically appreciated in nature somehow involves harm caused
by climate change.34 Ill refer to this as the pervasive case. Things in this world are the result
of processes linked to climate change either directly or more indirectly. Some of these things
may have positive aesthetic value and others will have negative aesthetic value but the key
point is that everything has been morally tainted. In this world of future people making firsthand aesthetic judgments of their environments, the moralist is likely to argue that all aesthetic
34

Im assuming appreciators exist in this possible world.

22
value is diminished. Every object and process a busy ant, the repetitive, soothing sound of
waves crashing on a beach, the majesty of a polar bear will carry with them the stigma of
climate change. It doesnt follow that there is no aesthetic value, only that it will be lessened in
some way. This seems to me to be a very odd world; on an extreme interpretation it could be a
place where no one can bear to enjoy natures beauty, its just too painful to do so. It is a
possible world though, one that we can imagine now about the aesthetic experiences of future
people. So, is this really how things would seem to go, aesthetically speaking? Isnt it more
likely that this world will be one in which people have become accustomed to changes
occurring over shorter and longer periods of time? So that in a world where everything is
affected, we may just notice that change less, and in this sense the moral pressure may not be
so constant as otherwise envisaged. This point about the nature of future possible aesthetic
experiences would seem to support the autonomists view, e.g., that the majesty of a polar bear
wont be affected. Rather, it will just exist within a new context, in which everything has been
impacted one way or another.35 If we have to choose between one world and the other, Id
much rather live in the autonomists version. And on the moderate view I take, this is not a
morally insensitive world, where aesthetic value trumps all other values.
The pervasive case presents an opportunity to consider just how moral concerns figure
for the moderate autonomist. The moralist will ask: do I want to be the kind of person who
appreciates aesthetic value in things that have morally suspect, even heinous, origins? Doesnt
such appreciation amount to assenting to actions, beliefs or attitudes we find reprehensible?

35

It is worth noting that there will be a loss of natural value in this world. Individual organisms and even
ecosystems may be flourishing but human hands will have influenced everything. In my view this factor will not
in itself necessarily lessen aesthetic value (though aesthetic value may change as particular non-aesthetic and
aesthetic qualities change. For example, while polar bears in our present world are graceful swimmers, in this new
world polar bears may not appear graceful at all because they may have become land animals who have lost their
swimming ability). Presumably, for the proponent of positive aesthetics, this will be a world in which all beauty is
diminished because nothing is untouched by the human hand. See note 23 above. Elliot (1997: 61, 70-72)
endorses positive aesthetics, and on his view a loss of naturalness could also mean a loss in aesthetic value.

23
Wouldnt it be better to condemn that beauty as superficial in some sense? And where there is
new beauty in the world, how do we feel about becoming the beneficiaries of this? As I see it,
we can recognize positive aesthetic qualities without thereby condoning direct or indirect
harms. The pervasive case presents us with a world less aesthetically impoverished, if still
morally impoverished, where the impacts of climate change are a constant reminder of the
harm weve caused.
This is perhaps where immoralism becomes useful for explaining how moral concerns
become relevant for the autonomist. In the philosophy of art, immoralists argue things the other
way around than moralists: the internal relation holds between aesthetic and moral value, but
moral defects in artworks can actually add to their artistic value in so far as our experience of
such defects can cultivate moral understanding, perhaps by giving different viewpoints on
human actions and increasing our grasp of the moral terrain.36 Now, the autonomist doesnt
accept the cashing out of this understanding as intrinsic to the experience, but taking moral
concerns as extrinsic to aesthetic value, the insight of immoralism is that it shows us that we
can sometimes learn from various kinds of harm. What if this possible world is one in which
polar bears have become extinct? Such majesty is rare in nature, and it will be a serious loss
aesthetically and in all sorts of other ways. Becoming conscious of the absence of the majesty
of polar bears may bring home to us through an aesthetic experience the dire consequences
of climate change. Instances of extinctions for which there are numerous precedents in our
present world will be sad reminders of just where we went wrong, and perhaps help to
motivate changes in moral behaviour.37

36

See Jacobsen, 1997; Kieran, 2003.

I would emphasize, again, that we ought not put the usefulness of such experiences first, in the sense of making
them the basis upon which we value them. As Lamarque puts it in the context of art: McCarthys The
Roadmight indeed be useful today in affecting attitudes about climate change, but that is not a reason in itself
37

24
We can and should be sensitive perceivers of aesthetic value who strive toward
practicing appreciative virtue.38 That is, we can recognize beauty or ugliness but also grasp the
morally complex issues that may be at play; moderate autonomists are not aestheticists who put
aesthetic value above all other forms of value. Autonomism aims to preserve the sympathetic
attention and perceptual and imaginative freedom inherent to aesthetic experience while also
recognizing that such experience is not entirely cut off from moral considerations.
So, as I see it, it would be wrong to characterize this position as morally insensitive. It
may be that closer attention to aesthetic properties linked to climate change, in spite of moral
concerns, can enable an overall experience with greater emotional depth. This is suggestive of
some of the themes found in discussions of tragic or painful art. Our aesthetic responses to
climate change are in many ways like experiences of tragedy the loss of a species is a real life
tragic story, and we might construe future scenarios of extinctions as playing out like the
fictions of tragic drama (except they wont be, which might only add to the painfulness of the
emotions).39 As such, we might consider climate change as presenting a new species of
tragedy, one which can enable an education of the emotions and help us to articulate and
communicate aesthetic and moral feeling in response to present and future impacts.40

6. Conclusion
for valuing the novel as art (Lamarque, 2010: 213). The autonomist is interested in the beneficial effects that
particular aesthetic experience will have for enlarging our understanding of climate change.
38
See Kieran, 2010, for the concept of appreciative virtue in relation to snobbery, and Sandler, 2007: 82, for his
classification of aesthetic sensibility as a type of environmental virtue belonging to virtues of communion with
nature.
39
Some might suggest that the aesthetic category of the sublime applies to climate change because of its temporal
and spatial vastness as an environmental problem. Given that sublimity is ultimately a positive aesthetic value, I
have a few reservations about this. While climate change may have sublime features (changes on an
overwhelming scale; adaptation on an extraordinary scale; extraordinary weather phenomena), its tragic even
apocalyptic aspects are perhaps more salient, troubling and, therefore, ultimately negative.
40
This is suggestive of other ways in which aesthetic experience can be drawn on to enable increased moral
sensitivity and awareness. I do not have space to explore these further ideas about how the aesthetic and ethical
are related, but a very useful discussion can be found in, e.g., Eaton, 2001.

25

I have tried to show how we might move from the moral to the aesthetic problem of climate
change and to set out some of the challenges for any new aesthetic analysis. As a form of
environmental harm playing out on vast spatial and temporal scales, climate change raises
questions about the status of aesthetic judgments about future nature and aesthetic judgments
within future nature. I have claimed that climate change puts moral pressure on the ways we
value the natural world from an aesthetic standpoint, but I have also argued that this moral
pressure need not lead to finding less aesthetic value in the world. The proper answer to that
moral challenge will be to understand the ways that aesthetic experience can be educative,
enabling us to grasp losses and gains in aesthetic value as well as, perhaps, to recognize
through this loss and our moral reactions to it where weve gone wrong.41

41

I would like to thank the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University for a Laurance S.
Rockefeller Fellowship, which enabled me to complete this paper, as well as an audience at the Center for their
useful comments. I am also grateful to Clare Palmer for feedback on an earlier draft, and to two anonymous
referees for their valuable comments.

26

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