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Frege's anonymous opponent in Die

Verneinung
Sven Schlotter

Friedrich-Schiller-Universitt Jena, Institut fr Philosophie ,

Zwtzengasse 9, D-07737, Jena, Germany
Published online: 16 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Sven Schlotter (2006) Frege's anonymous opponent in Die Verneinung , History
and Philosophy of Logic, 27:1, 43-58, DOI: 10.1080/01445340500315248
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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC, 27 (FEBRUARY 2006), 43 58

Freges Anonymous Opponent in Die Verneinung

SVEN SCHLOTTER
Friedrich-Schiller-Universitat Jena, Institut fur Philosophie, Zwatzengasse 9, D-07737 Jena, Germany

Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 01:08 15 January 2015

Received 30 July 2005

Accepted 16 August 2005

The impartial reader notices that Frege, in Die Verneinung, treats an opposing conception of negation,
but without specically naming its proponent. In this paper, it is proven for the rst time that the view in
question is that of his colleague in Jena, Bruno Bauch. Besides their dierent views, concerning above all
the status of false thoughts, there are nonetheless broader points of agreement between the ideas of
Bauch and Frege. These points of agreement cast light on both thinkers as representatives of a current of
Neo-Kantianism, having its source in Lotze, in which Kantian and Platonic elements are fused to form a
transcendental Platonism.

1. Current research situation

The question as to whether and to what extent Frege belonged to the
philosophical tradition of his time remains a controversial issue. For a long time,
the predominant image was of the solitary thinker who, independent of external
inuences, developed all his essential ideas on their own. A general reconsideration of
this view was brought about by the study of Hans Sluga (1980), who placed Frege in
the particular line of tradition including Leibniz, Kant and Lotze. Sharing Slugas
basic position, but amending some of the historical details, Gottfried Gabriel (1986;
2001) presented the thesis that Freges epistemological views essentially correspond
to those of Neo-Kantianism. This position did not remain unchallenged either. For
example, Wolfgang Carl (2001) argued that to characterize Frege as a Neo-Kantian
is to misunderstand the very core of his philosophical project.1
The following study cannot lay claim to a nal solution to this problem. My intent
is rather of a modest, methodical character, only. I will show that, through a detailed
investigation of historical context concerning the late works of Frege, correlations and
interdependencies become apparent that remain hidden with a consideration of the
text alone. In this respect it is important to examine, besides general inuential factors,
Freges particular situation and circumstances in Jena.2 The principal focus of the
following paper is Freges relationship to Bruno Bauch. The Neo-Kantian
philosopher was appointed to the University of Jena as successor to Otto Liebmann
in 1911, and from then on often referred armingly to Freges work.3 In historically
oriented research, this fact has already been pointed out several times.4 Going further,
I will make the case that the exchange between Frege and Bauch left traces in Freges
own work as well. In this manner, the rather naive view that Frege cited all of his
sources by referring to authors names or making use of footnotes can be dismissed.
1
2
3
4

Further objections to a classication of Frege among the Neo-Kantians are raised by Peckhaus (2000) and Glock (2002).
On Freges circumstances in Jena, cf. Dathe (1992).
For a detailed study of the life and work of Bruno Bauch, see Schlotter (2004).
Cf. Gabriel 1986 (pp. 86, 101). Kreiser (2001, pp. 580588) presented the exchange of ideas between Frege and Bauch in
the form of a ctional dialogue.
History and Philosophy of Logic ISSN 0144-5340 print/ISSN 1464-5149 online 2006 Taylor & Francis
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/01445340500315248

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Sven Schlotter

2. Prelude
In his autobiographical retrospective, Bauch (1929, p. 3) relates: In my early
boyhood I was already in love with anything having to do with mathematics. During his
studies, between 1897 and 1902, he remained for a long time uncertain whether or not to
devote himself to this most exacting of all sciences. After nally deciding in favour of
philosophy, he had no doubt that his future philosophical work would receive decisive
impulses from mathematics (pp. 910). Indeed, beginning in 1906, Bauch worked more
intensively with issues pertaining to the theory of science, formulating, in this context,
his position on the philosophical basis of geometry (Bauch 1907). It is thus surprising
that, before 1911, Bauch does not once mention Frege in his works, in spite of his
considerable familiarity with the mathematical literature.
In general, we observe that the Neo-Kantians did not begin taking Freges
investigations into consideration until comparatively late. With the exception of Kurd
Lasswitzs review of the Begrisschrift, the rst signs of a deeper examination can be
found in the work of Jonas Cohn, who, in his central epistemological study,
Voraussetzungen und Ziele des Erkennens (1908), refers several times to Freges
importance.5 Two years later, Paul Natorp (1910, pp. 112 128) and Ernst Cassirer
(1910, pp. 6970) follow Cohn, taking a critical position with respect to Freges
foundation of numbers, but nonetheless sharing with him the view that mathematics
has its basis in logic.6 In contrast, Heinrich Rickert takes a stand of clear opposition to
the logical mathematicism [Mathematizismus] of the Marburg School of NeoKantianism, raising the objection that a mingling of the two disciplines undermines
the autonomy of logic (Rickert 1911/1912, p. 27). In his treatise, Das Eine, die Einheit
und die Eins, Rickert seeks to make the case that the essence of number cannot be
understood through logic alone. On the other hand, he also argues that the
sensualistic and empirical theories of number are untenable:
This gingerbread or pebble arithmetic is considered today, in most circles, to be
denitively disproved. It is apparent that it is not essential for logic how we arrive
gradually at the concept of number, and whether we need concrete objects in
order to learn to count. (Rickert 1911/1912, p. 29)
Rickert here agrees with the drastic rejection of John Stuart Mills notion of number
presented in the introductory passages of Freges Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884, p. vii).7
In his Jena inaugural lecture of 11 November 1911, Bauch refers to precisely this point,
arguing against Poincares conventionalist interpretation of geometrical axioms: conventionalist geometry appears to me be a perfect complement to what has been designated,
by outstanding critics, as gingerbread and pebble arithmetic (Bauch 1912, p. 20).8
At this point, we would like to oppose the view that Freges achievement received,
even in Jena itself, absolutely no attention. Examining the matter closely, we nd that
especially the representatives of the younger generation, in the early years of the century,
5

6
7
8

Cohn 1908 (pp. 175176, 507, 513, 517). Here (p. 515), the obstacle hindering the reception of Freges work is also
mentioned. Cohn adds, to a detailed discussion of Russells theory of number, the following remark: A related theory
was, prior to Russell, formulated by Frege; I am unfortunately incapable of employing this form, since I cannot read
Freges Begrisschrift. Carnap (1921) mentions Jonas Cohn among his teachers at the University of Freiburg.
For Natorps criticism of Freges theory of number, see Thiel (1997).
Rickert probably sent Frege his treatise Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins. Cf. Frege 1976 (p. 199).
With reference to this particular passage, Cassirer (1910, p. 37) also agreed with the demand to sever the logical
structure of pure number-theory, incisively and energetically, from Mills arithmetic of pebbles and gingerbread .

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Freges Anonymous Opponent in Die Verneinung

45

began to show interest in Freges work. On 6 December 1911just a few weeks after
Bauch took on his position at the UniversityKurt Frankenberger, a student of
mathematics and physics, delivered a lecture Uber Begrisschrift at the Jena
Philosophical Society, a lecture in which he presented Freges position (Jahresbericht
1912, pp. 2122). Together with Frankenberger, Rudolf Carnap also attended Freges
courses during his studies in Jena.9 During the same period, Carnap studied Kantian
philosophy with Bruno Bauch (Carnap 1963, p. 4). In Bauchs seminar on the Kritik der
reinen Vernunft, he received impulses that would bear fruit in his doctoral dissertation,
Der Raum. In the curriculum vitae preceding the dissertation, Carnap cites Bauch and
Frege, among all his professors at the University, as having provided him with
important impulses in the area of the philosophy of science (Carnap 1921).
There can be no doubt that the local conditions favoured Bauchs reception of
Freges work. The rst results of this consideration are to be found in the article Uber den
Begri des Naturgesetzes (1914). Bauch here presented, in detail, his reasons for
believing that an examination of Freges work would be especially promising. Frege is
rst praised as a mathematical ally in the struggle against psychologism, as someone
who pronounced a severe, but just, sentence on psychologistic illogicalness [Unlogik] in
logic (1914, p. 318). In the spirit of this shared anti-psychologism, Bauch (probably with
Natorp and Cassirer in mind) can only welcome the current tendency of logicians
toward mathematics and mathematicians toward logic almost without reservation. At
the same time, he attemps to refute Rickerts objections, pointing out that the idea is not
for logic to adopt certain mathematical views without reection or critical examination.
For precisely this reason, he asserts, one must side with the mathematicians who seek the
foundations of mathematics in of course not formalistically empty logic. And in this
respect, the best starting point is certainly Frege (Bauch 1914, p. 319). Bauch
subsequently examines Freges functional theory of concept, which he considered to be
particularly important in the context of his own epistemological investigations.10
It is worth noting that Bauch, here and elsewhere, emphasizes Freges debt to
Lotze, who in his Logik of 1874 had already oered an interpretation of concepts as
functions. But upon closer examination, we see that the correspondence with respect
to this particular problem is rather terminological than factual. Lotzes use of the
mathematical functional symbol, with the help of which the mutual determination
of conceptual marks is to be established (Lotze 1989, xx 28, 110, 126), is clearly
dierent from Freges understanding of concept as a function whose value is a truthvalue.11 Yet this by no means precludes the fact that Lotzes work, in other respects,
had a signicant inuence on Frege. In this sense, we can understand Bauchs
statement, with which he concluded a lecture before his colleagues in Jena:
I heard it myself from the mouth of Frege, our great mathematician, that for his
mathematicaland, if I may add what Frege modestly did not mentionepochmaking investigations, impulses from Lotze were of decisive importance.12
9

10

11
12

This interest probably prompted Frege, in the summer semester of 1913, to oer the course Begrisschrift II for the
rst and only time. On Carnap as student of Frege, see Gabriels introduction of Frege (2004).
It is not necessary here to discuss the reception (aicted by numerous misunderstandings) of Freges functional theory
in detail. Cf. Zeidler (1994).
In this regard, Slugas remarks (1980, pp. 53, 5657), referring quite uncritically to Bauch, must be corrected.
Page 22c from a handwritten manuscript on Lotze. The document is owned privately by the descendents of Bruno
Bauch. The greater part of Bauchs Nachlass was, unfortunately, lost due to the circumstances of the Second World
War in Jena.

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We thus have before us the common ground upon which Frege and Bauch could
approach each other. As a student of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert,
Bauch belonged to the so-called Southwest German School of Neo-Kantianism,
whose reassimilation of the Kantian philosophy was directly inuenced by Lotze.
Bauch himself often strongly emphasized the signicance of Lotzes work for the
development of modern transcendental philosophy.13 In the following, we will
investigate the manner in which the thus-transmitted, strictly antinaturalistic and
antipsychologistic view of Kant inuenced Frege.

3. Bauchs view of Kant

It is well known that Frege regarded his logicist programthe attempt to
establish the basis of arithmetic in logicas having been shaken, if not refuted,
following Russells discovery of the contradiction. There was thus a real impetus for
rethinking the position on Kants philosophy of mathematics taken in the
Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Since the analyticity of arithmetical judgements could
not be justied, but their a priori status was still beyond question, the only solution
that remained was their recognition as being synthetic a priori, which Frege had
accepted all along for geometrical truths. In this regard, the appointment of Bauch, a
recognized Kant scholar, to the University of Jena, is especially worth noting. His
monograph, bearing the unostentatious title Immanuel Kant (1911), had drawn wide
attention. A signicantly expanded version of the work was already in preparation
and was to appear in 1917. In it, Kants achievement was compared with Freges
energetic and victorious struggle against the psychologistic illogicalness of a
subjective-idealistic logic (Bauch 1917, p. 173).
Concerning Frege, it is known that he was likewise impressed by Bauchs Kant
interpretation. At the beginning of 1912, he joined the Kant Society (Neuangemeldete
Mitglieder 1912, p. 188), which entailed a subscription to the journal Kant-Studien,
edited by Bauch. This decision was at least partly motivated by the fact that Bauch
was the editor, as is conrmed by an obituary written in 1942 by Paul F. Linke for his
deceased Neo-Kantian colleague. It reads as follows:
Frege, well-known today as the founder of modern exact logic, also had a strong
inuence on Bauch, but expressly stated that he was himself led by Bauch to a
deeper understanding of the Kantian doctrine. (Linke 1942, p. 143)14
Concerning the deeper understanding of Kant mentioned above, Freges
reorientation with respect to the foundations of mathematics would rst come to
mind. While he had tried to show in his Grundlagen that arithmetic, as a branch of
logic, cannot derive arguments from intuition, in one of his last unpublished
13

14

Bauch (1918b, p. 52). At the beginning of this essay (p. 45), Bauch points out that everything that in todays logic is
itself of logical value beneted, in one way or another, from the work of Lotze. In this connection, it is especially
worth noting that Freges logical investigation Der Gedanke directly follows Bauchs essay on Lotze in the Beitrage zur
Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus.
On the other hand, Linke points out elsewhere (1946, p. 77) that Frege had little in common with his Neo-Kantian
colleagues Liebmann and Bauch. This change in attitude can, however, be easily explained. In the later essay, Linke,
against his own better judgement, tries to diminish the points of contact with the Neo-Kantian school philosophy,
hoping to place Frege in his own, anti-Kantian line of tradition, having its origin in the work of Brentano. On Linkes
Frege reception, cf. detailed discussion in Dathe (2000).

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writings he cites the geometrical source of knowledge [geometrische Erkenntnisquelle], which can certainly be associated with Kants pure intuition (cf. Kaulbach
1969, p. xxxi), as forming the basis of both geometry and arithmetic. It thus seems
natural for us to assume, in his new position on the role of intuition, a direct
inuence of the Neo-Kantian (cf. Dathe 1993). But as far as this particular question
is concerned, Frege would hardly have been able to refer to Bauch. Indeed, the
latter believed that Kant had committed a fundamental error in overestimating the
importance of intuition for the foundation of geometrynot to mention of
arithmetic (Bauch 1907, p. 214). Like the representatives of the Marburg School,
Bauch also hopes to overcome the fatal dualism between transcendental aesthetics
and logic by showing that intuition is, in the end, conceptually determined. Bauch
believes that, in this way, the synthetic a priori can be given a form that must be of
particular interest to mathematicians:
If this [the synthetic a priori] could earn little sympathy up to now with
mathematicians [. . .], this was because it had long been presented, by
philosophers, in a psychologistic way, in other words, divested of its meaning.
[. . .] And both [mathematics and philosophy] are immediately in harmony as soon
as the synthetic a priori is placed in the conceptual sphere. (Bauch 1914, p. 317)
It can be easily seen that this interpretation (despite their mutual antipsychologism) goes directly against the intentions of Frege, who in his nal writings
sought refuge in a non-logical geometrical source of knowledge, based on intuition.
It may thus be fairly assumed that the deeper understanding of the Kantian doctrine
acquired through Bauch was not limited to the philosophy of mathematics, but was
rather of a much more general nature. In this regard, we must remember Freges
reservations, mentioned in the Grundlagen (1884, x 27, p. 37, n.), about Kants
terminology. Here, Frege writes that in using the word idea [Vorstellung] both
subjectively and objectively, Kant has given his doctrine a very subjective, idealist
colouring [Farbung] and made his true view dicult to discover. Such subjectiveidealist reservations could be completely dispelled through Bauchs anti-psychologistic Kant interpretation. Here, the distinction between the subjective and the
objective demanded by Frege is made with nality. Transcendental laws, divested of
all subjective aspects, enter the sphere of logic, corresponding to Freges domain of
the objective non-actual.

4. Frege and Munch on the Third Realm

Bauchs student Fritz Munch continues in this line of Kant interpretation in his
dissertation, Erlebnis und Geltung, published in 1913. The understanding of
transcendental philosophy presented in this study aims at the discovery and
elaboration of a sphere of pure sense [Sphare des reinen Sinnes], which is, according
to its very character, outside time, possessing subject-independent validity. In order
to prevent ontologizing and psychologizing misinterpretations, terminologically, of
this logical stratum [logische Schicht], Munch introduces, appealing to Georg
Simmel, the expression third realm [drittes Reich]. With this expression, a sui
generis sphere is to be characterized, which is neither subject nor object, neither
physical nor psychological, neither empirical nor metaphysical (Munch 1913, p. 38,
n. 2, p. 178, n. 3). The discovery of this third realm wasas Munch points out

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Sven Schlotter

elsewhere (1918, p. 26, n. 1)Platos great achievement, his insight being renewed by
Kants understanding of the logical.15
For our purposes, it is especially interesting that Munch, in his dissertation, refers
to Frege several times. He not only mentions Freges interpretation of concepts as
functions but also praises the Begrisschrift for its astute and penetrating eorts at
the service of the logication [Logisierung] of mathematics (Munch 1913, p. 41). We
can safely assume that Munchs study found its way to Frege. If it was not given to
him directly by the author, the supplement volumes to Kant-Studien, one of which
was comprised by Munchs dissertation, were available to Frege as member of the
Kant Society. The presence of Freges name in the index, as well as the laudatory
mention of the Begrisschrift, may have provided an additional impetus to read it.
Without supposing a deeper systematic dependence, it is clear that Frege retained at
least terminological impulses from Munchs study for his essay, Der Gedanke. In this
treatise, Frege species thought [Gedanke], i.e. sense of a sentence, as something for
which the question of truth can arise at all. Since thoughts cannot be categorized
among the things of the external world, nor among the ideas of the inner world, a
third realm must, according to Frege, be recognized:
Anything belonging to this realm has it in common with ideas that it cannot be
perceived by the senses, but has it in common with things that it does not need an
owner so as to belong to the contents of his consciousness. Thus for example the
thought we have expressed in the Pythagorean theorem is timelessly true, true
independently of whether anyone takes it to be true. It needs no owner. (Frege
1918, p. 69)16
The correspondence with Munchs writings is evident. From both authors, the
third realm (Frege probably adopted the term directly from Munch) is distinguished
from the physical and psychological and characterized by timelessness, in the sense of
being outside time. In addition to this, Munch also uses the term thought in an
objective sense. He writes, in complete agreement with Frege: How can a reasonable
person suppose that the thought of the law of gravity is an activity of human
consciousness? (Munch 1913, pp. 3940).17 Furthermore, it is not unlikely that Frege
contributed toward Munchs critical attitude with respect to language. The NeoKantian proposed, during the general meeting of the Kant Society in 1914, the
creation of a permanent commission for the establishment of a common terminology
among the dierent branches of transcendental philosophy (Munch 1914). The
establishment of specic, well-dened technical terms is necessary, according to
Munch, in order to free oneself from the viewpoints of everyday life and of the
particular sciences, awakening an understanding for the purely logical character of
the third realm. (Munch 1924, pp. 2325)

15

16

17

In consideration of Munch, Gabriels (1992) discussion of the conceptual history of third realm is to be
supplemented.
For most of the citations from the Logische Untersuchungen, I draw from the English translation of Geach and
Stootho (Frege 1977).
Frege himself, in his Fragment Logik (1983, p. 146), uses the example of the law of gravity in order to dierentiate
thought in its unchangeability from protean owing ideas.

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49

5. Origins of the debate

Frege could certainly expect a preliminary understanding of the subject matter
when he contacted Bauch, in the summer of 1918, inquiring about publishing
possibilities for Der Gedanke (Frege 1976, p. 8). In his response from 8 September
1918, Bauch proposes the essays publication in the recently created Beitragen zur
Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, of which Munch was one of the editors. Bauch
also sent Frege a similar essay of his own. This was the treatise Wahrheit und
Richtigkeit, which had appeared in 1918. The mentioned similarity consists in the
fact that Bauch pursues, in the essay concerned, the fundamental question of truth.
Starting with a consideration of Leibniz, he reaches the conclusion that truth cannot
be found among real thoughts, but rather in the domain of possible thoughts.
Continuing his investigation, he characterizes this realm of possible thoughts as
objective non-actual, expressly referring to Freges preface to the Grundgesetze der
Arithmetik: Mathematics, as G. Frege outstandingly demonstrated, is capable of
preventing the error of mixing up the objective non-actual with the subjective
(Bauch 1918a, p. 46; cf. Frege 1893, p. xviii).
Once again, we nd a considerable correspondence with Freges ideas. Both
philosophers place truth in the realm of thoughts, dierentiated, by a negative
categorial procedure, from subjective reality and the reality of things. Although
the recognition of a subject-independent, objective domain is generally described
as Platonism, we must emphasize here the fact that neither Frege nor Bauch
attribute to thoughts some metaphysical mode of being. The objectivity of
thoughts is rather for them a precondition, whose acceptance must, at the very
outset, form the basis for any investigation of the question of truth or non-truth.
The common origin of this transcentental Platonism, as it were, should be in
Lotzes interpretation of the doctrine of ideas in the third book of his Logik (cf.
Gabriel 1989, p. xxvii). Lotze here defends Plato against the old Aristotelian
accusation of hypostatization by means of the presumption that ideas do not
belong to the reality of being [Wirklichkeit des Seins], but belong to the reality
of validity [Wirklichkeit der Geltung]. Independently of individual subjective acts
of thinking, the valid contents of the thus-established world of thoughts
[Gedankenwelt] can be recognized as the same (eternally self-identical) by
dierent thinkers (Lotze 1989, xx 313321).
Yet, with all agreement with respect to their fundamental philosophical
approach, dierences soon began to appear. These dierences concern the
question of how far the limits of this objective realm of thoughts are to be set. In
contrast to Bauch, Frege granted objectivity not only to true, but also to nontrue, thoughts (whether these are false or neither true nor false). This dierence
seems already to be apparent in a letter from 11 September 1918, in which Bauch
conrms his reception of Der Gedanke, commenting that his essay (Wahrheit und
Richtigkeit) is indeed similar but less comprehensive (Frege 1976, p. 9). The fact
that the expression less comprehensive hardly refers to the mere length of the
essays is conrmed by a letter of 25 April 1919. In this letter, Bauch expressly
requests criticism of his treatise Wahrheit und Richtigkeit in Freges essay Die
Verneinung. The further contents of this letter, whose complete original wording is
unfortunately not extant, are marked in the so-called Scholz Liste 1 with the
revealing comment, on negation.
Already on 15 October 1918, Frege had written to Wittgenstein: I have already
completed a rough draft of a second short treatise on negation, which I hope to

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Sven Schlotter

publish as soon as possible. It was conceived as a continuation of the rst.18 Since

the events of the First World War and the Revolution prevented the regular
appearance of Beitrage, originally planned as a quarterly, the essay Die Verneinung
was not printed until the end of 1919.19 Together with Der Gedanke and a third part,
published in 1923 with the title Gedankengefuge, it constitutes Freges Logische
Untersuchungen.20 There is still a rather unclear understanding, even in recent
studies, with respect to the origins of this series of essays, the nal one published by
Frege. For example, the new manner of exposition, so clearly dierent from the style
of the Begrisschrift or the Grundgesetze, has been attributed to the failure of the
logicist program.21 Without denying the fundamental importance of Russells
paradox for Freges whole project, we may establish that, with the Logische
Untersuchungen, an older plan, dating back to the 1890s, was brought to fruition.22
Freges Nachlass contains several fragments concerning logic (Frege 1983, pp. 18,
137163, 201212, 213218). In these fragments, not only are the essential basic ideas
of the later Logische Untersuchungen to be found in an almost completed form, but
the intended structure of the treatise is also clearly discernible. The writings on
negation usually occupy a section of their own, but are at the same time quite short in
length. Comparing these Nachlass papers with the nal printed version of Die
Verneinung, we nd that the additional writings consist largely of critical
explanations.23 We are thus tempted to suppose that Frege did indeed respond to
Bauchs request, and that his essay can, at least in part, be read as a reaction and
response to the Neo-Kantians views.
That Bauchs importance has been overlooked for so long is no doubt due to
the fact that Frege does not mention his name once, although he was otherwise
never reticent about naming the authors he criticized. This becomes understandable, however, when we realize that Frege and Bauch knew each other
personally, and that the latter had made the essays publication in the Beitrage
zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus possible in the rst place. This journal
was the organ of the German Philosophical Society [Deutsche Philosophische
Gesellschaft], founded in Weimar in 1918 with the decisive inuence of Bauch and
Munch.24 The German idealism, to which the members of the newly created
society felt themselves committed, was by no means a subjective epistemological
position, but rather a platonistic idealism of values which, politically as well, was
meant to occupy an important role in the years following the First World War.
Germanys military defeat, perceived as a catastrophe, led to the conviction in this
circle that a national renewal could only take place through a commitment to the
18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Frege 1989 (p. 18). Wittgenstein then requests that Frege help him with the publication of the Tractatus in the
Beitrage. In his answer (p. 23) of 30 September 1919, he oers to speak to Bauch, whom he knows personally, on this
matter. Indeed, Bauch speaks of Wittgensteins work in a letter of 31 October 1919 (Frege 1976, pp. 9, 81).
Already on 28 October 1918, Arthur Homann, Editor of the Beitrage, had announced his readiness to print Die
Verneinung (Frege 1976, p. 81).
An already-begun fourth part having the title, Logische Allgemeinheit (Frege 1983, pp. 278281) and probably also
intended to be published in the Beitrage, remained unnished.
Stuhlmann-Laeisz (1995, p. 2). The philological-historical section of Patzigs introduction of Frege 1993 (pp. 57) has
also become outdated. For a more exact account, see Sluga (2003).
In his letter to Hugo Dingler from 17 November 1918, Frege (1976, p. 45) says that he hopes to bring in the harvest of
his life, so that it may not be lost.
Frege himself speaks in Die Verneinung (1919, p. 152) of the fact that he adapted this way of speaking to a view
foreign to him.
On the German Philosophical Society, cf. detailed account in Tilitzki (2002, pp. 473 518) and Sluga (1993, pp. 85 100).

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realm of eternal values. We can safely assume that Frege, who joined the society
toward the end of 1919,25 also shared this vision.

6. Freges criticism in Die Verneinung

After these preliminary remarks we shall, in the following, more closely investigate
the manner in which Frege integrated the criticism, solicited by Bauch, into his essay
Die Verneinung. The second Logical Investigation begins with a discussion of the
propositional question, which Frege determines as a demand to either recognize a
thought as true, or reject it as false. In both the armative and negative cases, the
answer is an assertion based upon a judgement. At this point, the development of
the argument is interrupted by an objection aimed at the symmetry, presupposed by
Frege, between true and false thoughts: Here, however, a diculty arises. If a thought
has being by being true, then the expression false thought is just as selfcontradictory, as thought that has no being (Frege 1919, p. 144).
This diculty follows from the view presented by Bauch in Wahrheit und
Richtigkeit, according to which false thoughts can claim no objective validity. A rst
indication for the dierence appearing here can already be found in Der Gedanke.
Here, Frege sees himself obliged to explain the specication, so I count what is false
among thoughts no less than what is true, with a lengthy footnote.26 In this footnote,
he rst points out that his use of the word thought corresponds roughly to the use of
the term judgement in the writings of the logicians. Thus, one could say in a
similar manner: a judgement is something which is either true or false. Qualifying
this, Frege adds that such a view is not uncontroversial:
Such an explanation has been objected to on the ground that it makes a division
of judgements into true and false judgementsperhaps the least signicant of all
possible divisions among judgements. (Frege 1918, p. 61, n)
Completely in the spirit of this reservation, Bauch had, in Wahrheit und Richtigkeit,
dealt critically with the common denition of judgement, according to which the
predicates true and false can be applied to it. This denition tends to disguise the fact
that falsity is not the counterpart of objective truth, but only of the rightness
[Richtigkeit] of subjective judging. In contrast, the judgement of logical validity, to
which actual thinking must conform in order to be right, is true at all times: it is not only
possible to apply the predicate true to it, and it is also not false, inasmuch as it is
impossible to apply the predicate false to it (Bauch 1918a, p. 48). In this regard, we may
state that the being of a thought (or a logical judgement) consists in its being true.27
25

26

27

Frege (1976, p. 9). In a letter from 30 October 1919, Bauch refers to Freges membership registration in the German
Philosophical Society. On 9 December 1919, chairman Horst Engert welcomes Frege into the society (p. 46). In the
same month, Freges entry is ocially announced in Mitteilungen (1919, p. 2). On the development of Freges political
views, cf. Kienzler (2000).
Frege (1918, p. 61, n.). The supposition that this footnote was provoked by Bauchs objection is supported by his later
writings in Wahrheit, Wert und Wirklichkeit (1923, p. 57). Here, Freges coordination of truth and falsity is, with
reference to this very passage, criticized: He discusses truth as something for which the question of truth can arise at
all, in order, with a simple so, to conclude the same for falsity.
Cf. in this regard the concluding section of Wahrheit und Richtigkeit (1918a, pp. 5657), in which Bauch actually
speaks of being and non-being referring to Plato. Bauch discusses in detail this problem, with reference to negation,
in Die Idee (1926, pp. 7581).

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In order to demonstrate the untenable consequences of such a view, Frege rst

points out that, under these conditions, the act of grasping the thought and judging
coincide. But it must in fact be possible to express a thought without, at the same
time, asserting that it is true. This becomes especially clear with the propositional
question. If its sense is a thought, whose being consists in its being true, then the
utterance of an interrogative sentence would already be an assertion, in other words,
the answer to the question. Frege summarizes this argument in a few phrases,
regarding which we may point out that they are aimed directly against Bauchs
diering use of the word thought:
It is a matter of what we take the word thought to mean. In any case, we need a
short term for what can be the sense of an interrogative sentence. I call this a
thought. If we use language this way, not all thoughts are true. The being of
a thought thus does not consist in its being true. (Frege 1919, p. 145)
Frege continues by more closely examining the view that false thoughts are to be
regarded as non-being. This non-being can mean that false thoughts have
absolutely no sense (equating falsity and senselessness), or that each thinker
associates their own sense to a false thought (lack of intersubjectivity). Both variants,
which are considered individually by Frege, can be found in Bauchs essay, Wahrheit
und Richtigkeit. Here, he writes:
A completely empty formalistic abstraction could, however, hold that even falsity
has an objective status independent of all actual subjective thinking. The equation
3 2 6 would thus be, as one might assert, just as false as the equation 3 2 5
is true, regardless of whether it is thought in actual subjective thinking or not. Of
course, this would be (if it is not a simple sophistication, but is meant seriously) a
deep misunderstanding of the actual matter. The equation 3 2 6 is nothing
and is no equation. A false equation is nonsense. (Bauch 1918a, pp. 4647)
To refute this supposition, Frege can argue that false thoughts possess an
indispensable function in scientic research. They occur not only in indirect proofs,
in which the way to the truth must rst pass through falsity, but also as antecedent or
consequent in hypothetical thought-complexes. Frege nally points out that the
investigator must, at times, content themself with raising a question as a hypothesis,
which later turns out to be false. All these modes of use presuppose, however, that
the same thought can be grasped by several people, and is not bound to the
consciousness of a particular thinker.
After Frege has demonstrated the objectivity of false thoughts, thus assuring the
symmetry between true and false, he can pass on to the discussion of negation. Once
again, his presentation of his own view is preceded by a critical section. In this
section, he opposes the view that a connection in a positive judgement corresponds to
a separation or dissolution in a negative judgement. This opinion, expressed by
Artistotle and generally held well into the 19th century, is also taken up by Bauch in
Wahrheit und Richtigkeit (1918a, p. 51), in which he characterizes negation as the
dissociation and separation from objects of judgement. Such a view is, according to
Frege, untenable since nothing can be specied as to what is actually separated.
Negation can separate neither true nor false thoughts into their component parts; nor
can it dissolve the connection of parts of sentences, things of the external world, or

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ideas in the interior world of the person who negates. Double negation is a further
example which goes against the dissolving eect of negation, since with double
negation, the second operation would have to bring together what was separated by
the rst.
In particular, Frege opposes the position in which the belief in the dissolving
power of negation is connected to the devaluation of the negative thought. Frege
here touches on the question, extensively discussed in the 19th century, of the
equality of the qualities of judgement. Whereas the majority of logicians (such as
Hermann Lotze, Julius Bergmann or Wilhelm Windelband) held armation and
negation to be equally tenable, alternative acts, Christoph Sigwart (1889, vol. 1,
pp. 150 161) stated, with particular emphasis, his opinion that negative judgement
is subordinate to positive judgement, as its dissolution or rejection. Following this
line of thought, Bauch, in Wahrheit und Richtigkeit, considers it more appropriate to
speak not of negative judgements, but at most of negative sentences. Apart from
the fact that, according to his opinion, negation can lay no claim to objectivity
through its compromising relationship to falsity, it also turns out, in the area of
subjective thinking, not to be of equal value with the positive act of judging. Thus,
the sentence now I am not going home would be completely indeterminate and
ambiguous. It does not say whether I am not going home, but rather to the
marketplace, to the library, to the theater or somewhere else; or whether I am simply
not going home, but rather riding, driving, etc (Bauch 1918a, p. 53). Although
Bauch does not grant negation any cognitive value, he must concede that negative
sentences can also be correct. But such cases are a matter of rightness in the vague
sense, not relating to the truth, as with the positive act of judging, but being directed
against falsity. They only serve to bar the path of falsity, to prevent the possibility of
subjective error.
Against the view that dismisses negative thoughts as less useful or even as
wholly useless, Frege argues that they can occur, without the slightest problem, in
premises of inferences. Here, in his view, we nd absolutely no reason to dierentiate
between armative and negative thoughts. For the laws of logic, this distinction is, at
any rate, unimportant, especially as no linguistic criterion has been found up to now
permitting a certain dierentiation between these two classes of thoughts. Frege
provides a simplication with even greater signicance when he subsequently refrains
from postulating a special, negative way of judging. What remains is a single
assertoric act, through which a thought is recognized as true and, at the same time,
the one opposite to it is held to be false.
Although Frege is very much in agreement with Bauch and the southwest
German Neo-Kantians with respect to the interpretation of judgement as an act of
acknowledgement,28 the actual dierence becomes apparent with the manner of
structuring the propositional contents of judging. So, Frege believes the most
important source of errors, to whose refutation his eorts up to this point had been
dedicated, lies in a misguided theory of judgement, concerning itself with inessential
accessories in its desire to dene what is essentially indenable:
And this is certainly what has happened to many people, who have tried to explain
what a judgement is and so have hit upon compositeness. The judgement is

28

For a detailed discussion, cf. Gabriel (2003).

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composed of parts that have a certain order, an interconnexion, stand in mutual

relations, but for what whole we do not get this? (Frege 1919, pp. 150151)
This comment can be directly applied to the relational theory of judgement
developed by Bauch in Wahrheit und Richtigkeit. Here (1918a, p. 50), the logical
judgement (i.e. the possible thought) is dened as objectively valid relation
between contents. Thus, Bauch remains fundamentally indebted, despite his strict
objectivist appearance, to the traditional view, according to which judgement is a
connection or composite of subject and predicate, eectuated by the copula. For such
a view, it is only natural, as Frege points out in summary, to regard negation as a
destruction or tearing apart of connections.
The way Frege overcomes the problems associated with this view (we only have
to recall, in this regard, the doctrine of the negative copula) demonstrates
the fundamental dierence between traditional and modern logic. According to the
functional view, established by Frege in place of the traditional subjectpredicate
structure of judgement, a statement (thought) consists of two components: one
complete in itself, and the other in need of completion. Since combination into a
whole always comes about by saturation of something unsaturated, there is no need
for the copula as a connecting third element. The particular strength of this view
becomes apparent with negation. Negation can be understood, according to Frege,
as a function that needs to be completed by a thought, the opposite thought
thus being generated as its value. We notice, however, that although Frege (1919,
pp. 155157) does indeed present a functional interpretation of negation, in the
whole of the Logische Untersuchungen the word function (and also the term truthvalue) is only mentioned briey and in passing. Frege quite apparently nds himself
on the path to an intensional functionalism, which recognizes thoughts as
arguments, rather than truth-values.

7. Bauchs reaction in Wahrheit, Wert und Wirklichkeit

Although Bauch repeatedly referred to Freges functional view in his writings
beginning in 1914, he was unable to make use of their actual philosophical
signicance for a deeper understanding of the statement. Instead, he raises, in his
principal work Wahrheit, Wert und Wirklichkeit (1923), the relational theory of
judgement to a universal holism, encompassing all spheres of being. According to
this theory, the relational character enables the subjective act of judging to
apprehend objects whose being (with Lotzes famous formula) is itself a standing-inrelation [in Beziehung stehen]. The structure of judgement corresponds to that of the
object, since both are founded in objective categorial relations of validity. With these
theoretical preconditions, Bauch is bound to repeat what he had already stated in
earlier writings, also with respect to the problem of negation.29 In the continuous
cosmos of relations that Bauch constructs in Wahrheit, Wert und Wirklichkeit,
negations can (despite Freges objections) lay no claim to logical valency. Since they
are not relational function, not relation, but rather relationlessness, delimitation,
29

Bauch included the writings of Wahrheit und Richtigkeit, practically word for word, in Wahrheit, Wert und
Wirklichkeit (1923, pp. 6680). Vogelsbergers dissertation, written with the inuence of Bauch, on the Hauptprobleme
der Negation in der logischen Untersuchung der Gegenwart, emphasizes the diculties to which Freges understanding
of negation would lead (1937, pp. 1619).

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separation from objects of judgement (Bauch 1923, p. 72), they remain, as simple
phenomena of empirical subjectivity, irrelevant as far as validity is concerned. This
corresponds to the fact that Bauch praises Freges essay Der Gedanke several times,
including detailed citations from it intended to conrm the timeless character of
thoughts (1923, pp. 5765)whereas there is no single reference to the treatise Die
Verneinung, which demonstrates the more fundamental dierence between the views
of the two philosophers.
It can be shown, however, that Freges criticism did in fact have an inuence on
Bauchs views. Whereas Bauch, in Wahrheit und Richtigkeit, had expressly held false
sentences to be senseless, he now (1923, p. 77) concedes their useful function with
respect to the furthering of knowledge (for example, in indirect proof ). Bauch makes
a similar correction for sentences expressing wishes or requests and interrogative
sentences. Although, in his opinion, they do not exist outside and independent of an
empirical consciousness, he nonetheless concedes that they can be communicated and
understood between dierent subjects. In order to guarantee this intersubjective
intelligibility, Bauch (1923, pp. 163174) introduces an additional objective level of
sense, which he, with reference to Frege, terms the third realm. With respect to the
actual matter, however, Rickerts inuence is most strongly present: he considered
the domain of sense to be an intermediate realm [Zwischenreich] which establishes a
connection between subjective thinking and objective truth (Rickert 1910/1911,
pp. 1927; Rickert 1921, pp. 233318). The equivalent of such an intermediary sphere
is not to be found in Freges writings. He is content with the statement that thoughts
are grasped by the faculty of thinking. The manner in which this takes places is a
question whose importance and diculty are indeed recognized by Frege, but whose
solution he seems to leave in the hands of psychology, rather than philosophical
epistomology. With an eye to this lack of epistemological reection, Bauch mentions
critically in Wahrheit, Wert und Wirklichkeit (1923, p. 62) the fact that Freges
contraposition of timeless thoughts and ideas in a temporal sense is insucient to
satisfy the subjective aspect of the problem of knowledge.30

8. Postlude
In conclusion, it is worth mentioning that the contacts between the former Jena
colleagues were by no means broken following the appearance of Wahrheit, Wert und
Wirklichkeit. In the nal year of his life, Frege was ready to participate in the series
Wissenschaftlichen Grundfragen,31 edited by Honigswald and Bauch (Frege 1976,
pp. 89, 8387). The methodological results at which he arrived in the paper written
for this series, Erkenntnisquellen der Mathematik und der mathematischen Naturwissenschaften (1983, pp. 286294), were welcomed by Honigswald as corresponding
completely to our aspirations. While the thus expressed agreement may indeed have
existed for Honigswald, who had always emphasized the role of intuition in
mathematics (Honigswald 1912, pp. 4656), a certain reservation in Bauchs case is
apparent. Whereas Frege, in his nal works, sought a new foundation of arithmetic

30

31

On the other hand, Prauss (1976) attempts to show that, in Freges essay Der Gedanke, Kants position is also
epistemologically approached.
The Wissenschaftlichen Grundfragen are a collection of writings, inaugurated in 1924 with Bauchs treatise on Das
Naturgesetz (Bauch 1924).

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in the spirit of geometry, Bauch began, since the middle of the 1920s, to concern
himself increasingly with Freges earlier works, which were still connected to his
program of logicism. In these works he hoped to nd arguments against the
philosophical currents which recognized the subject-independent ideal being of
mathematical objects, but held their objectivity to be free of all logical conditions.
Thus, Rickert, in his work Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins (1911/1912), had sought
to prove that the essence of number cannot be purely logically understood. With
reference to these reifying tendencies, Bauch (1926, p. 71) refers to Freges work,
which logicians who want to have a say about the essence of number can no longer
ignore. Speaking more generally, Bauch never missed an opportunity to emphasize
Freges signicance, mentioning him in the same breath as Descartes and Leibniz. He
no doubt contributed considerably to the fact that Freges achievements gradually
found recognition in academic philosophy. In a 1932 lecture entitled Zum Problem
der Zahl before his Jena colleagues, Bauch can say with satisfaction:
For us in Jena it should be of special interest that Freges works, having long
received little attention, and despite their extremely dicult readability, are now
beginning to awaken greater and greater interest; they are held by many to be the
most signicant achievement concerning the problem of number. (Bauch 1942,
p. 95)
Translated by Aaron Epstein and Christian Kastner

Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Aaron Epstein and Christian Kastner for translating this paper
and Brady Bowman for helpful advice on the translation.

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