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Why did some contemporaries believe that 1857 was essentially a mutiny of the Bengal Army?
Contemporaries of the time had a multitude of reasons to choose from as to what caused the events
of 1857. The motives to characterise it are arguably out of self interest, and the response to the
mutiny really moulds many views on the matter. At the time India had a very large potential for
making money for business through spice trader, similar to the gold rush in America, and as such
the influences to characterise the events may have come from self preservation of businessmen. To
call the events strictly a mutiny of the Bengal army also benefited the military establishment as it
allowed the military to continue their aim of pitting India against each other in order to keep the
sepoy troops busy in order to prevent dissatisfaction with British rule.
One reason why contemporaries may have believed that 1857 was a mutiny of the Bengal army may
well be the response to it. John Lawrence, who as of 1857 was Chief Commissioner in Punjab and
later become Viceroy, an appointed ruler of India from the Monarch, called for reformation of the
army post mutiny. Lawrence called for radical changes and specifically placed heavy emphasis
on a European Army of at least double it's former strength in India in order to discipline the
native army. (Embree, 1987, 113) Lawrence's focus here on a new European dominated army, as
presumably he distrusted or viewed failings in the native army, goes some way to explain the
mindset of contemporaries viewing the mutiny as that of strictly the Bengal army. This point is
further emphasised by the decrease of the population of native troops, with particular blame being
forced onto Bengal with two to one of European to native troops, where as other Presidencies
such as Madras and Bombay were only three to one. (Embree, 1987, 113) Additionally, in 1858 the
Peel commission was set up, by the War Office, to investigate the root reason behind the sepoys
discontent as well as those defects related to the army organization which contributed significantly,
in a way or another, to the outbreak of the uprising. (Belmekki, 2008, 112) Clearly then the mutiny
was viewed in a military light. Not only did the War Office create the commission into looking into
the uprising, where as if it was viewed as a civilian uprising perhaps the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs may be more apt to conduct the investigation, but the entire investigation was
focussed on the defects related to the army's organization rather than any economic or social
factors. With this in mind then contemporaries more than likely would have viewed the uprising as
a military affair, and with the uprising spawning out of Bengal, the conclusion may have been
drawn that it was simply a mutiny of the Bengal army. This view is also backed up by statements
from British educated Bengalis who claimed that, it was merely an affair of the sepoys, in which
the common people took no part. and that active opposition was confined to a sepoy army. (*)
However these statements are arguably dubious. An educated Bengali knew that his property and
low assessment were secure only so long as the British remained and the Hindoo Patriot suggested
that their splendid future relied entirely upon the existence of British rule (*) and so their desire
to keep down the rebellious urges and maintain British rule may have resulted in these statements.
Perhaps another reason as to why contemporaries viewed the events of 1857 as a mutiny is because
the view benefited them. On an international scale, other countries would have used the events no
doubt as propaganda. Carter and Bates suggest that Napoleon III's propagandists did their best to
spread doubt about Britain's prospects (Carter and Bates, 2010, 53) which would no doubt have
affected contemporaries writings through misinformation. Even more so Carter and Bates claim

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that Russia and Persia both received emissaries from Indian rebels (Carter and Bates, 2010, 53)
suggesting the rebels sent for support from these two nations, however this is disputed by Sayyid
Ahmed Khan who suggested that, For the Muslims of India and the Iranians to be in accord, is as
impossible as for the Protestants and the Roman Catholics. (Khan, 2005) Khan has reason however
for disputing this with his close ties to the British during the revolt. Moreover post mutiny Khan
released work criticizing the military response to the mutiny and instead tying the blame to British
policy. Clearly then his narrative would be to steer away from the military aspect of the revolt and
disputing the emissaries is his attempt at doing so. On a national scale, the British must have been
wary of their businesses in India, and their future potential. India had great opportunities for wealth
for businessmen and ultimately the Empire and as such needed to maintain it's allure as an exotic
environment in a similar sense to the wild west and the gold rush. Within this as well there was a
belief that through trade India would advance itself as a nation. According to Klein the British
sought to stimulate the ryot to raise sugar, cotton, tobacco, wheat, and other lucrative export
commodities. They envisaged the emergence of a broad class of petty entrepreneurs and agrarian
improvers whose ample profits would uplift their living standards, knowledge and social status.
(Klein, 2000, 555) and so for the Liberal government of the day, the necessity for India to not
appear as a war torn state, in order for business to still being appealing there, was a basis to their
Empire.

Slightly linked to the previous point, by portraying the events of 1857 as a mutiny of the Bengal
army it created a platform for new ties to be made with other groups. Within India the new ties
allowed for the reconstruction of the British Indian military from annexed Punjab territories and
Sikh fighters. These groups stood by the British during the mutiny and in turn after the mutiny
were rewarded and viewed in better light. (Rand, 2005, 5) For these groups it was much more
beneficial to them if the actions was seen as a mutiny of strictly the Bengal army. The advanced
role they got after the mutiny was heavily dependent on them being seen as loyal to the cause,
unlike the Bengal army. Furtermore, for the British and their military plan of expansion and
shielding rule by keeping troops occupied, the mutiny being seen as strictly Bengal not only
allowed them to save face, with it being only Bengal that mutinied and not all the regiments, but
also allowed for the Punjab regiments to have a new enemy to be wary of, much more so than the
British. Contemporaries will have seen these new links, and those links broken during the mutiny,
and the clear conclusion will have been that the military uprising was that of the Bengals, and not
the whole of India. Furthermore Stephen Cave, who had drafted letters to colonial governors,
suggested that sugar colonies in the West Indies were to receive those involved with the mutiny
however later adding that they were exiles rather than convicts and as such should be allowed to
earn wages. (Carter and Bates, 2010, 59) Cave's letters were one of the first reports of the mutiny
in Britain and clearly set the tone for the debate on what to do after the mutiny. As this was one of
the earliest reporting of the news on the mutiny, contemporaries of the time will have seen the way
in which the mutineers were to be treated and no doubt have jumped to the conclusion that it was
only the mutineers at fault, as they were the only ones getting discussed when talking of exile. Jill
Bender suggested that for some colonial leaders, such as Sir George Grey who was ex Secretary for
Foreign Affairs and at the time Governor of South Africa, the mutiny provided an opportunity for
them to shine. (Carter and Bates, 2010, 54) It allowed for these colonies and colonial leaders to

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evaluate where their place in the empire was at the time and gain favour by rallying behind the
cause and supporting the attempts to quash the rebellion. Again their militaristic response to the
events showed how contemporaries to the events viewed the situation as strictly an army one.
The nature of the British attitude towards India and Indian troops is without doubt a contributing
factor towards the events of 1857 being labelled at the time as only a mutiny of the Bengal army.
According to Geaves, initially the British were much more immersed within Indian culture in the
18th century. Partaking in in Muslim processions, relationships with Indian women and
administering funds for temples all meant that the average British officer was much more in tune
with Indian culture and community. (Geaves, 1996, 27) However Geaves goes on to say that post
Suez Canal, and with an influx of young Englishwomen seeking suitable partners the immersion
became segregation. (Geaves, 1996, 27) Clearly then with this in mind, although the Suez Canal
opened 10 years or so after the mutiny, contemporaries of the time writing on the events will have
been much more out of touch with the grievances that day to day, non military, Indians had.
Economic and social factors will have been overlooked out of ignorance in favour of the more
obvious military unrest. Expanding on this, Peers suggests that The British collectively believed
that they held India largely because Indians, including sepoys, were convinced of British
invincibility. (Fisher, 1997, 368) showing just how out of touch many of the British officers in
India would have been. Furthermore Peers suggested that the British military tactic was to keep the
Indian sepoys occupied by a plan of expansion so that they would not turn against the British.
(Fisher, 1997, 368)
Some of the reasoning as to why contemporaries of the time viewed the events of 1857 as a mutiny
of the Bengal army may well be that, at the time, it was viewed as this by figures in power. The
most notable example of this is from John Lawrence, who later became Viceroy of India, who stated
that one of the main causes of the mutiny as adding to it's [the Bengal Army's] numbers without
increasing the European force. Lawrence was clear here in tieing the blame into the Bengal army,
and moreover he states that the events were fundamentally an army mutiny clearly pointing a
finger of blame towards inefficiency and lack of discipline in the Bengal Army. (Embree, 1987,
31) Obviously then, when someone of such a high rank as John Lawrence is picking out the root of
the mutiny as the Bengal army contemporaries of the time will undoubtedly emulate this view.
Moreover, it was not just British officials of the time who were of the view that the events were
caused essentially by the Bengal army. Educated Bengali's claimed that it was merely an affair of
the sepoys, in which the common people took no part and that active opposition was confined to a
sepoy army. (*) Clearly then, although the Bengalis as mentioned early held a calculated invested
interest in appearing supportive of the British, contemporary historians of the time would have used
these accounts as basis for their works. Furthermore other Indians of the time, such as Sitaram
Pandy who had been one of the original soldiers to take India and later wrote his memoirs, claimed
that the principle cause of the rebellion was the feeling of power that the sepoys had, and the little
control the sahibs (Europeans) were allowed to exert over them. (Belmekki, 2008, 113) According
to Saul David, who wrote on the mutiny much more recently, this limit of powers was seen as a
weakness by Indians. (Belmekki, 2008, 113) Lawrence in his letter to Charles Trevelyan, who
himself was a member of the Company Civil Service and his wife on the Supreme Council of India,
which has links to Macaulayism (attempts to colonize through the educational system), wrote that

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the Bengal army was of unsatisfactory state as all the men were Poorbeas or from the Eastern
parts of India, and as such they united against the British interests. (Embree, 1987, 30) With this
letter going through at least two, or even three, high ranking members of the East India Company it
may be assumed that the reason contemporaries viewed the events of 1857 as strictly a revolt of the
Bengal Army would be that this is the view those who over saw India had. However other
contemporaries of the time such as Disreali claimed that, in Disreali's terms, it was not a mere
mutiny of sudden impulse and instead said that the British had alienated or alarmed almost
every influential class in the country. (Embree, 1987, 14) It must therefore be questioned why
Disreali can note the issues at a grass roots level and Lawrence can only point to the military as a
reason of mutiny. One potential explanation is that Disreali had previously headed a select
committee on how best to govern India in 1852 where it was decided that the best way would be to
eliminate the East India Company altogether. Therefore then it would be in Disreali's best view to
try and discredit how India is getting ruled across the board, in an attempt to bring down the
company, where as Lawrence who had built a career within the company would be obviously in
favour of blaming the events on one specific counter-able problem.
Overall then, much of the reasons for people to characterise the events 1857 as essentially just a
mutiny of the Bengal army are those of self interest. Whether it is Lawrence and Disreali using the
events for political gain, or simply a lack of foresight is disputable however. External
contemporaries such as Sir George Grey no doubt used the events in order to propel their careers
and cater to what higher ups wanted to hear, and those businessmen who owned land in India will
have had a keen eye on maintaining the perception that India was a safe place to do business.
Essentially then the events of 1857 were characterized as a Bengal army mutiny as this narrative
satisfied everyones own interest at the time.
2389
Bibliography
B. Belmekki, 'A Wind of Change: The New British Colonial Policy in Post-Revolt India Author(s),
Atlantis, 30 (2008), p. 111-124
M. Carter and C. Bates, 'Empire and locality: a global dimension to the 1857 Indian Uprising,
Journal of Global History, 5 (2010) p. 51-73
A. Embree, 'The Revolt Against Foreign Rule', (Delhi 1987)
M. Fisher, 'British and Indian Interactions before the British Raj in India, 1730s-1857 Merchants,
Politics and Society in Early Modern India: Bihar, 1733-1820 by Kumkum Chatterjee; Between
Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison State in India, 1819-1835 by Douglas M.
Peers; The Politics of a Popular Uprising: Bundelkhand in 1857 by Tapti Roy Review, Journal of
British Studies, 36 (1997) p. 363-370
R.A. Geaves, 'A Mutiny or a War of Independence? The Muslim Perspective' Islamic Studies, 35

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(1996), p. 25-44
S. A. Khan, 'The Causes of the Rebellion of India, (2005)
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00urdu/asbab/translation2005.html?
I. Klein, 'Materialism, Mutiny and Modernization in British India' Modern Asian Studies, 34
(2000), p. 545-580
G. Rand, 'Martial Races and Imperial Subjects: Violence and Governance in Colonial India,
European Review of History, 13 (2006) p. 1-20
* Got this from a handout called The Mutiny and It's Causes for my week 7 presentation and can't
find anything bar the title.