EN BANC

[G.R. No. 138200. February 27, 2002]

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS
(DOTC), petitioner, vs.
ROBERTO
MABALOT, respondent.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
At the core of controversy in the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari is the validity of Memorandum Order No. 96-735, dated 19
February 1996, and Department Order No. 97-1025, dated 29 January 1997,
both issued by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC).
The facts are uncontested.
On 19 February 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr.,
issued Memorandum Order No. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation
Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin, viz:
In the interest of the service, you are hereby directed to effect the transfer
of regional functions of that office to the DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending
the creation of a regular Regional Franchising and Regulatory Office thereat,
pursuant to Section 7 of Executive Order No. 202.
Organic personnel of DOTC-CAR shall perform the LTFRB functions on a
concurrent capacity subject to the direct supervision and control of LTFRB
Central Office.
On 13 March 1996, herein respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order,[1] against petitioner and LTFRB Chairman Lantin, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81,[2] praying among others
that Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared illegal and without effect.

On 20 March 1996, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order

enjoining petitioner from implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735.
On 08 April 1996, the lower court, upon filing of a bond by respondent,
issued a writ of preliminary injunction. On 25 April 1996, then DOTC
Secretary Amado Lagdameo, Jr. filed his answer to the petition.
Thereafter, on 29 January 1997, Secretary Lagdameo issued
assailed Department Order No. 97-1025, to wit:

the

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36, dated September 23, 1987, and for
purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions
in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), the DOTC-CAR Regional Office,
created by virtue of Executive Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, is hereby
established as the Regional Office of the LTFRB and shall exercise the
regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct supervision
and control of LTFRB Central Office.
The budgetary requirement for this purpose shall come from the
Department until such time that its appropriate budget is included in the
General Appropriations Act.
After trial, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to reopen the
hearing in the lower court for the purpose of enabling petitioner to present
Department Order No. 97-1025. In an Order dated 18 February 1997, the
lower court granted the motion.
On 03 April 1997, respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Petition assailing the validity of Department Order No. 971025. On 14 May 1997, the OSG presented Department Order No. 97-1025
after which petitioner filed a formal offer of exhibits.
In an Order dated 09 June 1997, the lower court admitted petitioners
documentary exhibits over the objection of respondent. Likewise, the lower
court admitted the supplemental petition filed by respondent to which
petitioner filed an answer thereto.
On 31
March
1999,
the lower
the decretal portion of which reads:

court

rendered

decision

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Memorandum Order

Nos. 96-733[3] dated February 19, 1996 and 97-1025 dated January 27, 1997

of the respondent DOTC Secretary null and void and without any legal
effect as being violative of the provision of the Constitution against
encroachment on the powers of the legislative department and also of the
provision enjoining appointive officials from holding any other office or
employment in the Government.
The preliminary injunction issued on May 13, 1996 is hereby made
permanent.
No pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Hence, the instant petition where this Court is tasked in the main to
resolve the issue of validity of the subject administrative issuances by the
DOTC Secretary.
In his Memorandum[4], respondent Mabalot principally argues that
a transfer of the powers and functions of the LTFRB Regional Office to a
DOTC Regional Office or the establishment of the latter as an LTFRB Regional
Office is unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of legislative
power. To this end, respondent quoted heavily the lower courts rationale on
this matter, to wit:
With the restoration of Congress as the legislative body, the transfer of
powers and functions, specially those quasi-judicial (in) nature, could only be
effected through legislative fiat. Not even the President of
the Philippines can do so. And much less by the DOTC Secretary who
is only a mere extension of the Presidency. Among the powers of the
LTFRB are to issue injunctions, whether prohibitory (or) mandatory, punish
for contempt and to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum. These
powers devolve by extension on the LTFRB regional offices in the
performance of their functions. They cannot be transferred to
another agency of government without congressional approval
embodied in a duty enacted law. (Emphasis ours)
We do not agree. Accordingly, in the absence of any patent or latent
constitutional or statutory infirmity attending the issuance of the challenged
orders, this Court upholds Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and Department
Order No. 97-1025 as legal and valid administrative issuances by the DOTC
Secretary. Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, the President -

through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC
Secretary in the present case - may legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTCCAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region,
with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and
responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
At this point, it is apropos to reiterate the elementary rule in
administrative law and the law on public officers that a public office may be
created through any of the following modes, to wit, either (1) by the
Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by
Congress), or (3) by authority of law.[5]
Verily, Congress can delegate the power to create positions. This has
been settled by decisions of the Court upholding the validity of
reorganization statutes authorizing the President to create, abolish or merge
offices in the executive department.[6] Thus, at various times, Congress has
vested power in the President to reorganize executive agencies and
redistribute functions, and particular transfers under such statutes have
been held to be within the authority of the President.[7]
In the instant case, the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR
Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode - by authority of law,
which could be decreed for instance, through an Executive Order (E.O.)
issued by the President or an order of an administrative agency such as the
Civil Service Commission[8] pursuant to Section 17, Book V of E.O. 292,
otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987. In the case before us,
the DOTC Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and Department
Orders pursuant to Administrative Order No. 36 of the President, [9] dated 23
September 1987, Section 1 of which explicitly provides:
Section 1. Establishment of Regional Offices in the CAR- The various
departments and other agencies of the National Government that are
currently authorized to maintain regional offices are hereby directed to
establish forthwith their respective regional offices In the Cordillera
Administrative Region with territorial coverage as defined under Section 2
of Executive Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, with regional headquarters
at Baguio City.
Emphatically the President, through Administrative Order No. 36, did not
merely authorize but directed, in no uncertain terms, the various

departments and agencies of government to immediately undertake the

creation and establishment of their regional offices in the CAR. To us,
Administrative Order No. 36 is a clear and unequivocal directive and
mandate - no less than from the Chief Executive - ordering the heads of
government departments and bureaus to effect the establishment of their
respective regional offices in the CAR.
By the Chief Executives unequivocal act of issuing Administrative Order
No. 36 ordering his alter ego - the DOTC Secretary in the present case - to
effectuate the creation of Regional Offices in the CAR, the President, in
effect, deemed it fit and proper under the circumstances to act and exercise
his authority, albeit through the various Department Secretaries, so as to put
into place the organizational structure and set-up in the CAR and so as not to
compromise in any significant way the performance of public functions and
delivery of basic government services in the Cordillera Administrative
Region.
Simply stated, it is as if the President himself carried out the creation and
establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC
Secretary, as alter ego of the President, directly and merely sought to
implement the Chief Executives Administrative Order.
To this end, Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution mandates:
The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
By definition, control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.[10] It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a
subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in
him by law.[11]
From the purely legal standpoint, the members of the Cabinet are subject
at all times to the disposition of the President since they are merely his alter
ego.[12] As this Court enunciated in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior,
[13]
without minimizing the importance of the heads of various departments,
their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President.
Thus, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of

business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,

presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Applying the foregoing, it is then clear that the lower courts
pronouncement - that the transfer of powers and functions and in effect, the
creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, may not be validly
made by the Chief Executive, much less by his mere alter ago and could only
be properly effected through a law enacted by Congress -is to say the least,
erroneous.
In Larin vs. Executive Secretary,[14] this Court through the ponencia of
Mr. Justice Justo Torres, inked an extensive disquisition on the continuing
authority of the President to reorganize the National Government, which
power includes the creation, alteration or abolition of public offices. Thus
in Larin, we held that Section 62 of Republic Act 7645 (General
Appropriations Act [G.A.A.] for FY 1993) evidently shows that the
President is authorized to effect organizational changes including
the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned:
Section 62. Unauthorized organizational changes.- Unless otherwise
created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency
shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and be funded
from appropriations by this act.
Petitioners contention in Larin that Sections 48 and 62 of R.A. 7645 were
riders, deserved scant consideration from the Court, Well settled is the rule
that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Unless
and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and
unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.
[15]

Worthy to note is that R.A. 8174 (G.A.A for FY 1996) contains similar
provisions as embodied in Section 72 (General Provisions) of said law entitled
Organizational Changes and Section 73 (General Provisions) thereof
entitled Implementation of Reorganization. Likewise,R.A. 8250 (G.A.A. for
FY 1997) has Section 76 (General Provisions) entitled Organizational
Changes and Section 77 (General Provisions) entitled Implementation of
Reorganization.

In the same vein, Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides a strong legal basis for
the Chief Executives authority to reorganize the National Government, viz:
Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise,
the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested
in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are
not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the
President in accordance with law. (Emphasis ours)
This Court, in Larin, had occasion to rule that:
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the
law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree
No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of
the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials. The validity of these two decrees are unquestionable. The
1987 Constitution clearly provides that all laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked.[16] So far, there is yet no law amending or
repealing said decrees.
The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1772, reads:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority
to reorganize the National Government. In exercising this authority, the
President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good
government and responsive national development, including but not limited
to the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and
development-oriented governmental framework:
xxx

b) Abolish departments, offices, agencies or functions which may not be

necessary, or create those which are necessary, for the efficient
conduct of government functions, services and activities;
c) Transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, properties, records
and personnel from one department, bureau, office, agency or
instrumentality to another;
d) Create, classify, combine, split, and abolish positions;
e) Standardize salaries, materials, and equipment;
f) Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge or integrate entities,
agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government,
as well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their
powers, functions, and authorities, including, with respect to
government-owned or controlled corporations, their corporate life,
capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters. (As
added by P.D. 1772)
g) Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes and objectives of this decree. (As added by P.D. 1772) (Emphasis
supplied.)
In fine, the designation[17] and subsequent establishment[18] of DOTCCAR as the Regional Office of LTFRB in the Cordillera Administrative Region
and the concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the former as
the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, fall within the scope of the continuing
authority of the President to effectively reorganize the Department of
Transportation and Communications.
Beyond this, it must be emphasized that the reorganization in the instant
case was decreed in the interest of the service [19] and for purposes of
economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in the
Cordillera Administrative Region.[20] In this jurisdiction, reorganization is
regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it isfor the purpose of economy
or to make bureaucracy more efficient.[21] To our mind, the reorganization
pursued in the case at bar bears the earmark of good faith. As petitioner
points out,[22] tapping the DOTC-CAR pending the eventual creation of the
LTFRB Regional Office is economical in terms of manpower and resource

requirements, thus, reducing expenses from the limited resources of the

government.
Furthermore, under Section 18, Chapter 5, Title XV, Book IV of E.O.
292[23] and Section 4 of E.O. 202,[24] the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications, through his duly designated Undersecretary, shall
exercise administrative supervision and control[25] over the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (Board).
Worthy of mention too is that by express provision of Department Order
No. 97-1025, the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office is subject to the direct
supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office. Under the law, [26] the
decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Franchising and Regulatory
Offices shall be appealable to the Board within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the decision; the decision, order or resolution of the Board shall
be appealable to the DOTC Secretary. With this appellate set-up and mode of
appeal clearly established and in place, no conflict or absurd circumstance
would arise in such manner that a decision of the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office
is subject to review by the DOTC-CAR Regional Office.
As to the issue regarding Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitution, we hold that the assailed Orders of the DOTC Secretary do not
violate the aforementioned constitutional provisions considering that in the
case of Memorandum Order No. 96-735, the organic personnel of the DOTCCAR were, in effect, merely designated to perform the additional duties and
functions of an LTFRB Regional Office subject to the direct supervision and
control of LTFRB Central Office, pending the creation of a regular LTFRB
Regional Office.
As held in Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees:[27]
To designate a public officer to another position may mean to vest him with
additional duties while he performs the functions of his permanent office. Or
in some cases, a public officer may be designated to a position in an acting
capacity as when an undersecretary is designated to discharge the functions
of a Secretary pending the appointment of a permanent Secretary.
Assuming arguendo that the appointive officials and employees of
DOTC-CAR shall be holding more than one office or employment at the same
time as a result of the establishment of such agency as the LTFRB-CAR
pursuant to Department Order No. 97-1025, this Court is of the firm view that

such fact still does not constitute a breach or violation of Section 7, Article IXB of the Constitution. On this matter, it must be stressed that under the
aforementioned constitutional provision, an office or employment held in the
exercise of the primary functions of ones principal office is an exception to,
or not within the contemplation, of the prohibition embodied in Section 7,
Article IX-B.
Equally significant is that no evidence was adduced and presented to
clearly establish that the appointive officials and employees of DOTC-CAR
shall receive any additional, double or indirect compensation, in violation of
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution. In the absence of any clear and
convincing evidence to show any breach or violation of said constitutional
prohibitions, this Court finds no cogent reason to declare the invalidity of the
challenged orders.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated 31 March 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City-Branch 81 in Special Civil Action Case No. Q-9626868 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

2.
G.R. No. 111091 August 21, 1995
ENGINEER CLARO J. PRECLARO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
On 14 June 1990, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a
violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information against him read as
follows:

That on or about June 8, 1990, or sometime prior thereto, in Quezon

City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Project
Manager/ Consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division, Industrial
Technology Development Institute, Department of Science and
Technology, a component of the Industrial Development Institute (ITDI
for brevity) which is an agency of the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST for brevity), wherein the Jaime Sta. Maria
Construction undertook the construction of the building in Bicutan,
Taguig, Metro Manila, with a total cost of SEVENTEEN MILLION SIX
HUNDRED NINETY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P17,695,000.00) jointly
funded by the Philippine and Japanese Governments, and while the
said construction has not yet been finally completed, accused either
directly requested and/or demanded for himself or for another, the sum
of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), claimed as part of
the expected profit of FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P460,000.00) in connection with the construction of that government
building wherein the accused had to intervene under the law in his
capacity as Project Manager/Consultant of said construction said
offense having been committed in relation to the performance of his
official duties.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
On 20 July 1990, during arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the
charges against him.
On 30 June 1993, after trial on the merits, the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Claro
Preclaro y Jambalos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of
Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY, as the maximum, perpetual disqualification from
public office and to pay the costs of this action.
SO ORDERED. 2

The antecedent facts are largely undisputed.

On 1 October 1989, the Chemical Mineral Division of the Industrial
Technology Development Institute (ITDI), a component of the Department of
Science and Technology (DOST) employed Petitioner under a written contract
of services as Project Manager to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD
(JICA) Building at the DOST Compound in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. 3
The contract was to remain in effect from October 1, 1989 up to the end of
the construction period unless sooner terminated. 4 Petitioner was to be paid
a monthly salary drawn from counter-part funds duly financed by foreignassisted projects and government funds duly released by the Department of
Budget and Management. 5
In November 1989, to build the aforementioned CMD Structure, DOST
contracted the services of the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction Company with
Engr. Alexander Resoso, as the company's project engineer. 6
How petitioner committed a violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices
Act is narrated in the Comment of the Solicitor General and amply supported
by the records. The material portions are hereunder reproduced:
xxx xxx xxx
3. In the month of May, 1990, Alexander Resoso, Project Engineer of
the Sta. Maria Construction Company, was in the process of evaluating
a Change Order for some electricals in the building construction when
petitioner approached him at the project site (p. 11, 25, Ibid.).
4. Unexpectedly, petitioner made some overtures that expenses in the
Change Order will be deductive (meaning, charged to the contractor by
deducting from the contract price), instead of additive (meaning,
charged to the owner). Petitioner intimated that he can forget about
the deductive provided he gets P200,000.00, a chunk of the
contractor's profit which he roughly estimated to be around
P460,000.00 (pp. 12-13, 22, Ibid.).
5. Having conveyed the proposal to Jaime Sta. Maria, Sr., the owner of
Sta. Maria Construction Company, Resoso thereafter asked petitioner if
he wanted a rendezvous for him to receive the money. Petitioner chose

Wendy's Restaurant, corner E. Delos Santos Avenue and Camias Street,

on June 6, 1990 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening (p. 14, Ibid.).
6. However, Sta. Maria, Sr. asked for two (2) more days or until
the 8th of June, perceiving financial constraints (Ibid.).
7. Petitioner relented, saying "O.K. lang with me because we are not in
a hurry." (p. 15, Ibid.) Petitioner was thereafter asked to bring along the
result of the punch list (meaning, the list of defective or correctible
works to be done by the contractor) (p. 15, Ibid.; p. 10, TSN, 18 Oct.
1991).
8. On 7 June 1990, Sta. Maria, Sr. and Resoso proceeded to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to report the incident (p. 15,
35, Ibid.).
9. The NBI suggested an entrapment plan to which Sta. Maria, Sr.
signified his conformity (p. 16, TSN, 12 Oct. 1990). Accordingly, Sta.
Maria, Sr. was requested to produce the amount of P50,000.00 in
P500.00 denomination to represent the grease money (p. 37, TSN, 6
Sept. 1990).
10. The next day, or on 8 June 1990, Resoso delivered the money to
the NBI. Thereafter, the money was dusted with flourescent powder
and placed inside an attache case (pp. 16-17, Ibid.). Resoso got the
attache case and was instructed not to open it. Similarly, he was
advised to proceed at the Wendy's Restaurant earlier than the
designated time where a group of NBI men awaited him and his
companion, Sta. Maria, Jr. (pp. 17-18, Ibid.).
11. Hence, from the NBI, Resoso passed by the Jade Valley Restaurant
in Timog, Quezon City, to fetch Sta. Maria, Jr. (Ibid.).
12. At around 7:35 p.m., Resoso and Sta. Maria, Jr. arrived at the
Wendy's Restaurant. They were led by the NBI men to a table
previously reserved by them which was similarly adjacent to a table
occupied by them (pp. 18-19, Ibid.).
13. Twenty minutes later, petitioner arrived. Supposedly, the following
conversation took place, to wit:

JUSTICE BALAJADIA:
q. When Dave Preclaro arrived, what did he do?
a. We asked him his order and we talked about
the punch list.
q. What was his comment about the punch list?
a. He told us that it is harder to produce small
items than big ones.
q. How long did you converse with Engr. Claro
Preclaro?
a. I think thirty minutes or so.
q. Was Preclaro alone when he came?
a. Yes, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. CAOILI:
q. When you talk[ed] about his punch list, did
you talk about anything else?
a. Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr., they were
conversing with Dave Preclaro and he told
[him], "O, paano na."
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
q. Who said "Paano na?"
a. Engineer Sta. Maria, [Jr.]. And then Preclaro
told [him], "Paano, How will the money be
arranged and can I bring it?" he said.
And then Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. told him it was
arranged on two bundles on two envelopes.

And then Dave Preclaro told, "Puede" and he

asked Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. if there is express
teller and could he deposit during night time
but Engineer Sta. Maria, Jr. told him, "I do not
have any knowledge or I do not have any
express teller you can deposit. I only know
credit card."
PROS. CAOILI:
q. When Engr. Sta. Maria intervened and
interviewed him that way, was there anything
that happened?
a. Jimmy Sta. Maria, Jr. handed two envelopes
to Preclaro.
q. Did Claro Preclaro receive these two
envelopes from Engineer Sta. Maria?
a. Yes, sir. (pp. 19-21, Ibid., See also pp. 13-14,
TSN, 29 Oct. 1990.)
14. From the moment petitioner received the two envelopes with his
right hand, thereafter placing them under his left armpit, he was
accosted by the NBI men (p. 22, TSN, 12 Oct. 1990).
15. A camera flashed to record the event. Petitioner instinctively
docked to avoid the taking of pictures. In such manner, the two
envelopes fell (p. 23, Ibid.).
16. The NBI men directed petitioner to pick up the two envelopes.
Petitioner refused. Hence, one of the NBI men picked up the envelopes
and placed them inside a big brown envelope (p. 27, Ibid.)
17. Petitioner was thenceforth brought to the NBI for examination (p.
28; Ibid.).
18. At the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section, petitioner's right palmar
hand was tested positive of flourescent powder. The same flourescent

powder, however, cannot be detected in petitioner's T-shirt and pants

(p. 5, TSN, 29 Oct. 1990). 7
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, as brought out at the outset, an information was filed against
petitioner which, after due hearing, resulted in his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan. Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner instituted the
present petition for review, ascribing to the Sandiganbayan the following
errors:
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE,
INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, THE
[PETITIONER] NOT BEING A PUBLIC OFFICER; and
2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT NOT ALL THE
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE GUILT OF THE
[PETITIONER] HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
We find the petition unmeritorious.
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that he is not a public officer as defined
by Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019 as
amended), because he was neither elected nor appointed to a public office.
Rather, petitioner maintains that he is merely a private individual hired by
the ITDI on contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified
period 8 as evidenced by the contract of services 9 he entered into with the
ITDI. Petitioner, to further support his "theory," alleged that he was not
issued any appointment paper separate from the abovementioned contract.
He was not required to use the bundy clock to record his hours of work and
neither did he take an oath of office. 10
We are not convinced by petitioner's arguments.
Petitioner miscontrues the definition of "public officer" in R.A. No. 3019
which, according to Sec. 2(b) thereof "includes elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified
or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal,
from the government. . . ."

The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates
that the definition is not restrictive. The terms "classified, unclassified or
exemption service" were the old categories of positions in the civil service
which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career
Service 11 by PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil Service
Commission 12 and by the Administrative Code of 1987. 13
Non-career service in particular is characterized by
(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and
fitness utilized for the career service;and (2) tenure which is limited to
a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to
the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was
made.
The Non-Career Service shall include:
(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their
positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or
confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed
terms of office and their personal or confidential staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the
government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a
specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in
the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period,
which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes
the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum
of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel. (Emphasis ours.)

14

From the foregoing classification, it is quite evident that petitioner falls under
the non-career service category (formerly termed the unclassified or
exemption service) of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined
by Sec. 2(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019).

The fact that petitioner is not required to record his working hours by means
of a bundy clock or did not take an oath of office became unessential
considerations in view of the above-mentioned provision of law clearly
including petitioner within the definition of a public officer.
Similarly, petitioner's averment that he could not be prosecuted under the
Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act because his intervention "was not required
by law but in the performance of a contract of services entered into by him
as a private individual contractor," 15 is erroneous. As discussed above,
petitioner falls within the definition of a public officer and as such, his duties
delineated in Annex "B" of the contract of services 16 are subsumed under
the phrase "wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law." 17 Petitioner's allegation, to borrow a cliche, is nothing but a
mere splitting of hairs.
Among petitioner's duties as project manager is to evaluate the contractor's
accomplishment reports/billings 18hence, as correctly ruled by the
Sandiganbayan he has the "privilege and authority to make a favorable
recommendation and act favorably in behalf of the government," signing
acceptance papers and approving deductives and additives are some
examples. 19 All of the elements of Sec. 3(b) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act are, therefore, present.
Anent the second issue, we likewise find Petitioner's allegations completely
bereft of merit.
Petitioner insists that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and that the charges against him should be rejected for
being improbable, unbelievable and contrary to human nature.
We disagree.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean that which produces absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty is required or "that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." 20 We have extensively
reviewed the records of this case and we find no reason to overturn the
findings of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner enumerates the alleged improbabilities and inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We shall examine the testimonies
referred to with meticulousness.

Petitioner asserts that it was improbable for him to have demanded

P200,000.00 from Engr. Resoso, when he could have just talked directly to
the contractor himself. It is quite irrelevant from whom petitioner demanded
his percentage share of P200,000.00 whether from the contractor's project
engineer, Engr. Alexander Resoso or directly from the contractor himself
Engr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr. That petitioner made such a demand is all that is
required by Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and this element has been sufficiently
established by the testimony of Engr. Resoso, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said when you were computing your Change Order
Mr. Preclaro or Dave Preclaro whom you identified
approached you, what did you talk about?
A He mentioned to me that we are deductive in our Change
Order three and four so after our conversation I told this
conversation to my boss that we are deductible in the
Change Order three and four and then my boss told me to
ask why it is deductive.
Q Did you ask the accused here, Dave Preclaro why it is
considered deductive?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was his answer if any?
A I asked him that my boss is asking me to ask you how
come it became deductive when my computation is
additive and he told me that I have done so much for your
company already and then he picked up cement bag paper
bag and computed our alleged profit amounting to One
Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos and then he told me that he
used to use some percentage in projects maximum and
minimum and in our case he would use a minimum
percentage and multiply to 60 and . . .
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Q What is 460?

A P460,000.00 and he said take of the butal and get two

Hundred Thousand Pesos.
JUSTICE BALAJADIA:
What is the translation now?
WITNESS:
A And he said disregard the excess and I will just get the
P200,000.00. (Emphasis ours.)
PROS. CAOILI:
Q What does he mean by that if you know?
A I do not know sir.
He just said, I will get the P200,000.00 and tell it to your
boss. (Emphasis ours.)
JUSTICE BALAJADIA:
Q What is P200,000.00?
A It is Two Hundred Thousand Pesos.
PROS. CAOILI:
Q What did you answer him when he told you that?
A He told me to forget the deductive and electrical and
after that I told my boss what he told me.
Q Who is your boss?
A Santa Maria Sr.
Q What was the reaction of your boss when you relayed
the message to Mr. Preclaro?

A The next day he told me to ask Dave where and when to

pick up the money so the next day I asked Dave "Where do
you intend to get the money, the Boss wanted to know."
Q What was the answer of Dave?
A And he told me, Wendy's Restaurant at 3:00 o'clock.
Q When?
A June 6 Wednesday.
Q When he told you that did you comply with June 6
appointment?
A I told my boss what he told me again that the meeting
will take place at Wendy's Restaurant corner Edsa and
Camias Street at around 8:00 o'clock p.m. June 6,
Wednesday.
Q What did your boss tell you?
A The next day he told me to ask Dave.
Q What did your boss tell you?
A My boss told me to ask Dave to postpone the meeting on
June 6 to be postponed on June 8 at the same place and
same time because my boss is having financial problem.
Q Did you relay the postponement to Dave Preclaro?
A Yes sir. I told what my boss told me.
Q What was his reaction?
A Dave told me "O.K. lang with me" because we are not in
a hurry. Any way we are the ones to sign the acceptance
papers and my boss instructed me that on Friday to ask
Dave to bring along the result of the punch list and if
possible also to bring along the acceptance papers to be
signed by Dave, Lydia Mejia and Dr. Lirag the director.

Q What happened next after meeting with Preclaro to relay

the postponement if any?
A Nothing happened. The next day, Thursday the boss
instructed me to go with him to the NBI to give a
statement.
Q Did you go to the NBI and report to the incident to the
NBI?
A Yes sir.
Q Did you give a statement before any of the agents of the
of the NBI?
A Yes sir.

21

xxx xxx xxx

Likewise, petitioner's alleged refusal to see Mr. Jaime Sta. Maria Sr. when the
latter tried to arrange meetings with him regarding his demand 22 does not
weaken the cause against petitioner. It does not at all prove that petitioner
did not ask for money. Conceivably petitioner did not muster enough courage
to ask money directly from the contractor himself. Getting the amount
through the project engineer would be safer because if Mr. Sta. Maria, Sr. had
refused to give money, petitioner could always deny having made the
demand.
Petitioner contends that the percentage demanded in the amount of
P200,000.00 is too high considering that the estimated profit of the
contractor from the CMD project is only P460,000.00. In petitioner's words,
this would "scare the goose that lays the golden egg." 23 We reject this
argument. The aforementioned contractor's profit is petitioner's own
computation as testified to by Engr. Resoso:
xxx xxx xxx
A I asked him that my boss is asking me to ask you how
come it became deductive when my computation is
additive and he told me that I have done so much for your
company alreadyand then he picked up cement bag paper

bag and computed our alleged profit amounting to One

Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos and then he told me that
he used to use some percentage in projects maximum and
minimum and in our case he would use a minimum
percentage and multiply to 460 and . . . (Emphasis ours.)
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Q What is 460?
A P460,000.00 and it ended to P215 thousand or
P20,000.00 and he said take of the butal and get the Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos. (Emphasis ours.)
JUSTICE BALAJADIA:
What is the translation now?
WITNESS:
A And he said disregard the excess and I will just get the
P200,000.00.
PROS. CAOILI:
Q What does he mean by that if you know?
A I do not know sir.
He just said, I will get the P200,000.00 and tell it to your
boss. 24
xxx xxx xxx
The records, however, do not show the true and actual amount that the Sta.
Maria Construction will earn as profit. There is, therefore, no basis for
petitioner's contention as the actual profit may be lower or higher than his
estimation.
Besides, as related by Engr. Resoso, petitioner considers the P200,000.00
percentage proper compensation since he has allegedly done so much for
the Sta. Maria construction company. 25

Petitioner also argues that:

According to STA. MARIA, SR., they were deductive by P280,000.00 (Id.,
pp. 34-35).
If STA. MARIA CONSTRUCTION was deductive in the amount of
P280,000.00, why would the petitioner still demand P200,000.00 which
would increase the contractor's loss to P480,000.00!
It might have been different if the changes were additive where STA.
MARIA CONSTRUCTION would have earned more, thereby providing
motive for the petitioner to ask for a percentage! 26
But this is precisely what petitioner was bargaining for P200,000.00 in
exchange for forgetting about the deductive 27 and thus prevent the Sta.
Maria Construction from incurring losses.
Petitioner's contention that it was impossible for him to make any demands
because the final decision regarding accomplishments and billing lies with
the DOST technical committee is unacceptable. Petitioner is part of the
abovementioned technical committee as the ITDI representative consultant.
This is part of his duties under the contract of services in connection with
which he was employed by the ITDI. Even, assuming arguendo that
petitioner does not make the final decision, as supervisor/consultant, his
recommendations will necessarily carry much weight. Engr. Resoso testified
thus:
PROS. CAOILI:
Q As a Project Engineer to whom do you present your
billing papers accomplishment report or purchase order?
A The billing paper was being taken cared of by the, of our
office. I personally do my job as supervision in the
construction.
Q Do you have any counterpart to supervise the project
from the government side?
A Yes, we have.

Yes, the DOST have a technical Committee Infra-Structure

Committee and also the ITDI as its own representative.
Q Who composed the Technical Committee of the DOST?
A A certain Engineer Velasco, Engineer Sande Banez and
Engineer Mejia.
Q How about the ITDI?
A The ITDI representative composed of Dave Preclaro.
Q Who is this Dave Preclaro?
A He is the consultant of ITDI. (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CAOILI:
Q As Project Engineer do you consult to any body regarding
your job?
A First if there is any problem in the site I consult my boss.
PROS. CAOILI:
Q How about with the other consultants representing the
ITDI and DOST?
A In the construction site we have meeting every Monday
to discuss any problem.
Q With whom do you discuss this problem?
A The Infra-structure Committee of DOST and the Infrastructure Committee of ITDI, the architect and the
contractor. We had weekly meetings.
Q What matters if any do you consult with Mr. Claro
Preclaro?

ATTY. JIMENEZ:
No basis.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
They met on problems on Mondays.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
But there is no mention of Preclaro specifically.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
With the representative of DOST and Preclaro
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Does that also mean that Preclaro is also among the
representatives he is going to consult with?
Well any way. . .
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Witness may answer the question.
Read back the question.
COURT STENOGRAPHER:
Reading back the question as ordered by the Court.
WITNESS:
A Every Monday meeting we tackle with accomplishment
report the billing papers. 28 (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner also claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
regarding the entrapment itself are conflicting, doubtful or improbable:

(aaa) according to RESOSO, only FOUR (4) P500 bills were dusted with
flourescent powder and used in the alleged entrapment.
Contradicting RESOSO, STA. MARIA, SR. said that he gave fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos in P500 denomination to the NBI.

29

There is no such inconsistency. Said witnesses were testifying on two

different subjects. Engr. Sta. Maria, Sr.'s testimony touched on the amount he
gave the NBI for use in the entrapment while Engr. Resoso's declaration
referred only to the number of bills dusted with flourescent powder.
Petitioner, likewise, misappreciated the following testimony of Resoso:
PROS. CAOILI:
Q What did he do with the two envelopes upon receiving
the same?
A Then he asked Jaime Sta. Maria, Jr. if there is bank teller
express, if he could deposit the money but Mr. Sta. Maria
said, "I do not have, I only have credit cards." 30
Petitioner intended to deposit the money in his own account not that of Mr.
Sta. Maria, Jr. He was merely inquiring from the latter if there was an express
teller nearby where he could make the deposit. Mr. Sta. Maria Jr. himself
testified as follows:
A He asked me if there was express teller. I told him I do
not know then he asked me whether it is possible to
deposit at the Express Teller at that time. I told him I don't
know because I have no express teller card and he asked
me how am I going to arrange, how was it arranged if I will
bring it, can I bring it. Then I told him that it was placed in
two envelopes consisting of 500 Peso bills and then he said
"Okay na yan." 31
The failure of the NBI to take photographs of the actual turn-over of the
money to petitioner is not fatal to the People's cause. The transaction was
witnessed by several people, among whom were Engr. Resoso, Mr. Sta. Maria
Jr. and the NBI agents whose testimonies on the circumstances before, during
and after the turn-over are consistent, logical and credible.

According to NBI Agent Francisco Balanban Sr., they purposely took no

photographs of the actual turn-over so as not to alert and scare off the
petitioner. During cross-examination Agent Balanban Jr. stated:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, of course, this entrapment operation, you made
certain preparation to make sure that you would be able to
gather evidence in support of the entrapment?
A Yes sir.
Q As a matter of fact you even brought photographer for
the purpose?
A That is right sir.
Q And that photographer was precisely brought along to
record the entrapment?
A Yes sir.
Q From the beginning to the end, that was the purpose?
A At the time of the arrest sir.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
From the time of the handing over of the envelopes until
the entrapment would have been terminated?
A No sir we plan to take the photograph only during the
arrest because if we take photographs he would be alerted
during the handing of the envelopes. (Emphasis ours.)
Q So you did not intend to take photographs of the act of
handing of the envelopes to the suspect?
A We intended but during that time we cannot take
photographs at the time of the handling because the flash
will alert the suspect. (Emphasis ours.)

JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Why did you not position the photographer to a far
distance place with camera with telescopic lens?
A We did not Your Honor.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
So was it your intention to take photographs only at the
time that he is already being arrested?
A Yes sir.

32

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner insists that when his hands were placed under ultra-violet light,
both were found negative for flourescent powder. This is petitioner's own
conclusion which is not supported by evidence. Such self-serving statement
will not prevail over the clear and competent testimony and the
report 33 submitted by the forensic expert of the NBI Ms. Demelen R. dela
Cruz, who was the one who conducted the test and found petitioner's right
palmar hand positive for flourescent powder, the same hand he used,
according to witnesses Resoso and Sta. Maria Jr., to get the money from the
latter.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mrs. dela Cruz since when have you been a Forensic
Chemist at NBI?
A Since 1981 sir.
Q JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Q By the way, is the defense willing to admit that the
witness is a competent as . . . .
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Admitted Your Honor.

PROS. CAOILI:
Madam Witness did you conduct a forensic examination in
the person of one Dave Preclaro y Jambalos?
A Yes sir.
Q If that person whom you examined is here in court would
you be able to recognize him?
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
We admit that the accused is the one examined by the
witness.
ATTY. CAOILI:
Did you prepare the result of the examination in writing?
A Yes sir.
PROS. CAOILI:
Showing to you Physic Examination No. 90-961 which for
purposes of identification has already been marked as Exh.
H what relation has this have with the report that you
mentioned a while ago?
A This is the same report that I prepared sir.
Q How did you conduct such flourescent examination?
A The left and right hands of the accused were placed
under the ultra violet lamp sir.
Q What was the result?
A It gave a . . . under the ultra violent lamp the palmer
hands of the suspect gave positive result for the presence
of flourescent powder.
Q What palmar hands?

A Right hand sir.

Q What other examination did you conduct?
A And also the clothing, consisting of the t-shirts and the
pants were examined. Under the ultra violet lamp the
presence of the flourescent powder of the t-shirts and
pants cannot be seen or distinguished because the fibers
or the material of the cloth under the ultra violet lamp was
flouresce.
Q Please tell the Court why the t-shirts and pants under the
ultra violent lamp was flouresce?
A The materials or the fibers of the clothings it could have
been dyed with flourescent dyes sir.34
xxx xxx xxx
What we find improbable and contrary to human experience is petitioner's
claim that he was set up by Engr. Sta. Maria Sr. and Engr. Resoso for no other
purpose but revenge on account, for petitioner's failure to recommend the
Sta. Maria Construction to perform the extra electrical works. 35
The Sandiganbayan has aptly ruled on this matter, thus:
For another, the claim of accused that there was ill-will on the part of
the construction company is hardly plausible. It is highly improbable for
the company to embark on a malicious prosecution of an innocent
person for the simple reason that such person had recommended the
services of another construction firm. And it is extremely impossible for
such company to enlist the cooperation and employ the services of the
government's chief investigative agency for such an anomalous
undertaking. It is more in accord with reason and logic to presuppose
that there was some sort of a mischievous demand made by the
accused in exchange for certain favorable considerations, such as,
favorable recommendation on the completeness of the project, hasslefree release of funds, erasure of deductives, etc. Indeed, the rationale
for the occurrence of the meeting and the demand for money is infinite
and boundless. 36

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Engr. Sta. Maria Sr., who
was then engaged in the construction of another DOST building, would not
risk his business or livelihood just to exact revenge which is neither profitable
nor logical. As we aptly stated in Maleg v. Sandiganbayan: 37
It is hard to believe that the complainant who is a contractor would
jeopardize and prejudice his business interests and risk being
blacklisted in government infrastructure projects, knowing that with
the institution of the case, he may find it no longer advisable nor
profitable to continue in his construction ventures. It is hardly probable
that the complainant would weave out of the blue a serious accusation
just to retaliate and take revenge on the accused.
From the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that on the basis of the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented during the trial, the guilt of
petitioner has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Digest:
Preclaro vs Sandiganbayan, 247 SCRA 454
(Public Officers, Non-Career Service)
Facts: Accused is a project manager/consultant of the Chemical Mineral
Division, Industrial Technology Development Institute, Department of Science
and Technology, a component of the Industrial Development Institute which
is an agency of the DOST.
He is to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD building, while the Jaime
Sta. Maria Construction undertook the construction. The structure is jointly
funded by the Philippine and Japanese Governments.
While the said construction has not yet been completed, accused either
directly requested and/or demanded for himself the sum of P200,000.00,
claimed as part of the expected profit of the contractor.
Petitioner was charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act for committing said offense in relation to the performance of his official
duties.

Petitioner asserts in a petition for review that he is not a public officer

because he was neither elected nor appointed to a public office, but merely a
private individual hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a particular
project and for a specified period. Hence the Sandiganbayan erred in taking
cognizance of the case.
Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 defines a public officer to include elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even
nominal, from the government
Issue: WON a private individual hired on a contractual basis by the
government is a public officer.
Held: Yes. The word includes used in defining a public officer indicates that
the definition is not restrictive. The terms classified, unclassified or
exemption service were the old categories of position in the civil service
which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service by
PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
A private individual hired on a contractual basis as Project Manager for a
government undertaking falls under the non-career service category of the
Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec 2(b) of RA 3019.
Under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec 6(2) of the Administrative
Code of 1987, non-career service in particular is characterized by 1) entrance
other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career
service; and 2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which
is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made.
Section 9(4) of the same provides that Non-Career Service It shall include
Contractual personnel or those employment in the government is in
accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job,
requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to
be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one
year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
agency.

3. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2971

April 20, 1951

FELICIANO
MANIEGO
y
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

CATU, petitioner,

Llorente
and
Yumul
for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Augusto M.
Luciano for respondent.

DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
This petitioner was convicted, by the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, of
a violation of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. He pleads for acquittal,
insisting upon purely legal points.
The facts found by that appellate court are substantially the following:
That on February 27, 1947, the accused, although appointed as a laborer,
had been placed in charge of issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic
violations in the Sala of Judge Crisanto Aragon of the Municipal Court of the
City of Manila. It appears furthermore, from the testimony of Clerk of Court
Baltazar and Fiscal De la Merced, then Deputy Fiscal attending to traffic
violations, that the accused had been permitted to write motions for
dismissal of prescribed traffic cases against offenders without counsel, and
to submit them to the Court for action, without passing through the regular
clerk. On the day in question, Felix Rabia, the complainant herein, appeared
and inquired from the accused about a subpoena that he received. He was
informed that it was in connection with a traffic violation for which said Rabia
had been detained and given traffic summons by an American MP. The
accused after a short conversation went to Fiscal De la Merced and informed
the Fiscal that the case had already prescribed. The Fiscal having found such
to be the case, instructed the accused that if the traffic violator had no
lawyer, he could write the motion for dismissal and have it signed by the
party concerned. This was done by the accused and after the signing by Felix
Rabia the matter was submitted to the Court, which granted the petition for
dismissal.
According to Felix Rabia and Agent No. 19 (La forteza) of the National Bureau
of Investigation, the accused informed Rabia that the latter was subject to a

fine of P15; that Rabia inquired whether the same could be reduced because
he had no money, and that the accused informed Rabia that he could fix the
case if Rabia would pay him P10; which Rabia did and the accused pocketed.
This charged was denied by the accused.
The pertinent portion of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through
the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and fine of not less than the value to the
penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon if the same shall have been
committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an
act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he
shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph. . . .
As correctly indicated by counsel for petitioner the four essential elements of
the offense are: (1) the accused is a public officer within the scope of Article
203 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that the accused received by himself or
thru another, some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift,
present or promises has been given in consideration of his commission of
some crime or any act not constituting a crime; (4) that the crime or act
relates to the exercise of the functions of the public officer.
There can be no question that petitioner was a public officer within the
meaning of Article 203, which includes all persons who, by direct provision
of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take
part in the performance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or
shall perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an
employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class. That definition
is quite comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public servant from the
highest to the lowest. For the purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the
standard distinction in the law of public officers between officer and
employee.
Petitioner, however, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in regarding
him as a public officer, expounded and discussed several grounds arranged
under the following hearings:
a. The doctrine of the temporary performance of public functions by a
laborer should not apply in defendants case.

b. The overt act imputed on the accused does not constitute a circumstance
by which he may be considered a public official.
c. His appointment as laborer came from one source, while the designation
and delimitation of the functions of his appointment came from another
source.
After having carefully considered the expository argumentation, we are
unconvinced. The law is clear, and we perceive no valid reason to deny
validity to the view entertained by the Spanish Supreme Court that, for the
purposes of punishing bribery, the temporary performance of public
functions is sufficient to constitute a person a public official. This opinion, it
must be stated, was followed and applied by the Court of Appeals because
the accused, although originally assigned to the preparation of summons and
subpoenas, had been allowed in some instance to prepare motions for
dismissal of traffic cases.
And this Tribunal has practically concurred with the Spanish court when it
opined1 that a laborer in the Bureau of Post temporarily detailed as filer of
money orders was a public officer within the meaning of Article 203 of the
Revised Penal Code. Indeed, common sense indicates that the receipt of
bribe money is just as pernicious when committed by temporary employees
as when committed by permanent officials.
The second essential element has likewise been proven. The Court of
Appeals said this petitioner received ten pesos from Rabia (and pocketed the
money) in consideration of his fixing Rabias case, and thereafter he
fixed it by filing a motion for dismissal, which was approved in due course.
In connection with the last two elements of the offense, it should be stated
that our pronouncements under the first sufficiently answer petitioners
propositions elaborated in several parts of his brief, revolving around the
thesis that since he was a mere laborer by appointment he may not be
convicted, because the preparation of motions for dismissal is not surely the
official function of a laborer. Enough to recall that although originally
appointed as a mere laborer, this defendant was on several occasions
designated or given the work to prepare motions for dismissal. He was
consequently temporarily discharging such public functions. And as in the
performance thereof he accepted, even solicited, monetary reward, he
certainly guilty as charged.
Wherefore, there being no issue about the penalty imposed, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed in toto. With costs.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo and Bautista Angelo,
JJ., concur.

Digest:
88 Phil 494 - Law on Public Officers Public Officer and Public Employee
the same for Purposes of the Penal Code
Feliciano Maniego was employed as a laborer to work as the person in
charge of delivering summons and subpoenas in the Municipal Court of
Manila. Nevertheless, Maniego was permitted to write motions for dismissal
of prescribed traffic cases against offenders without counsel, and to submit
them to the court for action, without passing through the regular clerk.
Sometime in 1947, a certain Felix Rabia was subpoenaed in connection with
a traffic violation. The said crime has prescribed without Rabia being
prosecuted but then Maniego informed Rabia that he is penalized with a P15
fine; that Maniego can fix this if Rabia can pay him P10. Maniego pocketed
the P10.00 and for this he was later charged for violating Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides in part:
Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through
the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and fine of not less than the value to the
penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon if the same shall have been
committed.
Maniego assails the charge. He avers, among others, that he is not a public
officer as he was merely hired as an ordinary government employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maniego is correct.

HELD: No. Maniego is considered a public officer under Article 203 of the
Revised Penal Code which includes all persons who, by direct provision of
law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part
in the performance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or shall
perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an
employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class. That definition
is quite comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public servant from the
highest to the lowest. For the purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the
standard distinction in the law of public officers between officer and
employee. Further, even assuming that Article 203 cant be applied,
although Maniego was originally engaged as a laborer, he was temporarily

performing public functions when he was permitted to draft motions. And as

in the performance thereof he accepted, even solicited, monetary reward, he
certainly guilty as charged. The receipt of bribe money is just as pernicious
when committed by temporary employees as when committed by permanent
officials.