SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal by the applicant and appellant from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, denying
the registration of the larger portion of parcel No. 1 (Exhibit A
of the petitioner), marked by the letters A, B, and C on the
plan, Exhibit 1, of the Government.
One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession
of a considerable tract of land located in the municipality of
San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took
advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain
a possessory information title to the land, registered as such
on February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of
the possessory information title of Restituto Romero, was sold
in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner,
and his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title
registered. Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands
on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from
the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on
the ground that the first parcel was forest land. The trial court
agreed with the objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from
registration. So much for the facts.
As to the law, the principal argument of the Solicitor-General
is based on the provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law and of
the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, commonly known as
the Maura Law. The Solicitor-General would emphasize that for
land to come under the protective gis of the Maura Law, it
must have been shown that the land was cultivated for six
years previously, and that it was not land which pertained to
the "zonas forestales." As proof that the land was, even as
long ago as the years 1894 to 1896, forestal and not
agricultural in nature is the fact that there are yet found
thereon trees from 50 to 80 years of age.
We do not stop to decide this contention, although it might be
possible, following the doctrine laid down by the United States
Supreme Court with reference to Mexican and Spanish grantes
within the United States, where some recital is claimed to be
false, to say that the possessory information, apparently
having taken cognizance of the requisites for title, should not
now be disturbed. (Hancock vs. McKinney [1851], 7 Tex., 192;
Hornsby and Roland vs. United States [1869], 10 Wall., 224.) It
Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable
for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by
the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared
by the Department Head to be agricultural lands." With
reference to the last section, there is no certification of the
Director of Forestry in the record, as to whether this land is
better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for
forest purposes.
The lexicographers define "forest" as "a large tract of land
covered with a natural growth of trees and underbrush; a
large wood." The authorities say that he word "forest" has a
significant, not an insignificant meaning, and that it does not
embrace land only partly woodland. It is a tract of land
covered with trees, usually of considerable extent. (Higgins
vs. Long Island R. Co. [1908], 114 N. Y. Supp., 262; People vs.
Long Island R. Co. [1908], 110 N. Y. Supp., 512.)
The foresters say that no legal definition of "forest" is
practicable or useful. B. H. Baden-Powell, in his work on Forest
Law of India, states as follows:
Every definition of a forest that can be framed for
legal purposes will be found either to exclude some
cases to which the law ought to apply, or on the
other hand, to include some with which the law ought
not to interfere. It may be necessary, for example, to
take under the law a tract of perfectly barren land
which at present has neither trees, brushwood, nor
grass on it, but which in the course f time it is hoped
will be "reboise;" but any definition wide enough to
take in all such lands, would also take in much that
was not wanted. On the other hand, the definition, if
framed with reference to tree-growth, might (and
indeed would be almost sure to) include a garden,
shrubbery, orchard, or vineyard, which it was not
designed to deal with.
B. E. Fernow, in his work on the Economics of Forestry, states
as follows:
A forest in the sense in which we use the term, as an
economic factor, is by no means a mere collection of
trees, but an organic whole in which all parts,
although apparently heterogeneous, jumbled
together by accident as it were and apparently
unrelated, bear a close relation to each other and are
as interdependent as any other beings and
conditions in nature.
The Director of Forestry of the Philippine Islands has said:
During the time of the passage of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, this question of forest and
agricultural lands was beginning to receive some
attention and it is clearly shown in section 18 of the
above mentioned Act; it leaves to the Bureau of
Forestry the certification as to what lands are for
agricultural or forest uses. Although the Act states
timber lands, the Bureau has in its administration
since the passage of this act construed this term to
mean forest lands in the sense of what was
necessary to protect, for the public good; waste
lands without a tree have been declared more
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