The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.

G.R. No. 101949

01 December 1994
FACTS:
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000
square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous
with two other lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view of the refusal of
the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has
the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the
relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding
selling a lot to a private entity
HELD:
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the
generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation,
such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of
the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.
In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of
real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure
gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent
disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for
the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is nonproprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for
the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal
Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof
are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for
profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living
thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the
donation.

INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION vs HON. PURA

CALLEJA
G. R. No. 85750 Sept. 28, 1990
FACTS:
ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in Morong Bataan, is a non-profit
agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly
registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and
enjoys Consultative status II. It has the activities parallel to those of the
International Committee for Migrtion (ICM) and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC).
On July 14, 1986, Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed
with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election
among the rank and file members employed by the ICMC. The latter opposed the
petition on the ground that it enjoys diplomatic immunity.
On Februaury 5, 1987 Med Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and
dismissed the petition of TUPAS for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, The Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations reversed the Med Arbiters Decisionand ordered the
immediate conduct of a certification election. This present Petition for Certiorari with
Preliminary Injunction assailing the BLR Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to
immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.
HELD:
The Petition is GRANTED, the order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for Certification
election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued is made
PERMANENT.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation
of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts
should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed
by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty
of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his
direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government
in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial
department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will
not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION vs HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO

G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the
Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable goods
under the Customs and Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent Judge then issued
a search warrant at the instance of the COSAC officers for the search and seizure of
the personla effects of Dr. Verstuyft notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic
immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive branch of the government.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent judge that
Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage
as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement
and further requested for the suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor
General accordingly joined the petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant but
respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from
search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.
HELD:
The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled
to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA
formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position.
The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly
affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of
the search warrant.
It recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of government, and
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his
discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of

property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting

foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued
by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

TANADA v. ANGARA
272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein
respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial
products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and
uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These
are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the
signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits,
restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the
Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign
trading intervention.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of
the said WTO agreement.
HELD:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity ,
with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of
our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in
good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered
as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such

as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its
sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate
did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of
signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal
of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be
viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of
international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic selfdestruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make
their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion

G.R. No. 139465
January 18, 2000
FACTS:
Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire
tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The
US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez
be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as
well as the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy
thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a
preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies. Jimenez
sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case against Jimenez refer to an
impending threat of deprivation of ones property or property right. No less is this
true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible
deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected
rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for
while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration
is irretrievable and beyond recompense.

EDUARDO TOLENTINO RODRIGUEZ and IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ, vs.

Judge of RTC Manila Branch 17
G.R. No. 157977 February 27, 2006
Facts: The US Government filed a petition for extradition against petitioners before
DOJ. After arrest, the petitioners applied for bail. A bail for 1M each was set and both
filed a cash bond. US appealed the decisin to grant bail. SC remanded the case to
the trial court with a direction to resolve the matter of bail according to the ruling in
US vs. Purugganan. The court then without notice cancelled the bail and ordered the
arrest of the petitioners. The petitioners are questioning the validity of the order,
contending that their right to due process was denied because no notice was given
them when their bail was cancelled.
Issue:
1) In an extradition case, is prior notice and hearing required before bail is
cancelled?
2) What constitutes a special circumstance to be exempt from the no-bail rule in
extradition cases?
Held:
Yes. In Purganan, a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest because notifying him before his arrest
only tips him of his pending arrest. But this is for cases pending the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that had been issued after
determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. The grant of the bail,
presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her

right to be on bail.2) Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community, and
That there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. In this case,
she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband
had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing
trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the
authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there is an existing holddeparture order against her; and that she is now in her sixties, sickly and under
medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on
bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without
the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary
liberty should not be discontinued.

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R. No. 154705. June 26,
2003]
FACTS: Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent.
The maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipments: air
conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water
motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.
The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services
unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The
respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. The latter claim that it
was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the
Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and
cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have
waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the
Maintenance Agreement.
HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or
juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the

establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment
of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity
when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement
was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental
functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino

376 U.S. 398 (1964)
Facts:
Farr Whitlock and Co. contracted with Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguay de
Cuba (CAV) to import sugar into the US. As part of a trade dispute, the government
of Cuba nationalized their sugar industry and seized the assets of several US-owned
sugar producers, including CAV.
CAV still made the delivery, but Farr didn't send the payment to the Cuban
government, instead they paid CAV's legal representative in the US, Sabbatino.
Banco National de Cuba (BNC) sued Sabbatino in US Court to get them to hand over
the money for the sugar. BNC argued that the Cuban nationalization was an official
Act of State and should be honored by the US.
Issue:

Whether the Act of State Doctrine was a violation of international law.

Held:
The US Supreme Court found that the policy of US Federal courts would be to honor
the Act of State Doctrine. The Court found that the Cuban seizure did not violate
international law, because there was no clear international opinion that a seizure of
land or property in a country by the government of that country was illegal. The
Court found that there was no need for the Executive branch to ask the courts to
apply the Act of State Doctrine. The Court found that it should be assumed to apply
because if even a single court made a mistake and failed to apply it, it could mess
up US relations with other countries. The Court found that the Act of State Doctrine
still applied, even thought the State was a plaintiff. Similar to the idea of sovereign
immunity where States can sue, but cannot be sued. In response to this decision,
Congress passed the Second Hickenlooper Amendment (aka the Sabbatino
Amendment) that revoked the presumption in favor of the validity of the Act of
State Doctrine.