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GR No. L-47362 December 19, 1940 JOHN F.

VILLARROEL
, appellant-appellant, vs.
BERNARDINO ESTRADA
, turned-appellee.
D. Felipe Agoncillo in representation of the appellant-appelante. D. Crispin Oben in representation of the defendant-appellee.

Some months thereafter, when the board of directors of the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., issued a call for the payment of the second
installment of the subscriptions, the defendant-appellant sent a radiogram to the plaintiff-appellee did so and sent P2,000 directly to the
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in payment of the said installment. Due to the manipulations of those who controlled the Philippine
Greyhound Club, Inc., during the absence of the defendant-appellant undertook the organization of a company called The Philippine
Racing Club, which now manages the race track of the Santa Ana park. The defendant immediately endeavored to save the investment of
those who had subscribed to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., by having the Philippine Racing Club acquire the remaining assets of
the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc. The defendant-appellant wrote a letter to the plaintiff-appellee in Shanghai explaining in detail the
critical condition of the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., and outlining his plans to save the properties and assets of the plaintiff-appellee
that he felt morally responsible to the stockholders who had paid their second installment (Exh. C). In answer to said letter, the plaintiffappellee wrote the defendant-appellant requiring him to return the entire amount paid by him to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc.,
(exhibit E). Upon receiving this letter, the defendant-appellant answered the plaintiff-appellee for any loss which he might have suffered in
connection with the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in the same way that he could not expect anyone to reimburse him for his own losses
which were much more than those of the plaintiff-appellee (Exh. B).

DECISION
Avancea,J.:
On May 9, 1912, Alejandro F. Callao, mother of defendant John F. Villarroel, obtained from thespouses Mariano Estrada and Severina a
loan of P1, 000 payable after seven years (ExhibitoA). Alejandra died, leaving as sole heir to the defendant.Spouses Mariano Estrada and
Severina alsodied, leaving as sole heir to the plaintiff Bernardino Estrada. On August 9, 1930, the defendant signeda document (Exhibito
B) by which the applicant must declare in the amount of P1, 000, with aninterest of 12 percent per year. This action relates to the recovery
of this amount. The Court of First Instance of Laguna, which was filed in this action, condemn the defendant to paythe claimed amount of
P1, 000 with legal interest of 12 percent per year since the August 9, 1930until full pay. He appealed the sentence. It will be noted that the
parties in the present case are, respectively, the only heirs and creditors of the original debtor. This action is brought under the defendant's
liability as the only son of the originaldebtor in favor of the plaintiff contracted, sole heir of primitive loa creditors. It is recognized that
theamount of P1, 000 to which contracts this obligation is the same debt of the mother's parents sued theplaintiff. Although the action to
recover the original debt has prescribed and when the lawsuit was filed in thiscase, the question raised in this appeal is primarily whether,
notwithstanding such requirement, theaction taken is appropriate. However, this action is based on the original obligation contracted by
themother of the defendant, who has already prescribed, but in which the defendant contracted theAugust 9, 1930 (Exhibito B) by
assuming the fulfillment of that obligation, as prescribed. Being theonly defendant in the original herdero debtor eligible successor into his
inheritance, that debt broughtby his mother in law, although it lost its effectiveness by prescription, is now, however, for a moralobligation,
that is consideration enough to create and make effective and enforceable obligationvoluntarily contracted its August 9, 1930 in Exhibito B.
The rule that a new promise to pay a debt prrescrita must be made by the same person obligated orotherwise legally authorized by it, is
not applicable to the present case is not required in compliancewith the mandatory obligation orignalmente but which would give it
voluntarily assumed thisobligation.It confirms the judgement appealed from, with cost against the appellant.
November 2, 1939
G.R. No. 46274
A.O. FISHER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOHN C. ROBB, defendant-appellant.
Marcial P. Lichauco and Manuel M. Mejia for appellant.
Wolfson, Barrion and Baradi and Ignacio Ycaza for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendant John C. Robb appeals to this Court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive part of which
reads:

The principal question to be decided in this appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in holding that there was sufficient consideration
to justify the promise made by the defendant-appellant in his letters Exhibits B and C.
In the fifth paragraph of the letter Exhibit B, dated March 16, 1936, addressed by the defendant-appellant to the plaintiff-appellee, the
former said: I feel a moral responsibility for these second payments, which were made in order to carry out my plan (not the first
payments, as you have it in your letter), and Mr. Hilscher and I will see to it that stockholders who made second payments receive these
amounts back as soon as possible, out of our own personal funds. As it is, I have had to take my loss along with everyone else here, and
so far as I can see that is what all of us must do. The corporation is finally flat, so it is out of the question to receive back any of your
investment from that source; the only salvage will be the second payment that you made, and that will come from Hilscher and me
personally, as I say, not because of any obligation, but simply because we have taken it on ourselves to do that. (And I wish I could find
someone who would undertake to repay a part of my own losses in the enterprise!) And in the seventh paragraph of the letter Exhibit C,
dated February 21, 1936, addressed by the same defendant-appellant to the same plaintiff-appellee the former said the following:
However, Mr. Fischer and I feel a personal responsibility to those few stockholders who made their second payments, including yourself,
and it is our intention to personally repay the amounts of the second payments made by those few.
. . . And, finally, paragraph 8 of the same letter Exhibit C states: We are to receive a certain share of the new Philippine Racing Club for
our services as promoters of that organization, and as soon as this is received by us, we will be in a position to compensate you and the
few others who made the second payments. That, as T have said, will come from us personally, in an effort to make things easier for those
who were sportsmen enough to try to save the Greyhound organization by making second payments.
Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
A contract exists from the moment one or more persons consent to be bound with respect to another or others to deliver
something or to render some services.
And article 1261 of the same Civil Code provides the following:
ART. 1261. There is no contract unless the following requisites exists:
1. The consent of the contracting parties;
2. A definite object which is the subject-matter of the contract;
3. A consideration for the obligation established.

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, who is ordered to pay to the former the sum of P2,000,
with interest at the legal rate from March 11, 1938, until paid, plus costs.
The facts established at the trial without discussion are the following:
In September, 1935, the board of directors of the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., told the herein defendant-appellant John C. Robb, to
make a business trip to Shanghai to study the operation of a dog racing course. In Shanghai, the defendant-appellant stayed at the
American Club where be became acquainted with the plaintiff-appellee, A. O. Fisher, through their mutual friends. In the course of a
conversation, the defendant-appellant came to know that the plaintiff-appellee was the manager of a dog racing course. Upon knowing the
purpose of the defendant-appellants trip, the plaintiff-appellee showed great interest and invited him to his establishment and for several
days gave him information about the business. It seems that the plaintiff became interested in the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., and
asked the defendant if he could have a part therein as a stockholder. As the defendant-appellant answered in the affirmative, the plaintiffappellee thereupon filled a subscription blank and, through his bank in Shanghai, sent to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in Manila
telegraphic transfer for P3,000 in payment of the first installment of his subscription. Later on the defendant-appellant returned to Manila
from Shanghai.

In the present case, while the defendant-appellant told the plaintiff-appellee that he felt morally responsible for the second payments which
had been made to carry out his plan, and that Mr. Hilscher and he would do everything possible so that the stockholders who had made
second payments may receive the amount paid by them from their personal funds because they voluntarily assumed the responsibility to
make such payment as soon as they receive from the Philippine racing Club certain shares for their services as promoters of said
organization, it does not appear that the plaintiff-appellee had consented to said form of reimbursement of the P2,000 which he had
directly paid to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in satisfaction of the second installment.
The first essential requisite, therefore, required by the cited article 1261 of the Civil Code for the existence of a contract, does not exists.
As to the third essential requisite, namely, A consideration for the obligation established, article 1274 of the same Code provides:

In onerous contracts the consideration as to each of the parties is the delivery or performance or the promise of delivery or performance of
a thing or service by the other party; in remuneratory contracts the consideration is the service or benefit for which the remuneration is
given, and in contracts of pure beneficence the consideration is the liberality of the benefactors.

he was morally responsible because of the failure of the enterprise, is not the consideration required by article 1261 of the Civil Code as
an essential element for the legal existence of an onerous contract which would bind the promisor to comply with his promise.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the costs to the plaintiff.

And article 1275 of the same Code provides:


Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.
ART. 1275. Contracts without consideration or with an illicit consideration produce no effect whatsoever. A consideration is
illicit when it is contrary to law or morality.
Manresa, in volume 8, 4rth edition, pages 618-619 of his Commentaries on the Civil Code, has this to say:
Considering the concept of the consideration as the explanation and motive of the contract, it is related to the latters object
and even more to its motives with which it is often confused. It is differentiated from them, however, in that the former is the
essential reason for the contract, while the latter are the particular reasons of a contracting party which do not affect the
other party and which do not preclude the existence of a different consideration. To clarify by an example: A thing purchased
constitutes the consideration for the purchaser and not the motives which have influenced his mind, like its usefulness, its
perfection, its relation to another, the use thereof which he may have in mind, etc., a very important distinction, which
precludes the annulment of the contract by the sole influence of the motives, unless the efficacy of the former had been
subordinated to compliance with the latter as conditions.
The jurisprudence shows some cases wherein this important distinction is established. The consideration of contracts, states the decision
of February 24, 1904, is distinct from the motive which may prompt the parties in executing them. The inaccuracies committed in
expressing its accidental or secondary details do not imply lack of consideration or false consideration, wherefore, they do not affect the
essence and validity of the contract. In a loan the consideration in its essence is, for the borrower the acquisition of the amount, and for
the lender the power to demand its return, whether the money be for the former or for another person and whether it be invested as stated
or otherwise.
The same distinction between the consideration and the motive is found in the decisions of November 23, 1920 and March 5, 1924.
The contract sought to be judicially enforced by the plaintiff-appellee against the defendant-appellant is onerous in character, because it
supposes the deprivation of the latter of an amount of money which impairs his property, which is a burden, and for it to be legally valid it is
necessary that it should have a consideration consisting in the lending or or promise of a thing or service by such party. The defendantappellant is required to give a thing, namely, the payment of the sum of P2,000, but the plaintiff-appellee has not given or promised
anything or service to the former which may compel him to make such payment. The promise which said defendant-appellant has made to
the plaintiff-appellee to return to him P2,000 which he had paid to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., as second installment of the
payment of the amount of the shares for which he has subscribed, was prompted by a feeling of pity which said defendant-appellant had
for the plaintiff-appellee as a result of the loss which the latter had suffered because of the failure of the enterprise. The obligation which
the said defendant-appellant had contracted with the plaintiff-appellee is, therefore, purely moral and, as such, is not demandable in law
but only in conscience, over which human judges have no jurisdiction.
As to whether a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration, read in volume 12 of the American Jurisprudence, pages 589-590,
paragraphs 96, 67, the following:
SEC. 96. Moral obligation. ? Although there is authority in support of the board proposition that a moral obligation is sufficient
consideration, such proposition is usually denied. . . . .
The case presenting the question whether a moral obligation will sustain an express executory promise may be divided into five classes:
(1) Cases in which the moral obligation arose wholly from ethical considerations, unconnected with any legal obligations, perfect or
imperfect, and without the receipt of actual pecuniary or material benefit by the promisor prior to the subsequent promise; (2) cases in
which the moral obligation arose from a legal liability already performed or still enforceable; (3) cases in which the moral obligation arose
out of, or was connected with, a previous request or promise creating originally an enforceable legal liability, which, however, at the time of
the subsequent express promise had become discharged or barred by operation of a positive rule of law, so that at that time there was no
enforceable legal liability; (4) cases in which the moral obligation arose from, or was connected with, a previous request or promise which,
however, never created any enforceable legal liability, because of a rule of law which rendered the original agreement void, or at least
unenforceable; and (5) cases in which the moral obligation arose out of, or was connected with, the receipt of actual material or pecuniary
benefit by the promisor, without, however, any previous request or promise on his part, express or implied, and therefore, of course,
without any original legal liability, perfect or imperfect.
SEC. 97. Moral obligation unconnected with legal liability or legal benefit. ? Although, as subsequently shown was formerly
some doubt as to the point, it is now well established that a mere moral obligation or conscience duty arising wholly from
ethical motives or a mere conscientious duty unconnected with any legal obligation, perfect or imperfect, or with the receipt
of benefit by the promisor of a material or pecuniary nature will not furnish a consideration for an executory promise. . . . .
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the promise made by an organizer of a dog racing course
to a stockholder to return to him certain amounts paid by the latter in satisfaction of his subscription upon the belief of said organizer that

July 8, 1942
G.R. No. 48006
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.

ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject
to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
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ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so
done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom another is responsible.

BOCOBO, J.:
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of
Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.

Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living with them.

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on
collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal
action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to
bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino
Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against
Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance
of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was
modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is
undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed.
As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:

Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the
branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.

... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several
times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public
Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.

ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the latter what he may have paid.

The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by the official
upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be
applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage.

REVISED PENAL CODE


ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only
subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible
in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals
insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the
Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of
Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from
wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising
from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of
his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.

ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and
6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the
following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person
under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be
insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable
in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.

The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him
primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that
Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said
Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must
cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal
Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth,
unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the
perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn
clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording
and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any
kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
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When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government,
or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the
authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and
secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt
from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishment. In default of persons criminally liable,
innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all
cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the
person, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in
case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
xxxxxxxxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the
instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of
the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer
study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising
from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual
under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of
its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as
culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law
6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero
acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this
legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then
article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This
portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely
repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while
the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all
violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws,
infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability under
article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una
responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia
indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility,
properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal
liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision between two trains belonging
respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case,
in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the
criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril
Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in
part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada
acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la
accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este,
sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por
delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden
publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los
quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no
borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el
articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial
que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse
en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo,
desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de

la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas
ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que
en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos
conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los
delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No
coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y
omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran
los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por
esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter
subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la
obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre
justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes
modos de proceder, habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se
reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo
sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun
cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para
despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian
jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir
su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the
civil obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is
based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa
surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this
reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages
are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar
nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are
derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence
intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith.
Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop
and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is
known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison
between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to
point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil responsibilities among those who, for different reasons,
are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the guilty
parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are
criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next
preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible."
Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service
or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or
enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of
our judicial system, so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and
inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to
exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was
not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21
was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved
till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the non-existence of the
responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is
greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res
judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and
whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of
the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author of the act. The action against
the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary
in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal
action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish
translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal
and not subsidiary. He writes:

Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe
responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto
legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria
contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son
imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa
del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del establecimiento, del maestro,
etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices)
causan un dao, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el
dao. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la
responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente
inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those persons for who one is responsible,
subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it
true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice
and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The
responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that
is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever
anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage,
the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It
is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se
responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad.
Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y
los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del
articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas
personas de quienes se deba responder."

followed the same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the decision in
that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car company. This is precisely what happens in
the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not
exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In
the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from
the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same.
But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence which he did not
overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi
driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs
were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might
be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in
prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against
him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of
the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held
liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in
the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case
while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two
years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought against a railroad company for damages
because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:

That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article
1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is
this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated
persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the
latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood
as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should
be responsible."

Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que
las expediciones facturadas por la compaia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan
tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se
quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de
entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daos y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante
importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir
los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:

Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or
culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and
that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.

Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del
pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el
retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de
aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la
reparaction de los daos y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega
de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el
articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por
relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.

One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of
having been run over by a street car owned by the "compaia Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal
case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company, paying for damages in the amount of
15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court of
Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compaia
Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la
sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las
dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que
se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico
fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo
1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daos
causados por sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este
ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia recurrente a la indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer
los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin
invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the trial court, in sentencing the Compaia
Madrilea to the payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of
the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had
taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the
act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of
acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to
article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers of establishments or
enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused
by one of its employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly

Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1)
that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint
should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to
the consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these
goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale
vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the
receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as the original complaint did not contain any
cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor
on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision
appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the
plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the
sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the
defendant company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by relations of economic character and by
administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case,
the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held
to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.

In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the
plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off
while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the
remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily
liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the
representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed,
payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising
from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with them.

If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street,
because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is
to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward,
he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached
a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not
have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street
and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on
the right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and
the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this
circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having
blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child would
not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the
death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or
culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer
could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime.

xxxxxxxxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxxxxxxxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the
employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the
laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any
conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the
selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in
criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon
their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual
force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and
criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article
112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been
expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be
enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of
articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not
intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is
civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose
prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against
his employees only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which
liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of
the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the
Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil
liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure
now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the
interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses
in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee
who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093.
More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are regulated
by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of
pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or
quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this
distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his
employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured
bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against
Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the
defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in
affirming the judgment, said in part:

Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric
& Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the
child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday
procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to
attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the
offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite
direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately
she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The trial
courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no
contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the
holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action
because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the
trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious
procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could
foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The
doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the
Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery,
but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V.
House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because
of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to
have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a
defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in
carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff.
On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good father of
a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the
machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard
garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been
used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or
constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from
liability.

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint
alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that
said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua
and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent
acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year
1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on
his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing
him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co.,
pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902
and 1903, held:

The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the action there had for its purpose the
enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on
the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's
contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is
different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability
arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code,
and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the
question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.

The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code.
Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a
civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the
demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are
announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and
direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the
exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this
court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902
to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the
authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil.,
586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925.
The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property
and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila
for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed
an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense
was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal
Code in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by
providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction
of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent
act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the
Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
xxxxxxxxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any
different ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in
the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might
not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said
further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of
the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the
present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from
Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely
different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have
already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric
Company had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The
defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore
claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption from civil liability established in article 1903
of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability
provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which
can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's)
property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is
such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the
defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers
of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be
required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have
endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles
calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It
is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that
they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should
reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to
Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a
careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee
because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that
before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la
de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and
utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of
stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to
the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for
culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime,
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed
by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et
seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better
safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent
civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.

G.R. No. L-32599

June 29, 1979

EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner


vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO
SALAZAR, respondents.

pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated February 23, 1971, with
respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more decisive interpretation of the rule. 3
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us, also to review the last two mentioned Orders, to which we
required jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.
The Complaint against

David G. Nitafan for petitioner.


truck-owner Timbol
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his
Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.

In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred by the
prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by
petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that the
Complaint does not state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as
the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.

The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as follows:

Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must
be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must
be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and
Identity of cause of action.

On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao,
Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and
a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two
separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya
with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The race against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for
causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to
hit and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed
as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00

It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of cause
of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya
was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact
as the trial Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he
(Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in the criminal cases,
the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code As held in Barredo
vs. Garcia, et al. 5

At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to
the left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before the
impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by the truck driven by
Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, tried to
show that, after overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left towards the poblacion of
Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position, his jeep was
bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then swerved to the left and hit
petitioner's car, which was coming from the opposite direction.

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in. individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code.
Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a
civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant- petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage
to property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227, and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify
Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine
and indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de oficio, and his bond
is ordered canceled
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between
Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither
was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance of
Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by
Montoya, for indentification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver
Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum allegedly for the reason that petitioner
was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief against both on only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by
a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the
afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September 30, 1970, petitioner sought before this Court the review of that dismissal, to which
petition we gave due course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge also dismissed the case as against the former.
Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could
be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which took effect on
January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same would be barred

That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit:
that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly
swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence
and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the same direction as Salazar's
jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise
incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must
consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or
omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee,
Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed
the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
Art. 31.
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the
criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking section 2, Rule 111,
Rules of Court, which says:
Section 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency
of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shau proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7 said:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an
action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31,
the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of
the result of the latter. Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary
to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule
stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of
substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso ... .

In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal
Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in
character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand
because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner
failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992


PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
Balgos and Perez for petitioners.

The suit against


Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private respondents.
jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended
party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of
civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal
action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeepowner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the
prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its
termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for
civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case,
expounded by the trial Court in this wise:
In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped and hit
the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the
result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar
cannot be held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the
damages sustained by petitioner's car. In other words, "the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch as
petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil
action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court 10 which provides:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx

xxx

xxx

c)
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in
a final judgment that the fact from which the civil night arise did not exist. ...
And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it
being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil
action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under:

PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate
officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his
assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (VicePresident), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of
Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their
alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the
school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic
institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to
dismiss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then assailed the
trial court's disposition before the respondent appellate court which, in a decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial court's
orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as
enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and
learned authorities on its meaning should give way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In
fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its
capacity to meet the new challenges of progress.
Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case of
Exconde vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; 3 hence, the ruling in the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to all kinds of
educational institutions, academic or vocational.

Art. 29.
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence ...

At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the
last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on the
merits of the case. 5

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint was correctly denied and the complaint
should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.

In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we sustain respondent Judge's Order dated January 30,
1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in
the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been
stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation
does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the
school could be made liable.

WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set
aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January
30, 1971 and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby
upheld.
No costs.
SO ORDEREd

However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not
necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that
would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand,
the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or
assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there
looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasidelict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extracontractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression
has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso
(124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner
airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract
of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks
the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).

G.R. No. L-47745

April 15, 1988

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR
GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.

This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad
(38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of
juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another
by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may
break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of
an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to
cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment
caused to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the
foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there
is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista
had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And,
even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of
Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only
because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like
a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student communities of the
so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of
hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious
deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its
contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. 9
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the
material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to
continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.

CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage
and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it
turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of
their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his
expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil
action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal,
the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint
against the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs
in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees . 3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the
defendants were completely absolved . 4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that
Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended,
that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in
preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was
shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and consequences of these facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was
then under the custody of the private respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for
the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which they
claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on
April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him
without making a report to the principal or taking any further action . 6 As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter
fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that
their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the
gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in
support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno 7 Mercado
v. Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it
turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the
separate civil action flied against them, his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of
the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a
party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and
Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school authorities who should be held liable Liability under this rule, he said, was

imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of
arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time at
the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for damages. Through Justice
Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued that the school was not liable because it was
not an establishment of arts and trades. Moreover, the custody requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a situation where
the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the parents."
Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other members of the court concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of
the Manila Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer who was already of age was not boarding in the school, the head thereof and
the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court declared through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody
that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious
act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it
relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting
opinion, that even students already of age were covered by the provision since they were equally in the custody of the school and subject
to its discipline. Dissenting with three others, 11 Justice Makalintal was for retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted
that the rule should apply only to torts committed by students not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the school
involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will have
to await another case wherein it may properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under
Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. The parties herein have also
directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades,
and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all
schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for
the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the
general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception
to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should
apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."

These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his
students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case
of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the
teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage
over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans
apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school
of arts and trades was such a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even boarded with
him and so came under his constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved
with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students. The
head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not be
directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent
increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article
2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original
mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary
amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the
students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school term, as
contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not
mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the control and under
the influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be coterminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after
such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises. In
the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school
and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that
before that day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon
the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as
submission of reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of
the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from observance of its rules.

The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part:

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more
than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is
still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.

I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What
substantial difference is there between them insofar as concerns the proper supervision and vice over their pupils? It cannot be seriously
contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third
Persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers"
but only "heads of establishments." The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the
Italian and French Civil Codes.

During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students' torts, in practically the same way that
the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or
other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not
necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote
immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of
such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shag be held responsible if the tort was
committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.

If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places the child
under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while
under his custody, for the very reason/that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority
and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.

In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school
of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or
even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it
had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.

There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students
are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature
of the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or
even the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that same tort were committed
in an academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or
the head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-academic school would be held liable,
and simply because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of
their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is
academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by
the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury contemplated may be
caused by any student regardless of the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by
simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were nonacademic.

Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also states that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the Persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to
the teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent
more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may
be unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the increasing activism among the students that is likely to cause violence and
resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling,

it is not the school that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held
answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in
the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all
cases now, in fact, these measures are effected through the assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher physically
enforce those rules upon the students. Ms should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent any injury that
may be committed by its students.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:

A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage
caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises and presumably under his influence. In this respect, the Court is
disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not
equal in degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him is greater than
on the teacher. It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the
teacher's influence, besides being coterminous with the period of custody is usually enforced only because of the students' desire to pass
the course. The parent can instill more las discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than
the teacher for the tort committed by the child.

As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever stands in loco parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents
whenever in such a standing. Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious acts of pupils and students so long as the latter
remain in their custody, meaning their protective and supervisory custody.

And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already of age and therefore less tractable than the minor then there
should all the more be justification to require from the school authorities less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence
in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the student's acts because he has reached majority age and so
is no longer under the former's control, there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the teacher's responsibility for the acts
of the student.

I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the term "teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge."
This would limit liability to occasions where there are classes under the immediate charge of a teacher, which does not seem to be the
intendment of the law.

Thus Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons who stand in loco parentis and thereby exercise substitute parental authority:
Art. 349

The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:

xxx

xxx

xxx

2) Teachers and professors


xxx

xxx

xxx

4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to apprentices;'

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following conclusions:

Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:

1.
At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously
observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also
brought him in the custody of the school authorities.

Art. 362.
The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each
school or institution....

2.
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-incharge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The
evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had
gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon,
the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3.
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline
upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence
when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day.
And while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when
the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
maintaining that discipline.
4.
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view of the
unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without
taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves
sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and
returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
5.
Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because
only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice.
Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have
been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein announced that none of the
respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the
tragic circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under
the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernan, Padilla and Teehankee, C.J., JJ, took no part.

Separate Opinions

But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can not contravene the concept of substitute parental authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils was explained in Palisoc vs. Brillantes (41 SCRA
548), thus:
The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their
obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from
dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some students themselves may inflict wilfully or through
negligence on their fellow students. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the responsibility treated of shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since Article 2180 speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the
same provision, the school, as their employer, may be held liable for the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory
legal duties as substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the school may exculpate itself
from liability by proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
Art. 2180. x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 349 of the Civil Code, supra, it is apparent that the Code Commission had already
segregated the classification of "teachers and professors" vis-a-vis their pupils, from "directors of trade establishments, with regard to their
apprentices."
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully analyzed and crafted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz. However, I would like to stress the need for a
major amendment to, if not a complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code insofar as it refers to teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades in relation to pupils and students or apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art. 2180 is a relic of the past
and contemplates a situation long gone and out of date. In a Palisoc v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation, it is bound to result in mischief
and injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in schools of arts and trades. Students in "technological" colleges and universities
are no different from students in liberal arts or professional schools. Apprentices now work in regular shops and factories and their
relationship to the employer is covered by laws governing the employment relationship and not by laws governing the teacherstudent
relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and perhaps early high school students, teachers are often no longer objects of veneration
who are given the respect due to substitute parents. Many students in their late teens or early adult years view some teachers as part of a

bourgeois or reactionary group whose advice on behaviour, deportment, and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively
rejected. It ,seems most unfair to hold teachers liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under
circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship. Why do teachers have to prove the contrary of
negligence to be freed from solidary liability for the acts f bomb-throwing or pistol packing students who would just as soon hurt them as
they would other members of the so-called-establishment.
The ordinary rules on quasi-delicta should apply to teachers and schools of whatever nature insofar as grown up students are concerned.
The provision of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved in this case has outlived its purpose. The Court cannot make law. It can only apply the
law with its imperfections. However, the Court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed.

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the term "teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge."
This would limit liability to occasions where there are classes under the immediate charge of a teacher, which does not seem to be the
intendment of the law.
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever stands in loco parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents
whenever in such a standing. Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious acts of pupils and students so long as the latter
remain in their custody, meaning their protective and supervisory custody.
Thus Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons who stand in loco parentis and thereby exercise substitute parental authority:
Art. 349

The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:

xxx

xxx

xxx

2) Teachers and professors


xxx

xxx

xxx

4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to apprentices;'


Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 362.
The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each
school or institution....
But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can not contravene the concept of substitute parental authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils was explained in Palisoc vs. Brillantes (41 SCRA
548), thus:
The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their
obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from
dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some students themselves may inflict wilfully or through
negligence on their fellow students. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the responsibility treated of shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since Article 2180 speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the
same provision, the school, as their employer, may be held liable for the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory
legal duties as substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts & Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the school may exculpate itself
from liability by proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
Art. 2180. x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 349 of the Civil Code, supra, it is apparent that the Code Commission had already
segregated the classification of "teachers and professors" vis-a-vis their pupils, from "directors of trade establishments, with regard to their
apprentices."
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully analyzed and crafted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz. However, I would like to stress the need for a
major amendment to, if not a complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code insofar as it refers to teachers or heads of

establishments of arts and trades in relation to pupils and students or apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art. 2180 is a relic of the past
and contemplates a situation long gone and out of date. In a Palisoc v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation, it is bound to result in mischief
and injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in schools of arts and trades. Students in "technological" colleges and universities
are no different from students in liberal arts or professional schools. Apprentices now work in regular shops and factories and their
relationship to the employer is covered by laws governing the employment relationship and not by laws governing the teacherstudent
relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and perhaps early high school students, teachers are often no longer objects of veneration
who are given the respect due to substitute parents. Many students in their late teens or early adult years view some teachers as part of a
bourgeois or reactionary group whose advice on behaviour, deportment, and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively
rejected. It ,seems most unfair to hold teachers liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under
circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship. Why do teachers have to prove the contrary of
negligence to be freed from solidary liability for the acts f bomb-throwing or pistol packing students who would just as soon hurt them as
they would other members of the so-called-establishment.
The ordinary rules on quasi-delicta should apply to teachers and schools of whatever nature insofar as grown up students are concerned.
The provision of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved in this case has outlived its purpose. The Court cannot make law. It can only apply the
law with its imperfections. However, the Court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed.

2. By statute, only questions of law may be raised in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is
conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
G.R. No. L-21438

September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner,


vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that
said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have
confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first
class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third
assignment of error, which reads: The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class
seats on the definite segments of his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut. 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:

DECISION
SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages;
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the
trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus
P3,000.00 for attorneys fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascosos plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted
to affirm the appealed decision in all other respects, with costs against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.

Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the
same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make
arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We
cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to
honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of
its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues
are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioners contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a First class ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiffs
Exhibits A, A-1, B, B-1, B-2, C and C-1, and defendants own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiffs testimony and
testified as follows:

The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as fully supported by the evidence of record, are:
Q. In these tickets there are marks O.K. From what you know, what does this OK mean?
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
A. That the space is confirmed.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a first class
round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in first class, but at Bangkok, the Manager of
the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the first class seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, there was a white man, who, the Manager alleged, had a better right to the seat. When asked to vacate his first class seat,
the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendants Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion
ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out
that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his first class
seat in the plane.3
1. The thrust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review all the findings 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that
respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable
to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate courts decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the
merits of the case shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based; 6 and that Every decision of the Court of
Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it. 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a decision state
the essential ultimate facts upon which the courts conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every
bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation
to specify in the sentence the facts which a party considered as proved. 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the
Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So
long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold
therefrom any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense. Because as this Court well observed, There is no
law that so requires. 12 Indeed, the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing
to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution. It is in this
setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without
taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellants side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony, would not vitiate the
judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the
defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal
presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the
court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by
the court and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon. 16They consist of the courts conclusions with
respect to the determinative facts in issue. 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as one which does not call for
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. 18

Q. Confirmed for first class?


A. Yes, first class. (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was
issued a first class airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of
said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiffs Exhibits A, A-l, B, B-l, C and C-1 belie the
testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation
whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendants own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a first class
accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal
understanding with plaintiff that the first class ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascosos ticket,
the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a
judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of
Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and all questions raised by the assignments of
error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant. So also, the judgment
affirmed must be regarded as free from all error. 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of
Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by
the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in
specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a
passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and
say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a
rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts
refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the
finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the
Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioners statement of its position,
as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioners accusation that respondent Carrascoso surreptitiously took a first class
seat to provoke an issue. 29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok to

confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager. 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in
the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent courts award of moral damages. Petitioners trenchant claim is that Carrascosos action is planted upon
breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision
of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter acting as
general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish
plaintiff, First Class passage on defendants plane during the entire duration of plaintiffs tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point up
to and until plaintiffs return trip to Manila, .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First
Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendants employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from
Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, the plaintiff has been compelled by defendants employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.

Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, white man have a better right to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The
record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove any better, nay, any right on the part of the white man to the First class seat that
the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a corresponding first class ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendants Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by having
taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does
find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he
did not give up his first class seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, the white man.38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not use the term bad faith. But can it be
doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first
class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the
tourist class compartment just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, bad faith contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose. 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:

6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments brought by defendants breach of
contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendants failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences,
embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the
like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst
others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at
Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioners employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
berth after he was already, seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments
and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral
damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be
drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But
the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondents counsel placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso
intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioners manager who gave his seat to a white
man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is,
therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36
On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France while at
Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook which
notation reads as follows:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene,
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by the
manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at
the trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37

The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances
that defendants Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him
thrown out of the airplane to give the first class seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a
white man whom he (defendants Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this white man had any
better right to occupy the first class seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding first class
ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful
malevolent act of petitioners manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. 43And this, because of the
relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carriers employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses
from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an
action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passengers check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action
for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of
ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected. 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger
and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature nevertheless the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. 47 And in another
case, Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the
train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to
destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by
calling him a lunatic, 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.
Petitioners contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos action as we have said, is placed upon
his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

The Court of appeals further stated

7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascosos testimony, thus

Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at
Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as
the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of
others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by defendants employees, the manager adopted the more
drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably
was what happened there, by the testimony of defendants witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters
O.K. appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said that the space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for
defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:

Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?

Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger has arranged with you?

A No, because I did not give my ticket.

A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation. (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)

Q About that purser?

In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:

A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you dont have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry
that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, I have recorded the incident in my notebook. He read it and translated it to me

A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the flight attendants approached me and requested
from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, We will note that you transferred to the tourist class. I said, Nothing of that kind.
That is tantamount to accepting my transfer. And I also said, You are not going to note anything there because I am protesting to this
transfer.
Q Was she able to note it?

because it was recorded in French First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene.
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT

August 31, 1954

I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49

G.R. No. L-7089


DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NORTHERN THEATRICAL ENTERPRISES INC., ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading First class passenger
was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene is predicated upon evidence [Carrascosos
testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on
the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh
and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res
gestae. 50 For, they grow out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant. 51 The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness
has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for
petitioner to have contradicted Carrascosos testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser
could have cleared up the matter.

Conrado Rubio for appellant.


Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz, and Benjamin Guerrero for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The facts in this case based on an agreed statement of facts are simple. In the year 1941 the Northern Theatrical Enterprises Inc., a
domestic corporation operated a movie house in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, and among the persons employed by it was the plaintiff DOMINGO
DE LA CRUZ, hired as a special guard whose duties were to guard the main entrance of the cine, to maintain peace and order and to
report the commission of disorders within the premises. As such guard he carried a revolver. In the afternoon of July 4, 1941, one
Benjamin Martin wanted to crash the gate or entrance of the movie house. Infuriated by the refusal of plaintiff De la Cruz to let him in
without first providing himself with a ticket, Martin attacked him with a bolo. De la Cruz defendant himself as best he could until he was
cornered, at which moment to save himself he shot the gate crasher, resulting in the latter's death.

We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages in contracts and
quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner. 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to
moral damages.54
9. The right to attorneys fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys fees. The
least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys fees be given. 55 We do not intend to
break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral
damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with
the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur
thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the
same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.

For the killing, De la Cruz was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 8449 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. After a reinvestigation conducted by the Provincial Fiscal the latter filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the court in
January 1943. On July 8, 1947, De la Cruz was again accused of the same crime of homicide, in Criminal Case No. 431 of the same
Court. After trial, he was finally acquitted of the charge on January 31, 1948. In both criminal cases De la Cruz employed a lawyer to
defend him. He demanded from his former employer reimbursement of his expenses but was refused, after which he filed the present
action against the movie corporation and the three members of its board of directors, to recover not only the amounts he had paid his
lawyers but also moral damages said to have been suffered, due to his worry, his neglect of his interests and his family as well in the
supervision of the cultivation of his land, a total of P15,000. On the basis of the complaint and the answer filed by defendants wherein they
asked for the dismissal of the complaint, as well as the agreed statement of facts, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte after rejecting
the theory of the plaintiff that he was an agent of the defendants and that as such agent he was entitled to reimbursement of the expenses
incurred by him in connection with the agency (Arts. 1709-1729 of the old Civil Code), found that plaintiff had no cause of action and
dismissed the complaint without costs. De la Cruz appealed directly to this Tribunal for the reason that only questions of law are involved
in the appeal.
We agree with the trial court that the relationship between the movie corporation and the plaintiff was not that of principal and agent
because the principle of representation was in no way involved. Plaintiff was not employed to represent the defendant corporation in its
dealings with third parties. He was a mere employee hired to perform a certain specific duty or task, that of acting as special guard and
staying at the main entrance of the movie house to stop gate crashers and to maintain peace and order within the premises. The question
posed by this appeal is whether an employee or servant who in line of duty and while in the performance of the task assigned to him,
performs an act which eventually results in his incurring in expenses, caused not directly by his master or employer or his fellow servants
or by reason of his performance of his duty, but rather by a third party or stranger not in the employ of his employer, may recover said
damages against his employer.
The learned trial court in the last paragraph of its decision dismissing the complaint said that "after studying many laws or provisions of law
to find out what law is applicable to the facts submitted and admitted by the parties, has found none and it has no other alternative than to
dismiss the complaint." The trial court is right. We confess that we are not aware of any law or judicial authority that is directly applicable to
the present case, and realizing the importance and far-reaching effect of a ruling on the subject-matter we have searched, though vainly,
for judicial authorities and enlightenment. All the laws and principles of law we have found, as regards master and servants, or employer
and employee, refer to cases of physical injuries, light or serious, resulting in loss of a member of the body or of any one of the senses, or
permanent physical disability or even death, suffered in line of duty and in the course of the performance of the duties assigned to the
servant or employee, and these cases are mainly governed by the Employer's Liability Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a
case involving damages caused to an employee by a stranger or outsider while said employee was in the performance of his duties,
presents a novel question which under present legislation we are neither able nor prepared to decide in favor of the employee.
In a case like the present or a similar case of say a driver employed by a transportation company, who while in the course of employment
runs over and inflicts physical injuries on or causes the death of a pedestrian; and such driver is later charged criminally in court, one can
imagine that it would be to the interest of the employer to give legal help to and defend its employee in order to show that the latter was
not guilty of any crime either deliberately or through negligence, because should the employee be finally held criminally liable and he is
found to be insolvent, the employer would be subsidiarily liable. That is why, we repeat, it is to the interest of the employer to render legal
assistance to its employee. But we are not prepared to say and to hold that the giving of said legal assistance to its employees is a legal
obligation. While it might yet and possibly be regarded as a normal obligation, it does not at present count with the sanction of man-made
laws.
If the employer is not legally obliged to give, legal assistance to its employee and provide him with a lawyer, naturally said employee may
not recover the amount he may have paid a lawyer hired by him.
Viewed from another angle it may be said that the damage suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the expenses incurred by him in
remunerating his lawyer, is not caused by his act of shooting to death the gate crasher but rather by the filing of the charge of homicide

which made it necessary for him to defend himself with the aid of counsel. Had no criminal charge been filed against him, there would
have been no expenses incurred or damage suffered. So the damage suffered by plaintiff was caused rather by the improper filing of the
criminal charge, possibly at the instance of the heirs of the deceased gate crasher and by the State through the Fiscal. We say improper
filing, judging by the results of the court proceedings, namely, acquittal. In other words, the plaintiff was innocent and blameless. If despite
his innocence and despite the absence of any criminal responsibility on his part he was accused of homicide, then the responsibility for
the improper accusation may be laid at the door of the heirs of the deceased and the State, and so theoretically, they are the parties that
may be held responsible civilly for damages and if this is so, we fail to see now this responsibility can be transferred to the employer who
in no way intervened, much less initiated the criminal proceedings and whose only connection or relation to the whole affairs was that he
employed plaintiff to perform a special duty or task, which task or duty was performed lawfully and without negligence.
Still another point of view is that the damages incurred here consisting of the payment of the lawyer's fee did not flow directly from the
performance of his duties but only indirectly because there was an efficient, intervening cause, namely, the filing of the criminal charges. In
other words, the shooting to death of the deceased by the plaintiff was not the proximate cause of the damages suffered but may be
regarded as only a remote cause, because from the shooting to the damages suffered there was not that natural and continuous
sequence required to fix civil responsibility.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

January 12, 1909


G.R. No. 4089
ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
J.H. Junquera, for appellant.
Filemon Sotto, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella
setting forth that on or about the 13th of October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in
San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give
birth to a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escao, it was found necessary, on account of the
difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the
afterbirth, in which services he was occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient
several times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without
alleging any good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants, or
any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with any other relief that might be deemed proper.
In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation therein contained and alleged as a special defense, that
their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the
house of the defendants, her stay their was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore, he prayed that the defendants be
absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the court below sustained the demurrer, directing the defendants, on the 23rd of January,
1907, to amend their answer. In compliance with this order the defendants presented, on the same date, their amended answer, denying
each and every one of the allegations contained in the complaint, and requesting that the same be dismissed with costs.
As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered by the court below on the 5th of April, 1907, whereby the
defendants were absolved from the former complaint, on account of the lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against the
defendants, with costs against the plaintiff, who excepted to the said judgment and in addition moved for a new trial on the ground that the
judgment was contrary to law; the motion was overruled and the plaintiff excepted and in due course presented the corresponding bill of
exceptions. The motion of the defendants requesting that the declaration contained in the judgment that the defendants had demanded
therefrom, for the reason that, according to the evidence, no such request had been made, was also denied, and to the decision the
defendants excepted.
Assuming that it is a real fact of knowledge by the defendants that the plaintiff, by virtue of having been sent for by the former, attended a
physician and rendered professional services to a daughter-in-law of the said defendants during a difficult and laborious childbirth, in order
to decide the claim of the said physician regarding the recovery of his fees, it becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay the bill,
whether the father and mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of the latter.
According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable
ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their
stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way
of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses are mutually bound to support each other,
there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the
unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed
from the sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses, including the
fees of the medical expert for his professional services. This liability originates from the above-cited mutual obligation which the law has
expressly established between the married couple.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional
services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her father
and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his
wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to which the life of the patient was

at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in
the indispensable services of a physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen, and compliance
therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against the
husband who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an emergency.
From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought an action against the defendants simply because
they were the parties who called the plaintiff and requested him to assist the patient during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly,
because they were her father and mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The defendants were not, nor are they now,
under any obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract entered into between
them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen.
In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the supreme court of Spain, while recognizing the validity and
efficiency of a contract to furnish support wherein a person bound himself to support another who was not his relative, established the rule
that the law does impose the obligation to pay for the support of a stranger, but as the liability arose out of a contract, the stipulations of
the agreement must be held. (Decision of May 11, 1897.)
Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to
provide support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it
does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which reason it is obvious that the former
can not be compelled to pay fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they consented to bind
themselves.
The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the judgment below are unfounded, because, if the
plaintiff has no right of action against the defendants, it is needless to declare whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical operation.
Therefore, in view of the consideration hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with the
costs against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978
CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA, MANOLITO VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA, NAPOLEON VIRATA, ARACELY VIRATA, ZENAIDA
VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA, PACITA VIRATA, and EVANGELINA VIRATA,petitioners,
vs.
VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH V,
stationed at BACOOR, CAVITE, respondents.
Remulla, Estrella & Associates for petitioners
Exequil C. Masangkay for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in Civil Case No. B-134 granting the
motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause. 1
The record shows that on September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft
Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla is the
employer of Ochoa; that for the death of Arsenio Virata, a action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted on September
25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, docketed as C Case No. 3162-P of said court; that at
the hearing of the said criminal case on December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a
separate civil action for damages against the driver on his criminal liability; that on February 19, 1976 Atty. Julio Francisco filed a motion in
said c case to withdraw the reservation to file a separate civil action; that thereafter, the private prosecutor actively participated in the trial
and presented evidence on the damages; that on June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their right to institute a
separate civil action; that on July 19, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio Virata, petitioners herein, commenced Civil No. B-134 in the Court of First
Instance of Cavite at Bacoor, Branch V, for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the registered owner of
the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa; that on August 13, 1976 the defendants, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
there is another action, Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between the same parties for the same cause; that on September 8, 1976 the
Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City a decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting the accused Maximo Borilla on the ground
that he caused an injury by name accident; and that on January 31, 1977, the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the
motion to Civil Case No. B-134 for damages. 2
The principal issue is weather or not the of the Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for the damages based on quasi-delict against
Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner, respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata.
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover
twice for the same negligent act.
The Supreme Court has held that:
According to the Code Commission: 'The foregoing provision (Article 2177) though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa
aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or quasi-delito has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court
of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed
Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article
forestalls a double recovery. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bocobo about
construction that upholds 'the spirit that given life' rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed
in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the
separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3(c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is 'more congruent' with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress', to borrow the felicitous language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. to 359, to hod as We do hold, that Article
2176, where it refers to 'fault covers not only acts 'not punishable by law' but also criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary
or consequently, a separate civil action lies against the in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty and

acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the, two assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words
the extinction of civil liability refereed to in Par. (c) of Section 13, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Brief stated, We hold, in reitration of Garcia, that culpa aquilina includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 3
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided, they
manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger
jeepney based on quasi-delict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to
the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil
Case No. B-134 isquasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasidelict and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.
Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, Civil Case No. B-134, they have only to establish their cause of action by
preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside and Civil Case No. B-134 is reinstated and remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President and


General Manager,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 158995

During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that their dismissal prayer be resolved. Hence, the trial court required them to file
within ten days a memorandum of authorities supportive of their position.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing
that the complaint is basically a claim for subsidiary liability against an employer under the provision of Article 103 [5] of the Revised Penal
Code. Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua
non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non condition for their
subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that since the
plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in
question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action. which was already dismissed.
In an Order dated September 4, 2001,[6] the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial.
With their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its subsequent order [7] of September 26, 2001, the
petitioners then went on certiorari to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in
refusing to dismiss the basic complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845.
In the herein assailed decision[8] dated April 25, 2003, the CA denied the petition and upheld the trial court. Partly says the CA in its
challenged issuance:
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies that the responsibility charged was the petitioners subsidiary liability under Art.
103, Revised Penal Code. As pointed out [by the trial court] in the Order of September 4, 2001, the complaint does not even allege the
basic elements for such a liability, like the conviction of the accused employee and his insolvency. Truly enough, a civil action to enforce
subsidiary liability separate and distinct from the criminal action is even unnecessary.

Present:
xxx

- versus HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as


Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS.
FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA,
Respondents.

PUNO, J., Chairperson,


SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

xxx

xxx

Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for fault or negligence under Art. 2176, Civil Code, which is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the liability
under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate, and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee or prior
showing of the latters insolvency. (Underscoring in the original.)

Promulgated:
September 26, 2006

In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in its resolution[9] of July 10, 2003. Hence, the
petitioners present recourse on their submission that the appellate court committed reversible error in upholding the trial courts denial of
their motion to dismiss.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
We DENY.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is whether the spouses Vallejeras cause of action in Civil Case No. 99-10845 is founded
on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the petitioners, or derived from Article 2180 [10] of the Civil Code, as ruled by
the two courts below.
It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845. That complaint alleged, inter
alia, as follows:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated April 25, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), as reiterated in its Resolution of July 10, 2003,[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, affirming an earlier Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 43, which denied the petitioners motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 99-10845, an action for
damages arising from a vehicular accident thereat instituted by the herein private respondents - the spouses Florentino Vallejera and
Theresa Vallejera - against the petitioners.
The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as follows:
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a
Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a
result of the accident.

xxx

xxx

xxx

3.
That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered owner of a Ford Fiera Van with Plate No. NMS 881 and employer
sometime February of 1996 of one Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer, a salesman of said corporation;
4.
That sometime February 26, 1996 at around 2:00 P.M. at Rosario St., Bacolod City, the minor son of said plaintiffs [now
respondents], Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit and bumped by above-described vehicle then driven by said employee, Vincent
Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;

In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, entitled People of the Philippines v. Vincent Norman Yeneza.

5.
That the mishap was due to the gross fault and negligence of defendants employee, who drove said vehicle, recklessly,
negligently and at a high speed without regard to traffic condition and safety of other road users and likewise to the fault and negligence of
the owner employer, herein defendants LG Food Corporation who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of his
employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;

Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and
remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case.

day;

On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint [3] for damages against the petitioners as
employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint was raffled to Branch 43 of the court.

6.

That as a result of said incident, plaintiffs son suffered multiple body injuries which led to his untimely demise on that very

7.
That a criminal case was filed against the defendants employee, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, (earlier filed as
Crim. Case No. 96-17570 before RTC) before MTC-Branch III, entitled People v. Yeneza for Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide, but the same was dismissed because pending litigation, then remorse-stricken [accused] committed suicide;
xxx

In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,[4] the petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras 7-year
old son, claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, including the
deceased driver. They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera
couple.

xxx
xxx
8.
That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant death suffered by the late minor Charles Vallejera were due to
the negligence and imprudence of defendants employee;
9.
That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed
to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if exercised, would have prevented said incident. (Bracketed words and emphasis
ours.)

Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein petitioners are being made to account for their
subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. As correctly pointed out by the trial court in its order of September 4,
2001 denying the petitioners Motion to Dismiss, the complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an
employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed against him nor
his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for damages based
on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the
petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of
the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The spouses further alleged
that the petitioners are civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence
required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have
prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son.
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates the
right of another. Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasidelicts.[11]
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender,
i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto;[12] and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as
felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law;[13] the intentional torts;[14] and culpa aquiliana[15]); or (b) where the injured
party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. [16] Either of these two possible liabilities may be
enforced against the offender.[17]

The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is
of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any pronouncement having been made therein. In reality,
therefor, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction of their driver
as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR., AUGUSTO ALMEDALOPEZ, and OSCAR M. LOPEZ,
Petitioners,
- versus OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO,*EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA,
MIGUEL V. GONZALES, and SALVADOR (BUDDY) TAN,*
Respondents.

G.R. No. 133347


Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:

Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa
criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the
Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee,
subject to the employers defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is
for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee. [18]
Article 1161[19] of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject
to the provision of Article 2177[20]and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this
Book, regulating damages. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation
has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes
known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or complaint,[21] and not with the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the
plaintiffs cause of action or lack of it based on the defendants perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. [22]
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couples minor son was caused by the negligent act of the
petitioners driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing to exercise the
necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which diligence,
if exercised, would have prevented said accident.
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would have
alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the
subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based on the principle
that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.[23] Since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely
because death intervened prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners
for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
[24]

Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim, repeatedly made mention of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and anchored their defense on their allegation that they had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of [their] employees. The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed the petitioners acknowledged the private
respondents cause of action as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover damages primarily from
the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the
employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former is not engaged in any business or industry.
Citing Maniago v. CA,[25] petitioner would argue that Civil Case No. 99-10845 should have been dismissed for failure of the
respondent spouses to make a reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages when the criminal case against the driver was
filed.
The argument is specious.
To start with, the petitioners reliance on Maniago is obviously misplaced. There, the civil case was filed while the criminal case
against the employee was still pending. Here, the criminal case against the employee driver was prematurely terminated due to his death.
Precisely, Civil Case No. 99-10845 was filed by the respondent spouses because no remedy can be obtained by them against the
petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal case against their driver during the pendency thereof.

October 15, 2008


x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court challenging the Joint Resolution[1] dated May 2, 1997 of then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto in OMB-0-94-1109, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners against private respondents, and the
Order[2] denying their motion for reconsideration.
This case stems from an all too familiar chapter in Philippine history, i.e., the declaration of martial law by then President Ferdinand
Marcos and the simultaneous sequestration of not a few private corporations, including one of the petitioners herein, ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN).
On April 18 and 26, 1994, petitioners Eugenio, Jr., Oscar and Augusto Almeda, all surnamed Lopez, as officers and on behalf of
ABS-CBN, executed separate complaint-affidavits charging private respondents Roberto S. Benedicto, Exequiel B. Garcia, Miguel V.
Gonzalez, and Salvador (Buddy) Tan with the following crimes penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC): (a) Article 298 - Execution
of Deeds by Means of Violence or Intimidation; (b) Article 315 paragraphs 1[b], 2[a], 3[a] - Estafa; (c) Article 308 - Theft; (d) Article 302 Robbery; (e) Article 312 - Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property; and (f) Article 318 - Other Deceits.
Individual petitioners complaint-affidavits[3] uniformly narrated the following facts:
1.
The day after the declaration of martial law, or on September 22, 1972, just before midnight, military troops arrived at the
ABS-CBN Broadcast Center in Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, and informed the officers and personnel thereat of the seizure and closure of
the premises by virtue of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1 issued by President Marcos ordering the closure of all radio and television
stations in the country.
2.
LOI No. 1 authorized the Secretary of National Defense to take over or control, or cause the taking over and control of all x x
x newspapers, magazines, radio and television facilities and all other media of communications throughout the country. Consequently, a
total of seven (7) television stations owned and operated by ABS-CBN were closed down by the government. [4]
3.
When it became apparent that petitioners would not be granted a permit to re-open, ABS-CBN on October 31, 1972,
terminated the services of all its employees, giving each employee his/her retirement benefits. Corollary thereto, sometime in November
1972, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., then president of ABS-CBN, wrote then Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, [5] of their desire to
sell ABS-CBN to the government. In that same month, however, Eugenio Lopez, Jr. was arrested by the military, and detained
at Fort Bonifacio for almost five (5) years until his escape therefrom on September 30, 1977.
4.
Subsequently, after the proposal to sell ABS-CBN to the Marcos government did not materialize, ABS-CBN started
negotiations with then Governor of Leyte, Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez, who expressed his desire and intention to acquire the former.
However, the negotiations with Kokoy Romualdez in 1973 likewise did not result in the sale and re-opening of ABS-CBN.
5.
On June 6, 1973, the television and radio stations of Kanlaon Broadcasting System (KBS) on Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City
were consumed by fire. KBS was the umbrella corporation of the Benedicto Group of broadcasting companies, including Radio Philippines
Network (RPN),[6] which operated TV Channel 9, the only television station allowed to continue operating during the early years of the

martial law regime. Respondent Benedicto, then Philippine Ambassador to Japan, managed, controlled, and was one of the principal
stockholders of RPN.
6.
On even date, both Benedicto and Alfredo Montelibano, who at that time was Chairperson of the Board of Directors (BOD) of
ABS-CBN, were in Bacolod. Benedicto constituted Montelibano as his emissary to the Lopezes, relaying his plan to temporarily use ABSCBNs broadcast studios in Quezon City, from which to operate TV Channel 9, for such period of time as may be necessary to rebuild
KBS burned studios.

7.
On June 8, 1973, Montelibano met with other officers and executives of ABS-CBN, including herein petitioners Oscar and
Augusto Lopez, informing them of Benedictos request. Oscar and Augusto, and the rest of the ABS-CBN management team, strongly
opposed the request. Eventually, however, when Montelibano mentioned that Malacaang and Romualdez had cleared said request, the
possibility of a government-ordered confiscation of ABS-CBN, and not least of all, the possible release of Eugenio Lopez, Jr., petitioners
Oscar and Augusto, as with the rest of ABS-CBNs executives, acquiesced to Benedictos request.
8.
Thus, at noontime on the same day, representatives of KBS headed by Jose Montalvo arrived at the Meralco Building to
finalize the proposed arrangement with ABS-CBN. The transaction between ABS-CBN and KBS is evidenced by a letter-agreement
dated June 8, 1973, which reads in relevant part:
This is to confirm the agreement arrived at between RPN and ABS-CBN to the following effect:
1.
Commencing on the date hereof, ABS-CBN hereby conveys to RPN by way of lease its TV and radio equipment (excluding
TV channels and radio frequencies) and its premises at the ABS-CBN Broadcast Center, Bohol Avenue, Quezon City (collectively called
the leased facilities) listed in the schedule attached hereto and marked as Annex A.
2.
RPN shall pay ABS-CBN monthly rental as is reasonable compensation for the use of the leased facilities. The amount of
the rental shall be determined after a discussion with Ambassador Roberto Benedicto.
3.
The term of this lease shall commence on the date hereof and continue for such reasonable time as may be normally
necessary for the rehabilitation of RPNs facilities unless an earlier period may be fixed by RPN and ABS-CBN after discussion with
Ambassador Benedicto.
4.
RPN hereby assumes full and complete responsibility for the leased facilities and shall be answerable for any and all losses
and damages to such facilities.
xxxx
6.
Upon termination of this lease, RPN shall return the possession of the leased facilities to ABS-CBN and vacate the same
without the need of notice or demand.
7.
ABS-CBN, through its Chairman, Mr. Alfredo Montelibano, shall have the right to select and designate the personnel (not to
exceed 20 at any one time) to maintain and operate all specialized TV and radio equipment.
xxxx
10.
ABS-CBN shall have the right to enter the Broadcast Center at any reasonable time during the term of this lease for the
purpose of determining compliance by RPN of the terms hereof.
xxxx
12.
RPN shall not, without the prior written consent of ABS-CBN, sub-lease the leased facilities or any part thereof nor shall
any part be removed from the premises except the equipment, which are intended for operation the Broadcast Center in due course of
operations.
9.
Meanwhile, it appears that the parties were hard pressed to negotiate and fix the monthly rental rate. Several attempts by
Oscar to set up a meeting with Benedicto for the fixing of the monthly rentals proved unsuccessful.
10. After more than four months of trying, a meeting between Oscar and Benedicto finally materialized on October 31, 1973. At
that meeting, the discussion not only covered fixing of reasonable rentals for the lease of the ABS-CBN studios, but likewise included the
possibility of an outright sale.
11. Thereafter, the discussions and negotiations stopped as none of the petitioners were able to meet anew with Benedicto who
had supposedly referred the matter to people above and the man on top.
12. Frustrated, then Senator Lorenzo Taada, as counsel for ABS-CBN, in May 1976, wrote Benedicto demanding vacation of
the ABS-CBN Broadcast Center and payment of back rentals for the use of the ABS-CBN studios and facilities.
13. In response, Senator Estanislao Fernandez, on behalf of Benedicto, met with Senator Taada in June 1976. Another meeting
took place between the parties respective counsels which included respondent Gonzales, another counsel for Benedicto. Despite these
meetings, no agreement was reached between Benedicto and ABS-CBN. On the whole, from June 8, 1973, the time KBS occupied the
ABS-CBN studios in Quezon City, no rental was paid by the former to the latter.

14. In the years following until the Marcos government was toppled in 1986, the ABS-CBN stations were transferred to the
National Media Production Center (NMPC) headed by Gregorio Cendaa of the Ministry of Information. Starting in January 1980, KBS, on
a staggered basis, transferred possession, control and management of ABS-CBNs provincial television stations to NMPC. Some of the
radio stations of ABS-CBN were turned over to the governments Bureau of Broadcast, while some were retained by KBS thru the
Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Radio Philippines Network (RPN).
15. Parenthetically, during a military inventory in 1979-1980, and a visit by ABS-CBN executives at ABS-CBNs radio transmitting
stations in Meycauayan, Bulacan, headed by petitioner Augusto, on August 13, 1984, ABS-CBN properties and massive equipment were
found to be missing. In addition, the musical records and radio dramas accumulated by ABS-CBN in a span of twenty-five (25) years and
stored in its library were now gone.
16. In June 1986, President Corazon Aquino, acting on the request of ABS-CBN through Senator Taada, returned to ABS-CBN
these radio and TV stations on a gradual and scheduled basis.
As required by the Ombudsman, the respondents, except for Garcia, filed their respective counter-affidavits, [7] with Benedicto
adopting that of Gonzales, denying petitioners charges, and averring that:
1.
The execution of the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement was a free and voluntary act of ABS-CBN which agreed thereto fully
expecting remuneration in the form of rentals, thus:
2. RPN shall pay ABS-CBN monthly rental as is reasonable compensation for the use of the lease facilities. The amount of the
rental shall be determined after a discussion with Ambassador Roberto Benedicto.
2.
In that regard, respondent Gonzales, counsel for KBS, RPN and Benedicto, participated in the negotiations and was present
at three (3) meetings for the fixing of rentals. Also in attendance were former Senator Estanislao Fernandez, specially engaged to
represent RPN and Benedicto, and Senator Taada and petitioner Augusto for ABS-CBN.
3.
Initially, the discussions centered on the possible formulas for the fixing of rentals. Later on, however, before an agreement on
the rental rate could be reached, the discussions shifted to the possibility of an outright sale. The discussions on the sale were expanded
as various creditors of ABS-CBN had made and presented claims before respondent Garcia, then Comptroller of KBS-RPN.
4.
However, the discussions were discontinued when then Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile reminded KBS of
the sequestered status of ABS-CBN facilities such that arrangements undertaken for the use and lease thereof should be taken up with
the government.[8]
5.
Meanwhile, in July 1974, Secretary Ponce Enrile authorized KBS, acting on behalf of BBC, to make use of the ABS-CBN
provincial stations which were not covered by the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement. The authorization was granted in connection with the
increased undertakings assigned by the Department of National Defense (DND) to KBS, specifically, for the governments mass-media
developmental peace and order nationwide campaign.
7.
Thereafter, in October 1977, RPN vacated the ABS-CBN studios and turned over the properties to George Viduya, the
general manager of the government station GTV-4. Viduya continued operations of GTV-4 at the ABS-CBN properties, after which, the
properties were all delivered in 1979 to the NMPC headed by Cendaa. The provincial stations were delivered and turned over on a
staggered basis, with the DZRI station in Dagupan handed over in 1979. The successive transfer of all ABS-CBN studios and stations,
in Quezon City and the provinces, were covered by receipts which were collated by the law firm of respondent Gonzales retained by KBS
for that purpose.
8.
The use of the ABS-CBN studios involved only three (3) juridical entities, RPN, ABS-CBN and the government. The charges
leveled by petitioners in their complaint-affidavits merely point to civil liability as specified in the letter-agreement itself:
4. RPN hereby assumes full and complete responsibility for the leased facilities and shall be answerable for any and all losses and
damages to such facilities.
On the whole, the allegations of petitioners do not support the elements of the crimes charged.
9.
Lastly, respondents invoke the grant of absolute immunity to Benedicto as part of the Compromise Agreement in
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34 which states:
The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized under the pertinent provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, to Benedicto, the members of his family, officers and employees of the corporations above mentioned, who are included in
past, present and future cases and investigations of the Philippine Government, such that there shall be no criminal investigation or
prosecution against said persons for acts, omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to have violated any penal
law, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned or included in this
Agreement.
Expectedly, the petitioners in their joint reply-affidavit refuted respondents counter-affidavits. Contrary to respondents allegations,
petitioners reiterated Benedictos over-all ploy, in conspiracy with the other respondents who were officers of KBS and/or RPN, to use and
occupy ABS-CBN properties without paying compensation therefor. Petitioners maintain that respondents grand scheme was to take-over
ABS-CBN, albeit ostensibly covered by the letter-lease agreement, giving the take over a semblance of legality.

Thereafter, with the issues having been joined, the Ombudsman issued the herein assailed Joint Resolution dismissing petitioners
complaints. To the Ombudsman, the following circumstances did not give rise to probable cause necessary to indict respondents for the
various felonies charged:

officers of his corporations as therein mentioned, such that there shall be no criminal investigation or prosecution against said persons for
acts or omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to have violated any penal law, including but not limited to
Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset treated or included in this Agreement.

1.

In effect, the People of the Philippines as the offended party in criminal cases has waived its right to proceed criminally against
Benedicto, et. al., for whatever crime they may have committed relative to, among others, the alleged plunder of ABS-CBN properties.
Again, whatever liability that remains thereabout on respondents part is perforce only civil in nature. [10]

The Letter-Agreement of June 8, 1973 belie any illegal take-over of the ABS-CBN complex.

While the Lopezes are now complaining that the letter-agreement was virtually forced unto them thru intimidation, hence, the
vitiated consent of Mr. Montelibano, there is nothing however which the complainants adduced to prove this allegation except their
threadbare allegations of threats. On the contrary, it appears that the Lopezes blessed the letter-agreement hoping that their financial
difficulties with respect to the affairs of the ABS-CBN and their problem concerning the continued detention of Eugenio Lopez, Jr. by the
military, would at least be mitigated. x x x
It is thus clear that the ABS-CBN complex was freely leased by Montelibano upon consultation with the Lopezes who entertained
some ulterior motives of their own which they expect would result from the agreement, either directly or indirectly. Of course, the Lopezes
may not have realized some of these expectations (i.e., the rentals, the release of Eugenio, Jr. from detention) but this does not change
the fact that the parties consent to the contract appears to have been freely given. Perforce, the complaint under Article 298 of the
Revised Penal Code of thePhilippines must fail.
2.

No unlawful taking as to justify charges for Robbery or Theft.

Robbery and Theft under Articles 302 and 308 of the Revised Penal Code were also attributed by the [petitioners] against the
respondents. From the records, it is clear that KBS-RPN has juridical possession of the ABS-CBN properties subject of this complaint; a
right which can be validly set-up even against ABS-CBN itself. It can be recalled that KBS-RPN was authorized to enter, occupy and
operate ABS-CBN facilities by virtue of the authority granted by the President, pursuant to LOI No. 1-A. Aside, the Broadcast Center itself
was covered by the lease-agreement. Under these situations, there is obviously no basis to charge the respondents for robbery and theft;
for these penal offense require as an element the act of unlawful taking or asportation. Asportation is simply poles apart from the juridical
possession which KBS-RPN enjoyed over the properties.
4.

Before anything else, we note that on April 5, 1999 and June 13, 2000, the respective counsel for respondents Tan and Benedicto,
in compliance with Section 16, [11] Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, filed pleadings informing the Court of their clients demise. Benedictos
counsel filed a Notice of Death (With Prayer for Dismissal)[12] moving that Benedicto be dropped as respondent in the instant case for the
reason that the pending criminal cases subject of this appeal are actions which do not survive the death of the party accused.
Petitioners opposed the move to drop Benedicto as respondent, citing Torrijos v. Court of Appeals[13] which held that civil liability of
the accused survives his death; because death is not a valid cause for the extinguishment of civil obligations.

Other TV and radio stations were taken over pursuant to LOI 1-A, hence no violations of Art. 312, 302 and 308 of RPC.

To the alleged violation of Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code, the respondents contended that their use of ABS-CBNs facilities
other than those included in the lease-agreement, was in fact with the authority of the then Department of National Defense (DND). There
is no denying that all of the ABS-CBN properties including the provincial ones are under sequestration pursuant to Presidential Letter of
Instruction No. 1-A, issued on September 28, 1972. It was under the strength of this Presidential Letter of Instruction that KBS-RPN was
authorized to enter, occupy and operate the facilities of ABS-CBN. This was also confirmed by DND Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile in his
letter to RPN dated June 26, 1976. Unmistakably, KBS-RPNs possession of the ABS-CBNs property other than those in the ABS-CBN
complex is primarily anchored on the authority pursuant to LOI 1-A. With this apparent authority, this investigation can not see in any
which way how the respondents could have illegally taken over the properties of the [petitioners], particularly those in the province; there is
therefore no convincing proof to support a charge under Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code. It may come to mind that occupation of
real property or usurpation of real rights in property under Article 312 requires as one of its elements the presence of violence against or
intimidation of persons as a means in securing real property or rights belonging to another. Plainly, this element is not shown. The
complainants may have felt intimidated by the sequestration order, but it is in the nature of such Order to be coercive. It was an act flowing
from the martial law powers of then President Marcos.
3.

Hence, this recourse by the petitioners alleging grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsmans Joint Resolution and Order.

No deceit was employed to gain possession of the Broadcast Center and the provincial TV and radio stations.

In the prosecution for estafa under [Articles 315, paragraphs 2(a), 3(a) and 318] of the Revised Penal Code, it is indispensable that
the element of deceit, consisting in the false statement of fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior to, or, at least
simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainants, it being essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation
constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the complainants to part with the thing. If there be no such prior or
simultaneous false statement or fraudulent representation, any subsequent act of the respondent, however fraudulent or suspicious it may
appear, can not serve as basis for the prosecution of these crimes.
[From petitioners complaint-affidavits], it is very clear that the late Alfredo Montelibano was the one who talked with Roberto
Benedicto, preparatory to the signing of the lease-agreement. As the complainants did not identify exactly which constitute the deceitful
act (or the intimidation) which could have induced the Lopezes into accepting the lease agreement, in most probability, the occurrences
which vitiated their consent happened during this preliminary discussion. Noticeably however, it is not Alfredo Montelibano, the one who
supposedly talked with Benedicto, who is testifying on the alleged veiled threat or deceits, if there are. Precisely, because he is already
dead.
x x x [I]t is submitted that the Lopezes can not now testify on something which are not derived from their own personal perception.
The bottomline is that what they are now trying to adduce, pertaining to the alleged deceits [or intimidation] attending the negotiation of the
lease agreement are purely hearsay. This is a matter which only Alfredo Montelibano could testify competently.[9]
The Ombudsman saw no need to discuss the defenses of prescription and immunity from suit raised by the respondents given his
dismissal of the complaint-affidavits on the merits. However, in a subsequent Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the
Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman lifted the Office of the Chief Legal Counsels ratiocination for dismissing the complaint-affidavits, thus:
Incidentally, RPN has been identified as among the corporation in which respondent Benedicto has substantial interests. In fact, it was one
of the subject matters of the Compromise Agreement reached by the government and respondent Benedicto in Sandiganbayan Civil Case
no. 34.
In that Compromise Agreement, for and in consideration of respondent Benedictos cession of equities, and assignment of his
rights and interest in corporations therein listed, among them RPN, the government extended absolute immunity to Benedicto, including

Our ruling on this issue need not be arduous. The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upon death, is extinguished
together with his criminal liability, has long been clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:[14]
1.
Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Law
Contracts
Quasi-contracts
xxx
Quasi-delicts

3.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way
of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure[15] as amended. The separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
4.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible [de]privation of
right by prescription.
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBNs insistence that the case at bench survives because the civil liability of the respondents
subsists is stripped of merit.
To begin with, there is no criminal case as yet against the respondents. The Ombudsman did not find probable cause to prosecute
respondents for various felonies in the RPC. As such, the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted along with the criminal action unless
the offended party: (a) waives the civil action, (b) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action,[16] is not applicable.
In any event, consistent with People v. Bayotas,[17] the death of the accused necessarily calls for the dismissal of the criminal case
against him, regardless of the institution of the civil case with it. The civil action which survives the death of the accused must hinge on
other sources of obligation provided in Article 1157 of the Civil Code. In such a case, a surviving civil action against the accused founded
on other sources of obligation must be prosecuted in a separate civil action. In other words, civil liability based solely on the criminal action
is extinguished, and a different civil action cannot be continued and prosecuted in the same criminal action.
Significantly, this Court in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals,[18] taking cognizance of respondent Benedictos death on May 15, 2000, has
ordered that the latter be dropped as a party, and declared extinguished any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be
attributable to him in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Lastly, we note that petitioners appear to have already followed our ruling in People v. Bayotas[19] by filing a separate civil action to enforce
a claim against the estate of respondent Benedicto.[20] The claim against the estate of Benedicto is based on contractthe June 8,
1973 letter- agreementin consonance with Section 5,[21] Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Plainly, the dropping of respondents Benedicto
and Tan as parties herein is in order.
We now come to the core issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners complaint
against the respondents. We rule in the negative and, accordingly, dismiss the petition.

We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to investigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.[22] The raison d etre for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insulate it from the long
tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges and fiscals offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public
officials, and through the execution of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and
misfeasances committed by public officers.[23]

In fine, the Ombudsman did not abuse his discretion in determining that the allegations of petitioners against respondents are civil in
nature, bereft of criminal character. Perforce, he was correct in dismissing petitioners complaint-affidavits.

In Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Desierto,[24] we dwelt on the powers, functions and duties of the
Ombudsman, to wit:

SO ORDERED.

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested primarily in the Office of the Ombudsman. It bears emphasis
that the Office has been given a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770
(The Ombudsman Act of 1989). This discretion is all but free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the Office is
insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence.

G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Esteban B. Bautista for accused-appellant.

Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.
The Ombudsman may thus conduct an investigation if the complaint filed is found to be in the proper form and substance. Conversely, the
Ombudsman may also dismiss the complaint should it be found insufficient in form or substance.
Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of the
Ombudsmans powers, and respect the initiative and independence inherent in the latter who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion
of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.
The pragmatic basis for the general rule was explained in Ocampo v. Ombudsman:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of
the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by private
complainants.[25]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Roberto S. Benedicto and Salvador Tan are dropped as private
respondents without prejudice to the filing of separate civil actions against their respective estates. The assailed Joint Resolution and
Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-94-1109 are AFFIRMED.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p


The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped and who
later died because of a foreign object left inside her vaginal canal.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under an information which reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and with intent to kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot and inserted a foreign object into the
vaginal canal of said Rosario Baluyot which caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her relatives. (66)

From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that we do not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers vested by the Constitution. In short, we do not review the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint except when the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.[26] In this regard, petitioners utterly failed to demonstrate the Ombudsmans abuse, much less grave abuse, of
discretion.

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla,
(3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5) Dr. Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia,
(9) Conrado Salonga, (10) Dr. Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14) Patricia Prollamanta (15) Mel
Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21)
lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.

Apart from a blanket and general charge that remaining respondents herein, Gonzales and Garcia, are officers of KBS/RPN and/or
alter egos of Benedicto, petitioners complaint-affidavits are bereft of sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that crimes have
been committed and the respondents, namely, Gonzales and Garcia, are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. [27] Certainly,
the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners complaint-affidavits.

On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the testimonies of (1) Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque
Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5) Dr. Val Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.

From the entirety of the records, it is beyond cavil that petitioners seek to attach criminal liability to an unequivocally civil
undertaking gone awry. As pointed out by the Ombudsman, although the petitioners may not have realized their expectations in entering
into the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement, such does not render their consent thereto defective.
The execution and validity of this letter-agreement is connected with respondents culpability for the felonies charged as these
include the element of whether they had juridical possession of the ABS-CBN properties. Essentially, petitioners claim they did not freely
give their consent to the letter-agreement. However, on more than one occasion, petitioners have invoked the letter-agreements
provisions, and made claims thereunder.
First, petitioners met and discussed with respondents the fixing of the rental rate for the ABS-CBN studios in Quezon City as
provided in paragraph 2 of the letter-lease agreement. Next, petitioners counsel wrote a demand letter to respondents for the payment of
rentals for the latters occupation and use of ABS-CBN properties pursuant to the letter-agreement. Last and most importantly, petitioners
have made a claim against the estate of Benedicto based on the same June 8, 1973 letter-agreement.
This action of petitioners clearly evinces their ratification of the letter-agreement. As previously discussed, the civil liability of
respondents Benedicto and Tan hinging on the charged criminal acts herein was extinguished upon their death. But other civil liabilities
founded on other sources of obligations under Article 1157 of the Civil Code may still be prosecuted either against the estate of the
deceased if based on contract,[28] or against the executors and administrators of the deceaseds estate if based on quasi-delict. [29]
As petitioners have ratified the letter-agreement, even after the lifting of martial law and the toppling of the Marcos government, and
advanced the validity of the letter-agreement in their claim against the estate of Benedicto, they cannot, in the same breath, aver that
respondents actuations in the execution of the letter-agreement were criminal in nature, or that the letter-agreement was more ostensible
than real and to insist on the prosecution of respondents for felonies supposedly committed in connection with this ubiquitous letteragreement.[30]

The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt are summarized in its decision, as
follows:
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought a boy and girl namely:
Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children
were chosen from among a bunch of street children. Once inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath. Jessie
Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to take a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the bathroom to do the same. While
Rosario Baluyot was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out some pictures depicting dressed up young boys, and put them on top of
the table. Other things which were taken out and placed on top of a table were three (3) other objects which he described as like that of a
vicks inhaler. One of these objects the accused played with his hands and placed it on his palms. The color of which is grayish blue which
turned out later to be the foreign object which was inserted inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects were later established
to be anti-nasal inhalers against pollution purchased by the accused in Bangkok when he went there as a tourist. While Rosario was in the
bathroom, accused told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so did the accused. He then started masturbating the young boy and also
guided the boy's hand for him to be masturbated, so that they masturbated each other, while they were both naked, and he gave Jessie
Ramirez an erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to join him in
bed. The accused then placed himself between the two (2) children and accused started fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his attention. He looked, and he saw accused placing his penis
against the vagina of Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate the vagina but it would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not
anymore bother to look because he was sleepy and fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an "American, paid Ramirez alias "Egan" P200.00 and Rosario
P300.00. He then left them in the hotel. After the American left, they went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that the American inserted
something in her vagina. But they could not do anything anymore, because the American had already left, and neither did they report the

matter to the police. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object was already removed from her
body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was
complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Then there was
another occasion wherein Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when he tried to talk to Rosario
she scolded him with defamatory remarks. Thereafter, he did not see Rosario anymore because he already went home to his aunt's house
who resided at Barrio Barretto and resumed his studies in the primary grades.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage scavenging at Lot 21, near the gate of the U.S. Naval Base saw
Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake Shop near Lot 21, being ogled by people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she
was unconscious and foul smelling. Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her to the Olongapo City
General Hospital in an unconscious condition, via jeepney. He went to the Information desk and he was the one who gave the personal
circumstances of Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian"
of Rosario, while Rosario was already in the emergency room. Although Gaspar Alcantara denied that he did not know the name of
Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on
duty. Limos testified that it was Alcantara who supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario. The Court gives more credence to the
testimony of Miss Limos as against Gaspar Alcantara who became a defense witness, for the reason that through his own testimony,
Gaspar Alcantara claimed that even prior to May 14, 1987, he had already known Rosario Baluyot for more than one (1) year, because he
has seen the said girl go to the house of his twin brother, Melchor Alcantara, who is his immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by
the name of "Nora" who was then in the custody of his brother. His brother Melchor was also living with their mother, brother and sister-inlaw and their two (2) children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's testimony even stays for one week or a few days at his brother's
house when she visits Nora. So the Court can safely assume that of all the more than one (1) year that he had regularly seen Rosario at
his brother's house, he must have already did come to know the name of Rosario Baluyot including her age. In his testimony in Court he
stated that he even asked Rosario for movie and softdrinks money which can safely be concluded that he knows her very well. It is against
normal behavior especially to a Filipino who have a characteristic of curiosity not to have found out the real name of the girl he claims to
know only as "Tomboy".
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital, nobody was attending to her since she is a street child, having
stowed away from the custody of her grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong to religious and civic organizations, in the
persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario Baluyot who
was all alone with no relatives attending to her and after finding out that she was only 12 years old decided to help her. After a short
interview with Rosario, regarding her name and age only because she clamped up about her residence and her relatives, they decided to
help her by providing her the medicine she needed during her confinement in readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was able to
get the name and age of Rosario Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for the first time. For Fe Israel, the age of
Rosario Baluyot was an important factor because their program assisted only indigent patients from infants up to 13 years old.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel movement and vomiting, which was first suspected as
gastro-enteritis, but which came out later as symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on
May 17, 1987, after she was examined by the physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there was a foreign object lodged in her
vaginal canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and foul smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the doctors who
attended to her was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by means of a forceps, but several attempts
proved futile because said object was deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged,
tender and distended, symptoms of peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent when she was scheduled for operation on May 19,
1987, after the first attempt for an operation on May 17 was aborted allegedly because the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital
director was not obtained. The surgeon who operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified that Rosario had to be operated even in
that condition in order to save her life. Her condition was guarded. This was corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during
Rosario's operation. It was in the evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision
on her stomach. He found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus and so with the peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and
patches of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and kidney appeared to have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and
septicemia were traced to have been caused through infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of
Rosario. The foreign object which was already agreed upon by both parties that it is a portion of a sexual vibrator was extracted from the
vagina of Rosario while under anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the assisting surgical
nurse for safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to the authorized person. This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr.
Rosete considered the operation successful and the patient was alive when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said patient in
the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The following day, Rosario got serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced her
death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of May 20, 1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated therein that the cause of death was
cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a transparent small jar and labelled "Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera
asked the nurse for the foreign object, and it was given to her under proper receipt. Herrera then showed the same to the persons who
helped financially Rosario's case, and afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in custody of the said object until
Mr. Salonga came and asked her for the object.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask him in locating the relatives of Rosario. They
were able to trace Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her that her granddaughter was already dead and lying
in state at St. Martin Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the burial expenses for Rosario.

Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence at Sta. Rita and asked her if she was interested in filing a
case against the person who caused the death of her granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she was brought to the Fiscal's (City)
Office to file the same.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger came to her house and told her that the
accused was willing to settle the case, but that accused Ritter had only P15,000.00. The old woman did not accept it because she knows
that the accused is liable to pay damages anyway. After that, she received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her to get a lawyer for her
case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have the case settled once and for all giving the reason that she can no longer bear the
situation, sent her nephew, Conrado Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her nephew obliged and told her that she will be paid at the office of Atty.
Legaspi. On a date not clear in the records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo, and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant barangay
tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were there, she saw Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the
bathroom, and thereafter Ritter left. After he left, Atty. Legaspi told Rosario's grandmother that they are willing to settle for P20,000.00, but
that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so she received the money with the understanding that there was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was
made to sign a statement, and she was asked to change the age of her granddaughter Rosario. With the document prepared, she and the
lawyer's messenger went to the Fiscal's office to have it subscribed, and was subscribed before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance of
P5,000.00 was not paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of Olongapo City and he could no longer attend to it. Atty.
Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the Court even apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station "A", was directed by Col. Daos, Station Commander of the
Olongapo Police Department to make a follow up of the case of Rosario Baluyot. On the other hand, since the suspect who inserted the
foreign object inside Rosario's vagina was said to be an American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also conducted its investigation headed
by criminal investigator Agent Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with the local police and with Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario was a
street child at Magsaysay Drive, they rounded up about 43 street children and from some of them they learned that Rosario Baluyot was
with Jessie Ramirez with an American at the MGM Hotel when the foreign object was inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez,
they asked him about Rosario Baluyot. They found out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot sometime before Christmas of 1986 with
an American, who brought them to the said hotel. Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the U.S. Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his
statement. Then he was brought to Mr. Edward Lee Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of the description supplied by Ramirez, a
composite drawing was photocopied and copies thereof were distributed to the local police and to the sentries at the gate of the U.S.
Naval Base. Some American servicemen who had resemblance to the composite drawing were photographed and these were shown to
Jessie Ramirez, but the result was negative. Aside from the physical description by Ramirez about the appearance of the suspect, he also
described him as having the mannerisms of a homo-sexual.
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking that the so-called American may be
European or Australian national, the team composed of Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon,
Jessie Ramirez and Michael Johnson, another juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They first went to the Manila NISRA Office, and thereafter
checked in a hotel. That was on September 23, 1987. On the first night, they went to Luneta Park where foreign homo-sexuals were said
to be frequenting, but the result was negative. Then on September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while they were standing at the corner of A.
Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a male caucasian who looked like a homo-sexual stopped by admiringly infront of the two (2) juveniles,
Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez then reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity with the American suspect, so the
two minors were instructed to follow the foreigner and to strike a conversation. They did, and when they returned, Jessie Ramirez told
them that indeed the said foreigner was the one who brought him and Rosario Baluyot to the MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez
that this foreigner had no beard while the one previously described by Ramirez had a beard. Jessie Ramirez told them that maybe he
have just shaved it off. The said caucasian then entered a bar, and after several minutes he came out, and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal
with his thumbs up, as a signal to confirm that the said foreigner is the suspect, arrested Ritter and brought him to the Manila Western
Police District. It could be mentioned at this stage that in this operation they were accompanied by two (2) policemen from the Western
Police District. The foreigner was hand cuffed and was told that he was a suspect for Rape with Homicide. After the arrest, they first went
to the pension house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag which contained his personal belongings, and from there
they brought him to the Western Police Department. At the said police headquarters, they were allowed a permissive search by the
foreigner of his clutch bag and his small shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D., 3 inhalers, money in the form of dollars and
travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and about P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they learned that the suspect's
name was Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national. During the questioning of Hitter, Salonga and his team already left the headquarters
and went to their hotel, because at this time Jessie Ramirez was already shaking with fear after he identified the accused.
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained at the Olongapo City Jail. The case for Rape with Homicide
was filed against him at the City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the preliminary investigation, accused was assisted by his own counsel. The
private complainant was Maria Burgos Turla because it was she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother Anita Burgos died
on January 12, 1982, and their father Policarpio Baluyot had left them under her custody. When this case was filed, the father's
whereabouts was unknown, and he only appeared when the trial of this case before the Court was already in progress. And upon his
(Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned about the death of his daughter Rosario Baluyot from the newspaper, long after
Rosario was already gone.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no crime of Rape with Homicide because the suspect was
described as an American while Ritter is an Austrian. Also advanced by the defense is that, it is a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario
Baluyot was at the time of the commission of the offense, already more than 13 years old, she having been born on December 26, 1973
as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 and was born on December 26,
1973 as testified to by Fr. Roque Villanueva of St. James Parish Church who issued the Baptismal Certificate, having custody and
possession of the book of baptism for the year 1975, but admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the matters or entries entered
therein. Likewise, the defense's stand is that the accused cannot be liable for Homicide because a vibrator is not a weapon of death but it
is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual pleasure, and that the death of Rosario Baluyot was due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the
surgeon and Director of the Olongapo City General Hospital, who operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109-116)

On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that the prosecution has established the GUILT of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape with Homicide as defined and penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00) Philippine Currency, and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of attorney's
fees to the private prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly committed by the court:
I

The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father supported by other independent evidence such as the
clinical record, death certificate and the testimonies of Fe Israel and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate presented by the
defense without any probative or evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand the application of evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules of Court).
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable to testify;

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS
COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT WAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.

(2) That pedigree is in issue;

II

(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the declarant by birth or marriage;

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS LESS THAN
TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE.

(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred or ante litem motam; and
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must as a general rule be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

III
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor do the declarations fall within the purview of the rule.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO AND NOT REJECTING THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE AND ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if
only to satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act (See People v. Villapaa, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide of a young girl who died after the rape because of a
foreign object, believed to be a sexual vibrator, left inside her vagina.
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victimwhether or not Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12)
years old at the time the alleged incident happened on October 10, 1986. The age is important in determining whether or not there was
statutory rape, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12
years of age, in which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or unconscious state do not have to be present.
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually abused by the accused and, therefore, rape was
committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the victim's grandmother and father who testified that she was
born on December 22, 1975. These oral declarations were admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in
the absence of a birth certificate, the act or declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence on any notable fact in the life of a
member of the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within the rule which permits the admission of hearsay evidence, oral declarations
are therefore admissible as proof of birth (Decision, p. 54).

The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario's age were admitted by the trial court are both alive, in the
Philippines and able to testify as they both did testify in court. Their declarations were made at the trial which is certainly not before the
controversy arose. The other witnesses who testified on Rosario's age are not members of the victim's family. The testimonies of Rosario's
relatives must be weighed according to their own personal knowledge of what happened and not as hearsay evidence on matters of family
history.
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony pursuant to the ruling laid down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118
[1903]) where the Court accepted the testimony of the mother that her daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The mother stated
that she knew the age because the child was born about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not hearsay, but came from
one who had direct knowledge of the child's birth.
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary or unusual one for the
witness, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness. (People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's death or funeral was never established, which indicates that the day
was rather insignificant to be remembered. The father's declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in court does not at all
show that he had direct knowledge of his daughter's birth. He was certain though that she was more than one (1) year old at the time she
was baptized.

The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario's birth date because her brother died in Pampanga and her
daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother) was the only one who failed to attend the funeral because the latter has just given birth allegedly to
Rosario (T.S.N. p. 8, Jan. 13, 1988).

The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's age, nor was there any basis shown to establish their competence
for the purpose. The clinical records were based on Gaspar Alcantara's incompetent information given when he brought the victim to the
hospital. Alcantara came to know her only about a year before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the circumstances of
Rosario's birth. The death certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely based on the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a
record of birth.

The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born on December 22, 1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and
he was certain that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).

All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident
are not adequate to establish the exact date of birth, much less offset a documentary record showing a different date.

The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the clinical record and the death certificate indicating that she was 12
years old when she was admitted at the Olongapo City General Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by Rosario's alleged
guardian, Gaspar Alcantara to the hospital's clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who interviewed Rosario Baluyot
also testified that she was told by Rosario that she was 12 years old. The trial court accepted this as adequate evidence of the truth.
Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness in this case declared that he was born on September 5, 1973 and that he was older than
Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must have been less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)

The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which the trial court rejected as being hearsay and of no value. As against
the oral declarations made by interested witnesses establishing Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more
convincing and worthy of belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower court to the St. James Parish Church, Subic, Zambales,
Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest testified and stated that he is the head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal
Register No. 9 entitled "Liber Baptisnorum", a latin term for baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said Registry Book, there
appears the name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25, 1974, and born on December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio
Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents of Subic, Zambales. Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo City as her address.

In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:

In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987, he answered that:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while
baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specifiedbut not the veracity of the status or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk
and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this
Court held that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic
Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the
certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be
admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law. (At pp. 84-85)

T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang napansin na inilabas ng kano sa kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon
man?

In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of business under Section 43 of
Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of
ecclesiastical duties and recorded in a book of the church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28 Phil. 105 [1914] Hence,
the certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot was baptized on December 25, 1974 may be admitted in
evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio Baluyot, the victim's father testified that he had in his possession a baptismal certificate different
from the one presented in court. However, no other baptismal record was ever presented to prove a date different from that brought by the
official custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states that Rosario was baptized on December 25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable
that Rosario could have been born on December 22, 1975. She could not have been baptized before she was born. Exhibit "22" may be
proof only of baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario was born in 1975. With the father's assertion that Rosario was more
than one (1) year old when she was baptized, we are then more inclined to agree that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in the Baptismal
Registry.
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate, coupled by
her mother's testimony, was sufficient to establish that Mary Rose was below twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos. (At. p.
426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more reliable document as to Rosario's birth which could serve
as sufficient proof that she was born on December 26, 1973. Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident
on October 10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age. The burden of proof lies on the prosecution to prove that Rosario
was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident in a charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this respect.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to
prove that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that there was force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Rosario submitted herself to
the sexual advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears to have consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while
her companion, Jessie Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental circumstances coupled with the
testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute inspite
of her tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced her to submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances do not come
under the purview of force or intimidation needed to convict for rape.

S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at napansin ko na may inilabas siya sa kanyang bag na parang vicks
inhaler, na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami at pagkatapos niya ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang dalawang pulgada. Iyong takip ay bilog na patulis at may tabang
mga kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang hugis ng dulo ng bagay na may takip dahil natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin mo nga sa akin kung makikilala mo ang mga
bagay na nasa larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na katulad noong takip ng bagay na inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang
bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay asul gayong ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti? (Exhibit "A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the appellant does not deny having possessed at that time. He
was certain that the object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91, January 6, 1988)
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in color with color blue (Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na
parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The inconsistency of the witness' testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements
made especially when he answered on additional cross-examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2" was the same
object being held by Ritter was because it was the only one shown to him by the prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie
Ramirez was not all certain about the sexual vibrator because he did not actually see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning that the foreigner inserted something inside her vagina.
The trial court admitted such statement as part of the res gestae. In a strained effort to accept such statement as part of res gestae, the
trial court focused the test of admissibility on the lapse of time between the event and the utterance. For the average 13 years old, the
insertion of a mechanical device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a young girl is undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie,
however, there must be more evidence to show that the statement, given after a night's sleep had intervened, was given instinctively
because the event was so startling Res gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside Rosario's vagina, the evidence is still not adequate to impute the
death of Rosario to the appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in her vagina. We quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even categorically admitted to you that she was already able to remove
the object allegedly inserted inside her vagina, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was committed. But was Ritter guilty of homicide?
ATTY. CARAAN:
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a consequence of the insertion of the foreign object into the
victim's vagina by the appellant.

Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by Rosario Baluyot later on when you met her when you asked her and
when she told you that she was already able to remove that object from her vagina?

We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina which led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the circumstances are capable of varying
interpretations and are not enough to justify conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in Rosario's vagina. Neither could he identify the object
(Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the same object which the appellant was holding at that time of the alleged incident.

A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, "Was it already removed?" And she answered, "Yes, it was removed." But the
same night, she again complained of pain of her stomach. She sent one of her friends to call for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was
uttering defamatory words against me as she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both children were invited by the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p.
73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be groaning in pain so we can just imagine the distress she was undergoing at this point in time.
If the device inserted by the appellant caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure the pain and discomfort until

May, 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must
be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
(People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness for the defense is considered an expert
witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a graduate of the State University in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949,
and a graduate of the Institute of Criminology University. He was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in 1963, and also a
graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the Prevention of Crimes in Tokyo Japan 1965. He was appointed Medico
Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation in 1940 until 1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and became the
Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima College
of Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical Center, Makati Medical Center, UERM Medical Center, MCU Medical Center.
He has been with the NBI for 43 years. He has attended no less than 13 conferences abroad. He is the author of the textbooks entitled
"Legal Medicine" and "Medical Jurisprudence".) With his impressive legal and medical background, his testimony is too authoritative to
ignore. We quote the pertinent portions of his testimony:
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. "C-2" which object was described as a part of a sexual vibrator
battery operated. Now, given this kind of object, would you kindly tell us what would be the probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it
is inserted into her vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a human being and as such be considered a foreign object. As a
foreign object, the tendency of the body may be: No. 1expel the foreign bodyNo. 2.The tendency of the body is to react to that
foreign body. One of the reactions that maybe manifested by the person wherein such foreign body is concerned is to cover the foreign
body with human tissue, in a way to avoid its further injury to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest symptoms and changes in the area where the foreign body is
located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but may be felt all over the body, we call it systemic reaction.
Now, considering the fact that this foreign body as shown to me is already not complete, this shows exposure of its different parts for the
body to react. If there is mechanism to cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of power from within and that power
must be a dry cell battery. [The] composition of the battery are, manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water and any substance that will
cause current flow. All of these substances are irritants including areas of the container and as such, the primary reaction of the body is to
cause irritation on the tissues, thereby inflammatory changes develop and in all likelihood, aside from those inflammatory changes would
be a supervening infection in a way that the whole generative organ of the woman will suffer from diseased process causing her the
systemic reaction like fever, swelling of the area, and other systemic symptoms. . . . . (TSN., pp. 13-15, October 19,1988)

Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that you mentioned, this object has a shorter time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to the time frame wherein infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign
body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the time frame is not more than 10 months, and this case is still within the said time frame."
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where an accused is facing a penalty of reclusion perpetua, the
evidence against him cannot be based on probabilities which are less likely than those probabilities which favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body lodged inside the body. An examination of the object gave
the following results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference3.031
inches (b) Lengthapproximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per certification dated 01 June 1988, signed by Mr. Rodolfo D.
Mercuric, Shipboard Electrical Systems Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic (see attached certification).
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator depicted in the catalog because no actual physical dimensions
and/or mechanical characteristics were shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL")
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on the open end portion which revealed the following:
Result of Examination
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1 shows the following inscription:

xxx xxx xxx

MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")

Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any reaction such as an infection would set in, how many days after the
insertion of this object in the vagina of a 12 year old girl?

From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert and based on Dr. Solis' testimony, it is more likely that
infection should set in much earlier. Considering also that the object was inserted inside the vagina which is part of the generative organ of
a woman, an organ which is lined with a very thin layer of membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of the body is more susceptible
to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)

A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed, in a way that vaginal secretion has more chance to get in, well,
liberation of this irritant chemicals would be enhanced and therefore in a shorter period of time, there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the insertion?

The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the circumstances of the case. We see no reason why his opinions qualified by
training and experience should not be controlling and binding upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(People v. Tolentino, 166 SCRA 469 [1988]).

A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body in the vaginal canal usually developed within, a period of two (2)
weeks . . .

Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined Rosario Baluyot on May 17, 1986 as a referral patient from
the Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN clearance to the patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)

xxx xxx xxx

Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Baluyot on that day?

Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator was inserted in her vagina on October 10, 1986 and she was
operated on, on May 19, 1987 the following year, so it took more than 7 months before this was extracted, would you say that it will take
that long before any adverse infection could set in inside the vagina?

A I examined her twice on that day.

A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs and even this lipstick of women usually, there are only about two (2) weeks
time that the patient suffer some abnormal symptoms.

Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of your findings, if any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the delivery room. The patient was brought to the delivery room wheel-chaired then
from the wheel chair, the patient was ambigatory (sic). She was able to walk from the door to the examining table. On examination, the
patient is conscious, she was fairly nourished, fairly developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at that time and examination deals
more on the abdomen which shows slightly distended abdomen with muscle guarding with tenderness all over, with maximum tenderness
over the hypogastric area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28, 1988)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what was your findings, if any?

A In my second examination, I repeated the internal examination wherein I placed my index finger and middle finger inside the vagina of
the patient and was able to palpate a hard object. After which, I made a speculum examination wherein I was able to visualize the inner
portion of the vaginal canal, there I saw purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the vaginal canal and a foreign body invaded on
the posterior part of the vaginal canal.
xxx xxx xxx
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he asked me to try to remove the said foreign object by the use of forceps which
I tried to do so also but I failed to extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario Baluyot both in the first and second instance, Rosario Baluyot was conscious
and were you able to talk to her when you were examining her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who inserted and placed the foreign object on her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3) months ago from the time I examined her.

From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could still answer questions asked of her although she was
complaining of stomach pains. Unfortunately, the medical attention given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her condition. The
operation on May 19 was too late.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis, which is massive infection, in the
abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the
uterus to the fallopian tubes and into the peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano vs.Intermediate Appellate Court (157
SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:
xxx xxx xxx
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no
defense at all. The defendant faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed against him. In a
manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important, therefore, to equalize the
positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the presumption
by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (At. p. 592)

Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what happened next with your patient?

Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?

The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of witnesses and preponderance of evidence presented by
the prosecution but there is no direct and convincing proof that the accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside the victim's vagina
which caused her death seven (7) months after its insertion. What the prosecution managed to establish were mere circumstances which
were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a
conviction it is imperative, though, that the following requisites should concur:

A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo surgery after that?

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's condition at that time. It ruled that it is inconceivable that she would
be striking a normal conversation with the doctors and would be sitting on the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara stated that when
he brought Rosario Baluyot to the hospital, she was unconscious and writhing in pain.

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised
Rules of Court)

A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on operation on that date.

It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at that time because there were several instances testified to
by different witnesses that she was still able to talk prior to her operation:
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the Olongapo Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement testified that as a
member of this group she visits indigent children in the hospital every Saturday and after office hours on working days.
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was still able to talk to Rosario Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates
helped Rosario go to the comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N., pp. 16-19, May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social worker who worked at Pope John 23rd Community Center under
Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital visits, she encountered Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child
who happened to be Rosario Baluyot seated on the cement floor and when she asked why she was seated there, she was told that it was
too hot in the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-13, September 7, 1988)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital actually testified that she was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September
14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on her so he brought her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)

For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved
should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all
others, as the author of the crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433 [1987]). In this case the circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution does not conclusively point to the liability of the appellant for the crime charged. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her death exemplified starkly the daily terrors that most
street children encounter as they sell their bodies in order to survive. At an age when innocence and youthful joys should preponderate in
their lives, they experience life in its most heartless and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle disappointments occupying
their young minds, they daily cope with tragedies that even adults should never be made to carry.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts of Government to dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as
a means of galvanizing the nation to care for its street children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and prosecutors alike if one
pedophile-killer could be brought to justice so that his example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the formulation and
implementation of meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they
are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that the accused did commit the offense
has not been satisfied.

By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:


1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates reasonable doubt about her being less than 12 years old when the carnal
knowledge took place. If the evidence for the prosecution is to be believed, she was not yet born on the date she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is not satisfactory, the prosecution has to prove force, intimidation, or
deprivation of reason in order to convict for rape. There is no such proof. In fact, the evidence shows a willingness to submit to the sexual
act for monetary considerations.
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the vagina of Rosario was Jessie Ramirez. This witness did not see
Ritter insert the vibrator. The morning after the insertion, he was only told by Rosario about it. Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario
who informed him that she was able to remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the night of that second encounter, he saw
Rosario groaning because of pain in her stomach. She was even hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only hearsay, it is also
contradictory.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign object with active properties to cause pain, discomfort, and
serious infection only after seven months inside a young girl's vaginal canal. Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez
recalled that the incident happened in December of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence, however shows that the
appellant was not here in the Philippines that December. As per the Commission on Immigration Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich
Ritter arrived in the Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on October 12, 1986. He never returned until September 23, 1987 (Exhibits
"DD" and "EE") The incident could have happened only in October, but then it would have been highly improbable for the sexual vibrator to
stay inside the vagina for seven (7) months with the kind of serious complications it creates.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital confinement testified that she told him "Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang
naglagay nito." The accused is not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities after the hotel incident. Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony
indicating that she was "used" by a "Negro" three (3) months prior to admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate profession, there
is always the possibility that she could have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual behavior where a vibrator or
vibrators were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and May, 1987.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the alleged crime renders the evidence for the prosecution
insufficient to establish appellant's guilty connection with the requisite moral certainty. (See People v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina.
This object may have caused her death. It is possible that the appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an
affirmance of conviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against
the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken into account. This rule applies even to
hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour violates the mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must
survive the test of reason. The strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
[1986]). As stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615 [1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of
the accused. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning such
proof "to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except
that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more
likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certaintya certainty that convinces and
satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p.
379, citing U.S. v. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally certain of the guilt of the appellant, he is, therefore,
entitled to an acquittal.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the children, Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in October,
1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we are convinced that he comes to this country not to look at historical sights, enrich his
intellect or indulge in legitimate pleasures but in order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the appellant who picked him and Rosario from among the
children and invited them to the hotel; and that in the hotel he was shown pictures of young boys like him and the two masturbated each
other, such actuations clearly show that the appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was sizing up young children. Dr.
Solis defined pedophilia in his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987 edition, as follows:

PedophiliaA form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the compulsive desire to have sexual intercourse with a child of either sex.
Children of various ages participate in sexual activities, like fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual intercourse.
Usually committed by a homosexual between a man and a boy the latter being a passive partner.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by itself. Pedophilia is clearly a behavior
offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social
well-being of our youth. (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848 [1989]). Pedophiles,
especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in our country.
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts injurious not only to Rosario Baluyot but also to the
public good and domestic tranquility of the people. The state has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. (Art. XV,
Section 3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. The appellant should
be expelled from the country.
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what
has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been
explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived
from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a
clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for the reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil
action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But
for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less
private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It
will close up an inexhaustible source of injusticea cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house. Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this
unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by
her sudden and incredulous death as reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with
homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and
the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As
earlier stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator
may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As
earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for
proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed by the
appellant should not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the circumstances of the case, we are awarding damages to the heirs of
Rosario Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles,
pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other
related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the
forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media exposes, college dissertations, and other studies deal at
length with this serious social problem but pedophiles like the appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and foreign publications

catering to them will continue to advertise the availability of Filipino street children unless the Government acts and acts soon. We have to
acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express the Court's concern about the problem of
street children and the evils committed against them. Something must be done about it.

On March 25, 1963, the United States Lines, through the Columbian Rope Company, by letter informed the Davao Parts and
Service, Inc. that it was filing a claim for the undelivered crates with the Manila Port Service. And true to its word, it filed on March 30,
1963 a formal claim with the Manila Port Service for the value of Crates Nos. 3648 and 3649, but the latter declined to honor the same.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on
grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the
heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation proceedings
against the appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry into the country.

On June 26, 1963, United States Lines, through Columbian Rope Company, its Davao agent, informed the Davao Parts and
Service, Inc., inter alia, that the Manila Port Service had not yet settled its claim, and that the one-year period provided by law within which
to bring action against the Manila Port Service for the two crates (Nos. 3648 and 3649) would expire on July 28, 1963.
Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., through Ker & Company Ltd., its agent in the Philippines, wrote on July 24, 1963 the United States
Lines expressing its appreciation to the latter for taking action against the Manila Port Service. In the same letter it requested for an
extension of time to file suit against the United States Lines (the prescriptive period for doing so being set to expire on July 28, 1963),
explaining that it could not file suit against any entity (including the Manila Port Service) except the United States Lines with whom its
subrogee the Davao Parts and Service, Inc., was in contract.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24033

February 22, 1968

PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD., plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
UNITED STATES LINES, defendant-appellee.

No reply having been received by it from the United States Lines, the Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. on July 29, 1963 filed a suit
praying that judgment be rendered against the former for the sum of P552.12, with interest at the legal rate, plus attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation. 1
On August 16, 1963, the United States Lines filed its answer with counterclaim, 2 while Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. filed its answer
to said counterclaim on August 26, 1963.
On March 9, 1964, the parties submitted a Partial Stipulation of Facts.

Quasha, Asperilla, Blanco & Associates for plaintiff-appellant.


Enriquez D. Perez for defendant-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

After trial, the lower court on October 31, 1964 rendered a decision dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 4
Thus this appeal, raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint and in exonerating
defendant-appellee from liability for the value of the two undelivered crates Nos. 3648 and 3649.

The facts antecedent to this appeal from a decision dated October 31, 1964 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, are as follows:
On June 29, 1962, General Motors shipped and consigned on a CIF basis to Davao Parts and Service, Inc. at Davao City from New
York aboard the United States Lines' vessel SS "Pioneer Moor" a cargo of truck spare parts in 25 cases and 4 crates (2 pieces unboxed),
for which United States Lines issues a short form bill of lading No. T-1 (Annex "A" and Exh. "1"), and which shipment was insured against
loss and damage with Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. The short form bill of lading No. T-1 indicated Manila as the port of discharge and
Davao City as the place where the goods were to be transshipped, and expressly incorporated by reference the provisions contained in
the carrier's regular long form bill of lading (Annex "B" and Exh. "2").
The SS "Pioneer Moor" on July 28, 1962 discharged at Manila to the custody of the Manila Port Service which was then the
operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, the above described cargo, complete but with the exception of two crates, namely,
Crates Nos. 3139 and 3148 valued at P1,498.25.
On July 30, 1962, the Luzon Brokerage Corporation, Customs broker hired by the United States Lines, filed in behalf of the latter a
provisional claim against the Manila Port Service for short landed, short-delivered and/or landed in bad order cargo ex-United States
Lines' vessel.
On August 30, 1962, the afore-described cargo, with the exception of Crates Nos. 3139 and 3148 which were not discharged at the
Manila Port, and Crates Nos. 3648 and 3649 which were discharged at the Manila Port but were lost in the custody of the Manila Port
Service, was transshipped by United States Lines to Davao through a vessel of its Davao agent, Columbian Rope Company, and duly
received in good order by the Davao Parts and Service, Inc.
Davao Parts and Service, Inc. filed on December 26, 1962 a formal claim with the United States Lines through the latter's agent,
Columbian Rope Company, for the value of Crates Nos. 3139, 3148, 3648 and 3649 in the total sum of P2,010.37.
The United States Lines, after proper verification, paid Davao Parts and Service, Inc. the sum of P1,458.25, representing the value
of Crates Nos. 3139 and 3148, when it was discovered that these two crates had been overlanded in Honolulu, but refused to pay for the
value of Crates Nos. 3648 and 3649 for the reason that these crates had been lost while in the custody of the Manila Port Service.
The two crates (Nos. 3139 and 3148) which were overlanded in Honolulu and for which United States Lines paid Davao Parts and
Service, Inc. the sum of P1,458.25, were later recovered and returned to Davao Parts and Service, Inc. and the latter refunded United
States Lines for the sum it paid.
In view of United States Lines' refusal to pay for the two crates (Nos. 3648 and 3649) which were lost while in the custody of the
Manila Port Service, Ker & Company, Ltd., agent of Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., in the Philippines, and insurer of Davao Parts and
Service, Inc., paid to the latter the value of said crates in the sum of P552.12.

It must be stated at the outset that a bill of lading operates both as a receipt and as a contract. It is a receipt for the goods shipped
and a contract to transport and deliver the same as therein stipulated. As a receipt, it recites the date and place of shipment, describes the
goods as to quantity, weight, dimensions, identification marks and condition, quality, and value. As a contract, it names the contracting
parties, which include the consignee, fixes the route, destination, and freight rate or charges, and stipulates the rights and obligations
assumed by the parties. 5
In this jurisdiction, it is a statutory and decisional rule of law that a contract is the law between the contracting parties, 6 and where
there is nothing in it which is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy, or public order, the validity of the contract must be
sustained. 7
The Bill of Lading (short form) No. T-1 dated June 29, 1962 (Annex "A" and Exh. 1) provides under Section 1 thereof (Exh. that, "It is
agreed that the receipt, custody carriage, delivery and transshipping of the goods are subject to the norms appearing on the face and back
hereof and also to the terms contained in the carrier's regular long form, bill of lading, used in this service, including any clauses presently
being stamped or endorsed thereon which shall be deemed to be incorporated in this bill of lading, which shall govern the relations
whatsoever they may be between shipper, consignee, carrier and ship in every contingency, wheresoever and whensoever occurring and
whether the carrier be acting as such or as bailee, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the regular long form Bill of Lading (Annex "B" and Exh. "2") provides, inter alia, that:1wph1.t
The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any loss or damage to the goods while the goods are not in its actual
custody. (Par. 2, last subpar. Emphasis supplied.)
The carrier or master, in the exercise of its or his discretion and altho' transshipment or forwarding of the goods may have been
contemplated or provided for herein, may at port of discharge or any other place whatsoever transship or forward the goods or any part
thereof by any means at the risk and expense of the goods and at any time, whether before or after loading on the ship named and by any
route, whether within or outside the scope of the voyage or beyond the port of discharge or destination of the goods and without notice to
the shipper or consignee. The carrier or master may delay such transshipping or forwarding for any reason, including but not limited to
awaiting a vessel or other means of transportation whether by the carrier or others.
The carrier or master in making arrangements with any person for or in connection with all transshipping or forwarding of the goods
or the use of any means of transportation not used or operated by the carrier shall be considered solely the agent of the shipper and
consignee and without any other responsibility whatsoever or for the cost thereof . The receipt, custody, carriage and delivery of the goods
by any such person or on carrier and all transshipping and forwarding shall be subject to all the provisions whatsoever of such person's or
on carrier's form of bill of lading or agreement then in use, whether or not issued and even though such provisions may be less favorable
to the shipper or consignee in any respect than the provisions of this bill of lading. The shipper and consignee authorize the carrier or
master to arrange with any such person or on-carrier that the lowest valuation or limitation of liability contained in the bill of lading or other
agreement of such person or on-carrier shall apply.

All responsibility of the carrier in any capacity shall altogether cease and the goods shall be deemed delivered by it and this contract
of carriage shall be deemed fully performed on actual or constructive delivery of the goods to itself as such agent of the shipper and
consignee or to any such person or on carrier at port of discharge from ship or elsewhere in case of an earlier transshipment.
The shipper and consignee shall be liable to this carrier for and shall indemnify it against all expense of forwarding and
transshipping, including any increase in or additional freight or other charges whatsoever.
Pending or during forwarding or transshipping this carrier or the master may store the goods ashore or afloat solely as agent of the
shipper and at the risk and expense of the goods and this carrier shall not be responsible for the acts, neglect, delay or failure to act of
anyone to whom the goods are entrusted or delivered for storage, handling, or any service incidental thereto.
In case the carrier issues a bill of lading covering transportation by a local or other carrier prior to the goods being delivered to and
put into the physical custody of the carrier, it shall not be under any responsibility or liability whatsoever for any loss or damage to the
goods occurring prior to or until the actual receipt or custody of the goods by it at the port or place of transportation to such port or place
where the goods are put in its physical custody, it acts solely as the agent of the shipper. (Par. 16, emphasis supplied.)
It is admitted by both parties that the crates subject matter of this action were lost while in the possession and custody of the Manila
Port Service. Since the long form of Bill of Lading (Annex "B" and Exh. "2") provides that "The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity
whatsoever for any loss or damage to the goods while the goods are not in its actual custody," appellee cannot be held responsible for the
loss of said crates. For as correctly observed by the lower court, it is hardly fair to make appellee accountable for a loss not due to its acts
or omissions or over which it had no control. 8
Contrary to appellant's stand, the appellee did not undertake to carry and deliver safely the cargo to the consignee in Davao City.
The short form Bill of Lading (Annex "A" and Exh. "1") states in no uncertain terms that the port of discharge of the cargo is Manila, but
that the same was to be transshipped beyond the port of discharge to Davao City. Pursuant to the terms of the long form Bill of Lading
(Annex "B" and Exh. "2"), appellee's responsibility as a common carrier ceased the moment the goods were unloaded in Manila; and in
the matter of transshipment, appellee acted merely as an agent of the shipper and consignee. Contrary likewise to appellant's contention,
the cargo was not transshipped with the use of transportation used or operated by appellee. It is true that the vessel used for
transshipment is owned and operated by appellee's Davao agent, the Columbian Rope Company, but there is no proof that said vessel is
owned or operated by appellee. The vessels of appellee's agent are being erroneously presumed by appellant to be owned and operated
by appellee.
Appellant argues that the provisions of the Bill of Lading exculpating the appellee from liability for cargo losses, do not apply where
full cargo freight is paid up to and beyond the point of stipulated discharge, and here defendant-appellee agreed to absorb all costs of
forwarding and transshipment freight having been prepaid up to Davao City. But the receipt of full cargo freight up to Davao City cannot
render inoperative the provisions of the Bill of Lading relied upon by appellee inasmuch as such a situation is not provided therein as an
exception. In fact, one searches the Bills of Lading (short and long forms) in vain for such an exception. Besides, it is for the convenience
of both parties that full freight up to Davao City had been prepaid, otherwise there would have been need to make further arrangements
regarding the transshipment of the cargo to Davao City. After all, the long form Bill of Lading provides that, "The shipper and consignee
shall be liable to this carrier for and shall indemnify it against all expense of forwarding and transshipping, including any increase in or
additional freight or other charge whatsoever." (Annex "B" and Exh. "2", par. 6, subpar. 4)
The filing of a claim by defendant-appellee with the Manila Port Service for the value of the losses cannot be considered as an
indication that it is answerable for cargo losses up to Davao City. On the contrary, it is a convincing proof that said party was not remiss in
its duties as agent of the consignee. That appellee captioned its claim against the Manila Port Service as "SS 'Pioneer Moor' Voy. 25, Reb.
1067 New York/Davao via Manila B/L T-1 31 Packages Truck Spare Parts Cons: Davao Parts and Service," likewise, is no proof that
appellee knowingly assumed liability for cargo losses up to Davao City. It merely showed that the goods would have to be, as indeed they
were, first unloaded in Manila and thereafter transshipped to Davao City.
Through the short form Bill of Lading (Annex "A" and Exh. "1"), incorporating by reference the terms of the regular long form bill of
lading (Annex "B" and Exh. "2"), the United States Lines acknowledged the receipt of the cargo of truck spare parts that it carried, and
stated the conditions under which it was to carry the cargo, the place where it was to be transshipped, the entity to which delivery is to be
made, and the rate of compensation for the carriage. This it delivered to the Davao Parts and Service, Inc. as evidence of a contract
between them. By receiving the bill of lading, Davao Parts and Service, Inc. assented to the terms of the consignment contained therein,
and became bound thereby, so far as the conditions named are reasonable in the eyes of the law. Since either appellant nor appellee
alleges that any provision therein is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy, or public order, and indeed We found none
the validity of the Bill of Lading must be sustained and the provisions therein properly applied to resolve the conflict between the parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.1wph1.t

G.R. No. L-36902 January 30, 1982


LUIS PICHEL, petitioner,
vs.
PRUDENCIO ALONZO, respondent.

GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of First Instance of Basilan City dated January 5, 1973 in Civil Case No.
820 entitled "Prudencio Alonzo, plaintiff, vs. Luis Pichel, defendant."
This case originated in the lower Court as an action for the annulment of a "Deed of Sale" dated August 14, 1968 and executed by
Prudencio Alonzo, as vendor, in favor of Luis Pichel, as vendee, involving property awarded to the former by the Philippine Government
under Republic Act No. 477. Pertinent portions of the document sued upon read as follows:
That the VENDOR for and in consideration of the sum of FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P4,200.00), Philippine Currency,
in hand paid by the VENDEE to the entire satisfaction of the VENDOR, the VENDOR hereby sells transfers, and conveys, by way of
absolute sale, all the coconut fruits of his coconut land, designated as Lot No. 21 - Subdivision Plan No. Psd- 32465, situated at
Balactasan Plantation, Lamitan, Basilan City, Philippines;
That for the herein sale of the coconut fruits are for all the fruits on the aforementioned parcel of land presently found therein as well as for
future fruits to be produced on the said parcel of land during the years period; which shag commence to run as of SEPTEMBER 15,1968;
up to JANUARY 1, 1976 (sic);
That the delivery of the subject matter of the Deed of Sale shall be from time to time and at the expense of the VENDEE who shall do the
harvesting and gathering of the fruits;
That the Vendor's right, title, interest and participation herein conveyed is of his own exclusive and absolute property, free from any liens
and encumbrances and he warrants to the Vendee good title thereto and to defend the same against any and all claims of all persons
whomsoever. 1
After the pre-trial conference, the Court a quo issued an Order dated November 9, 1972 which in part read thus:
The following facts are admitted by the parties:
Plaintiff Prudencio Alonzo was awarded by the Government that parcel of land designated as Lot No. 21 of Subdivision Plan Psd 32465 of
Balactasan, Lamitan, Basilan City in accordance with Republic Act No. 477. The award was cancelled by the Board of Liquidators on
January 27, 1965 on the ground that, previous thereto, plaintiff was proved to have alienated the land to another, in violation of law. In 197
2, plaintiff's rights to the land were reinstated.
On August 14, 1968, plaintiff and his wife sold to defendant an the fruits of the coconut trees which may be harvested in the land in
question for the period, September 15, 1968 to January 1, 1976, in consideration of P4,200.00. Even as of the date of sale, however, the
land was still under lease to one, Ramon Sua, and it was the agreement that part of the consideration of the sale, in the sum of P3,650.00,
was to be paid by defendant directly to Ramon Sua so as to release the land from the clutches of the latter. Pending said payment plaintiff
refused to snow the defendant to make any harvest.
In July 1972, defendant for the first time since the execution of the deed of sale in his favor, caused the harvest of the fruit of the coconut
trees in the land.

xxx xxx xxx


Considering the foregoing, two issues appear posed by the complaint and the answer which must needs be tested in the crucible of a trial
on the merits, and they are:

3. In deciding a question which was not in issue when it declared the deed of sale in question to be a contract of lease over Lot 21;

First. Whether or nor defendant actually paid to plaintiff the full sum of P4,200.00 upon execution of the deed of sale.
Second. Is the deed of sale, Exhibit 'A', the prohibited encumbrance contemplated in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 477?

2. In declaring granting without admitting that an interpretation is necessary the deed of sale in question to be a contract of lease
over the land itself where the respondent himself waived and abandoned his claim that said deed did not express the true agreement of
the parties, and on the contrary, respondent admitted at the pre-trial that his agreement with petitioner was one of sale of the fruits of the
coconut trees on the land;

Anent the first issue, counsel for plaintiff Alonzo subsequently 'stipulated and agreed that his client ... admits fun payment thereof by
defendant. 3 The remaining issue being one of law, the Court below considered the case submitted for summary judgment on the basis of
the pleadings of the parties, and the admission of facts and documentary evidence presented at the pre-trial conference.
The lower court rendered its decision now under review, holding that although the agreement in question is denominated by the parties as
a deed of sale of fruits of the coconut trees found in the vendor's land, it actually is, for all legal intents and purposes, a contract of lease of
the land itself. According to the Court:
... the sale aforestated has given defendant complete control and enjoyment of the improvements of the land. That the contract is
consensual; that its purpose is to allow the enjoyment or use of a thing; that it is onerous because rent or price certain is stipulated; and
that the enjoyment or use of the thing certain is stipulated to be for a certain and definite period of time, are characteristics which admit of
no other conclusion. ... The provisions of the contract itself and its characteristics govern its nature. 4
The Court, therefore, concluded that the deed of sale in question is an encumbrance prohibited by Republic Act No. 477 which provides
thus:
Sec. 8. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, land acquired under the provisions of this Act or any
permanent improvements thereon shall not be thereon and for a term of ten years from and after the date of issuance of the certificate of
title, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of such period.
Any occupant or applicant of lands under this Act who transfers whatever rights he has acquired on said lands and/or on the
improvements thereon before the date of the award or signature of the contract of sale, shall not be entitled to apply for another piece of
agricultural land or urban, homesite or residential lot, as the case may be, from the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation; and
such transfer shall be considered null and void. 5
The dispositive portion of the lower Court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, it is the judgment of this Court that the deed of sale, Exhibit 'A', should be, as it is, hereby declared nun and void; that
plaintiff be, as he is, ordered to pay back to defendant the consideration of the sale in the sum of P4,200.00 the same to bear legal interest
from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; that defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees.
Costs against the defendant. 6
Before going into the issues raised by the instant Petition, the matter of whether, under the admitted facts of this case, the respondent had
the right or authority to execute the "Deed of Sale" in 1968, his award over Lot No. 21 having been cancelled previously by the Board of
Liquidators on January 27, 1965, must be clarified. The case in point is Ras vs. Sua 7 wherein it was categorically stated by this Court that
a cancellation of an award granted pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 477 does not automatically divest the awardee of his
rights to the land. Such cancellation does not result in the immediate reversion of the property subject of the award, to the State. Speaking
through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, this Court ruled that "until and unless an appropriate proceeding for reversion is instituted by the State,
and its reacquisition of the ownership and possession of the land decreed by a competent court, the grantee cannot be said to have been
divested of whatever right that he may have over the same property." 8
There is nothing in the record to show that at any time after the supposed cancellation of herein respondent's award on January 27, 1965,
reversion proceedings against Lot No. 21 were instituted by the State. Instead, the admitted fact is that the award was reinstated in 1972.
Applying the doctrine announced in the above-cited Ras case, therefore, herein respondent is not deemed to have lost any of his rights as
grantee of Lot No. 21 under Republic Act No. 477 during the period material to the case at bar, i.e., from the cancellation of the award in
1965 to its reinstatement in 1972. Within said period, respondent could exercise all the rights pertaining to a grantee with respect to Lot
No. 21.
This brings Us to the issues raised by the instant Petition. In his Brief, petitioner contends that the lower Court erred:
1. In resorting to construction and interpretation of the deed of sale in question where the terms thereof are clear and unambiguous and
leave no doubt as to the intention of the parties;

4. In declaring furthermore the deed of sale in question to be a contract of lease over the land itself on the basis of facts which were not
proved in evidence;
5. In not holding that the deed of sale, Exhibit "A" and "2", expresses a valid contract of sale;
6. In not deciding squarely and to the point the issue as to whether or not the deed of sale in question is an encumbrance on the land and
its improvements prohibited by Section 8 of Republic Act 477; and
7. In awarding respondent attorney's fees even granting, without admitting, that the deed of sale in question is violative of Section 8 of
Republic Act 477.
The first five assigned errors are interrelated, hence, We shall consider them together. To begin with, We agree with petitioner that
construction or interpretation of the document in question is not called for. A perusal of the deed fails to disclose any ambiguity or obscurity
in its provisions, nor is there doubt as to the real intention of the contracting parties. The terms of the agreement are clear and
unequivocal, hence the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. Such is the mandate of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides that:
Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall control ... .
Pursuant to the afore-quoted legal provision, the first and fundamental duty of the courts is the application of the contract according to its
express terms, interpretation being resorted to only when such literal application is impossible. 9
Simply and directly stated, the "Deed of Sale dated August 14, 1968 is precisely what it purports to be. It is a document evidencing the
agreement of herein parties for the sale of coconut fruits of Lot No. 21, and not for thelease of the land itself as found by the lower Court.
In clear and express terms, the document defines the object of the contract thus: "the herein sale of the coconut fruits are for an the fruits
on the aforementioned parcel of land during the years ...(from) SEPTEMBER 15, 1968; up to JANUARY 1, 1976." Moreover, as petitioner
correctly asserts, the document in question expresses a valid contract of sale. It has the essential elements of a contract of sale as
defined under Article 1485 of the New Civil Code which provides thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate
thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
The subject matter of the contract of sale in question are the fruits of the coconut trees on the land during the years from September 15,
1968 up to January 1, 1976, which subject matter is a determinate thing. Under Article 1461 of the New Civil Code, things having a
potential existence may be the object of the contract of sale. And inSibal vs. Valdez, 50 Phil. 512, pending crops which have potential
existence may be the subject matter of the sale. Here, the Supreme Court, citing Mechem on Sales and American cases said which have
potential existence may be the subject matter of sale. Here, the Supreme Court, citing Mechem on Sales and American cases said:
Mr. Mechem says that a valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in existence, is reasonably certain to come into
existence as the natural increment or usual incident of something already in existence, and then belonging to the vendor, and the title will
vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes into existence. (Emerson vs. European Railway Co., 67 Me., 387; Cutting vs. Packers
Exchange, 21 Am. St. Rep. 63) Things of this nature are said to have a potential existence. A man may sell property of which he is
potentially and not actually possess. He may make a valid sale of the wine that a vineyard is expected to produce; or the grain a field may
grow in a given time; or the milk a cow may yield during the coming year; or the wool that shall thereafter grow upon sheep; or what may
be taken at the next case of a fisherman's net; or fruits to grow; or young animals not yet in existence; or the goodwill of a trade and the
like. The thing sold, however, must be specific and Identified. They must be also owned at the time by the vendor. (Hull vs. Hull 48 Conn.
250 (40 Am. Rep., 165) (pp. 522-523).
We do not agree with the trial court that the contract executed by and between the parties is "actually a contract of lease of the land and
the coconut trees there." (CFI Decision, p. 62, Records). The Court's holding that the contract in question fits the definition of a lease of
things wherein one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain and for a period which
may be definite or indefinite (Art. 1643, Civil Code of the Philippines) is erroneous. The essential difference between a contract of sale and
a lease of things is that the delivery of the thing sold transfers ownership, while in lease no such transfer of ownership results as the rights
of the lessee are limited to the use and enjoyment of the thing leased.

In Rodriguez vs. Borromeo, 43 Phil. 479, 490, the Supreme Court held:
Since according to article 1543 of the same Code the contract of lease is defined as the giving or the concession of the enjoyment or use
of a thing for a specified time and fixed price, and since such contract is a form of enjoyment of the property, it is evident that it must be
regarded as one of the means of enjoyment referred to in said article 398, inasmuch as the terms enjoyment, use, and benefit involve the
same and analogous meaning relative to the general utility of which a given thing is capable. (104 Jurisprudencia Civil, 443)
In concluding that the possession and enjoyment of the coconut trees can therefore be said to be the possession and enjoyment of the
land itself because the defendant-lessee in order to enjoy his right under the contract, he actually takes possession of the land, at least
during harvest time, gather all of the fruits of the coconut trees in the land, and gain exclusive use thereof without the interference or
intervention of the plaintiff-lessor such that said plaintiff-lessor is excluded in fact from the land during the period aforesaid, the trial court
erred. The contract was clearly a "sale of the coconut fruits." The vendor sold, transferred and conveyed "by way of absolute sale, all the
coconut fruits of his land," thereby divesting himself of all ownership or dominion over the fruits during the seven-year period. The
possession and enjoyment of the coconut trees cannot be said to be the possession and enjoyment of the land itself because these rights
are distinct and separate from each other, the first pertaining to the accessory or improvements (coconut trees) while the second, to the
principal (the land). A transfer of the accessory or improvement is not a transfer of the principal. It is the other way around, the accessory
follows the principal. Hence, the sale of the nuts cannot be interpreted nor construed to be a lease of the trees, much less extended
further to include the lease of the land itself.

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

The real and pivotal issue of this case which is taken up in petitioner's sixth assignment of error and as already stated above, refers to the
validity of the "Deed of Sale", as such contract of sale, vis-a-vis the provisions of Sec. 8, R.A. No. 477. The lower Court did not rule on this
question, having reached the conclusion that the contract at bar was one of lease. It was from the context of a lease contract that the
Court below determined the applicability of Sec. 8, R.A. No. 477, to the instant case.

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;


(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

Resolving now this principal issue, We find after a close and careful examination of the terms of the first paragraph of Section 8
hereinabove quoted, that the grantee of a parcel of land under R.A. No. 477 is not prohibited from alienating or disposing of the natural
and/or industrial fruits of the land awarded to him. What the law expressly disallows is the encumbrance or alienation of the land itself or
any of the permanent improvements thereon. Permanent improvements on a parcel of land are things incorporated or attached to the
property in a fixed manner, naturally or artificially. They include whatever is built, planted or sown on the land which is characterized by
fixity, immutability or immovability. Houses, buildings, machinery, animal houses, trees and plants would fall under the category of
permanent improvements, the alienation or encumbrance of which is prohibited by R.A. No. 477. While coconut trees are permanent
improvements of a land, their nuts are natural or industrial fruits which are meant to be gathered or severed from the trees, to be used,
enjoyed, sold or otherwise disposed of by the owner of the land. Herein respondents, as the grantee of Lot No. 21 from the Government,
had the right and prerogative to sell the coconut fruits of the trees growing on the property.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We find that none of the legal grounds enumerated above exists to justify or warrant the grant of attorney's fees to herein respondent.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower Court is hereby set aside and another one is entered dismissing the Complaint.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

By virtue of R.A. No. 477, bona fide occupants, veterans, members of guerilla organizations and other qualified persons were given the
opportunity to acquire government lands by purchase, taking into account their limited means. It was intended for these persons to make
good and productive use of the lands awarded to them, not only to enable them to improve their standard of living, but likewise to help
provide for the annual payments to the Government of the purchase price of the lots awarded to them. Section 8 was included, as stated
by the Court a quo, to protect the grantees from themselves and the incursions of opportunists who prey on their misery and poverty." It is
there to insure that the grantees themselves benefit from their respective lots, to the exclusion of other persons.
The purpose of the law is not violated when a grantee sells the produce or fruits of his land. On the contrary, the aim of the law is thereby
achieved, for the grantee is encouraged and induced to be more industrious and productive, thus making it possible for him and his family
to be economically self-sufficient and to lead a respectable life. At the same time, the Government is assured of payment on the annual
installments on the land. We agree with herein petitioner that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to prohibit the grantee
from selling the natural and industrial fruits of his land, for otherwise, it would lead to an absurd situation wherein the grantee would not be
able to receive and enjoy the fruits of the property in the real and complete sense.
Respondent through counsel, in his Answer to the Petition contends that even granting arguendo that he executed a deed of sale of the
coconut fruits, he has the "privilege to change his mind and claim it as (an) implied lease," and he has the "legitimate right" to file an action
for annulment "which no law can stop." He claims it is his "sole construction of the meaning of the transaction that should prevail and not
petitioner. (sic). 10 Respondent's counsel either misapplies the law or is trying too hard and going too far to defend his client's hopeless
cause. Suffice it to say that respondent-grantee, after having received the consideration for the sale of his coconut fruits, cannot be
allowed to impugn the validity of the contracts he entered into, to the prejudice of petitioner who contracted in good faith and for a
consideration.
The issue raised by the seventh assignment of error as to the propriety of the award of attorney's fees made by the lower Court need not
be passed upon, such award having been apparently based on the erroneous finding and conclusion that the contract at bar is one of
lease. We shall limit Ourselves to the question of whether or not in accordance with Our ruling in this case, respondent is entitled to an
award of attorney's fees. The Civil Code provides that:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

There is no evidence to contradict Bachrach's testimony on this point; and we are bound to credit him when he states his conclusion that
the value of the truck at the time it was sold was the amount he paid for it. In the absence of proof to the contrary this must also be taken
to be its value at the time it was brought away from Albay. It results that the defendant has failed to prove that he suffered any damage
whatever by the irregular manner in which the sale was conducted.
This brings us to the question of the amount of the attorney's fee allowed by the trial court. It is provided in the note given by the defendant
for the purchase price of the truck that, in the event it becoming necessary to employ counsel to enforce its collection, the maker is to pay
an additional twenty-five per cent "as fees for the attorney collecting the same." The trial court gave judgment for the full amount due on
the note and for an additional sum of P2,115.25, for attorney's fees. The appellant assigns this as error and argues that the agreement to
pay an attorney's fee, in addition to the principal and stipulated interest, is void as usurious and as being grossly excessive.

G.R. No. L-13660

November 13, 1918

E. M. BACHRACH, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE GOLINGCO, defendant-appellant.
Ramon Diokno for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.

We are of the opinion that it may lawfully be stipulated in favor of the creditor, whether the obligation be evidenced by promissory note or
otherwise, that in the event that it becomes necessary, by reason of the delinquency of the debtor, to employ counsel to enforce payment
of the obligation, a reasonable attorney's fee shall be paid by the debtor, in addition to the amount due for principal and interest. The
legality of such a stipulation, when annexed to a negotiate instrument is expressly recognized by the Negotiable Instruments Law ((Act No.
2031, sec. 2, par. E). Inasmuch as the statutory allowance for attorney's fees, as costs, is notoriously less than the amount which
attorneys are entitled to receive from their clients, unless such a stipulation is made and enforced, it follows that a creditor may be
compelled to pay, out of the money due him, a considerable sum as the necessary cost of enforcing payment by the delinquent debtor.
Such a stipulation is not void as usurious, even when added to a contract for the payment of the highest rate of interest permissible. The
purpose of such a stipulation is not to increase in any respect the benefits ultimately to accrue to the creditor. It is true that such a
stipulation may be made for the purpose of concealing usury; but that is a matter of proof to be determined in each case upon the
evidence.
We cite, with approval, the ruling of the supreme court of Georgia upon this question, as follows:

STREET, J.:
This is a suit for the recovery of a sum of money claimed as a balance due to the plaintiff on a promissory note. From a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for the sum of P8461, as principal, with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from the 10th day of July, 1916,
until paid, and for the further sum of P2,115.25, as a stipulated attorney's fee, the defendant has appealed.
The note in question represents the purchase price of an automobile truck which the plaintiff sold to the defendant at the time the note was
executed. As security for the payment of said indebtedness, the plaintiff took a chattel mortgage on the truck; and after the note had
matured this chattel mortgage was foreclosed. At the foreclosure sale the plaintiff himself became the purchaser for the sum of P539,
which amount was credited upon the indebtedness.
Of the questions raised by the defense only two in our opinion require serious consideration. The first has reference to irregularities in the
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; the second to the validity of the agreement for 25 per cent as an attorney's fee for collection.
We find that the requirements of section 14 of Act No. 1508 (the Chattel Mortgage of Law) were not observed in the sale of the truck. The
irregularity consists in the fact the truck was brought by Bachrach from Albay (which was the place of residence of the mortgagor) to the
city of Manila and here sold by the sheriff of the city at the instance of the plaintiff. There is no evidence that the mortgagor consented to
the removal of the truck to Manila or to the sale that was effected in the city; and it must therefore be held that the sale was improperly
accomplished. The statute requires that the mortgage chattel shall be sold in the municipality where the mortgagor resides, or where the
property is situated; and the latter expression has reference to the place where the thing is being kept for use by the mortgagor, not any
place where the mortgagee may choose to carry it when he takes it out of the custody of the mortgagor. It is admitted that notice of the
same was not posted anywhere in the municipality of Albay, as required in the section cited; and of course publication there would have of
little or no value when the sale was to be made in Manila.
The effect of this irregularity was, in our opinion, to make the plaintiff liable to the defendant for the full value of the truck at the time the
plaintiff thus carried it off to be sold; and of course the burden is on the defendant to prove the amount of the damage to which he was
thus subjected. With reference to the condition of the truck when it was sold, we find the following statement in the testimony of Bachrach:
Q. What was the condition of the truck at the time it was sold? At the time of the sale, everything that wasn't actually built on the truck
was removed; tires removed, generator, lamps, dynamo, everything that could be taken off with a monkeywrench was removed. It was in a
criminal condition.
Q. Was the body of the truck, or the chassis, and the motor on at the time you purchased it at the sheriff's sale? A. No.lawphil.net
Q. Had it been removed? A. Yes. We had a telegram from the sheriff of Tabaco, saying that the day he was to load the truck for Manila,
he had a protest from Golingco demanding the body, and I telegraphed the sheriff to deliver the body to Golingco, and send the truck.

A contract to pay attorney's fees for collecting, in addition to principal and interest, is not, on its face, usurious; nor does it become
usurious by reducing the debt to judgment, and including in the judgment ten per cent for attorney's fees.
The law . . . recognizes the validity of such a stipulation, and it meets the justice of the case very frequently for the debtor to pay for the
collection rather than the creditor, . . . We do not mean to intimate that usury might not be covered up by such a stipulation, that it might
not be a disguise, or contrivance for the concealment of usury; but there is no such indication in this case. There is no evidence that it was
not a bona fide stipulation to cover the contingency of having to incur expense in collecting this debt. (National bank of
Athens vs. Danforth, 80 Ga., 55.)
But the principle that it may be lawfully stipulated that the legal expense involved in the collection of a debt shall be defrayed by the debtor
does not imply that such stipulations must be enforced in accordance with their terms, no matter how injurious or oppressive they may be.
The lawful purpose to be accomplished by such a stipulation is to permit the creditor to receive the whole amount due him under his
contract without the deduction of the expenses caused by the delinquency of the debtor. It should not be permitted for him to convert such
a stipulation into a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor.
Contracts for attorney's services in this jurisdiction stand upon an entirely different footing from contracts for the payment of compensation
for any other services. By the express provision of section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an attorney is not entitled in the absence of
express contract to recover more than a reasonable compensation for his services; and even where an express contract is made the court
can ignore it and limit the recovery to reasonable compensation if the amount of the stipulated fee is found by the court to be
unreasonable. This is a very different rule from that announced in section 1091 of the Civil Code with reference to the obligation of
contract in general, where it is said that such obligation has the force of law between the contracting parties. Had the plaintiff herein made
an express contract to pay his attorney an uncontingent fee of P2,115.25, for the services to be rendered in reducing the note here in suit
to judgment, it would not have been enforceable against him had he seen fit to oppose it, as such a fee is obviously far greater than is
necessary to remunerate the attorney for the work involved and is therefore unreasonable. In order to enable the court to ignore an
express contract for an attorney's fees, it is not necessary to show, as in other contracts, that it is contrary to morality or public policy (art.
1255, Civil Code). It is enough that it is unreasonable or unconscionable.
We are not unmindful of the fact that the question as to the propriety of the stipulation for attorney's fee does not here arise directly
between the creditor in this note and the attorney into whose hands he might place the note for collection. The stipulation is contained in
the contract between the creditor and his debtor; and the attorney could not be held bound thereby. Nevertheless we think the same rule
applies as if the question had arisen directly between attorney and client. As the court has power to fix the fee as between the attorney
and the client, it must necessarily have the right to say whether a stipulation, like this, inserted in a promissory note is valid. A different
ruling, as may be readily seen, would make it exceedingly easy to evade the usury laws. As stated at the beginning of this discussion, the
lawful purpose to be accomplished by such stipulation is to permit the creditor to receive the amount due without the deduction of the
expenses caused by the delinquency of the debtor. It must not be used as a cloak for an exorbitant exaction.
We are therefore of the opinion that we are authorized to reduce the amount in question to a sum which will enable the plaintiff to pay a
reasonable compensation to his attorney; and we think that P800 is sufficient for this purpose. It is possible that, as a matter of fact, the
plaintiff may have contracted with his attorney for the performances of the services to be rendered him in this matter for a sum less than
P800, and had it been so made to appear, we would have reduced the amount recoverable, under this particular clause of the note, to the
corresponding sum. No evidence having been adduced upon this point, however, we are compelled to exercise our discretion and make

use of our professional knowledge as to the reasonable compensation to which an attorney would be entitled for the performance of such
services as those which the plaintiff in this case has had occasion to require from his counsel.
Wherefore it is ordered that the plaintiff have and recover of the defendant the sum of P8,461, with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per
centum per annum, from the tenth day of July, 1916, until paid, and for the further sum of P800 as attorney's fees, and for the statutory
costs of both instances, exclusive of the statutory allowance for attorney's fees. So ordered.

A payment of taxes under a mistake of fact has been held not to be voluntary, and is therefore recoverable. (51 Am. Jur. 1023)
On principle, a recovery should be allowed where money is paid under a mistake of fact although such mistake of fact may be induced by
a mistake of laws, or where there is both a mistake of fact and a mistake of law. (40 Am. Jur. 846)
When money is paid to another under the influence of a mistake of fact that on the mistaken supposition of the existence of a specific
fact which would entitle the other to the money and it would not have been known that the fact making the payment was otherwise, it
may be recovered. The ground upon which the right of recovery rests is that money paid through misapprehension of facts belongs, in
equity , and in good conscience, to the person who paid it. (4 Am. Jur. 514)
We find no reason to attribute negligence to appellee in making the payments in question, especially considering that the new law involved
a change in its status from a taxable to a tax-exempt institution; and if it continued to pay for a time after the exemption became effective it
did so in a desire to abide by what it believed to be the law. No undue disadvantage should be visited upon it as a consequence thereof.

G.R. No. L-17133

December 31, 1965

U.S.T. COOPERATIVE STORE, petitioner-appellee,


vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, as Treasurer of the City of Manila, respondents-appellants.
Herras Law Office for petitioner-appellee.
City Fiscal H. Concepcion, Jr. and Assistant City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for respondents-appellants.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.


G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an appeal by respondents from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering them to refund to appellee the sums it
had paid to the City of Manila as municipal taxes and license fees for the period beginning July 1957 up to December 1958. The total
amount involved is P12,345.10.
The material facts were stipulated by the parties. Appellee is a duly organized cooperative association registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on March 18, 1947 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 5165 as amended. Its net assets never exceeded
P500,000 during, the years 1957, 1958 and 1959. From the time of its registration it was under the jurisdiction of the Cooperative
Administration Office.
On June 22, 1957 Republic Act No. 2023, otherwise known as the Philippine Non-Agricultural Cooperative Act, was approved by
Congress, amending and consolidating existing laws on non-agricultural cooperatives in the Philippines. The two provisions of said Act
which bear on the present case are sections 4 (1) and 66 (1), which read as follows:
SEC. 4 (1) Every cooperative under the jurisdiction of the Cooperatives Administration Office existing at the time of the approval of this Act
which has been registered under existing cooperative laws (Commonwealth Act five hundred sixty-five, Act Twenty five hundred eight and
Act Thirty-four hundred twenty-five, all as amended) shall be deemed to be registered under this Act, and its by-laws shall so far as they
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, continue in force , and be deemed to be registered under this Act.
SEC. 66 (1) Cooperatives with net assets of not more than five hundred thousand pesos shall be exempt from all taxes and government
fees of whatever name, and nature except those provided for under this Act: ... .
Unaware of the exemption provided for in section 66 (1) appellee paid to respondent City of Manila municipal taxes and license fees in the
total amount and for the period already stated. In May 1959 appellee requested a refund of said amount from the City Treasurer, but the
request was denied. Hence the present suit.
Appellants contend that the exemption under section 66 (1) does not apply to appellee because the latter was trying business not only
with its members but also with the general public. It may be noted that this fact is not ground for non-exemption from taxes and license
fees. What the law imposes and that under another section (Sec. 58) is a restriction to the effect that a cooperative shall not transact
business with non-members to exceed that done with members. There is no proof that this restriction has been violated; and in any case,
the law does not provide that the penalty for such violation is the non-exemption of the cooperative concerned. All that is required for
purposes of exemption is that the cooperative be registered under Republic Act 2023 and that its net assets be not more than P500,000.
On the question of registration, section 4 is clear that every cooperative under the jurisdiction of the Cooperatives Administration Office
existing at the time of the approval of this Act which has been registered under existing cooperative laws (as is the case of appellee
here) shall be deemed to be registered under this Act.
Appellant next argues that since the taxes and license fees in question were voluntarily paid they can no longer be recovered, as appellee
was presumed to know the law concerning its exemption and hence must be considered as having waived the benefit thereof. That the
payment was erroneously made there can be no doubt. The error consisted in appellee's not knowing of the enactment of Republic Act
No. 2023, which although passed in Julie 1957 was published only in the issue of the Official Gazette for December of the same year. The
following authorities cited by appellee appear to us to be of persuasive force:

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:


This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal
Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San
Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his
palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to
see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening
of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay.
A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked
Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from
Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a
swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the
incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio
councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report
the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health
physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no
available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal
examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as
it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the
medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to
formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman
Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted
forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him and to this Office that
this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's
house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When
admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found
that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could
have been infected by tetanus.

That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such
position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon
including San Fabian, a town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed
and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields,
the water in said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with
some companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)

On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
Date Diagnosis
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision
"an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very
serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.

11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessation of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscitation and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought home by relatives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered
confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain
Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act.
Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his
death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his
wound, but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the process of
healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound
with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct.
5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in
this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G.
5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to work without his
wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an
afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it
is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario
Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended
his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of
the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal
ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx

... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffsappellants in their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death
which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give
rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition
or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of
inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the
hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave
Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions
of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).

We look into the nature of tetanus-

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual
case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not
criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987),
we said:

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days.
However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when
symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.

xxx xxx xxx

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest
presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way
to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is
responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained
contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients,
only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some
degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the
incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli
arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists.
Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer
lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which
prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually
present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter
incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus,
dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition,
pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him.
This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw
and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable
that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more
than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's
wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could
have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could
have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death.
The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As
we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been
explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived
from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a
clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil
action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But
for the purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion
or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It
will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the
indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner
was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al.
vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from
defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living
and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally
prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant
through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above
grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments
therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE;
and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS
GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in
Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the
decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so,
when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the
appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was
not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the
time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally
married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of
fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that
case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized
civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also
under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that
case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it
was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and
not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the
death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasidelito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued
for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V.
House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because
of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are
announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902
to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil
liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,

disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which
can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to
the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action
for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime,
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed
by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902
et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better
safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the
concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary
acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to
fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra,
which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of
Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of
the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother
and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana orquasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the
Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the
Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes
acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said
Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived fromquasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions
of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code
provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his
father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence
from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a
situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending
child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing
damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may
not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter
into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it
that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property
which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion.
Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.
Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about
construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed
in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the
separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule
111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with
modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do
hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea
thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling
that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am.
Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea
thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling
that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am.
Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).

Sec. 8 (I) ". . . The registration fees provided in this Act for trucks may be payable in two equal installments, the first to be paid on or
before the last working day of February, and the second to be paid on or before the last working day of August. (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 6 (b) "The date of cancellation of the postage stamps of envelopes containing money orders, checks, or cash shall be considered as
the date of application. . . .

G.R. No. L-14858 December 29, 1960


MARIANO S. GONZAGA, petitioner-appellee, vs. AUGUSTO CE DAVID, as Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Cagayan,
respondent-appellant.
Office of the Asst. Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor E. D. Ignacio for appellant. Ventura V. Perez for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The essential antecedents of this case are not disputed. On February, 1957, Mariano Gonzaga, as owner, registered with the Motor
Vehicles Office a cargo truck and a passenger bus, paying the first installment for registration fees due on said vehicles for 1957. To cover
the second installment for registration fees, Gonzaga remitted to the Provincial Treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, P500.00, under
postal money orders Nos. 18553, 18554 and 18555, purchased from and issued by the Post Office of Camalaniugan, Cagayan. The postal
cancellation mark on the envelope containing the remittance of Gonzaga bears the date August 31, 1957; so does the postal cancellation
mark on the face of the money orders.
The Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of Cagayan ruled that pursuant to Section 8 (1), Act 3992, otherwise known as the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, the second installment for registration fees was payable on or before the last working day of August; that the last
working day of August, 1957 was Friday, August 30, 1957; that consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga bearing postal cancellation mark
dated August 31, 1957 was made beyond the time fixed by law. Accordingly, said official sought to impose a 50% delinquency penalty, or
otherwise, threatened to confiscate the certificate of registration for the two trucks (Annexes "B" & "C").lawphil.net
Gonzaga brought this action in the Court of First Instance, which, upon a stipulation of facts, rendered judgment, the dispositive part
reading
POR TANTO, el Juzgado dicta decision declarando, como por la presente declara, que el pago hecho con los giros postales Nos. 18553,
18554 y 18555, por el recurrente, se ha hecho dentro del plazo fijado por ley; y, por tanto, el recurrente no ha incurrido con morosidad en
cuanto a dicho pago.
Se ordena al recurrido, sus agentes y representantes, que se abstengan de confiscar el certificado de registro de los dos trucks del
recurrente, por la alegada morosidad del citado pago.
Sin costas.
ASI SE ORDENA.
The only issue in this appeal is whether the remittance of petitioner-appellee covering the second installment of registration fees for 1957,
made by registered mail with postal cancellation dated August 31, 1957, was within the time fixed by law.
The following are the pertinent provisions of Act 3992 as amended

In support of its contention that August 30, and not August 31, was the last working day of August, 1957, respondent-appellant invokes
Republic Act No. 1880, otherwise known as the "40-Hour Week Law", pursuant to which government offices are to hold office from
Monday to Friday only, unless one of those expressly exempted therefrom.
As correctly held by the court below, the fact that pursuant to Republic Act 1880, the Motor Vehicles Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, had
no office on Saturday, Aug. 31, 1957, is immaterial in the case. The last working day contemplated in Sec. 8(I) of Act 3992 as amended
should not necessarily mean the last working day for Motor Vehicle Office. Under Sec. 6(b) of said Act, providing for payment of
registration fees by mail, the date of cancellation of the postage stamps of the envelope containing the remittance is considered the date
of application. Consequently, where the manner of payment falls under said Section 6(b), the law, in recognizing the date of cancellation
as the date of application, impliedly permits of a remittance or payment within that last day of August that the Post Office may still effect
cancellation; and the remittance, in fact, bears a postal cancellation, dated August 31, 1957. Moreover, it is not pretended by respondentappellant that the Post Office ceased or has ceased to transact business and discharge its functions on Saturdays by reason alone of
Republic Act No. 1880. Clearly, therefore,the remittance by petitioner-appellee was within the by law, as provided in Section 8 (I), in
connection with Section 6 (b) of Act 3992, as amended.lawphil.net
The fact that August 31, 1957 was declared a special public holiday by Proclamation No. 437 (dated August 21, 1957) of the President of
the Philippines did not have the effect of making the preceding day, August 30, the last day for paying registration fees without penalty. On
the contrary, Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code provides
Sec. 31. Pretermission of holiday. Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the
act may be done the next succeeding business day.
In Calano vs. Cruz, 91 Phil., 247, we ruled as follows:
The complaint filed by the petitioner herein was presented in the court a quo on November 23, 1951, exactly on the eight day after the
proclamation of the respondent as duly elected councilor for the Municipality of Orion, Bataan. It happens, however, that November 22,
1951, the last day of the seven-day period prescribed by Section 173 of the Revised Election Code, was declared a "Special Public
Holiday For National Thanksgiving" by Proclamation No. 290, series of 1951, of the President of the Philippines. The trial court held that
the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 28 of the Rules of Court could not be applied to the case at bar because it is an election case (Rule
132, Rules of Court), and declared that the complaint was filed outside of the period provided for by law. Assuming that Section 1 of Rule
28 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, the law applicable is Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides that "Where
the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding
business day." The court a quo, therefore, committed an error in declaring that the complaint was filed out of time.
The ruling is on all fours on the issue before us, and against respondent-appellant.
The decision appealed from is affirmed. Without costs..
Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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