Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978
CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA, MANOLITO VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA, NAPOLEON
VIRATA, ARACELY VIRATA, ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA, PACITA VIRATA, and
EVANGELINA VIRATA, petitioners,
vs.
VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, 7th
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH V, stationed at BACOOR, CAVITE, respondents.
Remulla, Estrella & Associates for petitioners
Exequil C. Masangkay for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in
Civil Case No. B-134 granting the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. 1
The record shows that on September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been
bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo
Borilla and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla is the employer of Ochoa; that for
the death of Arsenio Virata, a action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted on
September 25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City,
docketed as C Case No. 3162-P of said court; that at the hearing of the said criminal case on
December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a
separate civil action for damages against the driver on his criminal liability; that on February 19,
1976 Atty. Julio Francisco filed a motion in said c case to withdraw the reservation to file a separate
civil action; that thereafter, the private prosecutor actively participated in the trial and presented
evidence on the damages; that on June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their
right to institute a separate civil action; that on July 19, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio Virata, petitioners
herein, commenced Civil No. B-134 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor, Branch V, for
damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the registered owner of the
jeepney, Victorio Ochoa; that on August 13, 1976 the defendants, private respondents filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that there is another action, Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between
the same parties for the same cause; that on September 8, 1976 the Court of First Instance of Rizal
at Pasay City a decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting the accused Maximo Borilla on the

ground that he caused an injury by name accident; and that on January 31, 1977, the Court of First
Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to Civil Case No. B-134 for damages. 2
The principal issue is weather or not the of the Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for the
damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner,
respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata.
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the
Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same
negligent act.
The Supreme Court has held that:
According to the Code Commission: 'The foregoing provision (Article 2177) though at
first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a 'culpa aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or quasi-delito
has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist.
Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due
to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bocobo about construction that upholds
'the spirit that given life' rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the
lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the
preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed
by Article 100 of the Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections
2 and 3(c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is 'more congruent'
with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress',
to borrow the felicitous language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. to
359, to hod as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault covers not only
acts 'not punishable by law' but also criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or consequently, a separate civil action lies against the in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty and acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to
the bigger award of the, two assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In

other words the extinction of civil liability refereed to in Par. (c) of Section 13, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Brief stated, We hold, in reitration of Garcia, that culpa aquilina includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 3
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case
No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil
action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasidelict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P
is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict The
source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 isquasi-delict, not an act or
omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and
an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.
Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, Civil Case No. B-134, they have
only to establish their cause of action by preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside and Civil Case No. B-134 is
reinstated and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66274 September 30, 1984
BAGUMBAYAN CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, LELISA SEA and ARTURO SEA respondents.
De Santos, Balgos & Perez Law Office for petitioner.
Quiason, Ermitano, Makalintal & Barot Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the customer's claims for moral and exemplary damages due to the alleged
negligence of a waiter. The spouses Lelisa Sea and Arturo Sea and their four children went to the
Tropical Palace Hotel, Paraaque, Metro Manila in the evening of December 20, 1976 to see the
Reycard Duet Show they occupied a table and ordered drinks before the show the hall was crowded
and as anyone who attended such show can attest, excitement and confusion prevailed (8, 40-41
tsn, January 19, 1978).
Lelisa's version was that when a waiter named Baez was going to serve the tray containing the
drinks was overturned and fell on her. She was drenched. Later, she felt some chill. The drinks and
the splinters from the broken glasses allegedly destroyed her dress which, with her handbag and
shoes, cost one thousand pesos (32-33 tsn November 29, 1977).
She was shocked. She sensed that some persons were laughing at or pitying her. Lawyer Francisco
Gatchalian, who was at the same table, commented that it was one of those unavoidable things (24
tsn November 29, 1977).
A waitress took Lelisa to the ladies' room. She had to remove her dress and underwear which were
wet She was not given any towel to cover herself. She remained standing as there was no chair (2728 tsn). Two of her daughters followed her to the ladies' room (31 tsn). She returned to the hag after
about thirty minutes later when the show had started (28, 5152 tsn). The lower court erred in
concluding that she missed the show.
Lelisa testified that she was claiming moral damages of P100,000 for herself and her husband due
toembarrassment and the fact that the management did not even offer any apology on that night (3437 tsn). She was claiming exemplary damages in the same amount to teach the management a
lesson. The husband, Arturo Seta, testified that the incident infuriated him. There was no apology
from the management.
Rudy Tanchanco, the food and beverage manager, was one of three persons in charge of the show.
He testified that the admission was on a "first come, first served" basis. An the waiters
were extras performing under twelve supervisors. In open court, Tanchanco apologized to the
plaintiffs in behalf of the management for the inconvenience caused to them, meaning that the
management was sorry for what happened to Mrs. Seta (38-39 February 27, 1978).
The Seas sued the corporation, as employer of the waiter, for actual damages of P200,000 plus
attorney's fees of P10,000 and such moral and exemplary damages as might be fixed by the court.
The action involves a quasi-delict. It was based on articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
The corporation in its answer alleged that it came to know of the incident only when it was served
with summons. Had the incident been brought to its attention on that same night, it would have
apologized immediately to the plaintiffs, made appropriate amends and taken steps to discipline the
waiter and his supervisor.

In fact, in its answer it apologized to the plaintiffs. It labelled the incident as a fortuitous event. It
alleged that it observed diligentissimi patris-familias to prevent the damage. It reiterated that it was
sorry for what had happened. It manifested its desire to make the proper amends in any reasonable
manner or form.
After hearing, the trial court awarded the Seas P1,540 as actual damages consisting of the value of
Mrs. Sea's outfit and P540, the cost of the six tickets used by the Sea family which was
considered a loss because of their alleged failure to enjoy the show. It also awarded the Seas
P50,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as exemplary damages and P5,000 as attorney's fees.
The corporation appealed. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the judgment with the
modification that the moral and exemplary damages were reduced to P15,000 and P5,000,
respectively. Hence, this appeal.
The trial court sensibly noted that court action could have been avoided had the matter been taken
up directly with the corporation before the action was filed. No extrajudicial demand preceded the
action.
While the award for actual damages has some basis, the grant of moral and exemplary damages is
devoid of legal justification because it was not predicated upon any of the cases enumerated in the
Civil Code (Ventanina vs. Centeno, 110 Phil. 811, 816). The Civil Code provides:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission.
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3
of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
The instant case is not specifically mentioned in article 2219 which refers to quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries. The Appellate Court erred in considering it as analogous to the cases mentioned
therein without indicating what specific case the instant case resembles or is analogous to. For
example, an unfounded complaint with a baseless imputation of forgery is analogous to defamation
mentioned in article 2219 (7). It justified an award of P2,000 as moral damages (Justiva vs. Gustilo,
117 Phil. 71).
Generally, there can be no recovery of moral damages if the case is not mentioned in articles 2219
and 2220 (Malonzo vs. Galang, 109 Phil. 16; Ventanilla vs. Centeno, 110 Phil. 811).
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory
damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S.
815).
"Mental suffering means distress or serious pain as distinguished from annoyance, regret or
vexation. Mental anguish is intense mental suffering" (Johnson vs. Western Union Telegraph Co., 81
S.C. 235, 238, 62 SE 244, Note 35, 17 C.J. 829.)
"Generally, damages for mental anguish are limited to cases in which there has been a personal
physical injury or where the defendant wilfully, wantonly, recklessly, or intentionally caused the
mental anguish (22 Am Jur 2nd 275). "Nor will damages generally be awarded for mental anguish
which is not accompanied by a physical injury, at least where maliciousness, wantonness, or
intentional conduct is not involved" (22 Am Jur 2nd 276).
"Damages for mental anguish and suffering have been held recoverable where the act complained
of was done with such gross carelessness or recklessness as to show an utter indifference to the
consequences" (25 C.J.S. 820).
"Under Ohio law, damages for emotional distress consisting of embarrassment and mental suffering
and dire threats, are not recoverable unless intentionally caused" (Parmelee vs. E.A. Ackerman 252
Fed. 2nd 721).

In Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry Co. vs. Caple, 179 S.W. 2nd 151, it was held that where the act is wanton or
willful there may be a recovery for humiliation and mental suffering without any physical injury. It was
further held that in negligence cases, where there is no willful or wanton wrong, there can be no
recovery for mental suffering unless there is also physical injury.
We hold that the "embarrassment" to which Mrs. Sea was exposed by the incident is not the mental
anguish contemplated in article 2217 for which moral damages can be recovered.
Parenthetically, the case of People vs. Plaza, CA 52 OG 6609, 6612, a case decided by Justice
Sanchez, may be cited. In that case, Genoveva de Soriano was a passenger in a riverboat which
was bumped by another boat manned by Berchman Plaza and caused the first boat to capsize and
sink but did not drown Genoveva. She did not know how to swim Her life was endangered. She
suffered fright and mental anguish during those moments when her fate was uncertain. Her claim for
P500 as moral damages was not allowed.
In this case, it would not be just and proper to include moral damages in the corporation's vicarious
liability as employer. The award of P5,000 as exemplary or corrective damages cannot also be
sustained because there was no gross negligence in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is modified. The petitioner is ordered to pay
Lelisa Sea the sum of P5,000 to cover her actual damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
The award of moral and exemplary damages is eliminated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.
Guerrero, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The Sea's claim for excessive damages could have been amicably settled by the trial judge. The
record does not show whether or not a pre-trial was conducted. But it must be presumed that official
duty was performed, that a pre-trial was held. Why then was not a case like this aborted? Not only
did the case go to trial but the court awarded unwarranted damages and the Intermediate Appellate
Court which should have known better compounded the error. Judges and justices of inferior courts
are enjoined to review the law on damages so that decisions like those rendered by the trial and

appellate courts shall not be repeated. With this observation, I concur in the learned ponencia of Mr.
Justice Ramon C. Aquino.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The Sea's claim for excessive damages could have been amicably settled by the trial judge. The
record does not show whether or not a pre-trial was conducted. But it must be presumed that official
duty was performed, that a pre-trial was held. Why then was not a case like this aborted? Not only
did the case go to trial but the court awarded unwarranted damages and the Intermediate Appellate
Court which should have known better compounded the error. Judges and justices of inferior courts
are enjoined to review the law on damages so that decisions like those rendered by the trial and
appellate courts shall not be repeated. With this observation, I concur in the learned ponencia of Mr.
Justice Ramon C. Aquino.