Determining safety distance in process

design
Safety distance determination is a key design issue that may have a dramatic
impact on a refinery construction project
RENATO BENINTENDI, ANGELA DEISY RODRIGUEZ GUIO and SAMUEL MARSH
Amec Foster Wheeler

n 9 July 1976, one kilogram

of 2,3,7,8 tetrachlorodibenzodioxin (TCDD) was released
through a rupture disk at the
ICMESA plant in Seveso, Italy. That
was not only the day when the
ZRUOG IDFHG IRU WKH UVW WLPH WKH
hazard of a toxic cloud potentially
spreading over the whole community, but it was also the beginning
of a huge change in the regulatory
and methodological approach to
process safety. Seveso Directives I
(1982), II (1997) and III (2012) have
introduced the concept of risk in the
industry and have addressed the
quantitative risk assessment (QRA)
approach for siting of potentially
hazardous installations.
Previously,
a
prescriptive
approach was the general method
used to manage safety and occupational aspects of the industrial
world. The methodological change
ZDV SURJUHVVLYHO\ UHHFWHG LQ DOO RI
the safety and occupational health
laws of the European Union.
Through New Approach and Global
Approach, the European Commission
in 2000 also introduced individual
responsibility for the site owner to
provably certify the acceptability of
risk. In the industrial sectors potentially affected by major hazards,
such as the oil and gas and petrochemical/chemical industries, this
process has been implemented relatively more quickly than in others,
due to the industries cultural background and their high potential
hazards. The need to minimise risk
and a progressively growing
consciousness
about
friendly
safety (Kletz, 2010) have led to the
adoption of techniques and methodologies which are capable of

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reducing post-incident measures

and able to develop increasingly
sustainable approaches because of
their inherent low hazard and
potential for harm. The key concept
of inherent safety, which had been
introduced several years earlier
(Kletz, 2010) is the limitation of
effects by changing designs or reaction conditions rather than by
adding protective equipment that
may fail or be neglected.
QRA studies in the industry have
traditionally been implemented as
separate, stand-alone tasks, often
not synchronised with design development. A possible outcome of this
for the design team is to be delayed
while implementing suitable design
and layout changes, which generDOO\UHVXOWVLQVLJQLFDQWDGGLWLRQRI
protective measures, a non-harmoQLVHG DSSURDFK D YHU\ VLJQLFDQW
impact on project cost and, last but
not least, an ineffective achievement
of safety targets. This is often the
case with plant/equipment siting.
The traditional approach consists
essentially of the adoption of
prescriptive distances, which may
in fact be unsafe, or which may lead
to the available space being used in
a less than optimised manner. Amec
Foster
Wheelers
experience
includes a long project execution
history, throughout which the
necessity to develop risk-based,
VLPSOLHG WHFKQLTXHV WR LGHQWLI\
safety distances between plant
units, between main equipment and
occupied areas, has increased in
importance. This article describes
this evolution and presents a stateof-the-art,
quantitative
risk
assessment approach to safety
distance determination.

Background of the methodology of

the separation distance assignment
Early
guidance
about
safety
distances was given by Armistead
(1952), Backurst and Harker (1973),
and Anderson (1982). In 1976, the
Dow Chemical company included
safety distances in its Fire and
Explosion
Index
(FEI)
Guide.
Developed in the 1980s, the Mond
Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index
method is an extension of the original Dow Index method. Exxon
(1998) issued some safety design
VWDQGDUGV ZKLFK VSHFLHG SUHVFULStive values for layout spacing.
Similar separation distance tables
have been given by Mecklenburgh
(1985) and Industrial Risk Insurers.
Mecklenburgh also carried out a
categorisation of the most important
hazardous scenarios to be used in
support of plant layout.
Prescriptive separation distances
for small and large tanks containing
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the Health and Safety Executive in
1998 and, for LPG, in 2013. The US
Center for Chemical Process Safety
(CCPS) (2003) has provided typical
separation distances between various elements in open-air process
facilities. These tables are based on
historical and current data from
UHQLQJ SHWURFKHPLFDO FKHPLFDO
and insurance sectors. The data
were developed based on experience and engineering judgment
and, as clearly stated in the CCPS
textbook,
not
always
on
calculations.
On the other hand, risk- and
consequence-based methods have
increased in importance and this has
EHHQSURJUHVVLYHO\UHHFWHGLQFRGHV
and standards. In 1996, the

PTQ Q1 2015 31

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Safety distance as part of

inherently safer design

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The FEATHER model

)($7+(5 )LUH ([SORVLRQ DQG

7R[LFLW\ +D]DUG (IIHFW 5HYLHZ LV D
VRIWZDUH SURJUDP GHYHORSHG E\

PTQ Q1 2015 33

Design case
Hazardous material identity

Plant units/modules
Data collection

Main process data

Main equipment/piping
Substance(s) selection

Substances and
equipment data

Equipment/pipe selection

Process data

Process and
layout data

Module(s) congestion data

Hazardous
properties

Programme substances
properties database

(LEL, ERPG,
combustion, heat...)

(thermodynamic, toxic)

Hazard intrinsic
scenario

Flammability, toxicity

Ignition sources

Multiple hazard data

(yes/no)

(flammability and toxicity)

Field hazard
process scenario

Specific data requirements

Failure data
(hole size, failure rates...)

(particular endpoints)

LPG
Outflow model

Carbon dioxide

BLEVE

Ammonia
One phase

Frequency
Safety distance

Two phase
Diked/unidiked pool fire

Jet fire

Near/medium/far-field flow

(flame length, heat, radiation)

(light/heavy gases)

Congested-space blast

Frequency

Flash fire

Toxic cloud

Vaporisation flow

Open-space blast

Safety distance

Figure 1 Flow chart of FEATHER software

Amec Foster Wheeler aimed at automatically identifying the hazard

scenarios and providing frequency
and safety distances, along with
iso-contour
diagrams.
Safety
GLVWDQFHVDUHGHQHGDVWKHGLVWDQFH
from the release or blasting (BLEVE)
VRXUFH WR D SUHGHQHG WR[LF DPmable, heat-radiation, overpressure
endpoint. This software has been
programmed in Microsoft Visual
Basic and incorporates APIs physical-chemical
database
and

34 PTQ Q1 2015

WR[LFRORJLFDO GDWDEDVH 1,26+

26+$ )($7+(5 VWHSV DUH LOOXVtrated in Figure 1, where the light
EHLJH ER[HV UHSUHVHQW LQSXW GDWD
DQG WKH GDUN EHLJH ER[HV UHSUHVHQW
the output data or intermediate data
automatically
calculated
or
uploaded by the software.

along with the

hazard scenarios.

corresponding

Flow models

&KRNHGQRQFKRNHG DOOJDV RZV

are calculated according to adiabaWLF RXWRZ IRUPXODV 7ZRSKDVH
RZV DUH GHVFULEHG DVVXPLQJ
liquid state at the outlet because the
Chemical substances
Fauske and Epstein critical length
+\GURFDUERQV IURP PHWKDQH WR (1988) for phase transition is not
octane, crude oil, hydrogen, carbon H[FHHGHG $OO OLTXLG RZ LV FDOFXGLR[LGH DQG DPPRQLD DUH FRYHUHG lated through Torricellis formula.

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Dispersion

200

9HKPH[P]LZHML[`KPZ[HUJLT

Dispersion modelling has been

approached by tuning a blending of
sequential models, taking into
account the initial jet momentum/
DLU HQWUDLQPHQW LQ WKH QHDU HOG
%HQLQWHQGLWKHXLGPROHFXODU ZHLJKW LQ WKH PHGLXP HOG
(Britter and McQuaid, 1988), and the
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Wind and Pasquill weather categories data are selected by the user.

PHAST
FEATHER

180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

Pool evaporation and stripping

Hazard scenarios
Hazard scenarios are automatically
LGHQWLHGE\WKHVRIWZDUHEDVHGRQ
the characteristics of the substances.

100

200

300

7YLZZ\YLIHYN
Figure 2 Propane jet fire; comparison of FEATHER vs PHAST

45

9HKPH[P]LZHML[`KPZ[HUJLT

MacKay and Matsugus (1987)

formula has been adopted because
of its validation against experiments. For crude oil, gasolines,
diesels and kerosenes, the Reid
vapour pressure can be used to
estimate the mass of vapour evaporating from the liquid. It has been
assumed that all of the toxic gas is
stripped from the liquid in order to
be conservative. Once this mass of
toxic vapour is known, dispersion
models have been applied.

PHAST
FEATHER

40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
10

20

30

40

50

60

80000

100000

7VVSKPHTL[LYT

Pool fire

Jet fire

Flame dimensions and the radiative

X[FDOFXODWLRQKDYHEHHQPRGHOOHG
according to TNO (2005). A light or
VRRW\DPHRSWLRQFDQEHVHOHFWHG
Flash fire and toxic release

)ODVK UH KDV EHHQ PRGHOOHG

considering
the
distance
to
substance lower explosive limits.
This is conservative and reasonable.
Therefore, toxic release has been
modelled in the same way, just
UHSODFLQJWKHVSHFLFHQGSRLQW
Open space explosion

The TNT method has been selected

for modelling open space explosion. Despite the claimed poor
accuracy stated in the literature,

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Figure 3 Heptane pool fire; comparison of FEATHER vs PHAST

350

Radiative safety distance, m

%RWK GLNHG DQG XQGLNHG SRRO UHV

have been modelled. The evaporation effect has been considered
according to the methodology
outlined above. The TNO (2005)
model has been adopted.

PHAST
FEATHER

300
250
200
150
100
50
0
0

20000

40000

60000

0UP[PHSMSHTTHISLTHZZRN

Figure 4 Fireball; comparison of FEATHER vs PHAST

comparison with DNV PHAST has

shown very good results.
Congested space explosion

Explosion

in

congested

space

(module and units) has been

modelled according to the method
provided by Puttock. The user is
requested to provide geometrical
and congestion data. The software

PTQ Q1 2015 35

Comparison of FEATHER distances (to 8 kw/m2) with tabulated (prescriptive)

distances: jet fire and fireball
Distance from
To
To
To
To
To
To

Pipe rack

Assumed operating
pressure bar, g

Heat exchanger
Columns, accumulators, drums
Rundown tanks
Moderate hazard reactors
Intermediate hazard reactors
High hazard reactors

20

Distance
FEATHER, m

90 (jet fire)
150 300 (fireball)

Distance
tables, m
10
10
100
10
15
25

Table 1
Comparison of FEATHER distances (to 8 kw/m2) with tabulated (prescriptive)
distances: pool fire
Distance from
To
To
To
To
To
To

Intermediate
hazard pumps
Columns, accumulators, drums
Pipe racks
Heat exchangers
Moderate hazard reactors
Intermediate hazard reactors
High hazard reactors

Assumed
substance

Distance
FEATHER, m

Heptane

1535

Distance
tables, m
10
10
15
10
10
10

Table 2

automatically calculates whether a

DPPDEOH DWPRVSKHUH UHDFKHV WKH
module/unit and assumes that
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reasonable
and
conservative
hypothesis.
BLEVE

BLEVE has been modelled according to the method provided by

CCPS.

Accuracy and validity

FEATHER works according to the
H[FHHGDQFH FULWHULRQ IRU LGHQWLI\LQJ
VLJQLFDQW
KD]DUG
VFHQDULRV
Typically, a frequency of 10-4/yr is
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which can be changed. Accordingly,
a dual option has been implemented, which allows for the
provision of the iso-contours for the
VLJQLFDQW VFHQDULRV RQO\ RU IRU DOO
of the possible incidents. The softZDUH QGLQJV KDYH EHHQ FRPSDUHG
with DNV PHAST results. Some
H[DPSOHV KDYH EHHQ LQFOXGHG LQ
Figures 2, 3 and 4, and in Tables 1
and 2, showing the calculation of
distances to acceptable radiation
OHYHOVIRUSURSDQHMHWUHVRIGLIIHULQJ SUHVVXUHV KHSWDQH SRRO UHV RI
GLIIHULQJ SRRO GLDPHWHUV DQG UHEDOOV RI GLIIHULQJ LQLWLDO DPPDEOH
masses. The comparability is also

36 PTQ Q1 2015

very good within the sensitivity

analysis results. The software is not
intended to replace validated software adopted in QRA and
consequence assessment studies.
Nevertheless, it can be considered a
XVHIXO DQG H[LEOH WRRO IRU YHULFDtion of initial equipment spacing.

Conclusion
Amec Foster Wheeler is implementing a risk-based approach to safety
distance determination early in the
design of process plant. Spacing of
equipment and separation distance
LGHQWLFDWLRQ LV D PDMRU LVVXH ZKLFK
has been traditionally approached
by means of prescriptive distances,
EDVHG RQ VWDWLVWLFDO GDWD $ VSHFLF
risk-based methodology has been
used and software has been developed, which includes and integrates
validated models and provides
satisfactory predictive results in
terms of frequency and safety
distances. The method is considered
a step forward in the implementation of inherently safer design.
Based on a paper presented at the IChemE
HAZARDS 24 Conference, Edinburgh, 7-9 May
2014.
Further reading
1 Armistead G, Safety in Petroleum Refining

and Related Industries, John G Simmonds & Co,

Inc., New York, 1952.
2 Anderson F V, Plant Layout In: Kirk R E,
Othmer D F, 1982, op. cit., vol. 18, 23.
3 Backhurst J R, Harker J H, Process plant
design, American Elsevier, New York, 1973.
4 Benintendi R, Turbulent jet modelling for
hazardous area classification, Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries, 2010, vol
23, issue 3, 373378.
5 Britter R E, McQuaid J, Workbook on the
Dispersion of Dense Gases, HSE Contract
Research Report No. 1.7, 1988.
6 Cox A W, Lees F P, Ang M L, Classification of
Hazardous Locations, IChemE, 1993.
7 Crowl D, Louvar J, Chemical process safety
- Fundamentals with applications, New Jersey,
Prentice Hall PTR, 2002.
8 Fauske H K, Epstein M, Source term
considerations in connection with chemical
accidents and vapour cloud modelling, Journal
of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, vol
1, April1988.
9 Ivings M J, Clarke S, Gant S E, Fletcher B,
Heather A, Pocock D J, Pritchard D K, Santon R,
Saunders C J, Area Classification for secondary
releases from low pressure natural gas
systems, Health and Safety Executive Research
Report RR630, 2008.
10 Kletz T, Amyotte P, Process Plants: A
Handbook for Inherently Safer Design, CRC
Press Taylor & Francis Group, 2010.
11 Kawamura P I, MacKay D, The Evaporation
of volatile liquids, J. of Hazardous Materials,
1987, 15, 365-376.
12 Kletz T, Amyotte P, Process plants: A
Handbook for Inherently Safer Design, 2nd ed,
CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group, 2010.
13 Marsh S, Guidelines for the determination
of safety distances with respect to fire,
explosion and toxic hazards, Foster Wheeler,
2013.
14 Mecklenburgh J C, Process Plant Layout,
John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1985.
15 TNO, Method for the Calculation of Physical
Effects (Yellow Book), Ed: van den Bosch C J H,
Weterings R A P M, 2005.
Renato Benintendi is Principal Consultant,
Loss Prevention with Amec Foster Wheeler,
Reading, UK. He holds an advanced degree in
chemical engineering from the University of
Naples, Italy, as well as a masters degree in
environmental and safety engineering.
Angela D Rodriguez Guio is a Senior Process
Safety Engineer. She holds a bachelors degree
in chemical engineering from Universidad
Nacional de Colombia, a postgraduate degree
in occupational health and safety from
the Universidad Distrital Francisco Jose de
Caldas and an MSc in process safety and loss
prevention from the University of Sheffield, UK.
Samuel Marsh is a Process Engineer with Amec
Foster Wheeler. He holds a masters degree in
chemical engineering from the University of
Manchester, UK.

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