6.7 Pipeline Material Selection Corrosion Protection and Monitoring Philosophy PDF

KCP-GNS-PLD-DPR-0002
Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project
Page 1 of 13
Document Title: Pipeline Material Selection, Corrosion Protection and Monitoring Philosophy
Pipeline Material Selection, Corrosion Protection and

Monitoring Philosophy
Table of Contents
1
SCOPE AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ...................................... 3

1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
ASSUMPTIONS ....................................................................................... 5
2.1
SCOPE OF DOCUMENT .................................................................................... 3

DEFINITIONS................................................................................................... 3
ABBREVIATIONS.............................................................................................. 4
SYSTEM OF UNITS .......................................................................................... 4
GENERAL ....................................................................................................... 5
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................... 6

3.1
INTERNAL CORROSION.................................................................................... 6
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
LINEPIPE MATERIAL ........................................................................................ 9

CORROSION RESISTANT ALLOYS ..................................................................... 9
NON-METALLIC MATERIALS............................................................................. 9
EXTERNAL CORROSION PROTECTION .............................................................. 9
CONDITION MONITORING .............................................................................. 10
LOW PIPELINE TEMPERATURES ..................................................................... 10
PROPAGATING FRACTURE HOLD 3 ............................................................... 10
MANDATORY REFERENCES ............................................................... 11

4.1
4.2
4.3
Hydro-Testing .................................................................................................... 7
Operation-CO2 Corrosion ................................................................................... 7
Mothballing-MIC ........................................................................................................... 8
REGULATIONS AND STATUTES....................................................................... 11

PROJECT DOCUMENTATION .......................................................................... 12
DESIGN CODES ............................................................................................ 12
SUPPORTING REFERENCES............................................................... 13
5.1
5.2
PROJECT DOCUMENTATION .......................................................................... 13

DESIGN CODES ............................................................................................ 13
Table of Figures
Figure 1-1: Outline System Schematic.................................................................. 3
Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

The information contained in this document (the Information) is provided in good faith.
E.ON UK plc, its subcontractors, subsidiaries, affiliates, employees, advisers, and the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) make no
representation or warranty as to the accuracy, reliability or completeness of the Information and neither E.ON UK plc nor any of its subcontractors,
subsidiaries, affiliates, employees, advisers or DECC shall have any liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss howsoever arising from the use of the
Information by any party.
Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Page 2 of 13
Table of Holds
HOLD No.
Description
Section
FEED Full system commissioning philosophy document

No.
4.2
Low Pipeline Temperatures
3.7
Propagating fracture
3.8

Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Page 3 of 13
SCOPE AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
1.1
Scope of Document
This document presents the design philosophy, assumptions and design guidelines to be developed
during FEED for the material selection, corrosion protection and monitoring of the CO2 pipeline from
the Kingsnorth Power Station to the Hewett field. Figure 1-1 is an outline schematic of the overall
system.
The limits for the application of this document are defined as follows:
Kingsnorth pipeline ESD valve;
Riser ESDV at Hewett platform topsides.
Figure 1-1: Outline System Schematic
1.2
Definitions
COMPANY
E.ON UK or its nominated representative.
CONTRACTOR
The companies designated on the purchase order form

as being the selected Contractor of materials and
services.
WORK
The task, process or operation being conducted by the

CONTRACTOR on any tier on behalf of COMPANY.
Shall
Indicates mandatory requirement
Should
Indicates preferred course of action
May
Indicates optional course of action

Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Page 4 of 13
1.3
Abbreviations
BLEVE
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
BS
British Standard
CMP
Corrosion Management Programme
DNV
Det Norske Veritas
FEED
Front End Engineering Design
FGD
Flue gas desulfurization
FJC
Field Joint Coating
HSE
Health and Safety Executive
IID
Intelligent pipeline Inspection Devices
IVI
Internal Visual Inspection
ISO
International Standardisation Organisation
MIC
Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion
MMscmd
Million Standard Cubic Metre per Day
Mt
Million Tonnes
N/A
Not Applicable
NII
Non-Intrusive Inspection
NPS
Nominal Pipe Size
ppbv
Parts Per Billion by Volume
ppmv
Parts Per Million by Volume
PWA
Pipeline Works Authorisation
PWHT
Post-Weld Heat Treatment
SI
System International
SRB
Sulphate Reducing Bacteria
1.4
System of Units
Units to be used throughout the FEED design are defined in ref. [M29], Overall Project Units.
During the injection and production regimes, the CO2 may exist in the gas, liquid or dense phases
with varying densities. As a result, the flow rate in this report is given in tonne/day and Mt/year (as
opposed to MMscmd). Specific assumptions made to adapt this mass flow rate to its equivalent
volume flow rate will be clearly stated in the relevant reports.

Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Page 5 of 13
2
2.1
ASSUMPTIONS
General
The following assumptions have been made:
Pipeline will be required to cater for both gas and dense phase flow;
Dryness spec is 24 ppmv with 100 ppmv for short, upset conditions to ensure that liquid
water will not dropout in the line resulting in corrosion. This figure is the minimum
requirement and may change during FEED 1A. However, the gas specification delivered to
the pipeline will ensure that no free water or hydrate potential will exist in the pipeline or CO2
transport system;
Standard conditions that will govern the design flowrate are assumed as 1.01325 bara, and
15 C;
It is assumed that the pipeline system will have a design life of 40 years.

Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Page 6 of 13
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
3.1
Internal Corrosion
With respect to internal corrosion, the initial design basis is that CO2 gas will be dehydrated to a level
where condensation is avoided, otherwise severe corrosion problems would be expected even
without the presence of oxygen 1 . If the oxygen level is reduced to 50 ppbv or less, as a result
general O2 corrosion cant occur.
The anticipated high concentrations of CO2 (99.6 mol %) will give significant corrosion problems with
carbon steel if there is liquid water present. Initial estimates have put the potential oxygen level in the
CO2 to be as high as 200ppmv which also suggests high corrosion potential. However, as with CO2,
if there is no liquid water present then no corrosion can occur.
Clearly avoiding free water in the system is critical to avoid corrosion. The dryness spec detailed in
Section 2.1 is an extreme case requirement to avoid hydrates at the offshore choke, and that
temporary higher water content may be completely acceptable in the pipeline, subject to confirmation
during FEED 2.
As a result, the control and instrumentation system will be designed to monitor the water content of
the export CO2 and will shut down export if the water content exceeds permissible levels. The
possible responses to a "high water content" observation in the pipeline may be to set an alarm and
require operator action. During FEED 2 consideration will be given to the need for oxygen stripping
(or injecting scavengers) at Kingsnorth for planned shutdown activities.
In the absence of production pressure and temperature profiles a preliminary corrosion allowance of
1.5mm may be assumed (for delivery/construction and upset conditions), as there should be no
corrosion during operation. This assumption shall be validated during FEED 2, in particular due to 40
year design life.
The potential internal corrosion threats and their means of control are summarized in Table 3.1.1-a.
Corrosion
Threat
Control
Control Management
Oxygen
corrosion
Oxygen scavenger
Hydro-test water quality
Water quality specification
MIC
Biocides
Operation
CO2 corrosion
O2 corrosion
Dewatering
Dehydrating
Corrosion monitoring
Gas dryness
Inspection
Upset
conditions
CO2 corrosion
Corrosion allowance
Corrosion monitoring
Inspection
Mothballing
MIC
Biocides
Sampling
Analysis
Phase
Hydrotesting
Table 3.1.1-a Internal Corrosion Threats
Similar work is required to determine the impact of SOX, NOX and H2S. It is presumed that the
FGD plant will remove these to the required level.

Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Page 7 of 13
3.1.1
Hydro-Testing
3.1.1.1
Oxygen Corrosion
Oxygen corrosion poses a negligible risk to the pipeline during hydro-testing. If it is

assumed that the hydro-test medium is seawater, with a dissolved oxygen content of 8-10
mg/l, then the total wall thickness loss due to the reduction of all the contained oxygen
would be less than 10-3 mm. Nevertheless, even this low level of corrosion threat may be
eliminated by treating the hydro-test water with an oxygen scavenger such as ammonium
bisulphite.
Potable water may however be adopted for hydrotesting. This will be confirmed during
FEED 2.
3.1.1.2
MIC
Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) is a greater potential threat than oxygen

corrosion during hydro-testing. This is because natural seawater contains multitudinous
micro-organisms, including sulphate reducing bacteria (SRB) which are the species
frequently implicated in MIC. SRB are obligate anaerobes. That is to say that they do not
metabolize in aerated seawater. However, seawater will contain SRB spores, and these
may become active if anaerobic conditions developed during hydro-test, for example due to
the application of oxygen scavengers.
It is most improbable that MIC could develop to any noticeable extent during the time the
pipe remains filled with hydro-test medium (less than 6 months). However, there is a risk
that the introduction of SRB, combined with biofilm development during hydro-testing, will
result in incipient MIC. This would continue to develop during the operational life.
Thus, it is recommended that the hydro-test medium is dosed with a combination of oxygen
scavenger and biocide. It is further advised that the length of time that the hydro-test
medium is contained within the pipelines is kept to a minimum.
Although potable water may be used as the hydrotest medium (to be confirmed during
FEED 2) dosing will still be required to cater for small quantities of seawater introduced
during tie-in activities.
3.1.2
Operation-CO2 Corrosion
3.1.2.1
Risks
CO2 corrosion of carbon steel is the dominant threat to the integrity of the pipeline over its
operational life-time. The material selection made during the conceptual phase, ref. [S1], is
made on the basis of the susceptibility of carbon steel to CO2 corrosion.
3.1.2.2
Management
Corrosion management is that part of the overall management system, which is concerned
with the development, implementation, review and maintenance of the corrosion strategy.
The corrosion strategy provides a structured framework for identification of risks associated
with corrosion, and the development and operation of suitable risk control measures.
It is stressed that the development of the CMP will need to progress in parallel with the
design of the project.
Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Page 8 of 13
A Corrosion Assessment needs to be performed as the fluid composition data or projected
operating conditions for the line are confirmed.
A well designed and implemented CMP will pay dividends in terms of the integrity of the
line.
3.1.2.3
Corrosion Monitoring
A number of corrosion monitoring probes are likely to be installed immediately upstream

and downstream of the pipeline system at accessible locations. In-line corrosion spools
may also be considered. Coupons are expected to provide monitored information on any
reactivity between the flowing fluid and representative material samples including:
Line pipe material;

Girth weld material;
Seal materials (e.g. from valves seals).
3.1.2.4
Inspection
The pipeline system will be equipped with a pig launcher at the Kingsnorth pipeline inlet
and a receiver at the inlet to the offshore platform. These vessels will be specified to
accommodate intelligent pipeline inspection devices (IID) that will need to be designed
specifically for use in the flowing CO2 pipeline. There also may be a requirement to provide
pigging heads at the landfall location, HOLD 10.
Studies shall be carried out during FEED 2 to develop tools that will be compatible with and
reliable in the CO2 environment. The devices will be equipped with an ultrasonic inspection
tool along with other equipment and will be run frequently. The device will be designed to
seek any evidence of localised or general internal/external corrosion or damage to the pipe
wall. An operating strategy will be agreed in consultation with the suppler of the IID
inspection services during product development and this will generate recommendations
for the frequency of IID use.
The pipeline is required to undergo periodic, statutory inspection to ensure continued safe
and reliable operation. There can be significant cost advantages if inspections are
performed from the outside of the pipeline without breaking containment i.e. non-invasively.
However, there needs to be a balance between achieving these benefits and obtaining the
information required to ensure continued safe and reliable operation. While it may often be
the preferred option, Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) represents a relatively new approach by
comparison to Internal Visual Inspection (IVI) and many engineers responsible for
inspection planning have yet to build up experience with and confidence in its application.
In addition, there are a wide variety of techniques available, each with its own specific
capabilities and limitations and these require to be discussed further during later stages of
the project. For more information on NII refer to DNV-RP-G103, ref. [S13].
Refer to Full System Commissioning Philosophy, ref. [M27] for more information on
pipeline pigging philosophy.
3.1.3
Mothballing-MIC
During FEED 2 consideration will be given to the need for oxygen stripping (or injecting
scavengers) at Kingsnorth for planned shutdown activities.

Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Page 9 of 13
MIC becomes a risk for the production pipeline if SRB activity has previously been allowed
to develop in the system. If it becomes necessary to mothball a line that is already infected
with SRB then a very stringent biocide treatment package will need to be introduced.
During temporary shut downs (1-3 months) pipeline shall be filled with dry pressurised
(greater than 7 bar) CO2.
3.2
Linepipe Material
Carbon steel linepipe is the economical choice for CO2 transport. Subject to any additional
requirements such as those discussed above with respect to low temperature capability/toughness
and internal corrosion mitigation, a high strength grade of carbon steel is expected to be generally
suitable for construction of the onshore and offshore pipeline. Direct depressurisation of dense
phase could lead to temperatures lower than the minimum design temperature of carbon steel;
hence this issue will need to be addressed as part of the pipeline depressurisation/blowdown
studies.
3.3
Corrosion Resistant Alloys
Although the main pipeline is expected to be fabricated from carbon steel, there is likely to be a
requirement for corrosion resistant alloys (CRAs) at particular locations in the system, for example
valve materials, or spoolpieces subject to particularly low temperatures. Selection of suitable CRAs
shall take into consideration all relevant aspects of the service environment, including the
pre-commissioning and commissioning phases.
3.4
Non-Metallic Materials
When operating in CO2 dense phase mode, the potential for leakage leading to temperatures below
minus 70 C imposes onerous conditions on non-metallic materials such as seals. Due to liquid CO2
phase acting as a solvent swelling of elastomers may occur due to solubility/diffusion of the
pressurised CO2 into the elastomer. With dense phase CO2 explosive decompression of the
elastomer can occur if the system pressure is rapidly decreased.
All non-metallic materials shall be tested in order to validate their suitability for the CO2 service under
normal operating and transient/upset conditions.
3.5
External Corrosion Protection
The pipeline shall be protected against external corrosion using a standard anti-corrosion coating.
Insulation is not required. Where the linepipe is to be subsequently concrete coated for
hydrodynamic stability and/or protection, the anti-corrosion coating shall be compatible with the
application of the concrete weight coating.
Field joint coating (FJC) type shall be determined during FEED 2. The FJC including in-fill material
shall provide an equivalent level of corrosion protection as the parent coating.
The onshore pipeline will be cathodically protected using an impressed current system. Test posts
will be located at a nominal spacing of 1km along the entire route of the onshore section. Isolating
joints will be located at the shoreline and at Kingsnorth.
The offshore pipeline shall be cathodically protected using Al-Zn-In sacrificial bracelet anodes. The
cathodic protection design shall be primarily to DNV-RP-F103 supplemented by ISO 15589-2.
Anti-corrosion and insulation coatings and anodes shall be compatible with the design temperatures.
Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Page 10 of 13
3.6
Condition Monitoring
The main focus of monitoring will be to identify conditions that could give rise to internal and external
corrosion and to confirm that the operating conditions are being maintained in a way that corrosion is
being successfully inhibited.
The pipeline will also be monitored for leaks and a pipeline monitoring system should be considered
so that the operating conditions can be compared continuously to expected behaviour (i.e. both
simulations and historical). Particular care will be required when the system is taken from gas phase
to dense phase operation.
The pipeline will also be monitored for leaks (acoustic monitoring). The onshore section of the
pipeline will be protected from external corrosion in its buried location by appropriate coatings and/or
wrappings with holiday detection being used to confirm the coating integrity during the pipe laying
process. A cathodic protection (impressed current) system will be used to inhibit external corrosion
over the life of the onshore pipeline.
3.7
Low Pipeline Temperatures
When operating in dense phase mode, a leak from a CO2 transportation pipeline could chill the pipe
material locally and or generally (dependent upon the type of leak) to temperatures below -70 C,
and material selection will need to take this into account for fracture resistance.
DNV is in the process of organising research into this subject as part of its CO2PIPETRANS
initiative. In the event that material needs to be selected before focused research results are
available, E.ON will make a selection based on advice from a number of pipe mills and fabricators
that will be reviewed by E.ON and its advisors. The recommendations and decisions will be made in
consultation with the HSE. HOLD 2
3.8
Propagating Fracture HOLD 3
Propagating fractures in pipelines may potentially initiate at sites where an initial flaw, most often the
result of corrosion or impact damage has exceeded the critical length or crack tip opening
displacement. Due to the phase change that occurs at the release point of a CO2 pipeline, the
depressurization may be relatively slow therefore indicating that the distance a ductile failure may
run before it arrests may be significant.
Should a pipeline propagating fracture occur, the contents of a pipeline can be released within a very
short period. Consequently, current CO2 pipelines are fitted with mechanical crack arrestors to
address this issue; however fracture propagation control could also potentially be addressed by
increased linepipe toughness and thickness. This feature of CO2 pipeline design shall be addressed
during FEED 2.

Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Page 11 of 13
MANDATORY REFERENCES
4.1
Regulations and Statutes
Pipeline construction and burial requirements shall comply with all related directives from the
appropriate Port Authorities and Councils. In addition, the following acts and regulations shall be
complied with:
[M1]
Construction (Design & Management) Regulations 2007;
[M2]
Coast Protection Act 1974;
[M3]
Construction (Design & Management) Regulations 2007;
[M4]
Continental Shelf Act 1964;
[M5]
Environmental Protection Act 1990;
[M6]
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974;
[M7]
Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005;
[M8]
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc.) Regulations 1996;
[M9]
Offshore Petroleum Production and Pipelines (Assessment of Environmental Effects)

Regulations 1999;
[M10]
Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996;
[M11]
The Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 1994 (SI 1994
No. 3247);
[M12]
Pressure Equipment Regulations 1996.
Pipeline Works Authorisation shall comply with all related Pipeline Inspectorate (Department of
Energy) directives. In addition, the following guidelines and regulations shall be complied with:
[M13]
Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), Petroleum Act 1998:
Offshore Pipelines, Guidelines for the completion of pipeline works authorisations (PWA's);
[M14]
EIA Offshore Petroleum Production and Pipe-lines (Assessment of Environmental Effects)

(Amendment) Regulations;
[M15]
EPC-2002 The Offshore Installations (Emergency Pollution Control) Regulations;
[M16]
EU ETS-2005 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme Regulations 2005 (as

amended);
[M17]
FEPA Part II (as amended) 1985 Food and Environmental Protection Act 1985, Part II
Deposits in the Sea (as amended);
[M18]
Habitats-2001 Offshore Petroleum Activities (Conservation of Habitats) Regulations;
[M19]
OCR 2002 Offshore Chemicals Regulation;
[M20]
OPRC-1998 The Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response Co-operation

Convention) Regulations;
[M21]
PPC Offshore Combustions Installations (Prevention and Control of Pollution) (Amendment)

Regulations 2007;
[M22]
OPPC-2005 Offshore Petroleum Activities (Oil Pollution Prevention and Control)

Regulations;
[M23]
ODS-2008 The Environmental Protection (Controls on Ozone-Depleting Substances)

(Amendment) Regulations;

Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Page 12 of 13
[M24]
4.2
F-Gases 2008 The Fluorinated Greenhouse Gases Regulations 2008.
Project Documentation
[M25]
FEED Health and Safety Plan, KCP-GNS-SHE-PRO-0001;
[M26]
FEED Offshore Pipeline Design Data, KCP-GNS-PLD-DPR-0005;
[M27]
FEED Full System Commissioning Philosophy HOLD 1;
[M28]
FEED Offshore Pipeline Testing and Drying Philosophy, KCP-GNS-PLD-DPR-0003;
[M29]
FEED Overall Project Units, KCP-EEN-PCD-DPR-0001.
4.3
Design Codes
[M30]
BS PD 8010:2004 Code of Practice for Pipelines Part 1: Steel Pipelines on Land and Part 2:
Subsea Pipelines;
[M31]
DNV OS F101: 2008 Submarine Pipeline Systems;
[M32]
ASME B31.4 Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids;
[M33]
ASME B31.8 Gas Transmission & Distribution Piping Systems;
[M34]
DNV CO2 Pipeline Transmission Guidelines (CO2PIPETRANS) (In preparation);
[M35]
BS EN 14161 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries Pipeline Transportation Systems;
[M36]
DNV RP J202 Design and Operation of CO2 Pipelines.

Rev.: 05
Project Title:
Page 13 of 13
SUPPORTING REFERENCES
5.1
Project Documentation
[S1]
Kingsnorth Phase II CO2 Pipeline Project, Pipeline Design Basis, 80011-BOD-PL-001;
[S2]
Kingsnorth Phase II CO2 Pipeline Project, Transport of CO2 by Pipeline, 80011-RPT-EN-001;
[S3]
Kingsnorth Phase
80011-RPT-PL-001;
[S4]
Kingsnorth Phase II CO2 Pipeline Project, Project Summary Report, 80011-RPT-PM-003;
II
CO2
Pipeline
Project,
Offshore
Pipeline
Routing
Report,
[S5] Submission D168, Basis of Design for the Offshore Installation;

[S6] Overall Offshore Route Map Sheet 1 of 4 (General Restriction Areas), 80011-PL-3-011.
5.2
Design Codes
[S7]
BS EN ISO 16708 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries- Pipeline Transport SystemsReliability-based Limit State Methods;
[S8]
BS 7361-1:1991 Cathodic Protection. Code of Practice for land and Marine applications;
[S9]
DNV-RP-F109:2007 On-Bottom Stability Design of Submarine Pipelines;
[S10] DNV-RP-F105:2006 Free Spanning Pipelines;

[S11] DNV-RP-F103:2003 Cathodic Protection of Submarine Pipelines by Galvanic Anodes;
[S12] ISO 15589 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries-Cathodic Protection of Pipeline
Transportation Systems-Part 1: On-Land Pipelines (2003), Part 2: Offshore Pipelines (2004);
[S13] DNV-RP-G103:2007 Non-Intrusive Inspection.


6.7 Pipeline Material Selection Corrosion Protection and Monitoring Philosophy PDF

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Deskripsi Asli:

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

6.7 Pipeline Material Selection Corrosion Protection and Monitoring Philosophy PDF

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

KCP-GNS-PLD-DPR-0002

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Pipeline Material Selection, Corrosion Protection and

SCOPE AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ...................................... 3

SCOPE OF DOCUMENT .................................................................................... 3

DESIGN REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................... 6

LINEPIPE MATERIAL ........................................................................................ 9

MANDATORY REFERENCES ............................................................... 11

REGULATIONS AND STATUTES....................................................................... 11

PROJECT DOCUMENTATION .......................................................................... 13

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

FEED Full system commissioning philosophy document

Low Pipeline Temperatures

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

SCOPE AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Kingsnorth pipeline ESD valve;

Riser ESDV at Hewett platform topsides.

Figure 1-1: Outline System Schematic

E.ON UK or its nominated representative.

The companies designated on the purchase order form

The task, process or operation being conducted by the

Indicates mandatory requirement

Indicates preferred course of action

Indicates optional course of action

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion

Corrosion Management Programme

Det Norske Veritas

Front End Engineering Design

Flue gas desulfurization

Field Joint Coating

Health and Safety Executive

Intelligent pipeline Inspection Devices

Internal Visual Inspection

International Standardisation Organisation

Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion

Million Standard Cubic Metre per Day

Nominal Pipe Size

Parts Per Billion by Volume

Parts Per Million by Volume

Pipeline Works Authorisation

Post-Weld Heat Treatment

Sulphate Reducing Bacteria

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

The following assumptions have been made:

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Water quality specification

Table 3.1.1-a Internal Corrosion Threats

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Oxygen corrosion poses a negligible risk to the pipeline during hydro-testing. If it is

Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) is a greater potential threat than oxygen

A number of corrosion monitoring probes are likely to be installed immediately upstream

Line pipe material;

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Corrosion Resistant Alloys